

The Open Court.

A

WEEKLY MAGAZINE

DEVOTED TO THE WORK OF

CONCILIATING RELIGION WITH SCIENCE.

VOLUME V.

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MONEY AND ITS FUNCTIONS.

BY LYMAN J. GAGE.

BEING requested to present a popular explanation of money and its functions, I shall endeavor to avoid all technical terms and speak in the simplest manner possible. We are all deeply interested in getting a practical comprehension of what money is in its essential nature. Let us study it in the past, for the past can in all things teach us knowledge.

It is perfectly clear that, through all time, since man produced anything by his skill or industry, he has been in the habit of exchanging that portion of his labor which he did not need for his own use, for some portions more or less great of such things as other men by their skill or industry were able to produce beyond their own needs, but differing in kind from his own. These products were originally directly exchanged for each other. But it came about in the evolution of ideas, manners, and customs of all people sufficiently advanced to be called civilised or semi-civilised, that some one product of human skill or industry possessed a quicker and more universal exchangeability than any other. For it in certain quantities all men became willing to exchange whatever they had to exchange, whether the product of their labor or their labor service.

At different periods and among different people, this one peculiar thing was not constantly and everywhere the same. At one time or place it has been a beaver skin; at another time or place, shells or beads; at another, cattle or slaves; at another, iron, copper, or brass; at another, silver or gold. Now, by reason of this peculiar and universal exchangeability, the price or exchangeable power of all other commodities came to be expressed by the quantity of this one peculiar commodity for which they could be exchanged. It was natural that a name should be attached to the peculiar thing, and that name was money.

The books will give all the reasons which led to the natural selection of these various things designated as money. I shall content myself with one or two. First, and fundamentally, they were such things in their respective times and places as would universally minister to the comfort or pleasure of those who possessed them. Second, they were in their respective times and places relatively the most convenient, not

only for the purposes of universal exchange, but for preservation against further needs. It has been by the free play of human choice, ending in a consensus of action, that money has been thus evolved, never by conventional agreements made in advance.

In modern times, among civilised nations, silver and gold have superseded all other commodities as money, but they do not differ in their essential characteristics of desirableness in themselves (either for utility or ornament) from those other commodities which in ruder times, among more primitive people, were equally entitled to the appellation money.

It does not need a moment's thought to satisfy us that it was by a true *survival of the fittest* that gold and silver finally obtained universal recognition as money, and superseded all other forms of it.

Bear skins were universally desired, both for comfort and ornament, but too long kept they were liable to moth and mildew, and their value was thus diminished or destroyed. Cattle were liable to disease and death, and were expensive to care for. Finally, copper, iron, and brass were too easily produced and united in themselves the disadvantages of bulk as well as weight, with small value. Silver and gold are not easily destroyed. They are almost infinitely divisible, their purity or fineness is readily determined. As society has developed, their desirability for use and ornament has not diminished. Since they are practically indestructible, easily hidden and guarded, they of all things are the most convenient for their possessor to keep for such future needs of exchange for other things as he may then desire.

With this general statement thus made, I will ask and answer a few questions, which will lead by the shortest route to the end of my subject.

Question. Would not some other thing than silver or gold have been just as useful, just as exchangeable, and just as much entitled to the name of money, if these had not been selected?

Answer. Yes, perhaps so. But it is sufficient that these two *Society* has adopted, and in such a matter the individual may well go with the crowd.

Q. Ought there not to be more money in circulation? Is there now enough for the wants of trade?

A. The question cannot be answered by either an absolute Yes or No.

In the beginning,—if in such a matter there could be a definite point of beginning,—the quantity would have been of no consequence, or, in the words of Bonamy Price, “Any would have been enough, because the price of things would have become related to the volume of money, whether that volume were great or small; and once established in their fair relation to each other through their common relation to money, it would make no difference whether their price was what we would now call high or low. But the truly ideal money would increase in a ratio commensurate to the increase of things to be exchanged, minus the quickness of exchange which time might bring.

It is not probable that either gold or silver, or both in use together as the bimetalists desire, would form the ideal money. In this sublunary sphere, the ideal is seldom reached.

I am not aware of any well-ascertained data by which the question, Is there money enough? can be definitely answered. There has been an increase in volume within the last fifteen years much greater in ratio than the ratio of increase in the volume of things to be exchanged. There are those who affirm that there is not half enough. My own opinion is, that there is enough; that the price of things has become related to the existing stock, and that with the economics that have been secured and will no doubt be further gained in the use of money, there need be no present fear of a proper supply. A reasonable amount of good money is better than a larger supply of an inferior kind, since either have to be bought and paid for by honest labor.

Q. Would silver and gold be now rightly entitled to the name of money, if they were not coined at the mint and the value of the coin determined by law?

A. Yes. They would exchange as freely as now, and would then as now, be entitled in every sense but a technical legal sense, to the name of money. The coinage does not give the metal any value that the metal did not before possess. The law determines the fineness and quantity which a given coin shall contain; gives a name to the various coins respectively, and therefore treats of them as money, not recognising in its phraseology gold and silver in the form of bullion as money. But as bullion is as readily exchanged, and (in international trade) more to be desired than coin, and as the value of the coin derives its power from the quantity and fineness of the metal it contains, and not from the stamp of the Government machine, I repeat that essentially gold and silver bullion are as much entitled to the name of money before being coined into dollars, or sovereigns, or francs, as afterward.

I know that here is a vital point of dispute; that because the law in speaking of money treats only of

what it has stamped as such, philosophers are able to confuse us very much by attributing to the stamp the money value which really lies under it.

The law recognises, gives sanction, or forbids, but it is powerless to create.

Q. Does not the legal-tender sanction which the law places upon the issues of its mint, give a new and original value to such legal tender coin?

A. No. The laws of legal tender give a standing interpretation to the language of a contract, where such words as dollars, pounds, francs are used, and thus notifies both parties to a contract in advance, of what the law will require if they fall into dispute.

Q. Must it then be denied that, under no condition, nor within any limits, the legal-tender quality conferred upon a thing gives that thing a value which it would not otherwise have?

A. No: I admit, for argument's sake at least, that if the government should decree that doughnuts shall be legal tender for debts, a doughnut for a dollar, then (if doughnuts did not become too plentiful) they would be largely enhanced in value while they were in demand to satisfy existing contracts or pay existing debts, but I do say that as under such conditions all existing contracts would be soon cancelled and no new ones created, except upon the basis of the natural exchangeable value of doughnuts, they would soon cease to be in demand, and possessing in themselves only the value of doughnuts, they would sink back to their natural doughnut value. But the operation sketched ought not to be recognised as a creation of value, even of a temporary kind. It is really a robbing under the guise of law. Governments can confiscate and destroy—they cannot create value.

Q. How, then, is it that 412½ grains of silver, coined into a silver dollar, will exchange in the market for 25⅞ grains of gold, while as bullion, the same quantity of silver will only exchange for about two-thirds of as much gold?

A. There is one simple answer which completely explains the disparity. Great ingenuity is displayed in making some other explanation—scientific perhaps, but hard to comprehend. The one I submit is simple; any one can understand it, viz.:

For some years past and at the present time, the United States Government has been, and is, in the receipt of an income through tariff duties and excise dues, of about \$1,500,000 per day. This large revenue it disburses in payment of the interest and towards the principal of its debt, for pensions, and general administration expense. Upon its debts, and to whomsoever desires, it pays gold coin on the basis of 25⅞ grains to the dollar. From whomsoever desires to pay money into the treasury through the excise dues,

it will receive as of equal value gold coin or silver dollars containing $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains each. Thus it practically buys that amount of coined silver, giving in consideration an exemption from the payment of $25\frac{1}{10}$ coined gold. If it would receive nickels or dimes in satisfaction of such dues in a similar way, they would become exchangeable for about a dollar in gold each, if it were certain that the government could continue thus to receive them with one hand, while with the other it continued to pay, as now, in gold. The operation is in fact a virtual exchange to the extent the community now desires, of gold coin and silver coins on the basis of their (theoretical) legal value, instead of their commercial or natural relative value. The difference some one now does, or will hereafter, pay.

Q. Cannot the government continue this forever, and thus forever preserve a higher value to the silver coin than its equivalent in silver bullion?

A. No. Because with the continued coinage of silver in the present ratio of the coinage of gold, about three to one—that is to say, fifty-four millions of silver, against say twenty millions of gold, per annum—the proportion of silver payment to the government will steadily increase, until the treasury department will be obliged to either pay in silver or buy gold in exchange for it. With free coinage of silver, this result will be the sooner reached.

Whenever the government is thus compelled to suspend its present course in the respect just pointed out, the real commercial relation between the gold and silver coin will begin to appear. Then silver coin and silver bullion (coinage being free) of the same weight and fineness, will be alike in value, the same as gold coin and gold bullion now are.

Q. Then you do not believe that the free coinage of silver as now proposed, would enhance the value of silver bullion, and restore the old relations of 16 to 1 between gold and silver?

A. Free coinage of silver would no doubt give to $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains of silver bullion $\frac{9}{10}$ fine, as much value, i. e. purchasing power, as would be contained in the coined dollar; and if the government or some other power rich enough, would forever give gold for silver in the ratio of 1 to 16, then the old rates of 16 to 1 could be maintained. But we have already perceived (if it be the truth) that our government cannot do this. It may be added, that so long as the government is willing to accept silver at a fixed ratio, thus creating an artificial value for it higher than its natural value, silver will, as sure as water seeks its level, flow from all parts of this country and also from foreign countries into the United States Treasury driving out the gold, and the government will have to pay the difference. Even if the government had the financial ability to bear the loss, it would be a foolish use to

make of it, since all its power is derived from the people, and is used at their cost.

The fact is, that the value of all things—that is, their exchangeable quality for other things—is determined, and ought to be determined, by the free play of human action. Efforts made by powerful bodies, governments, corporations, syndicates, or trusts, to interfere with the free action of men in these regards, is injurious to all. The statement is as true when applied to gold and silver as it is of other things. Neither gold nor silver have value different in kind or differently derived, from other things. They are good for use and ornament. They will exchange for other things; but the relation in which they will exchange for other things, never continues for any long period the same. Nor is there anything in their nature by which (under any rule that can be stated) they should, in law or morals, continue to exchange for things in a fixed ratio to each other, of 15 to 1, or 16 to 1, or any other ratio. In fact, except within nominal limits, they never have thus been practically related. In every country where the effort has been made to make a fixed ratio practically operative, that effort has finally failed.* One of the two metals has always been the real money of account, the real instrument of exchange in the great industrial movements; the other has operated in an auxiliary and subordinate capacity. Perceiving this to be the fact, Great Britain in 1816 gave up the experiment, made gold the sole money of account, and coined silver for subordinate use only.

In our own country, from 1792 to 1873 our mints were open to the free coinage of silver and gold, part of the time in the ratio of 15 to 1, and part of the time in the ratio of 16 to 1; but in the whole period of 80 years, only 8 millions in silver dollars were coined. The mints of Mexico and Japan are both open to gold, but silver being the only medium of exchange, alone goes to the mint.

The Latin Union, so-called, made a league, limiting the coinage of silver, hoping thus to preserve in practice a theoretic ratio; but they were obliged to break it, and suspend coinage of one of the metals.

If we wished to secure the free exchange of these metals in a fixed ratio, it would be necessary to make an agreement with all commercial nations of the world. No doubt the silver producing countries would gladly agree. We could well afford to. In 1850 this country produced silver to the value of \$50,000. In 1890, the

*The ancient historians tell us of early times in Arabia and in Germany when silver was worth the same as gold, weight for weight. The ratio fixed by Spain in 1497 was 10½ to 1. Then in 1546, being dominant in the world of commerce and finance, she fixed the ratio at 13½ to 1. In the next century (1688) one hundred years after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, Portugal, then prosperous, wealthy, and dominant, fixed the governing ratio at 16 to 1. Then in 1717 England fixed hers at 15.02 to 1; France in 1726 at 14½ to 1; Spain in 1775 at 15½ to 1 in the Peninsula, though 16 remained the ratio in her American colonies. In 1785 and 1803 France adopted the Spanish ratio of 15½ to 1.

annual product was about fifty millions gold value. But there is much reason to doubt that non-silver producing countries would enter into such a compact. Great Britain certainly will not.

Well, then! If it be impossible to maintain the practical use of two kinds of money like silver and gold in a fixed ratio, which of the two is it the wiser to use?

The answer must depend on circumstances. If a country is insulated from others, has no commercial relations outside its own boundaries, and desires to establish none; then it may be said that it is quite an indifferent matter which of the two shall be the recognised money. Either will do. But if a country has trade and commerce beyond its own boundaries, and desires to encourage and extend such trade, then its interests require the use of that money which is current in the market where its foreign trade is settled. At the present time that market is Great Britain.

If the United States of America is to take that position in the World's progress, which we confidently hope for, it must be by the extension of its trade and commerce with other parts of the world. Whatever favors this, favors our Nation's development. Whatever hinders this, restricts and hampers our progress. At the present time, and for an indefinite period in the future, all our foreign commerce, amounting now to fifteen hundred millions of dollars per annum, is of necessity, transacted under the English standard of gold, for London is the settling-house where all these foreign payments are made. If we ship flour to Brazil, we must take our pay in London. If we buy sugar from Cuba, we must pay in London. If in our domestic affairs we degenerate to the silver basis, as we certainly will if the present compulsory coinage of silver goes on, or if those who seek to open our mines for the free and unlimited coinage of silver shall have their way, we shall then have voluntarily surrendered the standard that puts us on a parity with other commercial nations in the struggle for the world's trade, and shall have adopted a standard, whether theoretically superior or not, which will put our foreign trade and commerce in a most disadvantageous position.

So far in these remarks, I have not made any reference to paper money, so-called. What I have now to say, can be soon stated. There is a distinct and radical difference between gold and silver money, or any commodity used as money, and paper money. There ought to be a clearer distinction in the names applied to them. Gold and silver, (not to speak of absolute forms of money,) are real money. They carry their exchangeable value in themselves. Paper money derives all its power from its relation to real money. It has no value in itself, can serve no purpose either of use or ornament. Paper money is a promise, an

order, a warrant, which entitles the holder to real money when asked for by him. Thus related and kept effective, paper money is an immense economy. By its use, a considerable portion of an otherwise larger stock of real money can be exchanged, for things which directly minister to human needs.

I might speak also of checks, drafts, bills of exchange, and promissory notes, which in modern times operate in the exchange of commodities. They might be called, one or two degrees removed, a kind of paper money. They perform in a limited way, the same functions that paper money performs in a larger way; and like paper money, they economise the use of real money. Economise it as they may however, they cannot wholly supersede it—certainly not in this or in any immediately following generation.

A CHAPTER ON ANTHROPOPHAGY.

BY RICHARD ANDREE.

[CONCLUDED.]

As the most essential motives to anthropophagy must always be placed superstition—be it a religious or a secular sort—and revenge. These two we find spread everywhere and in fact strikingly so where cannibalism exists. Wherever prisoners of war are regarded as booty we find the handsomest and bravest and those prominent through their position eaten first. Cannibalism limits itself to the eating of separate parts; thus it is the eyes, the heart, the brain which are preferred, because they are the seat of the virtues, the bravery and the strength of the one to be consumed; and these the conqueror wishes to make his own. Thus also is explained the fact that often anthropophagy is a special right exercised by chiefs or chosen warriors, who alone are said to partake of the favor so as to strengthen and increase their moral qualities by such means. This happens sometimes in a sublime way, so to speak, among peoples who have perhaps no direct enjoyment of human flesh but who still wish to acquire from it the supposed moral gain. Thus the South American Tarianas and Tucanos do not directly eat the flesh of the dead in order to acquire the qualities and virtues of the deceased, but lay the body first for a month in the earth. Then they dig up the corpse from the earth and dry it to a crisp mass over a fire. This mass is pulverized, mixed with caxiri and drunken.* When the fetichman of the Ashantees devours the heart of a captured enemy, he does it in order not to be tormented by the spirit of the dead of which he assumes that the seat is in the heart. The Lamas on the Amazon River eat the marrow of the bones of their dead because they imagine that thereby the souls of the dead enter their own bodies (Marcoy). The Dajaks according to Müller† give boys the scalp

* Wallace, *Amazon and Rio Negro*, London, 1853, 498.

† *Allgemeine Ethnographie*, 315.

and the heart of fallen enemies to eat in order to make them brave and spirited. A Chippeway Indian woman for the same reason fed her children on the flesh of an Englishman (Long). Among the South Australians an older brother thought to acquire the physical strength of his younger brother if he ate him (Stanbridge); in Queensland the mother devours her newborn babe under the impression that she will get back the strength drawn from her by her offspring (Angas), and she also believes that she honors the dead by eating them. The Maoris, according to Cook, fancy that enemies who are eaten enter into eternal fire.

Everywhere we see therefore how the belief in the existence of a soul, a special spiritual power in the person to be eaten, is to be regarded as the final cause of anthropophagy. The spirit and the virtues of the person eaten are thought by the enjoyment of human flesh to enter into the possession of the person eating, exactly as by the reception of other food increase in physical strength arises.*

Closely connected with superstition is the other motive, revenge. This is most clearly and significantly shown us in the case of the Mesayas on the River Amazon, who after choking down with reluctance the flesh of slaughtered enemies vomit it up again (Marcoy). The punishment is then completed, revenge is sufficiently satisfied and the use of human flesh in and for itself appears disgusting to the Mesayas. Wild revenge was also the cause of anthropophagy among the Caribs, and the most of them were sick after the use of it (Du Tertre). Among the Botokudos revenge acts in conjunction with hunger in leading them to eat enemies (Tschudi); and Pigafetta, Vespucci, and Hans Staden relate the same of the Tupi tribes on the east coast of South America. Here, as we know from Hans Staden, passion runs so far that the destroyer of a slain enemy takes his name in order thus, besides destroying the body, to utterly obliterate his spiritual immortality. In a measure revenge is also the motive among the Negroes of the Delta of the Nile (according to Crowther); this appears to be the sole motive among the Manjema in Central Africa (according to Livingstone). Revenge debased the Melanesians of the Solomon Islands and New Hebrides to cannibalism. It is the principal ground for anthropophagy among the Indians of America.

Revenge has been formally brought into a system among a few peoples who regarded the eating of human beings as an integral part of their legislation.

* In parallel with this stands the belief widely spread among uncultured peoples that special animals or plants impart by their consumption special properties. I could adduce dozens of examples, but I mention only the Zaparos on the Napo in South America who eat, through preference, fish, monkeys, and birds "in order to become quick and agile." They avoid, however, the flesh of clumsy animals like the tapir and peccari "that they may not become unwieldy like these." For that would be disastrous to a hunting people of the primeval forests. *Journal Anthropol. Institut*, vol. 11, 503.

The greatest punishment that can be meted out to an enemy or a transgressor consists in his being eaten. As a special example of this may be adduced, according to the accounts of Junghuhn, the Batuas in Sumatra; besides the accounts referred to we may further state that some other tribes regard anthropophagy from the same point of view; as for instance, the Kissama in West Africa according to Hamilton, and the New Caledonians according to Garnier.

Anthropophagy seems to us to be most abhorrent in those places where every feeling is so deadened that the flesh of men is a pure delicacy or where it is eaten as commonly as any other kind of flesh. When—as different credible observers agree in relating—the Fans on the Gaboon and the Obotschi on the Niger exhume and devour the corpses of strangers, we can find for this practice no palliation. Human flesh is then a ware just as among us other flesh is in the meat markets. Hutchinson saw it offered for sale in the markets on the Altkalabar in Körbea; A. Vespucci and Pigafetta describe how it is preserved by smoking among the Tupi tribes; Monbottu, Abanga and Nyam-Nyam, New Caledonians and Fiji Islanders are also to be ranked in this category of arch-cannibals; they may always have had some other motive for their practice. Even more terrible, however, appears to us the eating of one's own children, as among the New Caledonians according to Garnier, among the Nyam-Nyam according to Schweinfurth, the Australians according to Angas, Stanbridge, and others. With this practice must not be confused the otherwise frequent practice of child-murder.

It is still to be mentioned that among several peoples anthropophagy appears as the special right of certain classes. Among the Potawatomis, according to Keating, it was the privilege of a narrow brotherhood who seemed to be endowed with special heroic virtues; among the Solomon Islanders the chief received as his regular portion a part of the body wrapped up in a banana leaf; among the Tahiti an eye of the victim was presented to the king, who acted as if he would devour it, and the same is related of the Hawaiian Islanders. The last two cases are still to be seen as a survival of a once prevailing cannibalism which existed generally though in a rudimentary form in Dahomey, where the king dips his finger in the blood of the slain victim and licks it; in Ashantee where fetichmen still eat the hearts; in the Samoa and Tonga Islands and wherever in the absence of other reports we are obliged to assume the former existence of cannibalism.

Many peoples shamelessly and freely show their anthropophagy, while in others there is no lack of indications that they are ashamed of the practice. This latter case, it will seem to us, is the beginning

of giving up the terrible custom. The cannibal feasts are often held in secret, and Livingstone could under no condition obtain admission to such a banquet of the Manjema. Grifeon du Bellay states that the Fans held their feasts of human flesh in secret and excluded the children from them. This latter was the case among the Markesans; here, however, as was more generally the custom, the women were likewise excluded from taking part in the matter. The Māoris admitted only prominent women.

It is pleasing now to see how anthropophagy is more and more losing ground, and how even in the short space of historical time which has passed since the great periods of discovery cannibalism has disappeared throughout a very considerable space. It has not always been the influence of white settlers or the zeal of missionaries that has brought about the extinction of the evil; tribes have succeeded in giving up their cannibalistic customs by themselves without foreign interference. Among many Polynesians—where traces may to-day be found of the former existence of anthropophagy—it had disappeared or was on the wane when white men first entered their islands as in Tahiti, Hawaii, the Navigator Islands and in Micronesia. Without doubt the inhabitants of the Malayan Archipelago were once commonly anthropophagous; to-day it is only with difficulty that we can find there traces of this primitive custom or remains of it. Indeed in many places anthropophagy has died out with the people themselves. For instance where only a hundred years ago in the region of the great North American lakes anthropophagous redskins devoted themselves to the chase, bound their enemies to the war pole, dismembered and ate them, the English race has spread overflowing the land. On the plateaus of Anahuac where once to the world-soul bloody human sacrifice together with cannibalistic banqueting were offered, the same Indian people live to-day having given up with their language, their old customs and anthropophagy, and been brought within the pale of our civilization. It is strange that there have not been wanting defenders of anthropophagy. Zeno, Diogenes, Chrysippus, and Montaigne exculpated it on moral grounds.* George Forster believes a favorable word should be said for it. "However repulsive it may be to our education," says he, "it is still in and of itself neither unnatural nor criminal to eat human flesh. Only for this reason is it to be banned and barred: because the social feelings of human love and sympathy can thus so easily be lost. But since without these feelings no human society can exist, the first step in culture among all peoples must have been this: to abolish the eating of human beings, to excite a detestation for it."†

* Winwood Reade. *Savage Africa*, 158.

† *Sämmtliche Schriften*. Leipzig, 1843. I. 407.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A VERY interesting journal is *The New Nation* which Mr. Edward Bellamy has just launched upon the turbulent sea of American debate. If continued on the plan of the first number *The New Nation* will be a valuable addition to the educational forces of the country. It is enthusiastic, sympathetic, and full of useful information. It is rather sectarian in tone, having its own "ism" and creed, but perhaps none the worse on that account, for isms and creeds are spiritual stimulants that sometimes tear up conservative mountains and fling them into the sea. Mr. Bellamy with fervid rhetoric describes the coming state, when all the people, having no longer any use for liberty, shall become absorbed into that beatific Nirvana known as "Government." That seems to be his dream of a new nation. He justly censures the animalism and greed of our present social system, but he does not seem to know how much of its unnatural selfishness is due to the patronage and paternalism of "government." These more than any other causes are helping to divide our people into beasts of burthen and beasts of prey. Does he ever think how many of the monopolies he complains of are created and fed by "government"? There may be too little Nationalism in some places, but certainly there is too much of it in others.

The contraction of liberty and the expansion of nationalism are clearly shown in the ten thousand bills introduced this winter into our state legislatures, to say nothing of the laws enacted or proposed by congress. To "have a law passed" appears to be the ambition of every man, and of every interest, from the millionaire ship owner, or mill owner, or mine owner, to the hod carrier and the shoveler. Men are no longer supposed to be of age at twenty-one, nor even at forty one. In the very pride of their strength and manhood they are placed under the guardianship of "government." Government must make their contracts for them, feed them with a spoon, and attend to all their business. In California, for instance, hundreds of bills have been introduced of which the following are specimens worthy of careful study: one, making the employment of persons not American citizens by contractors or sub-contractors a misdemeanor; another, making it unlawful to offer less than two dollars per day to unskilled laborers hired to work for the municipalities or the State; another, requiring that employers shall give three hours on election day to all their employes; and another, to establish a trout hatchery near San Francisco. The superstition is becoming general among us that "Government" lives up in the sky, that it has accumulated stores of impossible blessings to shower down upon its favorites, and that it has a guardian angel in the shape of a policeman to protect and care for every citizen. Independence is becoming a burthen to us, so we pray for masters to take us into their keeping, put our wills into harness, and guide our feeble minds.

The tendency of this Nationalistic legislation is made clearer to us by the actual bills themselves than by any quantity of abstract moralizing on their character, the general inclination being to surrender thought, will, and action into the keeping of our grandmother the government. In Pennsylvania is a bill to enable barber shops to keep open on Sunday, and in South Dakota is a bill to compel barber shops to remain closed on Sunday, a matter which it seems might properly be left by Dakota and Pennsylvania to the laws of health and cleanliness, without interfering with the liberty of barbers. In Illinois is a bill to pay a bounty of one cent a pound on all the sugar made in the State from sorghum, beet, or maple, while Nebraska has a bill to repeal that bounty. In Wisconsin is a bill compelling the payment of employes weekly, in Missouri a bill to compel mine owners to pay their employes every ten days, and in New Jersey a bill requiring hired persons to be paid fortnightly, with a Saturday half holiday

thrown in, our kind and meddlesome old grandmother the State assuming that the citizens are not yet of age, and therefore not capable of making contracts for themselves. In Indiana is a bill to prevent the playing of base ball on Sunday, and another compelling managers of State institutions to purchase *native* live stock for consumption; and in Dakota is a similar bill to encourage the use of *native* coal in state institutions. In Illinois is a bill allowing three cents to every inhabitant who kills an English sparrow, and in Indiana a bill giving a bounty of one cent for the scalp of that pugnacious bird, the consequence of which discrimination will be that the Indiana sparrow killer will send his birds over into Illinois where the bounty will be three cents per scalp.

The multiplication of statutory crimes is a disagreeable feature of the new nation we are so industriously building up; felonies without any moral evil, and misdemeanors innocent of injury, the free efforts of men to promote their own individual happiness. For example, in New York, besides the laws against voting too much, there are bills to punish men for voting too little, the penalty for declining to vote being fixed in the proposed bill at twenty five dollars. In Kansas it is proposed to "have a law passed" making it a felony to act as a lobbyist, or to employ an agent to secure the passage of any measure; and a bill is now before the legislature creating this new felony. In Missouri are bills making it a misdemeanor to sell tobacco in any form to minors, or to employ a locomotive engineer who has not had three years experience, or for any physician to compound prescriptions unless he is registered as a pharmacist. So also in Minnesota it will be a misdemeanor for any "incompetent person" to engage in plumbing, or dentistry, or in the business of a veterinary surgeon. A glance at the bills introduced this winter into our state legislatures will show an attempt to create five thousand new crimes, very few of them being *mala in se*. This multiplication of offenses means the multiplication of policemen, detectives, courts, and prisons. If only a tenth of those bills should become laws, judicial oppression and police tyranny would be increased to an intolerable degree, and espionage would become prime minister of the law.

While the new nation carries punishment in one hand, it bestows patronage with the other. It repeals our promises, modifies our agreements, and insures us against bad luck. In Nebraska is a bill forbidding any person to acquire over three hundred and twenty acres of land. In Illinois is a bill requiring all butter and cheese made from oleomargarine or cotton seed oil to be colored pink. In North Dakota is a bill to indemnify farmers losing crops by hail. In Minnesota is a bill exempting all manufacturing establishments from taxation, and another for distributing seed grain to farmers whose crops were destroyed by hail, storm, or blight. This is accompanied by a bill repealing the bounty for killing wolves. It has been discovered that this bounty, three dollars a scalp in certain months, and five dollars a scalp in others, acted as a premium on wolf growing, and made it more profitable in some parts of Minnesota to raise wolves than sheep, so the complaint is made that "wolf-farming" has become an "industry." It was also discovered that young wolves captured in the three-dollar months were carefully preserved until the five-dollar months came around. So the state law for the extermination of wolves having multiplied their numbers, it is proposed to repeal it altogether. The same experience will follow the indemnification for the loss of wheat by hail, storm, or blight. After a few years, the law having multiplied hailstorms in Minnesota it will be repealed like the bounty on wolves.

A portentous rumbling was heard last Sunday week in Chicago. It came from that throbbing volcano known as "Organised Labor." There was a debate in the Trades and Labor Assembly

over the employment of non-union men by the Directory of the World's Columbian Exposition, the Assembly declaring that none but Union men should be employed, and threatening riot and rebellion should their demands be disregarded and their commands disobeyed. One member sprung to his feet and shouted, "We will make the Directory put a regiment of soldiers around their grounds if they employ scab labor." The meaning of that is plain, "No man outside our society shall be permitted to earn bread for his wife and children by working for the World's Fair. Should he attempt to do so we will prevent him by violence." This is a usurpation of power for the sake of social injustice. Suppose that "Unorganised Labor" should make a similar threat! What right of proscription and punishment has one side more than the other? The threat of the Trades Assembly is a declaration of war, in which they may not have a monopoly of all the persecution. The right of working men to form themselves into Trades Unions is absolutely sacred, and ought to be vindicated at all hazards; the right of workmen not to join the Unions is equally sacred, and ought to have the same vindication. Our own slavery begins the very moment we attempt to enslave others. No "organised" members, though including all mankind except one man, can acquire the right to deprive that one of his liberty.

The first eruption of the volcano called "Organised Labor" occurred a few days after the warlike declaration of the Trades Assembly. It was not very fiery or destructive, but there was a promise in it of a shower of cinders heavy enough to bury another Herculaneum. Some Italian laborers employed to dig on the grounds of the World's Fair, were set upon by "Organised Labor," beaten, and driven from their work. The excuse for it all was that those poor men were Italians, or in the language of their assailants, "Dagos," having no right to work for a living in this land. There was a good deal of comic irony in the performance when a lot of organised foreigners declared that in this National and International testimonial to an Italian, no Italian should have part, nor be allowed to work on the tributary buildings to be erected in honor of Columbus. If this kind of petty persecution is to be continued the Italian government will very likely decline to take any part whatever in the Columbian Exposition.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

AGNOSTICISM JUSTIFIED.

To the Editor of The Open Court.—

Your article "Questions of Agnosticism" reminds me of several things I have seen in your paper upon the same term and what it is said to mean, and I admit that I write this because I am angry with you for what I have no better expression than your dishonesty in writing about it.

I know something of what the human mind is and I can almost plead guilty to the worship of Matthew Arnold's gentle God of Tendency, and I sometimes rival David in the hope that this God will make haste and do something for human intelligence and intellectual honesty and consistency. But as to Agnosticism, there are three kinds, are there? Is that true? or the statement honest? You know how the term originated and what it was coined to connote.

If I am asked is there a God who created the universe and controls and manages it, I answer I don't know, and you say it is awful.

If asked will men live another life in another world after death in this, how is it pessimistic? I answer the modest truth that I haven't found out. Now these and kindred questions are those to which the term was originally intended to apply and it has always

been so understood and used by all honest writers—so there can be no three kinds of agnostics, either wise or simple, to talk about. Agnosticism simply means intellectual honesty.

Your assumption (and that of Don Piat and certain Catholic priests) that agnosticism is in some-way an assumption of knowledge when it professes ignorance is unfounded, unfair and ridiculous.

Grand Rapids, Mich.

IRA Y. BURNHAM.

[The preachers of dogmatic religion have often—and not without cause—been declared guilty of stigmatising all who do not believe as they do, as dishonest. There are, however, agnostics who in spite of their opposition to orthodox religion resemble the dogmatist in zealous intolerance and narrow-mindedness as much as one egg resembles another. There is no objection to Mr. Burnham's "I do not know," but there is a great objection to the proposition that no one can know. Concerning Mr. Burnham's assurance "I know something of what the human mind is," we take the liberty of reserving our doubts. Ed.]

SHOULD THE WORLD'S FAIR BE OPEN ON SUNDAY?

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

THIS question is, I understand, soon to be decided by a committee of residents of Chicago, and I should like to see it discussed fully in *The Open Court*. I should particularly like to know how much truth there is in the story that the Centennial Exhibition, in 1876 at Philadelphia, though nominally closed against visitors, was really open to any one who chose to pay for being passed in by an exhibitor. Poor people and strangers who had no friends were shut out, while rich Philadelphians made up Sunday parties in order to see the show without being annoyed by vulgar crowds. That is the way Sunday laws generally work; and I don't want to have any such favoritism at the Columbian Exposition. Governor Willey, of Idaho, is right in saying that this Fair should be kept open for the "benefit of the poor people in Chicago: they will find things of more than usual interest in and about the grounds, that will tend to elevate their standard and keep them from the saloons."

F. M. HOLLAND.

BOOK REVIEWS.

OUR DESTINY. The Influence of Nationalism on Morals and Religion. An Essay in Ethics. By Laurence Gronlund, A.M. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

This book is a revised and enlarged version of a series of articles published in *The Nationalist*. Its author believes that socialism, which is to be inaugurated not by violence, but by enthusiasm, will establish, virtually, the kingdom of heaven on earth, and it will evolve an irresistible belief in God and immortality. Mr. Gronlund says: "I hold that, though it be perhaps a fact that a majority of those who are called Socialists are avowed Atheists, yet Atheism is not an integral part of Socialism, but merely an accretion upon it, like tartar upon the enamel of the teeth. Such are Atheists, not because they are Socialists, but because they are Frenchmen and Germans. Nationalism is eminently religious."

NOTES.

Mr. W. L. Sheldon of St. Louis has published a thoughtful and spirited address on the subject: "How far is it right to make happiness the chief aim of life?" His advice is, "not to go seeking for happiness, for that is just the way to lose what chance there is of finding it," and he bases this rule upon the consideration that "happiness is not the chief aim of life. . . Joy is the accompaniment and not the aim. If we make it the aim, we lose it even as the accompaniment."

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
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THE AMERICAN CAMORRA.

BY FELIX L. OSWALD.

IN 1849, when the naturalist Burmeister visited the Brazilian province of Matto-Grosso, he saw the natives cut down their woods by thousands of acres in order to get pasture-land for their cattle, and predicted that the denuded soil would soon bristle with thorn-shrubs much harder to extirpate than the trees of the primeval forest.

When the natural connection of moral causes and effects shall have been more clearly recognised, politicians may predict with similar confidence that the suppression of harmless amusements will always result in promoting the introduction of less harmless pastimes. North or South, human nature remains the same; the love of excitement, in its normal forms, is one of the healthiest instincts of the human mind, but under difficulties will satisfy itself the best way it can, and can be much more easily perverted than suppressed.

Under the rule of the Bourbons the lot of the poorer classes in the kingdom of Naples was in several respects much more wretched than that of absolute savages who enjoy at least the rough freedom of the wilderness. Taxes from which many nobles and a host of clerical drones remained exempt, had increased to an extent that made life to thousands of workmen a constant struggle for the bare necessities of existence. The right of free assembly had been restricted by a multitude of oppressive by-laws. Foot-races and vintage-festivals were interdicted to prevent their abuse for purposes of political agitation. Hunting was made a privilege of the rich. No man could shoot a quail on his own patch of farmland without first prepaying the price of a monthly hunting-permit that would have swallowed the proceeds of a month's labor. The poor were robbed of their *panes*, as well as of their *circenses*: tax-collectors fleeced them of their wages, and omnipresent police-spies prevented them from enjoying, even at their own expense, the outdoor sports which the Cæsars provided freely as the price of curtailed liberties. In the darkest days of that despotism the ministers of the autocrat were alarmed by the rise of a secret society known as the *Camorra*: a league of conspirators who ranged the country after dark and seized and enjoyed in a lawless manner what

the laws prevented them from obtaining in a better way. Their favorite prey was the hoard of a tyrannous revenue official, but they also plundered convents, country-seats and even the cottages of peasants whom they suspected of having furnished information to the police. Between 1825 and 1860 not less than *forty-two thousand* notorious robberies were committed by members of the society (*La Camorra*, *Notizie Storiche*, Florence, 1863), besides many other crimes and countless petty thefts. The night-roving conspirators were always prepared to assist each other and to meet resistance by deeds of violence; many expeditions were, indeed, undertaken for the special purpose of revenge, not only without any prospect of plunder, but with the certainty of incurring heavy expenses in behalf of imprisoned accomplices. The net proceeds of a week's work were paid into a common fund, which again was evenly distributed among the members at monthly intervals and spent with a freedom which made *Camorristi* the most popular visitors of the Neapolitan pleasure-resorts. As far as possible they tried to limit their raids to the houses of unpopular persons and thus managed to preserve the good will of the poor, poor peasant-boys and journeymen artisans having often no higher ambition than the hope of being admitted to the league of the secret brotherhood though that admission involved a long term of probation, and treason was always punished with death.

"Nothing would, indeed, be more erroneous," says Sign: Monnier, "than to suppose that the *Camorra* was recruited chiefly from the depraved classes of society; candidates for admission were generally poor, but they were the more respectable part of the poor working-population and rarely absolute paupers. Applicants for admission moreover had to prove that they had been guilty neither of espionage or theft; also that none of their near female relatives were prostitutes. A *Picciotto d'onore* (novice admitted on word of honor) had to remain on probation for a year, sharing all the dangers and none of the profits of the expedition, nevertheless the privilege of membership was coveted even by young aristocrats, either from a pure love of excitement or in the hope of getting opportunities for revenge on an obnoxious government official. Candidates of wealth were always welcome but remained objects of suspicion till they had practi-

cally proved the motive of their unusual desire. Suspicion, even without positive proofs of guilt, was apt to lead to expulsion. At no time did the leaders of the society countenance the practice of admitting candidates of unknown precedents."

The Camorra reached the zenith of its power under the rule of Francis II, when it enjoyed the popularity of a political reform league—a popularity that increased in proportion to the increasing severity of the measures adopted for the suppression of the society. Banishments, imprisonment, and numerous executions all failed to answer their purpose, but the evil was finally cured by the removal of its cause and under the more equitable laws of the present government the Camorra is fading away like the Vehm-Gerichte of northern Germany disappeared under the rule of the Protestant princes.

In the United States of America the despotism of the Sabbatarian by-laws would long ago have led to similar results, but for the modifying influence of two causes: The abundance of field-sports and the liberality of the wage-rates that enable thousands of sport-deprived city-dwellers to drown their ennui in alcohol. In Baltimore, St. Louis, and Philadelphia rum and beer operate as so many narcotic antidotes of the Sunday law evil, and the effectual suppression of Sunday-tipping might therefore be apt to lead to entirely unexpected results. In the hill-states the victims of the Sabbath-bigot indemnify themselves by field-sports. Offers of "rewards for the detection of hunting on the Lord's day" are in vain; from 6 to 9 A. M., and again from 4 P. M. to sunset, the voice of the squirrel-rifle is heard in the land on every fair-weather Sunday, the year round; game laws are quietly ignored, and informers would risk to get the wages of their zeal in the form of buck-shot. Those who really scruple about Sunday-sport and who, withal, have to work every day in the week, adopt the expedient of night-hunting. "Coons" can be found better in night-time than in daylight; foxes and opossums can be surprised in their nocturnal haunts by moonlight, and even in pitch dark nights deer can be decoyed by the gleam of a torch. In wooded mountain-regions the game-supply is practically as inexhaustible as the fisheries of the ocean.

But the case differs in lowland-regions at a distance from the sea-coast and from the shores of the large inland lakes. Indiana was all a wilderness a hundred years ago, and the settlement of Kansas did not begin in earnest till 1840; yet in many counties of those states game, large and small, has been far more thoroughly extirpated than in any part of game-law protected, old Europe. There are districts that could be measured by hundreds of square miles, where the best sportsman, aided by a pack of the best trained

hounds, might spend days in the vain attempt to scare up a rabbit or a partridge. Deer have long disappeared from the neighborhood of the best-settled counties, and turkeys are seen only at long intervals in the solitudes of the comparatively well-wooded northern districts of Indiana.

What are the sport-loving settlers of the southern parishes to do? Sunday amusements in their village are out of the question; athletic pastimes are not encouraged by the orthodox educators of the young and would interfere with the weekday's work of their elders. Game has disappeared. Weekdays and Sundays have to be divided between drudgery and hypocrisy.

But the expedient of night-hunts still remains. Night remains the best friend of those baffled in the competition for the prizes of the daylight arena, and the young farmers of Indiana and Kansas have organised Night-rider leagues, as their Kentucky forefathers organised coon-hunting clubs. In dark nights, but often also in cloudy full-moon nights, troops of masked young horsemen meet at some preappointed trysting-place, hold a whispered consultation and start on a *raid*—a risk-spiced expedition against some obnoxious member of the community. The ranch of a would-be informer or outspoken non-sympathiser is their favorite goal; but they may content themselves with whooping around the cabin of a frail female or of scaring a timid new-comer out of his wits. Bushwacker-raids with a political sanction would probably be much more to their taste, but feeling the need of some tenable pretext they have turned moralists and ride under the guise of social reformers.

The real motive of their expeditions is, however, well demonstrated by the concurring evidence of the following circumstances. The prevalence of the "White Cap" mania, in the first place, always bears an exact proportion to the dearth of better pastimes, and to the predominance of the public sentiment against Sunday-sports and their substitute—alcohol-revels. White Cap outrages are the children of tedium. They are extremely rare in game-abounding Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, in hilly Pennsylvania, in woody Michigan, in busy Illinois with its deep-water fronts, fisheries and metropolitan cities. They have become epidemic in Kansas and Indiana, and are getting rather frequent in the Sabbatarian counties of the Missouri and Ohio flatland regions. It is also well-known that the night-riders recruit their troops not from a class of moral rigorists, but from the ranks of lewd, mischievous, adventurous,—in short, fun-loving young men. Imagine young hoodlums of that sort assuming the rôle of ethical reformers.

But the most conclusive argument against that pretext is the preposterous frivolity of many of the charges preferred against their victims. Brutality in-

creases the spice of danger, but active brutality itself has a charm for certain minds, and for that reason, and without a vestige of moral motive, gangs of "white caps" have half killed a crippled old Ohio shoemaker who had been prevented by sickness from paying, or wholly paying, a trifling debt; two Indiana girls who had encouraged the attentions of the same youth and failed to heed a warning by a rival of the obnoxious Lothario were torn out of their beds and horribly maltreated by the associates of that rival. A Kansas preacher was dragged out in the woods at midnight and flayed "within an inch of his life" for having offered his hand and heart to a widow a few years older than himself. Now and then, of course, a more plausible pretext for a retributive raid helps to sustain the popularity of the night-riders, and as a rule, the laws of the land have proved powerless to avenge their brutal acts.

Out of eighteen trials in the state of Indiana fifteen resulted in an acquittal "for want of proof" against the defendants, though those proofs were plain enough for the private verdict of ninety-nine of a hundred neighbors; in two other cases the jury disagreed, and only one test-case, thanks to the energy of a fearless public prosecutor, led to a partial conviction of the prisoners. The project of organising a league of "counter-regulators" lacks the indispensable support of public sentiment, and a corps of government *gens d'armes* would stimulate the conspiracy of mischief-lovers as promptly as the establishment of the "Freedman's Bureau" stimulated the organisation of Kuklux clubs.

Pulpit-censors have exhausted their eloquence in vain, and the only effective remedies would be the revision of the Sunday-laws and the liberal encouragement of better pastimes.

THOMAS PAINE AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

A SMALL company recently gathered in the hall of the Manhattan Liberal Club to pay homage to Thomas Paine. It was the day after Paine's 155th birthday, and the deathday of Bradlaugh. The announcement of his death was made, and suitable resolutions passed. I found the meeting very interesting. During my ministry in the First Congregationalist Church, Cincinnati, I discovered the greatness of Thomas Paine, and on January 29, 1860,—the 123d anniversary of his birth,—gave a sermon concerning him. A few days after I received a letter from twelve of the most prominent and wealthy citizens, requesting the publication of the sermon,—“regarding it as a true, thorough, and faithful vindication of the character of one of the great, unappreciated, and much-abused heroes of our race.” I can quote the compliment now without vanity, knowing well that my little pamphlet was any-

thing but “thorough.” I did not half know the man. Since then those who in that Western city upheld with honor a name branded by pulpits for two generations,—previously honored only by poor and mostly illiterate radicals to whose annual screams against Christendom I used to listen from my corner,—have lived a long life. We have seen the fall of Slavery; we have seen the removal of laws which imprisoned woman in her home, and forbade her any share in the work of the world, except its drudgery. In these great movements we have participated, without knowing that from the pen of Thomas Paine, before the revolution, came the first plea and scheme for negro emancipation in this country, and the first argument for the admission of woman to some participation in the public work of the world. I have collected a large quantity of unpublished matter concerning Paine, but Charles Bradlaugh's career has been the document that has best enabled me to realise the historic significance of that early advocate of independence, and of justice irrespective of sex, race, or color.

Theology devised for Paine a retribution never accorded to any sinner outside the domain of imagination. Shakespeare, describing the punishment inflicted by meek and forbearing Christians on the Jew Shylock, represents them as taking away his property and also making him a Christian by baptism. The poet's satire on the Christians is recalled by the theological doom of Paine; they loudly affirm that he repented and recanted on his death-bed, but went to hell all the same. A place in heaven was never denied any penitent murderer on the scaffold, but Paine was sentenced to both conversion and damnation.

About fifteen years ago I was informed, on my arrival in New York, that Charles Bradlaugh was ill in St. Luke's Hospital. I hastened to visit him. His physician said that the illness had been very dangerous, indeed the patient was not yet out of danger. Bradlaugh had expected death. When I entered he took my hand eagerly, and showed a relief that at first I did not understand. But I presently saw that he had dreaded the slanders that swarmed around the dying and dead Paine. When I asked, “how can I help you?” he said, “I have been facing death—may presently be facing it again,—and my doctor, all who have approached me, can inform you whether at any moment they have seen in me any sign of fear. Should I die, you will be able to bear witness that I am not afraid to die,—have never been,—nor for a moment faltered from the principles to which my life has been devoted.”

So far as I could learn there had been no attempt to invade Bradlaugh's sick-room for pious purposes, and no doubt the disgraceful annoyances of Paine, in his last moments, could not now occur in any civilised

community. We must not, however, conclude that there has been a great change of heart in Christendom. There has been a change of head, and some weakening of "otherworldly" dogmas, by which interest in the freethinker's death bed and his doom after death has been enfeebled. But the first result was a transfer of the penalties to this world. Bradlaugh has had a harder time of it than Paine. Since I saw him in the hospital he has seen many a time when he might have been glad to postpone his persecutions to his final hour. His gospel of secularism had prevailed so far as to secularise his dogmatic adversaries, who were no longer satisfied to trust their offender to the future hell he had brought into doubt, but did their best to anticipate it. I say "offender," instead of heretic or freethinker, because mere heresy has not for a long time been a sufficient offence to incur the present penalties alluded to. Paine's attack on supernaturalism, as then established in popular hopes and terrors, and on the divine authority of the Bible, unsettled the foundations not only of the social order, but even endangered every parson's salary. Society and the parsons have, in the course of a century, adapted themselves to even larger measures of denial, and Paine, were he alive, would find his simple Theism conservative. The clergy would claim him as an ally against Ingersoll. But Paine's principles of rational investigation and fidelity to every ascertained truth, raised a standard of revolt against arbitrary authority which could be sustained only by being carried beyond the field of his particular battle. It must not be supposed that Paine dreamed that his Theism would be superseded,—though such anticipation would never have lowered his standard;—but what he did contemplate was the steady siege and reduction of every fortress of ecclesiastical and dogmatic authority.

This standard, at his death, passed from hand to hand; it passed through prisons; and at length it came into the hand of Charles Bradlaugh. He had not the genius of Paine, nor the constructive spirit of the author of whose testament he had become the executor. Which was well, for his business was to pull down. There is an actual incident of his early life that sounds like a fable of his future. When about twenty, he heard that some freethinkers had built a hall at Hackney on ground that was freehold. The freeholder had encouraged them to build, and even contributed, but took care not to give them a formal lease. In their ignorance they were entrapped; the freeholder claimed the building and piously forbade their use of it. Bradlaugh, with a hundred men, carried away every brick of that building, and left the clever freeholder his vacant lot, and his alluring pounds out of pocket. In much the same way, in later years, Bradlaugh confronted institutions built up by the toil

of the people, but from whose advantages they were withheld. His particular offence was that he explained to the people that the present royal family was founded by an act of Parliament, and might equally be abolished by the same power. Another offence was his exposure of the trivial or scandalous services to monarchs for which noble families were receiving pensions. These pensions he pulled down. He gave a great encouragement to freethought in demonstrating, by several successful suits, that English law would protect even "infidels" from libel and fraud. A duly hired hall having been closed against him by an intimidated contractor, he broke in the door, delivered his lectures, and when arrested proved his legal right before the magistrates. There was still, however, the difficulty for "infidels" that they could not give evidence without professing belief in future rewards and punishments. At this point Bradlaugh worked until the Evidence Amendment Acts were secured. This conflict went on until atheists were also admitted to sit on juries.

A relic of the old press laws under which Thomas Paine and his friends were tried, and all that could be got punished, survived in a provision that every new journal must give sureties, in eight hundred pounds, that it would not publish anything blasphemous or seditious. In 1868 the conservative government undertook to enforce this against Bradlaugh's "National Reformer." We all shuddered on reading at the head of his next issue, "Printed in Defiance of Her Majesty's Government." It proved to be Disraeli's bluff. Perhaps that Prime Minister feared that a trial might revive his own argument that Judas was as essential as Jesus to human salvation; at any rate his government backed down. But Gladstone's government took it up, but offered not to prosecute if Bradlaugh would admit himself wrong and stop his paper. Bradlaugh was his own lawyer; single handed he grappled with Sir R. Collier, Lord Coleridge, and Crompton Hutton, and beat them. "You have gained," wrote Mill, "a very honorable success in obtaining a repeal of the mischievous Act by your persevering resistance." The government's defeat in that suit having led to a civilisation of the press laws, there remained only one means by which freethought could be obstructed. If any one chose to think that any sentence in a book had an immoral tendency he had a good chance of suppressing that book, and thereby flinging some mud on its author or publisher, which might stick even after acquittal. In a previous paper I pointed out that, so far as hypocrisy might in that way restrict the entrance of the "age of reason" on moral and social problems, it has little prospect of success since the defeat of the Crown in its effort to punish Bradlaugh for publication of the "Fruits of Philosophy."

I say "the Crown"; but my reader will remember that the Crown which prosecuted also decided against itself. Let me here add that the critical historian who shall write the history of Queen Victoria's reign, will have to declare that during that reign England became a Republic; and that next to the Queen, Bradlaugh is to be credited with that result. The Queen's service has been the negative one of never interfering with Parliament or politics. How completely she has confirmed the supremacy of Parliament was tested when she was called on to sign Acts admitting into Parliament the man who had advocated "the impeachment of the House of Brunswick." She never interfered, but signed the abolition of the ancient oath. And she would as unhesitatingly have signed it had it been brought her before the House of Commons had disgraced itself. For some time Bradlaugh represented the constitution of England against a parliamentary mob. When the house refused to let its officers administer to him the oath, he administered it to himself. The legislative mobocrats tore his coat, imprisoned him in the Clock Tower, and boasted that they were stronger than he. But they were mistaken. The man who was put up to prosecute him for having voted without properly taking the oath did not know all the weapons in the ancient law-armory to which he appealed. There was an ancient law against "maintenance"—i. e. supplying money or other aid to any one to prosecute a third party. The distinguished member of the House of Commons who supplied the funds found the prosecution recoiling on him, and was so impoverished by damages added to his subsidies that the hat had to be passed around for him. Bradlaugh pleaded before the House of Lords, where he had no friendly ear, but it decided in his favor. By a series of brilliant legal victories, won from personally reluctant courts, Bradlaugh did much to convince the English masses that there was such a thing as a Constitution in Great Britain, and that the law could be depended on. In all this he especially fulfilled the last testament of Paine. His great forerunner's Quaker horror of war was increased by the revolutionary bloodshed in America and France; he had impressively exhorted his radical adherents in England to suffer much in order to make their revolution peaceful; he knew that his own principles were English principles, whatever ancient dross might mingle with them. Bradlaugh was the one leading English radical whose legal knowledge enabled him to see that the constitution was fundamentally on the side of freedom and justice. Had it not been for that knowledge, and his heroic perseverance, England might have suffered a bloody revolution. His every encounter burnt away the ancient dross and brought out the true elements of the constitution. But each effort burnt away some-

thing of his own life. Every victory took a year from his span. He was an eloquent speaker; and he might have written good books had not duty decided that his thoughts must be written in deeds.

So Charles Bradlaugh fulfilled Thomas Paine's trust. He passed the "Rights of Man" and the "Age of Reason" into Acts of Parliament. His death-bed was surrounded by fetters broken by his right arm. He was born, in 1833, into an England largely shackled in heart, brain, tongue, pen; he leaves an England as free as any country in the world.

CURRENT TOPICS.

AND now it is the Lord Mayor of London who has been detected in the awful crime of plagiarism. His Lordship delivered an address before the Polytechnic Institute, and it appears that most of his remarks were borrowed from a sermon preached by the Rev. Mr. Spurgeon in 1864. The *Pall Mall Gazette* published the two productions in deadly parrallels, and the Lord Mayor, being called on for an explanation, said that to the best of his knowledge he had never seen the sermon referred to, and could not account for the likeness between it and his own address. Here is a puzzle in psychology which ought to be explained. Can there be a vagrant mental soul, capable of inspiring two different men to express the same thoughts in the same language, without any collusion between them, and without either of them having heard or seen the speech and sentiment of the other? Or is the phenomenon the mischievous trick of a fairy, showing to her companions "what fools these mortals be"? Or is it a bit of metaphysical magic? Perhaps it is that spiritual freak which we call "unconscious cerebration," a vagary of hypnotism whereby the thoughts and words of others are photographed upon our own brains without our knowledge or consent. A London paper explains that the coincidence was due to the fact that Mr. Spurgeon and the Lord Mayor had both cribbed from the same orator, and this may be the correct solution of the mystery.

Plagiarism is one of the useful arts. How much vagabond and miscellaneous genius would be wasted were there not men of talent with industry and cunning enough to search for it, appropriate it, and set it in a literary frame. How many a gem of purest ray serene, flung carelessly from the brain of some political ranter, some social agitator, or some newspaper obscurity lies neglected and rejected until suddenly it flashes on us from the senate, or from some famous pulpit, or perhaps gleams at us from the pages of some great novel, history, or poem, apparently the original creation of the senator, the preacher, or the poet, as the case may be. This is good serviceable plagiarism, to which the world is much indebted, although when found out it goes by the name of larceny. How much of the founding genius of his time has been preserved to us by the hospitable plagiarism of Shakespeare, poetic and philosophic jewels which had he not adopted them would have been lost for ever! The magnanimous description of Cardinal Wolsey, given by Griffith in his dialogue with Queen Catherine, is taken almost literally from old Hollingshead's history, a book long since forgotten, and Shakespeare did well in taking it. When he committed literary theft it was always grand larceny; he never condescended to petit larceny; and at any rate, we can pardon Shakespeare for borrowing the thoughts of others when we remember how much and how often others have borrowed from him.

There is not plagiarism enough; it would be well if we had more of it, especially in the pulpit. A few years ago an eminent

minister of Chicago preached a sermon which was much admired. There was an unpleasant person present (there always is) who thought that he had read it in a religious journal called the *Foundation*, so he rummaged the files of that paper and found out that some passages in the sermon had been preached by a minister in London several months before. Then the newspapers printed the two sermons in parallel columns and exposed what they called the "offense" of the Chicago minister. He put in the plea of "unconscious cerebration," instead of stoutly avowing his act and justifying it. The truth is that our preachers do not plagiarise enough. If they did they would have larger congregations. People would go to church much oftener than they do if they thought the minister would occasionally plagiarise a sermon from some of the great preachers of the world. A minister who is tired, or nervous, or careworn, ought to be allowed to plagiarise a sermon, and if his selection be a good one he should have praise instead of blame for doing so. If a minister will honestly inform his parishioners that hereafter he will write his own sermons except when he feels tired, or sick, or mentally disturbed, and then will plagiarise a good one from somebody else, they will if they have any sense at all, not only be satisfied with the arrangement but give him an increase of salary.

* * *

Another comical bit of plagiarism arises from the morbid vanity that prompts us to affix our littleness to the greatness of some dead or living hero of the time. When a famous general dies there steps into the funeral that mendacious old veteran who tells that once upon the march when he was foot-sore and tired the general rode up surrounded by a brilliant staff, and dismounting from his horse helped the fainting soldier into the saddle, the general doing the rest of the march on foot while the weary straggler triumphantly rode six miles past his envious comrades, many of them foot-sore and weary as himself. The story does not say that the general carried the soldier's knapsack and gun, but of course this is understood, for without that service the act of kindness would be incomplete. At the funeral of General Sherman, this veracious veteran appeared, hailing from the town of Mechanicsburg, Ohio, and related the venerable fable just as it has been told of every general from Joshua to Sherman. When we consider that in the rear of a marching army there are always hundreds of sick and foot-sore men straggling along, the truth of the story becomes visible, and the kindness of the general in picking them up is magnified in proportion to the numbers thus relieved. Similar in vanity is the ancient fiction which explains the way to work through college. How comes it that whenever some unknown and unexpected person has the good luck to be elected to the United States senate, his biographers immediately inform us through the newspapers that he worked his way through college by "sawing wood." By what weird necromancy is this done? Or is this merely a college legend plagiarised from generation to generation? If not, what college is it that confers degrees upon young men for skill in sawing wood?

* * *

A great civic triumph has been won in Chicago; the Italians must not work on the Exposition buildings to be erected in honor of their countryman, Columbus. To threats of mischief hurled by "organised labor" is due this magnanimous achievement. It is now conceded that under some pretext or other the Italians are to be excluded from the work, and a sort of treaty is already pending, if it has not been ratified, between the Exposition authorities and "organised labor." The first article of this treaty is, "The employment of union labor as far as possible"; and the third is, "Preference to be given to local residents and American citizens." It is under this that the Italians are to be proscribed. It is pretended that they are especially aliens, and one of the great papers of Chicago actually spoke of the difficulty between them and the

"whites." This persecution of Italians is the most dangerous and selfish form of class tyranny that has yet appeared among our social complications since the abolition of slavery. Lest the Italians, or whoever may happen to be the proscribed element for the time, should escape the "American citizen" penalty by "taking out their papers," they are to be punished under the "local resident" clause of the treaty; and this is vague and general enough to include any sect or nationality that "organised labor" may choose to sentence to idleness and starvation. When this clause comes to be defined it will appear that "local residents" are those persons who have lived in the city for one, two, three, or ten years, or such time as may be dictated by this know-nothingism of labor. Every man in Chicago is a resident of the city whether he has been here ten days or ten years, and he has equal social rights with every other man, especially the right to labor for his bread. All men have the right to work for a living, and it is the right of every man that every other man shall work. All regulations, laws, decrees, and sentences that limit or abridge that right are cruel, despotic and unwise. They multiply the evils they are intended to diminish because they lessen production, and consequently the demand for labor. They reduce the working men to the condition of social cannibals devouring one another. Like the shipwrecked sailors on the raft, who when one man is eaten cast lots for another. So, in this case, when the Italians are devoured, it will be necessary to eat the Poles, and then the Hungarians, and then the Irish, and so on until the last man of the crew, having eaten all the others, quietly starves to death.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SENSIBILITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I REGRET that illness at home has delayed the expression of my sincere thanks to Mr. Ellis for pointing out, the unconscious misrepresentation I had made, in my article on the "Hidden Self," of Mr. Lewes's views. In this remote colony, to which I came three years ago, it was impossible for me to refer to Mr. Lewes's works; they had been parted with, together with the greater portion of my husband's library, as too heavy for transport. I thought my recollection of the passage referred to was so vivid that I need fear no mistake in relying on my memory. But in replacing the word "sensibility" by "consciousness" I see to my horror and vexation that I have attributed to Mr. Lewes the very word he strenuously objected to having used in that particular sense. The discrepancy lies, I trust, more in the particular word employed, than in the *idea* expressed. If we replace both "sensibility" and "consciousness" by the plain Anglo-Saxon word "feeling," it will be obvious that I was endeavoring to combat the same fallacy that Mr. Lewes did, viz. the prevalent idea that there can be no "feeling" where the connection with the highest cerebral centres have been destroyed. Mr. Lewes, says Mr. Ellis, was endeavoring to controvert the particular fallacy "that the Brain and the Brain only is the seat of Sensibility," and "that consequently the action of the rest of the Cerebro-Spinal Axis was 'purely Reflex, Physical, and Mechanical.' And the following passage given by Mr. Ellis would certainly have been quoted by me if I had had Mr. Lewes's works at hand, as expressing exactly what I should myself wish to say:

"It is true," he says, "that the man himself when interrogated declares that he feels nothing; the cerebral segment has attached to it, organs of speech, and expressive features by which its sensations can be communicated to others; whereas the spinal segment has no such means of communicating its sensations; but those which it has it employs." . . . "The question we have to

"decide therefore is, not whether a patient with an injured spine can feel impressions on, or convey voluntary impulses to limbs below the seat of injury—for as respects the nervous mechanism these limbs are separated from him no less than if actual amputation had taken place—the question is, whether these separated limbs have any sensibility? And the answer seems to me unequivocally affirmative. I assert therefore that if there is ample evidence to show that the spinal centres have sensibility when separated from the cerebral centres, such evidence can in no sense be weakened by the fact that a man with an injured spine is unconscious of impressions made below the seat of injury; such a fact follows necessarily from the establishment of two centres."

What Mr. Lewes, if I understand rightly, would call "consciousness" I should call "self-consciousness," meaning in both cases the function of the highest cerebral centres; these only can be called the seat of "the activity which is salient and discriminative." I used the word "consciousness" instead of "sensibility," because I cannot conceive of sensibility without consciousness. The strongest stimuli applied to sensory nerves are non-existent for the organism, that is no feeling of any kind is excited unless a response is elicited from some portion of the cerebro-spinal axis. If the "mind" is otherwise occupied, loud conversation will strike unheeded upon the ear, varied sights will pass unseen before the eye; rough contact will be unnoted. Sensibility I should define as the function of the peripheral sensory nerves, which convey the impressions made by the outer world to the mysterious energy we know as consciousness; an energy which appears to me to exist in its simplest form in unicellular organisms, and reaches its highest expression in the human brain. I cannot see that any break occurs throughout the animal kingdom; consciousness is found from the protozoön up to the human infant, and as the brain of the infant matures gradually expands in the highest cerebral centres into self-consciousness.

I do not like that it should be said or thought of me, that I "endeavor to increase the number of consciousnesses." If any endeavor of mine could decrease the number of consciousnesses, and restore the simple supreme Ego,—the one entity of which we used to feel certain,—to its old dominion, I would work willingly at the task. My only endeavor has been to put certain facts which appear indisputably proved by men of science, before the readers of *The Open Court* whilst I stated the conclusions to which those facts seem to point. I object strongly to what Dr. Carus has called an "onion structure of the soul," but the question in all physical science is not what one would like to be true, but what is, in point of fact, the Truth. MRS. ALICE BODINGTON.

MATSQUI, British Columbia.

[I do not remember ever having spoken of the "onion structure of the soul"; still I dissent from Mrs. Bodington's view of "the simple and supreme ego." P. C.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

MY UNCLE BENJAMIN. A Humorous, Satirical, and Philosophical Novel. By *Claude Tillier*. Translated from the French by Benj. R. Tucker. With a Sketch of the Author's Life and Works by Ludwig Pfau. Boston: Benj. R. Tucker.

This book has been buried in oblivion for almost thirty years, until it was brought to light again by a German *literateur*. Ludwig Pfau tells us the story of his discovery as follows:

"At the beginning of the fifties, while I was sauntering through Paris one day and standing before one of those itinerant news stalls that exhibit their wares on the ramparts of the quais and under the archways of the houses, my eyes caught sight of a stitched volume, of damaged appearance. No cover, no title-page, no preface, neither author nor printer,—nothing but a dirty title pasted

on with the three words: *Mon Oncle Benjamin*. I do not know what attraction these three words had for me, but they seemed to look at me in a friendly way, as if to say: "Only turn the leaves you will not regret it." I was not long to be entreated, and, indeed, scarcely had I hurried through a few pages when both style and contents began to fascinate me in such a degree that I bought the book for a few sous and put it in my pocket. Then I went to Luxembourg garden, took a seat beneath a chestnut tree, and did not rise again until I had read the book to the end.

The author of the book, Claude Tillier, had been forgotten, or perhaps never attained among his countrymen the prominence he deserved, simply because he had "lived in the province, died in the province and was therefore being ignored by Paris."

Ludwig Pfau visited his sunken grave and determined to revive the memory of Claude Tillier. He addressed his "pensive shade" in the lonely churchyard:

"Here you rest now, quietly and forsaken, under your modest sod, brave champion! I, too, am an exiled disciple of liberty, traveling along your paths and come for devotion to your grave. I, the refugee, will erect a monument to you in my home. I will translate your 'Benjamin,' into a language that appeals to forty millions of hearts. Look you, our enemies consider us as poor in wealth and as weak in power; but we are rich in spirit and strong of will, and we are their masters by the might of wisdom. An eternal law holds sway and its mighty spirit is leading the world gently, but irresistibly, towards our goal: the liberation of the human race, the reign of justice.

Concerning Tillier as an author Pfau says: Rarely do we find a combination of so much lyrical charm and so much polemical power and logical rigor as in the writings of Tillier. He was one of those beautiful natures of native nobility, who rise out of the depth of society, and who, in spite of temptation and misery, pass unsullied through the filth of life. Wholly of the third estate and of the people, he loved liberty passionately and battled for her heroically. Regardless of personal matters, he lived for his idea and found his reward in himself. Unselfishness was his virtue and human dignity his religion.

Mr. Benj. R. Tucker has translated Tillier's *Oncle Benjamin* into English—which, he says, is "a novel unlike any other by an author unlike any other."

After these testimonies we need not add that the book possesses a greater value than the literary merits of humor. The satire is only the garb which conceals the bravery of progress and the ideals of aspiring humanity.

GEORGE WASHINGTON'S RULES OF CIVILITY. Traced to their Sources and Restored. By *Moncure D. Conway*. New York: United States Book Company.

Mr. M. D. Conway explains the history of this his latest book in the preface as follows:

"Among the manuscript books of George Washington, preserved in the State Archives at Washington City, the earliest bears the date, written in it by himself, 1745. Washington was born February 11, 1731 O. S., so that while writing in this book he was either near the close of his fourteenth, or in his fifteenth year. It is entitled 'Forms of Writing,' has thirty folio pages, and the contents, all in his boyish handwriting, are sufficiently curious. Amid copied forms of exchange, bonds, receipts, sales, and similar exercises, occasionally, in ornate penmanship, there are poetic selections, among them lines of a religious tone on 'True Happiness.' But the great interest of the book centres in the pages headed: 'Rules of Civility and Decent Behavior in Company and Conversation.' The book had been gnawed at the bottom by Mount Vernon mice, before it reached the State Archives, and nine of the 110 Rules have thus suffered, the sense of several being lost.

"The Rules possess so much historic interest that it seems surprising that none of Washington's biographers or editors should have given them to the world. . . . But in 1888 the Rules were subjected to careful and literal treatment by Dr. J. M. Toner, of Washington City, in the course of his magnanimous task of preserving, in the Library of Congress, by exact copies, the early and perishing note-books and journals of Washington. This able literary antiquarian has printed his transcript of the Rules (W. H. Morrison; Washington, D. C. 1888), and the pamphlet, though little known to the general public, is much valued by students of American history. With the exception of one word, to which he called my attention, Dr. Toner has given as exact a reproduction of the Rules, in their present damaged condition, as can be made in print. The illegible parts are precisely indicated, without any conjectural insertions, and young Washington's spelling and punctuation subjected to no literary tampering.

"Concerning the source of these remarkable Rules there have been several guesses. . . ."

Mr. Conway suspected a French origin of Washington's "Rules of Civility," because his first teacher in Fredericksburg, Va., had been the Rev. James Marye, a native of that country; and he at last succeeded, with the assistance of Dr. Garnett, librarian of the British Museum, in discovering the source of the manuscript.

Mr. Conway tells us the curious story of how these rules migrated from an old Jesuit College in France, through the hands of a Huguenot to Virginia. He adds:

"Here then are rules of conduct, taught, if my theory be correct, by a French protestant pilgrim, unknown to fame, in the New World. They were taught to a small school of girls and boys, in a town of hardly a hundred inhabitants. They are maxims partly ethical, but mainly relate to manners and civility; they are wise, gentle, and true. A character built on them would be virtuous, and probably great."

NORA; OR, A DOLL'S HOUSE. AND GHOSTS. By *Henrik Ibsen*. Translated from the Norwegian by Henrietta Frances Lord. Chicago: Lily Publishing House.

The translation of these two dramas of the great Norwegian poet by Miss Henrietta Frances Lord is sufficiently clear to bring home to us the awe and power of the original—provided we have sufficient patience, and are not disturbed by the oddities of certain awkward expressions and literal renderings.

Ibsen's poems cannot be read for amusement, they must be studied, and the more carefully they are read, the more food for thought will they give. They present to us the sickness of our time partly to suggest a cure, partly to give way to a hopeless pessimism. "Nora, or A Doll's House" treats of the woman question. Nora has lived in a doll's house, her life has been play rather than serious work. Being confronted with duties she makes a mistake which legally, however, would have been a crime. With the purest of motives she forged her husband's signature, who is president of a bank. Shame and ruin threaten; her husband is full of indignation. But all turns out well; the danger of public exposure passes by; he calms down and is satisfied. But Nora is not. Having been so long a mere plaything, the doll of her husband, having faced the terrible possibility of criminal prosecution and conviction, she decides to learn the duties of life, to become independent in conscience and judgment. Her husband hopes in vain that she will stay, but she leaves his house.

Nora suggests a cure, but the "Ghosts" ends in desolation. It is the most awe-inspiring tragedy of modern times. The title is suggested by an incident. The son, Oswald Alving, has inherited the proclivities of his father; the father is dead, yet the

same incident happens again, but in addition to the proclivities of the father, Oswald has inherited the wages of his sin—a most terrible disease which terminates in a softening of the brain.

THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH. An Exposition of Socialism. By *Laurence Gronlund*, M. A. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

This book contains not so much discussions on social economy, as the Nationalists' creed concerning social economy. The present system is described as the Profit system and capital is defined as "mainly accumulated fleecings." Mr. Gronlund is possessed of a boundless optimism as to the results of society's adopting nationalism. All the evils which are felt now will pass away, and the happy issue of the coming revolution will be a millennium upon earth.

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BELIEF IN GOD.*

BY PROF. F. MAX MÜLLER.

To my mind the historical proof of the existence of God, which is supplied us by the history of the religions of the world, has never been refuted; and cannot be refuted. It forms the foundation of all other proofs, call them cosmological, ontological, or teleological; or, rather, it absorbs them all, and makes them all superfluous.

There are those who declare that they require no proof at all for the existence of a Supreme Being, or, if they did, that they would find it in revelation. Suppose they wanted no proof themselves, would they really not care at all to know how the human race, and how they themselves, came in possession of what, I suppose, they value as their most precious inheritance. Do they really think that in this case an examination of the ancient title-deeds might safely be dispensed with, while with regard to much less precious holdings it is considered a plain duty to guard these documents with the greatest care.

An appeal to revelation is of no avail in deciding questions of this kind. The history of religions teaches us that the same appeal to a special revelation is made, not only by Christianity, but by the defenders of Brahmanism, of Zoroastrianism, and of Mohammedanism, and where is the tribunal to adjudicate on the conflicting appeals of these and other claimants? The believer in the Vedas is as thoroughly convinced of the superhuman origin of his ancient hymns as the Zoroastrian of that of the Gathas and the Mohammedan of that of the Surahs; and the subtle arguments by which each, but more particularly the Brahman, supports his claims, would put some of our ablest casuists to shame. The followers of every one of these religions declare their belief in the revealed character of their own religion, never in that of any other religion. Many persons believe, and believe honestly, in visions they have had themselves, never in the visions claimed by other people. We may appeal to revelation in the court of our own conscience, but, before the court of universal appeal, we require different proofs for the faith that is in us.

Our belief in God as the author of all that exists,

* From the report of the fourth Gifford Lecture in the *Christian World*, sent by Prof. Max Müller.

whether we call Him father, or creator, or supporter of the world, has its deepest, its only living roots in that ancient, universal stratum of thought which postulated an agent in the sky, the sun, the fire, and the storm-wind; which was not satisfied with the mere play of appearances in nature, but yearned to know what it was that appeared; which felt the limits of the finite in all its sensuous perceptions, and in feeling the limits, felt at the same time the presence of something that was beyond those limits. This dissatisfaction with the finite, this struggle after the non-finite, this search for an agent for every act, of a mover for every movement, whatever shape it took, whatever name it claimed, forms the primitive and indestructible foundation of man's faith in God. If it is taken away, people may indeed have dogma, and may have creeds, but they cannot have their own ineradicable conviction that there is and that there must be a God.

Dogma can supply no argument against Atheism. Dogma is what my excellent colleague at Edinburgh, Mr. Hutchison Stirling, has very truly called mere *Vorstellung* which requires for its philosophical foundation the *Begriff*. But that *Begriff* has a history, and it is this history of the *Begriff* which to my mind is the true, because unanswerable answer to all Atheism. I should go so far as to say that the history of religion is the best proof of religion, just as the growth of the oak-tree is the best proof of the oak-tree. There may be excrescences, there may be dead leaves, there may be broken branches, but the oak-tree is there, once for all, whether in the sacred groves of Germany, or at Dodona, or in the Himalayan forests. It is there, not by our own will, but by itself, or by a Higher Will. There may be corruptions, there may be antiquated formulas, there may be sacred writings flung to the wind, but religion is there, once for all, in all its various representations. You can as little sweep away the oak-tree with all its millions of seeds from the face of the earth, as you can eradicate religion from the human heart.

The history of religion teaches us that the one everlasting conviction on which the whole of Natural Religion has been built from the beginning of the world is *true*. That is the conviction that there is an Infinite behind the finite, that there is an agent behind all acts, there is a *God in nature*. Convince the hu-

man understanding that there can be acts without agents, that there can be a limit without something beyond, that there can be a finite without a non-finite, and you have proved that there is no God. But let it be shown that the universality of that belief rests on that without which sense would not be sense, reason would not be reason, man would not be man, and we may say that for man as he is, for reason as it is, nay even for the perceptions of the senses as they are, belief in something infinite, in an agent, in a god, is irresistible. All names that human language has invented may be imperfect, may be deceptive, and may have to be replaced by newer and ever truer names. But the name 'I AM THAT I AM' will remain for those who think Semitic thought, while to those who speak Aryan languages it will be difficult to invent a better name than that of the Vedanta, *Sat-Kit ananda*, He who is, who knows, and who is blessed.

IS THE INFINITE A RELIGIOUS IDEA?

PROF. MAX MUELLER'S view of religion is based on the conception of the infinite. His idea of God is the infinite behind the finite. He says:

"Convince the human understanding that there can be acts without agents, that there can be a limit without something beyond, that there can be a finite without a non-finite, and you have proved that there is no God."

Is this not going rather too far? Does the agent supposed to be behind the processes of nature constitute nature's divinity? Prof. Max Müller's view of God is scientific as well as radical, but it makes of religion a metaphysical speculation; it identifies it with the conception of an hypothetic something behind nature of which we really know nothing. It appears very desirable to free religion from this metaphysical element and build it upon the positive facts of our experience which will always remain its safest foundation.

Positivism knows of no agent behind the natural phenomena; it dispenses also with the agent behind the psychical processes of soul-life. Positivism is an economy of thought. Instead of viewing acts as motions produced by the pressure of an agent behind them, we think the act and agent together as one. The agent is *in*, not *behind* the act. The act is the agent itself.

Positivism is commonly represented as atheism just as much as the view of the orthodox Oxford Professor would have been decried as atheism some ten or twenty years ago. And I grant that Positivism is not Theism, if Theism means the belief in a personal God who being shaped into the image of man, is conceived as an individual being, as a great world-ego swayed by considerations and even by passions and emotions, thinking now of this now of that thought, and regulat-

ing the affairs of the universe as it pleases him like a powerful monarch.

There is nothing more or less divine in the infinite than in any other mathematical, logical, or scientific idea. The infinite has one advantage only—if it be an advantage—over other ideas; its nature is less understood. But if there were anything divine in the conception of the infinite, why do we not use such formulas as $\frac{\pi}{2}$ or tangent 90 degrees, or simply the sign ∞ as holy emblems in our churches?

Prof. Max Müller must have felt this insufficiency of the idea of infinitude as the basis of religion. At least he has on another occasion modified his definition. In a former article of his,* Prof. Max Müller says:

"It may be said in fact it has been said, that the definition of religion which I laid down is too narrow and too arbitrary. . . . I thought it right to modify my first definition of religion as 'the perception of the Infinite,' by narrowing that perception to 'such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man.' I do not deny that in the beginning the perception of the Infinite had often very little to do with moral ideas, and I am quite aware that many religions enjoin what is either not moral or even immoral. But though there are perceptions of the Infinite unconnected as yet with moral ideas, I doubt whether they should be called religious till they assume a moral influence. On this point there may be difference of opinion, but every one may claim the right of his own opinion."

The infinite, it appears to me, is not at all a specially religious idea, and it will be very difficult to prove how the idea of the infinite can ever assume a moral influence, except in a very limited sphere. The powers of nature in their overwhelming influence upon the fate of man in a beneficent and evil way, the light of the sun, the flashes of the thunderstorm, the joy of great triumphs, the enthusiasm after extraordinary successes, our trials and sorrow at the bedside of our beloved ones, the agonies and anxieties of life, in one word definite and actual realities have done much more than the idea of the infinite in the production of religion. I am aware that Prof. Max Müller says: "These finite realities suggest an infinite agent beyond them." But this is no description of religion; it is an interpretation of religious ideas, representing them in a special phase of development.

The infinite may have produced a religious awe in a lonely scholar when he pondered over the problems of its nature and found himself unable to solve them. And it may have stirred a still deeper religious emotion in the mathematical mind who succeeded in solving some of its problems. But the same religious influence must be attributed to any other scientific idea. Was not Kepler overwhelmed with the grandeur of the cosmos when he solved the riddle of the motions of the heavenly bodies? Was not his emotion

* *Fire-Worship and Mythology in their Relation to Religion*. (The Open Court, page 2322, No. 146, Vol. IV.—16).

truly religious, and is there anything infinite in his formulas?

It will be noticeable that the infinite as a properly religious idea enjoys a very limited field. The two greatest religious documents are to my mind the Decalogue representing the Old Testament and the Lord's Prayer representing the New Testament; in neither can any idea of the infinite be found. It is true that the Lord's prayer ends with the clause "for thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, forever, Amen." "Forever" I grant, means infinite time. But it is well known that these words are not genuine with Christ; they have been added by the Christians of the first or second century; and if they were genuine, how incidental is the idea of the infinite, how secondary if compared with the momentous propositions of the prayer itself! It appears that religion would not suffer if the idea of the infinite were entirely dropped from its definition and Prof. Max. Müller's additional clause (i. e. "that which will influence the moral character of man") were made its main essence.

The definition of God as the infinite conveys no clear idea. The popular view of the infinite is very indefinite, and its scientific conception is a thought-symbol for a process never to be finished. The scientific view of the infinite does not represent a complete and real thing, but an incomplete and never to be completed function. Suppose that in measuring the world we arrived at the last star of the farthest milky way and took our stand between the definite reality behind, and empty space before us, is there no divinity in the finite existences we have measured, and is God living in the nothingness of the infinite space that lies beyond us unmeasured and immeasurable?

Let us define God as those realities of our experience to which we have to conform; as those manifestations of nature which we cannot fashion; as those laws of cosmic existence which we have to obey; and atheism will never again rise to overthrow the proofs of an existence of God. God is the authority of moral conduct, and religion is the basis of morality. All ideas which influence the moral character of man are religious while dogmas are either religiously indifferent, as if they represent ideas having no bearing upon moral conduct, or even deeply irreligious, if they are productive of immoral habits. And one of the most immoral church doctrines, not as yet entirely abandoned by orthodox people, is that man should believe blindly. It is a sacred religious duty to investigate the truth most scrupulously. Religion is not belief in the supernatural as the theologian of the old school says, nor is it the search for the infinite, as Prof. Max Müller says. Religion is much simpler. It is our search for truth with the aspiration to regulate our conduct in accord with truth.

P. C.

THE QUESTIONS OF AGNOSTICISM.

BY ELLIS THURTELL.

As an independent Agnostic, and a regular reader of *The Open Court* I hope I may be permitted to express the contemplative pleasure given me by the editorial article with the above title in the issue for January 29th.

What is there called the "Agnosticism of Science" is, I believe, the attitude of a strong and growing section of our English Agnostics. Among this section the doctrine of the Unknowable is very much equivalent to the doctrine of the Unknown. And the religion of the Unknown has special stress laid upon it, not at all for the purpose of restricting inquiry—as is sometimes represented—but for the purpose of pointing out the actual ignorance of those who assume to have what they are pleased to call supernatural knowledge.

Moreover, those who hold by this form of agnosticism consider that, if there be any advantage in the term "Unknowable," as against the term "Unknown," it lies in the greater emphasis supposed to be laid, by the Spencerian term, on the creation of a common ground, upon which philosophical *naturalists* may meet those philosophical *supernaturalists* who are willing to allow Science an absolutely free pass in every field of investigation—not excepting that of Theology itself.

It certainly does seem to the writer that,—whatever be the precise meaning which our great master, Herbert Spencer, attaches to the word,—the Unknowable must be held to have reference, not to all eternity, but merely to the present time. Even Goethe, whose scientific philosophy was so often tinged with a poetic mysticism, could say: "Man must always in some sense cling to the belief that the unknowable is knowable, otherwise speculations would cease." This is of course tantamount to admitting that "unknowable" is in reality only a question-begging epithet, if applied to any criterion of knowledge other than that which we at present possess; and an epithet that may easily be made an excuse for indolent acquiescence in know-nothingness.

It is surely time that some more close and comprehensive agreement than now maintains should be arranged, between such thinkers of the Positive-Monist, and the Agnostic School, as hold in common the "Agnosticism of Science" portrayed in the recent article in question. With all due deference to the able journalistic leaders of either side, I cannot but think that they are sometimes prone to magnify into essential differences what are only individualist distinctions, perfectly compatible with shoulder-to-shoulder philosophic fight against all supernaturalistic opponents.

A DEBATE ON MONEY AND ITS FUNCTIONS.

BY GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.

THEY had a most animated and exciting debate at the banquet of the *Sunset Club* on the 19th of last month, for the subject was "Money and its functions," a theme fruitful of political superstitions, and illuminated by a spiritual faith in the omnipotence of government to make the numbers three and five exactly equal in quantity and value to each other, an innocent belief in the miraculous power of Congress to engraft new laws upon the ancient scheme of Nature, so that we may gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles, or pluck dollars from the tree of legislation, a feat which amounts to the same thing.

The debate was opened by Mr. Clinton Furbish in a glowing speech, witty, sarcastic, and sharp; a speech abounding in assertions proving the "fiat" prerogative of government, its divine authority to create money, and its ability to transmute base matter into diamonds by a touch of its magic wand, as easily as the fairy changed mice into horses in order that the beautiful Cinderella might ride in grandeur to the prince's ball. He said that "fiat money saved the nation," that the soldiers were paid for saving it in "the crisp greenback, the fiat money of the government. And if it is not money to-day, call the roll and pay off Sherman's army, for if they were not paid in greenbacks they have not been paid yet." This was "crisp" as the greenback itself, but it called up a most unlucky reminiscence, the bad character of the greenback, and the mischievous mistake that brought it into being. The vice of it was its limited purchasing power, a corruption incurable by human fiat, and the soldiers were cheated by it; not the soldiers only, but all people dependent upon wages expressed in "dollars." The same objection applies to all paper money not redeemable on demand in the dearest metallic money current in its time.

With much enthusiastic feeling, and a good deal of eloquent "spellbinding," Mr. Furbish glorified the legal tender greenback, and sneered at the gold bug and the silver bug. In the creation of abundant fiat money he beheld the relief and the regeneration of the poor, the solution of the social problem, and the coronation of justice as king over all the nations. As a basis for fiat money, after scornfully rejecting gold and silver, Mr. Furbish offered this, "the power of the people to collect a revenue." In explanation he said, "It rests on the power of the government to collect a revenue beyond a tax, wider than a tax, taking more than you conceive is necessary for a tax, because it takes that value which the community created, which belongs to the community." Here appears to be the "single tax" plan for the confiscation of land values presented as a basis for a paper currency, and

in further illustration of his meaning he supposed the government engaged in building roads; it pays for the work in fiat money, this passes into circulation as currency, and gets back to the government again as taxes. In the words of Mr. Furbish, "Issue your money from your government for services rendered. It goes from the government and passes from hand to hand in the transfer of commodities, and returns in the form of revenue to that government, forming the only honest and fair basis of circulation, and stops forever the power to maintain a corner in gold or silver."

All that seems like building our monetary system on a cloud. The foundation on which Mr. Furbish would build a system of paper fiat money is just as intangible and fleeting as a cloud, because the government has not the rightful power of collecting "a revenue beyond a tax, wider than a tax, and more than is necessary for a tax," nor is a stable currency possible on such a shifting foundation as the expenditures of government, because these are a drain on the resources of the people, and never can become an addition to their wealth. No fiat of the government can give a dollar's value to a piece of paper, nor will it pass current for a moment until commercial vitality is given to it by the express or implied promise of the government to redeem it in metallic money having the same value according to its weight before coining as after, and independent of the image and superscription stamped upon it.

For centuries mankind has been afflicted with social wrongs because of the political mistake of governments that they possess the prerogative of creating money. Markets, not governments, determine what is money. No matter what nominal value governments may give to coins or paper bills, their actual value in exchange is fixed in the markets of the world. The commercial value given to a piece of paper by making it a legal tender in the payment of debts is a limited and abnormal value, a dishonest coercion of creditors, and the weakness of it appears in the fact that although government may compel a merchant to accept it in payment of a debt, it cannot compel him to receive it in payment for his goods. Here the fiat becomes impotent, and the legal tender usurpation fails.

The fiat experiment of the French republic is a lesson and a warning. This was much better money than our greenbacks, because it was not only legal tender in payment of debts but in payment for goods also; and besides, it was secured by a pledge of real estate, the confiscated lands of the nobles and the clergy. It was better than a mortgage. The first issue was made on All Fools day 1790, and amounted to \$80,000,000. This answered such an admirable purpose as what Mr. Furbish calls "a tool of trade," and was such an

easy and picturesque addition to the national wealth, that paternal statesmanship multiplied it by three, and as there was no scarcity of paper and printing presses, \$240,000,000 of this fiat money was issued before the end of the year.

In addition to its "legal tender" and real estate security, this money was further supported by the fervent patriotism which then animated France. It was the mark of an aristocrat and traitor to discredit the money of the republic. Still, for all that, it was at a discount of ten per cent. on New Year's day 1791. It was alleged as a reason for this that there was not enough of it to satisfy the wants of trade. So they issued a million dollars more of it by September 1792, but in spite of every stimulant its credit languished, and before Christmas it was at a discount of thirty-seven per cent.

The government greatly annoyed at the folly of the people who preferred coarse, materialistic silver and gold to "crisp" and pictorial paper, demonetised those unpatriotic metals, and forbade the use of them; and in order that the dollar might have "a uniform purchasing power," they fixed the maximum price of bread, and meat, and coal, and other things; but by a strange oversight they neglected to say how much wheat should grow on an acre of land; or how much wool a sheep should wear. They also made it a penal offense to ask any more for goods than the legal price; or to refuse the legal tenders in payment for merchandise, and as the "volume" of the currency was not yet large enough to restore confidence, to relieve the money market, to move the crops, to lift the mortgage, and perform other necessary miracles, they increased it by September 1793, to one thousand million dollars; but the laws of the market were paramount over the laws of the land, and the fiat money was at a discount of 55 per cent. However, the printing press never tired, and the making of money went on, until by the end of 1795, they had issued \$4,000,000,000, and it was at a discount of 99 per cent. Then the government decreed the penalty of death against those who should discredit this money, or refuse to take it at its face value for all goods and commodities whatsoever; and still feeling that the volume of it was insufficient for the wants of trade, they increased it to nine thousand million dollars, forty five thousand million francs. Then it reached par—it was worth nothing. And no fiat has been able to give it any value unto this day.

The chief speaker on the other side was Mr. Lyman J. Gage, who traced the evolution of money from shells and coonskins up to gold and silver which now hold supreme dominion as money, by virtue of the inexorable sentence that the fittest shall survive. "It does not need a moment's thought," said Mr. Gage, "to satisfy us that it was by a true *survival of the fittest*

that gold and silver finally obtained universal recognition as money, and superseded all other forms of it." Further, he explained, that gold and silver are universal money, not dependent upon coinage for its quality, nor upon statutes for its value. He showed the mistake of attributing to the stamp upon a coin the money value which really lies under it. He also denied that the legal tender sanction which the law places upon the issues of its mint gave any new and original value to such legal tender coin.

Mr. Gage explained the apparent paradox that seventy-five cents worth of silver when coined into a dollar becomes equal to one hundred cents in gold. He showed that the cheaper dollar is indirectly redeemed by the government, every time it is received for taxes at the value of a dollar in gold; but he also said that the time would come when by reason of the superabundance of silver coins, the government would not be able to do this, but would be compelled to pay out silver dollars at their bullion value, thereby putting the business of the country on a silver basis, gold being driven out as currency, but earning a good living in the business of discounting silver and greenback dollars.

Several other members of the club reinforced the arguments of Mr. Furbish, and Mr. Gage, by pertinent remarks, but nobody exposed that arrogant pretension of governments which impels them to interfere with money and its functions, especially that dishonest usurpation of authority to make anything whatever a legal tender in payment of debts. No earthly power can do that. The law that attempts to do it is void in morals as it is mischievous in policy. A debt contains a moral obligation which none but the debtor can discharge.

So, also, nobody denied the right of government to nickname coins in order to give them an arbitrary and artificial character expressive of no quality in the coins. Why not make an honest ounce of silver a monetary unit and name it truthfully an "Ounce." If the name of every coin expressed the actual weight of it, the multiple or fraction of an "Ounce," the people would not be so easily deceived by the fiscal tricks of governments. Florins, francs, dollars, and shillings, are deceitful nicknames, intended to conceal the quality of the money they pretend to describe. They may be of different weights at different times, but no government could coin three hundred grains of silver and call it an "Ounce" without being at once detected, nor could such a coin be made available to cheat the working man out of a part of his wages.

The debate at the Sunset club while excellent as far as it went, would have been more instructive had it reached further down towards the moral elements of money and its functions.

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF ETHICS.

BY MORRISON I. SWIFT.

THE nervous system is the physiological seat of morality. The breaking of the balance of the nervous system is, in that degree, the breaking up of morality, and is already hell. The nervous system is a delicate musical instrument; if you disturb the least of its atoms the harmony begins to falter. It depends upon such apparently remote things as the girth of the chest, the lifting power, and the density of the flesh. There is a moment of utmost physical perfection and at that very moment the nervous system is playing the ninth symphony and singing supernal songs. A day indoors drives out Beethoven and shuts up heaven. A year at the counter, or desk, or dictionary, may forever cloud the face of God. When love dies God dies, said Tolstoï, if not in these words by suggestion in his wonderful title "Where love is there God is." Love and God are functions of the nervous system. In that moment of utmost physical perfection love is alive and God is there. God dies by inches out of most lives. These beautiful presences, God and love, depend on the love and God capacity. An ounce of food taken daily beyond the need of food banishes daily more than an ounce of God. The progressive atrophy of the tissues through want of use denotes the atrophy of God and love. Love is the self-annihilating instinct of one being in the presence of another—and the power of instincts is greatest in the prime of man. Love is charity, and in the immense recuperation morning of life generosity is supreme.

Let us be not mocked. Age kills God.

"What is it to grow old?"

It is to spend long days
And not once feel that we were ever young;

It is to suffer this,
And feel but half, and feebly, what we feel.
Deep in our hidden heart
Festers the dull remembrance of a change,
But no emotion—none.*

We must grow old, but we need not grow prematurely old. Every departure from the perfect physical life is expiated by premature age. Age neither suffers nor enjoys. Where feeling is not there God is not. The tranquility of an old man is not happiness. "Do you say that old age is unfeeling?" asks Oliver Wendell Holmes. "It has not vital energy enough to supply the waste of the more exhausting emotions." Can we postpone old age? This is the question at the heart of all Bibles and moral treatises. This same youthful octogenarian, Dr. Holmes, gives us warning with genial sadness of what must happen to every daring survivor who scales the white peaks of age. "Nature's kindly anodyne is telling upon us more and more with every year. Our old doctors used to give an opiate

* Matthew Arnold, *Growing Old*.

which they called 'the black drop.' It was stronger than laudanum, and, in fact, a dangerously powerful narcotic. Something like this is that potent drug in Nature's pharmacopœia which she reserves for the time of need,—the later stages of life. She commonly begins administering it at about the time of the 'grand climacteric,' the ninth septennial period, the sixty-third year. More and more freely she gives it, as the years go on, to her grey-haired children, until, if they last long enough, every faculty is benumbed, and they drop off quietly into sleep under its benign influence." Happiness is contingent upon the degree of life and sensation, and these have ebbed low in the old man. "Time, the inexorable, does not threaten him with the scythe so often as with the sand bag. He does not cut, but he stuns and stupefies."*

There are no tumultuous sufferings in age, but I cannot acquit the prematurely old of the sorrows of hell. In them "festers the dull remembrance of a change" that wisdom might have deferred.

Physical and moral are at last one. They have the same root and trunk; we differentiate them by analysis, and fictitiously. Moral pains are as physical as the hand or foot. They are the discomfiture of the physical elements, and are caused alike by infractions of the so-called moral law and by bodily distempers. A cold not only sharpens the knives of conscience but its effect is incipient moral insanity. We may be sure that conduct which in none of its consequences tends to the destruction of the physical is not immoral. The greater part of moral suffering in the world is the product of a misunderstanding. Actions are supposed to be injurious that are not injurious, and they are met with the moral lash. The moral castigation causes unmeasured suffering but suffering that was gratuitous, mistaken, ignorance-born. "Terrible to me are the awful sufferings from trifles and unnecessary catastrophies," said Rakhmëtof.†

Thus at last all morality and all religion, all questions of the conduct of life and the attainment of happiness and heaven and God, return in the grand sweep of the circle wherein the universe is compassed to this,—the perfection of man's body. Whatever goods we know are ascending goods while the sun of life goes up, lessening all the fading afternoon until darkness sombrely invests them and terminates all. It were worthy the ecstasies and sacrifices of all the best of a generation or of ten generations to establish this central and spheric character of the body; at bottom the groping aim of fetish worshipper and priest and scientist in all generations since the cenozoic time, although obscured by many obscurations of theory, conscious purpose and method.

* *Over the Ten Cups*, p. 30.

† In Tchermusheosky's *A Vital Question*.

CORRESPONDENCE.

APOSTLES OF THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :—

I HAVE looked in vain in the literary periodicals of the last few years for any adequate notice of the *Journal Intime* of Henri Frederic Amiel, 'the lonely Genevese Professor' as Mrs. Ward calls him in her Introduction to her admirable translation of the two volumes published by Macmillan & Co. in 1885.

The authoress of "Robert Elsmere" declares that Amiel "speaks for the life of to-day as no other single voice has yet spoken for it." As a contribution of the religion of the future which is sure to arise, and which is indeed now well above the horizon, the thoughts and speculations of our author are invaluable. As formative influences leading to the highest, most spiritual, truly religious life I would place in the hands of our young people these two precious volumes with the valuable Introduction, and the writings of our own Emerson. I am more and more persuaded the older I grow, that it is not the quantity so much as the quality of what one reads and digests that tells. The author of "Nature," "The Conduct of Life," and the other priceless essays, enlarges, enriches, and enlightens the mind perhaps more than any other writer of our day. The great secret of his charm and influence is, that his is an essentially modern mind. Emerson like Amiel speaks most emphatically for the "life of to-day." "Every man is a scholar potentially and does not need any one good so much as this of right thought," says Emerson, and adds "the true scholar is the Church. Only the duties of intellect must be owned. Down with these dapper trimmers and sychophants! Let us have masculine and divine men, formidable law-givers, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, who warp the churches of the world from their traditions and penetrate them through and through with original perception. The intellectual man lives in perpetual victory." And now to return after our digression to Amiel. No question is so important and so deeply interesting as the religious question—or in other words the question of the so-called supernatural. Is religion possible without a belief in or at least acceptance of miracles? Now hear Amiel on this subject. In a notice of Ernest Havet's "Origines du Christianisme," he says: "The author for instance has no clear idea of religion; and his philosophy of history is superficial. He is a Jacobin. 'The Republic and Free Thought'—he cannot get beyond that. This curt and narrow school of opinion is the refuge of men of independent mind, who have been scandalised by the colossal fraud of ultramontaniam; but it leads rather to cursing history than to understanding it. It is the criticism of the eighteenth century, of which the general result is purely negative. But Voltairianism is only the half of the philosophic mind. Hegel frees thought in a very different way. Havet too, makes another mistake. He regards Christianity as synonymous with Roman Catholicism and with the Church. I know very well that the Roman Church does the same, and that with her the assimilation is a matter of sound tactics; but scientifically it is inexact. We ought not even to identify Christianity with the Gospel, nor the Gospel with religion in general. It is the business of critical precision to clear away these perpetual confusions in which Christian practice and Christian preaching abound. To disentangle ideas, to distinguish and limit them, to fit them into their true place and order, is the first duty of science whenever it lays hold upon such chaotic and complex things as manners, idioms, or beliefs. Entanglement is the condition of life; order and clearness are the signs of serious and successful thought. Formerly it was the ideas of nature which were a tissue of errors and incoherent fancies; now it is the turn of moral and psychological ideas. The best issue from the present Babel would be the formation or the sketching out of a truly scientific science of man."

One more quotation to illustrate the manner in which such a consummate scholar as Amiel approaches this great subject of religion. "But does the study of nature allow of the maintenance of those local revelations which are called Mosaism, Christianity, Islamism? These religions, founded upon an infantine cosmogony, and upon a chimerical history of humanity, can they bear confronting with modern astronomy and geology? The present mode of escape, which consists in trying to satisfy the claims of both science and faith—of the science which contradicts all the ancient beliefs, and the faith which in the case of things that are beyond nature and incapable of verification, affirms them on her own responsibility only. This mode of escape cannot last forever. Every fresh cosmical conception demands a religion which corresponds to it."

There is another book which is rich in suggestions and full of "formative influences." Renan's "Recollections of my Youth," translated by C. B. Pitman and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1883. The preface is especially worth reading over and over again. Allow me to give you one or two quotations from the book itself. "The very effort to shake off opinions in some respects unreasonable, had its advantages. Because a Paris flibbertigibbet disposes with a joke of creeds, from which Pascal with all his reasoning powers, could not shake himself free, it must not be concluded that the *ganache* is superior to Pascal. I confess that I at times feel humiliated to think that it cost me five or six years of arduous research, and the study of Hebrew, the Semitic languages, Gesenius and Ewald to arrive at the result which this urchin achieves in a twinkling. These pilings of Pelion upon Ossa seem to me when looked at in this light, a mere waste of time. But Père Hardouin observed that he had not got up at four o'clock every morning for forty years to think as all the world thought. So I am loath to admit that I have been at so much pains to fight a mere *chimera hominans*. No, I cannot think that my labors have been all in vain, nor that victory is to be won in theology as cheaply as the scoffers would have us believe. There are, in reality, but few people who have a right not to believe in Christianity. If the great mass of people only knew how strong is the net woven by the theologians, how difficult it is to break the threads of it, how much erudition has been spent upon it, and what a power of criticism is required to unravel it all. . . . I have noticed that some men of talent who have set themselves too late in life the task have been taken in the toils and have not been able to extricate themselves."

Once more one of the most learned and certainly distinguished of modern Frenchmen declares, "I no longer believe Christianity to be the supernatural summary of all that men can know; but I still believe that life is the most frivolous of things, unless it is regarded as one great and constant duty. Oh! my beloved old teachers," he exclaims, "Yes, I have said that your history was very short measure, that your critique had no existence, and that your natural philosophy fell far short of that which leads us to accept as a fundamental dogma. 'There is no special supernatural;' but in the main I am still your disciple." "Life is only of value by devotion to what is true and good."

In conclusion allow me to call your attention to a very remarkable address by Principal Fairbairn at the opening of Mansfield College, Oxford, in 1889, and published in the *Contemporary Review* during the summer, I think, of that year—one or two quotations must suffice, but I trust that your readers will turn to the address and ponder every word of it, especially as it was written by an orthodox clergyman. "If the history of the Universities proves anything, it is this: that it is impossible to exclude from them religion and religious questions. The local or the peculiar may be shut out, but the universal, the all pervading cannot be expelled. Now religion is as it were the one ubiquitous spirit in the realm of knowledge, pierce the realm at any part and you are

sure to touch religion. . . . It is impossible to study literature and take no account of the Supreme Book of our race, with the immense literature it has created in every tongue used by civilized man. . . . The body of truth is one, as the spirit of religion is ubiquitous, and to dissect it into a multitude of isolated atoms, each limited to its own small point in space without contact or connection with any other, would be to make a circle of the sciences and a university which embodies it alike impossible. . . . Men who believe dare not be silent about their beliefs. The enthusiasm of faith lives all the more intensely that its right to be is denied; and the very attempt to teach knowledge without religion would evoke the victorious and protesting resistance of the men who believe that all knowledge is religious."

I have been a constant reader of your valuable paper from its beginning, and I know, there are men who have long forsaken the old dogmas or more truly have exhausted and appropriated their meaning and significance, but who still believe with Renan that all religions may be defective and partial; but religion is none the less a divine element in humanity, and the mark of a superior fate, and with Goethe that God is now constantly active in the higher natures to attract the lower ones. I would counsel all such—strongly and their name is legion—to 'read, and inwardly digest' Emerson's writings, Amiel's Journal, Renan's "Recollections of my Youth," Principal Fairbairn's address, Mansfield College, Oxford, *Contemporary Review*, 1889.

Cannes, France.

ATHERTON BLIGHT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE UTILITY AND MORALITY OF VIVISECTION. By G. Gore, LL.D., F. R. S. LONDON: J. W. Kolckmann.

That this pamphlet, which is issued by the Association for the Advancement of Medicine by Research, will have any effect over the mind of what may be termed the sentimental anti-vivisectionist we do not believe. It is nevertheless an admirable contribution to the controversy, and its perusal would convince any unprejudiced reader that the indiscriminate charges made against vivisectioners of cruelty and immorality are quite unjustified. Dr. Gore well summarises the question when he says "the painful alternative of the present case is—either experiments on animals must be made, or the wholesale pain, disease, and slaughter of man and other animals by pestilences, epidemics, small-pox, scarlatina, foot and mouth disease, anthrax, etc., and especially through ignorance, must continue almost unabated" (p. 18). Undoubtedly vivisection is the lesser of the two evils, and, as the author points out, those who are opposed to it are enemies to animal welfare, as the knowledge gained by it "is more applicable to the preservation of the lives of animals than of man."

Dr. Gore is probably right when he says that the opposition to vivisection comes, with little exception, from sentimental persons and others professing religion, those who in all ages have opposed scientific research; the author thinks it is reasonable to infer, therefore, "that it is largely directed against the discovery of new knowledge, and the question of infliction of pain is far from being the only consideration." This view is supported by extracts from anti-vivisection publications, some of the statements in which Dr. Gore charitably suggests have "either been made in ignorance of some of the fundamental truths of science, or carelessly, not observing that they were incorrect." Ω.

NOTES.

THE committee appointed to award the prize of one thousand dollars for the best essay, treatise, or manual, adapted to aid and assist teachers in our free public schools, in the Girard college for orphans, and other public or charitable institutions, have decided that no one manuscript presented met the conditions of the offer,

but that two of them together did, clearly showing that morality can be taught without teaching theology and how to do it. The prize was ordered to be equally divided between Nicholas Paine Gilman, A. M., editor of the *Literary World*, Boston, and Edward Payson Jackson, A. M., Professor of Physical Science in the Latin School of Boston. Both treatises "The Laws of Daily Conduct, a Manual of Practical Morals for Teachers and Parents," by Mr. Gilman, and "Dr. Don's Morning Talks: A Colloquy on Good Morals," by Mr. Jackson, will appear in one volume by next fall.

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SHORT DISCUSSIONS AND CRITICISMS.

BY JOHN BURROUGHS.

I.

How inevitable that the early races and peoples should have subordinated the sun and moon etc. to the earth. They are clearly the servants and attendants of the earth. They are placed there in the heavens to give us light and warmth. As the sun sinks towards the horizon a change seems actually to come over him. His light grows thin and yellow. His day's work is done and he is going to rest, and in the morning will rise refreshed and strong. In winter the winds and the storms seem to drive him to the south, and he is feeble and disheartened.

Until science enlightens us we never dream that the sunset or sunrise is not a solar phenomenon, that these changes relate entirely to our little planet, that winter and summer, day and night, etc., are not universal phenomena, but local, and as it were, personal phases of our planetary life.

Now the Semitic cosmogony upon which our theology is founded is the outcome of this same feeling, this same geocentric conception of the universe. It magnifies the individual into the universal. The *London Spectator* in replying to Frederic Harrison, who thinks the Christian faith could not possibly have been first originated in an age that had a heliocentric astronomy, sets forth and enforces the opinion that our astronomical science has not in any vital respect altered or impaired the validity of the theological conceptions of the Jewish and Christian revelations. The *Spectator* fails to see that the Semitic dramaturgy sprang out of the colossal egotism of the early races, the races who considered themselves as the special centre and object of creations, an egotism that science tends directly to overthrow. It is true the old prophets and biblical writers sought to humble and belittle man in the presence of the hosts of the starry heavens, but this was only a momentary reaction from their gigantic egoism, which made Jehovah so solicitous about his chosen people. But this is not the point. The point is that the Copernican system of astronomy gives us a conception of the order and harmony of the universe and of the *physical* insignificance of our planet and its subordination to other bodies that is utterly inconsistent with our Semitic theol-

ogy. The two are not homogeneous; they spring from entirely different standpoints. The Israelites may have been God's chosen people, and this earth of ours may be the apple of his eye among the worlds, but the tendency of the study of science is to utterly uproot such notions. Science liberalises and impersonalises. To the impartial student of history all peoples are God's people, and all worlds alike the scenes of his power. In the light of modern astronomy what becomes of the notion that the heavens are above us, far away, and are of a higher and purer creation, or Hell beneath us, that the earth is corrupted or blighted by the Fall? Kindred notions of one theology. Do we not know that the earth is a star in the heavens, as incorruptible and undefiled as the rest? and that all worlds are kindred and of our stuff, that there is no up and no down, no high or no low in the universe? The lightning does not come out of heaven, nor the rain out of heaven, but out of the clouds. An eclipse is not a warning or a calamity, but purely a natural event, merely the lunar or the terrestrial shadow. Our actual physical smallness and insignificance is what science reveals; our grandeur and importance is what the eye and the untutored mind behold.

Science is impersonal; it tends to belittle and diffuse man; theology and literature tend to exalt him, and concentrate him, and set him above all. Mythology, theology, philosophy, literature, all exaggerate man and distort his true relations to the universe; but in these latter ages comes science and shows man what he really is, where he belongs in the scheme of the whole and what an insect of an hour, an ephemera of a moment he really is, and what a bubble is the world he inhabits. In a late religious work by Julia Wedgewood I find this remark:

"When once Galileo and Newton had forced the world to recognise that Heaven, if it was anywhere was everywhere, the moral took a new direction. The antithesis of Heaven and Earth vanished from the inward as well as from the outward world. Human nature became interesting for its own sake."

II.

One of the most liberal minded doctors of divinity allowed himself the other day to speak slightly of the "vaunted scientific method," as if the scientific method was some new fangled notion that had recently

become current, some patent process or labor saving machine for obtaining truth. As if men had not always used the scientific method, as if it was not as natural to the mind as walking to the body. When we sift evidence, or search into the truth or falsity of any objective proposition we inevitably use the scientific method. It is the method of proceeding from cause to effect, of proving all things, of testing every link in the chain which binds one fact to another. It has come into prominence in our time because of the great advance of physical science. Men are applying this method to questions that heretofore have been considered above its reach. Theological questions are brought within its range, much to the disgust of the theologians. Of many things that have been taken for granted men are beginning to ask, Are they true? and are applying the tests of this kind of truth. All the events and occurrences recorded in the Bible, are subject to the inquiry, Are they true? If we apply to them the scientific method what is the result? James Martineau, for instance, makes use of the scientific method when he shows so convincingly that the Synoptic Gospels must all have been derived from one common source. If these records, he says, were independent accounts of the words and doings of Jesus by the disciples whose names they bear, it is incredible that they should agree so closely in all their details; the different writers would have witnessed and would have recorded different scenes and events. Only of one-thirteenth of the days of the public life of Jesus do we have any record in the Synoptic Gospels. Were these gospels each an original, or the record of independent witnesses, we should have had the events and the utterances of Jesus on more days, since the apostles would not all have been absent and all present at precisely the same time.

The scientific method can no more be ignored or disputed than can the multiplication table. It is as old as the reason of man and is fallible only as man's reason is fallible. It cannot be applied to matters of religious faith, because we here enter a region where proof or verification is not possible.

III.

In the ancient temple of Apollo at Delphi lay a stone, the Omphalos, or navel stone, supposed to mark the centre of the earth. And sure enough, it did mark the centre of the earth, though not exactly under the conditions the ancients believed. The ancients supposed the earth had one centre, like a plain or any irregular surface, or as the navel is the centre of the body; but we know now that the earth is a sphere, and that any point upon its surface may serve as its centre. In like manner every religion thinks itself the one final and supreme religion,—thinks itself the

centre of the world; and for that race and that people it is the centre of the world; their life, their history, their development hinges upon it. Our navel stone, Christianity, is the centre of the world for us, and the Buddhist's, the Mohammedan's is the centre of the world for him. The religion of Apollo was the central fact in the history of Greece. There may be any number of true, though opposing and contradictory religions. There may be any number of centres to the infinite. Mathematics, the exact sciences, are always and everywhere the same, but religion is a sentiment, and the forms in which it clothes itself are as various as changeable as fleeting as the forms of summer clouds.

IV.

The whole order of the universe favors virtue and is against vice. Things have come to what they are, man has arrived at what he is, the grass and flowers clothe the fields, the trees thrive and bear wholesome fruit, the air is sweet and water quenches thirst through the action of the same principles by which we see that virtue is good and vice bad. Things have clashed and warred and devoured each other through past eternities and out of the adjustment, the balance at which they have at last arrived, we see that virtue is to be sought and vice to be shunned; we see that a good man's life is the fruit of the same balance and proportion as that which makes the fields green and the corn ripen. It is not by some fortuitous circumstance, the especial favor of some god, but by living in harmony with immutable laws through which the organic world has been evolved, that he is what he is.

V.

To say that the world or the order of nature is reasonable is like saying how well the body fits the skin. The order of nature fits our faculties and appears reasonable to us, not because it is shaped to them, but because they are shaped to it, just as the eye is shaped to the light or the ear to the waves of sound. Nature is first and man last. Things are good to us because our constitutions are shaped to them; no absolute goodness is argued. Fluids might seem like solids to beings differently constituted. Were the laws of the physical world designed to bring about certain results, or do the results simply follow? Shall we say that the inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of its orbit, is in order that there may be a change of season? or does the change of the season simply follow as an inevitable consequence? Is the air adapted to the lungs or the lungs to the air? Of course the lesser or secondary fact is always adjusted to the greater or primary fact. The structure of a bird, the mechanism of its wings and feathers, etc., is all adapted with the nicest accuracy to the one purpose of flying, but

is there anything here we can properly call design? The wing we know is the result of slow adaptation and modification, and not of anything like deliberate contrivance. God did not will that certain creatures should fly, and so proceed to make them wings and feathers. With disuse the wing disappears or becomes rudimentary. Use therefore makes the wing. What makes use?

Some mysterious impulse imprinted upon the organisation of which we know nothing. What I am trying to say is, there is nothing like man's ways, nothing artificial in nature—nothing in the finite that is copied from the infinite. Will, design, purpose, are partial terms. God is all will, all purpose, just as the sphere is all form, that is holds all form, and yet is of itself of no form. The circle goes in all directions, and yet in no direction.

VI.

Behold how men have puzzled themselves over miracles, and what ingenuity they have shown in explaining them; but it were better had the puzzles never been made. After the theologian has explained so clearly how they happen, the previous question still haunts us *do they happen?* Principal Telloch's explanation of them seems a very simple one. Miracles, he says, are simply the working of a Higher Will so moving the "hidden springs of nature that a new issue arises on given circumstances. The ordinary issue is supplanted by a higher issue." In other words, have given the same conditions *unlike* results may follow by reason of the interference of this assumed Higher Will. But are we not constantly dogged by the question, What proof have we that this Higher Will does so interfere? In assuming that it interferes are we not begging the whole question? One of Plutarch's natural questions was "What is the reason that pebble stones and leaden bullets thrown into the water made it more cold?" and after he was given the reason, we still want to know, do these things make water more cold?

The belief in miracles is a remnant of paganism, which the race is fast outgrowing. The religious sense of mankind is fast rising superior to all thaumaturgical aids. The conception of the forces of nature as constant, the view of the universe as a vital whole, softly but inexorably bound by the law of cause and effect in all its parts, is a much more noble and satisfying view to me at least, than that which has been foisted upon the world by an antiquated theology.

VII.

Think of the state of mind of the world when people actually believed in the devil,—not believed that they believed in him as now-a-days, but when they believed in him as really as they believed in heat and

cold, night and day, life and death; when doctors and theologians guarded their mouths while exorcising the evil spirit lest he jump down their throats. If a man inhaled a little fly by accident his reason might be unhinged by terror lest he had swallowed the devil. The king of Spain used to sleep between two monks to keep off the devil. What a dreadful hue was given to life by this belief; in what a constant state of apprehension and alarm men lived! The insane were of course possessed of the devil; all evil, storms, pestilence, disease, everything malodorous was the work of evil spirits.

VIII.

Christianity amounts to little without something to back it up, without integrity of character and fealty to truth. You may put on a varnish of religion as thick as you please, if the stuff beneath is poor, is shaky or full of knots, the result is poor. Our final reliance is always upon the man himself and not upon his creed. We care little what he believes or disbelieves, so that he believes in sobriety, justice, charity, and the imperativeness of duty, so that he speak the truth and shame the devil, and I reckon it is about so with God himself. What mankind, in their better selves love, can hardly fail to be acceptable to him. Atheism, itself, if sincere, and honest, is more in keeping with the order of the world than a cowardly and lukewarm deism. Belief in Christ will not save a man; he must be saved already or he is lost, saved by his character and conscience, or there is no material for belief in Christ to work upon. How many people we see who freely and heartily subscribe to the thirty-nine articles, yet in whom we have no confidence, and with whom we want no intimate relations. And it is not because they are hypocrites: it is because they are incapable of truthfulness or manliness. Belief is not saving, but character is. How shall we get character then; how deepen and fertilise the groundwork of men's natures? It cannot be done in a moment: conversion will not do it. When a man of force and integrity joins the church, the church has an acquisition; but when a slippery, inconstant, and equivocating person joins it, it has put a brick in its walls that will not stand the weather. The frosts and the rains will crumble it, and the structure be weakened. Character is of slow growth; it cannot be made to order; the most that can be done to encourage or stimulate it, is to lay the emphasis where it belongs, to insist upon things that are essential, to stop trying to convert men to a creed, but to open their eyes to a law, show them the penalties of fickleness, falsehood, intemperance, unchastity, riotous living, etc., not because they contravene some command or precept of the Bible, or because they endanger their chances of felicity in some other world, but because they contravene the laws

through which all growth, and health, and wholeness come, and endanger their well-being here and now. The preacher cannot create force and integrity off-hand in his hearer by praising force and integrity, but a great deal is gained when a love for these things is awakened. Men are made manly by an appeal to their manliness; noble sentiments are begotten by noble sentiments; when the true patriot speaks everybody is patriotic; when the real Christian appears everybody loves Christianity. I once heard Fred Douglass say the way to keep a man out of the mud was to black his boots, and the first step towards making a man manly is to convince him he has a capacity for manliness. Show him that religion is not some far away thing that he must get, but a vital truth which he lives whenever he does a worthy thing.

Religion, as something special and extra, which a man may or may not have, and which is attached to certain beliefs and ceremonies, has had its day. Whatever it may have been in the past, it is no longer a power to mould men's characters and shape their lives. That a man professes religion is no longer a recommendation to him, in applying for any place in the business or political world. It does not inspire any more confidence in him as a man, or as a trusted servant, but creates a certain presumption against him. He may be a wolf in sheep's clothing: watch him closely. A commonplace poet derives great advantages from the stock forms and measures which he uses; these are the garments of mighty bards; let him discard them and his littleness and poverty will appear. So a man often hides his mean and selfish nature in loud professions of religion; let him drop these and stand upon his own merits, and we shall not be imposed upon. When such an one fails we excuse the matter by saying, "Well it was not the fault of the religion, but of the man." The fault is in attaching any religious value to forms and beliefs—in having any cloaks of this kind in which a scoundrel may masquerade. If a man professes to be a legal or medical or scientific expert, and is not, he is soon found out. This is not a cloak, but a sword, and if he cannot wield it, he is soon exposed. But a man may profess Christianity to-day and rob a bank to-morrow. Probably no honest mind ever gave its assent to the literal truth of the thirty-nine articles, or to any of the various creeds, until its sympathy and its interest had been brought over by an appeal to the emotions. The creed is an after-thought; it is the terms which the conscience makes with the reason after the reason has surrendered. In assenting to it the convert thinks he is only assenting to the truth of his religion, or to the genuineness of the emotion he has experienced. Mayhap by and by he discovers that he has assented to a set of propositions, which standing naked and formal

as they do, divested of the spiritual warmth and magnetism, and the incentives to noble and heroic living which they had in the fervid exhortations of Paul, or in the calm sweetness of James, and which his reason alone is now to lay hold of, he is shocked and repelled, and is in danger of losing all his religion with the discovery of the unreasonableness of his creed. This is unfortunate, because the only thing real and valuable in religion, the only thing saving in it, is the emotion of Godliness, the love of Christ, of tenderness, gentleness, purity, mercy, truth. Without these, religion is nothing but a name, and with them the assent of the understanding to a lot of formal propositions about the plans and purposes of the Eternal, about the trinity, or the atonement, or original sin, etc., has nothing to do. There is no connection between these things. Religion is not a matter of reason or of belief, any more than poetry is. It is a sentiment.

THE RÔLE OF IDEAS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF PERSONALITY.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

NOTHING is more frequent or better known than the momentary dispossession of personality through some fixed and intense idea. So long as this idea occupies the consciousness, we might without much exaggeration say that it constitutes the individual. The obstinate pursuit of any problem, invention or research in all their various forms, represents a mental state in which the entire personality has been drained for the benefit of a single idea. Such an one is, to use a common expression, absent, that is automatic. Here there is an abnormal state, implying a rupture of equilibrium. Numberless current anecdotes concerning either rational or chimerical inventors bear witness to the fact. And incidentally let us observe, that every fixed idea is at the bottom a sentiment or a fixed passion. At all times some desire, love, hatred, or interest will support the idea, and impart to it its intensity, stability, tenacity. Whatever we may plead to the contrary, ideas are always in the service of passions; at the same time they resemble some masters, who actually obey while believing that they always rule.

Whatever may be the result, this state is but a mental hypertrophy, and people are perfectly right, when in identifying the inventor and his work, they designate the one by the other; in this instance work is equivalent to personality.

Up to this point we have no change of personality, but a simple deviation from the normal type,—or, what is better, the schematic type,—in which by hypothesis the organic, emotional, and intellectual elements would form a perfect consensus. We thus

* Translated from the French (*Diseases of Personality* Chap. III. 4.) by J. W.

have hypertrophy at one point and atrophy at other points, by virtue of the law of compensation or of organic equilibrium. And now let us consider the morbid cases. With the exception of certain artificial changes, produced during hypnotism, it is difficult to find many cases of derangement the incontestable starting point of which is an idea. Among changes of personality, from an intellectual cause, it appears to me we may class the facts relating to lycanthropy and zoanthropy, in all their forms, formerly of frequent occurrence, but now very rare. Still, in all cases of this kind* of which we have an authentic record, the mental debility in the lycanthrope is so great, almost verging on stupidity, that we might almost be tempted to look upon it as a case of retrogression; a return toward the form of animal individuality. Let us add, that inasmuch as these cases are complicated with visceral disorders, cutaneous and visual hallucinations, it is not easy to see, whether they are the effects of a preconceived idea, or whether they themselves produce it. We must remark, however, that lycanthropy has at times been epidemic, which is to say, that at least in imitating subjects, it must have originated in some fixed idea. Finally, this type of disease disappeared, when people no longer believed in it, that is to say, when the idea that a man is a wolf, could no longer fix itself in the brain of an individual, and make him act accordingly.

The only perfectly clear cases of ideal transformation of personality, are those of men who believe themselves women, and of women who believe themselves men, without any sexual anomaly justifying that metamorphosis. With subjects who are possessed, demoniacs, the influence of an idea also seems initial or preponderating. It frequently acts by contagion upon the exorcists themselves. To quote only one instance of this, Father Surin, who for so long a time was concerned in the notorious affair the Ursuline Nuns of Loudun, felt within himself two souls, and sometimes as it seems, even three.†

* See Calmeil: *De la folie considérée sous le point de vue pathologique, philosophique, historique et judiciaire*. Vol. 1, Bk. III, Ch. II, §§ 9, 16, 17; Bk. IV, Ch. II, § 1.

† P. Surin left a detailed report of his own mental state: *Histoire des diables de Loudun*, p. 217 and following. "I am not able to describe to you what is going on within me at such a time (he alludes to the time when the demon passes from the body of the possessed woman into his own), and how that spirit unites itself with mine, without depriving me either of consciousness or of the freedom of my soul, yet becoming like another ego of myself, and as if I had two souls, of which one is dispossessed of its body, and of the use of its organs, and compelled to keep aloof, looking merely upon the doings of the other intruding soul. The two spirits wrestle together in the same field, which is the body, and the soul is as though it was divided. According to the one side of its ego, the soul is the subject of the diabolical impressions, and according to the other side it is the subject of the movements proper to it, or that God gives to it. When—through the movement of one of these two souls—I wish to make a sign of the cross upon somebody's lips, the other soul very quickly turns my hand and seizes my finger to bite it furiously with the teeth. . . . When I wish to speak, I am stopped short; at table I cannot raise a morsel of food to my mouth; at confession I suddenly forget my sins and I feel the demon coming and going within me as in his own house."

In other words, the transformations of personality by effect of an idea are not of a very frequent occurrence; and this is a fresh proof of what we have again and again repeated, that personality rises from below. It is in the highest nervous centres that personality attains its unity, affirms itself with full consciousness; in them it completes itself. If through some inverse mechanism personality descends from above to below, it will remain superficial, precarious, momentary.

The creation of artificial personalities with hypnotised subjects affords an excellent proof of the above; and to this effect M. Ch. Richet has published very abundant and precise observations,* which I shall briefly quote. By turns they make the hypnotised subject (usually a woman) believe that she is a peasant-girl, an actress, a general, an archbishop, a nun, a sailor, a little girl, etc., and the subject will play all these parts to the degree of perfect illusion. Here the psychological data are perfectly clear. In this state of provoked somnambulism, the real personality remains intact; the organic, emotional, intellectual elements have not undergone any important change; but all remain in a potential state. An imperfectly understood condition of nervous centres, an arrest of function, prevents them from passing into action. An idea is evoked by way of suggestion, and at once, through the mechanism of association, it excites analogous states of consciousness, and no others; and with them,—always by association,—appropriate gestures, acts, words, and sentiments. In this manner there is constituted a personality external to the real personality, composed of borrowed and automatic elements. Experiments of this kind clearly show what an idea may achieve when freed from all control, and reduced to its own power and destitute of the support and co-operation of the individual in its totality.

In certain cases of incomplete hypnotism a dualism is produced. Dr. North, professor of physiology at Westminster Hospital, says, when speaking of the period during which he was affected by the fixed look: "I was not unconscious, but it seemed to me that I was existing in double. I imagined that within there existed another ego, perfectly alive to all that happened, but which did not care to interfere with the acts of the external ego, or to control them. The repugnance or incapacity of this internal ego to control the external ego seemed to increase in proportion as the situation was further prolonged."

But, would it be possible to suppress this true, internal personality? Can the real character of the individual be reduced to naught or to the point of actu-

* *Revue Philosophique*, March 1883. M. Richet has published more recent observations in his book *L'homme et l'intelligence*, p. 539 and 541. See also Carpenter: *Mental Physiology*, p. 562 and following.

ally transforming itself into its contrary? We cannot doubt this possibility; the persisting authority of the operator is indeed able to effect this result, after a more or less prolonged resistance. Thus M. Ch. Richet has impressed with radical republican ideas a lady known for her ultra-Bonapartist opinions. Braid, after hypnotising a strict teetotaler, several times repeated to him that he was drunk. "This affirmation being also corroborated by a sensation of staggering (produced by way of muscular suggestion), and it was amusing to behold him divided between this imposed idea and the conviction resulting from his ordinary habits." This momentary metamorphosis however has nothing alarming about it. As M. Richet justly remarks, "in these curious modifications the changes that take place are only in the external form of the being, in habit and general attitudes and not in individuality properly so called." As to the question, whether by means of reiterated suggestions, we might not eventually produce in susceptible subjects a genuine modification of character, it is a problem that experience alone can solve.

Perhaps this is a favorable opportunity to call attention to the phenomenon known as *disappearance of personality*, which the mystics of all epochs and of all countries have described according to their own experience, often in the most glowing language.* Pantheistic metaphysicians without reaching the state of ecstasy have also spoken of a state in which the spirit thinks itself "under the form of eternity"; appears to itself as beyond time and space, free from all contingent modality, one with the infinite. This psychological phenomenon although rare must not be forgotten. I take it to be the absolute dispossession of mental activity effected by a single idea (positive to mystics, negative to empirics), but which through its high degree of abstraction, and its absence of determination and limit, contradicts and excludes all individual sentiment. But let one single sensation however ordinary be perceived and the entire illusion will be destroyed.

*Of these descriptions I shall only cite one—the nearest to us by language and time. "It seems to me that I have become a statue on the banks of the river of time, and am attending the celebration of some mystery from whence I shall come forth old or without age. I feel as it were anonymous, impersonal; my eye is fixed as in death: my mind is vague and universal, as nihilism or the absolute. I am in suspense; as if non-existent. In these moments it seems to me that my consciousness withdraws into its eternity . . . it perceives itself even in its substance, superior to every form containing its past, present, and future; a vacuum that encloses everything; an invisible and prolific medium; virtuality of a world divesting itself of its own existence, in order to lay hold of itself again in its own pure inwardness. In these sublime instants the soul has re-entered into itself; and having returned to the state of indeterminateness it is reabsorbed beyond the bounds of its own life, it becomes again a divine embryo. Everything is effaced, dissolved, distended; changed into its primitive state, re-immersed in the original fluidity, without shape, angles, or definite design. This state is contemplation and not stupor; it is neither painful, nor joyous, nor sad; it is without all special sentiment and beyond all finished thought. It is the consciousness of being, and the consciousness of the latent omnipotency at the base of this being. Such is the sensation of the spiritual infinite." (Amiel, *Journal intime*, 1856.)

To sum up: The states of consciousness that are called ideas, are only a secondary factor in the constitution and changes of personality. The idea certainly plays a part, but not a preponderating one. These results agree with what psychology has long since taught, namely, that ideas have an objective character. Hence it follows, that they cannot express the individual in the same proportion as his desires, sentiments, and passions.

THE MAYFLOWER.

Epigæa repens. (Close to the ground.)

THE *Epigæa repens* must have been the first flower of Spring to greet the Plymouth pilgrims in the month of April after their winter on the bleak Massachusetts shores.

It was called by them, and has ever since been called by their descendants, the Mayflower, in honor of the vessel that brought them over, and in tender recollection of the flowers of May in the old country. Yet it cannot claim full possession of this name, which is given to so many other flowers in different localities.

By what chance it has come, in many places, to be called Trailing Arbutus, I know not, for although both plants belong to the Sub-order of Ericineæ, or the proper Heath family, yet this plant belongs not to the tribe Arbutæ, but to Andromedæ, (see Gray's Manual,) and the characters and expressions of the two species are very different, while its own botanical name *Epigæa* beautifully describes its constant habit of clinging closely to the ground.

My heart always thrills with pain when I hear it called arbutus, and my inward protest has taken shape in the following verses.

We may not call our flower that dear ship's name,
Which brought the sacred pilgrims to our shore,
Since others may that honor fairly claim,
Which add their beauty to the spring's rich store,
While our sweet blossom comes forestalling May
And hastening summer on her tardy way.

What heart-thrills woke among that pilgrim band,
When first by fragrant breath its home they found,
And for its welcome to their chosen land
They blessed the plant that closely "hugs the ground."
For *Epigæa* is its rightful name
By which it may the heather's kindred claim.

Arbutus is its cousin; loftier bred,
It rises oft a fair and stately tree
Where Caucasus uprears its cloud-capped head,
Or California grants it nurture free.
Give to the noble tree its rightful dower,
But not its name unto our pilgrim flower.

A modest blossom, it still "hugs the ground"
Though Commonwealths have risen on its soil,
Still in the solemn pine woods it is found,
To bless the children of the sons of toil;

By mount or sea it ever is the same,
For Epigæa is its rightful name.

In autumn budded, braving winter's snows,
Which turn to sweetness in its sheltering heart,
The chilliest wind New England's spring time knows,
Blights not the blossom with its icy dart,
But opening to the sun's first warming ray,
It brings the promise of the harvest day.

O Mayflower true, thou heralded the May,
And breathed God's message to that pilgrim band,
"Look hearts no more beyond the sheltering bay,
"Your home is here and this your chosen land,
"Cling tight like me, God's blessings still abound
"In humble hearts, that ever hug the ground."

Let kingly Laurel crown luxuriant June,
The Rose and Lily gladden Summer's day,
Aster and Golden Rod the harvest moon
And gold Chrysanthemum Thanksgiving day,
In wayward April most of all renowned
Is Epigæa close unto the ground..

Cling close true hearts, unto our pilgrim land,
Though venturous feet may tread the spreading West,
And when amid its lofty pines you stand,
There still you find the flower that loves them best,
Bend low and breathe its fragrance spread around,
And Epigæa bless that ever hugs the ground.

E. D. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

DID you ever read that amusing chapter in *Ivanhoe* which describes the meeting between Friar Tuck and the disguised King Richard at the friar's hermitage in the forest where the king had lost his way? It is worth reading, especially in Lent. The king having, not without some difficulty, obtained shelter for the night in the friar's hut, is offered parched peas and cold water for supper, the anchorite assuring him that he had nothing better in the hermitage, and that he himself was limited to such food by the rules of his order and the vow that he had made. The fat and rosy appearance of the friar made the king suspicious, and after a good deal of mutual banter, the hermit was compelled to produce from a secret cupboard a savory venison pie, and several quarts of wine, on which he and his guest made merry. There is refined satire in the story, but the jovial good nature of the hermit, and his courageous violation of the oppressive game laws, redeem the impudent hypocrisy which prompted him to take the monastic vows and adopt the garb of austerity that he might gratify more easily his taste for luxury and his passion for self-indulgence. The moral of the story is obvious, and the application of it might be made useful now. Society assumes the forms of lent as Tuck assumed his cowl, to spiritualise venison pie, and make piety a pleasure.

There is one keen detective among us who is not to be deceived by the odor of sanctity, nor by metaphysical sackcloth and ashes. The name of him is "Business." He knows the etiquette of lent; and the ceremonial sham of it helps him to sell his merchandise. How this mockery of the lenten fast grins at us from the shops where dainty eatables are sold, and where upon the walls and windows we may see this ironical advertisement, "Lenten Delicacies." It is easy enough to observe the forms of the holy season, while we cheat the spirit of it by wearing sackcloth made of silk, and fasting thrice a day on "lenten delicacies," artistically cooked and seasoned, so that the fast may be a feast. The palate of the epicure tingles with anticipated gustation, as he reads in

the newspapers ingenious recipes for cooking luxurious lenten food, dishes delightful to the appetite of Apicius, bills of fare that represent the contradiction and the travesty of lent, the counterfeit imitation and caricature of the forty days fast in the wilderness. The gospel, according to the four hundred, patronises lent by an economy of balls and parties, but makes it a religious excuse for a change of luxuries, that stimulate pleasure by variety. This false pretense of keeping lent while evading all its obligations, like other affectations of religion, gradually eliminates truth from the character, and makes insincerity a habit and a fashion.

Not in the formalism of religion only, do we see the respectability of cant and dissimulation but pharisaism overflows the churches and saturates both politics and business. It is becoming an axiom in all of them that duplicity is essential to success. The famous game of euchre in which the heathen Chinese concealed more aces and bowers than Bill Nye and Truthful James, has recently been imitated in a three-cornered game played in the United States Senate by Senators Plumb, Edmunds, and Morrill. In this interesting affair each of the contestants proved himself to be proficient in "ways that are dark and in tricks that are vain." Mr. Plumb having lost the game, brought the matter before the Senate, and complained that having stacked the cards for his own purposes, he had been caught with guile, and actually outwitted and outwinded by the other two. He sorrowfully said that when the McKinley bill was before the senate he had voted to sweeten it a little by a clause giving to the people of Vermont a bounty of two cents a pound on all the maple sugar they could make; but he had done this "with intent to deceive"—the legislature of Vermont. He had voted thus against his conscience to help Senator Morrill, who was then a candidate before the Vermont legislature for another term in the senate; but it was distinctly understood and agreed between the parties that after Mr. Morrill had made his calling and election sure, the bounty on maple sugar was to be stricken from the bill by the conference committee; instead of which, Mr. Morrill having been elected, and the bill being in conference, Senator Edmunds broke the agreement and actually wrote a letter saying that if the bounty on maple sugar were stricken out he would vote against the bill. So, as the vote of the Vermont senators could not be spared, additional saccharine was given to Vermont sap by a bounty of two cents a pound for all the sugar it might yield. No complaint would have been made, were it not that when Mr. Plumb attempted to get some bounty for the sorghum sugar of Kansas, Mr. Morrill opposed it, "Hence those tears."

Last Sunday, the pastor of the largest Baptist congregation in Chicago, preached on the subject of a personal devil, and proved, to his own satisfaction at least, and probably to the satisfaction of his hearers, that Satan is a real character with hoofs and horns, going about like a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour. The learned preacher, a Doctor of Divinity, having special knowledge of the subject, refuted the modern heresy that Satan is a myth, a mere name for the principle of evil, the ideal representative of darkness and of lies. He declared him to be an intelligent personality, whose envious ambition it is to defeat the plan of salvation by seducing human souls into his own service, and to their own perdition. The origin, the mission, the attributes, and prerogatives of the devil, are matters of controversy among Doctors of Divinity, and because of their confusion of opinion, some persons would abolish him altogether by denying his existence. The evidence that he is here amongst us is too strong to be resisted, and therefore it is better to acknowledge him and convert him. This is a holier work for Doctors of Divinity than scolding him. The sermon above referred to, being under discussion in a Baptist family, a young lady who is a member of the

church in good standing, was asked the pointed question, "Do you believe in a personal devil?" She answered, "O dear, yes: I know several right here in Chicago." She spoke better than she knew. The devil "Want," for instance, is the parent of a good many personal devils, and by abolishing him we shall easily convert them. There is hope even for Satan; and his conversion is not outside the plan of salvation.

A strange blending of Christianity and Paganism was exhibited a few days ago, when the Queen of England baptised a ship of war with wine; and with ceremonial words that sounded like incantations launched this iron corsair upon the sea, bidding it go forth on its malevolent mission of devastation and death. How thin must be the bit of civilised veneering that covers our native savageness, when even in England, whose missionaries with fanatical courage carry the bible everywhere, and preach its gospel to benighted souls from Greenland's icy mountains to India's coral strand, it is thought consistent and congenial that such a swaggering buccaneer should be commissioned by a woman, a venerable and virtuous lady seventy-two years old! With lofty phrase, and form that resemble the baptismal service in the prayer-book she named this ugly rover after her own son, the christening being done in pagan fashion by wine sprinkled on the forehead of the ship, henceforward to be known in mischief as the "Royal Arthur." But the performance was not Pagan altogether, because right there, by the very side of the Queen, aiding, assisting, and abetting the act of consecration, was a minister of the Christian gospel, offering prayer, giving grace and benediction to the sea monster, and invoking theological potency for its gunpowder and its guns. When the great cannon in the forts, and on the attendant ships in the bay, saluted the christening with diabolic thunder, the air became poisoned with a brimstone flavor, like atmosphere imported from the home of the condemned.

M. M. TRUMBULL

CORRESPONDENCE.

ABOLISH WOMAN SLAVERY.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I DOUBT whether any one believing strictly in the ethics of monogamy, nor yet his philosophical opponent of the varietist school will be satisfied with your leading articles on "Sexual Ethics." For people who are in deadly earnest about the way other people should live, are ill satisfied with concessions, either to themselves or their enemies. Therefore I suspect that instead of having poured oil on the troubled waters, you have rather added fuel to flame. While I have no particular interest in seeing the varietist side of the argument uppermost, I would prefer to see a stronger presentation of it, given from their own standpoint, than that allowed by the author in question. That standpoint would be necessarily a theoretical one, and the same from which any logical free-lover (monogamic or otherwise) would look. I can imagine such a person saying: "But sir, your whole argument rests upon the recognition of a monstrous fact, viz. that woman is, and always has been, *property*, that the present basis of marriage is purely an economy of man, in which child-bearing and rearing is the function of the wife, in return for which the husband protects and supports her, as he protects and supports his horses; that in the contest between several forms of sexual association, polygamic, polyandric, and monogamic, *all based on this same economic foundation*, monogamy has produced the best results. Very well. Concerning the recognition of the fact I have no quarrel with the author of those articles. On the contrary, the sooner it is admitted the better. But a most serious debate arises when he endeavors to perpetuate this ideal of property in women.

He who faces the east, knows that two great factors in economic evolution, apparently warring, but really in harmony with each other, the socialisation of industry and the equalisation of liberty, are rapidly transforming all human relations. This word human includes *woman*. The equalisation of liberty means the deathblow to property in wives, and the socialisation of industry means the possibility of bread-and-butter independence, that is the guarantee of equality. What then? The rearing of children, the constant, destructive sacrifice of woman's self-hood, necessitated by our much lauded family-life, will cease to constitute the *totale* of her existence. Higher than being a mother (any animal may be that), she will be first a human being. Now, the question between variety and single affection may indeed begin to be settled. But no argument which will apply to justify the monogamy of the present, can have any weight for or against a system of marriage whose basis must be that of a contract between equals for love's sake, not the transfer of a piece of property from a father to a husband.

Like the dissolving colors of a bubble, the old economy of society is changing, melting, going before our eyes. Are we then justified in holding up an ideal to the future, which was born in the barbarisms of the past. Do you not thus contend in supporting the wife-slavery of the individual family, by reasons necessarily drawing their strength from a dying system?

How much farther this might develop I leave to the enthusiastic varietist. For I myself believe strongly in *laissez-faire* in morals as in economy and am not over-concerned about the triumph of either system, contending only for unlimited competition between the conflicting theories: that is what I understand by *free love*.

Enterprise, Kansas.

V. DE CLEYRE.

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WOMAN EMANCIPATION.

ONE of the most important and at the same time noblest of our present ideals is the emancipation of woman. Woman is the weaker sex, because nature has destined her strength to be sacrificed for the perpetuation of the race. Woman represents the future of humanity; the immortality of mankind is entrusted to her. The burdens of life are upon the whole so divided that man must struggle with the adversities of conditions, while woman must suffer all the throes and woes which are the price of the continuance of human existence. He is the more active fighter, the worker, the hero; she is the passive endurer, the toiler, the martyr. He has under these conditions grown strong, physically and intellectually; she has grown noble. The activity of each being shapes its organism and models its character. Thus the virtues of man became daring courage, concentration of thought, and enterprising energy; the virtues of woman became abnegation of self, patience, and purity of heart.

Woman, being the weaker sex, has been and to a great extent is still held in subjection to the power and jurisdiction of the stronger sex. It is true that among cultured people the rudeness of this relation, has disappeared. The husband has ceased to be the tyrant of the household. He respects the independence of his wife and prefers to have in her a loving comrade rather than a pliant slave. Nevertheless progress is slow. It is perhaps not so much oppression by single persons as by traditional habits that is still weighing heavily upon woman, retarding the final emancipation of her sex.

Prof. E. D. Cope has written an article on the economical relation between the sexes* in which he emphasises woman's dependence on the support and protection of man. Professor Cope explains satisfactorily the present state of society, but he leaves out of sight the question whether this present state has to continue forever. His article is a scholarly investigation of existent conditions, but he does not touch the problem whether this is the only possible natural state or a special phase in the development of human sex-relations. We believe that the present phase is to be

followed by another phase securing to woman a better, nobler, and more dignified position.

It may be conceded, as a matter of historical statement; that in the struggle for life women had to depend upon men for protection and sustenance. Yet it must not be forgotten that men in their turn also had to depend upon women. What are men without mothers and wives? How helpless is an old widower, and in spite of his so-called liberty how poor is the life of an old bachelor.

Professor Cope does not overlook this point, yet he maintains that women as a rule cannot make a living; he maintains that whenever they do, it is an exception and this is the reason why they must look for sustenance and protection from the stronger sex. Granted that this has been so; also granted that many women had to marry for this sole reason, must we therefore conclude that this wretched state of things is to continue forever? It may be true that there was a time when serfdom was an unavoidable state for a certain class of people who in a state of liberty would not make a decent living for themselves; slavery perhaps was a greater blessing to them than to their masters. Would that be a reason for continuing slavery in a higher state of social conditions?

The woman question has originated through the very progress of civilisation. In order to make a living a human being has no longer to depend upon physical strength, but mostly upon mental capacities, nay, more so upon moral qualities. Sense of duty is more important than muscle power, and sometimes even than skill. The time has come that at least in many branches a well educated woman can do the same work as a man, and she is no more dependent upon man for sustenance and protection.

This fact will not alter the natural relation of sex. Our women will not cease to marry, to bear and to raise children. Yet it will alter their position in this relation. They will no longer marry for the mere sake of protection, but for love alone. They will then enter marriage on equal terms; and thus they will obtain a more dignified place in human society.

It cannot be denied that woman is different from man. The average man is superior in some respects, and the average woman is superior in other respects. Neither man nor woman is the perfect man. True

* *The Monist*, No. 1, p. 38.

humanity is not represented by either. True humanity consists in their union, and in the consequences of their union, namely in the family.

Woman's emancipation does not involve any detraction from man's rights or duties. Man will not suffer from it, on the contrary, he will profit. It will raise our family life upon a higher stage and man will be as much a gainer in this bargain as the slave-holder who can employ free labor easier and cheaper than keep slaves. As no one would wish to re-establish slavery now, so in a later period no man would ever care to have the old state recalled when women married mainly for the sake of sustenance and protection.

Let me add that woman emancipation is slowly but assuredly accomplished, not by acts of legislature, but by a natural growth which no conservatism can stop. Acts of legislature giving more liberty and chances of making a living to woman, will not be the cause, they will come in consequence of a true woman emancipation. There are many steps taken in a wrong direction. Efforts are wasted especially by some over-enthusiastic women in making women like men, instead of making men and women equal. These erroneous aspirations are injurious to the cause, yet after all they cannot ruin it. There is an ideal of a higher, more elevated and a better womanhood, and this ideal (although it is often misunderstood) will be accomplished without the destruction of the womanly in woman.

P. C.

MATERIAL RELATIONS OF SEX IN HUMAN SOCIETY.

BY E. D. COPE.

THE editorial notice of my article in No. 1 of *The Monist* on the "Material Relations of Sex in Human Society," requires the following remarks by way of further elucidation of the subject. It is evident that some men and women in common with the editor of *The Monist*, entertain the idea that an important change in the economical relations of the sexes is to occur, and that such change will be beneficial. They even use the term "slavery" in connection with the present general dependent relation of women to men. No doubt many men would be glad to have their wives support themselves, and even to support the entire family, but the aspirations of such men do not command our respect, unless their situation renders such assistance absolutely necessary. It is probable that the term "slavery" would be quite as appropriate to this state of affairs for women, as to its opposite. That women may and do often render important aid to the finances of a family, is right and proper, but it rarely extends to entire self-support and cannot be looked upon as evidence that women generally can be financially independent of men. The disabilities of married women are self-evident, and require no further

elucidation; every one is familiar with them and their effects in both domestic and business relations. The nature of the competition between men and women is well described in an editorial in the *Women's Tribune*, which commenting adversely on my article, affords unconsciously excellent support to my position. It says: "No men refrains from distancing a woman, whether it is in the race for a street car or a post office. In every sense of the word he is her competitor and antagonist in the industrial world. He only asks equal wages for her, when for her to be paid otherwise would make her a dangerous rival. This is not saying that many men are not just and chivalrous to women, but it is expressing the actual state of affairs as it exists to-day." As this is exactly the treatment which man gives his fellow-man in the working world, it is what woman has to expect so soon as she enters the field as his "competitor and antagonist." She cannot expect fairly anything else. The industrial pursuits of men have for their object in large part the support of a wife and children. And as between the woman who is not his wife, and the woman who is his wife, he will regard the latter before the former.

In the natural, i. e. matrimonial, relation between men and women, all this is changed. The man waits for the woman at the "horse car," "post office," etc., aids her to gain her desires, and gives her the first of everything. She is freer than the man, who is the "slave" to the economic and business relations of the time and place in which he lives. The supposition that man is "free" in business relations, is untrue; he is hedged about and under restraint in all directions. He is under the domination of the strongest muscle or brain, and the law of the extinction of the unfit, the reverse of the "survival of the fittest" has him in its iron grasp. That women should desire to enter this life in exchange for the comparatively mild restraints of the matrimonial relation is inconceivable, and is only to be explained on the supposition that they are ignorant of the facts. And to succeed in a matrimonial career it is only necessary to observe the principal conditions necessary to a man to success in business—personal civility and honesty.

RÉCOLLECTIONS OF HENRY SCHLIEMANN.

BY THEODORE STANTON.

IN July 1880 I went down from Berlin to Leipsic to attend the banquet given in honor of the Fourth by the United States Consul. I happened to stop at the same hotel where Dr. Schliemann and his family were staying, while he was busily engaged correcting the proofs of the book described in the following letter. I sat opposite him at table and conversed with him a great deal. Shortly afterwards he came up to Berlin, as will also be seen in one of the letters given below,

where I again met him. At Leipsic I also saw something of his wife and children. From this acquaintance sprang a correspondence. Looking over his letters the other day I found a few which seem to me to be of enough interest to make public, and I therefore lay them before your readers.

While at work correcting proofs, as already stated, Dr. Schliemann wrote me as follows from Leipsic, under date of July 12th, 1880, concerning his forthcoming volume:

"The new book, 'Ilios,' has not the form of a journal; it is altogether a scientific work and the historical part of the excavations is, therefore, out of place in the text. But as it is of great interest, I have joined it to my autobiography with which I begin the book. I can assure you, however, that if I commence the book with the history of my life, it is not from any feeling of vanity, but from a desire to show how the work of my later life has been prompted by, and has been the natural consequence of, the impressions I received in my earliest childhood, and that, so to say, the pickaxe and spade for the excavation of Troy and the Royal sepulchres of Mycenæ were both forged and sharpened in the little village in Mecklenburg in which I passed eight years of my earliest childhood. I also found it necessary to relate how I obtained the means which enabled me, in the autumn of my life, to realise the gigantic projects I formed when I was a poor little boy. But I flatter myself that the manner in which I have employed my time, and the use I have made of wealth, will meet with universal approbation, and that my autobiography may aid in diffusing among the intelligent public of all countries a taste for the high and noble studies which have sustained my courage during the hard trials of my life, and which promise to sweeten the days yet left me to live.

"I have availed myself of the opportunity to dwell at some length on the erroneous method by which Greek is taught in America and England. In fact I think it a cruel injustice to inflict for eight years on an unhappy pupil a language of which, when he leaves college, as a general rule, he knows hardly more than when he first began to learn it. As causes of this miserable result I accuse, in the first place, the arbitrary and atrocious pronunciation of Greek usual in America and England; and, in the second place, the erroneous method employed, according to which the pupils learn to disregard the accents entirely and to consider them as mere impediments, whereas the accents constitute a most important auxiliary in learning the language.

"What a happy effect could be produced on general education and what an enormous stimulus could be given to scientific pursuits, if intelligent youths could obtain in eighteen months not only a thorough

knowledge of modern Greek, but also a thorough knowledge of the most divine and most sonorous language which was spoken by Homer and Plato, and could learn the latter tongue as a living language so as never to forget it. And how easily, at how small an expense, could the change be made. A detailed account of the method I recommend, you find in my book. The idea was given to me by the examinations in the Merchant Tailor's College in London, to which I was invited. There were speeches in English, German, French, Latin, and Greek. All the speeches I understood, except those in Greek, nay, I did not understand a single word of them. I preach no idle theories, but stubborn facts, and ought, therefore, to be listened to."

Dr. Schliemann then goes on to give a *résumé* of the contents of his then forthcoming volume. As it concerns a most important archæological work, as it contains many curious facts, and as it comes from the author himself, I venture to give it in full, as follows:

"The order of my 'Ilios' is this: (1) My autobiography, containing a full description, as just mentioned, of the method by which any intelligent boy can master in eighteen months the difficulties of both modern and ancient Greek, learn both as living languages, understand all classics, and write with fluency dissertations in ancient Greek on any subject he is acquainted with; further the history of my excavations at Troy and Ithaca. (2) A full description of the country of the Trojans, its mountains, promontories, rivers, valleys, its geology, botany, zoölogy, history, as well as its all-important ethnology and linguistics. (3) Criticism of all ancient and modern literature on Troy. (4) The first city of Troy, the ruins of which are on the rock Hissarlik at a depth of from forty-five to fifty three feet below the surface. (5) The second city. Bronze was in both cities still unknown, but gold, silver, and copper, were known. In both cities were found five axes of jade (nephrite), which prove that the inhabitants had immigrated from the highlands of Asia. (6) The third or the burnt city, in which ten treasures were found. Here bronze as well as the art of soldering were known. The geology of the strata of *débris* of this most remarkable burnt city, as well as those of the two preceding and all the following cities, is minutely described by my excellent collaborator Prof. Rudolf Virchow, of Berlin, Emile Burwouf of Paris, and myself. Here were found five jade axes, and three more in the two following cities. (7) The fourth city. (8) The fifth city, which, as well as the four preceding cities, are prehistoric settlements. (9) The fifth is followed up in the sixth city by a Lydian settlement, all the pottery showing the very greatest resemblance to the most ancient pottery found in the *terra mare* between the trans-

Paduan district and the Abruzzi in Italy. (10) The seventh city, the Ilion of the Æolic colony. (11) The heroic tumuli of the Troad, of which I explored six.

"The book is illustrated among other things by about 2,000 different characteristic types of objects discovered in the seven cities. For the most part the Trojan antiquities are unique, but whenever there are *analoga* in other museums, these *analoga* are always carefully pointed out. All my arguments in the book are supported by quotations from ancient classics, and of such quotations there are, I think, more than five thousand in foot-notes, which greatly embellish the volume.

"If at present not all philologists believe that I discovered Troy in the third, the burnt city, on my death this discovery will be universally acknowledged, and, there being no second Troy to excavate, I venture to hope that my present work, which is the result of long years' hard labor, will be appreciated and will be considered for all coming ages very useful for reference."

When Dr. Schliemann died, surprise was expressed, even by some Americans, that the will of the great explorer revealed the fact that he was an American citizen. In my conversations with him he always referred to himself as an American, and his "we" and "us" always meant "we Americans" or "us Americans." The closing passage of the letter from which I have been quoting, and passages in other letters which will follow, show that Dr. Schliemann's American citizenship had, at least at this time, a strong hold on him. The letter closes with this paragraph:

"You asked me when I am going over to America. If this depended upon me, I would go over instantly and would never leave again the GREAT country. [The words are so written in the original.] But my days are counted and my minutes are precious. Besides, in America I cannot be of any use to science, whereas I may still be of great use to it by continuing my explorations in the Orient, where Sardis, in Asia Minor, Lycosara in Arcadia and Orchomenos in Boeotia, impatiently await their delivery by my pickaxe and spade. My fellow citizens are by far too intelligent not to understand all this, and I feel sure that they would applaud and hail with *far greater* enthusiasm any new, great archæological discovery I might make, than any lectures I could deliver to them personally on my old discoveries. Pray present my kindest regards to Dr. White. [Hon. Andrew D. White, then United States Minister to Germany.]"

In a brief note written on the same day as the foregoing letter, Dr. Schliemann said:

"I just learn from Professor Virchow that he has secured me the place of honor for the opening day of the Anthropological Congress (August 5) and that I have to lecture first. He adds that he has already

announced my name, and I see, therefore, no other alternative but to accept. I wrote to him to send tickets both to you and to our honorable minister, Dr. White."

I call attention to the "our" in the last phrase of this letter. In another letter he says: "On my first visit to Berlin I shall have very great pleasure in making the acquaintance of the honorable Dr. White, our United States Minister to the German Court. But after all I do not know yet whether I shall be able to attend in August the Anthropological Congress in Berlin, for the preparation of my lecture and my stay in Berlin would take up a whole week, whilst I have not a moment to spare."

But he did go up to the German capital, did have the place of honor, spoke in the presence of the then Crown Prince and Princess by whom he was highly complimented and was fêted in a grand way by all the German savants, as I saw with my own eyes during the sittings of the Congress. The effect of this changed sentiment in Germany in regard to Schliemann was very important. It evidently made Schliemann less of an American, or perhaps it would be more exact to say that it made him more of a German and secured for the Berlin Museum his valuable collections, which might otherwise have gone to the British Museum, or to New York.

The following letter, written from Leipsic after his return there, is dated August 31st, and reveals Schliemann's joy at the recognition of his labors by his native land. The opening passage refers to the banquet which closed the labors of the Anthropological Congress.

"By a strange accident I received only to-day your very kind letter of the 10th inst., from which I am sorry to see that you missed that splendid festival of the 9th inst. at the Kaiserhof, for you would have enjoyed it very much indeed.

"Mind that both in America and in England my discoveries were acknowledged at once and all my theories and conclusions were almost universally accepted there, whilst in Germany they were subjects of universal laughter and derision. But now all at once they see in Germany that they are wrong and implicitly accept all my arguments. Though this acknowledgment in my native country comes late, it is highly agreeable to me, for I thought it would come only after my death. But that it would come one day, I was perfectly sure.

"In fact the acknowledgement of the German scientific world could not have been more manifestly symbolised than by the *menu* of the grand dinner, which is twelve inches long by nine in breadth, and represents on the right Nordenskjöld laboring hard on board his 'Vega' in front of a huge iceberg on

which the manifold victuals are written in Swedish. Below, to the right, is pictured an Esquimaux holding in his hand the map of the Arctic regions, while to the left is the City of Berlin symbolised by a polar bear which holds a laurel wreath in his mouth.

"On the left side of the beautiful card I am represented heroically, sitting on the great treasure symbolised by a safe with the legend *Ἀρνέιμ Πριάμοιο*. (Arnheim is the celebrated safe maker in this country.) In my right hand I hold an immense spade; on my left is standing the goddess Victory putting a laurel-crown on my head, while the City of Berlin, personified by a bear, puts another laurel wreath at my feet. Above my head is represented Troy with its huge walls and towers, with the legend *Ἰλίου ἱπῆ*. In front of me is the list of the dishes in Greek crowned by the Lion's Gate of Mycenæ, with the legend in Greek which translated reads: 'Banquet in honor of the great Schliemann.' Below all this are beautiful representations from the 'Iliad,' such as Hector taking leave of Andromache and Astyanax frightened at the sight of his father's helmet-crest.

"Who would have thought so rapid a change possible only a few years ago, when the whole German press was insulting me and throwing thunderbolts at me? Nay they pretended even that I had got fabricated all the Trojan and Mycenian treasures at Athens to impose upon the credulous! But my collections have never been and never will be for sale.

"My kindest regards to you and to our learned ambassador, the Hon. Dr. White.

"I write in the utmost hurry and beg to be excused for slips of the pen."

The foregoing extracts show with what zeal Henry Schliemann bent to his work, reveal his strong American leaning, and prove once more how necessary applause and appreciation is to the happiness of a man of genius.

Paris, Feb., 1891.

CURRENT TOPICS.

LAST year, when the people of Kansas elected to the office of judge a citizen who was not a lawyer, some surprise was manifested, and the performance was regarded as a bit of lunacy peculiar to the inhabitants of that remote and sockless province; but the same eccentricity has been practiced in Chicago for many years without exciting comment. At this term of the appellate court forty-five judgments appealed from the lower courts were passed upon, and twenty-three of them reversed, leaving twenty-two affirmed, and these will very likely be reversed by the supreme court when they get up there. There are mechanics in Chicago, who for a hundred dollars or so, will make a wooden machine to decide law-suits, and will warrant that more of its judgments will be sustained by the higher courts, than of those rendered by the numerous judges innocent of law, who get seven thousand dollars a year each for deciding wrong. It has been candidly said in a book by one of the judges that the civil courts of Chicago, are practically closed against the poor. This is doubtless true, and

the exclusion is one of the incidents of poverty for which the poor man has reason to be grateful. "The law's delay" is among Hamlet's provocations to suicide, but in Chicago we have doubled this plague of life, for we have not only the law's delay, but at the end of that a reversal of the judgment. Happy is the man who is too poor to go to law.

* * *

While it is not necessary in Chicago, for a judge to be a lawyer, it is essential that he be a partisan branded "Republican" or "Democrat." This is the common law of the bench; and every candidate for judicial honors must be duly enlisted and mustered into a republican or a democratic battalion. Membership in any of the other political parties is a disqualification. A Coke or a Blackstone, a Kent or a Story, would not be eligible to a judgeship in Chicago until after he had obtained his diploma as a republican or a democrat. There are some good lawyers in Chicago who do not belong to any political party, and some who belong to one or other of the various heterodox parties, but never a man of them is eligible to the bench; and what is yet more curious, the judgeships must be equally divided between the orthodox partisans. Whenever a judicial vacancy occurs by reason of death or other accident, it must be filled, not for the public advantage, but according to the politics of the last incumbent. All this is delightfully stupid and conservative. It has in it the elements of that impartiality shown by old Squire Vinton, who was a justice of the peace in the western country several years ago. There were only two lawyers in the town, one of them a democrat, the other a republican, and consequently they had one side or the other of every case. One day the republican had a plain and very easy case, but was greatly astonished when the squire gave judgment against him. He remonstrated fervently, and showed how wrong the decision was, but the squire was firm, and said: "Mark, you won the last case, and it's Jimmy's turn to win this one, so judgment goes agin you, and squashes your declaration like a house fell on it." By this method of equity, the partisan division of the judgeships may be made logical, for unless the democratic judges decide in favor of democrats, and the republicans the other way, of what use is this partisan rule? The comedy of it does not become visible until we learn that the object of the rule is to protect us from the evils of a partisan judiciary.

* * *

Much inconvenience has been caused in genteel circles by the application to polite society of musty maxims to the effect that "all are equal before the law," that "there is only one code for the rich and poor alike," that "the law is no respecter of persons," and much fabulous tradition of a similar kind. Those doctrines when put into practice have given some annoyance to patrician suitors who have been compelled to accept juries composed of a miscellaneous mixture, drawn, as the legal jargon has it, "from the body of the county," rather than from a gilt edged catalogue. A change in this respect has been made in St. Louis, and no doubt it will be adopted by the courts of Chicago and other cities where high society is found. The new system of drawing special jurors, as adopted by the jury commissioners of St. Louis, is briefly this: By paying \$75.00 a man has the privilege of refusing to accept a jury drawn from the mixed rabble in the city directory, and may have his jury from the more select circle represented in Gould's Business Directory. The privilege is rather expensive, but we cannot expect to get aristocratic juries at democratic prices. After awhile juries will be classified into three grades according to quality, like the pews in the church, or the seats in the theatre. They hanged a lord in England once for ordinary murder, but they allowed him a silken rope because he claimed the luxury as due to his rank. His claim was conceded, provided he would pay for the rope, which he did. Had he lived in this more enlightened age,

he might by paying for it, have had a special jury to his liking, selected from "Gould's Business Directory."

Like a burlesque old wizard in a comic opera, the venerable Isaac Bassett, Assistant Something or other of the Senate, using his magic wand, put back the national clock three several times on the 4th of March, five minutes at a time, in order to lengthen the legislative day, and save the appropriation bills. At his command the sun went back fifteen minutes on the dial of Abaz, and the proud noon retreated three times to accommodate the fifty-first congress. This puerile miracle is done at the close of every congress in the presence and with the approval of "potent, grave, and reverend" senators, who pretend that the term is just fifteen minutes too short for the work that congress has to do. A spectator looking on during the closing hours of congress would suppose that madness had taken possession of both houses; but never had madness more method in it,—nor more money. In the convivial tumult of the time conscience becomes drunken, and millions are squandered in appropriations not fit to be made. The president has no time to examine the bills he is required to sign, nor is it intended that he shall have any, for that might mean the saving of millions to the people, and the defeat of a hundred conspiracies against the treasury. It is the very stultification of a people that the late congress which pretended on the 4th of March, that it needed just fifteen minutes more, and employed a magician to get it, actually spent the first nine months of its term in idleness without even coming together; and the present congress which began to draw pay on the 4th of March, will spend the first nine months of its term in the same way, and at the end it will pretend that it needs just fifteen minutes more to complete its business, and will call upon the same old conjurer for it.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES AND "THE OPEN COURT."

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

I AM an admirer of G. H. Lewes's philosophy; yet it has long been a matter of surprise to me that Lewes's work should be so little known, and should apparently have produced such a small effect. For several years now I have been looking out for evidences of his influence, and I have to confess, I have not seen many. It is true he is often referred to and quoted by authors as an authority, but his doctrine is, I believe, much misunderstood. I find too, occasionally, his thoughts appropriated without any acknowledgment, while I have seen him deliberately misquoted and misrepresented. Since I first began to read *The Open Court*, nearly two years ago, I have anxiously scanned its pages for evidences of Lewes's influence, but though I frequently discover coincidences of view, I have never yet been able to make up my mind whether Dr. Carus has read Lewes's works or not. If he has not done so, it is only one more indication of the fact, that what Lewes would call the "General Mind" is on the eve of making an important step in advance. Philosophic thought is spreading. Change is "in the air" and an advance is inevitable.

At the present time there are three special forms or phases of thought—more or less allied—seeking recognition. The Monism of *The Open Court*, the Hylo-Idealism of Dr. Lewins, and the Reasoned Realism of George Henry Lewes. It is true, that this last—strangely enough—seems to be out of the running altogether, and the reason for this is, I think, not far to seek. Lewes and Herbert Spencer each appeal to the philosophic world, and the Transfigured Realism of Spencer has proved to be—not more true but more popular than Lewes's Reasoned Realism. The fact is, that Spencer's philosophy with its "Unknowable Per-

sistent Force" seems admirably suited to answer as a cushion for such thinkers as have been compelled to relinquish their personal "Creator."

Hylo-Idealism is at present too shadowy and vague to meet with much acceptance, and unfortunately its originator has personally not been successful in placing his philosophy before the world; indeed his own exposition of it, seems to me to be little other than an alternate posing, first on the pedestal of Idealism and then on that of Materialism, and because this intellectual change of position is unconsciously accomplished Dr. Lewins believes he has reconciled them; nor can I—with all my admiration for Miss Constance Naden perceive that she has accomplished much more. The only other writer who has, just lately, been able to make a fair presentation of what Dr. Lewins has in his mind is Mr. McCrie. I refer to his article in *The Open Court*. But Mr. McCrie seems fully alive to the real outcome of Hylo-Idealism for he entitled his article "Positive Idealism."

With regard to the Monism of *The Open Court* I confess that notwithstanding I have read "Fundamental Problems," I am not yet able to say that I understand what Monism really means—hence I refrain from any criticism. I feel that it must be on the "right lines" or there could not be so many "coincidences" such as I have referred to.

Somewhat oddly,—notwithstanding my enthusiastic admiration for G. H. Lewes,—on one or two matters I do not agree with him. The oddness is not in the fact of my difference, but in the fact that on the points I refer to, Lewes and Dr. Carus are at one. It is not on points of doctrine, but of policy; perhaps if I quote the remarks from Lewes, you will better understand what I mean. In the first volume of his "Problems" (p. 2) he writes:

"There is a conspicuous effort to reconcile the aims and claims of Religion and Science—the two mightiest antagonists. The many and piteous complaints, old as Religion itself against the growing infidelity of the age might be disregarded were they not confirmed on all sides by evidence that Religion is rapidly tending to one of two issues, either towards extinction, or towards transformation. Some considerable thinkers regard the former alternative as the probable and desirable issue. They argue that Religion has played its part in the evolution of humanity—a noble part, yet only that of a provisional organ which in the course of development must be displaced by a final organ. Other thinkers—and I follow these—consider that Religion will continue to regulate the evolution; but that to do this in the coming ages, it must occupy a position similar to the one it occupied in the past and express the highest thought of the time as that thought widens with ever growing experience. . . . Those who entertain this hope and view of Religion founded on Science, believe—and I share the belief—that the present antagonism will rapidly merge in an energetic co-operation."

These are sentiments which I assume will be cordially agreed to by yourself, but for myself, I am unable so readily to shift the meaning of the term Religion. I am of opinion that the word has, and will ever retain, connotations which will render it a mischievous thing. Possibly in America where Religion is not state-endowed as it is with us, and where its dogmas have not become so much a part and parcel of the life of the people, and actually the means of livelihood to so many as it is in England, there might be some hopes of its dogmatic features being gradually relinquished, but here it must be destroyed, and for that which Lewes means by Religion, another name must be found. On somewhat similar grounds I object to the continued use of the word Soul, which Lewes also adheres to.

I now want to say a word or two on the subject of Ethics and Ethical Culture Societies. On the first proposition for the establishment of such a society in London, I admit I was not over enthusiastic; partly because, although it sounded very good and proper, I was not quite aware of the real aim, or what it was they hoped to reach. I soon began to perceive that it would hardly suit me. The objects of such societies may be useful as temporary expedients, but it is a case of applying remedies to symptoms, instead of striking at the disease. I have always strongly con-

tended that if the basis on which human conduct has hitherto been grounded, be taken away, it becomes absolutely essential that another foundation shall be prepared. If we take away Religion (i. e. the "Will of God") as a motive for right conduct, it is necessary to replace it by a philosophy which shall supply a more rational and consistent reason. I felt bound to cease my connection with one of such societies, especially when I found that while professing non-commitment to any philosophic basis, there was a decided antagonism to philosophic teachers who professed to be seeking such a basis. I may say that I agree almost entirely with your "Ethical Problem" lectures. And while writing I may say I cordially agree with your criticism of the word Agnosticism. It has seemed to me to be an utter absurdity to make a term which is simply an acknowledgment of ignorance as to a certain problem the title or the designation of a party—or of an individual. What a really good name would be I cannot pretend to say. I positively refuse to be called an Agnostic, and if people call me one I at once profess my preference for the title Atheist. I can afford to despise the opprobrium which is supposed to be attached to it. With regard to your own term "Monist" as I have already said, I don't quite see all its implications at present.

In *The Monist* Ernst Mach's article is excessively interesting to me, and it caused me considerable surprise to find that such notions had been "in the air" so long. I cannot agree with the article by Max Dessoir. However, there are many philosophic tastes and *The Monist* is a free platform.

Upper Tooting, London.

J. HARRISON ELLIS.

[Monism has been defined and expounded in different ways. I use the word simply in the sense of "a unitary conception of the world." There are unitary conceptions of the world of different types; there are, especially (1) spiritualistic and (2) materialistic monisms, and in addition to these extremes we have various monisms of purely speculative and even intuitive thought. Agnostic monism would be that view whose principle of unity is something unknowable. The monism defended by *The Open Court* is none of these monisms. Its idea is simpler than the principles of the other unitary world-conceptions. It is "positive Monism"; positive, because it takes its stand on the positive facts of experience, arranging them into a unitary system of knowledge.

[Positive monism is not a new philosophy or a peculiar system. It is the common principle of all sound philosophy. A reviewer of *The Monist* in *The Nation*, criticising our definition of monism says: "The search for a unitary conception of the world or for a unitary systematisation of science would be a good definition of philosophy, and with this good old word at hand we want no other." Let me repeat what I said in answer to this (*The Monist* p. 237): Call that which we call monism or a unitary systematisation of knowledge "philosophy"; we will not quarrel about names—*dummodo conveniamus in re*. We agree perfectly with our critic, for we also maintain that monism (at least what we consider monism) is philosophy; it is the philosophy. By calling our philosophy monism we wish to emphasise the importance of the agreement of all truths in one truth, for this agreement is the *sigillum veri*; it is the criterion of truth.

[The recognition of this agreement is a very fertile and important idea; it cannot be underrated. It destroys the supernatural and shows that dualism in any form is untenable. The entire cosmos is one indivisible whole. There is no duality of God and world, or of soul and world, or of spirit and matter. The soul is a part of the world; God is a special aspect of the cosmos, its laws being considered as the ultimate authority of moral conduct, as the basis of ethics; and spirit and matter are two abstracts representing different features of one and the same reality.

[Concerning G. H. Lewes, I have to state that—with the ex-

ception of Goethe's life—I am only superficially familiar with his works. Some years ago I read in his "Problems of Life and Mind" the chapters pertaining to causality, but did not find in that respect much agreement. In *The Index* of 1886, No. 37, N. S., I published an article on the subject stating my differences. The passage quoted by Mr. Ellis shows a strange coincidence with the object of *The Open Court*, which is "the conciliation of Religion with Science." (I take occasion to state here that this expression was formulated by Mr. Hegeler, who has read, if anything, even less of Mr. Lewes than I.) This, however, does not make the coincidence appear strange to me; since I myself can see that everywhere the effort of reconciling the aims and claims of Religion and Science are conspicuous, not only in America, but also in orthodox England. I need but refer to such names as Matthew Arnold and Seeley. The scientist may not be satisfied with their reconciliations; none the less there is the effort of accomplishing it. When I saw Professor Haeckel, he said among other things, that if his energies were not so completely taken up with his scientific work, he would gladly devote his life to elaborating and preaching the Religion of Science. Professor Haeckel is the son of earnest Christian parents, and he has preserved a truly religious spirit in the abandonment of dogmas no less than in the preservation of his faith in truth.

[Since I received Mr. Ellis's letter I have thought it advisable to place the works of Lewes in my library. I glanced over some of the volumes of "Problems of Life and Mind" and found many similarities, although even where I fully agree with Lewes, I should have expressed myself differently. They are also to me a proof that human thought "is on the verge of making an important step in advance." I will confess here that I have been much more struck by the similarities of my own convictions with W. K. Clifford's views. When I had settled several problems to my own satisfaction, I was not as yet familiar with Professor Clifford's solutions. I read his essays on "Cosmic Emotion" and on "The Nature of Things in Themselves" with an unusual delight. I could not accept Clifford's presentation *in toto*, but there were striking agreements. My article "Feeling as a Physiological Process" was written as it now stands, but I re-wrote the article "Feeling and Motion," adopting the expression "the elements of feeling" from Clifford. That in spite of important similarities there are also important differences, is a matter of course and has been pointed out in my article "Feeling and Motion."

[Concerning the name "atheist," I confess that it is more definite than "agnostic." But is it not also a mere negation of theism? Does it not also lack the positive element which makes a name valuable? If a new word is needed, I should suggest in the place of atheism the term "cosmism," as expressive of the belief in a cosmos, that is an impersonal non-theistic universe, the laws of which are explained as dependent upon its intrinsic and immanent order. P. C.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

NORTHERN STUDIES. By Edmund Gosse. London: Walter Scott.

This is a plainly but very tastefully gotten up book of 268 pages issued in the Camelot Series. This excellent series is edited by Mr. Ernest Rhys, and offers at the remarkably low price of one shilling (in America forty cents), a large number of select classical productions, which "aim rather at providing companions for street and field than scholars' texts." The present work is a reprint, with additions, of a part of the "Studies in the Literature of Northern Europe"; and at the present time when so much interest is taken in Ibsen and other fellow-authors of his it is peculiarly welcome. "If," says the editor, "only the pages that 'follow helped us to refer such a striking figure as Ibsen to his 'national antecedents, and to relate him (*à la M. Taine*) to 'the 'race, the milieu, and the moment,' their addition to the docu-

"ments of European literary interest would be notable. But they do this, not only for Ibsen, but for other and different figures—so different as Björnson and Bödcher, Runeberg, and our beloved Hans Andersen, and offer again suggestions of curious interest, for the dramatic critic in their account of the happily "conditioned National Theatre of Denmark." Mr. Gosse's book treats of (1) Norway, (2) Sweden, (3) Denmark; and is divided into the divisions "Norwegian Poetry since 1814," "Henrik Ibsen," "The Lofoden Islands," "Runeberg," "The Danish National Theatre," "From Danish Poets," and an "Appendix" with poems in the originals. These essays are delightful reading and the editor is to be congratulated in his having been able to put them before the public in so attractive and cheap a form. *μsps.*

METHODS OF TEACHING PATRIOTISM. By Col. Geo. T. Balch. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company.

Col. Balch's method of teaching patriotism, or "emotional patriotism" as he calls it, is as follows: The material symbols of the nation, its flags, its seals, its coats of arms, etc., are, as the incarnation of the national spirit and achievement, to be brought by exercises into daily contact with the thought and conduct of our children; each school is to have a flag to be presented to that class which attains the highest standard of punctuality and excellence, and every morning the flag and its guard are to parade before the school, and the school are to salute the flag; medals are to be struck with the national coat of arms, the national flag, etc., on their face, and to be granted to scholars as rewards for good conduct; and various other ritualistic practices are to be introduced. The children of the nation are thus to be enrolled in a grand American Legion of Honor, a miniature G. A. R.

A certain amount of this sort of thing, say a few times a year, on fête occasions might, we think, have a beneficial effect; but to have it every day, as Col. Balch proposes, for eight or nine years, the term of our public-school courses, would degenerate into the silliest chauvinism in the case of constitutions that could stand it that long, and into aversion and a welcome tedium vitae academice in the case of the more sensitively organized. This is true fetichism—so much of it. We think much more highly of the plan adopted in some of our schools, of devoting the afternoons of Friday to national studies and patriotic literary exercises. This is better than waving flags and blowing trumpets. To know "The Ride of Paul Revere" or "Old Ironsides" by heart, to have read the "Spy" or the "The Pilot" will instil more patriotism in the hearts of children than years of saluting flags and wearing flag-embazoned medals.

But why "teach" patriotism at all? Has patriotism ever been "taught" among the nations and in the epochs that have exhibited this virtue in the grandest forms and on the grandest occasions? One would think that patriotism were a hot-house plant that would thrive by the careful cultivation of gardeners and the sprinkling of water-pots, and not a sturdy oak that has its roots in a nation's soil and is nourished by storms and blasts. If we wish to preserve this oak we must cultivate the soil from which it grew,—the mind of the nation,—and not the acorns that it bears; for often in national as in natural life they are hollow. Enthusiasm for the past is praiseworthy and noble; but it should never sentimentally take the place of preparation for the future. The thought precedes the deed. Homer, not Miltiades, won at Marathon; the English Bible, not Cromwell, at Marston Moor; Luther, Lessing, Kant, and not Von Moltke, at Sadowa and Sedan. Our greatest care should be that the nation and its children should produce and learn to appreciate what is great, both in word and deed; and the love of it,—patriotism,—will surely follow. Men never refuse to fight for treasures,—especially of the higher kind which, as the Bible says, "neither moth nor rust doth corrupt."

μsps.

NOTES.

Prof. Max Müller says in one of his Gifford lectures: "How the peculiar character of a language may influence even religious expressions, I had occasion to notice in an intercourse with a young Mohawk. 'In Mohawk,' he said, 'we cannot say father, mother, child, nor the father, the mother, the child. We must always say my father, or thy mother, or his child.' Once when I asked him to translate the Apostles' Creed for me, he translated, 'I believe in our God, our Father, and his Son.' But when he came to the Holy Ghost, he asked, 'Is it *their* or *his* Holy Ghost?' I told him that there was a difference of opinion on that point between two great divisions of the Christian church, and he then shook his head and declared that he could not translate the creed until that point had been settled."

"When our thoughts are found to be so dependent upon the habits of our language," Prof. Max Müller adds, "shall we not allow a greater freedom in the interpretation of the letter?"

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The Open Court.

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COMTE'S GOSPEL OF WEALTH.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

IN subscribing to the opinion of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill declared that "the clumsy method of regulating by competition the proportion of product that goes to the workman, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly does not represent a moral ideal; and that until operatives and employers accomplish the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers accomplish that of an army, industry will never be moralised."

When these lines were written, a generation ago, such matters were looked upon by practical men as entirely out of their line, but, as Freeman says, "when statesmen who pride themselves chiefly on common sense, when newspapers which pride themselves on a certain air of dignified infallibility, make light of a question or of a movement, when they scorn it, when they snub it, when they call it sentimental, when they rule it to be beyond the range of practical politics, we know almost as certainly as we know the next eclipse of the moon, that the question will be the most practical of all questions before long."

The advocate of social reform is already in respectable company and the adherence of so practical a statesman as Mr. Gladstone must place the movement beyond the period of scorn. But it cannot be denied that the army of the well-meaning is still composed of awkward squads.

In an article entitled "Mr. Carnegie's Gospel of Wealth" the Ex-Premier points out that in our day, when the possession of land is no longer the principal form of property, the kind of wealth that chiefly grows "is what may be called irresponsible wealth; wealth little watched and checked by opinion, little brought into contact with duty." To awaken and stimulate a sense of responsibility in favor of the suffering poor, he advises the formation of a society whose members shall pledge themselves to give in charity a part of their yearly income, each one to decide for himself in advance how much that part shall be.

Among the different motives that may be relied upon to aid in this good work the devotion to others that Comte named *altruism* is mentioned, and this word recalls to us its author's own plan of social amelioration.

Unfortunately all reference to the sociological doctrines of this greatest of systematisers necessitates a preliminary disclaimer of much that will not bear the test of his own method and of most of what came after the six volumes of Positive Philosophy. We are not responsible for the "nervous crisis" and the "virtuous passion" that coincided with the initial elaboration of his second work and filled it with sentimental mysticism. History abounds in similar perturbations from Troy to Tipperary, and we can only deplore the accident that deprived us of a worthy sequel to the writings that have placed Comte among the greatest thinkers of all time.

Littré proposed as an exercise for students of history the research of what is necessary and of what is accidental in historical evolution; of what might have been different and of what could not have been different; and he suggests subjects of composition in which an accidental is suppressed and a sketch required of what would have come to pass in such an hypothesis. The accidental depending upon the intervention in social events of biological, chemical, or cosmic conditions; the necessary depending upon the nature of societies and the law of their development.

As an additional exercise some of the more tangled passages of biography or of general history might be given, and the students required to *look for the woman*.

According to Comte "the political and moral crisis that societies are now undergoing arises out of intellectual anarchy. While stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social order, we are suffering under an utter disagreement, and until a certain number of general ideas can be acknowledged as a rallying point of social doctrine our institutions can be only provisional."

This agreement upon fundamental maxims can be brought about only by consolidating the whole of our acquired knowledge into one body of homogeneous doctrine, which will have the assent of all men of superior intelligence and thus acquire the support of an enlightened public opinion. "There can be no doubt that the legitimate complaints lodged by the masses against a system under which their general needs are too little considered, relate to a renovation of opinions and manners, and could not be satisfied by express institutions. This is especially true in re-

gard to the evils inherent in the inequality of wealth, which afford the most dangerous theme to both agitators and dreamers ; for these evils derive their force much more from our intellectual and moral disorder than from the imperfections of political measures."

Having completed what Mill calls his profound and comprehensive analysis of history, and traced the progress of humanity in the past, Comte proceeded to institute an elaborate system for the reorganisation of society ; as if the science of sociology had been already far advanced. Littré explains what had really been done, besides the establishment of the method, by comparing this sketch of the development of history to what would be in biology a treatise on the evolution of the individual from age to age ; and, continuing the comparison, he says that in sociology there had been no treatise equivalent to a physiology.

Notwithstanding the ridiculous final result of this attempt to accomplish, by a change from the objective to the subjective method, what must be the work of succeeding generations, it is interesting to note certain points of resemblance between Comte's plan, half a century old, and the tendencies of to-day.

At the base of his system is the division between the spiritual and the temporal authority. During the Middle Ages the church "constituted a power that infused morality into political government." Unity of faith gave the Pope and the clergy authority over kings in the interpretation of God's will ; and equally respected by all, the priest became the guide of the strong and the protector of the weak. This unity having ceased to exist, the spiritual power must fall to the representatives of the new unity and a body of philosophers is created to direct education, show all men their duty and hold them to it with the aid of public opinion. These, like all other members of the speculative class, must renounce riches and political employment and content themselves with a modest subsidy and universal consideration.

The temporal government will be in the hands of capitalists whose dignity and authority will correspond with the generality of their operations ; the bankers in the first rank, then the merchants, then the manufacturers, and finally the agriculturists, with the great mass of workmen at the base. After dividing the different nations into a number of small republics, the chief authority in each is given to a triumvirate of its three principal bankers, who are to have charge of the state department, the interior department, and the treasury department. There will be no need of a secretary of war, or of a secretary of the navy, and the postmaster-general, being a man of letters, will probably represent the spiritual power as a delegate from the High Priest of Humanity, unless present signs fail.

The capitalist is regarded as a public functionary and his relations to society are similar to those approved by many socialists, but Comte proposed to accomplish by education and the force of public opinion what they would establish by political institutions. According to his plan we must discard the distinction between public and private functions. "There is a public utility in the humblest office of co-operation, no less than in the loftiest function of government. Other men would feel, if their labor were but systematised, as the private soldier feels in the discharge of his humblest duty, the dignity of public service, and the honor of a share in the action of the general economy."

He saw in the influence that belonged to men of letters and to metaphysicians in his day a partial recognition of the necessity of a separate spiritual government, and this influence has increased as metaphysics have become more and more like systematised common sense, and as the power of the press to mould opinion and control practical politics has grown with the extension of journalism.

Still there is no subsidised body of public censors in sight, and the members of the press have not yet shown a devotion to the "modesty" of their stipend and an aversion to temporal power that would indicate the speculative vocation. Regarding their appointment as ministers to foreign courts, it is in strict accordance with the system of the great positivist, who placed international relations in charge of the spiritual authority ; but, of course, it is possible that President Harrison was not influenced by this fact.

Another example of the spirit of the system is seen in the endeavor of the committees of one hundred, more or less, to moralise politics. In one of our states such influence recently kept the protégé of a thief from being elected governor, and as the unsuccessful candidate has since been arrested several times for embezzlement, it is generally admitted, outside of political circles, that the interference was not unwise.

The members of the clergy that have given up perfunctory sparring with the devil and gone at him with a will by "taking the pulpit into politics" are also in accord with what Comte considered the duty of the spiritual power.

If we turn to things temporal we find greater similarity between what is and what he said ought to be in this industrial era, for capital reigns supreme. The forms of a representative government are still retained but the sovereign people are not consulted in the choice of the lobby and the lobby makes the law. But there is one marked difference between the present condition of affairs and that established by the System of Positive Politics ; in the latter wealth governs directly and is responsible to public opinion, and if plutocracy is not a mere perturbation but has come to

stay, the sooner it takes on this responsibility the better. Some may say, as did a certain wealthy French financier just before the Revolution, "why innovate, are not we comfortable?" but they should profit by his later unpleasant experience.

Those of us who have not yet sufficiently outgrown our prejudices to look with equanimity on Comte's division of society into rich and poor, even if the latter are to have the wisest of care, may be pardoned for asking if there are not some immoral and abnormal influences at work to foster the present tendency. Of course, if it is found to belong to the regular order of development all we can do is to make the best of it. But even in that case we need not countenance every method of acceleration. We are not obliged, because we admit that the Indian must make way for the white man, to rejoice at the starving of squaws and papposes by a political heeler. It may be that this concentration of wealth in the hands of the few lies in the inevitable course of industrial progress, but we are not therefore bound to promote it by every form of corruption that ingenuity can devise. Whether it is so or not may be a very hard question to answer, owing to the complication of facts to be considered, but it is generally admitted that stealing is wrong and that bribery is wrong; would it not be fair to try what effect the suppression of these two in all their forms would have on this concentration? Perhaps it might not be found so necessary to abolish modest independence in the name of progress. The gospel of wealth is good but the gospel of justice is better.

If after paying the expenses of favorable legislation the industrial genius is able to amass millions he should not be too sure that all is for the best in a model world because he has used part of his surplus to endow a library. We may honor him by comparison, but perhaps the money would have done much more good if it had gone into the pockets of the operatives as fairly earned wages. There might be no library, and it is possible that the material benefit would be less, but the knowledge that an employer was paying more than he was obliged to pay would have gone further toward solving an important social problem than all the books in the world.

There are many cheap ways of proving that this is not "practical" but the fact remains.

What is and what is not practicable in an industrial sense, must be learned by future experience, but the moral principles that relate to man's intercourse with man are the result of past experience reaching back at least as far as Adam. They are worthy of respectful consideration.

There is no easy road to social reform, but if those who desire it were to give up their petty squabbling over matters of no earthly importance and unite in ap-

plying these principles to every-day affairs there would be an immediate improvement. The best way to work for society while the more able are generalising and co-ordinating the speculations of common sense, is to look about near home and attack such evils as are condemned by all honest men irrespective of creed. This will keep us busy, and it may be said, in passing, that it is not fair for other nations to use this country as a dumping ground for social problems.

Above all let us beware of the man that has found an economic mare's nest.

A MORAL ALLEGORY.*

BY C. S. WAKE.

SOME time ago there was much discussion among the violins as to the conditions of harmony, and a meeting was convened to discuss the important subject. The debate was opened by an instrument of moderate experience, who affirmed that the strings are the seat of harmony. The breaking of the strings causes the total loss of harmony, and if a single string is the least out of tune there is a beginning of discord. When all the strings are in perfect tune then can the finest music be performed, but let one of them be dissonant, and the heaven of harmony is destroyed. Where harmony is there is music, for music and harmony are functions of the strings. But there cannot be harmony without use, and the gradual loss of tone through want of use denotes the atrophy of harmony and music.

The violin sat down amidst loud applause and was succeeded by an instrument of less age but greater note. Harmony, said he, is the denial of self in the concert of instruments, and the power of self-denial is greatest in the prime of life. Age kills music as well as harmony. We must all grow old, but we need not grow old prematurely. Premature old age is the penalty of those who depart from the laws of harmony. And what a penalty! Age does not enjoy, and does not suffer even. It has no emotion, and therefore has neither harmony nor music. Being put on the shelf or hung on the wall is the usual fate of old violins, and that is not happiness. We may apply the remark of a noted octogenarian, full of human wisdom, who, when asked whether old age is unfeeling, answered: "It has not vital energy enough to supply the waste of the more exhausting emotions." A violin who has grown old in the service of harmony must have every faculty benumbed, and drop off quietly into sleep under the benign influence of "nature's kindly anodyne." Happiness is contingent upon the faculties of vibration and resonance, and these have decayed in the old violin.

* The article by Mr. Swift in No. 185 of *The Open Court* expresses his belief, but that it expresses the truth I do not believe, and the ideas embodied in the present Allegory came into my mind.

The speaker was continuing in this strain when time was called. He was followed by an instrument of mature years who was noted for his tone of profundity. I quite approve, said he, of what the preceding speakers have uttered. At last it is proved that the physical and the harmonious are one. They have the same basis, and although we can distinguish between them by analysis, the differentiation is purely fictitious. Discordant notes are as physical as the box or the strings. They flow from the dissonance of the physical elements, and result from the breach of the laws of harmony as well as from physical causes. Rest assured, my friends, that no action which does not tend in any of its consequences to the destruction of the instrument is inharmonious. Thus all harmony and all music, the attainment of happiness and heaven, come at last to this—the perfection of the instrument.

These sentiments were greeted with tumultuous scrapings, which had not subsided when an old violin arose. His venerable appearance imposed silence, although it was evident that he was looked upon as an intruder. He began by saying that the strings are not everything. They are useless without a box or body through which their vibration can be communicated to the air and its undulations rendered sonorous and musical in tone. The strings if broken may be replaced, but any defect in the box itself is irremediable. Then indeed can it be said that the heaven of harmony is destroyed. It is not true that harmony and music are functions of the strings, they are the functions of the whole instrument, and divine is the music which issues from it when touched by a master hand. Without use there cannot be harmony, of course, but although disuse may ruin the strings, it will not affect the body of the instrument, if its material is sound and duly seasoned and varnished.

The old violin continued, with some emotion, I deny that the power of self-restraint on which harmony depends is less in age than in middle life. To say that age kills harmony or music is a libel. Premature old age may do so, because it is due to an infringement of the laws of harmony and nature, but age itself is no penalty. It has not the passion of youth, but it is not devoid of feeling, and it has suffering and enjoyment commensurate with this feeling. Is it not happiness to rest after the turmoil of a long and busy life, spent even in promoting harmony! But that rest is not emotionless. The echoes of the past still reverberate amid the recesses of the instrument, which can live over again in memory the triumphs of former days. It is justly entitled to tranquil repose after its many years of service, but its tones are not gone, and they gain in mellowness what they may have lost in strength. But what avails even the finest qualities, the most modulated tones, unless they are received

and interpreted by a sympathetic mind! Thus the physical and the harmonious are not one in the sense intended by the former speaker. They have the same basis in nature, but they are separate expressions of it, and the mind which creates the harmony can better dispense with the instrument than the instrument with the mind. Nor can we say that no action is inharmonious which does not tend to the destruction of the instrument. If this were true, it would follow that every such action is harmonious; but how could this be if it had no relation to the instrument itself? And what is the good of a perfect instrument unless its perfection is utilised for the happiness of others! We cannot live for ourselves alone. We are members of a community and as such we have certain duties to perform to each other and to society at large. However perfect in structure and action may be the instrument, it can produce no real harmony unless in making use of its powers it seeks to benefit others. In conclusion I repeat that old age is not unfeeling or devoid of happiness, as my master Stradivari well knew. And thereupon he burst into a melody whose ravishing tones so enraptured his hearers that, on a vote being taken, he was almost unanimously declared to have carried the day.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE loss of the *Utopia* revives the controversy between speed and safety as qualities of a ship; and also the important question, how much human freight may an emigrant ship carry in proportion to its tonnage? It would be ironical flattery to call the steerage company packed into the *Utopia* by the dignified name of passengers; they were common freight, and like freight they went down to the bottom of the sea. Every year the inventive genius of man increases the speed of ships, until now the voyage across the Atlantic is a job of less than a week for a first class racer on a first class line. Unfortunately the means of safety have not grown in proportion to the increase of speed. A hundred dollars to one that there is not a passenger ship sailing between New York and Liverpool that in actual danger can lower a boat in three minutes; and the same wager that any ship in the navy can do it in ten seconds; why? Because the crew of a man of war is drilled, while the ship's tackle is always in good order. This is not the case on passenger ships where many of the crew are new men shipped merely for that voyage. Steamship companies will deny all this, and say that their crews are drilled like those of a man of war; and yet whenever an accident happens we always read the same story, "Orders were immediately given to lower the boats, but—but—but,"—and then come the melancholy reasons why; the ropes being foul, the blocks rusty, and no axes handy, the boats were of no avail.

* * *

It may be that in this particular disaster, owing to the strength of the gale, or the severity of her wounds, the *Utopia* could not possibly lower her boats quick enough to save her people; but had the sea been smooth as glass, without a zephyr to wrinkle its face, it would not have made any difference, the catastrophe would have been the same; not a boat would have been lowered in time, as I have good reason to know. Several years ago I was a passenger on this very same *Utopia* from London to New York, and the portents of bad luck hung about her even then. Just before

she swung from her moorings into the Thames, I observed a quarrel going on between one of the officers and one of the crew. They wrestled with each other across the deck, on to the gang plank, and down the gang plank to the shore. Here they were parted, the officer coming back, and the sailor staying on the land, whence he fired anathema upon the ship. He was the Dick Deadeye of the crew, and it was well to put him ashore. He had cast the horoscope of the Utopia, and his evil auguries filled the passengers with superstitious fear. Looking up at us as we were bidding friends good bye, he patronized us with sinister pity, and his green-eyed sorrow for our anticipated fate was touching in the extreme. "That ship is doomed," he said, "and I am sorry for you all. She is rated A 1 on the unlucky list; and she will never reach New York without an accident. The rats left her this morning before daylight; she is a condemned old tub and you had better come ashore." Just then the Utopia began puffing her way backwards out of the dock; and the soothsayer continued, "O, listen to that cough!" he said, "she cannot live a week, and when she sinks, remember what I said."

I am not weakly superstitious, and yet I confess to dread foreboding when I hear the babbling raven croaking "Nevermore." I knew then, as well as I know now, that there is no potency in curses, although there is in blessings, and yet I would rather that this envious and dismal mariner had given us a different farewell. I really did not shake him off my soul until after we had cleared the dangerous coast of England, and were well out upon the open sea. Then everything went merrily until we plunged into that eternal fog which would have turned Columbus back, had he not steered far to the southward where the fog was not. Suddenly there in the gloaming appeared the ghost of a full-rigged ship bearing down upon us with her sails all set. The refraction of the foggy atmosphere, or some other cause, magnified the spectre, and she seemed to sail upon the low, damp clouds, and not upon the sea. Surely this must be the *Flying Dutchman*, the phantom ship that sailors dread. Not so; this was a live reality, for we could hear fierce orders from the captain to his crew, as he turned his helm a port to give us way; too late, and his manœuvre brought him broadside on the Utopia, which promptly pierced his vessel to the heart, and she turned over like a whale in death, floating for a time with her keel above the waves. She was a hard working craft, earning an honest living by carrying kerosene oil, ten thousand barrels of it, from New York to Rotterdam, and she bore the classic name of Helios. With the great wide ocean free to both of them, what perverse concord was it that impelled the Helios and the Utopia to cross the Atlantic in opposite directions, on a line of travel not wider than a street? And meet each other in the fog?

Now comes the moral of my story, which indeed is all there is of interest about it. There was the crew of the Helios flung suddenly into the sea, contending with the billows and calling for help; and there was the Utopia stunned and bewildered, reeling into the fog. "Lower the boats," commanded the captain of the Utopia; and the sailors flew to the task, but it was the same old story; the knots in the ropes had rusted and stiffened so that they could not be untied; nothing would work as it ought to work, and it required minutes instead of seconds to lower a couple of boats wherewith to pick up the drowning crew. Fortunately, the barrels of oil in the hold of the Helios floated the wreck for a time, and the crew managed to climb on to the keel of the ship, as she wallowed upside down in the sea. This gave the sailors on the Utopia time to lower the boats and save the men on the wreck. Had a hole been made in the Utopia as would have been the case had she struck her foe obliquely, not a boat could have been lowered before the vessel would have sunk. That is the lesson of it,

lesson of no use to the Utopia, for she was no more competent to lower a boat when she was stabbed to death in the bay of Gibraltar than she was when she herself smote the Helios on the Great Banks of Newfoundland. Her case is not an exception, but an example. Every emigrant ship takes the like chances, and under similar circumstances their human cargoes must meet the same fate. Every ship should carry boats enough to save all her passengers, and the crew should be drilled in the methods of lowering boats, and in the practice of all other means of safety. But it would cost a little time, and time is money.

It is generally supposed that discipline and drill are only of mechanical assistance, and that they are nothing but physical agencies of great utility, but having no moral qualities of their own. This is a mistake. Discipline strengthens not only the hands, but also the hearts of men; and a crew of sailors well drilled and under discipline, is braver than a crew inexperienced and untrained. It is the same with soldiers too. Courage is one manifestation of the human soul under discipline. A well drilled company on either land or sea will face danger bravely from a sense of duty, while the very same men undrilled will retreat in panic, moved by the instinct of self-preservation. It is not so much cowardice, as want of drill, that makes a crew trample down the passengers and escape in the boats from a sinking ship. Sailors under discipline never do it.

Forty years ago the *Birkenhead* was carrying a regiment of British soldiers from one post to another. Sailing along the coast of Africa, in fair weather, and in sight of land, she struck a sunken rock and broke her back. Then the colonel ordered the troops to form on deck as if upon parade. This they did, and here is what he said, "Men, the ship is breaking up, but there are boats enough to save the women and children. Let the sailors have them for that purpose, but let no soldier leave the ranks." Not a soldier moved out of his place, while the sailors put all the women and children into the boats and started for the shore. Then the colonel took his place at the head of the regiment and he and his men went down with the ship.

The Duke of Wellington was commander of the army at the time, and when a report of the affair was made to him, he simply remarked "Good discipline! Good discipline!" It was thought that he might at least have paid a tribute to the bravery of the men, but he did not. He took the bravery for granted; he knew that without the discipline it would have been cowardice, and that the same soldiers would have trampled everybody down in crowding into the boats. He knew that it was discipline which had crowned physical strength with moral courage, and so he merely said, "Good discipline! Good discipline!" Drilling sailors at lowering boats will not only make them skilful to perform that duty, but it will also make them courageous to help the passengers into them before trying to save themselves.

M. M. TRUMBULL

CARLYLE.

BY ELLIS THURTELL.

MASSIVE, sky-towering, rugged as rude rock
That skirts some coast of thy leal stalwart land;
Formed to invite, and to repel the shock
Of thine own ages, head, and heart, and hand:
Giant of world, where springs of thought, close coiled,
Are found by master-minds mechanic place,
Carlyle, whose force hath been so strangely foiled
Through lack, or lapse of Charity's sweet grace.
Strong storm-scarred soul, though unpossessed by strength
Sprung panoplied from head of sympathy,
Thee must we hail, throughout our island length,
Preacher profound in sad prose harmony.

Peasant, yet preacher—prophet wast thou born,
 Grim Jeremiah of our century,
 Hadst thou not felt our Christian faith outworn,
 Thou hadst been swathed in cramping clerisy.

Still, none the less, a pulpit-voice was thine,
 Thundering athwart a boisterous sea of sin,
 Invoking human vengeance and divine,
 On flattering shows without, foul cores within.

Virtue and wisdom didst thou sometimes brand,
 Fury and folly didst thou sometimes crown;
 Sightless to grandeur in thy native land,
 Heroes shrank from thee frozen at thy frown.

True Titanolater of noble mould,
 Something of manhood's mercy didst thou miss;
 The marble heart, the steel-clad arm of old
 Gleamed God-like from another age than this.

Men must be herded with an iron goad,
 Dropped from Olympus into hero hand;
 Relentless will must point them out the road,
 Resistless force slay stragglers from the band.

Cursed be Man's softening of the rule of God,
 Or demi-God, or priest-annointed king;
 Cursed be poor fools who scorn to kiss the rod
 Upraised to urge under a heavenly wing.

Such thy despotic and despairing creed,
 The gloomy birth of gall-embedded brain;
 Angels and fiends of early epoch's need,
 Though dead to thee, for us must live again.

They shall not. Yet shall thy majestic law
 Of ethic empire thrill the sceptic soul.
 Touched by an impulse that, divine no more,
 Shall grander grow as generations roll.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE PROBLEM OF THE FREEDOM OF WILL.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

As one deeply perplexed concerning the question of freewill, I have taken peculiar interest in the controversy between yourself and Mr. Maddock. But, after all, are you not like the knights of old that disputed about the color of the shield?

Mr. Maddock represents man's relations to the universe by the hands of a clock, while you suggest the regulator. The latter is no better; because the counter action stops in the works, but we have a piece of mechanism that does represent man's relations to the universe, and also shows us both sides of the shield in a strong clear light.

When a boy I worked in a woolen factory wherein were employed various machines—looms, breakers, condensers, etc. Frequently one of the breakers would be stopped and immediately the various parts of the other machines would begin to move with greater speed. The engineer would go to the engine, turn a little wheel and the machinery would soon slow up to its former gait. Presently the breaker would be started again and the other machines would move too slow. Again the engineer would hasten to the engine, turn the wheel a little, and the proper movement would quickly be attained. Later the owners of the factory had a governor attached to the engine, and here we may ask what is our engine in its present form? Is it a creation or simply a product of evolution? If man, the immediate antecedent cause, is himself a result of evolution there seems no other alternative but to admit that our engine is likewise a product of evolution.

Now I imagine yourself and Mr. Maddock looking at this engine in action. An increase of speed is noticed, and you see the governor raise its arms slightly and the speed is checked before any harm is done. A little later the action is too slow: the governor, like a thing of intelligence, promptly lowers its arms, and all moves on as before. You see in this governor a something which as a fact reacts on the source of its own power to act, itself being promptly reacted on, to the regulation of its own action, and so far exercises freedom, "the lesser overcomes the greater," the creature modifies the creator. But you also see how the piston-rod by moving slower gives the motive to the governor that determines its motion, and so gives us determinism. Mr. Maddock sees that the governor is not at liberty to raise its arms when the piston moves slowly, but on the contrary must of necessity lower them, and seen from this side we have necessity. Mr. Maddock seems to contend that to regard the governor as a free agent it must raise its arms even when the movement becomes slower which is contrary to law, while you apparently go to the opposite extreme and contend that if it were of necessity that the governor lowered its arms they would have fallen even if the motion had been accelerated, equally contrary to law. Nature certainly reveals no such freedom as Mr. Maddock would dispose of, but it is a fact that there has been evolved a something that reacts on the prime factor of its action in a way to secure a determining principle in its own conduct. Thus looking at the engine with its attachment we see determinism which for all practical ethical purposes is equivalent to freewill—it secures the harmony sought. Nor is there that absolute necessity which you would dispose of, but carrying our view to the machinery connected with the engine we see that the action of the governor could not have been otherwise than it was. Thus the broader view gives us that fatalistic conception that everything is just as it is and could not have been otherwise. The more limited and keener view that you seem to take of the matter constrains you to regard the office of the engineer, in turning the little wheel, as actually transferred to the governor so that it henceforth acts independent of his governing and determining power, and works of itself to secure the regularity desired,—acts "from a will determined by its own nature and not by a foreign compulsion" exercised by the engineer. But the wider view of Mr. Maddock, though it fails to recognise the reactive influence of the governor, discovers that the office of the engineer has been combined with that of the man who starts and stops the breaker, and that the action of the governor, indirectly, is still determined by foreign compulsion. CYRUS COLE.

Garden City, Kansas.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

In your "Ethical Problem" you remark: "Before we commence building let us have a plan." I will add, and a foundation to rest upon, free from contradiction. I have no other motive in my persistence on this question than the one above named. In your definition of determinism I fail to see a foundation free from contradiction. It is no clearer to my mind than Calvinism. As determinism teaches that the will is not free you cannot logically say that it is. If all actions are determined by law they cannot be the result of freedom. A happy union is not the result of freedom; it is the outcome of law—law which produces harmony. Let me illustrate: If you present the north pole of a magnet to the south pole of another magnet you will have a perfect union, because there is attraction in both poles. This union is of law, not of freedom. Free the metal from the law of attraction and the union ceases. The metal *must* obey the law which conditions it; it has no freedom in the matter. So with man and wife: If they are conditioned to love there will be a union of hearts; and they *will* to love because they are conditioned by law like the two magnets; therefore their wills are subject to the law which conditions

them and are not free. Under the circumstances they *must* will that way; they are bound by the law of their conditions, and cannot loose themselves. Freedom would be to have power to will a union of north pole to north pole, which is impossible. You do not reason from induction; you reason from the organism not from the cause of its conditions. You say, "the union is free because the act of uniting results from a freewill, from a will determined by its own nature; and you stop reasoning here when you ought to go on to the inductive point, and say, and its own, or specific nature is conditioned by natural law and its condition is the cause of its willing. The lion wills to eat lamb because it is conditioned by nature to eat lamb. If it was conditioned like a lamb it would will to eat grass. Will therefore is governed by law and is not free. Here is determinism without contradiction and here is the firm foundation to build upon; we must give due credit to the architect as well as to the building. Freedom is not implied in necessity but harmony is. If freedom were the potent factor the magnet could roam around the compass at will, but as law is the potent factor it is bound to point to the north owing to the conditions of organism and environment. Results will not be the same no matter how we act, and we *will act* in accordance with laws of organism and environment, sometimes harmoniously and sometimes inharmoniously to ourselves, but never with freedom from law. Monism is not yea and nay; in it is yea. No logic can touch scientific monism. It seems to me that your difficulty is in trying to hold on to religion. Monism must be free from confusion. Monism must be established and rock-seated, free from contradiction and to do that the argument must come from science, not from religion.

JOHN MADDOCK.

EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE PRECEDING LETTERS.

I HAVE to correct a wrong notion of Mr. Maddock's concerning my definition of freedom. Freedom of will (as I understand and define it) does not mean that a man has the power to will the contrary of that which he, according to his character, actually does will. Such a freedom does not exist. Freedom of will, if the term has any sense at all, means the power of a man to act in accordance with his will, i. e. agreeably to his character.

Mr. Maddock is mistaken when he says: "Determinism teaches that the will is not free." Determinism teaches that willing is determined by law. What is law? Law is a formula describing facts of a special kind. There are not two things, law and will, the one dominating, ruling, or governing the other. There is but one thing, will, or rather all the many different acts of willing. The facts of reality alone are real, and the laws of nature are mere abstractions describing the regularity of these facts so far as we have been able to trace it. Nature is not the slave of law. Nature acts in a certain and definite way; and the way in which nature acts is called law. That is all. I cannot see any slavery in the action of the magnet; as if magnetism were one thing, the master, the ruler, and the magnet the other thing, the slave, the subject, the suppressed. The idea of "freeing the metal from the law of attraction" has no sense in my conception of nature, for the law of attraction is a part of its nature; it has not been imposed upon it as a fetter from the outside; the disposition of being attracted by a magnet is quality of it; it is part of its self.

What is will? Will is a state of mind tending to action. If such a state of mind exists in a person, we say he wills this or that. Now, if there is no hindrance for the will to pass into action, the will is free; if however the will is prevented from passing into action, it is restricted, it is not free. If a person is compelled to do an act, which he would not do unless compelled to do it, the action does not result from his own state of mind, it is not an expression of his own, of his free will. But if a person commits an act be-

cause in his mind there is a tendency to perform that act, he is free, which means he can let his own will pass into act.

The will of a man, accordingly, if considered as a faculty and not as a single state of mind, is a mere abstraction. There is no will in a man that wills now this and now that. There are innumerable states of mind tending to action, and in speaking of these tendencies in general we form the generalisation "will." These innumerable tendencies often naturally come in conflict the one with the other. Animals, children, savages, or uneducated people are apt to let any state of mind that dominates the present moment pass into act, rashly, and in that case it will easily happen that the act will afterwards be regretted. Thus another state of mind is produced in which a tendency prevails to make, if it were possible, the act or its consequences undone. In this case the liberty of one tendency has unduly overruled other, and perhaps more important, tendencies; the others have been overruled, their right remained unrespected. The means to prevent regret is to check every tendency to action as soon as it rises, until it has after a comparison with all the other tendencies been approved of by a general consensus of all. The determination of a man and the actual performance of placing this check upon the tendencies to action that live in his soul, is called self-control.

Self-control is the beginning of moral action in so far as it suppresses those tendencies that should, according to a careful deliberation, not be carried into effect, and allows only those to pass into act which have been approved of by a general consensus of the strongest inclination of the soul.

Moral motives are such as are fit to survive. Immoral motives are such as are contrary to the laws of existence, to life, or to social conditions; they will ruin either the individual or the race, or both.

Freedom will lead to the gradual extinction of immoral motives and it will strengthen moral motives. We may doubt whether a certain act is moral or immoral, because in many single instances a moral individual may suffer on account of its very morality; but not in the long run. Morally acting individuals may be sacrificed by the thousands and millions, the moral ideals will nevertheless be the only ones fit to survive.

If Mr. Maddock cannot accept the term "freewill" in this sense, I suggest to use the term a man's *own* will.

* * *

I am glad to notice that Professor Clifford took exactly the same view of freewill that I do. He says in his essay "Cosmic Emotion" "The peculiarity of living matter is that it is capable of combining together molecular motions which are invisible, into molar motions which can be seen. It therefore appears to have the property of moving spontaneously without help from anything else. . . . Its changes of shape due to aggregation of molecular motion, may fairly be called *action from within*, because the energy of the motion is supplied by the substance itself and not by any external thing. . . . As, therefore, the immediate origin of my action is in myself, I really am free in the only useful sense of the word."

BOOK REVIEWS.

ALMOST PERSUADED. By *Will N. Harben*. New York: Minerva Publishing Co.

The idea of this novel of 316 pages is to illustrate and establish the truth of natural ethics as opposed to the dogmatic and inconsistent systems of religious sects. Stanley, the hero, is cast away on an island at an early age of his life; there, living in solitude and in intimate contact with nature, he acquired the foundation of a sound and natural sense which led him in his after life (after he was rescued and educated) to refute by criticism and to disprove by practice the accepted notions of truth and conduct in the conventional Christianity of the day.

The novel is a "novel of tendency," in the sense in which we now have so many. We do not think that the execution is equal to the conception; the main emphasis is placed at times on unessential points; and although there are a number of animated passages in the book, as a rule the pathetic and sentimental parts lag.

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THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAGIC.

BY L. J. VANCE.

WE are apt to think of magic as though it were conceived in mischief, and brought forth in iniquity. We have come to regard magicians as little more than tricksters or sleight-of-hand performers, who now call themselves by the high-sounding titles of 'Signors' and 'Professors.'

The notions of magic and of magicians which are entertained now-a-days come from two sources—the one, oral and traditional, the other, literary and historical. In other words, modern ideas of magic are derived, in whole or in part, from folk-lore or from books.

As to those ideas of magic which come from the first source—folk-lore—a few words may here be said. There is a stage of the human mind in which the agencies of magic are accepted as the ordinary incidents of everyday life. Thus, children at a certain age do not hesitate to believe that there are giants fifty feet in height, that there are dragons breathing fire. To the untutored intelligence of a child, any one kind of man or animal is quite as possible as any other kind. A giant as tall as a tree seems no more intrinsically improbable than a Tom Thumb or a Gulliver Brobdignag; nor is it more unlikely that a dragon should breathe fire and smoke than that a snake should carry deadly poison in its mouth. We remember when the story of Aladdin and his Wonderful Lamp was first rehearsed to us; when such incidents as the changes of a man into a Genii, or of a horse into a house, or of flying through the air, were not regarded as impossible. Now, the semi civilized man looks upon the agencies of magic at least as "probable and common as duels and concealment of wills seem to be thought by European novelists." So says Mr. Lang.

The natural history and evolution of magic are subjects of more than curious and literary interest. It is now a matter of scientific importance to explain how magic arose, and why man believed in his will and power over the supernatural.

It may be urged that the ins-and-outs of ancient and modern magic are pretty well known. And so they are in certain ways. But, neither M. Maury in his valuable "History of Magic," nor M. Lenormant

in his erudite account of "Chaldean Magic," nor Mr. Lecky in his celebrated chapter (Chap. 1) in "Rationalism in Europe," exactly follow the same lines of argument that I would present here.

In folk-lore, in the science of Tylor, Lang, and others, we believe that an explanation will be found. To state Mr. Tylor's theory briefly, and by way of anticipation, man argued himself into a belief in magic, by confounding the image with that which it represents. Thus, there springs up a set of practices and beliefs which we moderns regard as magical.*

Let us take an example where the connection between object and figure is supposed to be real. One of the commonest acts of magic in ancient and modern times is the act of making an image and shooting at it, melting it away, drying it up, sticking pins into it, that the original may be hurt or injured. The practice was known to Plato, and is to day in vogue among Southern Negroes, as Mr. Cable informs us.

Here we find that semi-cultured man reasons himself into a theory of magic by association of ideas. He argues, in brief, that like affects like. In his mind, the slightest resemblance between any two things is enough to make them stand in the relation of cause and effect. Now, just as the ginseng was said by the Chinese and North American Indians to possess certain magical virtues because the roots resemble the human body, so the Zulus sacrificed black cattle in order to bring black clouds of rain.

But there are many, many kinds of magical beliefs and practices which cannot be explained at all on the "like to like" theory. Thus, the world-wide belief in the miraculous powers of Shamans and "medicine-men" proceeds from quite a different train of reasoning.

At this point, let us state briefly some of the objects of this inquiry. It is not necessary to examine every odd and end of magic. For, magic is so simple, yet so subtle, so plain, yet so deceitful, that many curious bits of art and artifice do not need or deserve any explanation. We are now concerned with the natural history of magic. We are thus called upon to show the state of mind out of which magic has been evolved. We must find, if possible, the general principles which underlie all magical reasoning. Our object, then, is to prove that the putting of these principles into every

* "Early History of Mankind," p. 117.

day practice is only the exercise of art magic, an art to which, as Lang remarks, nothing is impossible.

Our first question will be, What is the place of Magic in the mental development of man? Our answer is that, "magic belongs to the lowest known stages of civilisation." (Castren.)

For the purposes of this discussion, let us give some of the mental characteristics which belong to the lowest known stages of culture.*

1) First, man in the lowest known stages of culture never distinguishes between himself and things in the outside world. In that stage, again, the mind confuses all things, animate or inanimate, organic or inorganic, personal or impersonal. Gods and men, animals and plants, stars and trees, all seem on the same level of life, of feeling, and reason.

2) Then, there is a stage of human intellectual development known to students as "animism." In that stage, as Mr. Tylor and others have demonstrated, man ascribes the attributes of the human "soul" to all things, living or non-living. One of the first principles of savage belief is the continued existence of the dead. Thus, to the semi-cultured mind, the world is more alive with human souls than it is with human bodies. In Miltonic phrase, "millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth unseen"; but the savage believes that spirits of dead men are able to interfere in mundane affairs. They can give the living much trouble and so it is best to be on the right side of these powerful spirits.

3) In the third place, there is the wide-spread system of belief known as fetichism. In that stage of savage thought, material objects are supposed to be the abodes of spiritual beings, or fetiches. A spirit resides in every object; it can also interfere in mundane affairs. Hence, the savage does all he can to get on the right side of his fetich. From this belief there arose the worship of plants and animals. Later on, plants are not worshipped, but they are endowed with magical properties, as charms.

4) The savage notion of spirits is not all of one piece. There are hostile spirits—devils, witches, beast-shades, etc. They cause death and disease. "Over a great part of Africa, in South America, and Polynesia," says Mr. Tylor, "when a man dies, the question is at once: 'Who killed him?' The Alipones hold that there is no such thing as natural death, no man would die unless he were killed,"—by some evil spirit or conjurer.† From the savage notion that a man's spirit or strength may reside in his spittle, in his heart, in his nails, or in a lock of his hair—from this notion, there arises another, namely, that a man may be bewitched or conjured against his will.

5) Connected with all the preceding peculiarities of savage thought is the belief in sorcery. "The world and all the things in it, being conceived of vaguely as sensible and rational, are supposed to obey the commands of certain members of each tribe, chiefs, jugglers, conjurors, or what you will."* These magicians, like Owen Glendower, are not "in the roll of common mortals." They can influence spirits, can talk with the dead, and can visit the Land of Shadows. They work miracles, cause or cure diseases, and can bring thunder, lightning and rain. There is little or nothing these fellows cannot do, *if they have a mind to do it*. The miraculous powers of the Shaman or conjuror is based on the savage view of himself and of the outward world.

6) To all this should be added the fact that the savage is credulous and curious. The cunning medicine-man plays also upon the hopes and fears of his fellows. His claim of supernatural powers, of being able to work miracles, is admitted by savage men all over the world. The reason is that, the miraculous attainments of the Shaman or medicine-man are not believed to be rare or unusual. On this point, the testimony of Jacob Baegert is interesting. Baegert was a Jesuit father and missionary among the Indians of Southern California. He thus describes the claims of the conjuror. "There always existed among the Californians, individuals of both sexes who played the part of conjurors, *pretending* to possess the power of exorcising the devil, whom they never saw; of curing diseases which they never healed; and of producing pithahayas, though they could only eat them. Sometimes they went into caverns, and, changing their voices, made the people believe that they conversed with some spiritual power. They threatened also with famine and disease, or promised to drive away small-pox, or similar plagues."† The whole passage is valuable, because it furnishes a key to one kind of magic. Baegert naturally came to this conclusion: "The object of these impostors was to obtain their food without the trouble of gathering it in the fields; for the silly people provided them with the best they could find *in order to keep them in good humor and to enjoy their favor*."

No wonder that savage magic seems to the civilised mind, foolish and childish. Such is ancient magic. How could it be otherwise when we take into account the elements of thought and belief out of which it was fashioned? It is difficult for us moderns to realise the frame of mind which gave rise to magical trains of thought. That is to say, magic was the natural product and outcome of the beliefs above named: the belief in the continued existence of the dead; the

* The voluminous evidence for these mental processes of savages will be found in the works of Lubbock, Tylor, Waitz, McLennan and others.

† *Early History of Mankind*, p. 134

* *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, Vol. I, p. 47.

† *Smithsonian Rep.* 1863. p. 352.

belief in power of good and evil spirits or ghosts ; the belief in fetiches ; the belief in the animated character of all things ; the belief in the miraculous powers of medicine-men, and so forth. Such beliefs are clearly reflected in the magic of the savage—a magic which could satisfy only the untutored mind.

(TO BE CONTINUED.)

MR. GOLDWIN SMITH ON MORALITY AND RELIGION.

MR. GOLDWIN SMITH discusses the ethical question in an article in the last *Forum*, entitled "Will Morality survive Religion?" He presents no definite solution but sufficiently indicates one, and that is a denial of the question ; between the lines we read the answer, Morality will not survive Religion. He says :

"The withdrawal of religious belief must, however, one would think, have begun to operate, and some observers may be in a position to say what the effect is and how far philosophy or science has been able to fill the void. As the twilight of theism and Christianity still lingers, nobody expects a sudden change. Least of all does anybody expect a sudden outbreak of immorality among philosophers, whose minds are elevated by their pursuit and in whom the coarser appetites are sure to be weak ; so that the sensitiveness which men of this class are apt to show, whenever a connection is suggested between religious and moral agnosticism, is out of place."

Mr. Goldwin Smith illustrates his position vividly by presenting to us "some specimens of the moral as well as of the religious agnostic." The murderer Birchall is described in the following words :

"As he was the son of a clergyman and had been well brought up, he must have been thoroughly enlightened, and cannot have been led into crime by anything like the brutal ignorance of moral law which is often the heritage of the gutter child. Nor does it seem that evil passion of any kind was overpoweringly strong in him. The attempts of the enemies of capital punishment to make out a case of moral insanity were in this case more faint than usual. It even appears that there was an amiable side to his character. His college companions liked him. He seems to have been a loving husband, and there was something touching and almost heroic in the effort which he successfully made, while he was awaiting execution, to master the fear of death and to write his autobiography for the benefit of his wife. The autobiography, it is true, is nothing more than the vulgar record of a fast undergraduate's life at an inferior college ; but this does not detract from the nerve shown in writing it, and in illustrating it with comic sketches, beneath the shadow of the gallows. He only happened to have occasion for his friend's money. It is possible that if Birchall, instead of being sent to college—where a youth of his stamp was sure to be idle, and, being idle, to become dissipated—had been set to regular work in an office under a strong chief, he might have gone decently through life, though he would have been a very selfish man. But he was a thorough-going agnostic in morals as well as in religion. Evidently he felt not a twinge of remorse for what he had done. No doubt he cursed his own carelessness in having, when he was destroying all the proofs of identity on the corpse, overlooked the cigar case, the name written on which gave the fatal clue ; but the recollection of having killed a confiding friend for his money evidently gave him no more concern than as if he had slaughtered a bear for its skin. Bred a gentleman, he admirably preserved his dignity and impressiveness of

manner when standing at bay against his pursuers, and he showed the same qualities for the two months during which a whole community was staring at him through the bars of his cage, when the least sign of weakness would have been at once proclaimed. When he was sentenced, he remarked, with a philosophy which appears to have been genuine, that life is short for all, and that there is not much difference between a term of a few months and one of a few years. He might have added that he would make his exit from life more nearly without pain than ninety-nine men out of a hundred."

A similar striking case is found in the person of William Palmer, the Rugeley murderer, who also, Mr. Goldwin Smith says, "was evidently a perfect moral agnostic. He behaved at his trial as if he had been watching a game of chess, showed not the slightest sign of remorse, and met death with perfect apathy, if not with Birchall's genteel composure."

Mr. Goldwin Smith adds :

"As moral agnostics these men were low specimens of a character of which the great Napoleon was the highest. . . . He (Napoleon) was simply 'The Prince' of Machiavelli, that prophet of moral agnosticism."*

The present situation is described in the following words :

"Religious agnosticism is gaining ground, not so much perhaps in America as in Europe, because America is less speculative than Europe and because free churches do not provoke sceptical criticism so much as establishments ; but everywhere religious agnosticism is manifestly gaining ground. Are we to expect a corresponding growth of moral agnosticism ? We shall not have a crop of Birchalls and Palmers, still less of Napoleons ; but may we not have a crop of men who will regard morality as a superstition or a convention, and will do what suits their own interest ? Greece, after the fall of her religion, had the moral anarchy depicted by Thucydides and ascribed by him to that fall. She had the moral agnosticism of the Sophists. Rome, after the departure of the religious faith to which Polybius, in a famous passage, ascribes her public morality, had the immorality of the Empire. On the decline of the Catholic faith in Europe, ensued the moral agnosticism of the era impersonated in Machiavelli. In each case, into the void left by religion came spiritual charlatanry and physical superstition, such as the arts of the hierophant of Isis, the soothsayer, and the astrologer—significant precursors of our modern 'medium.'"

*I beg to differ in some respects from this view concerning Napoleon's character. Napoleon's success is not due to his unprincipled egotism and unscrupulousness ; it is due to the actual services he rendered to his nation and to humanity in general. He may be considered as a "scourge of God" but even as such he was the most indispensable man of his era. He was a scourge to Germany, but his achievements in having swept out of existence so many antiquated institutions and principalities, especially in having broken to pieces the old rotten Roman-Teutonic Kaiser-humbug, so as to make a regeneration of Germany possible, alone made his career a great blessing to Germany which outweighs all the innumerable injuries and suppressions he caused her. Let us not look to the vices of a man to explain his success. I am inclined to declare *a priori* that a successful man must have some virtues which are the causes of his success, and if he has great vices, it is, to say the least, probable that his virtues will eclipse his vices. The effects of the virtues will remain, the effects of his vices will disappear in time.

Does Mr. Goldwin Smith believe in Machiavelli ? I do not believe in Machiavelli. The great king who wrote the "Anti-Machiavelli" has refuted, not only in words but also in deeds, the theory that unprincipled rascality is the best policy for a king to maintain himself upon a throne. It is due to Frederick the Great's maxim that "the king is the first servant of the state" which proved a live presence with almost all his successors, that a scion of his family now occupies the imperial throne of Germany.

We feel inclined to say, this is a very pessimistic diagnosis of the future, but we are told :

"There is nothing pessimistic in this; no want of faith in the future of humanity, or in the benevolence of the power by which human destiny is controlled. The only fear suggested is that society may have a bad quarter of an hour during the transition, as it has had more than once before."

A 'bad quarter of an hour' for humanity may mean the ruin of nations! Was the pessimism of Tacitus unjustified because other nations arose in a grander glory after the ignominious ruin of Rome that followed its moral decline? Pessimism means to us that we ourselves and our nation will see this 'bad quarter of an hour,' and if it comes it will be terrible to all concerned. It will come like a deluge to sweep away the innocent and the good together with the guilty.

Pessimism in any other sense is not justified. The world is such that if the nation to whom by natural advantages the future of humanity seems to be entrusted, shows herself unwilling or unable to fulfil her mission, other nations will arise and take her place. We Americans especially are more inclined than others, and I do not deny that in some respects our hope is justifiable, to consider ourselves as the children of promise. But at the same time we are apt to forget that our mission implies duties. It is not enough to say, "We have Abraham to our father." The children of promise must be worthy of their duties; if they are not they will be rejected. Yet as to the whole, as to the evolution of mankind, there is no need of being pessimistic. "For I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." Evolution will not be checked because we prove unfit to carry the torch of progress. We shall, in that case, go to the wall and the torch will be handed to others.

And here we come to the point of disagreement with Mr. Goldwin Smith. He says :

"Evolution is not moral, nor can morality be educed from it. It proclaims as its law the survival of the fittest, and the only proof of fitness is survival."

Evolution, it is true, is in a certain sense, "a quasi-mechanical and necessary process"; it "will fulfil itself without effort or sacrifice" on my part, or on your part, or on the part of any individual. Yet in another sense, evolution is not a merely mechanical process;* nor can it fulfil itself without the effort or sacrifice of mankind. The question is not whether my help is in-

* Every motion is mechanically explainable, or in other words, every motion can be described in mechanical formulas, i. e. there is a uniformity of motions which can be formulated in the laws of mechanics. Evolution considered as a movement sweeping onward over the life of mankind is a mechanical process. But the mechanical aspect of natural processes is only one side; it does not cover the whole of reality. Not even the fall of a stone can be considered as a purely mechanical process. See the author's remarks on the subject in "Fundamental Problems" (p. 115 et seqq.), "Can the World be Mechanically Explained?" and his article "Some Questions of Psycho-Physics," *The Monist* No. 3, p. 401.

dispensable for evolution to fulfil itself, the question is whether my soul will enter into the evolutionary movement, or to use a biblical term, whether I shall enter into life eternal, as an element representing an upward or as one representing a downward pull. To speak of a single individual as helping evolution is something like helping God in governing the world. The individual does not come into consideration at all from an ethical standpoint, but that alone which is represented in the individual.

Mr. Goldwin Smith still recognises, particularly with regard to the gentler virtues, the influence of religion upon our code of ethics. He says :

"There is no saying how much of theism, or even of Christianity, still mingles with the theories of agnostics. When the agnostic assumes that the claims of the community are superior to those of the individual, when he uses such a term as 'conscientious,' and even when he speaks with reverence of an 'eternal source of energy and force,' careful scrutiny of his expressions might discover a trace of theism."

Certainly, there is a trace of theism in any kind of morality, even if the expression "the eternal source of energy" be rejected. We at least do most emphatically reject it as a dualistic and a meaningless phrase. Nevertheless, morality means obedience to some law higher, grander, and nobler than our individual interests. The recognition of the authority of this law is the kernel of all religion, it is also the truth contained in the idea of God.

Mr. Goldwin Smith says :

"The saying that if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent him, was very smart but very silly. Nothing can be done for us by figments. Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he keep his allegiance to the truth."

With this we perfectly agree. Nothing can be done for us by figments. But if all the nations that cease to believe in, and at the same time also cease to obey, the authority of the moral law, irredeemably go to the wall, can that moral law be considered as a figment? We may consider the personification of the moral law as a figment, and we have good reason to do so, but if by God is understood that objective reality in the world which by the penalty of extinction enforces a certain kind of conduct, we may expect no serious contradiction when we maintain that the existence of God can be scientifically proved.

It is a matter of course that the God of science is not like the God of the heathenish religions, not even like the good Lord of pagan Christianity who can be bribed by flattery and prayer, and still less like the benevolent and philanthropic God Father of Deism. He is an inflexible law, immutable, irrefragable, eternal; stern toward transgressors and kind toward those who keep his commandments. If Mr. Goldwin Smith will consider God in this sense as a natural law, or rather as the law of nature, as that in nature which is as it

is, in the Pentateuch called by the expressive name *Javeh*, as that which we cannot model at pleasure, but to which we must model ourselves in order to live and to continue to live—he will find that God is at the bottom of evolution also; he will find that morality indeed can and must be deduced from it. It is true that evolution proclaims as its law the survival of the fittest. But who in the long run of millenniums are the fittest if not those that conform to that stern authority, to the law of nature, to the order of the cosmos, to that all-power of which we are a part which has created us and still maintains our life,—to God.

If Mr. Goldwin Smith means to say that ethics without religion is a failure and will remain a failure, we agree with him perfectly. He says:

"With misgivings, conscious or unconscious, about religion, came the desire of finding a sanction for morality independent of theology; in other words, moral philosophy."

He adds that all those moral philosophers "whose philosophy has been practically effective, from Socrates downward, have been religious and have regarded their philosophy as the ally and confirmation of religion." This, I grant, is true if religion is used in the broad sense we use it, and not in the sense of a creed which declares that religiosity consists in a blind belief of traditional dogmas.

Mr. Goldwin Smith quotes approvingly a passage from his late friend Mr. Cotter Morison, whom he calls "the most thorough-going of agnostics." Mr. Morison says:

"Virtue may, and possibly will, bring happiness to the virtuous man; but to the immoral and the selfish, virtue will probably be the most distasteful or even painful thing in their experience, while vice will give them unmitigated pleasure."

This is true, and being true it suffices to explode any kind of hedonism which would fain make us believe that happiness is the consequence of virtue, and that virtue must be explained as that which gives pleasure or produces happiness. The quotation is valuable because it comes from an agnostic. Agnostics not being able to found ethics upon something which they do not know and which they consider as unknowable, have attempted to explain morality as that which is conducive to happiness. If ethics cannot be deduced from happiness or that which causes happiness, how can we explain it?

Mr. Goldwin Smith calls attention to the fact that all other attempts of teaching or explaining morality contain religious elements, and he is right. He says:

"Where they take as their foundation the authority of conscience, the categorical imperative, or the command of nature, it is clear that they are still within the circle of theism."

He adds these two propositions which, it appears, he believes to be equivalent: "Nature," he says, "is an unmeaning expression without an author of nature,

or rather, it is a philosophical name of God." The former proposition we reject as a decided *non sequitur*; the latter we accept. As soon as we consider nature, the world-order, the laws of the evolution of life in their moral importance, we are confronted with the true kernel of religious truth; their recognition is the kernel of the God idea, for God if it means anything is the moral authority whose will must be done.

Agnosticism is an untenable and a practically useless philosophy. Mr. Goldwin Smith says, "The profession of safe acquiescence in ignorance may sound very philosophic." But it is not; and he has our full assent when he says:

"The generation after next may perhaps see agnosticism, moral as well as religious, tried on a clear field. By that time, possibly, science, whose kingdom seems now to have come, will have solved in her own way the mystery of existence; at least so far as to provide us with a rule of life, personal and social."

We also believe that the kingdom of science seems now to have come. But if it comes, in what way and by whose authority does it come? It comes in the ordinary course of evolution by the authority of the God of the religion of science. It comes after all as a survival of the fittest in spite of Mr. Goldwin Smith's denunciation of the law of evolution. This is so palpable that no words need be lost about it. Yet Mr. Goldwin Smith's argument is so strong that we shall have to add a few further explanations.

Mr. Goldwin Smith says:

"The tiger has been as much evolved as the lamb; and the most noxious of human beasts, if he can hold his own in the struggle for existence, at whatever expense to his fellows, has as good a right to existence as Socrates."

Here we have to make two objections.

First we have to repeat what we have said again and again on other occasions: that this famous comparison so often employed to contrast the immoral evil-doer with the moral martyr does not correctly represent the nature of the problem. The tiger is not more immoral than the lamb; on the contrary, if the tiger represents the active energetic fighter who in the struggle for existence holds his own, while the lamb represents the passive sufferer who is too weak-headed to face his foe, the tiger is more moral than the lamb and it serves the lamb right that he succumbs to the victor. There is no morality in ovine indolence. Morality is not, as it is often supposed to be, merely the omission of certain grosser or more refined crimes, of different sins, bad habits, and peccadilloes; true morality is not passive, it is active, it consists in the achieving and doing of that which is our duty to do for ourselves and for mankind, which latter is only a wider range of our nobler self.

Our second objection to Mr. Goldwin Smith's argument is that "human beasts" can *not* hold their own.

They are constantly being eliminated by the natural selection of evolution.

We agree with Mr. Goldwin Smith when he says: "It is absurd to say that a life of self-denial and endurance, ending in martyrdom, is happiness"—for the law of morality cannot be educed from man's yearning for happiness—and in a certain sense we also agree to the clause he adds—"unless there is a compensation beyond." Morality as a factor in life and in evolution, as a law of nature, cannot be understood unless we rise above the sphere of the individual. Egotism is not morality, and moral actions are those which are consciously or unconsciously performed with an outlook beyond the narrow interests of the individual in time and space. Moral motives are superindividual. I purposely do not call them altruistic, because altruism does not seem to me the proper moral view; it simply replaces the interests of the own ego by those of other egos. The superindividual aspect however makes humanity and its ideals, the natural laws of social justice and the moral law of the world, parts of the individual and it is not the individual but these superindividual parts of his soul which will survive.

Mr. Goldwin Smith is not yet free from the individualism of our time. He seems to expect that morality and happiness shall be doled out to the individual in equal proportions. He introduces the following instance:

"A man acquires a great estate by fraud, enjoys it wisely, uses his wealth liberally, makes himself popular, takes good care of his health, lives long, dies respected, and leaves healthy offspring. Freed by his opulence from wearing toil and injurious exposure, he exhibits all the energy, vivacity, and sociability which are held out as the rewards of a right course of living. Morality says that he is miserable, but how can evolution condemn him?"

Evolution does condemn him. Evolution will in the long run eliminate such types as he is, as certain as it will eliminate the tigers from off the surface of the earth.

Mr. Goldwin Smith continues:

"Evolutionary philosophers give excellent precepts for healthy and comfortable living; but these precepts apparently the man fulfils, and thus he fulfils all righteousness. They may talk to him, indeed, of a more perfect state of society to be some day brought about by ethical science, in which he would be out of place; but he, having only one life, takes the world as he finds it, and makes the best of it for himself. Why should he sacrifice himself to the future of humanity?"

Why should he sacrifice himself for the future of humanity? Because the future of humanity is his own future. Why shall a boy sacrifice the hours of his childhood for the future days of his manhood? Why! Because the man is the continuance of the boy. The objection may be made that the comparison does not hold good; the future generations of mankind are not we ourselves, while the adult man is the same person as the boy. What, however, does "the same

person" mean? The word "person" represents a history, a continuance, nothing more. Persons are not unchangeable units; there is not one atom of the boy left in the man. Materially considered the adult man is as exactly as much and not more different from himself when he was a boy, as the present generations of mankind are different from the past generations, for in both instances the continuity is preserved in exactly the same degree and measure.

It is said that a man "having only one life takes the world as he finds it, and makes the best of it for himself." The truth is man has *not* "only one life."

"The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting
And cometh from afar."

Man's life, his humanity, does not consist of the material particles of his body. The properly human in man consists almost entirely of his relations with other men. His very language is superindividual, and if we could cut out the superindividual from his brain, there would remain a mere brute. How the superindividual naturally grows in man and how it will continue to exist beyond the grave need not be again explained.* There is a great truth in the idea of immortality, although there need not be an immortality either of bodily resurrection or in a purely spiritual heaven beyond.

The immortality of the soul is a truth; the immortality of the individual is an error. We must cease to consider the ego of the individual as a reality. It is no reality and the belief in it is an illusion; it is the veil of Maya. The antiquated view of regarding the personality of a man as an entity, as a kind of mysterious soul-unit, produces most intricate sham-problems; but these problems will disappear as soon as the veil of Maya has been lifted from our eyes.

As soon as we lose sight of the truth that mankind is one great whole and that the individual is a man only in so far as mankind lives in him, we shall not be able to understand and to account for morality. The superindividual in man, whatever it may be called, is as much a reality as is the shape of his body, and it is the superindividual elements in man which constitute his soul. The recognition of the immortality of man's soul, not in the old sense, but in a scientific sense, will be found to be the only satisfactory solution of the ethical problem and at the same time of the religious problem.

P. C.

THE SUNSET CLUB IN "DARKEST ENGLAND."

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

"GENERAL" BOOTH'S plan for the redemption of the poor was the theme of debate at the Sunset Club on the 19th of March.

Two ministers of the gospel were the chief debaters, one for "General" Booth, and one against him. The argument of the advocate who opened in the affirmative, was weakened by its mag-

* See *The Ethical Problem* pp. 31 et seqq. and 44.

niloquence. It was the effervescence of rhetoric. Every gallon of it contained three quarts of sentimental froth; about the right proportion in a pulpit exhortation to a lot of "miserable sinners," but rather too hysterical for the Sunset Club. There was also too much realistic detail in it, revelations of deeds done in the slums, hideous things which all men grieve about, but which it is in questionable taste to describe in all their bare deformity.

The first speaker, in analysing "Darkest England" into its component elements, very properly put physical infirmity among the chief causes of the evils exposed by "General" Booth, hereditary punishments, the sins of the fathers visited upon their children even unto the third and fourth generation. In describing those victims of heredity who constitute so large an element of "Darkest England," he said with pardonable bombast, "They were damned into the cradle, instead of born into light life; not landed into life, but shipwrecked into life." I have no disposition to quarrel with a literary style, when its phrases are so expressive and so true; and here it was that the speaker made a good strong plea in vindication of Booth's plan. "The first thing about it," he said, "is this, that it tries to relieve physical discomfort, thus making ready for real and lasting reform." That is the broadest and best road out of "Darkest England," and if the plan of "General" Booth only "tries" to open that road, it is worthy of all praise, whether its means are effectual or not.

The ardent advocate of "General" Booth's plan asserted secondly, that it contemplated the intellectual improvement of the poor, and on this part of the subject he said, "Failure is always a species of ignorance"; an opinion with a good deal of truth in it, and very well expressed. He also took high ground when he said "Any successful plan must include an intellectual element," but unfortunately he did not maintain himself there, for he completely failed to show any "intellectual element" in "General" Booth's plan. "An evening's entertainment and instruction" is altogether too indefinite and vague, for it may mean the delirious excitement and spiritual intoxication produced by the Salvation Army, shouting, psalm-singing, and beating tambourines and drums. Surely there is nothing "intellectual" or educational in that.

And as a third reason for applauding "General" Booth, the speaker said, "His problem deals with a change of environment so far as the environment has produced the misery." Really this deserves approval if its meaning is to bring the "submerged tenth" up out of the cellars in Tom All Alone's into brighter and more comfortable homes. This doubtless is the meaning of it, although disfigured somewhat by inelegant and ill-fitting metaphor. "In place of bad air and bad surroundings," pleaded the advocate, "give them sunshine, God's great scavenger, which searches out the least bit of filth." That is figurative but not poetical, and besides, it is otherwise vague, uncertain, and insufficient. "God's great scavenger" cannot work with much effect in "Darkest England" until the laws of England give more equal opportunities to all the English people.

In addition to a change in the conditions, the advocate said that the plan of "General" Booth contemplated a change in the men also. "This plan," he said, "understands full well that if you save the man he will save his own circumstances. Not Paradise itself can make a bad man good, Adam and Eve sinned in Paradise." This was a little inconsistent with the claim just previously made, that the reformation was to come through a change in the physical circumstances which made the sin and misery, and of which the unfortunates in "Darkest England" were the creatures and the victims. Paradise will not make men good, but it will cure them of the diseases and the sins that come from poverty.

A great many social wrongs and political errors have grown out of the theological mistake that Adam and Eve sinned in Paradise. The fabulous command that put restraint upon their freedom was the sinner, and it was brave and virtuous in Adam and Eve

to risk their lives for liberty. In this Paradise which we call Earth, there is not now and there never was any forbidden tree of knowledge; nor any tree the fruit of which we may not eat if we can get it. To the most precious thing within this world of ours every man and every woman may aspire, and the aspiration itself is virtue. Any mandate that seeks to limit the knowledge of good and evil is void according to the highest and divinest law, the law of progress to perfection. We know very little as yet, but there is nothing we may not know.

The learned counsel on the other side, as the lawyers have it, was a reverend iconoclast who toppled over the whole scheme of "General" Booth, and buried that famous commander in the ruins of it. For a minister of the gospel he was painfully logical; he did neither gush nor glow, but went straight at his work with hammer and anvil like a blacksmith. In the debate he had a great advantage by reason of experimental knowledge of the subject gained in London; and his testimony was like that of an expert. He spoke with contemptuous pity of "General" Booth, whom he described as a man without any business ability, untruthful, and dishonest. "I have no great esteem for him," he said, "I know too much about him. But let me say this: There is a construction of his character which is a charitable one. He knows no better. He has not those high ideas of honor and ethics which this problem needs." This estimate the speaker did not seek to prove by any thrilling figures of speech, but by information which appeared strong in the qualities of evidence. With vigorous, if not very classical, emphasis, he remarked: "The confession that 'General' Booth is not a business man and not practical, damns the whole scheme."

Further along, this critic had no hesitation in stigmatising the enterprise of "General" Booth as a mercenary scheme to enrich the Booth family, and he declared that the book which had appealed so strongly to the charity of England, "was founded largely on exaggeration and false statements." With sarcasm rough as a rasp, he said: "If you will take pains to notice you will see that every prominent office is in the Booth family. It is the lieutenants who starve."

The despotic features of the scheme, and the imperialistic refusal of "General Booth" to render any account of the fund placed in his hands, were exposed by the speaker and rightfully condemned. Charitable funds placed in the hands of any man to be used as he thinks fit, and never to be accounted for, are dangerous enemies to honesty. Give them time enough and they will surely breed corruption. They have already made a social autocrat of "General" Booth, and he grows callous to public opinion. "The fact is," said his critic at the Sunset Club, "'General' Booth is at the end of his tether. He needs more money and enthusiasm. I hope no such infiction will visit Chicago as the endorsing of any religious society to make it a social despotism as Booth would have the Salvation Army made."

I am sorry to see that the speaker threw contempt and ridicule upon what he called "the soup and salvation" plan of improving the condition of the poor. Perhaps it would be better to give the soup alone, but if the donors of the soup insist upon administering salvation with it, is it not better to accept the mixture rather than lose the soup? There was high-grade political morality in the scorn of the speaker for any system of charity that weakens the spirit of men. He said: "Independence, manliness, firm nerves, and strong muscles, these are not gained through soup-kitchens and salvation-uniforms. These things are the product of toil and battle upon the hillside. These things are the problem of man facing the problem of his own destiny *with what help his individual fellow-man can give him.*"

I have put the last part of that sentence in italics because in those words the problem lies. How much help is it wise to give, and how shall it be given? The bounty of alms may sometimes encourage idleness, and the receipt of them weaken the moral

nerve, by injuring self-respect; but after all there is a class of unfortunates who are entitled to charity as of right, and there is a fortunate class who are bound as of right to give. When there are no privileged classes, when the opportunities of all are equal, when even the accidents of life are evenly shared, then it will be time enough to moralise on the vice of charity in preserving and perpetuating a dependent class. Charity, even in the form of alms, is one of the great civilising and humanising forces of the world, and the practice of it is to some people such a luxury that they would rather give to an impostor than not to give at all. It may be misapplied in many cases but let us not discourage it, there is no danger that we shall have a surplus of it for several years to come.

After all, it may be a question whether "Darkest England" is over there in the East of London in the "Vitechapel" neighborhood, or West of Buckingham palace in Belgravia, where the Dukes, and Earls, and the Feudal Barons live. These conquered the English at Hastings, and have held them in subjection ever since. They have appropriated the land, mines, forests, and all the natural opportunities of the English people, and before the conquered can use any of them they must pay tribute of rent in some form or other to the conquerors. In that city of palaces lying south of Hyde Park, where an idle aristocracy squanders in luxury the spoils of the English, there is "Darkest England."

NOTES.

Moncure D. Conway who is so well known to our readers by his excellent contributions to *The Open Court* has contributed an interesting article to the April number of *The Century* on "Washington and Frederick the Great" from which we quote the following episode: "When John Brown went to conquer the South with twenty three men he believed that the less he trusted arms of flesh the more Jehovah might be depended on to unsheathe his sword. The only other sword Brown considered worthy to be used by the Almighty was that which Washington was said to have received from Frederick the Great. One of Brown's men (Cook) came as a spy to Bel Air, and was hospitably shown the Washington relics for which he inquired. Brown told Colonel Washington, after taking him prisoner, that he wished to get hold of the sword 'because it has been used by two successful generals.' The superstition cost him dear. In order to get the sword Brown detached six of his men to go after it—five miles away. He thus lost half a day, and all chance of escape. Seventeen lives were offered as on an altar before this mythical sword."

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THE CONCEPTIONS OF GOD.

AMONG the conceptions of God there are three which have been and are still the most prevalent and powerful; these three are Theism, Pantheism, and Atheism.

The Theist anthropomorphises that power which he recognises as the authority of moral conduct, and looks upon it as a stern ruler or a kind father. If evils appear as the consequence of vice, he says: These are God's visitations! And he thinks of God as teaching his creatures his will and enforcing his obedience, not by making the contrary absolutely impossible, but like a wise educator raising children in liberty, allowing them to make mistakes so as to learn by their own experience.

Theism is not wrong if we keep before us the fact that the personality of God is an allegory; and it must be granted that it is the best allegory we can discover. There is a world-order manifesting itself to those who have eyes to see and ears to hear. We have to conform to it and there is no escape from it. It is omnipresent, like all natural laws; like gravitation it is everywhere, it is bound up in all existence, being that something that encompasseth all our life.

In describing this omnipresence of God, the psalmist says:

Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?

If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there.

If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea,

Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.

There has been made, so long as Christianity exists and even longer, a strong opposition to the idea that God is, like man, an individual being, having at different times different passions and desires. The Old Testament contains the well-known passage: "God is not a man that he should lie; neither the son of man that he should repent."

God is as little a person as are the ideas of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth; and the passages of the Bible in which God is described as wroth or repenting, or as being subject to any emotion or sentiment of a human character, have been understood since they were written, by rabbis no less than by the fathers of

the Church, in an allegorical sense, which was not only appropriate because of the strength and expressiveness of the simile, but because it was also the language of the time. To speak or think of spiritual things otherwise than in the habits of the times would be equivalent to expecting that the author of Genesis should have known Darwin's origin of the species and all the details of natural history when he described in great poetical outlines the formation of the world and the origin of man out of the dust of the earth.

The dogmatic view that God is a person and must be considered as a person became finally established as the orthodox view of the Church during the second and third century after Christ, and in this way all other views were branded as atheism. But who gave to a few narrow-minded bishops and to the theologians of a special school the right to impose this interpretation of the Bible upon all mankind? Who gave the right to Athanasius to pronounce as an œcumenical confession of faith the *Quicumque vult salvus esse*, i. e. "No one can be saved except he believe as is here prescribed." Living the truth can save alone. But the truth cannot be pronounced on the motion of a bishop by the majority decision of an ecclesiastical council. The truth must be searched for, it must be established by careful observation and critique, it must be proved.

We are willing to recognise the truth wherever we find it, even in the errors of the past; we will patiently winnow all opinions and creeds, lest we throw away the wheat together with the useless chaff. But with all that, we do not intend to compromise with superstitions sanctified by traditions. If Athanasius's view of God and other religious conceptions are to be regarded as infallible truth too sacred for criticism and required to be accepted blindly, we shall openly and squarely side with atheism and denounce the belief in God as a superstition.

Atheism is right in the face of dogma and dogmatic theism. There is no person ruling the world; all the processes of nature take place with an intrinsic necessity according to the life that is in everything that exists. The whole world is one great cosmos pervaded by unalterable law.

But was the idea of God not something more than a belief in a huge person? Is it possible that an

enormous error swayed the intellectual development of humanity for millenniums? The strength of the God idea was not its error but its truth, and its truth is contained in the fact, that in spite of the advantages which sin, malevolence, iniquity, falsehood, and disregard of the rights of others seem to bring the evil-doer, humanity still believed in the final victory of justice and the triumph of truth. And this one feature in the idea of God was predominant whenever and wherever it exercised a moral influence over the minds of men. It gave them strength in temptation, hope in affliction, and confidence in tribulation. And shall we relinquish this treasure because it was alloyed with error? Shall we drop with the personality of God all the moral truth which the idea contains?

Schiller says :

"One God exists, one holy will,
While fickle man may waver.
Above time and space there liveth still
The highest idea forever."

If, then, God is no person, if God is considered as the All in All, if Nature alone is God, is not the latter view nearer the truth than theism? This view which identifies God and the world is called Pantheism, and it cannot be denied that in the face of the theistic view, pantheism is a deeper and more correct conception of God. Nevertheless, Pantheism has also its blind side, and most of its defenders are entangled in gross errors.

It is true that the idea of a personal God outside of the world and nature is not tenable; yet the idea of God and the idea of nature are not identical. God is nature in so far only as nature serves us as a regulative principle for our actions. God is the cosmos in so far only as its laws represent the ultimate authority of moral conduct. God is not the heat of the sun, not the rain that descends from the clouds; he is not the blossom of the tree, nor the ear of wheat in the field. The idea of God is a special abstraction, different from other abstractions, and it should not be confounded with them. Pantheism recognising the truth that there is no God outside of the universe, preposterously confounds God and the universe and thus leads to the confusion of a God-Nature, in which there is no wrong, no sin, no evil.

It has been said, and it is true, that the weakness of Pantheism is its inability to explain the evil of the world. If the All is in every respect absolutely identical with God, there is no evil: if everything is a part of God, its existence whatever it be, even the existence of evil, is sanctified by being divine. There would be no wrong, but there would be no right either. The morally bad would disappear together with that which is morally good, and the whole would appear as an absolutely indifferent and meaningless play of physical forces.

Does this state of things really represent life as it

is? Are there no ideals, no aspirations? Is there no direction, no goal, no aim in the evolution of life and in the development of mankind? Surely there is good and bad, there is right and wrong, there is health and sickness, there is prosperity and ruin, evolution and dissolution, building up and breaking down; there is heaven and hell in human hearts, there is God—and the devil. The world as it is is possible only in these contraries, in these oppositions, and its life is a constant struggle between Ormuzd and Ahriman.

It is a vain dream to think of a world which is good throughout. We can as little think of light that casts no shadow as of "good" without being the resistance to "evil," or without standing in a contrast to "bad."

Christ said:

"Woe unto the world because of offences! For it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh."

The Talmud contains a legend that the rabbis had once succeeded in catching the devil and keeping him confined, when lo! the whole world came to a standstill. Everybody went to sleep and all life ceased. Suppose it were possible that a world existed without any evil, it would be a world without any opposites, it would be a world of indifferent homogeneity, without aim, without direction, without interests. If there were at all in an absolutely good world a play of forces evolution would be as good as dissolution, progress would be equivalent to retrogression, and the cosmos would be a machine which might be turned backward just as well as forward.

Could you have a thermometer which indicates the heat only and not the cold at the same time? Good and evil are relations which are deeply founded in the nature of things. These relations arise through the very complications of life. To identify God and the All, to understand by God the upward direction just as much as the downward direction of evolution, is the same mistake as to identify the concepts heat and temperature. It is true that the same degree of the thermometer may now be perceived as heat and now as cold. Heat and cold are not two things mixed in our temperature; they are one. So are good and evil. Nevertheless there is a difference in the rising and the falling of the thermometer. There is a difference of heat and cold. This difference is relative and it disappears as soon as we leave the sphere of relations and consider either a single moment in its unrelated isolation or the total whole in its absolute entirety. A single act in my life if it remained unrelated and isolated could be called neither good nor evil. There is no absolute evil; nor is there any absolute cold. An isolated act would be like a certain position of the thermometer of which we do not know whether it represents a rise or a fall. It becomes hot or cold not

until it is referred to another state of temperature. And there is no sense either in speaking of the morality or immorality of the All in its absolute totality.

That which appears to us from our standpoint as evil—and I do not deny that, considered in this relation, it is actually and undeniably evil—appears if considered in the whole as a part of the total development of universal life, as a transitional and a necessary phase only. It is a partial breakdown, but it is no absolute destruction.

The evil in the world is comparable to the negative magnitudes and quantities in arithmetic. There are no negative things in the world; but there are negative magnitudes in arithmetic. They represent a contrary direction to that which has been posited. The minus is a positive operation, but this operation is employed to reverse a plus of equal magnitude. The plus and minus operations have sense and meaning only if considered in their mutual relation. This relation being neglected we have only single operations or the results of operations, but neither positive nor negative magnitudes. If the impossibility could be thought, that there are no interconnections among the parts of the whole cosmos, we should have neither bad nor good, but only isolated actual existences.

Consider the whole world as a whole and destruction disappears as much as new creations. There are, so far as we can see, only actual existences which move onward somehow in some direction. That which appears to us as a dissolution, as a destruction, is in the motion of the whole a mere preparation for a new generation. The breakdown of a solar system must appear only as an evil, as a negative operation in comparison to the positive operation of a building up. But in the entire cosmic life it will most likely be the indispensable preliminary phase of the construction of a new world. In the entire cosmic life, there is no evil, there is the progress of formation on the one hand and there is on the other hand the dissolution of those combinations which have become unfit for a continued existence. They must be dissolved in order to be prepared for new formations; and thus their dissolution may be considered as a blessing, as much as the curses that rest upon sin, if viewed as integral parts of the whole world-order, are not inflictions; they are as much blessings as the gains that accompany noble deeds.

In this sense we may say that God is everywhere in nature, he is in evolution, he is in dissolution, he will be found in the storm; he will be found in the calm. He lives in the bliss of good aspirations and in the visitations that follow evil actions. He lives in the growth of life and in its decay. God is not the storm, he is not the calm, he is not the decay of life, he is not dissolution. He is not the bliss of virtue, nor is he the curse of sin. But he is in them all.

In contradistinction to Theism, Atheism, and especially to Pantheism, we call this conception of God Entheism.

God is the indestructible *sursum*, which ensouls everything that exists, which constitutes the direction of evolution and the growth of life, which is the truth in the empire of spiritual existence. It is an actuality, no less than matter and energy; and indeed like these two, which represent as it were God's reality as well as his power and omnipotence, it cannot be lost in all the changes that take place in the constant formation, dissolution, and re-formation of solar systems. It is eternal, and it is in him we live and move and have our being.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAGIC.

BY L. J. VANCE.

[CONTINUED.]

A writer in the *Atlantic Monthly** has said: "Magic had its beginning in devil-worship." Than this nothing could be more plain, but can anything be more false? There have been all sorts of guesses about the origin of magic. Pomponazzi's attempt to explain the phenomena of magic by the influence of the stars,† is no worse than the modern attempt to find the beginning of magic in devil-worship.

Here, let us follow if we can, from the beginning to the end, the magical idea that man has power over the supernatural. This brings up the main elements of savage philosophy which, as Major Powell says, "is the result of *man's struggle to know*."‡ Or, as Mr. Tylor puts it: "Man's craving to know the causes at work in each event he witnesses, the reasons why each state of things he surveys is such as it is and no other is no product of high civilisation, but a characteristic of his race down to its lowest stages."§

Bearing in mind the savage mental *status* already described, we find that the phenomena of the outside world are all explained on supernatural principles. "The Hurons," says Charlevoix, "attribute the most ordinary effects to supernatural causes." What is the savage theory of causation? Man's "first explanations," says Mr. Powell, "were based on analogies with phenomena of his own existence subjectively interpreted."

An example or two may serve to explain more clearly the difference in the philosophies of uncultured and civilised men. The Rev. Francis Newman was going on a distant journey in the wilds of Asia. The natives tied around the neck of the mule a small bag supposed to have great magical virtue. Mr. Newman thought it a good opportunity to disprove a supersti-

* For May, 1882.

† Lecky's *Rationalism in Europe*, Vol. I, p. 284.

‡ *Trans. Anthropol. Soc.* Vol. II, p. 205.

§ *Primitive Culture*, I, p. 369.

tious notion; so he cut off the bag. "But as ill-fortune would have it, the mule had not gone 30 yards up the street before she put her foot into a hole and broke her leg." Of course all the natives were confirmed in their magical faith. They said with some satisfaction: "Now you see what happens to unbelievers!" Again, the arrival of the Jesuit missionaries among the Hurons was followed by, or coincident with, certain misfortune to the tribe. The Hurons were satisfied, for instance, that Father Charlevoix's clock brought bad luck; that his weather-cock brought bad weather, and so forth.

It is easy now to see how the savage philosophy of causation is at the bottom of magic. At the outset, we find that supernatural causes are assumed to produce the most ordinary and natural effects. Can man work supernaturally? Of course he can, and that belief finds continual expression in art magic.

Once more, according to savage philosophy, *antecedence and consequence in time* stand in the relation of cause and effect. The Egyptians reasoned in that way; "for when aught prodigious occurs," says Herodotus, "they keep good watch and write down what follows; and then, if anything like the prodigy be repeated, they expect the same events to follow as before." Mr. Lang, who has worked out this portion of the subject, says: "We see the same confusion between antecedence and consequence in time on one side, and cause and effect on the other, when the Red Indians aver that birds actually bring winds and storms, or fair weather."

To recapitulate: the general principles which underlie all magical reasoning are:

- I. That like affects, influences and suggests like.
- II. That natural effects are the results of supernatural causes; that coincidence stands for cause.
- III. That antecedence and consequence in time are the same as cause and effect. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc.*

VI. That certain people, "not in the rôle of common mortals," are in communication with spiritual powers, which are obedient to their will.

No study of the natural history of magic would be complete without some account of the practical application of magical reasoning to the wants and demands of every-day life. For, what makes magic magical, in the ordinary sense of the word, is the putting of wild, absurd and illogical ideas into daily practice. Now, the semi-cultured man means to be extremely practical. He uses magic in song, in dance, and in medicine for definite practical purposes. His magical arts are not *pour l'art*, but because they are useful to him. If the savage wishes to shoot game, to injure an enemy, to drive away evil spirits, or to recover from a fit of sickness, he goes about to ac-

complish his purposes in what he thinks to be the most practical way. Any notion that savage magic is *not practical* will be dispelled by a study of the beliefs and practices which are always used in a low stage of culture. As an illustration, we may mention that in the Pacific Islands charms are hung up to keep thieves out of the cultivated plots; a few cocoa-nut leaves plaited in the form of a shark will cause the thief who disregards it to be eaten by a real one; two sticks set one across the other will send a pain right across his body.*

Again, the savage verily believes that his medicine-men or Shamans can work for him practical results. He thinks, as we have seen, that human power will and can work supernaturally. On this belief, as Mr. Lang observes, "on this belief in man's power to affect events beyond the limits of natural possibility is based the whole theory of magic, the whole power of sorcerers." As a natural result of this belief, the doctor-wizard is the most practical man in the tribe. He can bring health, wealth and prosperity. When Mr. Turner was in Polynesia, he was disturbed night after night by the melancholy beating of shells, entreating the wizards to stop plaguing their victims.

Once more, the savage is a firm believer in the power of songs and incantations. He uses this kind of magic to drive evil spirits away, just as David drove the evil demon from Saul by his song and harp playing. The belief in the magical power of songs and incantations is found all over the world. It is a prominent feature in all magic, whether ancient or modern. Many of these magical songs are preserved in ritual; many survive in *märchen* or household tales.

In addition to these forms of magic, we find among savages the belief in the power of charms, and in a kind of "luck." Sticks and stones are no longer worshipped, but they are endowed with certain magical properties, chiefly in the way of charms. But why is any stick or stone lucky? That is not always easy to say. Somehow particular objects are believed to bring success, and, to the mind of the semi-cultured man, that is enough to make them "lucky." Just as the Indian hunter wears the claws of the grizzly bear that he may be endowed with its courage and ferocity, so he carries a bit of stone, perhaps, "for luck." As, even in our own day, there are people who carry a bent nail, a potato, a button, and so forth, "just for luck," you know.

Thus, there are three forms of magic which specially call for our attention. They are (1) the magic of the Shaman, (2) the magic of songs and incantations and (3) the magic of charms and of luck.

1. To understand the magic of the Shaman it is necessary to show how he comes by his miraculous

* Tyler, "Early History," p. 130.

powers. It has now to be shown what claims the Shaman has to be considered as a magician. Let us see how he goes to work. A good example is given by Mr. Dall.* He thus describes the methods in vogue among the Alaskans: "When the young aspirant for the position of medicine-man goes out into the woods, after fasting for a considerable period, in order that his to be familiar spirit may seek him, and that he may become possessed of the power to communicate with supernatural beings, if successful, he meets with a river otter, which is a supernatural animal." He kills the otter, and "takes out the tongue, after which he is able to understand the language of all inanimate objects, of birds, animals and all other living creatures. He preserves the otter's tongue with the utmost care in a little bag around his neck."

It is a "far cry" from Alaska to Australia, but the methods by which the medicine-man gains his magic is pretty much the same the world over. In Australia, according to Mr. Howitt, "the manner in which a man became a Bira-ark (wizard) was generally believed to be that being found alone in the forest by the Mrarts (ghosts), they took him up with them, and taught him."†

The belief that the magician of the tribe can communicate with the spirits is universal among savages. Thus, Mr. Brough Smyth mentions a case in which the wizard lying on his stomach spoke to the deceased, and the other sitting by his side received the message which the dead man told.‡

Now, the arts of the magician would be in vain unless he possessed power over the spirits with which he claims to be in communication. The savage really believes that the wizard of the tribe has this supernatural power. Thus, in an Ojibwa pictograph given by Schoolcraft, *power* corresponds with the sign for medicine-man or doctor. Garrick Mallery in his valuable study of gesture language gives the sign for medicine-man as follows: "Passing the extended and separated index and second fingers of the right hand upward from the forehead, spirally," indicates superior knowledge.§ He also gives another sign thus: "The hand passed upward before the forehead with the index finger loosely extended with the sign for *sky*," means knowledge of superior matters—spiritual power.

Here let us distinguish between the magician proper and the medicine-man. The line has been drawn by Mr. Schoolcraft. He says: "The Meda is a magician. He is the professor of the arts of the Grand Medicine Dance. He makes use of various articles which are supposed to have the power of cur-

ing the sick. . . . He is, however, professedly a magician. The power imparted to his medicines and charms is ascribed to necromancy. . . . The only use he makes of medicine is one wholly connected with the doctrine of magic. He is a seer, a soothsayer, a fortune-teller, a diviner and a prophet."*

Here, again, we come to the medicine practice of the savage. As we have seen, disease is attributed to evil spirits; the question being, not, How did the man die, but Who killed him? Now, the remedies of the savage are wholly magical. It is the business of the medicine-man to drive out the evil spirit; in other words, to practice his magical art. This is a feature of magic which calls for some illustration.

An excellent summary of the attributes of the Mojave doctor-wizard is given by Capt. John G. Bourke of the U. S. Army: "Mojave doctors are born, not trained. Their gifts are supernatural, not acquired. They can talk to the spirits before they have left their mother's womb. There are spirit doctors who are clairvoyants and exorcists; they talk to spirits. There are snake doctors who cure snake bites; sometimes by suction, sometimes by rubbing something on the wound, but generally by singing."†

Our idea of the medical practice of people in a low stage of culture is confirmed by Mr. James Morney's account of Cherokee theory and practice of medicine.‡ Thus, "plants are selected from some connection between their appearance and the symptoms of the disease." Here we find again the "like to like" theory; that you can cure a man by applying a plant of the color of the symptoms, etc. Among the Cherokees, biliousness is treated "with a decoction of several plants also called *Da lani*, from the color of the root, flower or bark." So, too, in treating for a snake bite, the doctor rubs his finger around the spot from left to right, "because the snake always coils from right to left."

Mr. Mooney proceeds: "The Cherokee doctor works to drive out a ghost or devil." Again, "every doctor is a priest, and every application is a religious act accompanied by a prayer. In these prayers the doctor first endeavors to show his contempt for the disease spirit by belittling it as much as possible, so as to convey the impression that he is not afraid of it."

Now observe how the Cherokee doctor goes to work to cure the patient. "Sometimes the medicine is blown from the mouth of the doctor upon the body of the patient, according to certain rules. . . . In every instance a prayer or sacred *song* accompanies the application."

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

* Rept. Bur. Ethn., 1881-2, pp. 111-112.

† Journ. Anth. Inst., vol. 13, p. 185.

‡ Aborigines of Australia, I, p. 107.

§ First An. Rept. Bureau Ethn., p. 380.

* Indian Tribes of U. S., edited by Drake, Vol. I, p. 73.

† Journal of Am. F. L., vol. 2, p. 172.

‡ Journ. Am. F. L., vol. 3, p. 47.

THE TRAGEDY AT NEW ORLEANS.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

THE chief topic of the time is the controversy between the United States and Italy. The cause of the dispute is the tragedy at New Orleans, and the difficulties of it grow out of the unsettled state of international politics and law. How far was Italy as a nation injured by the action of the mob at New Orleans; and what legal power has the United States to grant redress, either by punishing the actors in the drama, or by making compensation in money to the families of the victims? As to the character of the killing, after admitting all the provocation claimed for it, there still remains upon the heart and mind the painful feeling that it was an act of sanguinary vengeance intensified by race prejudice, an Apache execution, irrational and barbarous. The victory of eleven hundred armed men over eleven men unarmed and in prison is an achievement not great in chivalry. If Italy has any standing in an international court at all, the evidence and the argument are largely on her side, but the right of that country to interfere for the victims of the riot may fairly be disputed, since they had in reality ceased to be citizens of Italy.

What standing has Italy in the court? It is claimed that four of the men slain in prison were Italian subjects, having never assumed the obligations nor sought the protection of naturalization in America. This raises the question, how far a man may claim the protection of two governments while acknowledging service to neither. Those four men had renounced their allegiance to Italy by the substantial act of abandoning that country to become permanent residents of the United States. They could claim American protection for their property and their persons; but when required to serve on a jury, or in the army, or the militia, or to vote, or to perform any other duty belonging to citizenship, they instantly became exempt, and under the protection of Italy. In the same way, if required by the Italian government to render any duties to Italy, they could laugh at the demand, and place themselves under the protection of the United States.

Thousands of men of all sorts of nationalities choose to live in the United States claiming the protection of two countries without owning responsibility to either. Those four men who are the subjects of this international controversy were as much outside the political pale of Italy as if they had been born in Louisiana, or as the other seven who had formally taken the oath of allegiance to the United States. The treaty stipulations by which it is agreed that Americans shall be protected in Italy, and Italians in America, apply only to those who are in good faith foreigners, transitory persons having a temporary residence either for business purposes or pleasure; it has no application to permanent residents, whether they call themselves aliens, denizens, or citizens. Voluntarily those four men had withdrawn themselves from the guardianship of Italy, and that country might very properly have treated them as no longer a part of the Italian people. The United States might also take the same ground and insist upon it that by their own action they had renounced Italy and had become a part of the American people, but unfortunately the United States is on record against that principle.

Whether the position just assumed is correct or not, the United States is estopped from taking it. We have pressed the immunity and impunity of American citizenship to unreasonable extremes, and we have been more ostentatious than any other nation in wrapping our flag around criminals in foreign countries, under the plea, sometimes true and sometimes not, that at some previous period they had become naturalized American citizens. Only a few years ago a member of a Dublin "Mafia" who had been appointed to murder an informer, having deliberately and effectually performed the work, was tried for the crime, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged. There was no doubt about his guilt, yet the

government of the United States, on the unsupported claim that he had taken out his first papers, requested the government of Great Britain to arrest the sentence against the murderer. Not only that, but Congress passed a resolution asking a respite for the criminal, that matters might be shown which would entitle him to a new trial. Out of respect for the American government a respite was granted, but nothing was shown, or could be shown in favor of a new trial and the man was finally hanged. This is only one specimen of our interference with the laws against offenders in foreign countries under the pretense that the criminals were nominally citizens of the United States.

When Italy, out of regard for the safety of Italians in America, and in vindication of her own dignity, appeals to the treaty for atonement, we are compelled to plead that the security for our citizens which we have exacted from other nations we are not able to give to their citizens in return; that literally we are a nation without sovereign powers in our own territory, and that the question of retribution belongs exclusively to the State of Louisiana a State which politically Italy does not know, a State which is forbidden by the American constitution to have any political relations with Italy, either by treaty, or in any other way. We are very impatient because the Italian government does not seem to understand this curious anomaly; but let us imagine eleven Americans in Genoa, accused of crime, tried by an Italian jury and acquitted, immediately put to death in prison by the "leading citizens" of the town; would we not regard with surprise and scorn a plea of the Italian king that by the constitution of United Italy the national government had no criminal jurisdiction in Genoa. We should very promptly say that Italy could not plead its own constitution as an acquittal of its obligations to other nations.

It is hardly necessary to say that the plea of justification offered in this case would be demurred out of any international court in Christendom as not binding upon Italy. The charge that the murdered Italians were themselves the murderers of Hennessy was answered by the verdict of the jury, and in this controversy that verdict is conclusive *on the side of Italy*; that the jury was bribed and all the rest of it, is mere assertion without any legal evidence to support it; and even if all the excuses be admitted, the fact remains that the victims were Italians, confined in an American prison, and that they were illegally put to death by a mob, with at least the passive sanction of the mayor and other magistrates of New Orleans. As to the complaint that the Italian government has been rash and hasty in recalling the Italian ambassador from Washington, let us imagine again the case of eleven Americans illegally put to death in Genoa, and how long would it take us to withdraw our minister from Italy?

As to menaces, we heed them not; the United States is war-proof; but a nation too powerful to fear war ought to be too magnanimous to desire it. The tone of the Jingo press is not a true echo from the conscience of our people, although it might lead foreigners to suspect that we aspire to be the swaggering cowboy among the nations. Our very invincibility ought to make us just and kindly considerate, yet some of our papers appear to be edited by Captain Bobadil, they are so full of challenge and conceit. Especially sensitive in our own intercourse with foreign countries we sometimes forget that other people have national spirit and some patriotic feeling. Several years ago one of our most intensely American journalists, in an article criticising the conduct of our ambassadors to foreign courts, asked this question, "Is the United States a gentleman?" a very pertinent sarcasm, for the rules of good behavior apply to nations as to men. We may rudely defy the opinion of the outside world, but we cannot bide from our inner consciousness that the unfortunate affair at New Orleans has lowered us in our own esteem.

There ought to be magnanimity on both sides. The Italian government should consider the vast foreign population perma-

nently residing in the United States, and how impossible and unreasonable it would be to hold the government of this country answerable to all the nations of the earth respectively for whatever injuries may be inflicted here upon their former subjects. A very slight change of circumstances would reverse the position of the parties to this cause, making the United States plaintiff, and Italy defendant. Suppose, for instance, the men slain at New Orleans had gone back to their native land a couple of years ago, to live there for the rest of their lives, and suppose them claiming to be American citizens, appealing to the United States to redress wrongs done them in Italy, we might at this very moment be demanding reparation from Italy on their account, as Italy is demanding it from us. Such are the anomalies that result from straining beyond its legitimate province the privilege acquired by naturalization.

SOME REVIEWS OF "THE SOUL OF MAN."

WHILE glancing over some of the reviews of "The Soul of Man," I was astonished to find the book characterised as representing materialism, or mechanical positivism, or mechanical monism. It is strange how people can read into a book the ideas which they expect to find. Sometimes the things which reviewers sum up as the contents of the book are just the contrary of what the book contains.

A critic in *The Week* of Toronto, Canada, speaks of monistic positivism, but how much is he mistaken in what it means! The following extracts show how little acquainted he is with the ideas set forth in "The Soul of Man":

"By monistic positivism is meant a philosophy which postulates 'The All.'"

Positivism is a philosophy which knows of no postulates, but takes the positive facts of experience as its data.

"... It is positive because there is no reality, no selective activity, mind, but the law of 'The All' is mechanical."

When did I ever declare "mind" to be no reality? There is no selective faculty in the sense of "hypermechanical impulses," but there is mind, and mind is a reality.

When did I ever declare that the law of "the All" is mechanical? I maintained that all motions are mechanical, but feeling is not mechanical. The supposed interconvertibility of feeling and motion has been expressly declared to be an error.

"The 'All' is discovered mainly that it may be worshipped."

We have never proposed to worship the All.

"The book before us tells us how far the Monistic Positivists have now got. They have some information of the nervous system—principally cuts taken from authorities... whom they call the fathers of Monistic Positivism."

Does the critic of *The Week* think that Monistic Positivism is a sect? What a queer notion to call our great physiologists the Fathers of Monistic Positivism!

The Independent says:

"So far as the book has any consistent standpoint it is that of mechanical monism."

In a similar strain *The Christian Union* pronounces its verdict. It says:

"Dr. Carus is convinced that anatomy and physiology are the only proper pathways of knowledge to the nature of the soul. This is in outline what we understand to be his philosophy of things. There are entities or centres of energy which may be named atoms. These tend to cohere, and when they have collected they become an organism. The organisms also tend to congregate, and when they have succeeded, the result is a body. The energy is manifested double, whether in the simpler atom or the germ. It works outwards in its relations to others, and inward to preservation of self. When the congregation of entities or germs is complete, this outward working centralises, and is manifested as life, and, in its highest condition, soul."

"The real question is whether his physiological psychology is true. It cannot be dismissed easily as blank materialism of the pantheistic school.... Nevertheless, a question or two may be asked. What brings together, first of

all, these entities? Why do they tend to congregate, and how do we know anything of the matter? Is not this whole theory, therefore, built upon an unproved hypothesis? How do we know that life is only a mode of energy?—for surely this is implied in the monistic theory."

Is this muddle of words supposed to be a summary of my views? My first idea was that my representation of the subject must have been lacking in clearness, although my critic adds:

"Dr. Carus's book possesses the merit of clearness and frankness; though we utterly differ from his fundamental hypothesis."

I am much obliged for this praise, but I fear, it has been allotted too rashly. My critic says, "Dr. Carus is convinced that anatomy and physiology are the only proper pathways of knowledge to the nature of the soul," whereas I maintain, that although anatomy and physiology are indispensable, they are not by any means exclusively sufficient for a proper study of the human soul.

I have to add that I nowhere spoke of "entities" nor of "centres of energy." I did not say that "life is only a mode of energy." I said that "the energy which living beings expend in their activity, in their motions, their passions, and in their thoughts, is the same energy that we meet with everywhere, and which is produced in animal bodies in a more complicated way, yet in a similar manner as work is done by machines." In other words, life is a mode of energy *in so far only* as the motions of living organisms are considered. Thought is no energy, feeling is no energy; but when man thinks and when he feels, energy is expended.

My first thought was that I had not made my views clear enough, when I met with another view in *The Reform Advocate*, which, I am informed, comes from the pen of the editor, Dr. Hirsch. My view is summed up in the following words:

"Anatomy and physiology alone do not suffice to give the key to the riddles of life and the universe. The *geistige Band* of which Goethe speaks is not found along the lines of dissection.... Dr. Carus is a monist. His philosophy is positive. But not the crude positiveness of Comte and his blind followers, much rather the loftier, because in the true sense of the term more ideal positivism of Noire would have his qualified assent.... The concluding chapters of the book are those which interested us most, and for which we are extremely thankful to the Doctor. Two classes of men might with good results study these. The unyielding orthodox and the equally dogmatic atheist. Their dogmatism is well exposed. That God and immortality are not concepts which deserve merely a pitying scornful smile, or an impatient shrug of the shoulder, the altogether too loud agnostic of younger years might well study in this book. His teacher is a man of the greatest liberality of views, free from the trammels of theological prejudices.... It is refreshing to find one who speaks clearly on these things after the haze of would be enlightened twaddle. His discussion of the relation and the difference of Nature and God is to our mind one of the most suggestive of the volume. And what has pleased us most is the emphasis with which he pricks the presumption of basing ethics on happiness or any other foundation save that of an eternal outlook.... His religion of the future has in very truth all the essentials of the faith which alone can win the assent and devotion of the thinker."

Am I mistaken if I suspect both my critics, the reviewer of *The Week* and the reviewer of the *Christian Union* to be clergymen? It seems to me most difficult to a certain class of pious believers to understand and to state with objective impartiality the views of others. The critic of *The Week* says:

"The avowed purpose of Monistic Positivists is to build up a religion on monistic positivism.... A science which has repudiated in turn the dogmatic of the scholastics and the "natural religion" of Auguste Comte is now too independent to show much patience toward this new form of irreligious seduction."

Is it so difficult for a theologian to give to science what belongs to science? It is sometimes notable how little theologians care and how little they try to understand scientific methods of investigation. Their lack of scientific insight is plainly shown when they denounce physiological psychology as materialism because they consider it a denial of the spiritual element of the soul. Dr. Hirsch is also a theologian, but he appears almost as an exception. There are very few who recognise with him that science can have her full due without the slightest detracting from true religion.

P. C.

A JAPANESE SWORD.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

I was the spirit of Japan,
 I, the ennobler, I, the sword;
 Of all her islands I was lord
 And with me power to bless or ban.

I made the boor a gentleman;
 I taught the striving mass accord
 In gentle ways; for my reward
 They kept me bright as honor can.

New days are come, old days are dead,
 And warriors now no more rely
 On valiant steel but worthless lead.

My servant once, the Samurai,
 Now wields the yardstick in my stead,
 For it is mightier than I.

A REPLY.

BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

What meaneth this despondent mind?
 And when shall idle wishing cease?
 We cannot leave the world behind,
 But conquering it we may find peace.

Perchance if hence one could depart,
 Soon might he yearn to come again;
 O show the world a gentle heart,
 Whose joy lies in assuaging pain!

Irrevocably fades the leaf,
 And strength of youth shall pass away;
 There are abysses dark to grief—
 Alas! the deepest hell are they!

We see them; over them we go,
 Not halting in the eager race;
 And happiness lies close to woe,
 And grief and mirth with life keep pace.

The moon is sailing o'er the sky,
 Now shining full, now lost to sight;
 So, too, this changeful life doth fly,
 Evanescent in clouds of night.

—Platen.

BOOK REVIEWS.

KATECHISMUS DER HANDLESE-KUNST. Bearbeitet von *Gustav Gessmann*. Mit 19 Tafeln. Berlin: Verlag von Karl Siegismund.

The author of this interesting little pamphlet has compiled from several sources the data of Chiromantic belief, and explains them in concise outlines with the assistance of many instructive plates. Chirosophy, or the science of reading the character and fate of a person in the formation and lines of his hands, is a quaint study, and we do not deny that there is some truth in it. We may for instance distinguish a farmer, a tailor, a scholar, or a blacksmith simply by looking at their hands, but we cannot go so far as Mr. Gessmann goes, who considers Chiromancy as a regular science, which has the same rights as for instance "Meteorology, which upon the foundation of known facts and according to certain rules of experience prophecies the probability of rain, snow, storm, etc." Let alone other things, Chiromancy is an amusing pastime, and those who wish to know something about the heart line, the head line, the lines of life, of health, of the sun, the characteristics of artistic, psychical, square, and spade-like hands, or other details of this branch of occult knowledge will find this little pamphlet very useful.

KPS.

RELIGION OF MAN AND ETHICS OF SCIENCE. By *Hudson Tuttle*. New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co.

This book does not represent our views, its author belongs to that class of thinkers who are generally called spiritualists. We find, nevertheless, many ideas which meet with our hearty sympathy and approval. This is true mainly of the ethical truths. The present book is intended to set forth the Religion of Man in opposition to the Religion of the Gods, the former being conceived of as the religion of the future, the latter as the religion of the past. Mr. Hudson Tuttle says:

"The Religion of the Gods comes from without, as a foreign system, to be received by the servile devotee; the Religion of Man originates from within, and is a normal growth of humanity."

"The field is new; broad as the universe; profound as the depths of space; as high as heaven."

The question What is Religion? is answered on p. 63 as "Devotion to the right, consecration to duty, unshrinking self-sacrifice."

KPS.

NOTES.

Lieut. Col. M. von Egidy whose pamphlet "Ernstes Gedanken," was the subject of a few comments in a former number of *The Open Court*, is continuing his missionary work of religious reformation and has sent us a number of tracts of the same tendency as the pamphlet mentioned.

We have received from Dr. William J. Harris, United States Commissioner of Education, a brochure of seventy-seven pages, (with portrait frontispiece) entitled "Thoughts on Educational Psychology." The reflections of Dr. Harris will be read with interest by all. Dr. Harris also sends us a pamphlet on "The Right of Property and the Ownership of Land."

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P. O. DRAWER F.

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The Open Court.

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Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

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EVOLUTION AND HUMAN PROGRESS.*

BY PROF. JOSEPH LE CONTE.

THERE was a time—and that not many centuries ago—when science occupied herself only with material nature and even there only with the simpler parts, and parts most removed from the immediate wants and highest interests of man. For example, while kingdoms were crumbling and society decaying about her, she busied herself with investigating the curious properties of the curves made by cutting a cone in different directions. The higher human concerns she left to her sister, Philosophy, to solve, and her sister, Literature, to illustrate and embody in forms of beauty. Is it any wonder then that she should have been taunted for her supposed earthy and groveling spirit? Is it any wonder that she became the butt for the shafts of ridicule of her nimble witted sister literature, and the object of scorn of her imperial sister Philosophy? But she was sadly misjudged. She attacked first the most remote things, not because they were the most remote, but because they were the simplest and therefore the easiest to reduce to law and order. She avoided the nearest and dearest concerns of human life, not because they were nearest and dearest, but because they were so complex and difficult that she despaired of reducing them to laws. Law and order and completeness are her passion. She is loth to undertake what she cannot do well. Meanwhile content to work in silence in her own lowly domain, taunted and misjudged century after century, with a divine patience, she bided her time. After establishing herself firmly in her first narrow limits, she began to extend her domain to more complex subjects. From mathematics she passed to mechanics, then to astronomy, then to physics, then to chemistry, reducing these successively from chaos to order. Then she extended her dominion to biology also. This brings her near to man, but not yet in his higher parts. Then she invades the domain of brain physiology and touches now the borders of psychology. Last of all she dares invade also sociology and thus touches at last the highest interests of man and the noblest department of thought—the science of social organisation, of social progress, of politics and of government.

* An address delivered on Charter Day of the University of California, Berkeley, March 23, 1891.

Now at last her transcendent worth is acknowledged by all.

For ages upon ages, like Cinderella, she sat among the ashes content to do her humble work while her proud sisters flaunted their gaudy colors in the eyes of an admiring world. But now at last touched by the fairy wand of Reason she is transformed into a princess and seems likely to govern the world. But is it not barely possible that although now exalted into a queen some of her kitchen ways and kitchen thoughts still cling about her? Is it not true that having worked so long in the ashes she still imagines that all things are but different forms of dust and ashes? Does she not still look too much downward instead of upward? In a word is there not a strong tendency in modern science to drag down everything to a material plane? It has been my constant effort—I deem it my highest mission in life—to resist this tendency in myself and to counteract it in others by an appeal in the name of science, from her lower self to her higher self, from Cinderella, the kitchen maid, to Cinderella, the royal princess; in a word, to lift science to a recognition of her own glorious mission, that of verifying and at the same time giving rational form to all our noblest beliefs and aspirations.

Meanwhile, however, out of these ancient antagonisms and traditional tendencies there has grown up two opposite modes of viewing nature, which may almost be said to characterise philosophy and literature on the one hand and science on the other. The one is the natural result of dealing with man in his higher activities; the other of dealing, at first entirely and even yet mainly, with nature and with man in his lower activities. The outcome of the one is a spiritual philosophy despising our material nature; of the other a material philosophy ignoring our spiritual nature. These two opposite camps of thought have always been at feud, but now are preparing for a final struggle. Of course the battle ground will be the nature of man. For there, if anywhere, these two natures, the spiritual and material, meet and mingle.

* * *

There are, then, two extreme views—the old and the new—as to the relation of man to nature and especially to the animal kingdom. According to the one, the old, there is an infinite gulf separating man

from all else in nature; the differences between man and the highest animal is far greater than between the highest animal and the lowest microbe—the differences in the two cases are wholly incommensurable. Man must be set over as an equivalent not only against the whole animal kingdom, but against all nature beside—Nature, the Divine revelation and man the interpreter. According to the other, the new, it is impossible to exaggerate the closeness of the connection of man to the animal kingdom. Every bone, muscle, nerve, and organ of the body and every faculty of the mind has its correspondent in animals of which those in man are but slightly modified forms. Man has grown up out of the animal kingdom by gradual evolution and is even yet nothing more than the highest animal.

Again we find the same two extreme views—the old and the new—as to the organisation of society and the progress of man. According to the one—the old—these have nothing whatever to do with any law of nature. They are wholly the result of our spiritual nature and must be studied wholly apart and can receive no assistance from science. According to the other—the new—the organisation of the animal body is the type of the organisation of the social body, and all the principles and methods of biology must be carried over into the higher field of sociology. Nature is one without break from the inorganic and dead through the organic and living up to the intellectual and moral. No permanent progress can be made in the rational knowledge or science of man except by identifying it with that of lower animals. Human anatomy never made any scientific progress until it became a part of comparative anatomy, nor human physiology until it became comparative physiology. So also must psychology be studied in relation to the psychical phenomena of animals, sociology in connection with biology and social progress in connection with organic evolution before these can be truly scientific.

Now it has been often and truly said that in all such cases of extreme, mutually excluding views, both are right and both are wrong. Each is right from its own point of view, but wrong in excluding the other point of view. Therefore, a true philosophy is found in a more comprehensive view which combines and reconciles the apparent opposites, not indeed by pooling their issues, but by transcending them, by including what is true in both and explaining their differences. A true philosophy is a stereoscopic combination of two different surface-views into one solid tri-dimensional reality.

Such a more comprehensive and therefore more rational view, I am convinced, is found in my view of the origin of man's spirit (of his body there is no question)—of the origin of man's spirit from the anima of animals, of the pneuma of man from the psyche of

animals—by a process of evolution. According to this view, spirit in embryo in the womb of nature, unconscious of itself, but slowly developing through all geological times, at last came to birth into a higher spiritual and immortal world—at last became self-conscious, self-active free spirit in man. Thus the whole process of evolution of the organic kingdom, through infinite time becomes naught else than a divine method for the creation of spirits.

I cannot now do more than allude to this view. Some of you already know it. To others any attempt to restate it would take more time than I have at my command. Now this view of the origin of man's spirit completely explains the paradox of human nature. It completely explains, as none other does, the closeness of connection, and yet the infinitude of difference between the spirit of man and the psyche of animals, between the social organism and the animal body and between social progress and organic evolution. On a previous occasion similar to this I dwelt on one of these, viz. the relation of the social organism to the animal body and the relation of sociology to biology. My object to-day is to touch lightly the other, viz. the close connection, and yet the great differences between human progress and organic evolution.

* * *

I assume that organic evolution accomplished its purpose, achieved its end, reached its goal, in man. But as spirit in embryo in animals was born into a higher plane of activity in man, so organic evolution reaching its goal and completion in man was immediately transferred to this higher plane and became human evolution or social progress. As organic evolution reached its goal and completion in man, so must human evolution ever stretch forward to reach its goal and completion in the ideal man, the divine man.

Now, on this new and higher plane, all the factors of organic evolution must continue to operate as before; as before the environment physical and organic must modify the activities bodily and mental; as before use and disuse of organs and faculties must produce corresponding increase and decrease of the parts used; as before the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest must operate to perfect the race. But there is, there must be, a new factor introduced here, which immediately takes control of all the other factors, transforming their character and using them for its own higher purposes. This new and higher factor if factor it may be called (for it is much more) is the conscious, voluntary co-operation of the thing developing—i. e. the spirit of man—in the work of its own evolution.

This new factor is the necessary result of the birth of spirit from previous embryonic sleep into self-conscious and self-active life. It must, therefore, have

commenced its activity from the first emergence of humanity out of animality. But at first it was feeble. In his earliest stages undoubtedly man, like other animals, was urged on by forces of organic evolution unknowing and uncaring whither he tended. But more and more as civilisation advanced, this higher and distinctively human factor became more and more dominant until now in highly civilised communities, it takes control of evolution. This free self-determined evolution of the race, to distinguish it from the necessary evolution of the organic kingdom, we call progress.

But as already said, when the new and distinctively human factor appears, the previously operating factors do not disappear, but only become subordinate. They not only still exist, but they underlie and condition the activity of the higher factors. This is only one illustration of a universal law of organic nature. In every system of correlated parts in harmonious relation with one another by mutual dependence, the higher stands above and dominates the lower, but the lower underlies and conditions the higher. The spirit dominates the body, and more and more in proportion to the spiritual energy, but the body underlies and conditions the activity of the spirit. The same is true of all the organs of the body and the faculties of the mind in their relation to one another. The same is true of the factors of human evolution.

There is a resemblance and yet infinite difference between human progress and organic evolution. The resemblance almost amounting to identity in many respects, arising, of course, from the operations of the organic factors, has been pointed out by all recent writers, especially and with profuse illustrations and almost tedious insistence by Herbert Spencer. These, therefore, are probably already known to you. My object is now to bring into strong relief some of the differences, even contrasts produced wholly by the introduction of the new factor; differences which are usually ignored, or slurred over, or at least minimised by evolutionists, because modern science seems to think it must ignore the spiritual nature of man on pain of being thought unscientific.

See then some of these contrasts.

1. In organic evolution nature operates by necessary law without the co-operation of the thing evolving. In human progress the spirit of man voluntarily co-operates with nature in the work of its own evolution and even assumes to take the whole process mainly into its own hands. This new voluntary factor consists essentially in the formation and pursuit of ideals—the voluntary striving after higher and better things in the individual and in the race. We indeed form ideals, but our ideals react and form us. As are his ideals such is the man. Organic evolution operates by the law of force; human progress by the law of love.

2. In organic evolution the fittest are those most in harmony with the physical environment, and therefore they survive. In human progress the fittest are those in harmony with the ideal and often, especially in early stages when man is still under the dominion of the organic factors and the spiritual factor is still feeble, they do not survive because out of harmony with the social environment. But while the fittest individuals may indeed perish, the ideal survives in the race and will eventually triumph.

3. In organic evolution the sick, the helpless, the unfit in any way perishes and ought to perish, because this is the only way of strengthening the blood or physical nature of the species. In human progress the weak, the helpless, the sick, the unfit are sustained and ought to be sustained because sympathy, love and pity strengthens the spirit, the moral nature.

But remember, in this material world of ours and during this earthly life the spiritual and moral nature is conditioned on the physical nature, and therefore in all our attempts to help the weak we must be careful to avoid poisoning the blood and weakening the physical vigor. The gravest of social problems, viz.: How shall we obey the higher spiritual law of love and mutual help without weakening the blood of the race by inheritance and the spirit of the race by removing the necessity of self-help—this problem, I believe, can and will be solved by a rational education, physical, mental, and moral.

4. In organic evolution the bodily form and structure must continually change in order to keep in harmony with the ever changing environment. In human evolution or progress, on the contrary, and more and as civilisation advances, man modifies the environment so as to bring it in harmony with himself, and therefore there is no necessity for change of bodily form and structure or making of new species of man. Human evolution is not by modification of form—new species—but by modification of spirit—new planes of activity and higher character; and the spirit is modified and the character elevated, not by pressure of an external physical environment, but by the attractive force of an internal spiritual ideal.

5. The way of evolution toward the highest, i. e. from protozoön to man and from lowest man to the ideal man is a straight and narrow way and few there be that find it. In the case of organic evolution it is so straight and so narrow that any divergence therefrom is fatal to upward movement. Once leave the track, and it is impossible to get on it again. No living form of animal is to-day on its way man-ward or can by any possibility develop into man. They are all gone out of the way. There is none going right, no not one. The organic kingdom developing through all geological times may be likened to a tree whose trunk is deeply

buried in the lowest strata, whose great limbs were separated in the early geological times, whose secondary branches diverged later, and whose extreme twigs, but also its graceful leafage, its beautiful flowers and luscious fruits, are the fauna and flora of the present day. But this tree of evolution is an excurrent stem continuous through its clustering branches to the terminal shoot, man. Once leave this stem as a branch and it is easy enough growing in the direction chosen, but impossible to get back on to the straight upward way to the highest. In human evolution the same laws indeed hold, but with a difference. If the individual, or the race gets off from the straight and narrow way toward the highest,—the divine ideal,—it is hard to get on the track again. Hard I say, but not impossible. By virtue of self-activity through the use of reason and co-operation in the work of evolution, man alone, of all created things, is able to rectify an error of direction and return again to the deserted way.

6. We have spoken of several factors of organic evolution of different grades. Whenever a higher factor is introduced it immediately assumes control; previous factors sink into a subordinate position. But in human evolution the self determining rational factor when it comes in with the birth of the spirit of man, not only assumes control but transforms all other factors and uses them in a new way for its own higher purposes. It is evolution on another and a higher plane. It is another kind of evolution, determined by another and higher nature—the spiritual—though indeed still conditioned by the laws of organic evolution. As external and physical nature uses many factors to carry forward organic evolution, so the internal and spiritual nature characteristic of man alone uses these same factors on a higher plane and in a new way for human evolution or progress. Thus for example one organic factor—the environment—is modified or even totally changed, so as to effect suitably the human organism. This is Hygiene. Again, *use* and *disuse*, another factor, is similarly transformed. The various organs of the body and faculties of the mind are deliberately used in such manner and degree as to produce the highest efficiency of each part and the greatest beauty of the whole. This is education—physical, mental, and moral. Selective factors are similarly transformed and natural selection becomes rational selection. This, as we know, has been successfully applied to plants and to domestic animals. Why should it not be applied also to the improvement of our race by selection of our mates in marriage, of our rulers, our law-makers, our teachers. Alas, how little even yet does reason control our selection in these things! How largely are we yet under the control of the law of organic evolution!

7. Evolution as a law of the origin of organic

forms, is as certain and as universal as the law of gravitation. But the causes, the factors and the processes of evolution—the details of the manner in which evolution is carried out—these are still in the realm of discussion. Now in these latter times there has arisen a class of biologists including some of highest rank, who out-Darwin Darwin himself in the exaltation of the distinctive Darwinian factor—natural selection. They try to show that natural selection is the sole and sufficient cause of evolution—that changes in the individual, whether as the effect of the environment or by use and disuse of organs, are not inherited at all; that Lamarck was wholly wrong and Darwin was wholly right, or rather was wrong only in making any compromise at all with Lamarck.

I cannot at all accept this view, but shall not stop now to argue the question, partly because I have not time and partly because unsuitable for popular presentation. I wish only to point out some logical consequences in regard to human progress which seem to have escaped these Biologists—consequences which are, it seems to me, nothing less than a *reductio ad absurdum*.

In organic evolution when the struggle for life is fierce and pitiless, as it is now among the higher animals, natural selection is by far the most potent factor. It is conceivable though not probable, that at the present time organic evolution might be carried on wholly by this factor alone. But in human evolution, especially in civilised communities, this is impossible. If these biologists be right, then alas for all our hopes of race improvement. For natural selection will never be applied by man to himself, as it is by nature to organisms. His spiritual nature forbids. Reason may freely use the Lamarckian factors of environment and of use and disuse; but is debarred the unscrupulous use of natural selection as its only method. As this is an important point, I must explain.

All enlightened schemes of physical culture or hygiene, though directed primarily to secure the strength, the health, and the happiness of the *present generation*, yet are sustained and ennobled by the conviction that the improvement of the individual of each generation enters by inheritance into the gradual physical improvement of the race. All our schemes of education, intellectual and moral, though certainly intended mainly for the improvement of the individual, are glorified by the hope that the race also is thereby gradually elevated. It is true that these hopes are usually extravagant. It is true that the whole improvement of one generation is not carried forward by inheritance into the next. It is true, therefore, that we cannot by education raise a lower race up to the plane of a higher in a few generations, or

even in a few centuries. But there must be at least a small residuum carried forward from each generation to the next, which, accumulating from age to age, determines the slow evolution of the race. Are all these hopes baseless? They are so, if Weismann and Wallace are right. If it be true that reason must direct the course of evolution, and if it be also true, as these biologists assert, that selection of the fittest is the only method which can be used by reason, then the dreadful law of pitiless destruction of the weak and helpless must with Spartan firmness be voluntarily and deliberately carried out. Against such a course we instinctively revolt with horror because contrary to the law of the spiritual nature.

But the use by reason of the Lamarckian factors, as already shown, is not attended with any such revolting consequences. All our hopes of race improvement, therefore, are strictly conditioned on the efficacy of these factors, i. e. on the fact that useful changes in each generation are to some extent inherited and accumulated in the race.

Lastly we have said that the new factor introduced with man is a voluntary co-operation in the process of evolution, a striving toward a higher condition, a drawing forward and upward by the attractive force of ideals. Man, contrary to all else in nature, is transformed, not in shape by an external environment, but in character by his own ideals. Now this capacity, characteristic of man alone, of forming ideals and this conscious voluntary pursuit of such ideals, whence comes it? When analysed and reduced to its simplest terms, it is naught else than the consciousness in man of his close relation to the infinite and the attempt to realise the divine in human character.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAGIC.

BY L. J. VANCE.

[CONCLUDED.]

COMPARE the methods of expelling spirits cited in the last article, with the performances of the Thlinkeet doctor. "It is their business," says Mr. Wood, "to seize the soul with the mouth and breathe or force it back into the body. I only saw one Shaman exorcising and I do not believe he would have continued had he known I was observing him. He kneaded, pounded, yelled, chanted, frothed, swayed to and fro, played tunes, all up and down the suffering patient; blew in his mouth and nostrils and literally worried the life out of him. In general practice the Shaman continues till the wretched patient declares he is better." * Mr. Paul Beckwith, in his notes on the Dakotahs, says: "To impress upon the mind of the patient the divine nature of his medicines, the medicine-man adds to the efficacy of his remedies, myste-

rious incantations, contortions of feature and body, accompanied always by a drum, often placing upon the ground a paper or bark figure (note the connection between man and his image) and while the friends are holding the patient over it, shoots it with his gun." *

The same idea is brought out in Mr. Willoughby's account of the Indians of the Quinalt Agency, Washington Territory. "The me-satch-ies, or evil spirits, take possession of sick people and whom doctors are employed to drive out. With the loud beating of Indian drums and of sticks accompanied by their own voices and the contortions and guttural howls and wails of their doctors, they seek to drive out the unwelcome guest. The lips of the medicine-man are often applied to the body to draw out the evil spirit." †

This brings us to the point that we would be at. It is part and parcel of the doctor's magic to not only drive out the evil spirit, but to show the cause of the disease. How does he do that? Simply enough. The savage doctor sucks the spot, and then he takes out of his mouth a stick, stone, frog, lizard, or some other object. Thus, the Karoks of California have what they call a "barking doctor" (woman mostly). ‡ She first discovers the seat of the disease, sucks until the blood comes, then "takes an emetic and vomits up a frog, which she pretends comes from the patient." This form of magic is almost universal among savages.

There seems to be no end to the miraculous powers of the medicine-man. What the Incas allowed of their Shamans is true of every other semi-cultured race of people. According to the early Spanish historian, De Herrera, "The Incas allowed of one sort of them, who were said to take upon themselves whatsoever shape they pleased, to fly through the air, whither and as far as they pleased, to converse with the Devil. These men served instead of sooth sayers and fortune-tellers and to give account of what was done in remote parts before any news could be otherwise brought." §

Nor have the attributes of the medicine-men been exhausted. They are expert jugglers. They are clairvoyants, but they are sleight-of-hand performers of the first order. Doctor Stockwell says that, "all medicine-men of first rank are clairvoyants and psychologists (mesmerists if you like) of no mean pretensions, as a rule capable of affording instruction to the most able of their white confrères." The doctor goes on to say that "he has witnessed feats of legerdemain and necromancy that would appall a Houdin or a Heller executed in broad daylight, with mystic

* Smith. Rept., 1886, pt. 1, 246

† Ibid., p. 275.

‡ Smith. Rept., 1886, p. 235.

§ General Hist. of America, vol. 4, p. 353. (Translation, Ed. 1726.)

* Century Mag., July, 1882.

aids or surroundings." Thus, he mentions a performance in which guns, manifestly in perfect order failed to shoot in the hands of expert marksmen, merely through a look, a word or a bit of *incantation*; and yet again restored by a like process.*

Dr. Franz Boas, who spent considerable time among the Eskimos, was amazed at the feats of the *angakut*, or medicine-man. He gives an account of several wonderful performances. In one case, the *angakut* threw himself upon a harpoon "which penetrated his breast and came out at the back." Three men followed, holding the harpoon line; they led the *angakut*, bleeding profusely, to all the huts of the village. Then, he lay down on a bed, and was put to sleep by the *songs* of another *angakut*. "When he awoke after a while, he showed to the people that he was not hurt, although his clothing was torn and they had seen him bleeding." Many other feats, quite as wonderful, are recorded by Dr. Boas.†

2. Again, our idea of the magic power of songs and incantations is borne out by well-authenticated reports of the performances of medicine-men. Everywhere we see that the Shaman ekes out his magic by songs; everywhere we find the belief that much can be accomplished by singing. Dr. Boas says that "the *Angakuts* use a sacred language in their songs and incantations," and that many of the words have a symbolic meaning.‡

Francis La Flesche, a native Omaha, has recently described one of the most remarkable cures of a medicine-man that we have come across.§ The entire story is interesting, but space forbids more than one or two details. It appears that a boy had been accidentally shot through the head. At once the medicine-men of the tribe were called in. "The man who was first to try his charms and medicines on the patient began by telling in a loud voice how he became possessed of them; how in a vision he had seen the buffalo which had revealed to him the mysterious secrets of the medicine, and the *charm song* he was taught to sing when using the medicine." At the end of his story he started his song, and the other doctors sang in unison.

Mr. La Flesche continues: "This song is quite poetical to the Indian mind. It not only conveys a picture of the prairie, the round wallow with its gleaming water, and the buffalo drama, but it reveals the expectancy of the dreamer, and the bestowing of the power of the vision upon him for the benefit of sufferers." Sure enough, the boy got well, although an Army doctor, when he saw the practices of the Omaha

medicine-men, "shook his head, sighed, and made some queer little noises with his tongue, expressive of his feelings."

Extremely valuable in this connection, is the Navajo "Mountain Chant," set forth by Dr. Washington Matthews.* Here we have a ceremonial, lasting nine days, parts of which are intimately connected with the cure of disease.

It is not easy to give the explanation of the savage belief in the power of songs. Just how songs and incantations originated is not well understood. Perhaps the best explanation has been given by Mr. Howitt in his notes on "Songs and Songmakers" of some Australian tribes.† He says "it is a common belief that the songs, including all kinds of aboriginal poetry, are obtained by the bards from the spirits of the deceased." Thus, the Bira-ark of the Kurnai tribe "profess to receive their poetic inspiration from the ghosts" (Mrart), as well as the dances which they were supposed to have seen first in ghost-land. Just as in the Arabian Nights' story of the "Forty Thieves," the door opens only at the magic word—Sesame! so in *märchen* wonders are wrought by repeating set words or bits of rhyme.

3. As to charms, we have already seen how the idea of a kind of "luck" clings to this or that object. There are several reasons why certain things should be deemed magical or lucky. Usually any real or fancied resemblance of one object to another, any analogy based on form, color, etc., is enough to give that object a reputation for magical virtues. Thus, in New Zealand a stone in shape of a pig or of a yam was a most valuable find. Why? Because it made pigs multiply and yam plots fruitful. The Indian uses all sorts of stone or wooden figures as charms. In the Emmons collection from Alaska there are knives carved to represent the spirits possessed by the Shaman. One of these knives represents a crane, a mountain goat, a cuttle-fish, small spirits and a land otter.‡ "In dances," according to Lieut. Emmons, "the Shaman uses these knives to fight with an invisible opponent." Just as they hang up charms in the Pacific Islands to keep away thieves, so in South Africa the Basutos hang a kite's foot round the child's neck to give swiftness. The Kaffir is a perfect slave to charms, and Mr. Theall says that they "hardly ever undertake any matter of importance without using them."§

Mr. Lang regards the belief in luck as a relic of fetichism. He argues that "it is not at all impossible that the idea of a kind of luck, attached to this or that object, was evolved by a dint of meditating on a mere

* Pop. Science Monthly, Sept., 1886.

† Dr. Boas's account of "The Central Eskimo" (Sixth An. Rept. Ethnology) is worthy of careful study.

‡ P. 594.

§ Journ. American F. L., vol. 3, p. 217.

* Fifth An. Rept. Ethnology, pp. 385-467.

† Journ. Anth. Inst., vol. 16, p. 228.

‡ Journ. Am. Folk Lore, vol. 2, p. 217.

§ Kaffir Folk Lore, p. 205.

series of lucky accidents. Such or such a man, having found such an object, succeeded in hunting, fishing, or war." Many people will not wear an opal, simply because that stone is not considered lucky. Some wear amber beads to ward off erysipelas. The Neapolitans still wear amulets to avert the "evil eye."

It is time that educated people understood the natural history of magic. The magician is not an impostor, though he may be a juggler. Magic is not rooted in deceit, though it may have originated in bad reasoning. To the semi-cultured mind, any one kind of change is as magical as any other kind. The transformation of vibrating ether into the rainbow, of a blow into pain, of the printed page into visions of the beautiful, of the egg into the eagle, of the babe into the hero, of selfishness into love,—all these transformations are as magical to some people as the artificial formation of an icicle was to a certain Dutch king of Siam.

UNREST.

BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

Solemn is the night,
Sombre is the day,
Doubtful is the mood,
Lonely is the way,
Irksome is the task,
Doleful is the play.

Minutes only ours,
Thinking all too slow,
Acting as by chance,
Onward the years go!
Mirrored is the sky
In the lake below;

Mirrored, too, our lives
Even thus, I ween:
Impress of our touch
Shall be, and hath been,
Left on everything
Birth and death between.

Lips were silent when
Words had conquered fate;
Stagnant lay the mind,
Vision came too late.
Come, O Past, return!
What shall compensate?

Future—solemn thought—
Standeth there before;
Offers to us—what?
Opens it a door
Whence is seen the star,
Hope, forevermore?

Deep is the dark well
Of the years gone by,
Glimmers in its breast
All futurity;
Light of heaven illumines
Time's remotest sky.

TO THEODORE WELD, IN HIS 89th YEAR.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

Beneath the writing of the restless years,
Engraved on every heart lies undefiled
Life's earliest message to the wondering child;
Let the first lines be such as time endears.

Not all is dark if memory reverts
Some teacher born who made his wisdom mild;
Who sowed the seed but helped while April smiled
To harvest joy against the time of tears.

Such my good fortune, such the man I name;
One of the few by negro bondmen blest
That strove for freedom's sake and not for fame.

But he was nature's friend and chose the best,
As all the sunlight of his soul aflame,
His wealth of days our wealth of love attest.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE is a smell of sulphur in the air, and we hear in tones of ominous warning that Italy is putting on war-paint, dancing the ghost dance, and preparing to declare war against the United States. Simultaneously appears a catalogue of the Italian ships of war, their size, and strength, and armament, with columns of inexorable arithmetic showing the exact number of minutes it would require for a couple of them to destroy New York, Baltimore, or Boston. Then comes the expansion of the Italian power, blown into vastness by the trick of contrast, and windy lamentation for our own inferiority. Prophets of danger croak in sadness that our ships are few and feeble; and that in case of battle they would be useless either for fight or flight. Italy, they say, could strike us and defeat us before we could create a navy or build forts along the shore. All this looks like laying the foundation for a claim on Congress for additional millions to be wasted in the building of superabundant forts and ships. The chief defense of this nation is the moral strength of it, supported by its wealth, and the physical energies latent in its natural constitution, or held in reserve. This it is which makes the United States invincible, and practically invulnerable to-day. The security of this country rests upon its geographical position, and the ease with which its immense power could be made effective on short notice in case of actual war.

* * *

In reference to the Italian quarrel, it is freely said that should Italy declare war against us, the first advantage would be with her because of her navy and her preparation, but this, though plausible, is a short-sighted view of it. In modern times, nations before they enter upon war must look more to the end than to the beginning of it. To the final result, and not to a mere initial success, they must direct their strategy and their statesmanship. One nation can make war, but it requires two nations to make peace. In 1870, France declared sudden war against Prussia, and no doubt would have been glad to declare a sudden peace at any time after the battle of Wörth, but when it came to declaring peace, Prussia had something to say. Italy might, of course, declare sudden war against the United States, but at the end of it the treaty of peace would very likely be dictated by the United States, and not by Italy. Suppose the Italian fleet should pass the Narrows, and levy contribution upon the city of New York, is there a man in Italy foolish enough to believe that the United States would make peace until that ransom was paid back with usury? The knowledge of this by other nations is our guarantee of peace.

* * *

Another old castle has fallen down in England, after standing invincible for centuries against all the forces of civilised com-

mon sense. I refer to that ancient fortress of the law wherein was guarded the sacred superstition that a husband was the owner, the lord and master of his wife. A gentleman by the name of Jackson, who ought to have been at least a baron in the days of chivalry, left England for a time on business, while his wife remained behind with her mother and her sisters. On his return his wife told him that she would rather live with her own folks than with his folks, or with him, therefore she must decline the honor of his further acquaintance. Now, Mrs. Jackson was a valuable bit of property, for she had an income of her own amounting to \$3,000 a year. This was too precious to lose, and finding all persuasions useless, Mr. Jackson, after the feudal fashion, taking with him a band of his vassals and retainers, seized his wife as she was coming out of church at Clitheroe, and bearing her to his chariot, carried her off to his house at Blackburn, thirteen miles away. Here, figuratively speaking, he placed her in the donjon keep, lifted the drawbridge, manned the battlements with his archers, and prepared to stand a siege against all England. The sisters of Mrs. Jackson, with some retainers of their own, did besiege the stronghold for several days, without making any impression upon the fortifications, but at last a breach was made in the walls by means of an invention comparatively modern, a noiseless piece of artillery which no castle can withstand, the writ of *Habeas Corpus*. Strange as it may seem, conservative traditions were almost a match for that, and even came near defeating it, as we shall see.

* * *

It is to the advantage of muddy water that you cannot tell whether it is deep or shallow, and muddy minds often puzzle us in the same way. They pretend to be profound when they are only hazy and old. This was the mental condition of the Judges in the Jackson case, who having heard the evidence on the application for the writ of *Habeas Corpus*, denied the writ on the ground that Mr. Jackson was justified in his action, "because," remarked the Judge, "a husband has the right to the custody of his wife, and even to seize and detain her if necessary." Those judges had become so learned in the antediluvian precedents, their minds were so enveloped in the cobwebs of antiquity, that a modern idea seeking entrance there was caught and strangled in the attempt like a fly in a spider's net. The case being taken to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed, and the Lord Chancellor, in giving judgment, contemptuously overturned the legal fictions of centuries, saying "that it was with reluctance he could suppose that they had ever formed any part of the English law." He also declared that "no English subject had the right to imprison another whether she was his wife or not"; and therefore, said the Chancellor, "the lady must be restored to her freedom, and must be at complete liberty to choose her own place of residence." This is the most important decision affecting human liberty that has been rendered in England since the year 1782, when Lord Chief Justice Mansfield liberated the negro Somerset, on the ground that slavery was unknown to the English law, and that no slave could breathe the air of England.

* * *

While the Jackson case was agitating England, another trial of great importance was going on at the town of Maldon in that country. Three desperate malefactors were arraigned for felony before the Bench of magistrates. These delinquents were Clara Williams, aged twelve; Annie Williams, aged ten; and Lillie Messent, aged nine. It appeared from the evidence that the youngest criminal, Lillie Messent, aged nine, finding five sovereigns lying around loose in the house of her guardian, appropriated the money, and in company with her two accomplices Clara Williams, aged twelve, and Annie Williams aged ten, started off to paint the town red. The depravity of their taste was proved

by the testimony, for they indulged in candy to excess. This was to be expected, but what puzzled the "Bench" was that such desperadoes had the æsthetic ambition to buy books, pictures, pencils, pencil cases, and an unreasonable quantity of perfumery. It was also proven that the culprits were addicted to the reprehensible habit of "treating," for all the little girls at school were sticky with candy, and so saturated with perfumery that the school-room had an aroma like the fabulous bower of roses. Owing to the inefficiency of the police, the revelry of the criminals was not arrested until all the money had been spent with the exception of ten shillings. The crime being fully proved, the Bench was "impaled on the horns of a dilemma." To sentence babies to prison was an old-fashioned practice that might bring the magistrates into ridicule, and perhaps to punishment; while to discharge them would be an impeachment of the law. In this emergency they brought in the parents of the culprits and bound them over to bring the children up for judgment whenever called upon; and in this way they got rid of the prisoners and at the same time vindicated the law.

M. M. TRUMBULL

CORRESPONDENCE.

RELIGION AND THE INFINITE.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

I thank you for your article on my fourth Lecture. I quite agree with your objections, and when you see the whole of the lectures, you will find how carefully I guarded against this misapprehension. The Infinite is simply the highest generalisation for all that ever formed the object of religion. There is no wider term, it is wider even than Spencer's Unknowable, as I tried to show. But here as elsewhere we want a katharsis of language, otherwise we shall never have a new philosophy.

F. MAX MUELLER.

OXFORD, March 31, 1891.

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EMERSON FIFTY YEARS AGO.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

ON the last day of February, 1841, Emerson wrote thus to Carlyle, about what Matthew Arnold thought "the most important work done in prose during the present century": "In a fortnight or three weeks more, my little raft will be afloat. Expect nothing more of my powers of construction—no shipbuilding, no clipper, smack, nor skiff even, only boards and logs tied together." He meant the first volume of *Essays*, containing those on "Self-Reliance," "Compensation," and "The Over-Soul." His little book entitled "Nature" had appeared in September, 1836; most of the Addresses and Lectures, which were collected in 1849, into a volume of *Miscellanies*, had been delivered and published separately before 1842; his "Problem" had just been printed in the *Dial*; and he had done a large part of his best work in both prose and verse, for some of the earliest pieces written were among the last to be given to the world. Thus he stood fifty years ago, at his full height of thought.

He was already widely known for the work of which he speaks thus in the *Essays*, "I unsettle all things. No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at my back." On the first page of *Nature* stand these words: "Our age is retrospective. . . . Let us demand our own works and laws and worship." In one of his earliest lectures, he said, "Every church, even the purest, speedily becomes old and dead. . . . Only a new church is alive." His address in Divinity Hall and his essay on "Self Reliance" protested against a religion of traditional beliefs and rites; exaggeration of the merits of ancient personages, and conformity to "usages that have become dead." It was because this seemed to be the case with the communion service, that he had himself left the pulpit; and he said in his great book, "As men's prayers are a disease of the will, so are their creeds a disease of the intellect." All his reverence for Jesus did not prevent his insisting that "The soul needs no persons," and that religious truth "cannot be received at second hand." Such sayings seem to be harmless truisms now, but they were terrible innovations fifty years ago. Even Unitarians were furious against the heretic; but

he went on his way serenely, until the Church caught up with him. No opposition prevented his insisting that not only religious but political institutions were too often held sacred merely because they had come down from the past; and he did a timely service to art and literature by declaring that their culture in America was too timid and too submissive to classic and European models. We may date the birth of a really American literature from the time when Emerson said that it must be the daughter of liberty.

His best work, I think, was in making the old intolerant form of religion, which hated new ideas, forbade amusements, resisted philanthropy, and neglected moral duty, give place to one full of good works, friendly to reform, helpful to social pleasure, and hospitable towards new truth. Our popular religion has become philanthropic instead of intolerant, because it has caught new inspiration from Emerson, Parker, and other prophets of the Inner Light.

It was because he was a prophet that Emerson was an iconoclast. He denied in order to affirm. To know what he affirmed, we have only to read *Nature*, the address at Divinity Hall, or the essay on "The Over-Soul." These and other pages written at least fifty years ago are bright and beautiful with words which no one else could write. "The need was never greater of new revelation than now." "Religion is yet to be settled on its fast foundations in the breast of man." "Here is the fountain of action and thought." "From within or from behind, a light shines through us upon things, and makes us aware that we are nothing, but the light is all." "O, my brothers, God exists! There is a soul at the centre of nature, and over the will of every man; so that none of us can wrong the universe." "The league between virtue and nature engages all things to assume a hostile front to vice." "All things are moral. . . . Therefore is nature glorious with form, color, and motion, that every globe in the remote heavens; . . . every change of vegetation, from the first principle of growth in the eye of a leaf, to the tropical forest and antediluvian coal mine; every animal function from the sponge up to Hercules, shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong, and echo the ten commandments." "The world is nothing, the man is all: in yourself is the law of all nature." "In self-trust all the virtues

are comprehended." "Every man . . . knows that to his involuntary perceptions a perfect faith is due." (The passages abridged are from *Miscellanies*, p. 38, and *Essays I*, p. 57.)

These principles have transfigured religion, and made her pure and precious as she never was before. They have given us an original literature, full of life and strength, and taught our colleges the duty of encouraging independent thought. At the darkest time in all our national history, when the authority of the Constitution and the Supreme Court, of both political parties, of all the great sects, and of the Bible itself, was appealed to in defence of slavery, then Emerson brought deliverance by announcing the superior authority of the Higher Law. It was the philanthropy of Transcendentalism, not that of Science nor of the Church, which freed the slaves. The Suffragists, too, have relied mainly upon intuitional conceptions of natural rights. Neither of these reforms was much aided by Emerson until after 1841, but even then, he made a suggestion which has not yet been adopted as completely as it should be in our schools. In his lecture on "Man the Reformer," he urges "the claims of manual labor as a part of the education of every young man," and adds "We must have a basis for our higher accomplishments, our delicate entertainments of poetry and philosophy; in the work of our hands"; "not only health but education is in the work"; "Manual labor is the study of the external world."

Emerson's life was as beautiful as his thought; no one else was so highly honored in the village where he dwelt; and my own reverence has made me slow to criticise. But we must remember that Theodore Parker, while preaching essentially the same philosophy as his friend, and declaring that there were "None who work so powerfully to fashion the character of the coming age," admitted the "actual and obvious contradictions in his works," which, he added, "do not betray any exact scholarship." "We sincerely lament," said Parker in the *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*, "the want of logic in his method, and his exaggeration of the intuitive powers." "Some of his followers . . . will be more faithful than he to the false principle which he lays down and will think themselves wise because they do not study, . . . and inspired because they say what outrages common sense." The brief popularity of Fourierism was greatly aided by Emerson's saying, in the famous *Essays* of 1841, "No man need be perplexed in his speculations. Let him do and say what strictly belongs to him, . . . though very ignorant of books." "Trust the instinct to the end, though you can render no reason. . . . It shall ripen into truth." "We know truth when we see it." His highest authority was what he called the Reason, a purely intuitive power which, as he admitted,

"never reasons, never proves." Parker complains that he "discourages hard and continuous thought." He opened the door for abolitionism, but it has also let in socialism, anarchism, spiritualism, mind healing and free coinage. Brownson stated, soon after his renunciation of Transcendentalism in 1844, that some English adherents of that philosophy were trying to introduce the practice of free love, and that, sternly as Emerson and his friends denounced such a perversion of their system, "They cannot avoid this conclusion." He appeals to such passages as "The only right is what is after my own constitution; the only wrong what is against it." "Our moral nature is vitiated by any interference of our will." "Our spontaneous action is always the best." "If the single man plant himself indomitably on his instincts and there abide, the huge world will come round to him."

We need not say with Brownson, that free love is "Transcendentalism in full bloom," or that it is the legitimate conclusion from Emerson's philosophy; for that is so wide and vague as to make no practical conclusion more legitimate than any other. Emerson was neither more nor less consistent, when he came out plainly as an abolitionist in 1844, than when he yielded so far to his introspective tendencies as to declare in 1841, "If I am just, then there is no slavery, let the laws say what they will." "Give the slave the least elevation of religious sentiment, and he is no slave." Zeal for reform could scarcely be expected of an optimist who thought

"That night or day, that love or crime,
Leads all souls to the Good";

but philanthropy finally took the lead in his philosophy. Such were the fruits of the reaction from being guided badly by old Mother Church, into trying to dispense with all guidance or restraint, except that furnished from within. Fifty years more have shown, not only that men still need guidance, but also that the true guide to duty is Science. Her value is much plainer now than when he first wrote; and if her method is sufficient, his is outgrown. The spring in which he died was unusually backward; and his favorite flower delayed so long to bloom as to call forth these lines:

Why did the Rhodora blossom so late,
And the Spring keep back her flowers?
Did the May-day know of her poet's fate,
And was Nature's grief like ours?
He came in a time of gloom and need,
As a prophet of joyful May;
And he bade New England's wintry creed
To a sunnier faith give way.
His words were a flood of life and light
Which has burst that icy chain,
And awaked a glory of blossoms bright
With a promise of golden grain.
The summer of thought draws near,
Bringing truth hitherto unknown;
But the herald of spring is dear;
And the might of his work we own.

CHILDREN AS TEACHERS.

BY E. A. KIRKPATRICK.

From olden times, it has been thought that adults should be the teachers and children simply learners, but in this Nineteenth Century of civilisation, the greatest find that they can learn from the little ones. The best educators are those who have learned most from little children and the most successful primary teachers are those who can see and feel things as children see and feel them. Authors of literature and text-books for children must now know child nature or fail. Scientific philologists are beginning to recognise the fact that children just learning to talk can teach them more about how languages are formed than can be learned by years of patient study of dead and living languages. Even the philosopher and psychologist are turning to the child for the solution of some of the problems that have so long baffled them, and the practical moralist turns from theories to learn of children how moral ideas are formed and moral action called forth. While Carus Sterne has shown that they exercise a direct influence on their parents.

The development of the race is epitomised in the development of the child, and the observer may read it in the unfolding psychical activity of the innocent child with more pleasure and profit than in the learned histories of civilisation.

Tiederman, Darwin, Taine, Alcott, Romanes, and other learned men have studied their own children scientifically, and taken notes on their development, while Perez, Kussmaul, and others have made observations on a number of children. Humphreys, Holden, and Noble have collected and examined the vocabularies of several children two years old, in order to discover the general laws of speech. Emily Talbot has collected observations of mothers on young babes. The most thorough and accurate study has, however, been made by Preyer, who carefully observed and experimented upon his boy during the first three years of his life, noting down each day everything calculated to throw light upon the capacity of children and the order of the development of their powers. Much light has been thrown on many subjects by these investigations, but a sufficient number of carefully verified facts has not yet been collected to enable us with certainty to distinguish characteristics common to all from individual peculiarities. It has been made evident that not only must there be persevering exactness in observing and recording the facts, but that many of them can be accurately observed and correctly interpreted only by one versed in physiology and psychology.

Considerable interest has been aroused and many plans proposed designed to increase scientific knowl-

edge on the subject, to bring parents into new and pleasanter relations with each other and to preserve records of interest and value to the family. Probably no more acceptable or more valuable present could be given a child who has just attained his majority than a little book containing a record of his life from babyhood. The data contained in such a record would make it possible for him to obey the maxim, "Know thyself," and to guide himself by that knowledge, while the little incidents of childish life that give so much pleasure when remembered and related by the parents would be preserved and enjoyed by himself and his descendants.

It will probably be years before the observations of many scientists on children can be collected, but, in the meantime, a father, mother, or older sister of ordinary intelligence can by exercising patience and care observe and record certain facts of child development that will be as important and reliable as those furnished by the most learned scientist. These observations, also, are those made at the most interesting age of the child's life,—the period of the development of speech. With a little care the mother can easily record the development of language in her cunning little prattler,—an evolution as remarkable and full of interest as that traced by the philologist in the languages of the various races in different ages, and throwing as much light on the origin of speech in man and the laws of its development.

The one who will carefully make out a list of all the words now used by a child, and then carefully note down new words as they are learned, will secure facts of prime importance in the further development of psychology and pedagogy. The more scientific student may be enabled to suggest still more fruitful lines and valuable methods of investigation in infant psychology.

There are two principal things to notice in such a study. (1) the development of the power of articulating and (2) the development of the intellect; hence it is necessary to keep two lists of words, one containing all words articulated by the child with indications as to how they are pronounced, and the other all words used understandingly, those used only in direct imitation, only at sight of pictures in a book, or only from memory, as in nursery rhymes, being omitted from this list. The first list would indicate the common difficulties encountered in learning to articulate, and an examination of a sufficient number would make it possible to determine whether there really are any general laws of mispronunciation such as have been proposed. The second list would indicate the intellectual progress of the child as it learns new words and learns to use old ones with increasing accuracy and to put them together into phrases and sen-

tences. Words that are invented by the child and those used in a sense different from the ordinary meaning are especially interesting and throw considerable light on the subject of how children classify and generalise. A child who saw and heard a duck on the water called it "quack," and this word being thus associated with the bird, and with the liquid upon which it rested, he therefore called all birds and all liquids "quack," and later seeing the eagle on a coin he called that and other coins "quack." The observing mother will note many similar peculiar yet natural uses of words by her little one who is getting acquainted with this complex world of ours and learning the strange language of its inhabitants.

After the child's present vocabulary has been obtained as accurately as possible, its further progress can easily be recorded by noting down, in alphabetical order, the words learned in each succeeding month. On the backs of the sheets containing the vocabulary for each month may be given the peculiar meanings attached to words, the earlier attempts at putting words together, the later sentences of interest, especially those showing the characteristic grammatical errors, and any other items of interest. Such lists of words kept from the time a child begins to talk until he is three years of age could not fail to give interesting and more or less important results, and a comparison of a number of vocabularies of children under three years of age, such as could be obtained by a few months of observation, would have a similar value. How much do the vocabularies of children in cities differ from those in the country or in villages? What is the effect on the vocabulary of associating with other children of nearly the same age? What difference does ease or difficulty of pronunciation have upon the adoption of words into the vocabulary, and what is the effect of special teaching by parents? These are a few of the many interesting questions that might be answered by such vocabularies, accompanied by the necessary information. Notwithstanding these various influences, many of the same words would probably be found in all of the vocabularies. I found 64 words used in common by four little girls two years of age. Besides the facts suggested above, the age and sex of the child, and the nationality of the parents should be sent with the record.

It is to be hoped that such observations by parents of children who are just learning to talk will soon become common. If those who have begun or will begin such observations will send me the record for several months, with any comments or suggestions they see fit, I shall be pleased to compare the records and make the results public.

Those who intelligently and sympathetically study

the intellectual and emotional development of the child from day to day will find it more interesting than any continued story, and will gain more knowledge of human nature than by reading the most vivid character delineations.

Worcester, Mass.

OUR FUTURE POLITY.

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

THE article by Louis Belrose, Jr., in the *Open Court* of April 2d, on "Comte's Gospel of Wealth," introduces a topic which should have immediate and general consideration. The question is whether the Industrial Feudal System of the Monopolists shall replace Our Republic and the republican institutions of our fathers, while the Roman Catholic church system takes charge of the religious, social and general interests of the people, under the rising oligarchies of the future. This was substantially the Polity which Comte projected, and it is the one now rapidly taking form, as is clearly pointed out in the able article referred to. The question is, Will it be final? Shall we have a repetition of the Catholic Regime and the Feudal System of the Middle Ages upon an industrial scientific and higher plane? Comte thought there was no escape from it. As soon as war in the progress of Civilisation was replaced by industry and *Capital*, the Capitalist and the Captain of industry merely replaced the Soldier and the Baron of the former system. The Republic of equals, of well-to-do people, the Republic of Washington, Jefferson, and Jackson, gradually vanished. There is no civilisation of industry without CAPITAL, those who own and control that control all. The census, and the articles of Thomas G. Shearman on our growing Plutocracy and the nascent Billionaire, give the true readings of the signs of the times. Gradually the conditions of the life of the many are passing into the hands of the few.

In a similar way the rapid growth of the Roman Catholic Regime in the world of religion and social affairs is equally manifest. It is amusing to notice how that Church assures the millionaire that he is "God's steward" and will get safe into heaven through the "eye of the needle," if he will only submit to and pay the Church; then to the poor she is always the "Mother," Friend and Protector. Thus she holds both Plutocrat and Slave in her control as parts of the dispensation which keeps her as a necessity, and enables her to claim mediation between the two while using both. Without them her occupation would be gone. Comte, therefore consistently prophesied and re-instated the Catholic Regime upon laws and dogmas of science, when the theological dogmas should become no longer credible, as an inevitable necessity of the new Feudal System. As Dr. Congreve teaches,

we are to have Positivism, i. e. CATHOLICISM, *minus* theology and *plus* science.

It is now about a quarter of a century since this Comtean Polity came over the Atlantic as the alleged outcome of the positive science and religion of mankind. Many of the open minds and hearts of the more aspiring students of sociology in America, and especially in New York, gave this new Gospel a thoughtful consideration. There was felt to be much of the highest value in Comte's Positive Philosophy, and much in his conception of a human religion, but this Polity was the stumbling-block over which there was no passing for many of us. We could see how the Philosophy and Religion could be revised and brought up to date truly and usefully. Under the influence of Mr. D. G. Croly, then editor of the *New York World*, and Mr. Courtlandt Palmer, founder afterwards of the Nineteenth Century Club, both of whom have now gone over to the majority. Some of us attempted a Statement or Epitome of Positive Philosophy and Religion, of which a copy now lies before me, a sort of mile-stone in the history of our evolution. The point that makes it relevant to the present discussion is that it regards Comte's Polity of Aristocracy and Catholicism as a necessary but only a *temporary* phase of progress, and distinctly avows that the Utopia of the Future will be finally a re-integration of Plutocracy and Catholicism into some form of "Socialism"—a Republic of social industrialism, just as far removed from Comte's notion of an industrial Feudal System, as our Political Republic is, or rather *was*, removed from the castles and robbers of the Middle Ages. Just as the old Feudal System finally consolidated and ended in the modern royal dynasties of Europe; France, England, Germany, etc., so surely the Industrial Feudal System of Monopolies can only end in their consolidation. Condensed capital, machinery and intelligence are seen to be irresistible. Will they ultimately and forever be controlled by a few Captains of Industry under the *moral* influence of a Catholic church? The Frenchman, Comte, said Yes, but his American students have never been able to agree to that answer. The result was that Positivism, or Constructive Liberalism, received a check in its hopeful progress from which it has never recovered, either in Europe or America. Herbert Spencer, then chiefly through the efforts of Prof. E. L. Youmans and the Appletons as publishers, took the lead of Liberal Thought, and held it against Comte's Catholicism, as he now holds it against Carl Marx's Socialism.

But the question constantly recurs, What is our future Polity to be? Mr. Spencer gives us agnostic Philosophy with frightful verbosity. But his religion, morality and, above all, polity—where and what are they? It is plain enough that these four factors of

the future must be settled together as parts of one mighty whole. Until we know to what port we are sailing—in a word, what is to be our future Polity—we are simply drifting without chart or compass. Nor if we, some of us, at least, have a pretty deep conviction as to the general nature of that polity, can we embark in ships plainly sailing under Comte's influence to a mirage of the Middle Ages, or under Spencer's to Monopolistic Feudality or Anarchy?

Is not the true line of evolution that which leads us to the supremacy of THE PEOPLE over the conditions of their comfort, welfare and civilization? A Feudal System or a Monarchy cannot be made tolerable to the American People by any church or "spiritual power." But as pointed out by Mr. Belrose what else can we expect? We answer the continuance of our Republic, saved by gradually passing to the people the monopolistic powers that of old went to Lords and Kings, but which can never go to them again, or to corporations or a Plutocracy, in substance their successors.

If Sociology is a science, merely drifting without regard to our future is blind and wicked folly. For that future our religious, political, social and moral life is a preparation, or life has no end or object at all.

If the solution we have intimated is not correct, let him answer better who can.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THIS Italian question reminds me of the "foreign subject" imposture, as it was practised in this country during the war. When the draft was ordered, regiments of patriots who for years had been conspicuous as hustlers and knockdowners at the polls, marched gallantly up to the office of the Provost Marshal, and claimed exemption on the plea that they were "foreign subjects" of all sorts of emperors, kings, and queens. They owed allegiance to every flag under the sun, excepting the American flag, and they "demanded" that their names be stricken from the lists. Public spirited fellows long eminent for skill in that branch of civil engineering which directs caucus machinery swarmed at the consulates clamoring for safety. In comic paradox appeared Hungarians invoking the aid of Austria, Poles appealing to Russia, and fierce Fenians demanding the protection of the British flag. What is more wonderful still, they got it. The consuls knew that the United States could not afford to quarrel with other nations then, and with an air of imperious dictation they required that those "foreign subjects" be released from liability to service in the army. Some of those very same non-combatants went back to the old country, and when arrested for political offenses there, declared themselves to be citizens of the United States, claiming the protection of the American flag; and what is most wonderful of all, got it.

A new sect, or combination of sects, has appeared in England. It seems to be a rival of the Salvation Army, and is called the "Gospel Messengers." The officers, while having rank and grades like those of the Salvation Army, are known by other titles, having at least the merit of originality. The nicknames of honor which have amused our vanity so long, are thread-bare, and the Gospel Messengers deserve praise for inventing another set. The officers of this new propaganda are Comets, Planets, and Stars, correspond-

ing as nearly as may be to Colonels, Majors, and Captains. Inferior to these are First Lights, and Second Lights, answering to First and Second Lieutenants, while below these again are a sort of Cadets, who are known as Coming Lights. There are no privates in this army to dilute its quality; the lowest grade in it being that of Coming Light, a great improvement on some other armies I have known. Their temple of worship is called a "Haven," which by the way, is more of a naval than a military term, and for musical torture they have a banjo and brass whistle, something more harrowing to the souls of sinners than even the tambourine and drum. Although but recently formed the new sect already has its martyrs, the chief of them being John Routledge, a Sergeant of Police in London, who has been dismissed from the force because he had become a Comet, as erratic, though not so bright; the excuse of his persecutors being that Comet Routledge was neglecting his duty as a policeman to blaze as a meteor in the gospel sky. Several years ago I was travelling down the Mississippi River in company with a gentleman who had seen much of the world, and as we passed Nauvoo he took off his hat and saluted the Mormon temple. I asked him why he did so, and he answered: "I salute every old religion,—and every new one," and in that spirit I suppose we may welcome the "Gospel Messengers."

The doctrine of international reciprocity has extended beyond the boundaries of commerce into the domain of ethics and religion. For many years England has been sending missionaries to convert the heathen in foreign parts; and now the heathen, in the gentle spirit of reciprocity, is returning the favor by sending missionaries to convert the Christians in England. The Nizam of Hyderabad, moved with pity for the benighted condition of the English people, and piously believing that their poverty and sins are due to Christian practices, has sent missionaries to convert them to the religion of Mahomet. He has done this at his own personal expense, and without taking up any collection. The report is made, although there is no harm in doubting it, that those missionaries are having greater success in England, than the English missionaries ever had in Asia or in Africa. The head of the movement is an English lawyer named Quilliam, who was converted to Islamism several years ago. While Mr. Quilliam directs the missionaries where to plant the standard of the Crescent, the Nizam furnishes the funds. Sooner or later it must have come to this. The English could not for ever go on exporting their own religion to Hyderabad without importing some of the religion of that country in return. The principle of reciprocity required this to preserve the balance of trade, which in religion at least, had been for a hundred years largely in favor of England. She had exported so much religion to foreign parts that very little was left for home consumption; and this movement of the Nizam will restore the equilibrium. Should he succeed in improving the manners and condition of the English people, the Nizam will find a good field of operations for a few missionaries right here in the city of Chicago. If he could spare them now, and convert us in time for the World's Fair it would be so much the better.

I give a welcome hail to the new nation just born in the South seas, "The Commonwealth of Australia." In extent of territory it is greater than the United States of America, and it contains more people than the United States had when Washington was elected President. While nominally, for the present, a part of the British empire, because it prefers to be so, it is essentially an independent republic. In blood and spirit, in laws, language, religion, history, and traditions, it is another England, founded by the descendants of those energetic tribes the Angles, Jutes, and Saxons, that strange confederation, prophecy of the United States, which in the woods and marshes between the Weser and the Baltic sea proved unconquerable by either Gauls or Romans; a restless race

who passing over to Britain in boats not much better than canoes, conquered that island, abolished its language, and changed the very name of it to Angleland. Overflowing that country, some of their posterity crossed the Atlantic, colonised North America, and created the political communities known as the United States and Canada, while another portion of them, a curious mixture of exiles and voluntary emigrants, occupied the great continent in the Southern Hemisphere, and as a sign of their latest conquest, proclaim the new nation "The Commonwealth of Australia." The Constitution is said to be modelled partly on that of the United States, and partly on that of Canada. No matter, constitutions grow; even the Constitution of the United States, with all its conservative precautions against its own amendment, has been amended fifteen times in the space of a hundred years, and the Constitution of Australia will be changed as often to meet the requirements of new conditions and the demands of human progress.

Like a journey through a famous land, or a voyage up a mighty river, to the philosophical student is the charm of traveling by the aid of history up the devious pathway of an ancient people to contemplate the landmarks of their glory. Still greater is the pleasure of anticipating the achievements of a new nation for the coming thousand years. There are wise persons in Chicago, I see their advertisements in the papers, who can tell our fortunes, good or evil, for a dollar. They do it by a knowledge of the planets, but who shall cast the horoscope of a nation? What system of astrology can do that? This prescience is not given even to the genius of the stars. Yet we would like to lift the veil that hides the future, and see the noonday of Australia. We can speak for the present at least, and say that the young commonwealth starts with a bodily and mental constitution healthy and strong; and with some advantages which no other nation has had. She has all the experience of the older nations, with only a limited share of the consequences resulting from their vices, their misfortunes, and their trials. Her people will be homogeneous, and the race question will not vex them. There will be no "Negro Problem" in that new country to divide the citizens and perplex their politics. Australia is too remote for war with any of the older nations, and will save the cost of armies. Not having to study the politics of war her mental powers can be employed in moral statesmanship, and in learning the ethics of law. Her penal code will be merciful, for in her time of anger Australia will remember that among the founders of her greatness were men whose fathers had been transported in chains from England, many of them for misfortunes which the law called crimes. If Australia has borrowed some parts of the American constitution it is only a fair exchange, because many of the states of the American Union have borrowed the election law of Australia, and all of them must do so if the will of the people is to be fairly recorded and loyally obeyed. Out of her education will come Shakespeares and Schillers, Newtons and Franklins, poets, philosophers, statesmen, inventors, greater perhaps than any the old world has yet made in its weary evolution of man. Her territorial sway will be imperial for the natural resources of Australia are greater than those of any other nation, save the United States alone; and perhaps they will be found equal to these when the explorations are all done. Advance, Australia!

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

LAW AND THE FREEDOM OF WILL.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :

WHEN I illustrated man's relation to the universe by the hands of a clock, the regulator was included as a part of the works which move the hands rhythmically. Man is like the hands of a clock because he is subject to the laws of his organisation. As he

is organised so must he express himself, and that is why men differ one from another. They are different instruments with but one performer. Because we can carry out some things that we wish, that does not prove that we are free; it only shows that we have no opposing environment. Because the hands of the clock meet with no obstacles it does not prove that they are free; they are subject to the mechanism which the clock-maker combined to move them. So man, in all that he does, is subject to the mechanism of the combination which was combined by the great clock-maker of us all. The clock did not make itself, neither did man make himself. A clock that is not properly balanced needs a regulator. It is the same with man. Being vicious by nature, and vicious in degree, his regulators are his opposing environments—the laws of church and state. If a clock is properly balanced and needs no regulator, the hands are not free but still are forced to move by perfect works. It is so with man: If he acts morally without an opposing environment he so acts because he has an organism that forces such an expression. Such an one will be repelled by an immoral environment and an immorally organised man will be repelled by a moral surrounding.

I accept the definition, that "determinism teaches that willing is determined by law" and that is why I declare the will is not free. When I use the term law I mean cause. There are two things, therefore, law and will. Man cannot will without a cause. He wills to remain where there is attraction and he wills to leave where there is repulsion; and the attractive and repulsive forms of matter have to be there as a part of the combination of his actions, or he would not will one way or the other; he would be like the governor when not belted and pulled to the crank-shaft. I must take ground against the statement that "Nature is not the slave of law." "Nature acts in a certain definite way," because it is forced to act that way. I make this statement from the standpoint of reason. Nature cannot make a planet revolve both ways at once, nor travel both ways in its orbit at the same time. A man is a slave when he must work at his master's bidding; so Nature is a slave when it must work at the bidding of its master, the impossible. The magnet *must* point to the north because it is conditioned to point that way. Demagnetize the metal and Nature can't make it point toward the north.

I cannot accept the term "man's own will," because that would destroy monism. Man does not possess anything that is his own. All that he has Nature has loaned him, and makes him pay it back. His will is not his own any more than the governor is the engine's. Monism cannot contemplate man as independent of Natural Law, nor can the thing formed resist the combination of the former; it *must act as it is conditioned*; there is no miracle in Nature. A man free from natural law would be a miracle. Herein is man cleared from the charge of rebellion against his maker, and that justification comes from science, not religion.

I perfectly understand your definition of freewill: When a man acts without any obstacle in his environment—when he carries out his desire—you say he is free and is not under law. Here is where I beg to differ, because he, like the hands of the clock, is subject to the works which Nature endowed him with, the same as the hands of the clock are subject to the works which the clock-maker endowed it with. You give no credit for the natural causes within man which force him to express himself as he does. In the order of evolution man cannot react back upon the Power that evolves him step by step. Herein is hope and comfort for all mankind. Religion has taught that folly, but it is the function of science to stamp it out. Professor Clifford is no credential for proof. Men speak as they are organized. The credential to an assertion must come from Nature, and as there is no effect in Nature without a cause, man cannot act free from natural law. The prime cause of his every action is where the balance of Power is—either in the organism or in the environment. JOHN MADDOCK.

[I have to protest against Mr. Maddock's presentation of my view, that "when a man acts without any obstacle in his environment, . . . he is not under law." Man's actions are always according to law. I accept Determinism unreservedly.

[I object to Mr. Maddock's expressions that a man who acts as he wills is a slave of law, that man is subject to the laws of his organisation, that as he is organised so he must express himself, and that nature is a slave of law. All these expressions contain the dualism of law and reality. As a man is organised *so he is*. What is man aside from his organisation? Nature acts in a definite way, and a man of a certain character (being a part of nature) acts also in a definite way. There is no law imposed upon nature; law (i. e. uniformity) is a feature of nature.

[Mr. Maddock says "that when I use the term law I mean cause." I do not use "law" and "cause" as synonyms; law being a uniformity of nature, and cause some motion that produces a change.

[I have repeatedly called attention to the error that lies hidden in the expression "laws govern"; the laws of nature are not ukases imposed upon nature. Objectively considered, they are uniformities of nature, and subjectively considered, i. e. regarded as generalised statements formulated by science, they do not govern, they *describe*.

[If I speak of "man's own will," I do not mean to attribute to man any independence of nature. "Man's own will" is a term describing nature's action as it takes place in man. The power that produced man is not outside of man as a clock-maker is outside of the clock; it is in him and he is a part of it.—ED.]

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I am interested in the freewill discussion, and in a conversation with Mr. Maddock, I found out that he by no means considers that his position cannot be moved. I think, however, that we can come to an understanding on this matter if we will only agree on a statement of the question.

Mr. Maddock, in our conversation, took for illustration a hungry man and a dinner. He says that I must eat my dinner because of the laws which control my organisation and that I cannot will otherwise, therefore my will is not free. I think Mr. Maddock must agree that the will comes with the organisation condition and did not exist until it did. The will and the organisation condition are one. For instance, special conditions of reality bring about a special organisation (in this case man), and with this special organisation comes special organisation conditions; but those organisation conditions are not entities in themselves; the organisation and the condition are one. Take away either and neither remains. It cannot be said one is the slave of the other, for they are one. There is no more duality than there is between the two sides of the curved line, although one side is concave and the other side is convex.

So with organisation conditions comes will. The organisation conditions are not laws controlling a will which is something separate. Mr. Maddock may say "I want you to will that you are not hungry, but you are hungry and you cannot will; that you are not." Yes, I am hungry, (this is the way I symbolise my organisation condition) and he asks me to not only change my will but my organisation with its conditions; then he says "If you cannot, you are not free." How can I be and still not be?

The special conditions of all reality that brought about my special organisation with its conditions exist no longer—they are me, so they do not control me. Of course, I am a part of all reality and cannot be exempt from all reality condition. I and reality with its condition are one, however.

Thus we see that all specials are reduced to generals, and those generals are generalised until they reach the one complete

generalisation. The trouble is that although we claim to be monists we are not. Reality and the order of reality are one. Law is a symbolical expression of this observed order.

LEROY BERRIER.

Minneapolis, Minn.

BOOK NOTICES.

The Mystery of New Orleans. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company.) This is a novel by Dr. Wm. H. Holcombe of New Orleans. The plot is unessential. The idea is "to illustrate the new discoveries in physio-psychology . . . ; to throw a little helpful light upon the race-problem; and to cultivate friendly sentiments between the North and South." Something is also said about vivisection, in strong condemnation of it. The author's chief conceptions are based on the results of scientific research in the domain of psychological science. That is they are ostensibly based on these results. But we know of no scientific investigations which support Dr. Holcombe in the mystical extension he has made of his data. In fact, all theories of "psychic ethers," "reflection of thought by mental mirrors," etc., etc., which make thought a substance, and moreover *any kind of a substance to suit the purpose*, do not need the support of the investigations of science. Not being based on facts they can be established just as well and just as solidly without facts. Only their solidity is limited, in this case, to their metaphorical character. For the rest, they are merely ideas mistakenly applied to provinces where they do not belong.

We have received the new catalogue and prospectus of the Princeton Preparatory School at Princeton, N. J. The curriculum of this institution, which is under the competent and wise administration of Mr. John B. Fine, Head-Master and Instructor in Latin and Mathematics, extends over a period of four years, and embraces a number of courses of thorough instruction in the English Branches, the Classics, Mathematics, Science, History, and the Modern Languages. The extension of the courses in science and mathematics, usually very meagrely represented in preparatory schools, is to be much commended.

The Upper Ten. A Novel of the Snobocracy. By W. H. Ballou. (New York: United States Book Company.) This is a short and entertaining novel, "of a new type of fiction," as the author says—namely the submarine type. It partakes of its type—is watery in some parts and sparkles in others with a deep-sea, cerulean-green wit. Some happy satirical hits are made at the society of the American metropolis, and the volume (paper-bound) is interspersed with some very pretty verses.

We have received from the Rough Notes Publishing Co. of Indianapolis their last annual *Digest of Insurance Cases* (brought down to Nov. 1, 1890). This publication is compiled by Mr. John A. Finch and epitomises, professedly, all the decisions of the courts relative to insurance cases and all the leading articles written on this vast subject. The present volume contains digests of three hundred and seventy-one cases.

NOTES.

Mr. Wakeman has presented the Brooklyn Ethical Association with an excellent contribution to their Evolution Series. It is his lecture on Ernst Haeckel, which tells us of Haeckel's life and work. The pamphlet contains as a frontispiece a neatly reproduced picture of Haeckel. Mr. Wakeman concludes his lecture in the following words: "When the old religions fall, what will you give in their place? We answer, *Religion!* Look around! The enchanted castle of existence of the past was but a half-seen, discolored prophecy of the truth which is replacing it, with a grandeur and a reality that terrifies the soul at first. People

"are frightened when science tells them that this world is the real one, and 'the other' its shadow. But this true world includes all—is The All! It brings with it a new philosophy, religion, morality, life, and motive, which is an enduring well-spring of energy, consolation, and hope—not of pessimism nor optimism, but of ever-victorious meliorism. Do not as an ethical society fear that the old moral lights will be blown out and darkness result. The true scientific foundation will replace the old, as in our cities the scientific electric light has come to take the place of the old smoky lamps. To secure such replacement, throughout the whole individual and social domain of human affairs, is the motive and inspiration of those scientists who, in Europe and America, put their conclusions before the people in the simplest language, yet ever eloquent with these new purposes and hopes. Of the noblest of such teachers and prophets none stands forth more prominently than Ernst Haeckel. From his concluding words at that Munich contest rings out the motto which, in a word, expresses the impulse of his own life, and of the creative era of the new faith of Monism: *Impavidi progrediamur!* "Undaunted we press ever on!"

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THE KREUTZER SONATA.*

BY P. K. ROSEGGGER.

THERE is a book much spoken of called the "Kreutzer Sonata," and written by the Russian, Count Tolstói. The authorities of various countries have done their part to advertise the book by prohibiting it. Afterwards the injunctions were removed and thus officially everything was done to promote a work unrivaled in revolutionary spirit.

Well, then, what is written in this Kreutzer Sonata? The Kreutzer Sonata has the form of a novel; it teaches that man should live as chaste a life as woman, and that she has the same right as he to expect purity of him at the day of marriage. And that is right! Secondly it teaches that husband and wife should live their married life in chastity, that according to Christ, it is adultery even for the husband to look on his wife to lust after her. Married people should live like brother and sister. Lastly it is written in the Kreutzer Sonata that sexual love is not necessary by nature, it can and must be suppressed; and that in this way the human race will have to be discontinued. These being the main ideas, Tolstói tells us the story of an unhappy marriage such as has often been told and represented on the stage.

There is danger of ridicule, should we take an author seriously who says something in jest. Yet Tolstói is bitterly in earnest with his doctrines, as can be readily felt by the feverish excitement that pervades the whole book.

Tolstói is a naturalistic poet; he does not write a work of art in the old sense of the word. The naturalistic poet proposes problems without solving them. He brings conflicts to a climax without explaining them. He complains and finds no comfort; he accuses and knows no remedy. You say, we all of us can do that; for that we need no poets. And in addition, if a naturalist makes a proposition, it is impractical and unrealisable.

It is strange that the naturalist Tolstói ventures upon an idealism which is scarcely, if ever, found in fairy-tales. He proposes to abolish the natural relation between man and woman because it sometimes causes mischief. It is right to pour away the dirty

water, but it is not right to pour out the child together with the bath, and still less to do away with marriage and children together. The abolition of love is something new. The Russian has outdone Oriental and Romance imagination. But he claims Schopenhauer's authority in his favor. And that settles it!

The poet declares that sensual love is contrary to humanity and marriage to Christianity. A Christian should not marry.

It little behoves a critic to say of a poet he has grown old. Yet we can boldly tell the Count Tolstói to his face that he has grown old, the more so as we can remind him of his younger years. He has praised love and founded a happy family life. What he says in his Kreutzer Sonata is only an ingenious whim of the theorising old man. I see no chance of a milder condemnation of the book.

The book, however, has another side which is not so harmless as his philosophical speculation on love. Tolstói describes the married life of a couple, the husband being coarse and sensuous and the wife without a heart. Their marriage naturally is in the highest degree unhappy and ends in murder. Such things happen. Yet if the poet thinks that it is the typical marriage, the rule, and a common occurrence, he insults humanity.

It is a most significant error of our present conception of marriage, that we suppose that two people of different sex marry in order to satisfy in a legal way their sexual instincts. If that were the end to be attained, it could be accomplished without marriage. There are weightier reasons for marriage. There is the sympathy between two people, the harmonious communion of souls, the wants of the heart to confide in another with whom it will be easier to bear life's joys and tribulations; with whom there are common interests for a whole long life—these are the real and decisive reasons for marriage.

It may be maliciously objected, if that were so, two men or two women might marry and marriage would be friendship only. But this objection will not in the least disturb me; for certainly marriage must be friendship. If marriage is not a bond of friendship, it is immoral in the highest degree. Yet in order to be a bond of friendship for the whole life until death doth part it, it must be so intimate as to make of two

* Translated from the *Heimgarten*, a German monthly of which the author of the present article is the editor.

spheres of interest one world with all joys and tribulations in common, including the satisfaction of all wants and also those of the sexual instinct. It must be a partner from whom you can expect posterity, so as to continue to live through him or her beyond the grave. The sexual side of marriage, in itself the basis of it, becomes, when humanly and socially considered, a subordinate feature; the most important part will always remain the moral relation, the bond of friendship, the exchange of souls between husband and wife.

What is fidelity? Is it only a faithful preservation of the body? A friend is false who betrays me, who misuses my confidence, who injures me, whose goodwill is not reliable. Thus a woman can be false without committing herself otherwise, and this lack of fidelity can be extremely grave.

The Kreutzer Sonata has been read by one-half of the civilised world. But the book cannot make a lasting impression, for its ideas are impractical and do not take into consideration the human and moral side of the question.

It is almost coarse for a poet if he entirely overlooks—as Tolstoi does in his Kreutzer Sonata—the moral feature and the moral strength of man. Between the two people whom he introduces as an example of modern marriage, there is no other communion than animal sensuality and diabolical hatred. They are brutal, hypocritical without heart, without soul, without goodwill, without sympathy, without intellectual interests, without almost anything human or humane—such are the heroes of his novel, and with such characters he attempts his demonstration.

Had Tolstoi not generalised, had he presented the story as one special case, the effect would have been great. For these two people are represented most admirably and true to life. The husband's jealousy and its tragic result cannot be described with more psychological truth and thrilling vigor. The heart of the reader is overcome as though by a thunderstorm.

But then he is told: Look to it dear reader, you also are of this kind; you also have been in your youth a coarse roué; you also have married your wife as one buys a slave; you keep her as one keeps a chattel for pleasure's sake; you torture her with senseless jealousy and some day you will kill her. Will the reader not throw the book into the author's face and shout: What right do you have to insult me in this way—me as well as the great majority of my fellow-men?

Or, perhaps, are matters really as bad as that?

I ask, are matters really as bad as Tolstoi makes us believe? Does marriage instead of elevating man degrade him below the animal? If that be so, I beg

the poet's pardon and ask him the next time to be much severer with that infernal race whose malignity is without bounds. Would it then not be advisable to turn the evolution of mankind backward?

Among the peasantry there are scoundrels also, but they are—as Tolstoi himself confesses—exceptions, for the peasantry are too hard oppressed to be bad. An aged peasant once said to me: "The old woman there is my best comrade," and this simple word expresses a truth which has not found room in Tolstoi's world-despising novel. It is a truth which criticises the opinion of and should be regarded by those married people of the modern fashion or the author of the Kreutzer Sonata himself.

THE KREUTZER SONATA.

BY CHARLES K. WHIPPLE.

IN THE *Forum* for August, Mrs. Stuart Phelps has an article entitled "The *Décolleté* in Modern Life." Her object is to call public attention to a vicious practice common among ladies in fashionable life, the tendency of which is to corrupt both sexes in that class, and thus indirectly the whole of the community in which they live. Mrs. Phelps seems to have written this article from a strong conviction of the pernicious character of the practice in question, and from a sense of duty in confronting the unpleasant conspicuousness of taking the first step toward its removal. Her desire was to call attention to public indecencies which have become common and popular, and to do this in decent language. But an embarrassing difficulty soon occurred. She was about to give an actual instance of the fault in question, that no mistake might be made about her meaning, but paused, saying, "My pen shrinks from *writing* what this high-bred lady *does*." A lady, too, whom she describes as "otherwise immaculate," and as belonging to one of the best families.

I am reminded here of two cases in which my own attempts to call attention to notorious public indecencies, with the hope of inciting efforts for their removal, were counteracted by that false delicacy which leaves enormous evils to run their course triumphantly, to avoid the unpleasantness of plainly describing them. One of these cases was the refusal of six of the most respectable papers in Boston to publish an article in which I had called attention to the corrupting influence of the *ballet*, and of the accompanying dances by single female performers in the Boston theatres. These newspapers habitually praised the performers, but thought it indecent to describe exactly what they did, even for the purpose of checking their evil influences upon the community.

The other case I had in mind was my competition, more than half-a-century ago, for a prize offered by a

pious and worthy gentleman for the best tract of twelve pages on "The Family Relation as affected by Slavery." My tract was accepted, but with an objection that portions of it were "too naked," and a requisition that those portions should be omitted. Thus it happened that in a work, the express object of which was to expose some vicious characteristics of slavery, a specification of the very worst of those features was suppressed, because the would-be reformer shrank from putting into words, even words of condemnation, a description of the things habitually done by respectable and pious people, and known to be so done, and known to be expressly authorised by existing State laws and Church customs, showing both State and Church to be participants in the guilt of those abominable practices. Was it really better to leave those worst abuses to flourish undisturbed than to shock prudish sensibilities by such open declaration of them as was the needful preliminary to their suppression?

To return to Mrs. Phelps's article. That the prudishness above hinted at dominates that estimable lady, is shown by her attack upon Tolstoi at the close of her article. She testifies respecting his last published work (evidently "The Kreutzer Sonata") that it is "true" and "well-meant," and that its author "has certainly moral motives of a very high and noble order." After such characterisation of the book and the author as that, how strange is it to hear Mrs. Phelps rebuke him, call on him henceforth to keep silence, and say, "His unpardonable fault is one of literary taste." She admits the existence of the gross immorality which Tolstoi describes as habitual and permitted in Russia, but seems to assume that to suffer its continuance without protest is better than to shock the delicacy of the pure minority by such plain description as shall compel attention to the vices in question, and prompt to active efforts for their removal. Is not this a specimen of preference for mere outside cleansing of the cup and platter?

The *vices* in question, I have said. For although Tolstoi begins with condemnation of the very fault which Mrs. Phelps attacks in this country, moved obviously by feelings and motives like her own, he goes on to describe and rebuke other vicious customs in Russia. These evil practices exist also here, and need to be pointed out and stigmatised here, as the indispensable means of arousing opposition to them. The very reason why well-known abuses in the sexual department prevail and continue here is because so many of the better sort "shrink" from open speech and action against them. Here, as in Russia, gross and shameful ill-treatment of women is habitually practiced by men accounted not only respectable but cultured, refined, and pious. This fact, no doubt,

increases the difficulty of effective remonstrance. All the more ought we to recognise and be grateful for the benefit which Tolstoi has conferred on the half-civilised world by disregarding "literary taste" in comparison with moral, religious and social reform. New England not less than Russia or ancient Palestine needs the voice of one crying in the wilderness against abuses which long custom and a vicious theology have seemed to sanctify. Very many of the men ranked among "our best classes" may see themselves, as in a glass, in the Kreutzer Sonata; and they ought not only to read it, but to mark, learn, and inwardly digest it.

Tolstoi's book, called "The Kreutzer Sonata," is very much spoken against, and indeed it has great faults.

In the first place, it is very strange that an author who holds intense and peculiar ideas about moral and social reform should choose to present them to the public through a character so extravagant and fantastic as that of Posdnicheff. Tolstoi evidently recognises much defect and much error in the popular ideas of civilisation, and religion, and considers it his duty to attempt their rectification. Judging for himself what is right, according to the precept of Jesus, and penetrated with the conviction that he is bound to diffuse the truth he has received, he attacks, unreservedly and fearlessly, some of the vicious practices which he asserts to be common and permitted in Russian society, the highest as well as the lowest. To attempt a work of reform is not a rare thing; but this man's work is especially noteworthy in that some of the customs there represented as unjustifiable and pernicious are such as the male half of the community everywhere assume to be not only lawful but right, falling within their masculine prerogative, and fortified by such antiquity of respectable usage that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. Nay, the pious people who indulge in the practices here condemned will quote scripture in their defense as confidently as our Mormons do for their peculiarities. Under such circumstances, an author who feels obliged to condemn customs sanctioned by the popular religion as well as by respectable social custom has a hard task before him, and should present his case in a cautious and prudent manner, taking special care to avoid overstatement. It is strange then, I say, that Tolstoi should have presented his reformatory ideas through the mouth of a person like Posdnicheff, not only headstrong, extravagant and ill-balanced, but maddened by jealousy. He has however chosen this method; and our part is, first to judge which of his accusations is well grounded, and then so to examine ourselves as to find whether we lie under the same condemnation.

The chief aim of "The Kreutzer Sonata" is to compel men to consider the rights and duties of husbands and wives in marriage. The subjects of marriage and divorce have of late been very prominent in periodical literature, both in England and in this country. But Tolstoï goes beyond all the magazines and reviews in the extent and the boldness of his criticism. His peculiarity, theologically, is an attempt to show that the teaching of Jesus, in its plain and obvious meaning, should be our rule of life, both for individuals and societies.

In previous books Tolstoï had enjoined non-resistance to injury, the return of good for evil in all cases, indiscriminate almsgiving, and abstinence from the taking of oaths and the accumulation of property; claiming that the obvious meaning of Jesus in regard to these matters should be accepted as law by those who call him Lord and Master. But in "The Kreutzer Sonata" he makes a special plea for the duty of chastity, not only urging its observance upon both sexes but claiming for it a significance not generally recognised. He insists that the gospel prohibition to men of sexual desire towards women was intended to apply "notably and especially" to their own wives, and that sexual intercourse, after pregnancy is established, is a wrong and an outrage, injurious to both mother and child. He might have gone further, and represented that the passage in question forbids also the sexual desire which precedes marriage, and is one of the incitements to it. It is certain that the words of Jesus on that subject, taken in connection with his example, and the language of Paul and of the author of the book of Revelation give the impression, on the whole, that though marriage is permissible, permanent continence and celibacy are purer and more holy.

The ideas above-mentioned are those upon which special stress is laid in "The Kreutzer Sonata." But many other statements are confidently made by the narrator, Posdnicheff, some of which are not only questionable, but better suited to his character and circumstances than to those of the author. It remains true, however, that Tolstoï here as in his previous books, has written from a strong conviction of duty, with an elevated moral purpose, and on a subject which needs plain and urgent speech, in the interest alike of civilisation, morality, and religion. The reformer who, for these purposes, braves such reproach as has been thrown upon the author of "The Kreutzer Sonata," deserves a candid hearing from other reformers, especially from those who claim to be followers of the same Lord and Master. The books of Tolstoï are far more accurate representations of what Jesus taught and enjoined than the sermons and commentaries of those who claim officially to represent him.

THE NEW ETHIC OF THE SEXES.

BY SUSAN CHANNING.

"From curb'd licence pluck
The muzzle of restraint, and the wild dog
Shall flesh his tooth in every innocent."
—King Henry IV.

IN the case of Sir Charles Dilke, who was compelled to abandon his political career because of alleged sexual immorality, and now in the attitude of Mr. Gladstone and his English and Irish coadjutors towards their fallen colleague, Mr. Parnell, we catch a breath of the new ethic of the sexes, equality of virtue. The days of high aims and Pompadourism are no more. It may be said of the great men of to-day in morals what John Fiske says of the men of the day who have fully kept pace with scientific movements: "They are separated from the men of the past by an immeasurably wider gulf than ever before divided one progressive generation of men from their predecessors." Lord Nelson and Lady Hamilton did their country eminent service, but, great as they were, their private immorality would at the present day prevent their crowding their drawing rooms with the wit and fashion of London. It is owing to virtue that we exist. In primeval times the tribes deficient in conjugal fidelity and addicted to polyandry, reared no children and were soon blotted out of the book of nature.

Although a high standard of virtue gives but a slight advantage to each individual over others, still the increase in the number of virtuous men and women gives an immense advantage to a nation, since at all times and throughout the world the tribes or nations which supplanted others, the one element in their success was their standard of morality. The Irish owe their indomitable courage and seven hundred years of struggle against foreign foes, who have never completely subjugated them, to their respect for virtue and chastity, and the fact that early marriages is the rule among them. Ireland, as Lord Macaulay said in the House of Commons in 1844, is the home and perpetual nursery of heroes. Her men, as John Stuart Mill maintained, are Princes among men in every country but their own. And why? Because heroes are, as history has shown, only begotten by virtuous men and women. Turkish rule began to totter the moment she was deprived of her Janizaries. These men who had fought her battles so bravely were the tribute children of Christians. Polygamy depresses mind, heart, and body, while the union of one man to one woman cemented by love flushes the whole organism with color, gives a higher pitch to our lives, and is imparted to our offspring.

The northern barbarians, as the Romans called the Germanic races, when they first appeared on the historic stage had, according to Mommsen and Taine, the most exalted ideas of woman and the sex relations; premature unions were forbidden and were prevented by infibulation. The Cimbri who first made the western world feel that Rome's Empire had begun to totter, when they first touched the orbit of ancient civilisation, marriage was pure among them, chastity instinctive; the adulterer was punished by death, and the adulteress obliged to hang herself.

When Gaius Marius defeated the Cimbrians 103 B. C., their women showed as much courage as the men; in size and strength they were little inferior; tall and stately, with flaxen hair and blue eyes, they excited the admiration of the Romans, and when they fell into the hands of their enemies and could not obtain from Marius assurance of their chastity, they slew themselves with their own hands.

Lecky in his "History of European Morals," says, "It is one of the most remarkable and to some writers one of the most perplexing facts in the moral history of Greece that, in the former and ruder period, woman had undoubtedly the highest place and their type exhibited the highest perfection. The female figures stand out on the canvas almost as prominently as the

"male ones, and are surrounded by an almost equal reverence. . . . The whole history of the 'Siege of Troy' is a history of the catastrophes that followed a violation of the nuptial tie."

But as some animals under domestication lose the instinct of pairing with a single mate, so does man whenever and wherever luxury and magnificence abound. Ease and luxury have the identical blighting effect on the intellect and morals as extreme poverty. When Greece and Rome had to be either anvil or hammer, and when men to live had to fight there was little personal immorality. But when Greece had conquered her great enemy Persia and the Greek began to build himself fine houses and fill them with works of art, and when Rome was mistress of the world and had not an enemy whom she feared, then did their men seek the intoxication of vice and forgot the thrill of emotion which great achievements and great men inspire.

Culture, in its broadest sense, reached a height in Greece in the fifth century before Christ, and in Italy in the fifteenth century after Christ, never before or since paralleled. The young man of talent and ambition who visited Athens in the time of Pericles, listened to a political speech from that great man, then a lecture from Anaxagoras, after which he visited the studio of Phidias, then to see a new play of either Sophocles or Euripides, and he finished up his night at the establishment of Aspasia, where he heard Pericles and Thucydides discuss whether the latter had better devote his genius to poetry or history, or listened to music and the ballads of Sappho and Anacreon sung by the most beautiful and accomplished women in Athens, who were not the wives or daughters of the great men present, but women who had enrolled themselves in the ranks of the *hetærae*.

We discover the same culture and magnificence in Italy in the closing days of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Italy, which had restored intellectual light to Europe, reconciled order with liberty, recalled youth to the study of laws and of philosophy, created the taste for poetry and the fine arts, revived the science and literature of antiquity, given prosperity to commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, fell like her ancient prototype Greece, an easy prey into the hands of the very barbarians whom she was leading to civilisation because all her republican energy and virtue had been crushed out by luxury and vice. Roderick Borgia, then Pope, was a fair type of the Florentine nobility. He was a man of immense wealth, utterly depraved in character and a most perfidious politician. His whole aim in life was personal power and to settle well his illegitimate children, of whom he had many.

Up to the present day the sexual immorality of man has been due to a bankrupt public opinion. As John Stuart Mill points out in his "Utility of Religion," illicit sexual intercourse, which in both sexes stands in the very highest rank of religious sins, yet not being severely censured by public opinion in the male sex, they have in general very little scruple in committing it, while in the case of women, though the religious obligation is no stronger, yet being backed in real earnest by public opinion, is commonly effective.

Some people suppose that no effective authority can be obtained over mankind without a belief in a supernatural religion, but the reflecting and well informed know better. As Mill said after reading Comte's "Positive Philosophy," which recognises no religion except that of Humanity, "this book leaves an irresistible conviction on your mind that any moral belief concurred in by the community generally may be brought to bear upon the whole conduct and lives of its individual members with an energy and potency truly alarming."

We all know that we cannot be happy if we are despised and detested by our fellows. Society may not have the power to make us very happy but it certainly has the power of making us very miserable.

As Bryce points out in his "American Commonwealth," the

force of public opinion creates the views of individuals as well on political as on moral questions. In Vol. II. p. 211, he says, "In examining the process by which public opinion is formed, we cannot fail to note how small a part of the views which the average man entertains when he goes to vote is really of his own making; although he supposes his views to be his own, he holds them because his acquaintances, his newspaper, and his party leader holds them."

That men are commonly governed not by religious belief, but by the law of honor which is nothing more than the opinion of their equals, is seen in the fact that a breach of this law even when the breach is in accordance with true morality, has caused many a man more agony than a real crime. George the Second adored his wife, Queen Caroline, he thought her, in mind and person the most attractive of her sex, but he thought that conjugal fidelity was an unprincely virtue and in order to be like Henry IV and the Regent of Orleans he affected, as Macaulay says, a libertinism for which he had no taste, and frequently quitted the only woman he really loved for ugly and disagreeable mistresses.

The struggle for virtue like the struggle for existence must now be used in a wide sense including the dependence of one being upon another, and as in the animal world the struggle for life is most severe between individuals of the same species who frequent the same districts and require the same food, and are exposed to the same dangers, so in the case of man and woman, having the same appetites and passions, frequenting the same places and exposed to the same temptations, they should afford each other mutual protection.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is owing to man's selfishness and compulsion that woman owes her more highly developed virtue. As Winwood Reade has shown in his "Martyrdom of Man," women from their earliest childhood are subject by the selfishness of men to severe but salutary laws, and chastity becomes the rule of female life. At first it was preserved by force alone, but, after a time women became the guardians of their own honor, and regarded and treated the woman as a traitor to her sex who betrayed her trust. It is certainly, as he says, an extraordinary fact that women should be subject to a severe social discipline, from which men are almost exempt. But it is not the women who are to be pitied; it is they alone who are free, for by that discipline they are prevented from the tyranny of vice. The passions are always foes, but it is only when they are encouraged that they are able to become masters, and no calculus can integrate the number of intellects that have been paralyzed, innocent hearts that have been broken asunder, lives that have been poisoned, and young corpses that have been carried to the tomb by their having become masters. That man should be subject to the same discipline and held to the same standard of virtue as woman is the doctrine of the new ethic of the sexes, and the day has evidently dawned in which public sentiment will rigorously enforce the doctrine. For good men have begun to realise with Goethe: "That the unit that makes a self-sacrifice only injures himself, unless all endeavor the whole to accomplish."

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE battle flags of Germany, draped with funeral colors, mourn for the great Field Marshal who carried them triumphantly to Paris, and saw them wave above the Pont d'Jena, and by the Arc de Triomphe in the Champs Elysée. Although a soldier all his life, it may be justly said that Von Moltke's victories have done much to abolish war. Unlike all other conquerors there was nothing spectacular or theatrical about him. We never see him pictured on a fiery steed, prancing about in the midst of his

legions, frantically waving his hat, and charging upon clouds of smoke. He was the genius of military mathematics, and he won battles by calculation as Paul Morphy won in chess. France declared war against Prussia on the 15th of July, 1870, and by the 1st of August the Emperor Napoleon had played the opening moves of his game; these Moltke answered by counter moves which placed the German army on the French frontier, and there is no doubt that had he met the Emperor at any time after the 1st of August, he could have warned him of the inevitable by announcing "Checkmate in five moves." It is often said that a liberal discount must be allowed on his victories, and credited to the blunders of his enemy; but this abatement will not apply to Moltke because whether his enemy would do the right thing or the wrong thing, was thought out, and allowed for in his calculations. He was the martial spirit of his country in its intellectual activity, he was Germany's "battle thinker" and by the very logic of his combinations he forced the moves of his adversary, and made the strategy not only for his own army but for that of his enemy also.

* * *

"Learn to condense," is a bit of commonplace advice often given to students of literary composition, but the lesson of the great Field Marshal's life shows the value of the admonition in every form of work, from the management of an army to the writing of a letter. There was no waste in Moltke, not even a waste of words; and men said of him that he could be silent in many languages. The reason was that he had learned to combine his faculties and direct them all in harmony to the purpose of the hour. He needed all his energies for action, and because even talk must draw for sustenance upon the nervous forces, he said little. He had brought his own faculties under drill and discipline, and in like manner he could condense the energies of a kingdom into a cannon ball, compact and irresistible. He drew eight corps of the Prussian army from divergent points and converged them upon Sadowa in the critical moment of battle, as a lens concentrates the sunbeams. The centre of the Austrian army melted under the heat, and when the sun went down upon the field, Austria had no longer either voice or vote in the politics of Germany. By his infallible mathematics he worked out the doom of the French empire long before the challenge of Napoleon came, so that when the proclamation of war was made, he had nothing to do but touch the little button that set in motion all the complex machinery of the German army, and move it like the sweep of a sword across France to the field of destiny by the ramparts of Sedan.

* * *

Every great man's life is an example from which instruction may be drawn; and that of Moltke shows the value of temperance and exercise; not the exercise of pleasure, but the exercise of work. He started in life with ninety years capital in the bank, and his account was never overdrawn. His allowance for a day sufficed him for a day, he did not by over-indulgence and excess consume his capital, and so he lived his ninety years, a healthy, vigorous man. He worked hard but he slept easy; and the reason why he did not die at three score years and ten, or even at four score years, was because he had something to do, a potent element of long life. When a man at sixty-five, or seventy, says that his work in this world is done, it is a charity for nature to take him at his word, and give him his eternal rest. Many men, perhaps most men, start in life with ninety years capital in the bank, but they overdraw, and find themselves vitally bankrupt at sixty, or sixty-five. Few of them reach an end so happy and desirable as Moltke's last day. Work in the line of public duty in the morning, dinner at home in the evening, a quiet game of whist, and then, "a stoppage of the heart"; no days of pain and fever, no

vigils of the night; only a stoppage of the heart; and in the morning Berlin wakes up to learn that Father Moltke is dead:

"For in the night, unseen, a single warrior,
In sombre harness mailed,
Dreaded of man, and surnamed the Destroyer,
The rampart wall had scaled."

Moltke was old enough to remember how the French tore Germany to pieces after the battle of Jena, as the lion tears his prey. He lived to see Germany united, and through his own industry and genius, the greatest military power in the world.

* * *

I have often wondered why it is that wholesale state socialism is nauseous and disagreeable to so many people who have a greedy appetite for it when they can get it in retail quantities. There is a practice in England, and a very good practice too of "heckling" a candidate for Parliament, by which is meant, not assault and battery, or any other form of bodily torture, but a searching of the inner soul of him by questions concerning definite measures of public policy. It is not enough in that country for a candidate to proclaim in clarion tones that he is devoted to "the time-honored principles of the party," but he must declare whether or not he will vote for this, that, or the other specific thing. At the recent election for Hartlepool, the opposing candidates were Sir W. Gray, Unionist, and Mr. C. Furness, Liberal, both excellent and very popular men. One of the "hecklers" put eighteen straightforward questions to each candidate, and amongst them this, "Are you in favor of free education, and the supply of a free dinner to scholars who would otherwise be compelled to remain in school all day without any food?" Now, here was state socialism of high quality, but in retail quantity, and Mr. Furness promptly answered, "Yes"; but Sir W. Gray could not swallow it without a little Worcestershire sauce, and so he flavored it thus: "I would favorably consider such a proposal, but I think the free dinner would require great care to prevent imposition." This answer was not satisfactory, as it left the electors in doubt whether Sir W. Gray meant great care in the cooking of the dinner, or in the giving of it, and Mr. Furness was elected.

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A great deal of sarcastic humor has been showered upon the various incongruities which have grown out of the Pension imposture; as for instance, the ridicule cast upon the old patriot who applied for a pension because he broke his leg in "jumping the bounty," and upon the other, who did not go to war himself, but caught the rheumatism owing to "the overstrain of mental anguish" which he suffered on account of those who did. All that kind of amusing banter is laughed at as the rollicking mockery of the journalistic funny man, who enliveneth the dull corners of the newspapers; but here is an actual case which will make the professional jester serious. In the *Review of Reviews* for February appears a letter from Walt Whitman, dated January 6, 1891, in which he says: "I am totally paralysed from the old secession war time overstrain." This was not written in irony, but in sober earnest, and it will probably silence the critics who sneer at Walt Whitman's pension. At the time he received his injury, the poet was about forty years old, and although he did not overstrain himself enough to go to the war, he did not escape its calamities, for now at the age of seventy he finds himself paralysed by "the old secession war time overstrain." It is not necessary to pretend like that for sympathy, because all men will sorrow for a poet in distress; and if his poems entitle him to a pension, let him have it, for poetry, and not for a "war time overstrain."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF SEX.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

POSSESSED of rather more than ordinary interest in the sex question, and agreeing with Professor Cope that any proposition for the amelioration of the condition of women should be discussed and decided by women, I am moved to certain remarks suggested by his article on "The Material Relations of Sex" in the first number of *The Monist*.

All through its perusal I was impressed by his unconscious recognition of an underlying question, which, apart from woman's inferiority, determines the relations of the sexes. This is plainly apparent in the paragraph alluding to the communistic system of wealth production and distribution, in which he admits the possibility of promiscuous sex-relations. While I agree with Professor Cope that to institute communism would be a decided blow at progress, since progress consists in a constant widening of individual liberty while communism invokes authoritarian direction, nevertheless, I hold that in acknowledging the possibility of variety in sex relations under the communistic regime, he has admitted that the present social arrangement of sex is the necessary outgrowth of our economic conditions.

Postulating the fact of woman's mental and physical inferiority, our writer sees no possible ultimatum for her but the service of maternity and child-bearing in return for "protection and support" from some man, or set of men called a "state." This brings us at once to two vital questions:

Is woman's inferiority the cause, or the effect, of her economic subjection?

Is economic independence for woman a possible ideal?

I think it can be clearly proven that the mental constitution of woman, like that of man, has never failed to rise where restrictions upon equal freedom have been torn down. Whenever woman has had the same opportunity as man, results have proven that her capacities for development are as unlimited as his. It may be objected that I am instancing exceptional cases instead of dealing with types. My reply is that only in exceptional cases have women enjoyed the same opportunities as men. Yet these cases are sufficiently numerous to warrant the conclusion that nature affords no insuperable obstacle to sex-equality in brain; and that inferiority in the typical woman must be regarded as the result of her dependent economic condition, created by the artificial restrictions of man.

Concerning the physical disability of the sex, it is more difficult to show the beneficent results of liberty, since even the most advanced of women are so hampered by body-dwarfing, dress, and custom that we have scarcely sufficient data for opinion concerning her possibilities of physical development. Such as we have would indicate that much of her present incompetence during periods of gestation and nursing, is incidental to the present defective social arrangement which condemns woman to the wasteful drudgery of individual housekeeping, and all the slavish work of the much lauded family-life.

However, even physical inferiority need not prove the eternal barrier to economic independence which Professor Cope would make of it. To-day industrial progress demands not so much physical strength as skill. Undoubtedly the elephant has physical strength superior to man, yet that he is no competitor against man I need waste no space to prove. Likewise the Hercules of ages past would have no place in competitive industry to-day simply because he would not be adapted to his environment. Granting the present physical disability of woman, it by no means follows that, with equal opportunity, she would be unable to compete with man in the fields of productive industry. Indeed one general com-

plaint of the workingmen is that they are competing, and, by the law of the survival of the fittest, have already driven men out of several branches of employment, such as textile fabrics, shoe-making, etc. No great amount of strength is required, but skill and patience; and it is the universal testimony of the overseers that women are equally skilful and more reliable.

There is a class of economic reformers called anarchists, who contend that with opportunity to exploit nature thrown free to the human race, the hours of labor would be so reduced as to enable one to produce sufficient to satisfy all his needs by three hours work per day. This with our present machinery, the possibilities of further reduction being left to further developments. They also contend that such freedom must necessarily result in constant labor-demand, thus securing the laborer against the present nightmare of involuntary idleness. Under such conditions, bearing in mind that the ever increasing displacement of physical strength by machinery, keeps reducing the physical burden of productive labor, woman's economic independence becomes a realisable ideal, and the whole matter of sex association changes. When woman comprehends her independence, marriage will no longer be a matter of "protection and support," which Professor Cope declares is the basis of monogamic wifehood. It will become a matter of mutual co-operation, based, let us hope on something higher than the sale of the powers of motherhood, and demanding the same standard for man as for woman.

Whether monogamy or variety will then obtain depends on which of these systems produces the higher type of humanity. At present it is impossible to decide, since without the independence of woman there can be no equality, and without equality no true adjustment of sex relations.

VOLTAIRINE DE CLEYRE.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

AS THE preceding notice of my article by Miss de Cleyre repeats the usual formula of a class of social reformers, I must again emphasise the foundation facts of the situation, as they appear from a physiological standpoint. These are somewhat opposed to our ideals, I freely admit; but it is the history of every human mind that is not incurably imaginative rather than exact, to learn the lesson which a bondage to material conditions imposes on us all alike.

Miss de Cleyre asks, "Is woman's inferiority the cause or the effect of her economic subjection?" She then expresses the opinion that it is the effect and not the cause of such subjection, as well as of "body dwarfing dress and custom." This is the fundamental error of a large class of women doctrinaires, and it needs but a superficial knowledge of Natural History to comprehend it. The inferior physical strength of the female sex is general (though not entirely universal) in the animal kingdom; and as mentality is one of the functions of human mechanism, it extends to the mental organism in man as well. It is a simple corollary of the law of the conservation of energy that where a large amount of energy is devoted to one function, less remains for expenditure in performing another. The large part of the female organism devoted to the functions of gestation, lactation, and maternal care of children, simply puts her out of the race as a competitor with man, on anything like equal terms. Even if those functions are not active, the machinery for the performance of other functions is not thereby increased in quantity or improved in quality, except in such small degree as one woman may accomplish in a life-time. And this small accomplishment she does not transmit, since the unmarried woman has no children. I call attention to the fact that although woman has had the advantage of the inheritance of male accomplishments and capacities since the origin of the species, the relation between her and man still remains about as it ever has remained. The one sex progresses about as rapidly as the other, and they maintain about the same relative position.

This fact is so fundamental that it is unreasonable to expect any change in the future. What can be done is to improve both sexes as much as possible in all their powers, and to acquaint each with their limitations. In this way the greatest amount of happiness may be attained with a minimum of conflict and waste.

It is evident that marriage is the destiny of both sexes, and the question which I have considered in the article in *The Monist* is the nature of its conditions.

In the first place monogamic marriage is no more a slavery to women than the support of a family is to a man. Man is, to use this common, but inexact expression, in a state of "slavery" to the conditions of his environment, and no socialistic scheme can relieve him of the difficulty, though some mitigations can be doubtless introduced. Man is an essential part of this environment, and contributes to the "slavery" to which he is subject. Woman's environment differs from that of man, in the difference in the relation in which she stands to man, as compared with that which subsists between man and man. That she should escape the consequences of this environment is no more to be anticipated than is the case with man himself. She has the advantage of man however in having for her "master" a being who is naturally inclined to admire, aid, and support her; while, to man the environment is mostly controlled by grim necessity imposed by unfeeling forces. When man rebels against this environment, and makes reprisals on society by appropriating the property of others, he makes a serious mistake, and he finds it out, generally soon. So some women, discontented with their relations to a husband, are dishonest to him. They also have trouble. Community of wives is as impossible as community of property, unless wives surrender all claims to more than temporary consideration. There are both men and women who think this the better system, and who act on it. But the men generally abandon it ultimately and marry. It would be interesting to know what becomes of the women. More information is needed, but the general impression is that such women have not chosen wisely.

It is true that woman like "any animal" can bear children; but it is also true that man like "any animal" must make a living. The two occupations are on a par. But neither should neglect to develop their "self-hood" in such leisure time as they can command from these necessary occupations. Every girl should have a good education, especially in biology and housekeeping, and the more she knows of the science of life, the better will she be prepared to know and to fulfil her part in human society.

Another aspect of the question of woman's entrance into the industrial field as a competitor to man, requires more space than I can give to it here. It is the fact, that woman, not being responsible for the support of her husband and family, can afford to work at some occupations for much lower wages than man can accept. This is one of the reasons for the lower rate of women's wages; and it is not due, as many thoughtless agitators assume, to the parsimony of severe task-masters. The advent of this cheap labor into some fields has driven men out of them, and if the range of such work is to be much extended, a larger number of men will be thrown out of employment. This state of affairs is said to exist in some departments of iron manufactures in Pittsburgh, and in some other industry in Scotland. Under such circumstances men must emigrate, or cease to marry, since they can support themselves alone on their reduced wages. Any thoughtful person may follow this state of affairs to its logical consequences. One of these would be the diminution in the number of marriages and the substitution thereof of a system in which women would be the chief sufferers. So that their success in some of the lighter fields of industry does not redound to the benefit of women at large.

I do not wish to be understood however to deny *in toto* the advantage of more or less industrial occupation for women. For

temporary purposes and under peculiar conditions, it is often not only desirable but necessary that women should have remunerative occupation. But I merely wish to point out that this state of affairs does not represent the fundamental organisation of society, and cannot alter it in the least. It is only necessary where there is a surplus of female population.

It has occurred to me that, in order to escape further discussion on my part, it would be well to reinforce the fundamental fact on which my position rests, viz. the disadvantageous relation to man occupied by woman in an unprotected and unaided "struggle for existence." Some women do not appear to realise this fact, and some men support them in this mistaken opinion. Nevertheless the real state of the case is known to, or suspected by, the majority of mankind. To such as do not perceive it, it may be a help to refer to the fact that every pursuit apart from those connected with maternity, and the teaching of children, may be as well done by men as by women, and a majority of the pursuits of men cannot be followed by women at all. The fact that a number of women succeed for a time in occupations usually filled by men, does not alter the general principle. Indeed it is often entirely proper and necessary that they should do so, provided that they understand the general law of social equilibrium and act accordingly when occasion arises. But of this law they sometimes do not hear, but are taught by alleged reformers in the press and on the lecture platform, doctrines that falsely assert that in the nature of things the world is as open for an independent career to a young woman as to a young man. If I shall have prevented a single young woman from spending the best years of her life in learning the truth in this matter, my purpose will have been served.

E. D. COPE.

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FROST AND FREEDOM.

BY F. L. OSWALD, M. D.

IF a philosopher of ancient Rome should be permitted to re-visit the glimpses of the upper world, the discovery of the Lost Atlantis would probably surprise him much less than the development of a superior civilisation in climes which for ages had been inhabited only by unprogressive barbarians.

The stars of empire, in science, art, and industry, had, indeed, long proved a tendency to move with the shifting centres of political power, but from the earliest dawn of historical traditions to the close of the Middle Ages that movement had progressed in an almost due-westerly direction: From the highland homes of our Aryan ancestors to Persia, Asia Minor, Greece, Italy, and finally to Spain—for there is no doubt that the Spanish Moriscos were the chief heirs of Roman culture. The expulsion of the Moors seemed to have deprived Europe of that heritage, but about the middle of the sixteenth century the seed that had been extirpated from the soil of Andalusia began to germinate in Holland, in northern France, in Germany, Poland and Great Britain, the sea-port towns of the Mediterranean became marts for the products of northern industry, and before long the pæons of northern inventors drowned the echo of the classic Eureka; the Muses and Graces began to ramble in fur-coats; inspired poets brandished bottles of usquebaugh.

Had the overpopulation of the summerland-regions obliged the children of progress to colonise the higher latitudes? As if in special refutation of that conjecture Columbus had shortly before opened the gates of a new western world. Besides, large tracts of productive lands in southern Europe and northern Africa were hardly more than half-settled. Hundreds of square miles in the valley of the Guadalquivir remained tenantless, while emigrants from Lombardy sought new homes on the banks of the Thames and the Elbe. Still more suggestive is the northwest ward advance of the centres of enterprise on our own side of the Atlantic. A considerable percentage of the Mayflower pilgrims were at first inclined to regret the adverse gale which forced them to land six hundred miles north of their original goal, but the free choice of subsequent home-seekers made the path of that storm the chief highway of exodus. The frozen swamps of north-

ern New England were certainly not colonised for lack of room in the sunny terrace-lands of North Carolina.

It would be equally erroneous to suppose that the pioneers of progress were driven further and further north for lack of encouragement in the old southern homes of civilisation. Mohammed the Second was not the only southern ruler who tried in vain to foster the arts of peace, and the industries of northern Europe may be said to have born their first fruits in spite of manifold discouragements. The fervid enthusiasm of southern saints, too, is apt to get chilled north of the Alps, and the seed of Temperance has found a far more congenial home in Yemen than in Jutland.

But if frost cannot be said to strengthen the motives of our virtues, it certainly tends to mitigate the penalty of our vices. Sir Emerson Tennent inclines to the opinion that the Hindoo dread of fleshfood is something more than a prejudice, since his Cingalese servant, a fellow entirely unincumbered with religious scruples, was taken deadly sick after eating a lunch of boar-steaks on a warm morning. Eighteen ounces of solid food per meal for a man, and twelve ounces for a child, is considered a fair ration in many Bengal villages of the more prosperous sort, and an idler who should increase that average to forty ounces would be warned by his sanitary advisers. The experience of the traveler Chamisso, on the other hand, makes it probable that a native of Kamtschatka can devour sixteen pounds or 256 ounces, of fat meat, with perfect impunity, and Guinnard once saw a Patagonian chief finish eight installments of a stew that was handed him in brimful pots, holding at least a quart and a half a-piece. The test-cases of numerous Arctic voyagers have exploded the notion that a low temperature begets an instinctive craving for alcohol, but it is no use denying the fact that it mitigates the after-effects of alcoholic intoxication. In other words, a northern toper cannot justify his foible on the ground of greater temptation, but only on the unholy plea of greater impunity. Alcohol cannot increase our vital vigor, but it will decrease it less in Scotland than in Spain—less even in a Spanish winter than in a Spanish summer:

"Junio, Julio of Agosto, dieta de ollas
Y tres nodios en bragillas."

—says a Castilian proverb. "During the dogdays take a pledge of abstinence and continence."

But such pledges are apt to get broken. The Spanish sinner who has been starved in Lent is not likely to become a saint in midsummer, though the effect of his excesses enforces the old proverb by remorseless arguments, and the many million-fold repetitions of that experience has gradually deflected the westward currents of emigration in a northerly direction.

In short, frost is an antidote. It moderates the intensity of blue to the victim of blue-devils; it makes pork-fritters digestible and mince-pies less immediately fatal, and it has at least indirectly modified the earth-blighting effect of pessimistic doctrines. The gospel of anti-physical dogmas was never able to get a proper foothold in latitudes where a man's daily food generally depends on his daily toil. Honey and wild locusts do not abound in the snow-drifts of North Dakota; in Norway there is no denying the fact that bodily exercise may profit a good deal if applied to a stack of cordwood. A stylite mounting a pillar in the Kansas prairies would be unhorsed by the first blizzard. On a hillside, fourteen miles east of Irkutsk, Professor Atkinson once saw a gang of convict-miners dig through thirty-eight feet of frozen soil, before they could reach a stratum of loose gravel. In a climate of that sort it must be decidedly difficult to persuade a native that mountains can be removed by faith; and the warning not to take thought of the morrow is naturally apt to be neglected where the morrow is so unaccustomed to take care of itself.

Hence the latent Protestantism of the North European nations, even at a time when Denmark was as full of convents as Italy. The precept of absolute obedience was always rather hard to enforce in those northern monasteries, and the divine right of kings is liable to be challenged by men who had learned self-reliance in their struggles with snow-tornadoes and famished wolves. "How is it, your slow-going countrymen were so fast in renouncing their allegiance to the church of their fathers?" Erasmus was once asked by an Italian prelate. "There was no time to lose—the costume of the Flagellants is too unhealthy in a climate like ours," said the facetious Hollander, and Henri Rochefort is probably right that the Czars will never succeed in freezing out the virility of their subjects, and ought to transfer their rebels to a sweat cure establishment, à la Cayenne. In the meantime, it is a suggestive fact that the northern vassals of paternal monarchs enjoy the prerogative of being handled with comparative soft gloves. The proverbial superciliousness of Prussian bureaucrats is said to have been toned down remarkably in the province of Sleswick-Holstein. Even in Russia the north provinces assert the prestige

of Government pets, and the attempt to curtail their privileges (as in the case of Finland) is defied in a manner which further south would be resented by wholesale edicts of banishment.

With that comparative freedom from the worst evils of tyranny, of fanaticism, alcoholic enervation and dyspepsia, the immunities of the North rather outweigh its climatic sorrows and might seem to justify the prediction that the *hegemony* of Caucasian culture, will ultimately erect its standard on the borders of the Arctic circle. The attempt to verify that prediction would, however, be wrecked on the obstacle of two physiological facts: Social culture is inseparable from the culture of certain plants which no arts of tillage will ever enable to flourish in the climate of Labrador, and the energy-stimulating influence of a low temperature reaches its maximum near the line where the sixty-fifth parallel crosses the fir-woods of northern Europe and at least ten degrees further south in our own hemisphere.

Our boasted latterday civilisation is, in fact, a hot-house product, and even hothouses cannot wholly dispense with the aid of sunlight. We cannot hope to feed the colonists of an Arctic Utopia on a harvest of pot-plants, and after deducting the manufacturing expenses of our artificial luxuries the net surplus of happiness would be too small to discount the gratuitous blessings of the South. Even in northern Lapland permanent settlers become stunted, both in their physical and mental development; there are still a few fairly comfortable villages in the valley of the Tornea River and on the shores of Lake Paitas; but further north the antidote of frost is administered in clearly indigestible quantities. The Laplanders are kinsmen of the northern Tartars, while their tall Swedish neighbors are descendants of the Caucasian Race; but about the end of the ninth century a specially enterprising tribe of that race, a horde of adventurous Northmen, settled the west coast of Iceland, with results summed up in the present condition of the frost-tortured islanders. The nine hundred winters of their national existence have shortened their average stature by nine inches and their average longevity by fifteen years. Their hereditary pluck has saved them from utter defeat in the struggle for survival, but their victories, like those of King Pyrrhus, have been purchased at a price that will prove ruinous in the course of a few repetitions.

While the belief in the value of life and earthly happiness remained an unquestioned tenet, the natives of the Mediterranean god-gardens were hardly tempted to colonise the frozen steppes of Sarmatia, and the revival of Nature worship may yet people Mexico with refugees from the rigor of Canadian blizzards and blue laws; but by that time the Spanish-American Repub-

lics might be "industrially organised," in the Bel-lamite sense of the word, and the day, perhaps, is near when the overpopulation of the sunny latitudes will reduce the lovers of independence to the choice between the Boss-ship of a national workhouse and the solitude of a snowbound Arcadia.

The manliest males of our species will probably prefer the latter alternative, and the last habitable borders of the Far North will remain the chosen home of the Free.

THE LABOR PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND.*

BY GEO. JULIAN HARNEY.

It is an old hyperbolic figure much in favor with popular orators to talk of "the eyes of England," the "eyes of Europe," etc.; but it is no exaggeration to say that a year ago "the eyes" of Europe, of Australia, and the United States were turned toward the East End of London. The dockers in their great Strike had the sympathetic good wishes of their fellow workers in every land where Labor and Capital stand in the like relation to each other that they do in Great Britain. Nor was that sympathy restricted to the working classes.

I have seen, with regret and pain, in certain "Labor organs" contumely and derision poured upon sympathisers and conciliators occupying some other social plane than that of the artisan and the laborer; being held up as enemies in disguise rather than as friends inspired by the best feelings of humanity. What do such champions of Labor mean?—what do they want? The so-called upper classes—I use this well-understood term for convenience, not that I believe in upper and lower, or classes and masses—are reproached, and have for ages laid themselves open to the reproach of active oppression, or heartless indifference to the sufferings of the many. Very well. But when from these classes step forth men to denounce the wrongs, aid and advocate the rights of the millions—why should they be repulsed or meet with scorn and hatred? One man *may* have in view the exaltation of his church; another, the preservation or the obtaining of a seat in Parliament; while another, believing in the coming peril of the higher classes *may* think that peril is to be averted by timely concessions, in the substitution of something like justice for wrong. But, excepting in any case where such designs are palpable and unquestionable, it is forbidden by every sentiment of honor to question the motives of those who set themselves the holy task of assuaging sorrow and raising up the fallen.

Looking back to a year ago, the events of that time present an aspect much to be admired. The steadfastness and pacific conduct of the dockers, the en-

ergy and the moderation of their leaders, and the earnest sympathy of friends and volunteers, untiring in their efforts to help the strikers to secure a substantial victory; these facts, together with the "crowning mercy" of the docks directors, combined to render the dockers' strike of 1889 one of the most memorable, perhaps the most glorious of struggles in the history of labor.

The dockers obtained their demand, the sixpence an hour, with special payment for overtime, and other valuable concessions. Their success had a widespread influence, and was the indirect, if not the direct, cause of an advance of wages and other advantages in many other callings, in, and far beyond the metropolis.

So far so good. I remember the time when the class of laborers employed in the loading and unloading shipping were paid but 3d. per hour. That was the payment, I happen to know, on Fresh Wharf, Lower Thames Street; and I believe it was the same at the London and St. Catherine's docks, fifty—sixty years ago. I doubt if in some skilled trades the workers receive as good wages as now the dockers receive at the rate of their sixpence an hour.

I wish that the history of labor struggles since October, 1889, could be regarded with as unalloyed satisfaction as the incidents and immediate result of the Dockers' Strike.

It was, I believe, one of the accepted conditions of the termination of the great strike that unionists and non-unionists were to work side by side, at least without the one being molested by the other. In the course of a few months the non-unionists have disappeared. If this elimination of the non-unionist element has been brought about by moral suasion, by fair and just means, there can be no cause for aught but approval and commendation. But if otherwise, then the voice of approval must be mute, even if the voice of condemnation is not heard.

I suppose there can be no doubt about the matter, as one sample, a sample only, attests. Some two or three weeks ago it was reported in the newspapers that six hundred dockers in Tilbury Docks had gone on strike to oust three non-unionists. Of course they succeeded. I wonder what has become of the luckless three!

But the refusal to work with non-unionists, the refusal to allow non-unionists to work, is not all, nor the worst. Having attained to a certain strength, which seems to give them absolute mastery, the dockers close their books and will not permit any further extension of membership. Nor is this all. Not only are those who have hesitated or neglected to become unionists to be henceforth excluded, but also weakly men, men who, from whatever cause, cannot prove themselves up to a certain standard of bodily strength

* From *The Newcastle Chronicle* (1890).

—though what that standard is does not appear—are also to be excluded. These exclusions seem to me cruel and monstrous.

Formerly, and but a few years ago, Trades Unionists fought against the tyranny of "the Document," and the attempts of millowners and other capitalists to compel them to renounce their unions as the condition of employment. The workers were justified in their resistance, and all men worthy of the name rejoiced in the defeat of the capitalists. But now the case is reversed. It is the men who dictate the terms of employment. Not content with their own perfect freedom to unite and combine, they refuse to all not in their unions the common right to labor. "In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread," ran the primeval curse. But the new version is:—"Though willing to sweat, you shall not earn bread, unless we of the Union grant you leave, and admit you to share in our monopoly!"

With all his imaginative powers, Robert Burns could never have imagined such a state of things.

" See yonder poor, o'erlabored wight,
So abject, mean, and vile,
Who begs a brother of the earth
To give him leave to toil;
And see his lordly fellow-worm
The poor petition spurn,
Unmindful, tho' a weeping wife,
And helpless offspring mourn."

The "lordly fellow-worm" indicated by the poet was the landlord, the capitalist, the rich man, the employer. To him it would have been inconceivable that the docker, or other Trades Unionist, should play the part of the "lordly fellow-worm."

I pass by with the merest mention the scenes of violence at Leeds, Southampton, and elsewhere. Mark: violence not directly against "the classes," but against those who belong to "the masses," and against third parties having no connection whatever with the question at issue between the dockers and directors. At Southampton, why should travellers to, or from, any part of the world, have been hindered in their outgoing, or their incoming because of some question at issue between the strikers and those they strike against? The world was not made for Cæsar! Granted. Was the world made for Trades Unionists alone? There are other people in the world who require more than standing room; who, as well as Cæsar and the docker, have certain "unalienable rights" to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

The "blackleg" is the *bête noir* of the unionist. What is a "blackleg"? If I understand, the opprobrious term is applied to the unemployed who are willing to take work voluntarily relinquished by men on strike. The strikers have the right to declare they will work only on certain conditions. But have they the right to prevent other men working? It is said

the "blacklegs" are idlers, loafers, "scalawags," in short, a disreputable class. It is assumed such persons abhor work. Surely if they seek work, that is the first sign of their reformation.

The "blackleg" is an evil, no doubt. But how is he to be eliminated? Strikes that are disastrous help to make "blacklegs," and unions that refuse admission to workers must add to the number of the unemployed, from whom the "blacklegs" come. What are the men to do excluded from the books of the Dockers' Union? Are they to starve? Or must we go back to the evil times following the spoliation of the Church when wholesale hangings took the place of relief and aid at the doors of monasteries—when death was the penalty of pauperism—and hangmen eliminated some seventy thousand of "sturdy beggars," for whom, as for the "blacklegs" now, there was "no place at Nature's board"?

In the old time insolent calumniators of the laboring classes were profuse in flinging about such choice epithets as "mob," "the rabble," "the unwashed," etc. Mild terms compared with those applied to the outcast "blacklegs." "Reptile" is about the mildest term! What a blaze of natural and justifiable indignation there would be if any member of "the classes" applied to "the masses" the language applied by some of "the people" to others of "the people"! Construed literally, it might be regarded as incitements to the maiming and murdering of "blacklegs." I protest against these methods of dealing with an acknowledged evil. Boycotting and savagery of word and deed may be condoned by trafficking politicians, but should be sternly discountenanced in our social troubles—difficult enough to dispose of without the addition of incitements to the brutalities of internecine conflicts.

It had been hoped that the Trades Congress convened to meet in Liverpool would at least have tried to so regulate the labor movement as to correct the fast-growing evils glanced at—merely glanced at—in these remarks. That hope has been disappointed.

The first great fault of the Congress was in its constitution. The delegates appear to have numbered from four hundred and fifty to four hundred and sixty. Assuming the whole number, or nearly the whole present, it would be next to impossible for four hundred and fifty delegates to act as a deliberative assembly. The House of Commons is a mob, and often a disorderly mob, of nearly seven hundred, sitting in a room ridiculously, because purposely, constructed to hold not more than half that number comfortably! I suppose the Trades Congress suffered in like manner from inadequate accommodation. The People's Charter proposed to reduce the number of M. P.'s to three hundred, and that would, at least, have mitigated the evil

of the present constitution of the Lower House. Had the Trades Congress been limited to one hundred and fifty, or even one hundred members, it would have been much more likely to have exhibited the attributes of a deliberative assembly. According to some of the papers, the dockers had fifty delegates; they might with as much reason have sent five hundred. They could as well, or even better, have been represented by one-fifth of the fifty. Fulness of representation does not depend upon number, but upon proportion.

Another mistake was the crowding of what in modern parlance is termed "the agenda" with resolutions, for the discussion of which three weeks would hardly have been sufficient, into the debates of one week. Debates, properly speaking, there were none. The greater portion of time occupied by leading speakers was with personal explanations. The most important, far-reaching questions were disposed of after ten, five, and even three minutes' speeches! Considering the number of debaters who could be permitted to speak at all, the Congress might well have been reduced to fifty members, and the cost in time and money of four hundred been saved.

Could anything be more absurd than the treatment by the Congress of the co-operative deputation? The co-operators have been reproached that, intent only on the making of big dividends, they have ignored, or continually deferred, putting co-operation to the test in relation to production. I suppose it was on this most important subject that the deputation attended to express the views of the leading and most advanced co-operators. On the question whether to grant the deputation a hearing, the Congress (strange to say) was equally divided. The president got over the difficulty in a way worthy of the wisdom of King Solomon. He decided to halve the deputation and allow *one* of the two to speak five minutes. 'Five minutes! The most thoroughly informed, the most explicit of speakers, restricted to five minutes, would naturally fail to give any adequate idea of the potency of co-operation applied to production. The pretence of hearing the deputation at all was a farce.

Valuable and praiseworthy resolutions were adopted. As to others less commendable, criticism would be useless. A word or two must, however, be said in reference to the contest over the Eight Hours Question.

It seems to me much less remarkable that the "Legal Eight Hours Day" was adopted by a majority, than that the hostile minority was so large—the more remarkable as the minority was headed by delegates from Manchester, which led the way in the earlier struggles for the reduction of the hours of labor; and, more, Manchester was the first place where journalistic and organised efforts were made in favor of eight hours, nearly sixty years ago.

My sympathies are with the eight hours advocates; but every thinking man must admit that the grave doubts and objections, not of capitalists, but of the workers represented by the minority in the Congress, are not to be set aside by the vote of a triumphant majority, the waving of hats, and loud hurrahs. Speech-making as at present abused is the curse of the land. But it does not follow that so important a question as that of eight hours should be decided upon after some half-dozen speeches of ten or five minutes each. Not the most able and terse of speakers could do justice to such a theme in any such time. Considering the far-reaching consequences—whether for good (as I believe) or for evil (as many fear)—of the adoption of the eight hours system, a week's discussion, calm and deliberate, would not have been an hour's waste of time before the president rose from his seat to put the question to the vote.

Last week I asked: Does the "People's Parliament," the Trades Congress, the direct representative of labor, present a more hopeful aspect than is presented by the House of Commons? I am sorry I cannot answer in the affirmative. But there will yet be time and abundant opportunity to guard against a repetition of the mistakes of the Liverpool Congress. If the trades desire a representative body which shall impress society at large and receive the country's endorsement, the delegates must be reduced to a number fitted to constitute a deliberative assembly; and the time for deliberation must not be restricted to the Procrustean limits of a week's discussion. So, haply, may be avoided the regrettable excitement, scenes of disorder, and most of the unsatisfactory procedure of the recent Congress.

The late Prince Consort, on a memorable occasion, observed that Parliamentary institutions were on their trial. Democracy—political and social—is now on its trial. Let not misgiving stifle hope. Let us rather cling to the belief that—despite regrettable incidents of the passing moment—the time will come—

When the despot and the anarchy alike shall pass away:
And morn shall break, and man awake in the light of a fairer day.

THE AMERICAN IDEAL.*

BY DR. PAUL CARUS.

THE United States of North America is a nation without a name. Poets hail our country Columbia, and Europeans call us simply Americans. Yet these appellations are not, properly speaking, names. Attempts have been made to provide the nation with a name, yet so far all the attempts have proved failures.

We need not care about a name. When we need a name, it will be given us. Much more difficult would

* Reprinted from *America*.

it be to give ideals to a nation ; yet luckily, although we are a nation without a name, we are not a nation without ideals.

We have high and great ideals, although they are neglected and forgotten by many ; and some of our most influential politicians treacherously trample them under foot. We can say without boasting that our ideals are the noblest, the broadest, the loftiest of any in the world.

Our ideals are sublime because they are humanitarian, and thus this great republic of the West has become a bulwark against the evil powers of inherited errors and false conservatism. So long as it shall remain faithful to the principles upon which its constitution is founded, this republic will be a promise and a hope for the progress of mankind.

There is a prejudice in Europe against the ideals of America. It is fashionable in the old countries to represent Europe as the continent of ideal aspirations while America is described as the land where the dollar is almighty. Germans most of all are apt to praise the fatherland as the home of the ideal while the new world is supposed to be the seat of realistic avarice and egotism.

This is neither fair nor true, for there are as many and as great sacrifices made for pure ideal ends on this side of the Atlantic as on the other side. We maintain that Europe is less ideal than America. If impartial statistics could be compiled of all the gifts and legacies made for the public benefit, for artistic, scientific, and religious purposes, the American figures would by far exceed those of all Europe. In Germany the government has to do everything. It has to build the churches, to endow the universities, to create industrial and art institutions. If the government would not do it, all ideal work would be neglected, science would have to go begging, and the church would either pass out of existence or remain for a long time in a most wretched and undignified position. This state of affairs is not at all due to a lack of idealism among the people of the old world, but is a consequence of the paternal care of the government. The government provides for the ideal wants of its subjects ; so they get accustomed to being taken care of. There is scarcely anybody who considers it his duty to work for progress, except where he cannot help it, in his private business, in industrial and commercial lines. Scarcely anybody thinks of making a sacrifice for art, science, or the general welfare, and science and general welfare are looked upon as the business of kings and magistrates.

We live in a republic and the ideals of republican institutions are a sacred inheritance from the founders of this nation. We are no subjects of a czar or emperor, for in a republic every citizen is a king ; and

the government is the employé of the citizens. The highest officer of our government, the president of the United States is proud, when leaving the White House, of having tried to be a faithful public servant promoting the general welfare according to his best ability.

It is true that we are far—very far, from having realised our ideals. Our politics are full of unworthy actions, and many things happen of which we are or should be ashamed that they are possible at all in the home of the brave and the free. It is true also that many of our laws, far from expressing a spirit of justice and goodwill towards all mankind, are dictated by greed and egotism ; further it is true that national chauvinism and national vanity go so far as to make any, even the sincerest, criticism of our national faults odious. Nevertheless we have our ideals and our ideals may be characterised in the one word humanitarianism.

How many there are who believe in the beneficial influence of petty advantages, unfairly gained by giving up the higher standard of justice and right ! How many there are who suppress the cosmopolitan spirit of our ideals and foster a narrow exclusiveness which they are pleased to call patriotism. Their sort of patriotism will never benefit our country but will work it serious injury.

Our fourth of July orators pronounce too many and too brazen flatteries upon our accomplishments, and speak too little about our duties, when they represent us as that nation upon the development of which the future fate of humanity depends. There is too much talk about our freedom, as if no liberty had existed before the declaration of independence. What a degradation of the characters of our ancestry ! Was it not love of liberty that set the sails of the Mayflower, was it not love of liberty that drove so many exiles over the Atlantic. Did the love of liberty not pulsate in the hearts of all the nationalities that make up our nation ? Were not the Saxons, the Teutons, the sons of Erin, the Swiss, the French, the Italians, jealous of their liberties ? does not their history prove the pride they took in preserving their rights and securing the dignity of their manhood ? Love of liberty fought the battle of the Teutoburg forest even before the Saxon separated from his German brothers to found the English nation. Love of liberty was described by Tacitus as the national trait of the barbarians of the North whose institutions and customs and language have with certain modifications devolved upon the present generation now living in America.

Let us not undervalue our forefathers for the sake of a local patriotism ; let us fully recognise the truth that we have inherited the most valuable treasures of our national ideals from former ages. In thus understanding how our civic life is rooted in the farthest past, we

shall at the same time look with confidence into the darkness of future eras. Our present state is but a stepping stone to the realisation of higher ideals, for the possible progress of mankind is infinite and our very shortcomings remind us of the work that is still to be done.

Let us cherish that kind of patriotism which takes pride in the humanitarian ideals of our nation.

With our humanitarian ideals we shall stand, and without them we shall fall. So long as our shores remain the place of refuge for the persecuted, so long as our banner appears as the star of hope to the oppressed, and so long as our politics, our customs, our principles rouse the sympathy of liberty-loving men, our nation will grow and prosper; the spirit of progress will find here its home and the human race will reach a higher stage of development than was ever attained upon earth.

This great aim, however, can be attained only by a strong faith in the rightfulness and final triumph of the ideal, by perseverance and earnest struggle, by a holy zeal for justice in small as well as in great things, by intrepid maintenance of personal independence and freedom for every loyal citizen, and by the rigid observance of all duties political and otherwise so that the electors cast their votes in honesty and the elected fill their offices with integrity.

Historical investigations proved that the golden age must not be sought in the past. May we not hope that it lies before us in the future? Without believing in a millennium upon earth, in a state of ideal perfection, or in a heaven of unmixed happiness, we yet confidently trust that we can successfully work for the realisation of the golden age in our beloved home on the western continent—where the conditions are such as to leave no choice for two alternatives: either the uneducated classes (among whom we have to count some of our richest citizens) will with their ballots and their influence in politics ruin the country, or they will, perhaps after many dearly bought experiences, be educated up to a higher moral plane.

Let us work for the American Ideal and let us hope for the future.

CURRENT TOPICS.

AMONG the most interesting traits of a free people is the freedom to give pet names to public men, especially to prominent politicians, or candidates for office. It is a pleasant thing to live in a land of liberty where we have the privilege of scolding in poetical figures of speech the persons who differ from us in opinion, and those whom we envy or hate. We ought to prize most highly the privilege of making faces at a man who was once President of the United States, and we should appreciate the precious right to call him "the stuffed prophet," a playful nickname given him by his enemies. Let us never surrender our sovereign prerogative of marking the Secretary of the Treasury by the descriptive title "Calico Charley," even though we know not why we call him so.

The ingenuity and taste we display in christening our statesmen excite the wonder of the world, and finely illustrate that comical exuberance which we call American humor. I once knew a Senator of the United States, from one of the big states too, who probably at some time or other had a Christian name, but in the shuffles of a political career it was lost, and he was familiarly known as "Coffee Pot"; and another, who was named by his parents John James, is called by an opposition paper "Jumping Jack," for no reason in the world that I can see, except that the initials of the real name and the nickname are the same. There is, it must be admitted, some coarseness in the titles we give to prominent men; but then, look at our freedom, and the stretch of our eagle's wings. As Elijah Program remarked of the estimable Chollop, "Rough he may be. So air our Bears. Wild he may be. So air our Buffaloes. But he is a child of Natur', and a child of Freedom, and his bright home is in the Settin' Sun." Sometimes, however, the nickname is expressive and refined, as for instance, that given by Miss Anna Dickinson, the other day, to the Postmaster General, "Merciful Heavens" Wanamaker. This is a specimen of our more æsthetic style; and yet they say that Miss Dickinson is insane. I cannot believe it; and if the charge is true, then "Pity 'tis, 'tis true."

* * *

There is very often great profit in a nickname. In fact it sometimes forms the capital stock of an aspiring politician; and when he happens to be a candidate, it is worth a hatful of votes at the polls. It is most effective when it brings its lucky owner down to a picturesque level with the common people and identifies him with their manners, their hardships, and their trials. In such a case it is more impressive and captivating than the patrician designations "Baron," "Earl," or "Duke." The descriptive nickname "Railsplitter," was a prouder title—for election purposes—than any to be found in courts of chivalry. An old rail, was a more illustrious coat of arms—for a candidate—than any picture in the books of Heraldry. We do not accuse a man of statesmanship when we call him "Old Tippecanoe," and yet the musical jingle of that nickname was a potent influence in the election of two Presidents of the United States. No doubt when General Cass "run for President" in 1848, he could show a statesman's record forty years long, but what availed it when the friends of the rival "nominee" lifted the whole contest out of politics by calling their candidate "Old Rough and Ready"? By this device they took the popular imagination captive, and elected their man. Sense yields to sentiment because reality is dull to those who dig, and weave, and spin.

* * *

The comedy of the "Two Governors," now being played in the state of Nebraska, seems to be an infringement of the copyright of Pinafore. There is much pathos in that memorable scene where the gold-laced captain changes places with the common sailor on being informed by Little Buttercup that she had mixed them up when babies in such a careless way that the wrong baby got into the right place, and the right baby into the wrong place. Some people have doubted the probability of the incident illustrated in that scene, but a very close imitation of it was presented the other day in the State of Nebraska, when Governor Boyd surrendered his office and glided into private life, as soon as he found out that through some careless mixing up, he was not Governor of Nebraska, and that another man was. With every disposition to treat such a serious matter with due solemnity, I half suspect that the whole performance is another bit of American humor, and that I am the victim of a practical joke. So like broad comedy is it, that I should not be at all surprised if both Governors were to step on to the portico of the capital, and sing a comic duet, with the usual accompaniment of a double shuffle dance. It is a delightful piece of Harlequinade. Here is a man, elected Gov-

error by the people, sworn into office, and governing in style, when, Presto, he vanishes, through the window, and another man begins governing who was not elected at all. The reason given is worthy of the pantomime; it appears that the duly elected Governor was not eligible to the office because his father was only half a citizen; that is, he had been only half naturalised. He had taken out his first papers but not the second. A good deal of sympathy is felt for Governor Thayer, who has been so magically made governor. It is so uncomfortable to sit in another man's Chair of State, and to wear another man's clothes. He will probably abdicate.

* * *

In the fight at Tom Taggart's, down there in Southern Illinois, a truthful account of which may be found in the poetry of John Hay, we are informed that Col. Blood fired at Judge Flinn, and missed him, the bullet striking an innocent bystander, one of the admiring spectators of the fight. In the language of the historian, "it took Seth Bludsoe atwixt the eyes, and caused him great surprise." The surprise of Mr. Bludsoe was trifling when compared with that of Mr. Henry W. Blair, late Senator from New Hampshire, and Ambassador designate to China, when informed that the Chinese government would not receive him, because to the Chinese people he was *persona non grata*. This decision took Mr. Blair "atwixt the eyes," and caused great surprise, not only to him, but also to the President, who had commissioned him to represent the United States at the Court of China. The surprise came from the discovery that the "Heathen Chinese" had the same feelings as other people, and that the Chinese government had a sensitive National spirit. Mr. Blair, when in the Senate, had been conspicuous for his intolerance towards the Chinese. He had spoken of them always with scorn and bitterness, he had legislated harshly against them, and had inflamed the Anti-Chinese prejudices of his own countrymen. With an egotism dull as leather he affects to be astonished when the Chinese government with dignified self-respect refuses to receive him. Another surprise is this, that Mr. Blair himself did not have spirit enough to decline the mission, knowing how unwelcome he would be to the Chinese, and that he could not expect any courtesies in China except those official civilities due to him as Minister from the United States.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

WHAT SHALL IT PROFIT.

BY WILLIAM D. HOWELLS.

"If I lay waste and wither up with doubt
The blessed fields of heaven where once my faith
Possessed itself serenely safe from death;
If I deny the things past finding out;
Or if I orphan my own soul of One
That seemed a Father, and make void the place
Within me where He dwelt in power and grace,
What do I gain, that am myself undone?"

(Reprinted from *Harper's Magazine*.)

ANSWER.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

"What do I gain?" Must you be paid a price?
When did Truth barter for a man's belief?
Come she with joy we hail her, bring she grief
We hail her still; her name is our device.

She needs no cabbage-garden paradise
To feed a faith whose lingering days grow brief;
Above all saviours she shall reign the chief
Though some may sell and some deny her thrice.

"What do I gain?" O Finder of the way,
Whose white feet passing crush the seeds of doubt,
Immortal Truth, we know wherewith you pay:—

Faith in the fellowship of worlds about
This flower of thought that lives in human clay,
One with the soul of things past finding out.

NOTES.

We regret to learn that Mr. George Julian Harney of Richmond, England, is just now disabled by a severe attack of rheumatism. Mr. Harney is one of the most eminent of the workingmen statesmen of Great Britain, almost the last survivor of the Chartist leaders who agitated England fifty years ago, the political teachers of the Russells, and the Gladstones who have reaped where they have not sown, the harvests planted by the Chartists in toil, and sorrow, and persecution. For a long time Mr. Harney has been a contributor to the *Newcastle Chronicle*, and his articles in that paper on the labor question and the social problems are among the best in tone, temper, and instruction that we have ever read. They are, of course, not so tempestuous as the speeches he used to make in his "hot youth," but they abound in practical good sense, and they are illustrated by incidents and apt quotations drawn from a remarkable memory. His articles on "The Two Parliaments," the House of Commons, and the Labor Congress at Liverpool, are good specimens of his peculiar style. We print one of them in this issue of *The Open Court*. It would appear from this that the Labor Parliament was not much wiser or better than the other, and equally imbued with the spirit of class legislation.

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GHOSTS.

THE Norwegian poet Henrik Ibsen has written a most awe-inspiring drama under the mysterious title "Ghosts." Does this most modern author believe in spirits? Does he take us into a haunted house? Are not ghosts and haunted houses left as a survival only? O no! The ghosts of which Henrik Ibsen speaks are everywhere; they are not exceptional cases; for we ourselves are visited by the spirits of former ages; our brain is haunted by ghosts. It is full of the proclivities, the dispositions, the ideas, and the sins of our ancestors.

Mrs. Alving, the widow of a dissolute husband, and mother of a son whose life has been poisoned by his father's sin, witnesses her son's behavior in the adjoining room. It is the exact repetition of a scene in which her husband had played her son's rôle some twenty years ago. There is his ghost reappearing. In considering the weighty seriousness of the truth, that we inherit, not only the character of our ancestors, but also the curses of their sins; that all our institutions and habits are full of ideas inherited from a dead past, she says: "I am afraid of myself, because there is in me something of a ghost-like inherited tendency of which I can never free myself. . . . I almost think we are all of us ghosts. It is not only what we have inherited from father and mother that reappears in us, it is all kinds of dead old beliefs and things of that sort. These ghosts are not the living substance of our brain, but they are there nevertheless and we cannot get rid of them. When I take up a newspaper to read, it is as though I saw ghosts speaking in between the lines. There must be ghosts all over the country. They must be as thick as the sands of the sea."

It is perfectly and literally true that our soul is haunted by ghosts; nay, our entire soul consists of ghosts. Our brain is the trysting place where they meet and live; where they grow and combine, and in their combinations they propagate, they create new thoughts which according to their nature will be beneficent or baneful.

What are these ghosts? They are our experiences, the impressions of our surroundings upon the sentient living substance of our existence. They are the reactions that take place upon the impressions of our surroundings; they are our yearnings and cravings; they

are our thoughts and imaginations. They are our errors and vices, our hopes and our ideals.

Henrik Ibsen shows that the ghosts which are the inherited sins of our fathers lead unto death. What an overwhelming and horrific scene is the end of the drama, where the son asks his mother to hand him the poison in case the awful disease will pass upon him which will soften his brain and spread the eternal night of imbecility over his soul. The mother in her anxiety to calm her son's wild fancies, promises to do so: "Here is my hand upon it," she says, with a trembling voice: "I will—if it becomes necessary. But it will not become necessary. No, no! It will never become a possibility."

There is a law of the conservation of matter and energy; but there is also a law of the conservation of the stuff that ghosts are made of. The law holds good not only in the material world, but in the spiritual world also. Every vice transmits its curse; and the moment comes when the unfortunate mother has to face the fatal attack of the terrible disease.

The heroine of the drama, the innocent and wretched mother had sought help of the clergyman—the man whom she had loved. When her husband had betrayed her, had poisoned her in her youth, she fled to him in wild excitement and cried: "Here I am, take me!" But the clergyman's stern virtue had turned her away from his door, and he prevailed upon her to remain a dutiful wife to her vicious husband. She had tried to find comfort in the religious injunctions which he preached to her. She lived a life in obedience to what he represented as her duty. But now she says to him: "I began to examine your teaching in the seams. I only wished to undo a single stitch, but when I had got that undone, the whole thing came to pieces, and then I found that it was all chain-stitch sewing-machine work."

The distressed woman feels only the curse of law and order which have been invented for the salvation of mankind. Her experience leads her to trust rather in anarchy than in the threadbare superstition which our generation has in favor of the letter of the law. The sternness of virtue cannot save us, nor our blind obedience to sanctified traditions. She exclaims: "What nonsense all that is about law and order. I often think it is that which exactly causes all the mis-

eries there are in the world. I can no longer endure these bonds; I cannot! I must work my way out to freedom!"

Here lies the cure of the disease. We must work our way out to freedom. The simple method of shaking off law and order will only increase our troubles. We must learn to understand the nature of ourselves. By patient work alone can we exorcise the evil spirits that haunt our souls; and we can nourish and foster those other spirits which shower blessings upon our lives and the lives of our children. We cannot escape the natural law which, inviolate, regulates the growth of our souls; but we can accommodate ourselves to the law and the same law, that works disaster and death, will produce happiness and life.

Superabundance of life gives a power that might produce great and noble results. But when the life is stagnant as was that of Mrs. Alving's husband, a vigorous youth exuberant in strength and health, an unsatisfiable craving for pleasure takes the place of a want of activity; and instead of useful work, vicious habits are produced. The germ of many diseases is a morbid pursuit of enjoyment. Pleasure is made the aim of life, leading astray step by step into the abyss of misery and death. Not that happiness and pleasures were wrong! But it is wrong to make of them the purpose of life. Let happiness be the accompaniment of the performance of duty and happiness will follow as the shadow follows the body. If we pursue happiness, we turn our back upon the sun of life and we shall never find either satisfaction or happiness.

* * *

The law of the conservation of soul-life with its blessings and its curses has not only a gloomy side, it has also a bright side, and it behooves us when considering our heir-loom of curses, to remember that they are small in comparison to the grand inheritance of blessings which have come to us from thousands of generations. What is all our activity, our doing, and achieving, our dearest ideals—what are they but the torch of life handed down from our ancestors? Gustav Freytag, the German novelist, might also have called almost all his novels "Ghosts." Especially the "Lost Manuscript" and the series of novels called "The Ancestors" are studies illustrative of the same truth. Yet while Ibsen paints the dark side only of the law of the conservation of ideas, Gustav Freytag paints the dark and the bright sides. Gustav Freytag says:

"It is well that from us men usually remains concealed, what is inheritance from the remote past, and what the independent acquisition of our own existence; since our life would become full of anxiety and misery, if we, as continuations of the people of the past, had perpetually to reckon with the blessings and curses which former times leave hanging over the problems of our own existence. But it is indeed a joyous labor, at times, by a retrospective glance into the past, to bring into fullest consciousness the fact that

many of our successes and achievements have only been made possible through the possessions that have come to us from the lives of our parents, and through that also which the previous ancestral life of our family has accomplished and produced for us."

We have to bear the evil consequences of the vices of our ancestors, but these evils can be overcome; and when they cannot be overcome, they will after all find a termination, for death is the wages of sin.

The nature of sin is its contrariness to life; its main feature is the impossibility of a continued existence. Extinction being the natural consequence of viciousness, the wages of sin are at the same time the saviour, the redeemer from the evils of sin.

If all the parents in the whole world were like Chamberlain Alving, the ruthless father of Oswald Alving, and like Mrs. Engstrand, the frivolous mother of the coquettish girl Regina, humanity would soon come to an end. It may be that none of us is entirely free from these traits; but some of us are so more or less. In some of us these traits are mixed with ennobling features, and we are striving to overcome that which we have recognised as bad. However, nature is constantly at work to prune the growing generations. Death is the wages of sin, and the bright side of this awful truth is the constant amelioration of the race.

SOCIALISM AND TRANSCENDENTALISM.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

MORRIS, the poet, gives us in "News from Nowhere," a delightful picture of the golden future when poverty, vice, marriage, and all the other evils imposed upon man by society are to be abolished so completely, that everybody will be healthy, handsome, and fond of work. This is substantially the plan on which Brook Farm and nearly forty other communities started in this country, between 1840 and 1845, with the support of Emerson, Parker, Alcott, Hawthorne, William H. Channing, George Ripley, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth P. Peabody, James Freeman Clarke, Hedge, Higginson, Curtis, Greeley, Dwight, James, Story, Cranch, Whittier, and Lowell. Even Thoreau took a friendly interest in socialism, and there was nothing else about which these Transcendentalists agreed so generally. The system then in vogue had been announced, as a deduction from Nature's own theory, by Fourier, whose fundamental principle was inscribed upon his tomb-stone in these words: "Instincts correspond to destiny and produce harmony." No wonder that a theory thus originated had "so much truth" in the opinion of Emerson and other Transcendentalists, who knew that communities had been founded by Pythagoras, and projected by Plato and Coleridge. Marx and Lassalle have since reached similar results by *a priori* reasoning; and such conclusions proceed most legitimately from unscientific methods of thought.

The popularity of socialistic and also anarchistic writers is largely due to the boldness with which they set aside the teachings of experience and deny the value of existing institutions. What could have been more in harmony with a philosophy which placed intuition high above experience, and thought institutions much less sacred than impulses?

How speedily experience avenged herself for this neglect was shown by the failure of more than half of the Fourierite associations before they had been in operation for two years. Brook Farm lasted longer, but ended in leaving the laborers and investors unpaid; and this was the case wherever the principles of Morris and Fourier were followed out. The members were allowed to work as they chose; and they did not often choose to work hard at what needed most to be done. This was notoriously the case at Brook Farm, where the real workers, as Emerson says, were very few; and they found themselves so much in demand, that one of them has told how it was "'Burton' here and 'Burton' there," as long as he stayed. Most of the managers had no authority and showed little ability, except in cases where they enriched themselves at the community's expense. Life proved less pleasant in many of the phalansteries than in the old-fashioned family; but the main trouble was the difficulty of making both ends meet.

Whatever success has been achieved by socialistic communities is due to their having conformed so far to teachings of experience as to keep up discipline enough to compel the members to work as the rulers direct. These rulers usually serve for life, fill all vacancies among themselves and appoint subordinate officials without consulting the rest of the community, and do not even tell how much money has been earned or spent. This is substantially the plan which has been followed for nearly a hundred years by the Shakers, and also that of the Amana community which was started the same year as Brook Farm, 1842, and is, I think, still prosperous. One of the Amana overseers admitted to Mr. Nordhoff, author of "The Communist Societies of the United States," that three hired men would do as much work as five or six of the brethren; and a similar confession was made to him in a Shaker village. This deficiency is, however, made up partly by making all purchases with great care at wholesale prices, and partly by enforcing rigid economy and abstinence from luxuries. The practice of the necessary economy, diligence, and obedience has been greatly facilitated by religious zeal; and there has been at least one case in which lack of this bond made it impossible to tolerate the severity of management under which the community was actually growing rich. (See the chapter on the Wisconsin Phalanx in Noyes's "History of American Socialisms.")

It has of course been much easier for a village to keep up the strict discipline necessary for success in socialism than it would be for a great nation. Any form of communism, which might be imposed upon our people by a revolutionary minority, or even by a majority vote, would encounter millions of opponents, who would soon be joined by men who had been socialists on account of a restlessness which would make the new restraint insupportable. Still other millions of people would keep on trying, as they do now, to get a living with as little labor as possible. The discipline, necessary to make this mass of sluggishness and hostility sufficiently productive, would have to be cruelly severe. The lash would be as busy in the industrial army as it ever was on a Southern plantation; and it must be remembered that all the horrors of slavery could not make negro labor as efficient as it is now under freedom of competition. A still greater obstacle to the success of an industrial army of sixty million soldiers would be the difficulty of finding competent commanders. When we think how hard this was thirty years ago, we cannot suppose that it would be easy now. Our system of electing rulers and appointing officials has not proved such a brilliant success, that we could rely upon it for placing all our farms, factories, stores, railroads, and other industries under such able managers as not to run serious risk of national bankruptcy. The more these industries are concentrated, the greater will be the difficulty of successful management. At present, competition increases or diminishes the power of each employer of labor, according as he succeeds or fails in employing it efficiently. The man who knows best how to run a small factory makes it a great one; and thus the place is filled much more suitably than could be done by a popular election or a government appointment. Thus competition is the test of competency; and no other test has been found equal to the needs of large business interests. The nationalists have not persuaded our people that our railroads can be made less dangerous by letting the superintendents be appointed with no particular reference to qualifications, and dismissed every four years. Scientific methods of thought are now so much in honor, that socialism is not likely to regain the popularity which it enjoyed before the Fourierite bubble burst. Glorious results will be achieved by reformers who work patiently by the light of experience; but no hasty theorist is going to turn the world upside down.

WALLACE ON DARWINISM.

BY J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

It is generally acknowledged that Professor Russel Wallace discovered simultaneously with Charles Darwin the theory of evolution. In the preface of a popular book recently put forth by his publishers he mod-

ently terms his researches "Darwinism," thus yielding to the great naturalist the honor which ought equally to attach itself to his name. As a scientific work it is thorough-going and conclusive. His knowledge is immense, his style simple, his logic irresistible. As a text-book of the doctrine which it seeks not only to further popularise but to substantiate by the latest scientific discoveries, it is a brilliant compendium of Charles Darwin's two great books—"The Origin of Species" and "The Descent of Man." It is more than this. It boldly and intelligently enters a field which other celebrated naturalists refused even to touch and draws conclusions as to the ethical aspect, or fatality of the doctrine as applied to man. In fact it is a forcible accessory to the doctrine of optimism which for generations asserted itself in Christian polemics and, in a vague but certain manner, dominated Greek and Oriental philosophy. Professor Wallace admits that he has differences, that his differences in many respects clash with the minor assertions of his beloved co-worker, Charles Darwin; but he announces that his entire work tends forcibly to illustrate the overwhelming importance of natural selection over all other agencies in the production of new species. It has been urged as a palpable objection to Darwin's work, that he founded his theory on the evidence of variation in domesticated animals and cultivated plants; and from this field of inference built up the generalisation which made the doctrine of evolution a method of the universe. Professor Wallace, primarily, seeks to prove the theory by a direct reference to the variations of organisms in a state of nature and hence his labors are the more interesting and valuable because of the objections raised against Darwin's alternative. Hence, whatever defects exhibited themselves in the *modus operandi* of Charles Darwin are in this book noticeably absent and the way is paved for continued triumphs which "Darwinism" as a doctrine has already achieved.

Two suggestions which Professor Wallace makes are particularly worthy of notice, altogether because they are facts which underlie the present social order and which are inexcusably forgotten in much of the current discussion of social and religious questions. In fact they are—the one an objection to the Malthusian doctrine of population which Darwin seemed to hint at, that population tends to increase faster than subsistence; and the other, the necessary development or contingency of that part of Darwin's work, which he seemed timid of asserting, or disqualified by his own testimony in his "Autobiography" to argue—the optimism which groups and centres the phenomena of nature about the benevolence of God or what most of us mean when we say God. It is needless to say that these facts are interdependent and would associate

themselves in any thoughtful mind. It is also needless to remark that they circumscribe the problem of evil (which has always puzzled humanity) and the problem of eschatology about which sectarian Christianity has had so much wrangling. It would not be irrelevant to the general discussion to observe that I take for granted the doctrine of evolution, reaffirming Professor Wallace's revolutionary postulates.

Malthus found no greater advertiser of his cruel doctrine than Charles Darwin who, in the third chapter of his "Origin of Species" maintains that the struggle for existence is "the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms." Hence our own Agassiz, for he was Americanised enough to be called our own, bitterly opposed "Darwinism" chiefly if not altogether because it conflicted with his notion of a benevolent supreme being and seemed to be, to use his own language, "Malthus all over." To Malthus we are indebted for one of those high sounding formulas—the geometrical and arithmetical ratios—by which the misery of the many seem to be naturally justified, and which among a vast number of people, as J. S. Mill declares, carries far more weight than the clearest reasoning. It is to quote Mr. Mill again "an unlucky attempt to give precision to things which do not admit of it, which every person capable of reasoning must see is wholly superfluous to the argument." And yet Mr. Mill accepted the theory that population tends to increase beyond the means of subsistence. Now Professor Wallace vigorously opposes this view of the universe. He indirectly touches upon the subject in what may yet prove to be an axiom, that the tendency everywhere in nature is to give to animals "the maximum of life and the enjoyment of life with the minimum of suffering and pain." This conclusion in itself carries great weight in as much that, as an indirect argument, it can be employed very effectively against the Malthusian doctrine. For if the reverse were true, if the tendency of nature to furnish animals with the minimum of life and the enjoyment of life or the maximum of suffering and pain, a doctrine which hinting at the method of the universe, Malthus seemed to think was the fatality of all animal creation, then Professor Wallace's work is in vain. Then is God not benevolent but omnipotent and his caprice our inexplicable damnation. The fact is as Professor Wallace has shown that there are innumerable barriers erected by nature herself among her own offspring for the possession of the very thing Malthus and Darwin mournfully despair of, and that everywhere in the sudden catastrophies which befall and accompany animals in their growth and history, catastrophies in which whole species of animals are annihilated, the tendency if not the actual law of the universe is, to ameliorate

the suffering and destroy the pain of the unfortunate. What has usually been supposed to be horrible and agonising pain among the lower animals chiefly, is, in reality, nothing of the kind but is the picturesque fancies of our own pathetic nature—a fact which many of us can testify in our own experience. And along this line Professor Wallace proves conclusively that it is the fear of death as a dreaded crisis among men and a partial cause of much needless and anticipated pain which, horrifying the human mind, makes many imagine must be the *actual condition* among the animal families in the war for the survival of the fittest. And he states that as the death of animals is generally un-anticipatory and in nearly all cases immediate and not lingering, the fact of their terrible pain is at once preposterous conjecture if not an impossibility. Why some animals should die that others might live is a question which no one has been able to explain yet because it is so is no reason for affirming that the method is derogatory to any animal's happiness or pleasure. It is a presumption which has no foundation in reason—is built upon sophistry and is a part of that pseudo science which has found apologists in every age and among every civilised people on the globe. The fact is as Professor Wallace admits that this daily and hourly struggle, this incessant warfare, is nevertheless the very means by which much of the beauty and harmony and enjoyment in nature is produced, and also affords one of the most important elements in bringing about the origin of species. He adds weight to what some might call his speculative moralising by asserting in contradistinction to Malthus and Darwin that "while the offspring always exceed the parents in number, generally to an enormous extent, *yet the total number of living organisms in the world does not, and cannot, increase year by year.*" "Consequently," he continues, "every year, on the average, as many die as are born, plants as well as animals; and the majority die premature deaths." Of course this fact does not disprove at a single stroke what Winwood Reade writes in his "Martyrdom of Man,"* nor does it furnish any adequate explanation of this very condition he bewails but it disproves the theory of Malthus and hence destroys the lofty superstructure of sophistry which was built upon the assertion that as population tends to increase, the power of subsistence tends to decrease or to be inadequate. Hence the claim made by a rising political economist that poverty as the failure of nature to meet the requirements of an ever increasing population, is a gross

* "Pain, grief, disease and death, are these the inventions of a loving God? That no animal shall rise to excellence except by being fatal to the life of others, is this the law of a kind Creator? It is useless to say that pain has its benevolence, that massacre has its mercy. Why is it so ordained that bad should be the raw material of good? Pain is not the less pain because it is conducive to development. Here is blood upon the hand still and all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten it."

misrepresentation of nature, a caricature of the creator's beneficence, the very opposite of which being really the case, that there is plenty of provision for all the natural wants of animal creation.

When we ascend from such considerations up into the greater thought of an optimism which such facts employ, an interpretation of the universe from the standpoint of benevolence will not seem impertinent. The great conflict in which nations of men and species of animals were actors, has been the means of developing a higher plane and multiplying opportunities for life's enjoyment. The truth is very much as Professor Wallace has stated, that all the slow growths of our race struggling toward a higher life, all the agony of martyrs, all the groans of victims, all the evil and misery and undeserved suffering of the ages, all the struggles for freedom, all the efforts toward justice, all the aspirations for virtue and the wellbeing of humanity, in fact the whole purpose, the only *raison d'être* of the world, with all its complexities of physical structures, with its grand geological progress, the slow evolution of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, is the development of the human spirit in direction of its perfect and perpetual happiness. Professor Wallace has no suggestions to offer on the reconstruction of the universe, although he recognises his utter inability to explain away the fact that pain and pleasure are not one and the same thing—a conclusion to which many philosophers, chiefly Hegelians, give their support. For viewing any and all sensations in man as conditioning some immediate or future beneficent object, Professor Wallace was but carrying out the *a priori* assumption of God's benevolence to its legitimate end when he stated that beings thus trained and strengthened by their surroundings, are surely destined for a higher and more permanent existence than the one in which they now live, and we may confidently believe, he concludes, with our greatest living poet:

"That life is not as idle ore,
But iron dug from central gloom,
And heated hot with burning fears,
And dipped in baths of hissing tears,
And batter'd with the shocks of doom
To shape and use."

There can be no philosophy of life more sound and rational than that one, which being designated "Optimism," traces in the method of the universe, the benevolence of God, and dares to affirm that all things work together for good—that love and the issue of the universe is correlative and at one—that our pleasures are proportioned to the planes upon which we live—that our wills are ours we know not how perhaps, but they are ours to make them what God intended they should be. Into this obscure realm of thinking, where many intellectual giants have become lost, where many millions of earth's children have

buried their hopes in despair and where religion has proven in many instances to be but a will-o'-the-wisp to tempt man to leap from the edge of a sword into a fool's paradise, Shakespeare flashes a light when he says :

"There is nothing good or bad,
But thinking makes it so."

The whole scheme of life—whatever may be the issue—is a fatality approved if not ordained for the wellbeing and eternal happiness of mankind. And it is a matter of small importance whether we stand weeping in utter despair at the order of the universe, or whether like a famous Athenian philosopher we laugh at the follies of man ; for by taking thought we cannot add one cubit to our stature nor change the universe one iota, and we act and shall continue to act, whether through wisdom, sophistry, or prompted by our mechanism, forever in the direction of perfect happiness. For this end Professor Wallace seems to believe our life is destined. And judging by the efforts which many are making to-day to develop paradise among us, we are on the high way to a joy in which many instead of a few will find satisfaction, and by which "Darwinism" truly shall see its final earthly triumph.

ETHICS IN OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

The Voice of New York has published a symposium on the question "Should ethics be taught in our Public Schools? If so, How?" The answers given are mostly affirmative, yet they vary greatly concerning the method of teaching ethics. The answers follow here in concise extracts.

Mr. Amos M. Kellogg, editor of *The School Journal* says, "A school that does not teach ethics or morality is to be avoided." A moral act is defined as "a fitting act. It fits the case we are in that we reverence our maker," etc. "Happiness and joy come to those who do the fitting thing."

The editor of *The Open Court* demands that all instruction should be education, and the purpose of all education is to teach man right conduct. Special lessons in morality might be helpful, but since nothing is so apt to become tiresome as moralising, especially gifted teachers would be required. Morality being applied religion, a difficulty in teaching ethics naturally rises wherever people have different religions. The introduction of ethics in our public schools will accordingly lead to a neglect of the properly sectarian element of religious doctrines and gradually produce a common and universal religion. This will be the Religion of Science.

Dr. R. B. Westbrook, the President of the American Secular Union advocates the teaching of secular morality in our state schools. "There is in every child," he says, "a natural sense of oughtness, of duty ; to do right because it is right and because it is most conducive to happiness. To avoid wrong because it is wrong and is sure to result in misery ; this constitutes natural morality—that is secular morality ; and there is no other."

John Bacon, D. D., Ex-President of the Wisconsin State University, recognises the need of teaching ethics. Concerning the how to teach it, he emphasises the spirit in which the daily duties are performed and the healthy tone of the school sustained. Moral teaching should be "constant but never obtrusive." The teachers must freely use "the spiritual convictions." It is a folly for the

teacher to neglect the religious impressions, and it is still greater folly to require him to pass them by.

Professor Felix Adler, of the Society for Ethical Culture, expresses his unwillingness to join in the discussion, because "the time has not yet come for the public agitation of this matter." The right text-books must first be written and if ethical teaching is prematurely introduced into the public schools, it will become a source of danger. Sects will try to introduce their sectarian religious teachings, or it may also be used by crude radicals to introduce radical ideas under the cover of moral teaching. The kind of moral instruction given in the public schools should be strictly and absolutely neutral with regard to all questions of metaphysics and theology. Prof. Adler advises us to proceed with great caution in agitating this matter.

The Rev. Charles G. Ames, of Boston, says : "The ethical element enters synthetically as oxygen into the air we breathe. To administer it separately has not been found to agree with the constitutional craving of children who hate preachiness." The moral sentiments require gracious, tender handling, and are touched most powerfully (1) by a loving personality, (2) by the atmosphere and sunshine of good example, (3) by the continuous discipline of active duty.

Mr. Austin Bierbower of Chicago, Ill., the author of a text-book on ethics, says : "It is not necessary to teach religion in the public schools even if religion be necessary for moral training. . . . While religion presents a basis for morality, and offers some additional motives, these can be taught in connection with the teaching of religion (in the church and Sunday school) and need not be presented in the teaching of ethics any more than the metaphysical basis need be taught, or any more than the religious bearings of geology need be taught in teaching that science."

Mr. T. B. Wakeman desires that "we should have a secular system of education, just as we have a secular system of government. . . . But it is said that a general agreement cannot be obtained as to the means of such education. Let us try and see it!"

Mr. B. O. Flower, the editor of *The Arena*, says : "The great fundamental principle of morals can be developed independent of any dogmatic or theological speculations. . . . To most effectually teach ethics in schools it seems to me that we should have a systematic course of training in which the cardinal virtues should be impressed on the plastic mind of the child. . . . Next we could have ethics laid down in text-books and illustrated by striking incidents in history and biography." Music and hygiene should also form a part of the ethical education.

Josiah Strong, D. D., Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, demands that Church and State be kept entirely separate, but that we must distinguish between church and religion. Ethical instruction in the public schools, he says, "cannot even be avoided. . . . Ought ethical instruction to include religion? I answer no, not for the sake of religion ; and yes, for the sake of morals. . . . Religion alone affords adequate motives to the practice of moral precepts"—these motives being "the existence of God, the immortality of man, and man's accountability."

The Rt. Rev. Thomas Preston, a Catholic prelate, says that "morality and religion cannot be properly separated. . . . ethics must be taught and with it the principles of religion. . . . But ethics cannot be taught in the public schools without offending many citizens who support these schools. . . . They must be stripped of every reference to ethics or moral principles, and society must look out for itself as to the observance of its own laws."

Mrs. Abby Morton Diaz shows a strong antipathy to text-books. "Text-books?" she says. "Printed lessons in morals? By no means!"

J. W. Bashford, D. D., President of Ohio Wesleyan College, says : "Ethics rest upon a scientific basis and scholars have as much right to be taught this as any other science. . . . We ac-

cept Daniel Webster's authority that the state has not abandoned all moral functions. . . . It is not inconsistent for the teachers of the state to recognise the existence of God." As to ethics, he adds, "I prefer it to be taught only incidentally and in a fragmentary manner."

* * *

Does not this symposium prove that we cannot teach ethics without coming in conflict with some religious views? Indeed we cannot teach ethics without teaching religion—religion being the basis of morality.

By religion we do not understand a system of church doctrines, not the sectarianism of special revelations. Religion is cosmical in its character. We may briefly define religion as our aspiration to live in accord with truth. There is but one religion, viz. that of truth. There are not several contradictory truths, there is but one truth, and we have to search for truth, to inquire into it, to reason it out with all the means at our disposal, in a word we have to find it just as we have to discover natural laws.

The attempt to teach ethics—so-called pure ethics—without finding out the facts upon which ethical rules of conduct are grounded, without having first discovered the natural laws of ethics, will be of little use. It would be like teaching descriptive geometry to pupils who have no idea of geometry itself, its definitions, its theorems, and its methods. On the other hand it will be found to be impossible to teach ethics and leave religious doctrines alone. Ethics is not based upon theological speculations, it is not based upon dogmatical religion. But for that very reason rational ethics must come into conflict with the irrational ethics of an erroneous religiosity. There are enthusiasts who believe that ethics can be taught without coming in conflict with religion (viz. dogmatic religion). They are as much mistaken as would be an advocate of republicanism in a country where there are several royal and imperial pretenders to the throne, trusting that the republic can be introduced without coming in conflict with the assumptions of the pretenders. Religion has no sense unless it be a guide through life, a regulation of conduct, a basis of ethics. The Rt. Rev. Thomas Preston is fully consistent when he declares that morality and religion cannot be properly separated and ethics cannot be taught in the public schools without offending many citizens who support those schools.

Let us not disguise the truth and let us plainly understand the consequences of this proposition. Ethics based upon the facts of life, natural ethics, or ethics as a science (whatever you may be pleased to call the ideal of humanitarian morality) will introduce a new religion, or rather it will purify and reform the old views. It will destroy their errors, their superstitions, their paganism, yet it will bring out more clearly than ever the purely religious kernel of the old religions, it will widen the sects into truly cosmical congregations, not pretending to be catholic, but being catholic, in the original sense of the word.

What will decide the final outcome of this problem that now agitates so powerfully the public mind? The answer is very simple. The question will be decided by a survival of the fittest. If ethics can be taught only through the instrumentalities of church doctrines, the old dogmatic religions will survive. If ethics can best be taught without inquiring into the why of ethics, without basing it (assisted by either science or religion) upon any foundation, pure ethics will survive. But if it is possible to base ethics upon the data of experience so as to derive the rules of conduct from the facts of reality, we shall see in the near future the rise of the religion of science. If the religion of science is possible, (not a religion according to the views of Auguste Comte which is artificial and an imitation of Romanism, but a simple religion of truth,) if it be possible to transform and to reform any old religion so as to become a religion of science whose highest doctrine is to find the truth and to be guided by the truth alone, there is no

doubt that this religion of truth will conquer in the end. It will prove in the long run the strongest, it will come out victorious in the struggle with its competitors and it will be the fittest to survive.

P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SENSIBILITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :—

It is one of the strangest inconsistencies of our age, permeated as it is with philosophic tendencies, that notwithstanding the extraordinary confusion which arises whenever Metaphysical, Psychological or Philosophical questions are discussed,—owing to the extreme ambiguities of language,—there has as yet never been any persistent attempt to remedy the evil. I say no persistent attempt, because although one very vigorous effort has been made it has unfortunately never been seconded. Why it should be so, it is hard to say. It is true that metaphysicians with a strong theological bias, (I prefer the term theological to dualistic, because it more clearly indicates the real animus which induces certain writers to do their best to perpetuate the confusion,) would find their occupation gone if the nomenclature of philosophy were made as precise as that of science.

The one effort to secure greater precision in the use of terms was made by George Henry Lewes; indeed it was an aim he never ceased to have in view in all his philosophical writings. Many before him had complained of the ambiguities of language, —even among those who profited by the confusion,—but by no one has the resulting mischief been so clearly pointed out, and by no one beside him has such an effort been made to remove it.

Lewes says, "Physical Basis of Mind," p. 322, of the principal psychological terms, for example: "They are employed by different writers, and are understood by different readers, in widely different senses; they denote and connote meanings of various significance. All physicists mean the same thing when they speak of weight, mass, momentum, electricity, heat, etc. All chemists mean the same thing when they speak of affinity, decomposition, oxygen, carbonic acid, etc. All physiologists mean the same thing when they speak of muscle, nerve, nutrition, secretion, etc., but scarcely any two psychologists mean precisely the same thing when they speak of sensation, feeling, thought, volition, consciousness, etc., and these differences of connotation and denotation lead to endless misunderstandings." In another place he admits that "language was formed long before psychology began to interpret mental processes; we have accepted the terms in use, all that we can do is to point out their ambiguities."

There cannot be any doubt that one of the most, if not the most ambiguous of these terms is the term Consciousness. So all pervading is the mischief resulting from the different senses in which this word is employed that I am induced to quote once more Lewes's condemnation of it. He says ("Problems," Vol. iii, p. 143): "Whoever reflects on the numerous ambiguities and misapprehensions to which this term gives rise will regret that it cannot be banished altogether, but since it cannot be banished, our task must be to attempt to give it precise meanings. Generally the term is synonymous with feeling, i. e. sentience; only in this sense may we define psychology to be the science of the facts of consciousness." Now it is in this sense that Lewes believes it would be wise not to employ the term at all, although he adds (p. 152): "Having thus endeavored to explain why it is desirable not to make the term conscious states and sentient states equivalent, . . . let me now add that it will be difficult if not impossible to avoid the occasional use of the term consciousness as the equivalent of sentience owing to the language of philosophers and ordinary writers having so thoroughly identified them."

Mrs. Alice Bodington (*The Open Court*, No. 184) is so far right then in thinking it would have been better to replace both sensibility and consciousness by the Anglo-Saxon word "feeling," though even here we should not altogether escape analogous ambiguities. Sentience (as the subjective aspect of sensibility) would, I think, be better still, and then—as Mrs. Bodington will, I think, perceive—she would be absolutely correct in declining to "see any break throughout the animal kingdom." "Consciousness (sentience) is found from the protozoön to the human infant; and as the brain (nervous mechanism) of the infant matures, gradually expands in the highest cerebral centres into self-consciousness (into the full light of consciousness)."

Mrs. Bodington "cannot conceive of sensibility without consciousness." This obviously depends upon whether consciousness is used in the wider or more restricted, special sense. That the "limb" below the seat of injury in the spine exhibits sentience is obvious, but that it should exhibit consciousness is impossible since it is severed from the organ of consciousness as completely as if amputated.

I have to thank Mrs. Bodington for her extremely courteous reply to my criticism, which I assure her was not penned with the view of inflicting any "vexation"; nor are the further remarks I would beg to offer upon one or two points in her present letter. Mrs. Bodington defines "sensibility as the function of the peripheral sensory nerves which convey impressions made by the outer world to the mysterious energy we know as consciousness." Will Mrs. B. pardon me if I ask her to reflect for awhile on this use of the word "energy" as a synonym for consciousness? I would also ask her to consider whether it is really desirable to "restore to its old dominion" the idea of "a simple supreme ego" as an "entity." I put the queries with all respect, and with a good deal of confidence, because Mrs. Bodington herself displays so well the true scientific spirit when she says that "it is not what one would like to be true, but what is in point of fact the truth."

J. HARRISON ELLIS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

DRAMATIC SKETCHES AND POEMS. By *Louis J. Block*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1891.

This is a very pretty book, finely printed and elegantly bound. Its contents are of unequal merit. As verses they are well enough, but some of them will hardly rank as "Poems." They are lame in the feet; having too many, or too few. Prose versified remains prose, even when the metre is even and the cadence true. The tone of these verses is good, although their time is often bad. They soar aloft at the beginning, but seem unable to stay long upon the wing, and drop like a wounded bird. For instance, in the verses to "Success":

"He has failed, you say:
From the rise to the set of day
His name is not heard:
He has abandoned his lofty schemes
He is lost in idle dreams.
The event has not occurred,
His star is not seen in the sky
There is nothing left him save to die."

Now, if the beginning of that were accepted as good poetry, the sixth line would convert it into feeble prose, "The event has not occurred." "Wild wind of the North," ends better than it begins, and most of it is of a higher quality than much that passes for poetry in these days. The same praise may be given to some other pieces in the book; but what shall be said of this, the conclusion of "Resurgence"?

"Take thou the day and the hour; what though the sun is hidden, what though the clouds are weaving their gray and gloomy engirdment for the pale welkin, what though the air is solemn and

heavy, life, and time, and labor remain thee, and, in the spring-time, swift memorial gleams of the sweet-voiced times which return not, clouds in flocks o'ertravelling the deep blue concave, blossoms, birds, and winds, in whose hearts reposes the measureless sunshine."

All that is prose; its incoherency in places does not convert it into poetry, neither does the breaking of it into blank verse. Some of the pieces give promise that the author will do better by and by.

M. M. T.

NOTES.

Rev. J. C. F. Grumbine proposes in the present number his optimistic views concerning evolution as well as the Deity that shaping the ends of our destinies produces evolution. He bases his belief upon the authority of Professor Wallace and his trust in the benevolence of God—which latter, however, is the assumption to be proved. Mr. Grumbine's philosophy "dares to affirm that all things work together for good" and by good is apparently understood "happiness." This view is a modernised Deism which we are fully convinced is untenable, in its crudest form of the eighteenth century as well as its more refined form of the nineteenth century. The idea of a benevolent Deity (whatever that term may mean, either a personal God or the factors of evolution in nature) stands in a palpable contradiction to the facts of all experience—if benevolent means that God cares for the sufferings of his creatures and wills their happiness so as to procure as many pleasures for them as possible. God, or nature, or the factors of evolution take care that there is no stagnation in life, in history and in evolution in general. Far from being benevolent, the Deity of the world is stern to cruelty. We have more fully expressed our view on the subject in a former article of ours, "The Rise of Consciousness," pp. 363-369 of *The Soul of Man*.

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THE DIVINE AND THE HUMAN IN RELIGION.*

BY PROF. F. MAX MUELLER.

It should be remembered that in no religion was the abyss which separated the Divine from the human greater than in that of the Jews. Their conception of the Divine was completely transcendent. The idea of anything approaching deification was blasphemy in the eyes of the Jews. Adam, though created by Jehovah, was never called the Son of God, in a genealogical sense, except in the Gospel of Luke, and that Jesus called himself the Son of God was enough to condemn him to death. It was among the Jews where the two ideas of the Divine and human had been most widely wrenched apart that we witnessed the strongest reaction. The desire for nearness to God, likeness to God, oneness with God, might be suppressed for a time, but it was always there. Though the Jew lay prostrate before Jehovah, yet his heart always panted for him; and it was the Jew who, in the great history of the world, was destined to solve the riddle of the Divine in man. It was the soil of Jewish thought that gave birth to the truest conception of the relation between the Divine in nature and the Divine in man.

In what I am going to say I shall pay little regard to the miraculous events in which the birth of that concept was supposed to have been manifested. What are those miraculous wrappings to us? When the Divine in the outward world had once been fully recognised there could be nothing more or less Divine, nothing more or less miraculous either in nature or in history. Those who assigned a Divine and miraculous character to certain consecrated events in the history of the world only, were in great danger of desecrating thereby the whole drama of history and of making it not only profane but godless.

Is this a pantheistic view? It is pantheistic in the best sense of the word, so much so that any other view would soon become atheistic. The choice lies between pantheism and atheism. If anything, the greatest or the smallest, could ever happen without the will of God, then God is no longer God. To distinguish between a direct and indirect influence of the Divine, to admit a general and a special providence, is like a relapse into polytheism, a belief in one or many gods.

* From the last Gifford Lecture, a report of which appeared first in the *Christian World*.

What we call Christianity embraced several fundamental doctrines, and one of these is the recognition of the Divine in man, or, as we call it, the belief in the divinity of the Son. The belief in God, in God the Father, or the Creator and Ruler of the World, had been elaborated by the Jews. It was ready to hand. Greek and Roman, most of the civilised and uncivilised nations of the world, had arrived at it. But when the founder of Christianity called God his Father, and not only his Father, but the Father of all mankind, he no longer spoke the language of the Jews. For them to claim divine sonship would have been blasphemy. Nor should he speak the language of the Greeks. To them divine sonship would have meant no more than a miraculous mythological event, such as the birth of Hercules. He spoke a new language, a language liable, no doubt, to be misunderstood, as was all language, but a language which to those who understood it had imparted a new glory to the face of the whole world.

It is well known how this event, the discovery of the Divine in man, which involved a complete change in the spiritual condition of mankind, and marked the great turning point in the history of the world, had been surrounded by a legendary halo, had been obscured and changed into a splendid mythology, so that its real meaning had often been quite forgotten, and had to be discovered again by honest and fearless seeking. Christ had to speak the language of his time, but he gave a new meaning to it; and yet that language had often retained its old discarded meaning in the minds of his earliest, nay sometimes of his latest, disciples also. The Divine Sonship of which he spoke was not blasphemy, as the Jews thought; it was not mythology, as so many of his own followers imagined and still imagine.

The two words Father and Son seemed the best known of our language, and yet it would be difficult to find two words more full of mystery even in their everyday acceptance. Nothing seemed more natural than to apply these words to God and man. The expression had become so familiar that we hardly realised that it is, and could only be, a metaphor. And yet it was really the boldest metaphor in the whole of human language.

True sonship depended on knowledge. A man

might be a son of a king, but if he was brought up by an old shepherd with his other children he was a shepherd boy, not a prince. And yet as soon as he discovered and knew that the king was his father, and not the shepherd, he at once became a prince, he felt himself a prince, the son of a king. It was in the same way that man must discover that God is his Father before he could become a son of God. To know was here to be; to be to know. No mere miracle would change the shepherd boy into a prince; no mere miracle would make a man the son of God. That sonship could be gained through knowledge only, through man knowing God, or, rather, being known of God, and till it was so gained it did not exist even though it be a fact.

If we apply this to the words in which Christ spoke of himself as the son of God, we should see that to him it was no miracle, it was no mystery, it was no question of supernatural contrivance, it was simply clear knowledge; and it was this self-knowledge which made Christ what he was, it was this which constituted his true, his eternal divinity. What could be clearer than the words of Christ himself—"No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him."

But though Christ used the homely words father and son, he himself warned the disciples against the wrong use of these words. "Call no man your father upon earth, for one is your father, which is in heaven." Could anything be clearer and stronger? Instead of saying as we would say, "Call not God father, because father means your father upon earth," he said, "Call no man father, for father has now assumed a new and higher meaning, and can no longer be used in its old familiar sense."

Those who have learned to look upon Christianity not as something unreal and unhistorical, but as an integral part of history, can see how all the searching after the Divine and Infinite in man is fulfilled in these simple utterances of Christ. For we must never forget that it was not the principle object of Christ's teaching to make others believe that *he only* was divine, immortal, or the Son of God. He wished them to believe this for their own benefit, for their own regeneration. Thus we read, "As many as believed him to them gave he power to become the sons of God."

It might be thought at first that this recognition of a Divine element in man must necessarily lower the conception of the Divine. And so it did in one sense. It brought God nearer to us; it brought the Divine from the clouds to the earth. It bridged over the abyss by which the Divine and human were completely separated in the Jewish and in many Pagan religions.

It rent the veil of the temple. This lowering, therefore, was no real lowering. It was an expanding of the concept of the Divine, and at the same time a raising of the concept of humanity, or, rather, a restoration of what is called human to its true character, a regeneration or a second birth, as it was often called by Christ himself.

* * *

Objections will be raised against my line of argument. It will be said on one side that I have deserted the impartial standpoint from which the student of the science of religion should never flinch, and that my chief object has been to magnify Christianity by showing that it was the fulfilment of all that the world had been hoping and striving for. In one sense that is true. But if I hold that Christianity has given the best and truest expression to what the old world had tried to express in various and less perfect ways I have at least given the facts on which I rely. If my facts can be proved to be wrong my conclusions will fall, and if any better expression could be given to what the witness within calls the truth I shall be most ready to accept it. Nor shall I ever wish to convey the impression that because the teaching of Christ is true, therefore all the teachings of other religions are false. On the contrary, I hold with St. Augustine that there is not one which does not contain grains of truth.

But I expect even stronger objections from the opposite side. So far from accepting the exalted position I assign to Christianity in the historical growth of religion, many theologians hold that Christianity stands altogether outside the stream of history, and beyond the reach of any comparison with other religions. The true divinity which I have tried to show Christ claimed will not satisfy them at all. They want not a real but a miraculous divinity—a divinity not very different, in fact, from that which soon after his death was ascribed to Plato, as the son of Apollo, or which was claimed for other founders of religions. If people are satisfied with such a belief it probably contains all that they require and all they can comprehend. I do not deny that they have a warrant for their belief in some of the earliest documents of the Christian Church. But the very fact that by the side of the synoptical gospels we find the Gospel according to St. John should teach us that here is a natural progress and easy transition from the one to the other, and that the same lesson might be conveyed to some in parables, to others in all plainness of thought and speech.

A DOUBTER'S HOPE ETERNAL.

BY WM. ARCH. McCLEAN.

A Doubter lay dying. Life had been sweet and good to him, but much sweeter had it been to his dear ones, his friends and humanity. Peace, justice, and

love had been the forms in which his daily service to duty and truth had been moulded. He had yoked himself to stars of right, true morality, and purity, the reins that held these brilliant steeds were in a master's hand, and to the goal of earthly happiness,—a consciousness of duty to right living,—they were unswervingly driven. Had he a fault,—what mortal has not—but those who knew him best and loved him, found none. Those who knew him least, found fault because in his clear keen cut mind, theories, dogmas, creeds, and orthodox religions had vanished before doubt, even as mists before the morning sun. Intellectually as on a mountain top he had stood, and in this upper ether reason had wrestled with and dethroned orthodoxy in the service of truth.

Now doubting, this doubter died. The old slain enemy, orthodoxy, in pitiful despair now tried to appear aghast, but one sweet Christian singer, who knew him well, and who had a wealth of human kindness in her soul, dared to confess in song :

"Saying, 'There is no hope,' he stepped
A little from one side and passed
To Hope Eternal. At the last,
Crying, 'There is no rest,' he slept.
A sweeter spirit ne'er drew breath;
Strange grew the chill upon the air;
But as he murmured, 'This is death,'
Lo! Life itself did meet him there.
He loved the Will; he did the Deed.
Such love shall live. Such doubt is dust.
He served the truth; he missed the creed.
Trust him to God. Dear is the trust."

From whence the Hope Eternal? Whither the rest? 'Lo! Where is the life to welcome death with? A dumb awful silence is the answer. The human breast, the heart, the desires, feelings, sentiments, longing for a Hope Eternal, make and create one for their own satisfaction. Wanting rest, imagine it can be found. Dreadful of the non-existence after death of the ego earthly entity, picture an Olympus, a throne of Bramin, a home of Confucius, a Heaven, the Happy Hunting Grounds. But does a like to be believed in ideal create and establish a reality? Do we know aught beyond life but that which the hope, which was evolved from the brain of humanity when earth was young, is fond of painting for itself, each different to suit each one's tastes? And so some singer has felt and to the world was conceived :

"We are born, we laugh, we weep,
We love, we droop, we die,
Ah! Wherefore do we laugh or weep?
Why do we live or die?
Who knows the secret deep?
Alas! Not I."

No shore, shoal, or harbor, that faith and belief would paint us that we turn to for answer but back flies our own answer, "Alas! Not I." All further knowledge seems a sublime silence. To all presump-

tions of creed, sect, and dogma, back comes the hollow echo of our own voices, "Alas! Not I." How very careful and cautious the world's most honest and zealous searchers after truth are, to assert, if at all, that to them there exists only a *belief* in immortality.

Why trouble the poor brain with a finite answer to an infinite riddle? The facts of existence, whose self-differentiation, somehow, some way, live and breathe in the consciousness of each mortal, are, "we are born, we live, we die." Birth, life, and death, are the sole attributes of existence. Be that so, then it is become each one's right in turn to be well born, to perform the duties of right living, and to die well in completion.

Orthodoxy asserts it is well enough to be a doubter in health, prosperity, happiness, and life, and pictures in fancy dread his hopeless state in sickness, misfortune, sorrow, and death. Tells of the purposeless life of the doubter, the hopeful state after probation to the believer. Rub the cob-webs from our eyes. Is it so? No, it cannot be, in fancy, in ideal dwells our would-be conceptions or knowledge of the hereafter, in reality we live and duty to life enjoins us to make of life all we can. How much better it is to strive towards the completion of our most exalted efforts in right living, towards an industrious, honest, honorable, temperate, charitable, pure, and true life, than by struggling after an imagined reward hereafter, often regardless of the life lived. The only real self-satisfaction in life is the good there is in the life we live.

But then we die. And how does the doubter die?

"Alas and yet alas,
For glory of existence that shall pass!
For pride of beauty and for strength of song!
Yet were the untried life a deeper wrong,
Better a single throb of being win
Than never to have been."

The doubter dies contented, after a right life. Death's summons is obeyed unquestioningly, as the only proper culmination to life and he grieves not. Existence to be complete is recognised to contain but birth, life, and death. To live forever in the flesh were to war against nature and not reach the ultimatum of existence. Life to be a perfect whole, to be a completed entity, must come to an end. The crown, the finishing point of life is death. To be born, our usefulness is ahead of us. To die our utmost living accomplishment is finished. Both are natural, both are good. Therefore the doubter mourns not, not as one without hope, but whose hope in death is only fulfilled. Born by inevitable laws, we live and die by laws as inevitable, all working towards an unity of completion, whether such be measured by an hour or three score and ten. Hence no matter how little or small a life may seem, it however contained everything

needful to complete that one life, not a minute longer would have added any more of fulness to it.

Nature makes no blanks, every life is a full existence in accordance with all powerful and often unappreciated laws. This alone would account for the fact, so often remarked upon, that a man or woman dies to-day and no matter how great, at once, the stream closes over the place occupied but a second before with scarcely a ripple. The cause, in death his or her life was completed, his or her work was finished, not another stroke of action was wanting, the world has no further need of his or her useful active existence. We may never know it, or appreciate it, but the full rounded life is the life it is given to each one to live, and just as he or she shall live it. When the time is reached, when the bounds are set, all living usefulness is ended. The utmost completion is reached by proof of death and the world is better off, richer with the memory, which then becomes an inheritance forever.

The proof that all things are for good, somehow, some way, we believe has been the history of this universe, mankind and nature, and convince us that the death of no man takes place unless it be towards more good than his existence. Then death is fruition. It is death that weaves a crown for birth and life. The parts are made whole, the unperfected is perfected, by death. The doubter feeling this, dies satisfied that his birth and life do thus reach full fruition and completion, and dying pens for his tomb this inspired epitaph, containing the glory of the only immortality he knows:

"I was not and I was conceived,
I lived and did a little work,
I am not and I grieve not."

FAITH AND DOUBT.

THE value of scepticism was the subject of discussion at the last meeting of the Evolution Club of Chicago. And it was a strange fact that almost all the speakers glorified scepticism as if it had been the cause of all progress, as if the human mind reached the climax of perfection in Doubt.

This attitude, it seems to us, is based upon an erroneous conception of the function of doubt, and it is now so prevalent partly because the terms doubt and scepticism are often identified with any denial of certain religious beliefs, and partly because agnosticism, which despairs of a definite solution of the fundamental problems of philosophy, is at present the most prevalent and fashionable world conception.

In the addresses made, it was maintained that all success in life was due to doubt. Mr. Armour had doubted the propriety of the prevalent methods of distribution in the meat-market; and Charles Darwin had doubted the truth of the biblical account of creation, and lo! what were the results! Mr. Armour created an

establishment which made meat cheaper all over the world, and Charles Darwin wrote "The Origin of the Species" and "The Descent of Man." One of the speakers defined doubt as the faith of a man in himself and in his ideals, contrasting it with a blind faith in dogmas. But it strikes us that this view of doubt and scepticism is, to say the least, misleading. Doubt, real doubt, is unable to produce any results. The man who has a faith acts according to the faith that is in him. But the man who doubts is like Buridan's donkey who hungers between two bundles of hay so long as he remains in the agnostic state of not knowing which bundle should be eaten first.

It was maintained, likewise, that the times of scepticism had been the times of progress. This is true only if scepticism be identified with active thought. Goethe said, that the epochs of strong faith alone had been the periods of a strong activity, of progress, of creative thought, fertile with ideas and deeds. It is not true that Mr. Armour's doubt produced the new methods of the distribution of meat, it was his faith in the new methods and not his doubts as to the old methods that produced progress. The negative element of doubt, important though it may be as a transient phase in the growth of our ideas, is not so important as the positive element of a new faith for the creation of great things. It is most probable that the new faith in the truth of the evolution theory developed in Darwin's mind long before his old faith had broken down, and it is not impossible that for a long time he did not even realise the full extent of the conflict between the old and the new faith. Success after all is always due to faith; and doubt is nothing but a state of suspense in which a new faith is struggling with the old faith, and only lasts so long as both faiths are sufficiently equal in strength to paralyze each other.

An instance of the fashionable glorification of doubt is Mr. Wm. Arch. McLean's article "A Doubter's Hope Eternal," in the present number of *The Open Court*. The aim of doubt is always its annihilation. Problems tend to be solved and the end of doubt should be their settlement. But here we are told that theories and dogmas vanish in a clear and keen cut mind before doubt, even as mists before the morning sun. But if the old theories are not replaced by new and better theories,—better because they are true;—it would seem as if we should rather compare the state of doubt to the mist. For if we are surrounded with a dense fog we cannot see, and only so long as we are in doubt do we answer "Alas! I know not." It is strange, however, that Mr. McLean's doubt is not at all a state of not knowing. He very soon becomes inconsistent with himself. As soon as he tries to describe his doubter's hope eternal it is noticeable that doubt is

simply a wrong name; for what he calls doubt is actually a new faith. His "doubter mourns not, not as one without hope," for he positively knows that "we live and die by laws as inevitable, all working toward a unity of completion" and "Nature makes no blanks," and death has also its place in nature. "It is death that weaves a crown for birth and life." A new faith is dawning on the intellectual horizon of mankind; and whether the new faith should be considered as preferable to the old faith has, to the large masses of our people, not as yet been decided. Hence the prevalence of doubt. This prevalent state of doubt is unquestionably the harbinger of better days, it is a sign of progress, it promises life and growth and evolution. But let us not make doubt the aim and end of thought. Our ideal is not the despair of an eternal scepticism, but the great hope of a new, of a better and a truer faith.

P. C.

THE ERROR OF MATERIALISM.

IN ANSWER TO COL. PAUL R. SHIPMAN'S CRITICISM.*

COLONEL PAUL R. SHIPMAN wields a vigorous pen, and his onslaughts appear overwhelming. Yet I do not see that his crushing verdicts have any reference to me, since the monism criticised by him is not my conception of monism. Accordingly, in spite of my best intentions to enjoy another philosophical tilt with a man whose name is so honorably known among the authors of this country, I cannot rise in self-defence because my views have not been attacked at all.

Did I ever speak of the "duality of atoms?" I rarely speak of atoms, and if I do I am careful in pointing out that the term "atom" is a mere symbol to denote chemical equivalents whereby to describe the proportions in which the elements combine. The existence of real atoms, i. e. of ultimate indivisible units, is not only unproved but even unthinkable. The philosophical idea of atoms is as untenable as, for instance, that of a round square, for it contains in itself contradictions. Rejecting atoms (not in a chemical but in a philosophical sense) still more must I consider "dual atoms" as an absurdity.

Col. Shipman charges me with crude dualism, because I reject the idea that feeling is material. I do reject the idea that feeling is material, but did I ever declare (as Col. Shipman repeatedly maintains) that "consciousness is immaterial, and will material?" The contrast of these two propositions is just as nonsensical as each proposition in itself. There is no sense in calling consciousness and will either material or immaterial. Neither consciousness nor will has anything to do with matter; both are non-material. We might just as well propose a discussion of the problem whether ideas are green or blue. Any issue concerning the color of ideas would be no less futile than to speak of the materiality or immateriality of the will or of consciousness.

It appears to me that the difference between Col. Shipman and myself is primarily a difference of reasoning rather than of opinion. The Colonel overlooks the fundamental rules of philosophical propædæutics, and this oversight produces as a secondary symptom a difference of opinion. Col. Shipman propounds a few very strange maxims which have been held for some time as axioms by the materialist school, but are now only to be found

in the lumber-room of the history of human thought or in the curiosity shops of philosophy.

Col. Shipman, speaking of the "omneity of matter," says among other curious things:—

"Mind is material."

"Immaterialise consciousness and you abolish matter."

"With immaterial things, if there are such things, science has nothing to do; to deny this is to cut loose from the sheet anchor of fact."

"Matter is the sheet anchor of fact."

Col. Shipman's propositions about the "omneity" of matter and the materiality of mind remind me of a most interesting episode in the history of philosophy. Feuerbach, the enthusiastic prophet of an idealised materialism, confounded thought with the phosphorous substance of the brain. His dictum has become famous. Without phosphorus, no thought. He declared that man is what he eats. *Der Mensch ist was er isst*. The elevation of the soul, accordingly, should not be expected to be accomplished by the church, but by the kitchen; *die Küche* and not *die Kirche* will save us. Why not feed on fish if in that way man can become a genius? The progress of mankind would depend on more phosphoric diet than meat. This was a queer perversion of thought in a brilliant mind which was aglow with a holy fervor for a religion of mankind! Yet Feuerbach's materialism was outdone by Carl Vogt, one of the most ingenious, witty, and sarcastic writers of the nineteenth century, if not of all ages. Carl Vogt had a peculiar knack of being pointed in all his utterances, and he formulated his philosophy in words which stuck in the minds of the people, and have become famous all over the world. He said: Thought is a secretion of the brain. Thought stands in the same relation to the brain as gall to the liver and urine to the kidneys."

Lotze wittily remarked in answer to this comparison, he had not known that the origin of thought was so uropoetical. Wolfgang Menzel, however, a champion of the darkest orthodox Christianity, but no less sarcastic than Carl Vogt, and often even more malevolent in his criticisms (for instance, of such men as Goethe and Schiller), declared he did not wonder that kidney secretions and thoughts were equivalent, at least in Carl Vogt, and he called him an untranslatable name which, mildly expressed, reminds of the famous fountain-statue in Brussels behind the Hôtel de ville—so shocking to the English lady travellers.

Incidentally it may be mentioned that Carl Vogt's idea had been expressed in almost the same words by Cabanis, who spoke of the brain as producing "*la sécrétion de la pensée*."

Before we expose the absurdity of this proposition, we must recognise its truth. Thinking, objectively considered, is as much as any other activity of the human organism, a physiological process. When a man thinks, we know that at the same time some material particles of his brain are in motion. Herein lies the correctness of Vogt's comparison, and herewith it ceases. For thought, unlike gall, is not a secretion. Gall is a substance, but thought is not a substance. Gall is a special kind of organised matter, but thought is no matter. If it were, we might bottle it or preserve it in tin cans. What a fine prospect to buy canned thought at the grocer's!

The fact is that thoughts are the subjective states of awareness which are felt when certain physiological processes take place in the brain. A pain which I feel when my skin is pricked is not a material thing; it is not substance. Pains, pleasures, sensations, perceptions, thoughts, cannot be handled like pebbles or other material objects. It is true that pleasures and pains do not exist in absolute abstractness. There are no pains hovering in empty space like the ghouls and ghosts of old legends; there are no ideas flying about in immaterial nudity. All the ideas, the pains, the pleasures we know of are certain states of mind in real and actual creatures.

We must not forget that our method of cognition rests on ab-

* Col. Shipman's criticism appeared in *Secular Thought*, February and March, 1891.

straction. All our concepts, matter and mind included, are only symbols to represent certain features abstracted from the facts of experience. Our abstract concepts are not realities but ideas, mere noumena, things of thought, invented for the sole purpose of comprehension. When making abstractions, we limit our attention to one special feature of a thing and exclude other features. When speaking of the matter of a thing, we exclude all its other properties. By the matter of which a human body consists, we do not understand its form, nor its life, the display of its activity, nor the feelings which ensoul its active brain, but simply the materials of which it consists. If we speak of matter, we do not mean force. If we speak of force we do not mean matter. If we speak of form, we mean nothing but relation. If we speak of consciousness, or of feeling, or of thought, we have no reference to either matter or force nor even to form. All these terms are different abstractions of one and the same indivisible reality. There is no force without matter, no matter without force, but matter is not force and force is not matter. A motion is a change of place; and force is expended wherever a change of place occurs. The thing moved is material, but the motion itself is not material. When we speak of a man's ideas, we mean his ideas and not the material particles of his brain. If science had nothing to do with immaterial things, psychology would be no science, mathematics would be no science, logic and arithmetic would not either. And what is Col. Shipman's sheet anchor of fact, as he is pleased to call matter, but a mental symbol for certain features of our experiences? It appears to me that mental apprehension, the most immaterial part of man's experience, is after all the "sheet-anchor of fact." To speak of the omneity of matter, to declare that force and feeling and consciousness and thought are material does not prove the boldness of freethought, it betrays an immature mind. To define matter as an all-comprehensive term which has to include all features of reality is an unjustifiable license. Wherever this license is indulged in, it will be followed by a confusion of thought; for it is an oversight of the most elementary rules of philosophical propædæutics.

It is for this reason that one of the greatest chemists, a man who should know what matter is, (Baron Justus Liebig), designated the materialists as philosophical dilettanti. And this judgment is partial in so far only as the same is true of the spiritualists who make spirit, and the Platonists who make pure forms, the all-embracing realities of the world.

Matter, force, mind, spirit, form, feeling, are mere abstractions. To look upon any of these in their kind most general terms as something else than terms or mental symbols, to look upon them as "omneities" or all-comprehensive realities, is a self-mythification and will lead either to occultism or to agnosticism. Indeed Col. Shipman's materialism is agnosticism. He looks upon matter as a mystery, and the mystery of matter, he says, is absolute. Yet this absolute mystery is to him the condition of knowledge; it is the "sheet-anchor of fact."

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

I HAVE the privilege of subscribing to one of the "great dailies" of Chicago, and I am continually edified by the ingenious manner in which it mixes politics and piety, especially in the Sunday edition. Two or three Sundays ago there was a leading article in it, something in the style of a religious exhortation, reminding its readers of what they ought to give thanks for in their devotions on that blessed Sabbath day. In addition to other beatitudes conferred upon them as a "chosen people," they were devoutly exhorted to be especially thankful to Divine Providence for the prospect of an abundant harvest in the United States, and a "shortage" of crops in Europe. The sentiment of that worship appears to be the ethics of Wall Street also, for in the *North American*

Review for May, I find an article on "Our Business Prospects" written by Mr. Henry Clews, a man made of money, in which he prophesies "brighter business" for the remainder of the year; and he gives four reasons why, the second of which is this: "The evident prospect of good crops (for us), while the European crops are a partial failure." Thus do a false religious economy and a selfish political economy help each other, while moral economy teaches that every man is interested in the welfare of every other man, and every nation in the prosperity of its neighbor. The famine of one country cannot be the nourishment of another; nor can the United States ever grow rich on the poverty of Germany, England, France, or even of Timbuctoo. The Atlantic ocean, bearing that the Pacific had lost ten million tons of salt, might laugh at the calamity but in due time it would find itself a partner in that loss. And so it is with the great oceans of humanity; and the multitudinous worlds. They are one.

Prayers to God for exclusive personal favors and thanks for special gifts are of a doubtful morality. They narrow the soul and make religion sordid. They stimulate self-love and exalt vanity. They make the sorrows of others the joys of ourselves, and they reverse the commandment, "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Prayers for ourselves alone, for me and my wife, my son John and his wife, us four and no more, must weaken our sympathy for others, because within those prayers are the germs of envy, jealousy, and hate. When they develop a spurious patriotism they inflame the antipathies of nations. An old Greenwich pensioner who had fought in the wars with Nelson, confessed upon his dying bed that he had been a very wicked sinner; and when his spiritual adviser tried to comfort him by reminding him that he had probably done some good in his time, he answered, "No Sir, not much; I killed a Frenchman once; that's all the good I ever done." This was no paradox, for his achievement was blessed in the English religion of his time. The National Anthem of England is a prayer, imploring God to "scatter" the enemies of the queen, and also to "confound their politics." Soon there will be no queen in England, nor any king, and then the national hymn will pray, if there shall be any prayer in it, that the politics of other nations may not be confounded but improved, so that they may establish righteousness. Who prays by generous deeds prays best, or in the words of Coleridge, "He prayeth best who loveth best"; and he who prays for others, will if a benediction comes in answer, surely get a share of it. Slowly but surely the religion of humanity is rising above that insular theology which prays for an abundant harvest in America, and a "shortage" of crops in Europe.

It is related of Marshal von Moltke that on his ninetieth birthday he was presented with flowers and congratulations by some fair young ladies of Berlin, and in acknowledgement of their kindness he said, "You make me wish to be young once more." "How young?" said one of the girls. "Oh, about eighty," he replied; and comparatively speaking, eighty would have been youth again to him. The secret of longevity appears to be hidden still among the occult sciences, and an inquisitive explorer has been trying to find it by searching among the lives of old men. He was disappointed, for their contradictory testimony would baffle a jury. It is thought uncivil to question women about their age, and the same rules of etiquette should apply to men also, for on that subject they are as sensitive as women. The bold explorer found it so; for when he requested Senator Evarts to give him the recipe for long life, the senator who is only about seventy, told him to consult some older man. "Go to Senator Morrill," he said, "He is eighty-one." The interviewer went to Senator Morrill, but that aspiring young statesman told him to call again in about six years, "and perhaps by that time," he said, "I may be competent to form an opinion about longevity." To remind an old man of his

age makes him older. "Natural civility is careful on this point, although artificial gentility frequently offends by patronising old age in an awkward, amiable way. This explains the short and petulant answers the interviewer sometimes got.

Do men inherit longevity? If not, how shall we account for those weak, rickety persons who unreasonably continue to live in poor health for eighty or ninety years. And for those robust fellows who just as unreasonably die at fifty? Here is an old man, hearty and strong, who accounts for his fine condition by saying, "For fifty years I have bathed every morning in cold water"; and here is another man of the same age equally strong, who explains the phenomenon by saying, "For fifty years I have never allowed cold water to come near me." One man attributes his long life to abstinence, another to indulgence; and as the jury cannot agree, the problem of longevity remains unsolved. The testimony of the patriarchs interviewed by the explorer that I spoke of, complicates the question more and more. Mr. Holman, a member of congress from Indiana, being about to celebrate his golden wedding, thought that matrimony had a tendency to lengthen life; but then again, the next witness, General Early, an older man than Mr. Holman, said he did not know whether matrimony had that effect or not, for he had never tried it. Mr. Holman also testified that the use of tobacco had a tendency to shorten life, but his testimony must be stricken out, because he added, "I have chewed the weed ever since I was a boy, and I am an inveterate user of it still." There was a good deal of testimony against whiskey, and wine, and beer, but this was rebutted by Mr. Vaux, a member of congress from Pennsylvania, an antediluvian who sat in congress long before the war; and he explained the secret of his longevity by saying, "As to my eating I do not take a great deal of food; and as to drinking, I believe that whiskey is the basis of all good liquors and I confine myself to it. I take it straight, and I smoke on an average about twenty cigars a day. Also I believe every word that is between the lids of the bible." To which of these three causes does Mr. Vaux attribute his length of days? I should like to know whether he thinks his longevity is due to taking his whiskey straight, or to smoking twenty cigars a day, or to believing every word in the Bible. The symposium such as it was, tends to show how unreliable is the testimony even of experts on the subject of old age.

The American idea of an "organ" is a newspaper devoted to the principles of a certain political party, when the party has any principles, and when it has none, to its measures and its methods right or wrong, especially the wrong. In England however, a party "organ" is literally a musical contrivance out of which the machine politician, by simply turning a crank, grinds campaign melodies, warranted strictly partisan. It is in fact an "organ" like the rasping torment which a brunette son of Italy is at this moment operating beneath my window. For political meetings those organs are very economical as they save the expense of a brass band; but sometimes, like certain campaign orators, they strike the wrong "key note," and get response in hisses instead of cheers. One of that kind was lately the subject of a lawsuit in London, the plaintiff, a maker of musical instruments, having made it for the Parnellites, who refused to pay for it. The defense to the action was that the machine was to be a reliable Parnell organ, but when they began to grind the music out of it they found that it was a staunch McCarthy organ, and that it stubbornly refused to play anything but heterodox McCarthy tunes. It was pleaded that the organ had been warranted to play the inspiring anthems, "What should we do without Parnell," "Wait till we catch McCarthy," "Why we hanged Tim Healy," and other airs of similar sentiment; whereas in truth and in fact, it refused to do so, but persisted in playing exasperating tunes of an

opposite character. The plaintiff's reply was that the defendants did not know how to work the instrument, and therefore it had failed. This was probably correct, but the trouble would never have occurred had they employed one of our skillful politicians to grind the organ, for he would have drawn from its intricate wheels and springs any imaginable tune or tone that any imaginable audience might require.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

VIRTUE AND SURVIVAL.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

MRS. SUSAN CHANNING in her "The New Ethic of the Sexes," *The Open Court*, May 7, says, "It is owing to virtue that we exist." She uses the word, virtue, in its especial sense, i. e. meaning chastity, if judged by the context. She says also, "In primeval times, the tribes deficient in conjugal fidelity, and addicted to polyandry, reared no children, and were soon blotted out of the book of nature."

There is no testimony that tribes addicted to polyandry reared no children. The testimony is that infanticide was not uncommon, owing to the sharp struggle for life, which was also at the root of polyandry.*

The testimony of science concerning these assertions, is, as far as known to-day, that all peoples started alike in universal promiscuity, rising from that, by slow stages through a limited promiscuity, polygamy, and polyandry, to the communal, barbaric and civilised family.† Virtue to-day, in the structure of the language of the Chinese, of the American Indian, and if the India Indian—the Dravidas, who number about thirty millions,—are found terms of relationship which fit the customs of polyandry. These terms exist as fossil relics, which proclaim past conditions of the society in which they were coined. In the speech or dialects of the Polynesian peoples, similar terms are not yet buried in the structure of the language, although the customs of that portion of the globe have risen somewhat above them,—and are no longer expressed by them. The Savage tribes of Oceanica are estimated as about one-fifth the population of the globe. While arrested development is at work among them, at least to the extinction of the native Australian, it may largely be attributed to the porcity climatal or otherwise, inherent in their habitat. Extinction of these ocean peoples must be very far off in time.

It cannot be that societies become extinct, simply from absence of chaste customs, or that they survive solely by the virtue in a high limitation of the sex relation, else how survives a society that furnishes employment to the Capt. Vernerses? How survives a society such as that exposed awhile ago in the columns of the *Pall-Mall Gazette*, or, is indicated in the sexual relations set up in Africa by Caucasian traders and agents, who are seeking fortunes there? In our commercial journals one may read of the enormous amounts of alcoholic liquors forced on the African natives, at the mouth of the cannon, as opium was on China at an earlier time. It is generally believed that the decrease in the native population of Hawaii dates from the advent there of trading vessels of the commercial nations importing alcoholic liquors, and the vices of white societies.

If it were true that the extinction of peoples comes from absence of the modern family relations alone, then all manufacturing nations are in the line of extinction. It is held by those who have deeply investigated the factory system of industry which has obtained in the United States for the last seventy-five years, and much longer in England, that it undermines home-life and the family relations.

* See "Life-History of Our Planet," Chap. VI, p. 191, on Man's Antiquity.

† See "Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge," 218, Ages of Barbarism, p. 497.

The employment of women and children at inferior wages, displaces the full-paid man-worker, and he must go hither and thither, even across the seas it may be, to find a market in which he may sell his labor for a living price. The wife and mother away during working hours, the home is no longer home, and the ties centred there through generations of development, are weakened and must be finally uprooted. This destructive effect of the modern industrial system on the family relation has already become a theme of alarming interest in social science circles. It would seem that for the conservation of a people's life, other virtues must be added to that of chastity. Human Love came slowly out of primitive conditions and the family was founded.

More slow to appear is Justice, which is the keystone of the Social Arch.

Until that is set in its place the perpetuity of no social structure is secure.

MARY GUNNING

Chicago, May 9th. '91.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM, ITS RELATION TO LABOR REFORM AND PROSPERITY, AND CITIZENS MONEY. A Critical Analysis in the Light of Free Trade in Banking. By *Alfred B. Westrup*. Chicago: Mutual Bank Propaganda.

These pamphlets contain the condensed arguments of the Mutual Bank Propaganda, in opposition to the National Bank system, and in support of what is called Free Trade in Banking. Mr. Westrup's doctrine is a revival of the ancient principle, that as money is only the representative of wealth, all wealth should be allowed to circulate as money through its representative expressed in terms of dollars, and made of paper. The old position was that if a man owned a house worth five thousand dollars, he should be permitted to monetise it in the form of five thousand paper dollars, and use it in his business, or in any other way; the house, of course, being the security to the holders of the five thousand paper dollars, and liable for their redemption. This appears to be very nearly the position taken by Mr. Westrup, excepting that instead of every man being permitted to coin his own house into money, the owners of a hundred houses would combine the value of them into the capital stock of a Mutual Bank. He requires that Banking be made as free as Bootmaking, and that the exclusive privilege to issue notes to circulate as money, now given to the National Banks, through the ten per cent. fine on others, shall cease.

Mr. Westrup's monetary system is not at all a part of the "Greenback" plan, nor in harmony with it, for the freedom of his money necessarily requires the withdrawal of the "legal tender" privilege from all money of every kind, although Mr. Westrup does not say so. To make paper money is one thing; to get somebody to take it is another; and it is quite safe to say that the money of the Mutual Banks would be at a discount from the beginning, by reason of the insecurity of the security, which is to be "unincumbered improved real estate, never vacant lands." Improved real estate is poor security, for the improvements may burn down; and this contingency alone would at once depreciate the money of the Mutual Banks.

There is much in these pamphlets worthy of consideration, especially Mr. Westrup's criticism of certain economic superstitions, and our existing monetary system; but it will be hard for him to convince the men of business that the substitute proposed by him is not open to more serious objections. M. M. T.

THE DAUGHTER, Her Health, Education, and Wedlock. Homely suggestions for mothers and daughters. By *William M. Capp*, M. D. Philadelphia and London: F. A. Davis, 1891.

Says the author: "The ignorance concerning the simplest matters of personal and household hygiene and physiology even

among those who have enjoyed fair opportunities to obtain a good education, is often most surprising." He presents in this elegantly bound little volume of 144 pages very concise information on these essentials of woman's education. He explains briefly the mother's task, the care of new born infants from the hour of their birth, the infant's bath, bottle-feeding, nursing the child, care of the nipples, medicines, rocking the baby, chafed skin, teething, air, habits, the child at school, boys, and girls, puberty, the sexual nature, household duties, coeducation of sexes, considering marriage, home-making, housekeeping, pregnancy, care of teeth and hair, preparation of food, the skin and bathing, and gymnastics. The little book does not pretend to give advice in abnormal and difficult situations, but it contains much valuable information of things which every woman ought to know and negligence of which often causes grave calamities. K.

THE GENIUS OF GALILEE. AN HISTORICAL NOVEL. By *Anson Uriah Hancock*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. Cloth \$1.50, paper 50 cents.

It is difficult to know how to describe this work. It is called an historical novel, and certainly a good deal of information, more or less historical, is interwoven with the narrative. In no other sense, however, can that character be ascribed to the story, unless the episode, contained in the fifth Book, relating to "the Genius of Galilee," can be so described. The narrative is chiefly concerned with the fortunes of an apocryphal sister of Joseph the father of Jesus, and its ideas, where they are fictitious, are essentially modern both in character and expression. There is but little flavor of antiquity. It is somewhat startling, moreover, to come across a reference to the moral peculiarities of Tolstoi and Zola, or even to the opinions of Gen. Lew Wallace and "the inimitable Thomas Hughes Q. C." as to the childhood of Jesus, in a narrative of events happening at the commencement of the Christian era. The book is nevertheless well written, and it may answer the purpose for which it is intended. Ω.

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SELFISHNESS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

A SPECIOUS plea in behalf of human selfishness is sometimes made on the ground that all human actions are necessarily selfish. Aside from those cases in which we are compelled against our will and which in the strict sense of the word are hardly *actions* at all, it is held that all voluntary actions are done with a view to our own pleasure or happiness. It is even said that we can no more help acting selfishly than we can help breathing; that when we seem to be interested in the welfare of another, it is because the other contributes to our happiness; that we deceive ourselves in thinking we can act for the happiness of anybody but ourselves; that if for example we give a quarter to a poor man on the street it is not for his benefit but for our own, since if we refused we might have disagreeable sensations afterwards.

What is the truth in this?—for I suppose it may be taken for granted that any views honestly held by intelligent persons must have some truth in them. What is indisputable seems to me to be this—that we never do anything voluntarily unless we choose or prefer or please to do it. In fact, it is so clear that I suspect it comes near being tautological. When we speak of acting voluntarily, we *mean* acting according to our will or pleasure. Now from this truth the inference is drawn that we act *for* our pleasure,—or, (since pleasure and happiness are at bottom the same thing) for our happiness. It appears thus to be a necessary law of our being that all actions are interested, their final end being in ourselves. Our own pleasure or happiness seems to be the only thing that can move the will to act; if we care for others, it is only that this is one way of getting pleasure for ourselves.

It must be admitted that there are considerable authorities for this view. Leslie Stephen, one of the first English writers on Ethics, says that "pain and pleasure are the sole determining causes of action."* A leading American sociologist, Lester F. Ward, declares that all actions "agree in having pleasure for their end," and that "benevolent and philanthropic actions are prompted like others by the motive of diminishing disagreeable feelings experienced by those

who perform them."* Bain holds that there are "only two great classes of stimulants; either a pleasure or a pain, present or remote, must lurk in every situation that drives us into action."† And Bentham asserted that "every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributing to his own greatest happiness."‡

None the less I ask, is it true that we always act for our pleasure or happiness? To act *for* a thing is to act in view of it, is to act with it in mind, or to aim at it. Is it true that we always have pleasure or pleasures in mind when we are prompted to action? I think it more nearly accords with our ordinary consciousness and modes of speech to say that it is sometimes the case that we desire certain *things* or *objects*, and while the getting them gives us pleasure, it is not so much the pleasure as the things we want. This seems to be true sometimes even of a desire like hunger. The satisfying of hunger generally brings pleasure, but it is not the pleasure the really hungry man is thinking of, but the food—it seems a direct appetite for an object. When we do think of the *pleasures* of eating, this is not so much the primary as a secondary desire; and when a person thinks of almost nothing else (being perhaps so well-fed that he never experiences real hunger), we do not call him an exceptionally hungry man, but a gourmand.§ The same direct interest in an object sometimes shows itself in the business world. I was struck a few years ago by the language of the President of a bank that had failed. He said with a kind of mournfulness, "I was wedded to it always. To me my own pleasure was a second thought to its prosperity." Any of my readers can probably think of persons in these days of feverish competition who are so wrapped up in business pursuits that they scarcely think of themselves or their pleasure—do not, as we may well say, think enough. It is as if such persons put all that is commonly called pleasure or enjoyment to one side and set but one aim before them—that of making money. It is perfectly true to say that this is their choice, their preference,

* Dynamic Sociology.

† Emotions and Will, p. 460.

‡ Constitutional Code, Introduction, § 2.

§ This point is worked out with admirable precision and delicacy by Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, pp. 44, 45 (3d ed.)

* Science of Ethics, p. 30.

their (in this sense) pleasure or happiness. But it hardly has sense to add that they act as they do *for the sake* of this pleasure, when all that is meant is that they act as they choose and it would be as rational to say that they act for the sake of their choice. In fact, this brings home to us that there is an ambiguity in the word pleasure and it is incumbent on us to trace it out if we do not wish to be led astray by words. Pleasure seems sometimes to indicate the mere fact of preference or choice. To say "I please to do a thing," or "it is my pleasure to do it," is the same as saying "I choose to do it; pleasure here means a state of will. On the other hand, pleasure sometimes means a sensation—as when we speak of the pleasures of taste, the pleasures of exercise, the pleasures of study or the pleasures of doing good; we mean here the agreeable feelings that follow any of these things, and the idea and expectation of which may of course move us to action. The two senses of the word point to different psychological states. Yet since we have the same word for them we glide from one to the other without being clearly aware of the difference. When we act as we please, or according to our pleasure, we think it must be the same, when anyone tells us so, as acting in view of our pleasure or for the sake of it; yet in the latter statement, we use the word pleasure in one sense, (that of an agreeable feeling), and in the former, we use it in another sense (that of preference or choice). No one would say we act as we choose, for the sake of our choice, and yet we delude ourselves into thinking it is rational to say that we act as we please for the sake of our pleasure. It is only rational to make the latter statement, in case we understand by "please" one thing and by "pleasure" a quite distinct thing. But the fact seems to be that we may act *according* to our pleasure (in the sense of choice) and yet *for the sake* of a hundred other things besides pleasure (in the sense of agreeable feeling). I have spoken of money-making; but we may set before ourselves victory in some sport, or a position of power over others, or adding to the sum of knowledge in the world or the creation of objects of beauty or the advancing of social justice. For though from any of these objects once attained, there would doubtless come pleasure to us, yet we may scarcely think of the pleasure in the time, being completely absorbed in the pursuit of the objects themselves.

Let me take a very simple illustration. A boy plays a game of ball; he plays to beat—and he doubtless thinks at the outset how fine i. e. how pleasurable, it would be to beat. But he gets into the game, he warms up, he tries to make every step and movement count and to take advantage of every failure or weakness of the other side—and what is he thinking of now? Of the pleasurable emotions that will follow

victory? Perhaps not at all, but simply of winning the game. At any given moment, possibly not even of this, but rather of getting the greatest number of tallies for this inning, or even of simply reaching a certain base; and if, while he is running for the latter, he allows himself to think of the pleasures of victory or even looks ahead to the winning of the game, his attention may be so divided as to hinder him from reaching the base. The truth is that instead of the pleasure of victory being the constant spring of his action, it may be so in the first place and then not be thought of again till the game is done. Can a person be properly said to be acting *for* that which is not in his mind—to be aiming at that which he is not thinking of? This would be self contradictory.

After all, is it not so familiar a truth that it is a commonplace, that pleasures are surest to come when we do not aim at them, that if we seek them we are apt to lose them? How does this comport with the idea that we are always seeking our own happiness and always must? The fact is that it is because men do not always seek it and sometimes forget it altogether, that they get most of the happiness that they actually possess. Without doubt benevolent individuals experience agreeable feelings after doing kindly acts; but it is possible that they experience them in an inverse ratio to the extent they have distinctly expected or aimed at them. If we give a quarter to a poor man with no other motive than that of experiencing self-congratulation afterward, we run the risk of not experiencing self-congratulation at all; and our feeling may be instead, "What sophisticated fools we were to expect it!"

The facts compel us to go further. We may not only forget our pleasure and happiness, but we may voluntarily do things inconsistent with our pleasure or happiness, taken as a whole. It is not true to our experience to say as Bentham does that we always act for what at least at the moment we think will contribute to our greatest happiness. It may possibly be rational to do this, but in fact we sometimes do the contrary. We may do things (for a present enjoyment) that we know will be followed by more misery than happiness; a present craving may overrule the rational thought of our greatest happiness; we may voluntarily let the latter go for the sake of the gratification now. The appetite for drink may so rule us; we may be perfectly aware that for every moment of pleasure (in drinking) we shall have in time twenty moments of pain and none the less choose the present pleasure. John Stuart Mill admitted that men sometimes "pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good."* Moreover, there is an experience of

* Utilitarianism, c. ii.

a different character in which we may act even against present pleasure. A distinction of consciousness has passed into common speech, namely, that between choosing to do a thing from "a sense of duty" and so choosing because we anticipate pleasure in so doing. In the latter case, we may need only to think of a thing to want to do it; in the former, though reason and conscience approve, it may be hard to make up our mind. For example, one person finds pleasure in walking, or riding on a horse; the idea has only to cross his mind at certain times to make him wish to throw up his books or his business and go out *ins Freie*. Another may recognise that the exercise would be good for him, may feel that he *ought* to go, and yet from absorption in his books or work, or perhaps from physical laziness, may be averse to going. Plainly these are different moods. Both may eventually choose to take the walk; but one from anticipation of pleasure, the other from a sense of duty.

Sometimes the nobility of a thing, aside from duty, may attract us and lead us to bear pain willingly for the sake of achieving it. Mrs. Browning says, "If heads that hold a rhythmic thought must ache perforce, then I, for one, choose headaches."

This does not mean that headaches are ever agreeable sensations or that by willing we can make them so, but simply that we may choose them despite their disagreeableness for the sake of a higher good. So J. S. Mill somewhere says that the state of a discontented Socrates is better than that of a contented pig; that is, in certain circumstances it is better to be unhappy than happy. And there have been not a few who have acted on this conviction. One feels in reading some of the leaders of modern scientific thought, Tyndall for instance, that the sacrifice of all things false, however pleasant they may be, is for them a paramount and primary duty. Romance and tragedy are full of situations in which the longing for personal happiness goes down under the influence of a grander motion. Adam Bede resigns in his own mind the girl he loves because he sees his brother loves her and he will not stand in his way. Enoch Arden comes back, finds his wife married again and happy with her husband and children, and goes off without revealing himself, rather than disturb their happiness. Fedalma, in what seems to me George Eliot's masterpiece, *The Spanish Gypsy*, chooses sorrow rather than a joy that destiny had made base for her. To her lover, whom she feels she must renounce for the sake of loyalty to her father and her tribe, she says:

"O, all my bliss, was in our love: but now
I may not take it: some deep energy
Compels me to choose hunger."

Happiness seems to her in the crisis of her life to be a smaller thing:

"I can never shrink
Back into bliss,—my heart has grown too big,
With things that might be."

Will some one say, But she could not have chosen hunger and sorrow, had she not found pleasure in doing so, had it not on the whole made her happier to do so, and hence was she not after all seeking her happiness? I simply answer, What is meant by pleasure or happiness here? If the meaning is simply that this was Fedalma's free act, that so she preferred or chose or pleased to do, then the statement is indisputable, since it is only saying that she could not have chosen unless she had chosen or wished to choose. But if "pleasure" is used in the sense of agreeable feelings, present or remote, then to say that she acted in anticipation of such feelings and for the sake of them is false. As a personality in the poem, her wishes were simply to be true, to be loyal to her tribe, and for the sake of that she consented and even welcomed the sorrow, hunger, and pain incidental to it. It is darkening counsel with words, mere sophistication, to say that she was actuated by the thought of pleasure or happiness, when these only existed to her as things to be renounced.

A man will even sacrifice his life, in those rare emergencies where some larger interest calls. When an engineer stays at his post in face of a collision, knowing that he may thereby help to save other lives though he may lose his own, has it not almost an air of burlesque to say that he acts so as to increase the number of his agreeable emotions, when he knows that all emotions may soon be forever at an end with him? The glorious story of the Birkenhead has recently been recited by Gen. M. M. Trumbull in these columns.* Certainly those men went down to their watery grave because they chose to; it was, in this sense, their pleasure, their happiness to. And yet the thought of pleasure or happiness probably never crossed their minds; it was their *duty* they chose—and duty meant almost certain death. In view of such instances it is simply paradoxical to say that men always act with a view to their pleasure or happiness. I may make some remarks on the turning of this psychological mistake into an ethical theory in a subsequent article.

MAX MÜLLER DENOUNCED FOR HERESY.

PROF. MAX MUELLER'S Gifford Lectures were the subject of acrimonious discussion in the latest monthly meeting of the established Presbytery of Glasgow, held on May 6, 1891. Rev. Dr. Watt who had been moderator up to date resigned the chair and Rev. Mr. Gillan of Carmunnock was elected in his place. After the discussion of sundry other business which has no

* *The Open Court*. Apr., p. 2759

special interest for outsiders, the following resolution was moved by Mr. Robert Thompson:

"Inasmuch as the teaching of Prof. Max Müller, the Gifford lecturer in the University of Glasgow, is subversive of the Christian faith, and fitted to spread Pantheistic and infidel views among the students and others, and inasmuch as it is questionable whether the Senate has legal power to receive a bequest such as Lord Gifford's, and to appoint a lecturer to carry out the teaching of the same, the Presbytery appoint a committee to examine the views of the Professor as set forth in his lectures, and also to ascertain the Senatus's power in relation to the acceptance of the Gifford bequest and the appointment of a lecturer, and to report to a further meeting."

Schopenhauer says, it is easier to burn a heretic than to refute his view. Since the stake has gone out of fashion, so called heretics are pooh-poohed and stigmatised as adversaries of Christ. Not the slightest attempt is made to refute Prof. Max Müller yet it is boldly maintained, as will be seen from the following report, that only he is for Christ who will denounce Prof. Max Müller's views. Mr. Thompson should not be so rash in identifying his own opinion with the cause of Christ. From the Christian standpoint we maintain that a man who thinks on religious matters as does Mr. Robert Thompson is a heathen and against Christ. Only he is for Christ who fearlessly stands up for truth.

We reprint the report of the meeting without further comments from the *Glasgow Herald*:

In supporting the motion, Mr. Thompson said the university was set up to promote the liberal arts and sciences and to teach religion within the university. There were ordained ministers of the Church within the Senate, and they by their presence at these lectures had been contributors toward the seducing of the students and others who had attended to hear the most extraordinary views propounded by the lecturer. These views were simply a rehash of German mysticism, Pantheism, and the old argument of the infidel Hume, combined with the refuse of the minds of all the populations of the world who had gone into every error in regard to the conception of God and the moral government of the universe, as well as its physical development. The lecturer had, besides, outraged Christianity by denying some of its fundamental doctrines—the incarnation, the resurrection, and the ascension of Christ. Now, the Church of Scotland, he maintained, had power through its Church Courts to overhaul the Faculty of Theology in the university, and he asked the Presbytery to pass the resolution he had submitted. There was no anathema pronounced against the professor. He simply asked them to appoint a committee to inquire, and he held that if they were faithful to their ordination vows they were bound to do so. It would have been far better if this Edinburgh lawyer had at some time had his money cast into the Firth of Forth than that he should by these lectures have given an impetus to infidelity and scepticism. He had got encouragement even within the university, for some of the professors held views that were neither in harmony with the Confession of Faith nor with the position some of the ecclesiastics held. A Romish priest had taken up the subject, and had spoken well upon it. He gave him honor for what he had done. People were saying "Where are the ministers?" and the lecturer said that he knew many of the ministers held one thing and preached another. Here was one of the most universal slanders ever committed against a Christian community.

Mr. A. T. Donald seconded the motion. He believed, he said, that these lectures had done irreparable evil to the artisans of the community. He met the views enunciated every day in his congregation and parish, and he believed the sooner the Presbytery gave their voice on the subject the better. It had been left too long. He was very proud indeed that Dr. Munro, the Roman Catholic clergyman, had the boldness to deliver the sermons he did. He believed those sermons touched the very foundation on which the lecturer built up his arguments.

Dr. Watt submitted the following amendment:

"That the Presbytery express profound regret that teaching of an unsettling character should be given apparently under the sanction of the Senatus of the university, but deem it inexpedient to take any action in the matter."

The reason why he proposed this motion, he said, was that he had received the following note from Professor Dickson, whose absence he regretted:

"Dear Dr. Watt,—I see that the subject of the Gifford lecture occurs in the business of the Presbytery to-morrow, I had hoped to be present for the purpose of making a short statement for the information of the Presbytery as to the facts. But as I am disabled for the moment by a slight accident, I shall be glad if you will take the opportunity of submitting the enclosed note on the terms of Lord Gifford's will, which I drew up some time ago and put into the hands of Prof. Max Müller." That Document, Dr. Watt continued, bore date January, 1891, and was as follows:

"Considerable controversy having arisen in the newspapers over certain statements in the first two Gifford lectures of this session as to 'Physical Miracles' and the belief of the clergy in regard to them, and calls having been made for a definition of what is meant by the lecturer in his use of that expression, it seems expedient to recall the express words in which Lord Gifford has embodied his wishes as to the treatment of the subject. In the deed, as prefixed to Professor Max Müller's 'Natural Religion' Lord Gifford, under what he calls leading principles, says—'I wish the lecturers to treat the subject as a strictly natural science . . . without reference to, or reliance upon, any supposed special or so-called miraculous revelation.' The latter clause, which is the only restriction suggested by the testator, is couched in a peculiar form, for which it may be presumed that there was some special reason on the part of a Scotch lawyer or judge accustomed to weigh his words. Lord Gifford was well aware that provision was already made in the universities—to which he offered his gift—for the teaching of theology as based on revelation; and, if he may be credited with judgment, good taste, and common sense, it seems hardly open to doubt that in desiring that the lecturers should avoid 'reference to' as well as 'reliance upon' any miraculous revelation, he wished to keep the handling of the subject as far as possible aloof from the risk of coming into collision with already existing provisions. But for this limitation there would have been obvious difficulties in the way of the universities accepting the trust. Whatever may have been his aim, his language as distinctly excludes reference to miracles as it includes reliance on them; and the one thing of the nature of a restraint imposed on the lecturers is this explicit intimation of the testator's wish, so far as that may under the circumstances be expected to have weight with them. If this view should be acted on there would be little risk of bringing one part of the teaching in the university into collision with another, or of having those who have been concerned in the appointment of the lecturer, and who are of very various views, subjected to the imputation of responsibility for statements of opinion which, whatever may be their value, are essentially, under the circumstances, a *hors d'œuvre*."

So far, Dr. Watt continued, he had discharged his duty to Dr. Dickson, and he should not weary the Court by anything he had to say. He believed he would follow the line of argument Dr. Dickson would have taken had he been present, though for what he said he himself was responsible. Although he felt in a somewhat curious position, he desired to offer something in the nature of an apology for the Senatus in the peculiarly difficult circumstances in which they were placed. He believed it would be found that there were many members of the Senate who were as deeply concerned and grieved at the turn that had been taken by Prof. Max Müller's expressions as any member of the Presbytery. But their position was such that they did not see how they could vindicate themselves in any way that would be satisfactory to themselves, and to the public generally. There were certain considerations that could be urged in the way of defence, if defence was needed, of the appointment of Prof. Max Müller as Gifford lecturer. The first thing that had to be taken into account was that whether the Senatus had taken the trust or not it was certain that a lectureship of the kind contemplated by Lord Gifford would have been instituted, because there was an alternative body, the Faculty of Physicians, who would have had to take charge of the trust, and he doubted whether the public would have been better served by lecturers appointed by them than they would be by the Senatus of the university. Then, when they considered that no conditions could be imposed upon the lecturer, they could easily see that in regard to the first appointment, at least, the most well meaning men might have been led into a position which they regretted. It was impossible that any fault could have been found with the first appointment. Prof. Max Müller was a man of very great eminence not only in philology, but also in all branches of modern human learning; and surely if fault could have been found with the appointment voice would have been given to it long before the Professor began his lectures. He could easily see that, had Professor Dickson been present, he could have founded an argument of very considerable weight upon the paper he (Dr. Watt) had just read. He could have said that Prof. Max Müller had a sphere of his own, while the professors of theology had their sphere, and that it was not to be expected that he would have dealt with such subjects as revelation and miracle, which belonged properly to another recognised part of the university. He (Dr. Watt) had no hesitation in saying that regret must be widely felt among the members of the Senate that the lecturer in one department should have used words which seemed to cast discredit upon the teaching of the university in another department. This must be felt all the more from the consideration that these lectures were intended primarily for students, and, he believed, attended largely by students and ladies. Regret must be felt that students at an immature period of life attended these lectures, and as responsibility attached to the whole body of the Senate as the teaching power, he thought that was something they as a Presbytery might regret. The one difficulty in the matter was that Prof. Max Müller should have been appointed for a second time—(hear, hear)—but there was something to be said even for that. The main argument employed was this. It was said that this was a man of eminence who came to give a course of lectures, and that that course was not finished. It was open to them, and no doubt that they hoped, notwithstanding the somewhat dubious utterances he had made, that by-and-by in the course that was to come afterwards he would put them right. As this motion assumed, many members of the Senate, if not the Senate as a whole, felt regret at the unfortunate turn things had taken; but it was certain that if they had shut off Prof. Max Müller's words, and said, "We will not reappoint you," and if the reason for doing so had been stated, the outcry against them, on the plea that they were repressing freedom of thought, would have been quite as strong as the outcry for giving too much license.

Dr. John McLeod, in seconding the amendment, said he would have preferred if the first part had been expressed in somewhat stronger terms. He was also to some extent in sympathy with that part of Mr. Thompson's motion which would lead more clearly to the discovery of the relations between the Presbytery and the Senate, or such portions of the Senate as dealt with theological matters. Meantime, as a matter of form, he seconded the amendment.

Dr. F. L. Robertson said the position he took was that the Presbytery had no jurisdiction over the Senatus of the university. They had no doubt authority over certain individual members of the Senatus, but over the Senatus as a body they had no jurisdiction whatever, and they ought not to set themselves up as judges of a Court which was quite independent of them. If the members of the Senate were so anxious to apologise to the public or to any other person, it was for the Senatus to make these apologies or take whatever action they pleased. Had the proposals of Mr. Thompson and Dr. Watt been restricted to this, and in view of the utterances which were alleged to have been made at the university, the Presbytery should take the matter into their consideration, that would have been an appropriate motion. But to ask the Court to take action which would imply that they assumed jurisdiction over the Senatus of the university was what he for one was not prepared to do. The amendment he would propose was as follows:

"The Presbytery being advised that the Gifford Lectureship, at present held by Prof. Max Müller, was founded by Lord Gifford in order that the origin of religion might be discussed on a scientific basis, declare that it is out of their province to express an opinion on the wisdom of the founder in constituting the trust, on the expediency of the university in accepting the trust, and on the manner in which they have administered the trust."

Mr. Niven, in seconding, said he hoped that the expression of the opinion that had been called forth would be a sufficient indication of the desire of the Presbytery to conserve the interests of religious truth, while at the same time they refrained from intruding into affairs where they had no legitimate or legal right to appear.

Mr. Thomson having replied, it was suggested by the Clerk that the vote should be taken *per capita*.

Mr. Thompson—I move that the roll be called, that we may see who is for and who is against Christ.

Dr. F. L. Robertson—I rise to order, and ask that Mr. Thompson should withdraw that expression. (Hear, hear.)

The Moderator asked Mr. Thompson to withdraw the expression, but he declined.

Dr. Robertson—I insist on it being withdrawn. Neither Mr. Thompson nor any member of the Court has any right to affirm that any man who moves an amendment, or who is prepared to support it, denies Christ.

Mr. Thomson—I say those who prefer the motion are, in my opinion, for Christ. It is an expression of opinion.

The Moderator—Will you authorise me to ask Mr. Thompson to withdraw that expression in regard to any member of the Court?

Mr. Thomson—I say those who prefer the motion—

The Moderator—You do not gain anything by the course you are adopting.

Mr. Thomson—I say I look upon it in the light I have stated.

The Moderator—Is that a modification?

Dr. Robertson—It is not. I move that he be requested to withdraw the expression.

Mr. Thomson—In case it should influence any of your votes I withdraw. I have sharp eyes, and I can see who are for and who are against. In case somebody should tell me he changed because I held to what I said, I withdraw. I should not do it otherwise.

The Moderator—Do you withdraw?

Mr. Thomson—Yes, of course.

The two amendments were then put to the meeting, when thirteen voted for Dr. Robertson's and seven for that of Dr. Watt. In the second vote Dr. Robertson's amendment was put against the motion, and carried by seventeen to five votes. On the result the division being announced.

Mr. Thomson exclaimed—Five for Christ!

The Moderator—I do not think that is in order. I do not think Mr. Thomson has a right to say of any member that he is not for Christ.

Mr. Thomson—I said they were for Christ. I did not say they were not for Christ.

The Moderator—The implication was rather strong.

Mr. Nivan—I am sorry that Mr. Thomson has recurred to this matter again. I feel that it is inconsistent with the character of a Church Court that observations like that should be allowed to pass unnoticed. I think that Mr. Thomson should be again called upon to withdraw the observation that he has made.

Mr. Thomson—I said five are for Christ, but I might have said more—that they are for the Church of Scotland.

The Moderator—You have heard again that you are requested to withdraw your insinuation against members of this Court.

Mr. Thomson—I do not withdraw. I made no insinuation.

The Moderator—Do you state explicitly that there is no insinuation?

Mr. Thomson—I said decidedly that five are for Christ. You can ask me to explain.

Dr. Watt—Mr. Thomson ought clearly to understand that the Presbytery, having taken this view that he should be requested to withdraw, may adopt a certain course of conduct. If Mr. Thomson refuses we must punish him in some way.

Mr. Thomson—You will be punished for your heresies.

Dr. Watt—The forms and laws of the Church do not provide us with any method of punishment, because those who laid down the rules of procedure could never for a moment have supposed that such words and expressions, contrary to good feeling, could ever be spoken or allowed in any Church Court. I say this, because as your Moderator I felt myself in a difficulty if I should be pushed into this corner. I feel extremely for you, sir, on this the first day on which you have taken the chair, that you should be placed in this most unfortunate position. I should like Mr. Thomson to know that we can at least pass a resolution in which we express our sense of grievous displeasure and our censure. If a man does not feel that, I do not know what he can feel. That would be his punishment. I am not making a motion, but letting Mr. Thomson know that that is the only alternative before the Presbytery.

Dr. John Macleod—In the observations I made with reference to Dr. Watt's motion I was at pains to say that I sympathised to a very large extent with the motives which animated Mr. Thomson in so far as they led him to challenge the teaching which has been lately delivered in the university. I refrained from committing myself to his motion, however, because I felt it went prematurely into a matter with which it was not expedient for the Court to deal. In these circumstances I am entitled more than anyone to ask that he should withdraw the expression. Mr. Thomson must be certain that many of us who have not seen it to be our duty to support his motion are as profoundly indignant at any teaching that would tamper with the great verities of the Christian faith as he can be. If it could be supposed for a single moment that the Senate of the university or any part of it were in sympathy with such teaching, I should be the first to take action and to propose that the Church sever its connection with the university altogether, so deeply do I feel on the subject. I hope, therefore, that Mr. Thomson will see it to be his duty to withdraw the expression and

not put us in the position of being sympathisers with the teaching he has condemned.

The Moderator—I think after that appeal you should withdraw.

Mr. Thomson—That relieves me a great deal. I said that five are for Christ and the Church of Scotland. I hold that we are all that. I do not mean to particularise and say who is not for Christ.

The amendment was then adopted.

The meeting afterwards separated.

THE SUNSET CLUB ON THE JURY SYSTEM.

At the last banquet of the Sunset Club, one hundred and ninety-one members were present, and the subject for consideration was "Our jury system, can it be improved?" In addition to the two leading speakers, fifteen others took part in the debate, and they were nearly all alike in opinion that "Our Jury System" is a very bad one, and that it ought to be improved. They were not harmonious in their plans for improving it, because many of them seemed to have only a superficial knowledge of the genius and moral constitution of Trial by Jury, and its importance as a sanctuary for liberty when personal rights are assailed by the conspiracies of government. They saw Trial by Jury corrupted in the interest of wrong, and they charged upon the system itself the very adulterations which it has always resisted until defeated by force or fraud.

The banquet being ended, and the requisite aroma given to the subject by the incense of cigars, the chairman called upon Mr. Sigmund Zeisler to open the debate. He did it very well, but unfortunately, at the very beginning of his argument, he led the company astray by criticising, not the jury system, but those very sensible persons who manage to keep out of the jury box. His budget of reforms went up in smoke when he said that "no amount of legislation will radically improve our jury system so long as citizens shirk jury duty." This admission blocked the road, because it is morally certain that until the jury system as operated in Chicago is reformed, citizens whose time is worth anything will continue to "shirk" jury service. That service is no longer a public duty; it has become a persecution which it is our domestic duty to escape from if we can. Mr. Zeisler himself complained that at one trial in Chicago, seven weeks were consumed in the selection of a jury; and of course the jurors chosen early were compelled to wait week after week for the others. After that, several weeks more were consumed in the trial, which consisted of ten parts testimony and ninety parts objections to its introduction. A man's duty to his family commands him to avoid serving as a jurymen at such a trial.

Most men will agree with Mr. Zeisler that the number of "challenges for cause" ought to be reduced, and especially those founded on opinions formed or expressed. It is a dismal thing to see a lawyer of great mental incapacity fishing in the dried up river bed of a man's past lifetime, with a hook baited with frivolous questions, hoping to get a nibble to which he may call the attention of the judge as a sign which when corroborated by twenty other signs which he expects to get may justify a "challenge for cause." It is not so certain, however, that the business of examining jurymen as to their qualifications should as Mr. Zeisler claims, "be taken from counsel, and given to the presiding judge." There are grave objections to that plan.

It would be travelling backwards to deprive a prisoner or his counsel of the right to ask a witness or a jurymen any question that may be properly put. Eye to eye, and voice to ear, emphasise every question, and they help the test of cross examination. It is the right of every man to use their potent influence to aid him in revealing truth or exposing falsehood. Nor ought it to be the law that only second hand questions be put to a jurymen concerning

his qualifications, roundabout from the counsel to the judge, and then from the judge to the jurymen. This is the practice at courts martial, and it is of doubtful wisdom there. A prisoner is often at a disadvantage because he is not permitted to examine or cross-examine a witness, but must filter all his questions through the Judge Advocate. A similar practice would be a novelty in our courts, but hardly a reform.

He did not mean to do it perhaps, but Mr. Zeisler stuck some red hot pins into the consciences of his congregation when he denounced the practice of summoning talesmen by special venire as "vicious in itself and a powerful aid to those who practice the art of jury packing"; for he knew that a jury packed in that "vicious" manner by special orders, had sentenced American citizens to death with the approval of nearly all the men he was talking to. Is it according to etiquette thus to raise ghosts at a festive board?

Mr. Zeisler's chief objections were brought against that principle of trial by jury which requires that the verdict shall be unanimous; and here he made a plausible and business like argument in favor of a verdict by a majority of two thirds. He was not entirely consistent in his reasons, and the success of his pleading was largely due to the fact that he left out of it the political character of trial by jury, and treated that venerable institution as merely a practical method by which issues of fact may be decided. This indeed is the exterior form of it, but its inner spirit is now and always was that not only shall the facts be found, but also that twelve impartial men chosen from the body of the county shall approve the legal consequences which the judges aver must follow. Trial by jury has always held in reserve supreme authority over the final issue Guilty, or Not guilty, and within the heart of it as within a citadel the Anglo Saxon race for fifteen hundred years has preserved "the higher law."

Coming down to instances, Mr. Zeisler brought up the Cronin case to show how the rule of unanimity almost defeated the law of punishment. Had the one dissenting juror in that case held out for an acquittal instead of a compromise, it would have necessitated a new trial; and that, said Mr. Zeisler, "would have meant the eventual escape from all punishment of the perpetrators of a brutal murder." In this warning and complaint Mr. Zeisler was inconsistent with himself, because a little farther on he said that "in capital cases the death penalty should not be inflicted unless the jury should unanimously agree upon a verdict of guilty." Why not? If the *fact* of guilt can be legally established by two thirds of a jury why should not the vindication follow? By this concession to the principle of unanimity Mr. Zeisler weakened his case and strengthened the other side, because if a verdict by less than twelve ought not to carry with it the death penalty, it must be for the reason that the verdict itself is doubtful as a finding of the fact. And a verdict which is to doubtful to hang a man ought not to be sufficiently true to imprison him for life.

General Stiles, the appointed leader of the other side, brought his battalions on to the field in good order, but they came to reinforce the arguments of Mr. Zeisler, and gave him victory. General Stiles agreed with him throughout, and even went beyond him, for he said: "It is an important question whether at the proper time we could not afford to dispense with the jury system altogether. There are a great many objections to it." He was not prepared, however, to advocate the immediate abolition of the jury system. "We must grow up to that," he said. "Like many other things, that is a condition that must be evolved, not created." The practical objection to this argument is that it will apply to any change proposed by anybody; "at some future stage in the progress of social and political evolution," says the reformer, "the change may be safely made, but—but—but, not now."

The general discussion that followed lacked originality, and the men who took part in it seemed like a lot of stragglers in the rear of the column trying to keep up with the main body com-

manded by Mr. Zeisler and General Stiles. They kept on firing at the malingerers who hide when the detail comes for them to serve upon the jury; and one enthusiastic veteran proposed to expel from the Sunset club all shirkers of jury duty. The proposition was not entertained, because if adopted it would have been fatal to the club. That same enthusiast also conjured up the "jury briber," and proposed to "take him out and hang him." There is always among those after-dinner orators an amiable gentleman pretending to be a man of sanguinary purpose, who sentences to rhetorical death any trivial delinquent whom his imagination, acting as a moral policeman, seizes and brings before him for judgment.

The jury briber having been marched off to summary execution, the debate went on. Some of the members advocated professional jurors, elected for a term of years and paid good salaries. Others thought that a jury commission should be appointed with power to revise the jury lists, and present the names of men from whom the jury should be drawn. One member said: "The root of the evil is that litigants and their lawyers are not honest." Noticing a good many lawyers present, he thought that he ought to modify his accusation, and he did so by offering for the lawyers an excuse which rather strengthened the original charge. With amusing simplicity he said, "I am not preaching that lawyers must be honest, for if they are, *they lose their case.*"

Nearly all the proposed changes had merit in them, and perhaps any of them if adopted would be an improvement on the jury system as administered in Chicago and other cities now; but when compared with a trial by a jury of twelve good and lawful men impartial in themselves, and impartially drawn by lot from all the qualified voters of the county it is not likely that any of them would be better than the original system, except perhaps in civil causes and in criminal cases below the grade of felony; and it is not at all certain that they would be an improvement even there. What is needed is the *restoration* of trial by jury, not its mutilation, nor the substitution of some other system for it.

The moral qualities and the political importance of trial by jury were presented for consideration by two members of the club, but they came too late upon the field. It was near the end of the debate when Mr. Gregory said: "No lawyer who has studied the history of his profession can but be moved by the accounts of the great battles for freedom which have characterized its growth and development, and in which trial by jury has borne so conspicuous a part." And it was even later when Mr. Hatch condensing a very strong argument into a very few words, said: "The jury system is not merely a means for the administration of justice between parties, it is a political institution. It stands between the people and arbitrary government, whether it comes through the government itself, or by powerful lords, as in the early history of England, or as to-day in the encroachments of powerful trusts and corporations. The civil liberties of the people will be safe so long as the administration of justice is taken part in by juries selected by the county at large."

If Mr. Hatch and Mr. Gregory had spoken earlier, the debate would have been forced on to the higher plane of historical comparison, and the patriotic services of trial by jury would have been considered. Besides discussing the most expedient way of getting verdicts, this larger question must have been debated. Has individual freedom become so firmly established in this country that we do not need any longer the political protection of trial by jury? Considering the enormous wealth of the American Plutocracy, the Imperial prerogatives claimed and exercised by the Legislative and Executive powers in the American republic, and the disposition to increase them at the expense of popular liberty, it may be well for us to pause before we weaken by one-third the old safeguard which curbed the Norman barons and conquered the English kings, a jury of twelve impartial men, unanimous in their verdict.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

THE PROGRESS OF RELIGION.

THE *Christian Union* of May 7th says concerning a discussion which of late took place between Professor Briggs and his antagonist, concerning the "whither" of his unorthodox theology: "There is every reason to believe that we are at the beginning of one of the most fundamental theological discussions of the century, for the question of the sources and authority of the Bible goes to the root of the Christian religion. That this discussion was certain to come has long been evident to all those who have been familiar with critical work on the Old Testament; that it ought to come has long been the conviction of those who hold that the world is entitled to every particle of light, and that to know the truth is the only security. The *Christian Union* deprecates quite as strongly as any of those who oppose opening this question the waste of time and strength in abstract theological discussion, but this discussion involves a very different question than one of forms or statements. It can no more be postponed than can the movement of the human mind searching for truth and compelled to modify its conclusions by truth. The Christian Church is bound to welcome truth from whatever quarter it comes; if it believes in the truth which it possesses, it will be absolutely fearless; instead of shunning discussion and investigation, it will court the clearest and most searching examination of all the foundations of its faith. What it holds essentially are a few great historic facts which answer to the few great human needs and which solve the few great human problems. The life of the Church is not bound up in any theology or philosophy; it is not identified with any explanation of these facts. The facts belong to the Church ecumenical and universal; the explanations belong to the Church provincial. The Church provincial has often been disturbed and compelled to modify its positions; the Church universal, holding to the essential facts of Christianity, has never been shaken and never will be. There has been no more disastrous blunder than the attempt to fight against any form of new truth on the part of religious people. The Church ought never to have been arrayed against any form of scientific investigation; and yet it has steadfastly, through the mouths of many of its leading teachers, fought every inch of ground over which science has passed, and been driven, step by step, backward from its positions, only to discover at length that it had been holding ground that never belonged to it and opposing that which was best for it. For it will be seen in the long run that the greatest ally of religion in this century has been science, correcting false ideas, cutting off speculative excrescences, simplifying, broadening, and making still more majestic the general conception of the universe. Since this discussion was certain to come, it ought to come inside the Church and not outside it. The researches of Biblical scholars in the last hundred years have created a new province of scholarship; they have collected a vast mass of materials bearing upon many of the books of the Old Testament and raising many questions with regard to their dates and authorship. The material is in the possession of a host of scholars. What the scholars know the world will know, sooner or later, for all the conclusions of scholarship are certain, eventually, to become common property. It is simply a question, in this case, whether these great subjects shall be discussed and these great issues settled by devout, reverential scholars inside the Church, or whether the conclusions shall be reached by men without religious feeling or interests, but in possession of the facts; it is a question whether the revision of the attitude of the Church on these matters shall be made by its friends or forced upon it by its enemies. The issue which has been precipitated by the outspoken frankness of Professor Briggs ought to have been raised years ago. The Church owes a debt of gratitude to Professor Briggs because he has had the courage to raise this question frankly and in all its fullness inside Church lines. He does not stand alone; there are many other Christian teachers and scholars

who, without agreeing with him in every respect, hold to his general view and are at one with him in believing that the time has come for discussion and action. In such a discussion as this there are manifold temptations to heat, unfairness, and precipitation. All these things are to be deprecated and avoided. Professor Briggs has already been widely misrepresented. For his sake, and for the sake of all those who are to take part in this discussion, we warn our readers in no case to make up their opinion until they know that they fully understand the position of the man they are judging."

This article is a good sign of the times. It proves that the harvest is near at hand and that a great reformation is preparing itself. Whether this reformation is to take place in the Presbyterian Church, of which Professor Briggs is a member, would however seem to be doubtful. The General Assembly at Detroit last week vetoed his appointment to the chair of Biblical Theology in Union Seminary. The grave question of heresy still remains to be decided by the New York Presbytery.

BOOK REVIEWS.

EASY LESSONS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

By Alfred Bayless. Chicago: W. W. Knowles & Co.

This is an excellent school book, and it will be of great assistance to students of the American Constitution. Some big boys too who think themselves lawyers might study it with a good deal of profit. It is an easy explanation in detail of the several Articles and Sections of the Constitution, a subject of study generally supposed to be extremely difficult to everybody excepting persons "learned in the law."

Some of the author's comments and explanations refer to parts of our political system outside the Constitution, but the separation is not clearly made, as for instance in passages like this: "The senate committees are appointed by the senate itself, but the house committees are appointed by the speaker." This immediately follows an explanation of the Sections of the Constitution which refer to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, and without some explanation might be mistaken for parts of the Constitution. So also, such a statement as this, "Every member of Congress is addressed as Honorable." This also might be supposed from the context to be a mandate of the Constitution; but these are trifles of small moment in comparison with the merits of the book.

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THE DISCOVERY OF THE SOUL.

BY PROF. F. MAX MUELLER.

PHYSICAL Religion beginning with the belief in agents behind the great phenomena of nature, reached its highest point when it had led the human mind to a belief in one Supreme Agent or God. It was supposed that this God could be implored by prayers and pleased by sacrifices. He was called the father of gods and men. Yet even in his highest conception he was no more than what Cardinal Newman defined God to be. "I mean by the Supreme Being," he wrote, "one who is simply self-dependent, and the only being who is such. I mean that he created all things out of nothing, and could destroy them as easily as he made them, and that, in consequence, he is separated from them by an abyss, and incommunicable in all his attributes." This abyss, separating God from man, remains at the end of physical religion. It constitutes its inherent weakness; but this very weakness became, in time, a source of strength, for from it sprang a yearning for better things. The despairing utterances of Job, "Man lieth down and riseth not," and of the Psalmist, "The dead cannot praise God, neither any that go down into darkness," are but the natural consequence of that abyss which had been fixed by Physical Religion between God and man, between the Infinite and the finite.

The history of religion teaches us that a belief in the Divine in Nature does not and cannot yield any satisfaction to a desire for a more intimate relation with the gods or with God, and to the irrepressible yearning for immortality. That satisfaction, so far as history allows us to see, came from a different source, from what I call Anthropological Religion, or the discovery of the Divine in man.

We cannot take the name and concept of a soul in man for granted, and proceed at once to the question how that soul came to be considered as immortal. We have to find out, first of all, how such a thing as a soul was ever spoken of and thought of. To us the two words, "body and soul," are so familiar that it seems almost childish to ask the question how man at first came to speak of body and soul. But to have framed a name for soul is by no means a small achievement, and I have no doubt that it took the labor of many generations before it could be accomplished.

We saw how long it took to frame a name for God. We also saw that man could never have framed such a name unless Nature had taken him by her hand, and made him see something beyond what he saw in the fire, in the wind, in the sun, and in the sky. The first steps were made very easy for him. He spoke of the fire that warmed him, of the wind that refreshed him, of the sun that gave him light, and of the sky that was above all things, and by thus simply speaking of what they all *did* for him, he spoke of agents behind them all, and at last of an Agent behind all the agencies of Nature. We shall find that the process which led to the discovery of the soul, and the framing of names for soul, was much the same. There was no conclave of sages, who tried to find out whether man had a soul, and what should be its name. If we follow the vestiges of language, the only true vestiges of all intellectual creations, we shall find that here also man began by naming the simplest and most palpable things, and that here, also, by simply dropping what was purely external, he found himself by slow degrees in possession of names which told him of the existence of a soul.

It is clear that in the case of the soul, as in the case of all other abstract objects, the first name and the first concept were necessarily formed from material objects. The soul, as we conceive it as an invisible, intangible, immaterial object, could never have been named, and if it could not be named, could never have been conceived. But what could be named and conceived was the blood or the heart, and, better still, the breath, the actual *spiritus* or spirit that went in and out of the mouth and the nostrils. Take whatever dictionary you like, and you will find how the words for soul, if they can be analysed at all, invariably point back to a material origin, and invariably disclose the process by which they were freed from their material fetters.

It may be asked, What has our belief in a soul to do with a belief in God? And, to judge from many works on religion, and, more particularly, on the origin of religion, it might seem indeed as if man could have a religion, could believe in gods and in one God, without believing in his own soul, without having even a name or a concept of soul. It is true that no creed enjoins a belief in a soul as it enjoins a belief

in God ; and yet, what is the object, nay, what can be the meaning of our saying, "I believe in God," unless we can say at the same time, "I believe in my soul"?

The belief in a soul, however, exactly like the belief in Gods, and at last, in one God, can only be looked upon as the outcome of a long historical growth. It must be studied in the annals of language, in those ancient words which, meaning originally something quite tangible and visible, came in time to mean something semi tangible, something intangible, nay, something infinite in man. The soul is to man what God is to the universe.

When we remember what is now a fact doubted by no one, that every word in every language had originally a material meaning, we shall easily understand why that which at the dissolution of the body seemed to have departed, and which we consider the most immaterial of all things, should have been called at first by the name of something material—namely, the airy breath. This was the first step in human psychology. The next step was to use that word "breath" not only for the breath which had left the body, but likewise for all that formerly existed in the body—the feelings, the perceptions, the conceptions, and that wonderful network of feelings and thoughts which constituted the man, such as he was in life. For all this depended on the breath. The third step was equally natural, though it soon led into a wilderness of imaginations. If the breath, with all that belonged to it, had departed, then it must exist somewhere after its departure, and that somewhere, though utterly unknown and unknowable, was soon painted in all the colors that love, fear, and hope could supply. These three consecutive steps are not mere theory, they have left their footprints in language, and even in our own language these footprints are not yet altogether effaced.

This linguistic process which led to the formation of words for the different phases of the intellectual life of man is full of interest, and deserves a far more careful treatment than it has hitherto received, particularly at the hands of the professed psychologist. What is quite clear is that all the words of the psychological terminology, for instance the Homeric expressions "Psyche," "Menos," "Thymos," "Phrenes," begin as names of material objects and processes, such as heart, chest, breath, and commotion, just as the names of the gods begin with the storm-wind, the fire, the sun, and the sky. At first every one of these words was capable of the widest application. But very soon there began a process of mutual friction and determination, one word being restricted idiomatically to the vital breath of the life, shared in common by man and beast, other words being assigned to the pas-

sions, the will, the memory, to knowledge, understanding, and reasoning.

We have seen that the way which led to the discovery of a soul was clearly pointed out to man, as was the way which led to the discovery of the gods. It was the breath which almost visibly left the body at the time of death that suggested the name of breath, and afterwards the thought of something breathing, living, perceiving, willing, remembering, and thinking within us. The name came first, the name of material breath. By dropping what seemed material even in this airy breath, there remained the concept of what we call the soul.

The belief in the continued existence of the soul after death, and in its liability to rewards and punishments, seem as irresistible to-day as in the days of Plato. We cannot say that a belief in rewards and punishments is universal. We look for it in vain in the Old Testament or in Homer. But when that belief has once presented itself to the human mind, it holds its own against all objections. It is possible, no doubt, to object to the purely human distinction between rewards and punishments, because, from a higher point of view, punishment itself may be called a reward. Even eternal punishment, as Charles Kingsley used to say, is but another name for eternal love, and the very fire of hell may be taken as a childish expression only for the constant purification of the soul. All this may be conceded, if only the continuity of cause and effect between this life and the next is preserved. But when we come to the next question, whether the departed, as has been fondly supposed, are able to feel, not only what concerns them, but likewise what concerns their friends on earth, we may call this a very natural deduction, a very intelligible hope, we may even admit that no evidence can be brought forward against it, but beyond that we cannot go.

Man, if left to himself, has everywhere arrived at the conviction that there is something in man or of man besides the material body. This was a lesson taught not so much by life as by death. Besides the body, besides the heart, besides the blood, there was the breath. Man was struck by that, and when the breath had left the body at death, he simply stated the fact, that the breath or the *psyche* had departed. All the speculations on the true nature of that *psyche* within, belong to the domain of Psychology.

A mere study of language would show how general, nay, how universal, is the belief in something beside the body, in some agent within, or of what in Sanskrit is called by a very general name, the *antahkarana*, the agency within. Every kind of internal agency was ascribed to that something which showed itself not only as simply breathing and living, but as feeling

and perceiving, soon also as naming, conceiving, and reasoning. In our lectures on Anthropological Religion we have had chiefly to deal with the speculations which arose from that *psyche*, as no longer *within*, but as after death *without* the body. Here also language began with the name of breath. The breath had gone, the *psyche* had departed. That *psyche*, however, was not conceived as mere breath or air, but as retaining most of those activities which had been ascribed to it during life, such as feeling, perceiving, naming, conceiving, and reasoning. So far I do not see what can be brought forward against this primitive and universal form of belief. If there was a something in man that could receive, perceive, and conceive, that something, whatever name we call it, was gone with death. But no one could think that it had been annihilated—*nunquam nihil ex aliquo*. So long, therefore, as the ancient philosophers said no more than that this something, called breath or *psyche*, had left the body and had gone somewhere else, I do not see what counter-argument could stop them. Even during life, the body alone, though it could live by itself, could not be said to see or hear or perceive by itself. The eye by itself does not see, it requires something else to receive and to perceive, and that something, though itself invisible, was as real as the invisible Infinite and the Divine behind the agents in nature, whom we call the gods of the ancient world. It became in turn the soul, the mind, the agent, the subject, till at last it was recognised as the Infinite and the Divine in man.

In our longings for the departed we often think of them as young or old, we think of them as man or woman, as father or mother, as husband or wife. Even nationality and language are supposed to remain, and we often hear expressions, "Oh, if the souls are without all this, without age, without sex, without national character, without even their native language, what will they be to us?" The answer is, they will really be the same to us as they were in this life. Unless we can bring ourselves to believe that a soul has a beginning, and that our souls sprang into being at the time of our birth, the soul within us must have existed before.

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.

But however convinced we may be of the soul's eternal existence, we shall always remain ignorant as to how it existed. And yet we do not murmur or complain. Our soul on awakening here is not quite a stranger to itself and the souls who as our parents, our wives and husbands, our children and our friends, have greeted us at first as strangers in this life, but have become to us as if we had known them for ever,

and as if we could never lose them again. If it were to be so again in the next life, if there also we should meet at first as strangers till drawn together by the same mysterious love that has drawn us together here, why should we murmur or complain? Thousands of years ago we read of a husband telling his wife, "Verily a wife is not dear, that you may love the wife; but that you may love the soul, therefore a wife is dear." What does that mean? It means that true love consists, not in loving what is perishable, but in discovering and loving what is eternal in man or woman.

THE LOGIC OF DIFFERENTIATION.

BY HELEN A. CLARKE.

It is a question in my mind whether the present tendency of science is not to exalt beyond its proper sphere the law of differentiation. Can the most highly differentiated or specialised product of nature be proved to be, on the whole, the highest product in any but a relative sense? It seems to me that differentiation carried too far must end either in stagnation or decay. No one will deny that the differentiation which has resulted in a species of animals that can swim and live in the water makes them far superior to man in this respect, but who will dare to say that they are, on this account, a higher product of nature than man? The same is true of the differentiation which has resulted in flying. And what is the price which these highly differentiated beings have paid for their superiority in this line? Simply that they are forever cut off from all progress; their individuality is reduced to a minimum, they can fly and swim beautifully, but they can do precious little else except reproduce their kind.

When man first came upon the scene, whatever may have been the producing forces of a condition favorable to his appearance, Nature found herself face to face with a new sort of material in the rough, in which there were latent immense possibilities for intellectual and spiritual development and over which she was to wield her differentiating sway. And from her task she has never flinched until, to give a few examples, we have, here, a dancing, flirting, vain, selfish species of man, and there a toiling, moiling species; here a race of millionaires, and there, a race of paupers; here we have a genus which can write the most learned essays, and yet cannot enjoy the finest musical composition in the world; there a genus which will grow rapturous over a symphony, and call Herbert Spencer "stuff"; here a sex whose standard is morality, and there a sex whose standard is immorality. Mind protoplasm, so to speak, has been undergoing the process of differentiation into just so many birds and fishes of the mind kingdom. Now, the question is, "Is this a course of things which is going

to bring about the greatest sum of happiness to the human race?"

It is quite conceivable that if the birds and fishes of the animal kingdom had had their choice of being supreme flyers or supreme swimmers, or of foregoing this special supremacy for the sake of the greater possibilities opened out in becoming members of the human race, they would have chosen the latter. Shall we for the first time fully aroused and conscious of nature's differentiating methods do everything in our power to further her designs until we have so many species of perfected and isolated specialists that no farther general progress will be possible?—unless still another sort of un-differentiated, homogeneous being should be kind enough to make his appearance and give Nature another chance.

I do not see what good there was in our finding out this law of nature if we are only to go on consciously doing the same thing we have been unconsciously doing for millions of ages. It would be about as sensible to insist that after the discovery of the law of gravitation men should have made a point of tumbling down as often as possible in order to show their appreciation of Nature's beneficent law and aid her in carrying it out. The truth is that men are slaves to the laws of nature only so long as they remain unconscious of them. As soon as they have found them out, the laws of nature become their slaves. The destructive lightning is chained and made to do the duty which was once done by a farthing candle.

It is just here that man has such an enormous advantage over the lower animals, and if he lets nature develop him into *fishes* and *birds*, he is ignoring his own most distinctive characteristic, and one which ought to prevent his blotting out the progress of the race by overspecialisation.

I have been led to make these remarks mainly on account of the use which scientists are making of the argument of differentiation against woman. For hundreds of centuries, religion has been made to bear witness against her, and, now, just when a new day seemed to be dawning, and the pernicious results of religious superstition are being thrown off, she is to be subjected to a *material* superstition which bids fair to make her fight for independence harder than it has ever been; for science scorning the spiritual sceptres of the human past as unbecoming our fuller knowledge yet inconsistently bows in abject servitude to the material sceptres of an ante-human past. The scientific man is so much taken up with his new found ancestors, the beasts of the field, and he is so delighted with the resemblances which he perceives to exist between them and himself that he is for modeling his life on their plan, and he either ignores, or issues scientific

Bulls against any tendency he may observe to escape what he calls the fundamental laws of nature.

Nature, having divided the men off from the women, it is the duty of the human race, says the scientist, to follow her lead and emphasise this dividing as much as possible. Now, it is rather a curious fact that, although they preach the practicability of as much sub-differentiation and specialisation—provided the main line of differentiation from women is preserved—as possible among men, they declare that women must remain among themselves a highly differentiated *whole* of men-pleasing, child bearing, house-keeping beings.

Fortunately, for the women, they possess a consciousness which the poor birds and fishes of the past did not possess, and although they perceive that every opportunity is given them to become specialists in one line, they prefer the larger possibilities which open out to them in considering themselves homogeneous, and capable, like men, of further sub-differentiation.

Since, spite of their sex difference, men and women do possess many points of likeness, the tendency of this sub-differentiation has been to make men and women—not more different, but more alike—at least intellectually. But intellectuality is tending to spiritualise woman more and more; and, no doubt, much to the chagrin of the materially superstitious scientist, there is being developed a species of woman in which the sex instinct is reduced to a minimum, and to whom love can come only in the person of a being spiritually and intellectually *like* herself. While a lower kind of love may be founded in difference, the higher kind of love which alone endures can only be founded in fundamental likeness.

To illustrate, we may suppose the point in evolution reached where the sexes have become completely differentiated. Such a point once reached, there are but three things which could happen, either men and women must grow farther and farther apart, or they must continue to occupy the same relative position towards each other, or they must grow closer together. If nature is servilely aided in her differentiating plan, she will take men off to one pole and women off to the other and there will be no bringing them together on any but the lowest sexual plane. The men who "fly" will find the women who can hardly even "swim" most uninteresting personages and will either prey upon them or leave them alone altogether, either of which would result in the decay of the race.

If, on the other hand, nature be supposed to have assigned men and women their place permanently at the point where their difference is emphasised, rather than their likeness, there can be no real friendship nor sympathy between them. Men will have either intellectual or "fast" pursuits, women, domestic or

frivolous pursuits, and the inevitable result will be that they will have little but an ephemeral sexual attraction for each other, their lives will not harmonise and the result will be stagnation.

Should, however, men and women both wisely use the laws of differentiation, the result must be that they will grow more and more alike intellectually and spiritually and an increase of sympathy between them will be the result.

If we look about us we are led to the conclusion that so far, women alone, and, of course only some of them, have been exercising this guiding influence on differentiation. Men have either stood still at the point where the differentiation became emphasised, representing, broadly speaking, orthodox superstition, or they have enrolled themselves as slaves to nature's law and followed the direction which represents scientific superstition. In either case they are getting farther away from those women who are developing their spiritual as well as their intellectual instincts, and who will have nothing to do with men, however intelligent, who insist on the supremacy of animal instincts.

That what I have said of developing womanhood, is true, is proved on every side by the fact that many a woman is finding her companion for life in another woman, in whose love and sympathy the higher needs of her nature are fulfilled, and scientists may talk as they will about her duties to the human race, she has found out the sacredness of her duty to herself and never again will she be willing to fulfil duties to the race, unless they are raised to a plane where they will not conflict with her intellectual and moral ideals.

From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that differentiation may be used to bring about likeness as well as difference, and having become conscious of its laws, it is our duty so to use them as to bring about the highest development of the human race.

There may come a time when the work of the specialists will be accomplished; when the human intellect will be able to grasp universal knowledge, from which alone springs universal sympathy, and with that, greater happiness than the specialist ever dreamed of in his philosophy; when the musician shall be in sympathy with the scientist, and the scientist shall not scoff at the poet. In fact, a suspicion will cross my mind at times, that Nature herself is tending to produce not a heterogeneous crowd of differentiated noodles but beings who will unite, in one glorious world-embracing synthesis, the knowledge which her slaves the specialists have developed to that stage where the new order of beings can seize and ripen it in the warmth of all other knowledge. But it rests with man to decide whether he shall be that being or whether it is to be a species yet unborn.

ENGLISH REFORMERS AND AMERICAN PRISONS.

BY GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.

THE Howard Association for the promotion of the best methods of the Treatment and Prevention of Crime and Pauperism have issued a leaflet entitled "The collegiate and hotel prisons of the United States, 1891." (Office: 5 Bishopsgate Street, London.)

We notice this tract at some length because the subject matter of it is of great importance; and because of the philanthropic services of John Howard, whose humane example is the inspiration and vitality of the useful institution which bears his name. As the life of John Howard was devoted to the abolition of crimes, the mitigation of penalties, and the reformation of criminals, it grates a little harshly upon the feelings that an association organised to carry on his work, should issue a pamphlet complaining that the treatment of criminals in the prisons of the United States is not sufficiently painful and severe. The foundation of its argument is the following statement:

"American criminality is so alarmingly increasing, that whereas in 1850, every million inhabitants of the United States only contributed 290 prisoners, the proportion had risen to 853 in 1870 and as high as 1,169 in the million in 1880. The census of 1890 appears to indicate a still further increase of criminality; there being 10,000 more 'convicts' than in 1880."

These figures are misleading, and they show us with what ingenuity statistics may be used to reveal and conceal the truth. In that one extract the words "prisoners," "criminality," and "convicts," are synonymously used; whereas, in fact, a "prisoner" may be neither criminal nor convict, a "criminal" neither convict nor prisoner, and a "convict" may be not a criminal nor in prison, for his conviction may be for the violation of some petty city ordinance involving no moral turpitude whatever. The figures are misleading also because they make no discrimination between crimes *mala in se* and crimes which are merely *mala prohibita*. In one year 7,566 persons were imprisoned in the Chicago house of correction, and all but 190 of them were incarcerated for non-payment of fines. Yet in the statistics used by the Howard Association they all appear as "convicts."

In compiling those figures no notice is taken of the multiplication of statutory offenses which is constantly going on in the United States. We have about fifty legislatures in this country and they spend the winter time in making laws prohibiting and making criminal various deeds of commission and omission which are perfectly innocent in themselves. The "criminality" deplored by the Howard Association may be obstructing the sidewalk, killing game for food instead of sport, peddling, pulling a tooth without a license, or some such heinous thing.

The Association complains that "criminals and vagrants in America are treated with a leniency which is positively cruel to the honest community." By this leniency, remarks that admirable society, "the Americans have sought to reverse the Divine ordinance that the law should be a terror to evil-doers." Only a hundred years ago, and even down to the reign of George the Fourth, platoons of malefactors were hanged every Monday morning at Tyburn corner in London, or in front of the Newgate prison; while hundreds of others were transported to the penal settlements at Botany Bay; and yet the law was not a greater terror to evil-doers then, than it was after John Howard and his disciples had forced the "Divine ordinance" of mercy into the sanguinary criminal code of England.

The Howard Association criticises our habit of pampering convicts; and with good reason, if the following statement is true:

"Thus some prisons in the United States, such as Elmira and Concord, have introduced 'the collegiate system,' for rendering proficiency in study a chief test of the fitness of their inmates for liberation. These and other American prisons provide their inmates with a sumptuous dietary. Thus at the California state prison of Folsom the convicts are not even obliged to work. If they choose to remain idle and lounge about in gangs they may do so; and still have every day a meat diet with coffee and vegetables. If they volunteer

to work at the quarries near the prison they are rewarded with soups, syrups, tea and cake and meat suppers. A third grade secures for them chops and steaks for breakfast as well as supper, with hot rolls and fruit, and a dinner worthy of a good hotel."

We admit that this is maudlin benevolence, and that it strains the quality of mercy to the breaking point, but we think there is a mistake as to the "menu." We half suspect also that the Howard Association circulated this tract as a sinister inducement to the criminal classes of London to emigrate, and thereby save the taxpayers of that village the expense of supporting them at Millbank or Pentonville. What is the use of passing laws to exclude European criminals from this country so long as the Howard Association persists in telling them that this is the paradise of convicts, where they may revel in luxury and idleness, besides receiving when in prison all the advantages of a "collegiate" education. Are the members of the Howard Association sufficiently aware of the awful responsibility they assume when they thus lead their English brethren into temptation? We hope that this leaflet has not been translated into foreign languages and circulated on the continent of Europe; but if it has been, we warn the criminal classes there not to be led astray by it, for if they come over here and get into an American penitentiary expecting to receive hotel fare and a collegiate course of education they will be wofully disappointed.

Some of the criticisms directed specially against the Elmira system will apply to the "reformatory" principle in every other prison in the world, and they make strong arguments in its favor; as for instance, this:

"Considering the severe competition of honest industry, it is most unfair to the ordinary American workman that these criminals at Elmira should be taught artistic and fancy trades, such as modelling and designing from nature, embossing in brass, executing portraits in copper, telegraphy, and so forth.

Here is an admission that even "convicts" may have a genius for the higher mechanics and the esthetic arts; and if teaching them is unfair to the ordinary workman it must be because they have the ability to learn; and if when released from prison they enter into "competition" with other workmen, it must be because they are willing to earn their living by work instead of crime. This complaint bears testimony in favor of Elmira. The Howard critics appear to recognise that themselves, for they tacitly concede the claim that Elmira *does* reform, but they insinuate that this very reformation is a bad thing tempting young men to commit crime that they may be imprisoned at Elmira and converted into useful citizens. On this rather unreasonable view of it they moralise in a stately, Sir Leicester Deadlock sort of a way, and say, "The safety and welfare of the community far outweigh in importance the interests of the individual," a mouldy sentiment which for ages has been urged as an excuse for every injustice which the community may think proper to inflict upon that unlucky "individual."

It would be comical irony should the Howard Association begin a reaction towards that irrational and vindictive system of prison discipline which it was the mission of John Howard to soften and to civilise.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A VERY good stroke of business was accomplished last week by a party of Turkish brigands not far from Adrianople. They wrecked a railway train, and after "holding up" the passengers in a way that would have done credit to American experts, they invited Herr Israel, the Berlin banker, with three of his friends who happened to be on the train, and also the conductor, to partake of their hospitality at their country seat in the mountains. The brigands were so delighted with the society of their German guests that they sent a message back to town saying that they really could not afford to part with them for less than ten thousand dollars apiece, or forty thousand dollars for the five, the

conductor being generously thrown into the bargain without any extra charge. They also added by way of a postscript that if the money was not paid they would cut off the heads of their guests, and send them to Berlin for nothing. The matter coming to the knowledge of Chancellor Caprivi, he immediately telegraphed an order to the German Ambassador at Constantinople to pay the money and release the captives. Although the sum demanded for the prisoners was far beyond their value, he would not higggle about the price, but pay it, and require the Turkish government to refund the money.

The prompt and businesslike action of Chancellor Caprivi, in the matter of the Turkish brigands is in admirable contrast to the methods pursued by the English authorities in a similar case that occurred in Greece. Lord Muncaster and some friends were captured by brigands in the neighborhood of Athens, and carried off into the mountains where they were held for ransom. There was so much chaffering and circumlocution by the English officials, who could not do anything without expending the constitutional quantity of red tape and sealing wax, that the prisoners were all the time in jeopardy; while the Greek government mounted its cavalry in hot haste to chase the brigands and release the captives. The slowness of the English government in the right direction, and the haste of the Greek government in the wrong direction, sealed the fate of the captives, for the brigands, impatient and alarmed, solved the whole problem by putting them to death. Perhaps this case furnished the lesson for Caprivi; but whether it did or not, his action will go far towards abolishing that international nuisance known as brigandage. When governments find that they must pay the damages caused by tolerated brigands they will probably suppress them. It will hardly do for the Grand Vizier to say to Chancellor Caprivi that owing to the peculiar constitution of the Turkish empire, the Turkish government has no criminal jurisdiction in the State of Adrianople.

In his picturesque and fascinating way Macaulay describes the scene inside the palace at Whitehall that Sunday evening when King Charles II. was mortally struck with apoplexy in the midst of a gay and dissolute company. The eloquent historian says: "His palace had seldom presented a gayer or a more scandalous appearance than on the evening of Sunday the first of February, 1685. . . . The great gallery of Whitehall, an admirable relic of the magnificence of the Tudors, was crowded with revellers and gamblers. . . . A party of twenty courtiers was seated at cards round a large table on which gold was heaped in mountains." We have been accustomed to regard that royal and patrician dissipation as the quality of a prodigal era which ended long ago, and yet, leaving out some of the grosser features which Macaulay mentions, the scene at Tranby Croft, where the Prince of Wales officiated as banker at a baccarat table, was in its gambling character an imitation of Whitehall. A game of cards played by friends at a private house for nominal stakes put up merely to emphasise the amusement may be harmless enough; but a game wherein one of the players wins five hundred dollars a night, as Sir William Gordon Cumming did at Tranby Croft, is covetous gambling, whether it be played by baronets, earls, and princes, or by knaves and sharpers of the baser sort. Luxury and idleness must have excitement, and gambling is one of the stimulants they crave. The man who has fallen low enough to win another man's money fairly, will soon descend low enough to win it unfairly if he can. And they say there was cheating at Tranby Croft, by a chivalrous knight, in a game where the bank was kept and the cards were dealt by the heir to the English throne.

It was rather a pleasant thing for the British democracy to see the Prince of Wales in the witness box confessing himself a

baccarat banker and a gambler; because his presence there in that capacity rubbed a little more veneering off that venerable superstition which is known as monarchy. Whatever brings that ancient institution into contempt is regarded as a gain to political civilisation; and the sordid pastimes of the prince tarnish the crown which the exemplary life of his mother made radiant. This baccarat scandal as they call it shortens the reign of royalty and caste in England. It shows to the English people of what common clay their titled aristocracy is made. It will do greater service than that, for it will lower the fence that divides cheating from gaming, and hasten the time when they will be compelled to graze in the same pasture. The difference between winning money fairly and winning it by cheating is only of degree. Neither is honest, but one is a little more dishonest than the other. The fashionable world of London affects to be greatly shocked that there should be cheating at cards by one of the Prince's own set, a baronet and lieutenant colonel of the guards, and the Prince himself in the witness box dolefully referred to the thimble-rig performance at Tranby Croft as "a sad event"; not the gambling, nor even the cheating, but the detection and exposure of the cheat. The Prince is a grandfather now, and old enough to know that every winning of money by gambling, no matter how "square" the game, is "a sad event." No man can honestly win, and take, and keep five hundred dollars of another man's money, no matter how fair may be his play according to the gambler's code.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

LAW PERMITS NO FREEDOM OF WILL.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :

IF I misrepresented your view by stating that when a man acts without any obstacle in his environment he is not under law, it was because you claim that at such a time a man is free; hence you palter with monism in a double sense. What the thinkers of this age are striving for is clearness of thought and logical expression. We have had confusion enough and bitter strife enough. What we want now is, that which will tend to harmonise with reason and bring "peace on earth and good will among men," but I don't see how these can obtain from your definition of monism. Because to say that you "accept determinism wholly and fully, but from the same standpoint of monism freewill must also be accepted," you make confusion instead of peace. You can, as an individual, accept that contradiction, but you cannot truthfully teach that doctrine for scientific truth; for it is equivalent to saying that two and two are four, but you must accept the doctrine also, for certain reasons, that two and three are four. What we want is clearness here. True monism does accept Determinism wholly and fully; it *must*, there is no alternative, but semi-religious monism need not. As Professor Huxley says, we must call a spade a spade.

I can distinguish between your position and the pagan doctrine of the freedom of the will and God's sovereignty, but your position is equally at variance with reason. If you postulate the freedom of the will because, in your opinion, it is best adapted to teach morals, I grant you the right, but you must remember that upon your own confession of determinism you assume an error that good may come. Artificial morality may largely depend upon teaching that untruth, but *real morality, never!*

The doctrine of scientific monism is not adapted to those who need moral instruction; it is for those who are *moral*. Under the necessity of adaptation to condition, nature had to start with the delusion of freewill. But we are now beginning to see face to face and that delusion must go along with the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

I agree with you that "man's actions are always according to law, but I insist that his actions are caused by law—cause—and therefore are not free. There is this difference between us: You postulate freewill (after you have declared by determinism that no such thing exists) for the sake of morality, while I deny it for the sake of scientific monism, truth and consistency.

To say that nature is a slave to law, or cause is not stating a dualism of cause and reality, because cause is reality. When I say that nature cannot exist and can exist at the same time, I declare a reality and at the same time show that nature cannot do both. The causes which govern forms are a part of nature, so when I say that a man is caused to eat by reason of hunger, I state a reality, not a dualism of cause and reality. I agree again, that "the power that produced man is in him and that he is a part of it," but I insist that he is a subordinate part through and through, that comes and goes by that which is not himself. When he is, nature is one, and when he is not, nature is still one. With organisation comes will, same as sight and hearing—nature's adaptation to ends. The eye must see, the ear must hear, and the will must sense action; all these are affected by causes. The eye cannot see an object if it is not there; the ear cannot hear a sound if there is none and the will cannot will unless there is something to repel or attract it. A man's actions are not the results of himself alone; they are results of combinations of which he is always a factor, but he is never the prime factor; that honor belongs to nature, and true monism must give it that honor, for all things proceed from one.

There is no dualism here. The stalk is a necessary factor for the production of corn, but it is not the prime factor because nature evolves both stalk and corn. If nature could evolve corn without a stalk it would not be governed by that law. Prof. Joseph Le Conte is mistaken when he says "in organic evolution nature operates . . . without the co-operation of the thing evolving," because the stalk is as essential for corn as good men and women are for the formation of a good environment.

Now instead of postulating an untruth for the purpose of morality, in order to cause mankind to feel their responsibility, would it not suit monism better to declare the undeniable truth which harmonises with determinism, that man in his relation to results is always a factor in the combination and therefore *must* be held responsible? Nature does not hold mankind responsible because they are free, but because, in the nature of things, it must.

JOHN MADDOCK.

ARE WE THE SLAVES OF LAW?

CLEARNESS of thought can be attained only by giving plain and unmistakable definitions. I have defined the term freewill as I use it, repeatedly; and it is not my fault if Mr. Maddock again and again speaks of a free will as a will which is not determined by law. Everything is determined by law and also all the actions of man are strictly and unequivocally determined by law. Not only the actions, but also all the wishes, desires, and tendencies to act, every and even the slightest commotion in our mind, every thought, every hope and fear, they all arise according to strict and unalterable laws. Will is a tendency to act. If this tendency to act can freely pass into act, I call the will free. If for some reason it is prevented from passing into act, I observe that the will is under constraint, it is not free. These are my definitions, and anyone criticising my position has to bear in mind what I mean by "free."

Mr. Maddock's definition of "free" seems to be "that which is not determined by law," and of course if free means "not determined by law," there is no freedom. But then the word "free" would be a useless word and we should drop it entirely; but we should have to invent a new word for that which I understand by free. It is apparent that there is a great difference between an act which is performed without constraint and another act which

is performed by some compulsion. If a man works because a slave-driver stands behind him with a whip, his work is no moral act; but if he works without any such compulsion simply because he wills it, if he works from what I call "freewill" and what Mr. Maddock calls "he must" because the law of nature forces him to do, his act is the true expression of his will. The acts of what I call "freewill" are necessary acts; they are determined by law. But being free, they show what kind of a will is in the man; and we can accordingly judge of the character of a man only if we consider the acts which he performed when he was under no constraint, when he was free. The acts of a slave do not show his real character. All our ethical education aims at liberation. We educate our children to make them free. We teach them the nature of the moral law and as soon as they possess motive impulses in their mind to remain in harmony with the moral law, we need no longer put any restraint upon them, we need no more watch them, but can leave them to themselves, or in other words, we can give them their freedom.

Now Mr. Maddock might ask me why I use the word freedom for a state which according to his usage of terms is slavery. He imagines that I do it, because "it is best adapted to teach morals." That is not my motive. My motive is that I trust it is the truest expression of things as they actually are. Man's actions are not "caused by laws" as Mr. Maddock says; man is not "a slave" of laws. Man's actions are caused by "causes"; and causes which affect a man's will are called motives. If a hungry man finds bread, he will if he is without constraint naturally and necessarily eat it. Hunger is the main motive of his act of eating and this hunger is at the time a part of himself. Hunger means a want of food, and a want of food implies the desire to eat. The desire to eat is at the time his will. If this will is not restrained (if it is free), it will pass into act. Would it be proper to say that this will is the slave of his desire to eat? This will is the man's desire to eat. Accordingly there is no sense in saying that it is the slave of itself.

But Mr. Maddock says, man is the slave of laws and he also says that nature is the slave of laws. To say that man's will is the slave of his motives is a meaningless tautology, for every free man may be called his own slave. But to say that man is the slave of laws (viz. the psychological laws of action) and that nature is the slave of natural laws, is a palpable dualism. Natural laws are only formulas describing the uniformities of nature. Hungry men desire to eat is a statement of fact, or rather of many facts which belong together. If I call this statement a law I must not think of it as some legal authority which is outside of the stomachs of hungry men compelling them to have a desire for food. The actual facts are the hungry men and all hungry men desire to eat. This uniformity is formulated in a general statement, and the general statement is called a natural law. It is positively erroneous and shows a trace of dualism to consider the law of gravitation as the power that forces the stone to fall. Gravity makes the stone fall, and gravity is a certain quality of the stone, it is (so far as the fall is concerned) the stone itself. The stone certainly falls according to a certain law, its fall is determined by law or in other words there is a uniformity in all falls of stones which can be described in a definite formula. But there is no sense in saying that the stones, when falling, are slaves of that formula. Nor is there any reason to speak of men whose freedom of action is not curtailed as slaves of the psychological laws by which the uniformities of human action are described.

If I have taken up this subject again and again, it is because I believe with Mr. Maddock that we must strive for clearness of thought, and I respect Mr. Maddock's pertinacity although I regret that he does not understand what I mean by free will.

P. C.

NOTES.

The Century for June contains an illustrated article "Women at an English University," (Newham College, Cambridge) by Eleanor Field.

National Zeitung is the name of a new German publication which makes its weekly appearance in Chicago. It is most ably edited by Joseph Brucker and discusses the live, political, economical, religious, and literary questions of the day. The first five numbers which we have seen are very promising and we do not doubt that the success of the journal is ensured.

Professor Max Müller tells us in his article "The Discovery of the Soul," how man came to believe in a soul. He explains to us the historical growth of the soul-idea which was taught us mainly by death. Death proved that besides the natural body there must be something else in man, his life, his soul, something spiritual which leaves the body with the last breath. This something was conceived as an agent within and was accordingly called in Sanscrit *antahkarana* (the agency within). This conception of the soul as the agency within has been of great service in the evolution of our psychological ideas, but it has also been a source of many errors. Even to-day it is not uncommon to represent the soul as a certain something which is a distinct entity moving about in the body. This soul-entity is either supposed to consist of a special ethereal substance or (according to Herbart and his school) it is said to be an immaterial point, an atom forming a centre of energy and causing all the phenomena of soul life by interaction with the material brain-cells. Prof. Max Müller is no dualist, but most representatives of the idea that the soul is an agency within, are dualists. The errors that so naturally originate from the idea that the soul is an agency within the body, have led to an abandonment of the term and gave way to what may briefly be called the psychology of positivism. We have stated our view of the subject at length in a series of former articles and in "The Soul of Man," and need not go into further details here.

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BRIGHT EYES AND DARK EYES.

BY PROF. F. MAX MUELLER.

I OFTEN divide my friends into two classes: those with bright eyes and those with dark eyes. Those with bright eyes, whatever they look at, whether nature or man, whether the past or the present, see only what is bright and beautiful and good. Those with dark eyes, wherever they look, see only what is dark and gloomy and bad. I am sorry for my dark-eyed friends. They are often very excellent people—very honest, very conscientious; but, with all that, they can be very unjust. Their ideals are pitched too high for this world. Show them a brilliant jewel, and they will at once look for a flaw in it. Give them a fragrant rose, and they will complain of its thorns. Describe to them an ancient religion, full of noble aspirations, and they will at once discover something that seems to them strange, absurd, and wrong, while what is good and true in it entirely escapes their notice.

My bright-eyed friends are, I believe, the better judges. They know how to appreciate even what is not quite perfect, if only it is well meant. And, after all, true criticism does not consist in merely finding out faults: it has a higher, though it may be a more difficult, task to perform—namely, to find out what is good, or what was at least meant to be good.

But besides my bright-eyed and my dark-eyed friends, there is a third class—a most mischievous, though, I am afraid, a very numerous class. They see nothing but what is bright in all that is their own, and nothing but what is dark in all that is not their own. This produces a most disagreeable squint, and makes a straightforward view of things and any honest judgment almost impossible.

Now, I cannot help thinking, and saying that most of the judgments we meet with of foreign religions come from these squinting critics, who with one eye see nothing but what is good and true in their own religion, and with the other nothing but what is bad and false in the religions of other nations. We see them from the very first dividing all religions into two classes—namely, true and false religions, the true being their own, the false comprising all the rest. And, mind, I do not accuse Christian critics only. This squinting treatment of religion is universal, or almost universal. The Mohammedan, the Jew, the Buddhist,

the Brahman, the Parsi, the followers of Confucius and Laotze in China, nay, the very believer in Unkulunkulu—all are convinced that their own faith only is bright and beautiful and true, while that of all other people is dark and gloomy and bad.

Now, I ask, is that a proper state of mind in which to approach the study of religions? Would it not be far better to look in all religions for something that is good and true? Should we be the losers if the Buddhist also held a truth which we ourselves hold? Is a truth less true if it is believed in by other religions also? There are, no doubt, many things in other religions which strike us as strange, which offend us as gross, and which we feel inclined to reject at once as utterly false. I have had much to do, not only with what we call false religions and heresies, but also with these very heretics, and with honest believers in these false religions. Some of them, whether Brahman or Buddhists, or Parsis, or followers of Confucius, were most excellent men—men of high character, of cultivated minds, and perfectly honest in their arguments. There was no point of religion or philosophy which I could not discuss with them as freely as I discuss them with my own friends and colleagues. But I must confess that I by no means always got the best in these arguments.

When discussing with a Buddhist priest from Japan, my excellent friend Bunyiu Nanjio, the question of prayer, I was startled when he declared to me that his sect considered prayer as sinful, as almost blasphemous. I tried to show him that prayer was a universal custom, that it seemed to arise from a most natural impulse of the human heart, that it was only an expression of our own helplessness and of our trust in a higher power, and that, even if not granted, a prayer would help us to submit more readily to the inscrutable decrees of a higher wisdom. But he would not yield. If we really believe, he said, in that higher wisdom, and in that higher power, it would be an insult to put our own small wisdom against that higher wisdom, or in any way to try to interfere with the workings of that higher power. You may adore and meditate, he said, you may trust and submit, but you must never ask, not even of Buddha, though he is full of pity and compassion.

Again, when I tried to convince him that we are

so made that we *must* believe in a Maker of the world, or in an Agent behind all the phenomena of nature, or, at least, in a first cause, he demurred. He did not say either Yes or No. He simply stated that Buddha had forbidden all inquiries into such matters, and that therefore he would not allow his mind to dwell on them. And how, he added, if you believe in an all-powerful, all-wise, all-loving Creator of the world, can you ascribe to him so imperfect a piece of workmanship as this earth, and hold him responsible for all the suffering, the misery, the disease and crime which we witness in every part of our globe?

I do not say that he convinced me, or that his arguments admitted of no reply. I only wish to show how many things that seem to us at first sight most irrational in foreign religions may admit of some rational explanation, if not defence—may not be so utterly absurd as they appear at first sight.

THE RELATION BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR.

BY C. STANILAND WAKE.

THE great economic problem of the day is the relation between the two classes of wealth producers, popularly known as capitalists and workmen, which includes the practical question of their respective rights in the division of the property they join in creating. The essential condition for the solution of this, as of any problem, is the ascertaining of the factors on which it depends and their relative value. The statement of the present question implies that the only persons entitled to participate in the first instance in the distribution of wealth are those who, either personally or by those whom they represent, have aided in its production. To understand aright, however, the position of these persons among themselves, it is necessary to determine, in the first place, the nature of wealth, and secondly, how it is created. In dealing with these two subjects I shall follow chiefly Mr. H. D. Macleod, whose "Elements of Economics" ought to be carefully studied as a strict application of Baconian methods.

Wealth might be defined as anything having economic value, but such an explanation introduces other terms which themselves require definition. Aristotle declared that wealth consists of all things whose value is measured by money, and it is now recognised that an economic "quantity" is anything whatever whose value can be measured in money. This definition supplies the criterion of wealth, the essential principle of which is *exchangeability*. Therefore wealth, in its widest sense, is defined as anything that can be exchanged, or in the words of Mill, which has the power of purchasing. This definition has to be supplemented, however, by the observation that a thing to be exchangeable must have value. The determination of

what constitutes value and of the source of this quality will furnish the conditions of the economic problem under consideration.

There can be only one test of value as an economic quantity, namely, demand, which depends on the possession of something by one person and the desire for it by another. It is evident, therefore, that for a "phenomenon of value," that is an exchange, to take place, there must be "the reciprocal desire or demand of two persons, each for the product of the other." Thus we may say that what constitutes value is reciprocal demand. This conclusion does not inform us, however, of the actual origin and cause of value, which can be best ascertained by acting on the principle laid down by Bacon, who says that "the induction which is to be available for the discovery and demonstration of sciences and arts must analyse nature by proper rejections and exclusions, and then after a sufficient number of negatives, come to a conclusion on the affirmative instances." It was declared by Locke that labor is the cause of all value, and McCulloch, applying this principle, affirms that "in its natural state matter is rarely possessed of any immediate or direct utility, and is always destitute of value. It is only through the labor expended on its appropriation, and on fitting and preparing it for being used, that matter acquires exchangeable value, and becomes wealth." That this statement is erroneous, and therefore that labor is not the cause of value, is evidenced by the fact that labor may be bestowed without the object of it, be it land or a movable thing, thereby acquiring value. Moreover, if labor is the sole cause of value, it would follow (1), that all differences or variations in value must be due to differences or variations in labor; (2), that all things produced by the same quantity of labor must be of equal value; (3), that the value must be proportional to the labor; and (4), that a thing once produced by labor must always have value and the same value. There is no difficulty in showing that none of these inferences are true, and from a consideration of the examples he adduces, Mr. Macleod concludes that labor is not in anyway whatever "the form or the cause of value, or even necessary to value." This conclusion is confirmed by the consideration that if labor is the sole cause of value it must be the cause of its own value, an idea which will not be entertained by any one. The real relation between them, as pointed out by Whately, is that labor is an *accident* of value in a certain class of cases, which must be affirmed also of materiality and durability, neither of which is necessary to value, that is, things may have this property without those qualities. Nor is value based on utility, as is sometimes asserted; since things may be useful in one place and not in another, and however useful a thing may be the more abundant it

is the less its value. In fact, some objects, such as diamonds, may be of great value and of little use.

The fact is that value does not belong to any object for its own sake, nor does it depend on human labor. It is really an affection of the mind, and its source is *demand* as the expression of desire. Without demand there can be no value, and the amount of value depends, the supply being the same, on the quantum of demand. This was the view of Aristotle, and of the Roman jurists, and it is that of all modern economists. McCulloch says clearly, "the desire of individuals to possess themselves of articles, or rather the demand for them originating in that desire, is the sole *cause* of their being produced or appropriated." It is the demand of the consumer, and not the labor of the producer, which constitutes a thing wealth, and hence demand is the inducement to labor, which without it would have no value.

The principle here laid down applies no less to capital than to labor. By capital is meant a head or source, that from which increase or profit flows, and therefore whatever when used gives a profit is capital. It is evident that this rule does not limit capital to money. Personal qualities are as useful for the production of profit as money, and they form the basis of the whole system of credit to which the wonderful development of modern commerce is chiefly due. It has been well said that "labor is the poor man's capital," and in fact capital and labor are merely different forms of wealth, as having exchangeable value. They both participate in the production of that which is required to supply the demand on which value depends, and they are equally valueless unless put to use. Capital and labor are thus different kinds of property, using this term in its original sense of "right," and not simply in relation to things. Any right having exchangeable value is a form of property, and hence personal rights which can be used for profit, or have a money value, are as much property as money, land or houses. Land stands on exactly the same economic footing as capital, and a due regard for this fact would prevent many bitter contentions as to the natural ownership of land. The total value of land "consists in the right to the past products of the soil, together with the right to a series of future profits or products forever"; to which should be added that these products depend in great measure on the use of capital in its forms of money and labor. A merchant having capital invested in trade, or possessing credit owing to his personal qualities, answers to the land owner. He has the right to his accumulated profits, and to the future profits to be earned by the use of his money, and by his personal capital in the form of skill and mercantile character.

We have thus arrived at the conclusion that labor

is a form of capital, and that the value of both "capital" and labor is due to their ability to supply the demand on which value depends. There is, however, another factor besides demand which enters into the question of value. The demand for any particular form of property may be small or great, and the supply may vary in the same way, so that the value of the property is also liable to vary. This principle is the general law of value, or the general equation of economics, and Mr. Macleod shows that it is universally applicable, and not merely, as some economists suppose, when prices are very high or very low. He says: "No other quantities but demand and supply appear on the face of the equation: we therefore learn that no other causes influence value or changes of value, except intensity of demand and limitation of supply. We learn that neither labor nor cost of production can have any *direct* influence on value: and that if they do so *indirectly*, it can only be by and through the means of affecting the demand or the supply: and that no change of labor or cost of production can have any influence on value unless they produce a change in the relation of supply and demand."

In conclusion, I am not concerned to lay down any particular rules for the division of profits or products between the two classes of workers or wealth producers, the capitalist or rather trader—for as we have seen all men who work for a reward are wealth creators and therefore capitalists—and those who assist the trader in his work. The former is the possessor of the source of profit money, or the credit which represents it, and the latter is the possessor of the source of profit personal labor, both of which have a market value. The personal equation must be added in either case, however, and this fact renders it more difficult than it would otherwise be to estimate the exact proportions of profit which any particular person is entitled to. But as between traders as a class on the one side, and their employees on the other the difficulty would not be so great; it being remembered nevertheless that only those employees are entitled to participate in profits, as such and not as wages, whose labor is distinctly profit producing. It may be added that this share of profits may be paid either as increased wages or by way of bonus. There are two points which should be always kept in mind in dealing with the great economic question we have been considering. The one is that the two forms of capital, money and labor, are equally necessary to each other, and that it is, therefore, the interest of the working class (so called) that capital should increase as much as possible to compete for labor. "When working men," says Mr. Macleod, "complain of the tyranny of capital and the low price of their labor, it is not the tyranny of capital which is their enemy, but the tyranny

of their own excessive numbers." The other point to be kept in mind is that economics cannot be divorced from ethics. That which is right, as demanded by fairness between man and man, is also expedient, as being in the long run the most economical from a business standpoint.

ARISTOCRATOMANIA.

ENVY of the rich is a very common feeling among the poor. And why is it so common? Because the rich are more fortunate in possessing worldly goods to satisfy not only their needs, but also any unnecessary wants. They have the means of procuring for themselves whenever they please all sorts of pleasures which because they are expensive lie outside the reach of the poor.

It is true that the rich have the means to procure themselves pleasures in an extraordinarily higher degree than the poor; but if the poor imagine that for that reason they actually enjoy life and life's pleasures better than the poor, they are greatly mistaken.

This is true in several respects. First the zest of pleasures is lost, if they are procured without trouble. Pleasure cannot be bought, pleasure must be felt, and the capability of having pleasure depends upon subjective and not upon objective conditions. The man who does not work lessens his capability of enjoyment in the same degree as he ceases to be in need of recreations; and pleasure which is no recreation after serious toil, which is not the satisfaction of a want, soon ceases to be a real pleasure, it becomes flat, stale and unprofitable.

The rich, in order to remain healthy in his spirit, in his sentiments, in his recreations and wants, must live like the poor man—not like those who are wretched and destitute, but like those who work for a living. The rich, be they ever so rich, must, for the mere sake of their mental and moral health, continue to be active, and their activity must have an aim and purpose, it must be productive of some good, it must be work of some kind.

The pleasures of the poor are, as a rule, richer and deeper in color than those of a certain class of typically rich people—viz., such rich people who noticeably appear and wish to appear as rich among their less fortunate fellow creatures; and the reason of this difference lies deeper still than in a mere lack of exertion and wholesome activity on the part of the rich. One of the most irresistible temptations of the rich, it appears, is their eagerness to be distinguished from their fellowmen as a special class of men, a peculiar and a higher species of the human kind. This is a disease which may be called aristocratomania, and it is one of the most deplorable diseases, not uncommonly proving fatal to the existence of noble and great families.

Aristocratomania is a disease which erects a barrier between special classes of men, not because the one is actually better, wiser, more moral, or nobler in character than the other, but because the one can indulge in luxuries in which the other cannot.

The aristocratomaniac is no aristocrat in the etymological and good sense of the word. He is not a better man than the rest of mankind; he is worse, he is a degeneration. His soul instead of being enlarged and widened has shrunk, and in the measure as it has shrunk it has lost in human interest, sympathy, and love.

The aristocratomaniac is perhaps charitable, he is kind, but his charity and his kindness appear offensive as soon as they are properly analysed, for their main element is a superstitious condescension.

The state of aristocratomaniacs is ridiculous and pitiable. It is ridiculous because of the vanity of their pride; it is pitiable because of the shriveled condition of their souls. The punctilious observance of social formalities has taken the place of cordiality and truthfulness. The fashionable ceremonial of society life has become the highest rule of conduct, but the real sentiments which ought to underlie the forms of social intercourse are neglected and forgotten.

The highest object of the aristocratomaniac is to burn incense before the altar of his God—the Puny Self which is fed with flattery and vanity. No emotion is permitted which would conflict with this deity, for great is the Puny Self and he is almighty in the soul of the aristocratomaniac.

Whenever the aristocratomaniac has injured or has given offense to his fellowman, the little word: "I beg your pardon," which by natural impulse wells up in a human soul, remains unspoken because the great Puny Self sees in it a humiliation of his majesty.

Why is there so little warmth in the family life of aristocratomaniacs? Brothers and sisters among the poor help one another, they rejoice at their joys and bear their woes in common. Does wealth produce a chill in the atmosphere so as to freeze out all cordiality and goodwill? Does wealth beget dissatisfaction, envy, jealousy, ill-will among men? Is the old Nibelungen-saga true that a curse rests on gold which will lead its owner to perdition? Certainly it takes a strong character to be wealthy and to remain human, kind-natured and broad-minded. The dearest and most sacred affections are too easily suffocated among the thorns and thistles of worldly goods. Proud of their possession of worldly goods the higher goods of truly human feelings are lost. As the mother of Christ said to Elizabeth:

"God hath filled the hungry with good things and the rich he hath sent empty away."

There are several causes of aristocratomania, for it is a very complicated disease and its symptoms show themselves in different ways, but one cause appears to be its main source and this one cause is the lack of solidarity with the interests of aspiring, toiling and progressing mankind. That which kindles sympathies in the hearts of men are common labor, common sorrows, common wants and common hopes. There is nothing of that between the aristocratomaniac and his fellowmen. He has with other aristocratomaniacs common joys, common fancies and fashions, common comforts and a common pride. But these feelings do not kindle sympathies.

There is a peculiar and a manlike sympathy in the dog who drags the cart of his poor master and earns a living as his help mate, sharing his master's labor and bread. But there is no such amiability in the snarling pug who idles away his time in the lap of his idle mistress. He is egotistic, impertinent and dissatisfied. He has also become infected with aristocratomania, for dissatisfaction is one of the most telling symptoms of the disease. Says Goethe in describing the symptoms of aristocratomania :

" They 're of a noble house, that's very clear
Haughty and discontented they appear."

There are among the poor a class of people who either from lack of strength, because the burdens of life are heavier than they can bear, or from lack of courage and good will, because they do not intend to work for a living, become spiteful and bitter. This disease is in many respects similar to aristocratomania. The aristocratomaniac feels himself exempt from the common lot of mortals, the spiteful poor thinks that he also ought to be exempt. He has the predisposition of becoming an aristocratomaniac, and being hopelessly shut out from the class to which his instinct leads him, he dreams of rising above the crowd of common mortals with the help of the masses by preaching hatred and destruction. This is the Marrat type of the demagogue, vanity, egotism and ambition are but too often the motives of him who pretends to be a reformer, imitating Christ in his denunciations only but not in his charity, love and self-renunciation. One of the most prominent social agitators actually exposed his main spring of action in quoting Virgil's verse :

" Flectere si nequeo superos Acheronta movebo.
[Can I not bend the Gods, I'll stir the under world.]

Moral health cannot be found in the aristocratomaniac nor in the would-be aristocratomaniac, but in the patient and plodding worker, be he rich or poor. He who has risen in his imagination above mankind and the sorrows of mankind has cut himself loose from the tree of humanity. The fate of aristocratomaniac families as a rule is sealed. They are doomed. Life

is activity and wherever life ceases to be activity, it dries up and withers away.

Is this perhaps the meaning of Christ when he said that

"A rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven.
"It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God."

These passages are strong and what they teach should not remain unheeded. There are two lessons which they teach, one of warning and the other of comfort. The warning is for the rich not to erect a barrier between themselves and humanity, not to allow their souls to be shriveled by wealth and pride of class, for the poor, not to be blinded by the advantages of wealth ; wealth is not happiness and does not convey happiness. The real contents of life, its meaning, its import and its worth cannot be expressed in dollars and cents. We have to create the actual values of life ourselves.

But there is in Christ's words about the rich also a solace. The solace is for those who live their lives in the sweat of their brows. Life's strength is labor and sorrow. Let us not expect a different fate and we shall the more easily be able to meet the duties of life and to conform to the unalterable laws of mental and moral growth.

Let us not lose time with complaints, but let us be like Horatio :

" As one, in suffering all that suffers nothing,
A man that Fortune's buffets and rewards
Has ta'en with equal thanks."

Let us preserve the elasticity of our minds and if we have to drudge, if we are surrounded with difficulties and disappointments, we shall bear them gladly and grow the stronger through their resistance. It is said that the palm tree, if weighed down by some heavy stone grows the more stately and the more straight raising its crown above all the other trees which either do not experience any resistance, or if they did, would not have the strength to overcome its pressure. P. C.

SOME NONSENSE.

WITH A PURE MATHEMATICAL MORAL.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

THEOLOGY began to ooze out of politics when, tired of hypocrisy, the people of England set up May poles in honor of the return of the second Charles, and, incidentally, of cakes and ale. After this it kept on oozing pretty fast ; and when Dutch William was well in saddle there really seemed to be nothing much left worth quarreling about and not a few staunch old Rounders went about saying it was "all day" with politics. What nonsense ! With near two hundred years between them and a Tammany and a tariff to make the angels weep.

Wouldn't it be a grand thing if theology could be hustled out of common sense. I mean just what I say, so that common sense

could be had neat. Now, you go to any misfit religion store, and ask for a few yards of unbleached common sense, and the salesperson, in spite of every effort on your part, will persist in doing up with the bundle several skeins of sewing theology. Some will admit that its only for basting; others insist that the goods must be made up with it. Then there are other notion stores especially in the country where you cannot purchase the unbleached article at any price. Some establishments claim to keep the real thing in stock; but when you get a sample and take it home, you find invariably that either it won't wash, or has been dyed some sort of color. Of course you go back the next day, and tell the man how it is and remonstrate. It is possible he may be liberal enough to say he will try and see what he can do, that he will send and get it; but these instances are rare. I have had shop-keepers, [the "you press the button, we do the rest" sort] tell me to my face over and over again that I was mistaken in supposing it was the unbleached I wanted; that the lavender was much the most serviceable, or the raspberry roan, or some such color, more becoming to my style of beauty.

"But," I say, "just look at this dress I have on. It is made of the unbleached material, is quite folly proof and wears like iron."

Invariably the man declines to look. He is usually civil, because he wants me to trade; but he declines to look. Oh, dear! oh, dear! Now I am not prepared to say that dyed stuffs do not have their uses, nor that basting thread is utterly valueless. If I habitually wore a dress that would come off in the street if not sewed up with some particular kind of thread, I incline to the opinion that rather than go naked I would get some. And if wearing an unbleached garment made me a laughing stock, I presume I should wear a dyed one. The point I make is very simple; only that shop-keepers should keep the goods I require in stock, rather than put me to the trouble and expense of sending to the factory.

Some tell me (and I believe them) that there is really little or no demand for unbleached common sense. What I am trying to do is to create a demand—see!

This matter of "sides" to the great question of life is to me a wonder. Taken all around mankind is a comical race. No one "takes sides" in mathematics. Why should they in some other things? What would you think of one (say a prohibitionist on principle) who decided in his own mind that the arithmetic abounded in false doctrine because two jugs of rum and three jugs of rum made five jugs of rum? Comical, isn't it?

Did you ever hear of Mr. Francis Bacon? Those of you who have been in Wisconsin and made the acquaintance of Ignatius Donnelly, have I feel sure; and yet I very much doubt if you thoroughly understand the good that man did for the world. Morally he seems to have been a corrupt man, and it is barely possible that he did not write Shakespeare; but he took a new departure in physical science by demanding proof of all statements found in books concerning the operations of nature. If he found a statement in a book, he didn't believe it *because it was there*; nor, on the other hand, did he disbelieve it. He said, let us experiment, and find out for ourselves if it is true or not. In this way he arrived at several important results, and set others on the road to arriving. Among others he helped set me, which was perhaps unfortunate.

Then there was Niebuhr. Did you ever hear of him? He was an historian, and he made a new departure in historical writing by invariably consulting original documents. He thought, as I confess I do myself, that facts have a tendency to improve a work on history.

Harriet Martineau was another person who seemed to have gotten hold of the same general idea. Did you ever hear that story about what she said to the old Gossip? Well, it seems the gossip

came in, and began to relate some scandal about what a neighbor said derogatory to Miss Martineau's character.

Miss Martineau never retorted by saying that the neighbor was a "huzzy," nor "a mean thing," nor that she was "another," nor anything of that sort. She only rang the bell, and when the domestic came sent for her "things," and when the "things" came put them on, and then said, sweetly as you please, to the gossip: "Now, my dear, I am ready; suppose we go."

"Go where?" says the Gossip in a flutter.

"Why, to the neighbor's, of course."

"And what for?"

"To inquire, of course," says Miss Martineau.

Now the very last thing in the world old Gossip wanted was inquiry. She "didn't want to get mixed up"; what was said was "told in confidence," and all that. She begged to be let off, but Harriet was firm. What the result was I have forgotten. Oh! I'd like to have gone along incog. I expect there was a "racket." One thing I feel sure of: Harriet kept cool and came out "on top." Another thing you can safely reckon on: gossiping went out of vogue in the neighborhood where Miss Martineau lived.

But to get back to "taking sides." You observe I said that no one takes sides in mathematics. I wrote that last April, and only this week I found that I had been too hasty. It never does to be too hasty. One ought to wait till one is sure before being certain.

A gentleman has an office in the same building with me who now and then drops in to hunt up a precedent, or to get advice as to a rule of practice. Only the other day he happened in again, and somehow, both of us having leisure, we fell to talking about "views." A good deal of nonsense was talked—deference to my friend prevents me saying by which of us,—till he told me that "he was so constituted" as to be quite sure that mathematics had no existence except in *minds*,—subjective business, you know,—the same old row broken out afresh. Whew! how he talked—learned was no name for it. Plato, William Hamilton, Aristotle, and all the pestilent brood of guessers. Now, I am not learned; but I can tell yarns. I pitched in, and told one to my friend,—a sort of scientific yarn, about how the world, from this on, progressed, and progressed, and progressed; and how the human race got older and wiser, till even babes used logarithms. Also how at the same time the solar heat gradually diminished. The Erie Canal was closed all the year round; then an ice bridge formed (and stayed) across Long Island Sound; and the wheat crops failed except in Central Africa, and the people began to grow scarce, for want of food; then only a few sheltered nooks along the Congo were inhabited, and finally only one poor old Hottentot was left. Think of that situation! One Hottentot, and he laid up with scurvy.

You recall the boat that carried Cæsar and his fortunes. What a fuss people of a rhetorical turn do make over that incident. But what about the Hottentot? It looks to me as if he too had a pretty heavy responsibility. *Imagine Mathematics waiting about and preparing to die with the last man.* Don't say you can't imagine it. Remember that my friend said *he couldn't imagine anything else.*

Well, you give it up, do you? After mature consideration of the *reductio ad absurdum* you are prepared to state your positive conviction that Pure Mathematics is of more value than many Hottentots.

And yet (for after all the subtle and simple were born twins) Mathematics may only exist in a mind. But is that mind of necessity a man's? Is there not possibly a universal mind of which Mathematics is a function? This universal mind cannot be like ours, a limited individuality; but would it be the worse for that? I do not dogmatise. I only ask for information; but I must say it looks plausible.

THE HUMANITARIAN ALLIANCE.

We have received from Minneapolis the following "Brief Statement of the Principles of the Humanitarian Alliance": "Humanitarianism, like any other doctrine, must have a basis to build upon. To give it authority it must embody a world conception which will be in perfect harmony with its teachings. As its teachings are drawn from science, all its conclusions must be in accordance with scientific premises, which will necessarily force its defenders and advocates to premise with the facts of the universe instead of with the unsupported vagaries of the enlightened human mind. From the standpoint of induction and scientific evolution, it contemplates the whole of the human race, differentiated as it is, as children of one parent, and emphatically declares that good and evil are simply relative terms. Instead of condemning mankind for their different expressions of beliefs, it charitably condones; because it positively affirms that all forms and conditions are the sole evolutions of nature; and that mankind, suffering as they do, are more to be pitied than blamed.

"Humanitarianism regards punishment as a necessary cause of deterrence while vicious characteristics in mankind last; a means to an end; not to meet out revenge or retaliation.

"Man's relation to the universe, of which he is a part, is such that he must be held responsible for his actions, because he is unavoidably a factor in every combination which affects the weal or woe of society.

"As progress is the order of evolution and mankind are necessary factors in the operation, humanitarianism teaches that it is the duty of all who are in harmony with its doctrine to organise for the promulgation of truth, for the destruction of superstition and for the formation of an environment which will assist the weak in their moral and intellectual growth.

"Humanitarianism positively affirms that the doctrine of inspired revelation given once for all is absolutely false, because in the order of progress there must be continual adaptation to meet the demands of the successive moral and intellectual development of the human race.

"It rejects the doctrine of miracles, because miracle is impossible in a universe of cause and effect. It also rejects the doctrines of vicarious atonement and divine forgiveness of sins, because the relativeness of things in nature prevents the positiveness of sin, and the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, because it is evident that the body dissolves and becomes assimilated with the earth. As regards the future, humanitarianism is optimistic. It contemplates nature as too wise, powerful and ingenious to make a mistake, and it enjoins all mankind to confidently trust in the mighty power of evolution, which alone can effectually accomplish the resurrection and ascension—the complete elevation and development of all mankind.

"But its motto is, 'One world at a time,' and to encourage individual effort in the great work of amelioration here and now.

"Humanitarianism will respectfully criticise for the sake of progress, but it will not denounce. As no man or woman is infallible in all things, all lectures and speeches must be subject to respectful criticism, and all doctrinal decisions must be based upon the credentials of science, not settled by majority vote (as in the case with ecclesiastical councils), so that *truth alone* will stand for authority, not postulated authority for truth."

The Humanitarian Alliance proposes the following articles of federation: "Humanitarianism enjoins all of its members to subscribe as much as in them lies to one all pervading unity, without beginning or end, incapable of increase or diminution; [Nature is a unity] to accept the world as their country and all men as their brethren; to accept observation, experience and natural enlightenment as teachers, and reason with a right premise as their only guide; to demand no more than they are willing to render and to allow the same liberties to others that they desire for them-

selves; to encourage one another to meet the inevitable with fortitude, and to courageously acknowledge the majesty of truth; to submit to the decrees of wisdom, and to respect the opinions of others—when not dogmatically laid down as truth; to cherish virtue, propriety, benevolence, sincerity, reciprocity, and kindness, aiming to make all events profitable, all days holy, and all actions worthy of emulation; to stand by the glorious principles of our republic that teach the sovereignty of the individual and which demand the entire separation of church and state."

The document is signed by JOHN MADDOCK, Secretary, Pro Tem. (2123 Lincoln St., N. E., Minneapolis, Minn.) and by DR. J. S. SEELEY, President, Pro Tem.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE HOUSE OF THE WOLFINGS. By *William Morris*. London: 1890. Reeves & Turner. 196 Strand.

The House of the Wolfings is a legendary romance, partly prose and partly poetry, but mostly poetry; a spirited story of the wars and ways of the Wolfings, a tribe of the ancient Goths, the crest on whose banner was a wolf, and who dwelt on the Welsh border, just before the Romans withdrew from Britain. The body of it is a stimulating description of battles, fought by the Wolfings against the Romans, who had invaded their territories for "booty and beauty," but who were defeated after much hard fighting by Thiodolf the War-Duke of the Wolfings, who was himself slain in the last fight, as he knew he would be, because he had been forewarned by the Hall-Sun, a beautiful maiden who had the gift of prophecy through psychological powers, a sort of medium, who spoke through inspiration, as one in a trance, after the manner of the modern spiritualists. In fact she was hardly mortal, but a re-incarnation brought mysteriously, if not miraculously into being. It must be said in her favor that she prophesies in picturesque poetry highly spiritual, and warm with the natural beauty of the summer time. She could not say, like the soothsayer to Lochiel, "'Tis the sunset of life gives me mystical lore," for her pictures of the future were painted by the sunrise.

The story has a martial sound all through, like the striking of spears on a shield, the challenge of the Wolfings, and their clamor of defiance. An important part of its charm is the language in which it is told, a very triumph of our old Anglo-Saxon speech. With amazing skill Mr. Morris has wrought out a story abounding in graphic descriptions of the beauties of nature, of primitive home life, of marches and battles, without calling to his aid the latinised words which seem to be indispensable to our language now. The speeches of his hearers too, are full of strength and meaning, yet nearly every word, perhaps every word, is English of the Saxon line. In this respect alone, the work is valuable as a study of what can be done by the unaided Anglo-Saxon tongue. Occasionally a latinised word appears like "mumtion," but probably more through oversight than from necessity.

Mr. Morris modestly calls his book, "A tale of the House of the Wolfings and all the Kindreds of the Mark, written in prose and in verse." He makes no claim for it as poetry, only "verse;" and yet it is very good poetry too; even the prose of it might easily be arranged as verse if artfully broken into lines—beginning with capitals, and properly punctuated. For instance, the description of Thiodolf, though told in running prose in the ordinary way, might easily be arranged into blank verse, like this:

"Short, and curling close to his head was his black hair,
Grizzled a little, so that it looked like rings of hard dark iron;
His forehead was high and smooth, his lips full and red,
His eyes wide open and steady, and all his face
Joyous with the thought of the fame of his deeds,
And the battle with a foeman whom the Markmen knew not yet.
He was a man well beloved of women,
And children ran to him gladly to play with him.

A most fell warrior was he, whose deeds,
No man of the Mark could equal;
Blythe of speech even when sorrowful of mood,
A man that knew not bitterness of heart:
And for all his exceeding might and valiancy,
He was proud and high to no man, so that the thralls,
Even the thralls loved him."

Nearly all the prose in the book might be done into blank verse like that, much of it better than that, which is only another example that the prose of some writers is poetry, while the poetry of others is prose.

In some of the dialogue there is much of mystical grandeur, as in that between Thiodolf and the Hall-Sun, wherein he says:

"I have deemed, and long have I deemed that this is my second life,
That my first one waned with my wounding when thou cam'st to the ring
of strife.
For when in thine arms I wakened on the hazelled field of yore,
Me seemed I had newly arisen to a world I knew no more."

And his guardian angel, the Hall-Sun, who in spirit had been with him in all his battles, will not be with him in the next one, and she tells her vision thus:

"In forty fights hast thou foughten, and beside thee who but I
Beheld the wind-tossed banners, and saw the aspen fly.
But to-day to thy war I wend not, for Weird withholdeth me
And sore my heart forebodeh for the battle that shall be

For thee among strange people and the foe-man's throng have trod,
And I tell thee their banner of battle is a wise and a mighty God.
For these are the folk of the cities, and in wondrous wise they dwell
Mid confusion of heaped houses, dim and black as the face of hell."

In the dialogue between Thiodolf and the Wood-Sun, just before his last battle we get a glimpse of this old Goth's idea of the continuation, or more theologically speaking, the immortality, of the soul.

"Thiodolf," she said, "How long shall our love last?"

"As long as our life," he said.

"And if thou diest to-day, where then shall our love be?" said the Wood-Sun.

"He said, 'I must not say, I wot not; though time was I had said. It shall abide with the soul of the Wolfing Kindred.'"

She said, "And when that soul dieth, and the kindred is no more?"

"Time ago," quoth he, "I had said, it shall abide with the Kindred of the Earth; but now again I say, I wot not."

And afterwards, when the battle was done and Thiodolf slain, she announced his death as merely another life in these words. "O men in this Hall the War-Duke is dead! O people hearken! for Thiodolf the Mighty hath changed his life!"

In the social theories, and religious thoughts which Mr. Morris finds among those ancient Goths, we may read some of the new politics which is agitating their posterity in England, America, and Germany; and it is all worth reading.

NOTES.

We have received a circular of the "Illinois Woman's Alliance," containing a statement of the principles of the association and a list of reforms urged upon the administration of the city of Chicago. They refer to Education and to the Health and Police Departments; persons interested may apply to the corresponding secretary, 10 State St., Room 209, Chicago.

A very interesting article appeared in the last number of the *American Journal of Psychology* on "Arithmetical Prodigies," by Dr. E. W. Scripture. The wonderful powers of the great mental arithmeticians and calculators are subjected to a psychological analysis, which sheds considerable light on the possible greater cultivation of normal capacities. The article is also published in brochure form. (Worcester: Blanchard & Co.)

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SHORT DISCUSSIONS AND CRITICISMS.

BY JOHN BURROUGHS.

IX.

THE old theology asks us to believe that the relations between God and man were radically different at some former period of history than now, that they were more intimate and personal. Is it probable that man's relation to the air, the water, the earth, has ever been any more intimate and vital than now; that his food ever nourished him in any other way than it does now, that offspring were ever begotten by any other method, or that the relations of men to each other were ever essentially any different from the present? If God is not a constant and invariable power he is nothing. Does gravity intermit? Are not the celestial bodies always on time? Are not life death generation always subject to the same laws? The moral and religious nature of man rises and sinks; he seems more conscious of God and of divine things in some period of history than in others, in some races than in others, but this is a fluctuation doubtless governed by natural causes, if we could penetrate them, and is not the result of any change of plan or purpose of the Eternal. God walked and talked with men in the patriarchal days, because men interpreted their own thoughts, dreams, desires, motions, as the voice of God. We define and differentiate things more nowadays, though probably the old prophets were strictly correct, for is not man himself a manifestation of God? With the devout and religious habit of mind comes the boldness to ascribe all our thoughts and promptings and happenings to God. It is the not-ourselves that rules and controls us and in which we live and move and have our being, and whether we call it God, or by any other name the fact remains the same. The religious mind gives it one name; the scientific mind another; the former makes it personal and sustains a personal relation to it; the other makes it impersonal and names it law or force. Indeed the dispute between the saint and the scientist is not as to a matter of fact, but as to a matter of feeling. One reaches through consciousness, what the other reaches through intellect, and the results differ just as the media differ. There is fear, love, hope, and other emotions mingled with the one experience, but there is none of these things mingled

with the other. Indeed one is an *experience* while the other is a rational process.

X.

The region of the unconscious in one, so much more deep and potent in some men than in others, is our hold upon the eternal. The disclosure of thoughts, of knowledge, of power that we did not know we possessed—these things may be said to be from God. The Biblical writers ascribed all spontaneous thoughts to God. Such were a revelation. When these men looked deep into their hearts they found God there and they conversed with him freely. What we call communing with ourselves, the religious mind calls communing with God. Every writer, every orator knows what it is to see depths and views open in his mind that are a surprise to him, and that but a moment before he was ignorant of. This is inspiration. All scriptures are given by inspiration, because they come not by way of the reason and the understanding, but by way of the conscience and the spiritual sense; all poetry the same. We call it God or we call it genius, just according to our training and habit of mind. The mind does open sometimes and refuses to open at others. Undoubtedly a man has or has not a capacity for great and high thoughts. How the thoughts arise is as great a mystery to him as to another. In our speech of to-day we do not ascribe these things to God—that is to any objective agency or power external to ourselves; it is a purely subjective phenomenon, as much so as the seeing of visions or the dreaming of dreams. Mohammed thought he saw and talked with Gabriel and once with God; St. Paul believed he heard a voice and saw a light from heaven: we call them mental hallucinations; the man's own conscience, or fears or hopes, or thoughts seen externally; but they were as real to them as any outward object. The other day a man in Philadelphia died from the effects, as he alleged, of witchcraft. We know he was not bewitched, that is, that the cause of his trouble did not lay in any power or thing external to himself; it could never be real to another mind, but it was terribly real to him. To all intents and purposes he was bewitched even unto death.

All that lies back of our conscious powers, all the *not me*, the pious soul calls God. And indeed how little we are in and of ourselves. Look at yonder wa-

ter wheel doing its work. All the *not me* in that case is the water that flows, and gravity that makes it flow, and without them the wheel is nothing. In our own case we draw quite as largely upon the universal, upon that which is not ourselves. Call all the *not me* God and we have some idea of the closeness and imminence of God to the old Hebrew prophet. Science shows all this *not me* to be impersonal force; it shows how much of it is race, or family, or climate, or environment, or physiology, or geology; how the mind itself is a part of the body; how the conscience itself arose, how the church, the state, and all institutions. A certain order of minds stamp this force with personality. All the early minds did, but science leads us farther and farther away from an anthropomorphic God. It is singular that we should have outgrown anthropomorphism so far as to deny personality to the separate forces of nature, but ascribe it to nature as a whole.

XI.

The view which the old theology takes is an artificial view; it imposes upon the world arbitrary and artificial conditions as if one were to paint the grass blue and the sky green. It says the world is a lost and condemned world, that God is estranged from the race of man, that through some act of disobedience of Adam six thousand or more years ago, sin and death entered the world, and that a way of escape from eternal ruin has been provided for mankind by the life and ignominious death of an innocent and just person, Jesus of Nazareth, etc. This I say is an artificial view, an utterly unscientific view, as much so as the belief not so very old that witches could cause storms and tempests, or as the view of Justyn Martyr that the earth becomes fertile when dug by a spade because the spade is in the form of a cross.

Theology looks upon sin as something entirely apart from a man's natural defects, and upon religion as something entirely independent of his good qualities: both are from without, one the work of a malignant spirit, the other the gift of a good spirit, but both arbitrary or mechanical, and in no way related to the ordinary course of nature. How different the natural or scientific view! When we look upon the world with the eye of a philosopher we see that it is indeed the theatre of opposite and contending forces, but that the good, that is the good from the point of view of the best interest of the race, is slowly triumphing; we see the race struggling up into a higher and better life the long, dark and devious route which man has come is disclosed, but his evolution has gone steadily forward. We do not find sin, in the theological sense, we see defects and imperfections, we see vice and disease, the ends of nature crossed and thwarted, but no more and no differently in the case of man than in

the case of the animals and plants; we see in fact, that death is everywhere the condition of life. We do not find that the theological system takes hold of fact as reality at any point. It is a matter entirely extraneous, or apart from the laws and condition of things. There is no place for the scheme of redemption. It looks just as artificial as the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. It is an invention of theology. On our maps we paint the different states and countries different colors and make the boundaries very prominent, but in nature we know these things are not thus differentiated. The different climates are not thus sharply separated; neither are day and night divided by right lines. But our theology is as artificial as our maps or as our division of time.

How easy to see that these systems have come down to us from an entirely different state of things, an entirely different condition of mind from that which prevails to-day; a state of mind which viewed all things externally, in an arbitrary and artificial light, which looked upon nature as the theatre of strife between beneficent and malignant spirits, which saw satanic agencies everywhere active, which saw all forces as supernatural forces, which begat a belief in magic, divination, alchemy, astrology, witchcraft, which believed an old woman could turn herself into a wolf and devour flocks of sheep, which looked upon an eclipse or a comet, not as a natural event, but as a supernatural. Nearly all these dark superstitions have perished; the condition of mind that begat them has passed away, but the superstition of the magic of Christ's blood and all those pagan notions of heaven and hell, have survived; but the intense realisation of them of the old days of witchcraft, is fast fading away. They are coolly held as intellectual propositions and that is about all. The light of science, where it is fully admitted is as fatal to them as sun to mildew. Science begets a habit of mind in which these artificial notions cannot live, just as the study of medicine begets quite a different theory of disease from that of the Indian practitioner.

The study of nature kills all belief in miraculous or supernatural agents, not because it proves to us that these things do not exist, but because it fosters a habit of mind that is unfavorable to them, because it puts us in possession of a point of view from which they disappear. The opposite of the natural man is not the spiritual man,—for the natural man is often the most spiritual,—but the *artificial* man. The man upon whose mind has been foisted an artificial system of belief, a view of things, a view not encouraged by nature, but in opposition to nature.

An artificial man, a man to whom all promptings of nature and suggestions of reason were looked upon as the whisperings of the evil one,—such was and still

is the good old orthodox believer. He cherished an artificial system of belief, a system which attributed curious plans and devices to God outside of nature, to save fallen man—a system of belief, the most perfect expression of which is found in the creed and elaborate ritual of the Catholic church. All the other churches are more or less compromises with nature, with the natural man. They concede some rights to him, the right of private judgment, the most precious of all; but the Romish church concedes nothing; it is the expression of absolute outward authority, it is as arbitrary and unnatural as anything can well be. It is the complete expression of a church, of a religious organisation, of a system of things which takes a man's salvation out of his own hands and puts it into the hands of an ecclesiastical hierarchy. At one extreme stands naturalism or science, at the other stands the Catholic church, while the other churches occupy intermediate grounds. Indeed there is a regular gradation from Rome down or up, to nature, the Anglican church probably standing nearest Rome, and the Unitarian nearest nature.

XII.

I apprehend that the success of Christianity has not been owing to the fact that it is true as a system of doctrines, but that it is true as a system of ethics. It is a good working hypothesis. It restrains vice, it stimulates virtue. The doctrines are false, but they gave force, and, as it were, dramatic representation to the ethics; they embodied it in living concrete form, as in a parable or allegory, so that they have a new power over men's hearts and minds. But always have the doctrines been held as primary, and the ethics as secondary, though the two were inseparable. The orthodox churches to-day set more store by the doctrines, when the pinch comes, than by the ethics. It is more necessary to believe certain things, than to be a certain type of man, to lead a certain kind of life. The American Board of Foreign Missions, refuse certain candidates for labor in the foreign field, who hold an extra belief in the extent of God's mercy to the heathen. If you believe in probation after death, says the board, you are none of ours, no matter what your daily walk and conversation may be.

By making the object of religion some other world, some other state of existence than this, a great leverage seems to have been gained. It gave room for the imagination to work, for the ideal to play a part. The enchantment of distance, the fascination of the unknown, the lure of the absolutely pure and perfect, (which of course would not satisfy us when attained any more than their opposite) have been great helps in elevating the race. The conscience of the race has slowly become attuned to these high promises and

ideals. The present life is vulgar and mean, and to a large part of mankind seems hardly worth the having. The world of which we form a part is always more or less a prosy commonplace world, we are crushed and dwarfed by its materialism or its dull cares. Heaven must be some other world, some far away elysium field. This hope, this lure keeps the heart from failing. That this "poor life is all," how such a conviction would cause millions of souls to sink back in the slough of despond; because this life is poor to them, they have not the power to transform it and see it shot through with celestial laws. This earth is no star in the heavens to them, but a very vulgar and prosaic clod.

THE LITTLE GLASS SLIPPER.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

THERE was a great commotion in the school. Little Debby Smith of Bloomingdale had come out boldly denying the faith, and affirming a positive disbelief in the fairy god-mother and the little glass slipper. It was terrible. The whole neighborhood was scandalised; but the primary department of the school felt that the very foundation of things was unsettled. Some went so far as to accuse Debby of denying the inspiration and even the existence of a personal Cinderella. Lulu Weeks wrote on the blackboard of her class room, "Debby is a skizm"; but when asked by Debby to define what a "skizm" was, she couldn't do it. At recess things had come to such a pass that Kitty Brown told Debby to her face that what she had said was Heresy. This brought matters to a climax and at once four or five of the children cried out: "Heresy! Heresy!"

Then Ada Martin said something ought to be done about it; and eventually something was done. Ada, and Mary Booth, and Si Knapp hunted up Debby and fetched her out in the yard to answer concerning her false doctrine. At first Debby was not at all inclined to answer, but preferred to go on eating her luncheon. Perhaps she would have gone on if it hadn't been that Willie Wickers pulled her lunch basket out of her lap and spilled her sandwich and cake. At this Debby began to cry, and to claim that she was being persecuted. I am sure I do not know how it would have ended if Mabel Johnson had not offered her services as moderator. She proposed that Debby should be allowed to eat her lunch in peace, and that then all the children should hear what she had to say as to her belief or disbelief in Cinderella, and if found to be an infidel on the subject, none of them should play tag or puss in the corner any more with her. This course seemed wise and just to the children, because, you see, it was about what the grown folks did. At all events poor Debby gathered up the fragments

that remained of her luncheon, much the worse for dust, and with tears in her eyes sat down and finished it.

When the last mouthful was down Clara Hobbs asked Debby to define her position, so (as Clara forcibly observed) that the children all might know whether she was a fit person to play puss with or tag. Poor Debby! I pity her, don't you? And don't you think all right minded people ought? Of course it is a very solemn thing to have doubts concerning Cinderella, and yet (as some look at it) it is much more solemn having the doubts to deny them before children. Some have doubts, but go about proclaiming their beliefs on street corners, at recess to be seen of children, so as to "make themselves solid" with them, and most who do this achieve a fair business success at it. However let us get back to Debby. There she was up before the sanhedrim of the school required to define her position. This she now proceeded to do.

I believe (she said) in the plenary inspiration of Cinderella as a whole. I believe implicitly in a personal Cinderella and in the personality of the wicked sisters. I am convinced that there was a prince, and I hold sacred the doctrines of the rats and the mice and the pumpkin; but I deny most strenuously that there was any little glass slipper.

At this, I tell you, there was an uproar. Some howled "Heresy"! loud as they could. Some said they wouldn't play with Debby any more, and some were for setting Willy Wicker's dog "Shep" on her. Happily better counsels prevailed, and all they did was to resort to "lip." There was plenty of this, such as it was. Kitty Brown enquired (wisely enough, as I look at it) how Debby could believe in the story of CINDERELLA AND THE LITTLE GLASS SLIPPER, and yet deny that there was any little glass slipper at all. Kitty made some remarks "in this connection" which were very able, but which lack of space prevents my quoting.

Dora Jones said she thought great care should be taken lest injustice be done, and very earnestly besought Debby to reconsider her position. This Debby refused to do, she would not modify her expressed views even to the extent of admitting that, while there might not have been a *little* slipper, that at least there was a *slipper of some sort*. No, Debby was firm. No slipper of any sort was her doctrine, and by that she proposed to stand.

Whatever we may think of her doctrinal standards we all must admire her pluck. Don't you look at it that way?

Curious how many divergent, and some may say even discordant "views" were elicited as to the meaning of the story of Cinderella. I suppose now you

will be glad to learn that my time is up, and therefore I am unable to give them all in full. Of course ultimately poor Debby was convicted of heresy, and now she wanders at recess and after school tagless and pussless, a sad warning to those who deny the truth as it is in Cinderella. As to what that truth really is few know anything; but those few, happily for themselves, know it all. I think Pollikins Roe, who is really a very bright little girl, put it better than the rest; she said to me privately that as for herself she had no opinions on the subject; that she thought the story of Cinderella was of no value except for the principles it contained; and that it was quite beyond the capacity of any child or any number of children to decide how much truth there was *in the incidents*.

Minds are to each other as some power of their homologous conditions. To translate traditional beliefs into intellectual equivalents, to render feeling in terms of tongue are tasks that children of all ages have tried their minds at.

At this epoch, as I believe, never before, are faith's presumed foundations being broken up. What shall the righteous do? Godly men are changing churches, going out, or being put out of churches. Alas! they change, they go for reasons as frivolous as those of the children in Bloomingdale school.

Is it not absurd to adhere to the letter and ignore the spirit? Is it not frivolous to have "views" as to the fairy prince, to "believe" in rats and mice and pumpkins, and yet to deny glass slippers? to speculate, and philosophise, and guess, whilst all the while the old steadfast truth has them in derision, and mocks when their fear cometh.

The follies of our fathers, as well as the sins, have been visited upon us. Our minds are wounded. Let us heal them,—treating our brain hurts as surgeons do the flesh, binding them up with antiseptic solutions of principle against the spores of bigotry, the microbes of prejudice. These are in the atmosphere without and the blood within.

Go to the National Gallery in London, and there look upon one of Turner's masterpieces—what do you see?—a blur, a blotch, a meaningless mass of paint without form and void. But as you move suddenly you are aware of a change. What was in you dark has become illumined. A step,—a glance, and lo! you have justified to yourself the ways of Turner to men.

Facts are figments; steps towards or away from opportunities; but the truth is in a vision, a focus, a vantage you share with none other.

Outside of that focus there was no Turner; within it you became one with him in art. He had revealed himself.

So look upon the marvellous landscape of nature;

the earth's beauty, the ever widening scenes of science, the illimitable vista before, the brief, imperfect past, not as if this were all, but as knowing that there is a focus where the hand of the master may be visible.

So also look upon the story of Christianity. Get your inspiration, not from Clio, but from Themis. Think no longer that the truth must rise or fall with the reasonableness or the folly of historical statements. The grandest of all truth is in a parable—a lie. Yet be sure, with the greater as the lesser story, with the Bible as with Cinderella, the merit is in you, and the sole merit any statement can have is in the principles it gives.

Truth has ever needed a revelation. Euclid "revealed" geometry—Copernicus, Newton, Volta, Bacon,—how glibly come the names of the great revealers.

Religion is as truly a science as geometry; but it is the science,—not of assumed facts of history, but of known relations of soul,—of the relations of the individual to the eternal, of the differential to the Constant, of the concrete to the abstract, of the example to the principle, of man to God.

You have the power within you to freely fix your own focus to see and know,—to take your inheritance of amorphous character and crystallise it,—make it, not indeed perfect, but isomeric with perfection.

SCIENCE TEXT-BOOKS.

BY E. P. POWELL.

The Open Court has freely discussed the sexual nature and sexual relations as a necessity to a rational conception of the family or a scientific conception of society. But we have not yet reached an era when school books consider it essential to do the same thing. I have before me as good a school Physiology as I have ever seen "for the use of Grammar and Common schools." The author specifically avows his purpose to give our young people something rather more directly practical than is usually found in school physiologies. "The book is intended for pupils from twelve to fifteen years of age;" that is for those who are just reaching puberty and are involved in that terribly serious problem of chastity or debauchery. It is pre-eminently the age when sexual matters must be understood, and the child wisely advised, or degeneration moral and physical will set in. Where shall such advice come from, or from what source shall the simple fundamental laws of the scientific development and use of the body be looked for if not from a school physiology—"intended for pupils from twelve to fifteen." Yet you may read this book through without discovering that the author is aware of the existence of sexual organs or sexual characteristics. The subject is not alluded to. Evidently Nature made the

body so that a learned and moral physician considers it necessary to ignore parts of it in a supposed discussion of the whole. But the subject of alcoholic drinks has been treated with enlargement and emphasis. An appendix is added devoted to the more full elucidation of the question of temperance and abstinence. Every wise educator as well as observant citizen comprehends that excess in the use of stimulants as well as the use of narcotics is owing very largely to the antedating abuse of the nervous organism and to devitalised conditions caused by sex abuse. Our text-books are fighting a symptom and not the disease when they belabor alcohol. What our physiologies ought to do is to teach the wise use of every organ of the body; and supremely of such organs as involve life or death, regeneration or degeneration, vital vigor or a prostration of the whole nervous system, and an appeal to stimulants, that ultimate in worse wreckage.

I am delighted when I read the chapter on "The Nervous System" to find so discriminating and yet thorough a discussion of the government of thought sensation motion by these filaments. "The nervous system in a man may be compared to the general of an army." Nerves and nerve cells it clearly is needful that the boy of twelve should understand. Our author begins at the brain and carefully unfolds the truth as he creeps along down the spinal cord. Excellent laws of diet and sleep and hygiene are laid down; but that the boy is a boy and the girl a girl, with specific sexual powers embodied in the nerve organism, and involving more of misery or joy than accrues individually and socially from any other source is not directly or indirectly referred to. I understand that this is not the fault of this author alone. It is the custom of our school books and schools. The custom is based on a much more general habit covering our family life. It is conceived to be indelicate to discuss a certain part of the functions with which Nature has endowed us. If we could insure absolute ignorance on the sexual question until puberty the mistake would not be so gross. But we know very well that any omission of this sort on our part is amply filled up by false and vicious information gathered freely in the common intercourse of of our school system. That is while we decline to teach science, nescience and lies are inculcated. Not one child in one thousand in the United States reaches twelve years of age without prominent and very dangerous views, if not habits, involving the sexual organs, and the whole nervous system. Society is undermined by the consequences of this combination of knowledge and ignorance. Wrecks not only fill our idiot and insane asylums, but others drag on as devitalised fragments of our social organism. Wives and husbands stumble ahead with broken health and beget distracted children. The possible improvement of the

human race as well as the amelioration of nervous disorders depends on right knowledge being substituted for false knowledge at the outset.

While our whole common school curriculum needs readjustment to modern acquisitions of knowledge, it is peculiarly needful that our physiological teaching tell the primary truths of our whole organism, and not of part of it only. It is a mistake to suppose any such omission is required in order to secure chastity. The subject can be discussed if discussed in due time. But it is all important that so far as the truth is told, it be the truth without prevarication or exaggeration. We do not want a chapter of perfervid morals in place of science. Exactly that is what we are getting of late in the discussion of alcohol, a passionate tirade against stimulants. Several physiologies now in use in the United States are by statute teaching what is supposed to be temperance. I am a total abstainer myself; but I will not allow my children to consider such rant as knowledge. I see no reason for the cowardice that tries to ensure the young from vice by forestalling exaggerations and biased statements, if not absolute falsehood. The simplest straightforwardness is always surest and safest as it is most scientific.

I sympathise with Mr. Huxley somewhat in his pessimistic views as to the possibility of engrafting science teaching upon any school system now existing. It is quite as difficult here as in England. The incapacity of the average teacher is supplemented by the conglomerate nature of the average text-book. By far the larger part of our science text-books are gotten up to order by professional text-book makers. These men will as soon prepare you a chemistry as a geography; or a zoölogy as quickly as a botany. I am bound to say their work is equally valuable in all directions. That which is inserted is as astounding as that which is omitted. The interference of State Legislatures has been well intended but has secured some queer results. Professor Cope in the January *Naturalist* calls attention to the condition of affairs in Indiana. Every teacher is compelled to attend State Institutes and discuss certain topics assigned for the occasion. This year the study is botany; and here is how the work is perfected. In January the flower and fruit of the strawberry is the subject; the topic for November is the dog-tooth violet; for December tulips. Any one who understands the fundamental principle of science teaching knows it is the study of things, and not of books. But here there is no thought of botany as anything but book study. The dog-tooth violet blossoms in April and tulips in May. Still it must be seen that there is a general consciousness that what we need in our schools is science. The struggle of legislators is promising. The evolution will become a rational fact in due time. Sins of omission as

well as commission will be exorcised. I do not doubt but that we shall shortly have a physiology that is aware that nature did not make a mistake in making us male and female.

SOCIALISM AND ANARCHISM.

Social reformers and the enthusiastic prophets of a new mankind tell us that when their dreams are realised a radical change will take place in the nature of man. The coming man will lose all the vicious features of the present man; universal happiness will reign all the world over and humanity will become a homogeneous mass either of independent sovereigns or of well adapted members of society. The former extreme is called anarchism, the latter socialism or nationalism; and the exponents of either view expect from the application of their panacea a cure for all social diseases and the institution of a millennium upon earth.

How vain are the endeavors to construct an ideal Utopia either of an individualistic or socialistic humanity! Does it not prove that sociology is still in its infancy? Instead of studying facts, we invent and propose schemes.

The mistake made by anarchists as well as by socialists is that individualism and socialism are treated as regulative principles while in reality they are not principles; they are the two factors of society. Neither of them can be made its sole principle of regulation. You might as well propose to regulate gravity on earth by making either the centrifugal or the centripetal force the supreme and only law, abolishing the one for the benefit of the other.

Individualism and socialism are factors and cannot be made principles. This means: Individualism is the natural aspiration of every being to be itself, it is the inborn tendency of every creature to grow and develop in agreement with its own nature. We might say that this endeavor is right, but it is more correct to say that it is a fact; it is natural and we can as little abolish it as we can decree by an act of legislature that fire shall cease to burn or that water shall cease to quench fire. Socialism on the other hand is a fact also. "I" am not alone in the world; there are my neighbors and my life is intimately interwoven with their lives. My helpfulness to them and their helpfulness to me constitute the properly human element of my soul and are perhaps ninety-nine one hundredths of my whole self. The more human society progresses, the more numerous and varied become the relations among the members of society, and the truth dawns upon us that no advantage accrues to an individual by the suppression of the individuality of his fellows. First he, in so doing, never succeeds for good, and secondly the mutual advantage will in the end always

be greater to all concerned the more the factor of individualism in others remains respected. Human society as it naturally grows is the result of both factors, of individualism and of socialism.

The anarchist proposes to make individualism, and the nationalist to make socialism the main principle of regulation for society. Are not these one-eyed reformers utterly in the dark as to the nature of the social problem? The social problem demands an inquiry into the natural laws of the social growth in order to do voluntarily what according to the laws of nature must after all be the final outcome of evolution. By consciously and methodically adapting ourselves to the laws of nature, we shall save much waste, avoid great pains, and acquire the noble satisfaction that we have built upon a rock: and no innovation is possible except it be a gradual evolution from the present state and the result of the factors which are at present active.

Socialism and anarchism are the two extremes, and all social parties contain both principles in different proportions. The republicans and the democrats represent the same opposition of centripetal and centrifugal forces in their politics. Party platforms are exponents of the forces that manifest themselves in the growth of society. They may be either symptoms of special diseases or indicators of a wholesome reaction against special diseases. A movement may be needed now in the direction of anarchism and now in that of socialism. We may now want a regulation of certain affairs in which the public safety and interest are concerned: for instance, in giving licenses to physicians and druggists, in the supervision of banks, in railroad matters, etc., etc.; and then again we may want a greater freedom from government interference. The temporary needs as they are more or less felt will swell the one or the other party.

It would be a misfortune, however, if one of these partisan forces could rush to the extreme and realise the social or anarchical ideal before its opposite had been deeply rooted at the same time in the hearts of the people. Social institutions not based upon liberty, or government interference to the suppression of free competition, would be exactly as insupportable as anarchy among lawless people who have no regard for the rights of others. But there is no danger that either extreme would entirely disappear to leave the whole field to the other alone. The law of inertia holds good in the psychical and sociological world no less than in the physical.

As the present man is the man of the past only further developed, so the coming man will be the present man only wiser, nobler, purer. There is no chance for a radical change of the nature of man or of the constitution of society. However there is a chance and more than a chance, there is a fully justified

hope and a rational faith that man will continue to progress. Nature's cruel work of incessantly lopping off the constantly new appearing vicious outgrowths of human life through the survival of the fittest, and by an extirpation of the unfit, will in the future be performed by man himself, from the start, as soon as he has discovered the conditions under which these outgrowths become impossible.

Human society will in the future be more anarchistic in the same measure as it will be more socialistic. Not that socialistic institutions or laws will through an external pressure abolish competition and impose upon the individual more socialistic relations; nor that the abolition of laws will restrict government interference so as to give more elbow-room to individual liberty. Individual liberty will increase at the same ratio as the social instincts of mutual justice will become more than at present a part of every individual man. This has been the law of social progress in the past, it has made the republican institutions of the present possible and this law will hold good for the future also. Anarchism could be realised only where the laws of justice were inscribed in the hearts of all men, so that every man were a law unto himself; and perfect socialism can be realised only where every individual's greatest joy consisted in the ambition to serve the community. The former would be a state of altruistic individualists and the latter one of individualistic altruists. Both states are ideals and both are represented by more or less consistent parties which for the attainment of the same aim propose opposite means. These parties are exponents of certain forces that manifest themselves in the growth of society. It is well to understand both ideals and to sympathise with both, although the one as much as the other may be equally impossible, for evolution is a constant and a simultaneous approximation to both ideals.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

It seems that the "lost cause" has fallen under the humiliating patronage of Lord Wolseley, a general in the British army, "England's only general" they call him over there, a compliment which if well deserved bodes ill for England. His Lordship, fresh from the battle fields of Hyde Park and Wimbledon, is earning an honest penny by writing for the magazines a platitudinous and second hand review of the American civil war. Lord Wolseley is a confederate partisan who has not yet learned "that the war is over," and he takes revenge on the union soldiers by petulantly telling them that they really ought not to have won it you know, after he had prophesied that they must fail. By the way, his Lordship is one of the wisest of those military soothsayers who prophesy portentously after the event. If a battle was won by haste, he can show that haste was wise, if lost, that rashness was to blame. Lord Wolseley's essays are merely wrappers for dynamite cartridges by which he hopes to shatter the reputation of the union army. In a recent article on General Sherman, Lord Wolseley produces from the cellar of mouldy fables that faded

picture of the confederate "victors in a hundred fights against vastly superior numbers," and that other bit of maudlin gloom which represents the surrender at Appomattox, when "Lee's gallant but starving army, hungry and without resources, but not beaten in battle, laid down their arms."

It does not appear at all strange to Lord Wolseley, who has never yet commanded in actual war,—for he will hardly dignify by that name the conquest of a few Egyptian savages;—it does not appear at all paradoxical to him, that the "victors in a hundred fights," should foolishly surrender to the vanquished in a hundred fights; but men who have seen war in reality will think such a phenomenon impossible to be. Lord Wolseley is almost piously sentimental concerning the "sincere patriots" of the South, and yet he pretends that they were always confronted by "vastly superior numbers." How came that? It is the boast of confederate partisans like Lord Wolseley that the South was unanimous in sentiment, and that her valor was only equalled by the devotion of her sons, who left everything behind them, and rallied round their flag. Then those very same historians immediately try to prove that very few of the said sons went into actual fight. Lord Wolseley cannot be allowed the double boast that thousands sought the battle but that only hundreds fought it. Equally inconsistent is his claim that the confederates were starved in a country that supported the union troops luxuriously when they marched over it. The confederate soldiers will not thank Lord Wolseley for his patronage. To tell brave men that their conquerors were cowards is flattery in reverse. Our theatre of war was too vast for the military comprehension of Lord Wolseley, but he is fairly competent to give us a critical review of the Easter Monday sham Battle of Brighton, or perhaps to show us how the disastrous Battle of Dorking was lost through the fussy incompetence of the Horse Guards.

I see that the old Vikings of the north have some descendants living yet. One of them by the name of Peary, an American Lieutenant, has taken a little ship and started northward for the conquest of the pole. This is a more praiseworthy expedition than some of the piratical excursions of his ancestors, the old sea kings; but a wail of gloomy portent comes from portions of the American press, pitying the foolhardy enterprise and the rash navigator who dares to tempt the fate of Hendrik Hudson, of Sir John Franklin, and DeLong. Out of the depths of their fear they exclaim, "Why does not the American government put a stop to those Arctic expeditions, which inflict hardship, impose danger, and imperil human lives in a search for something which it is not possible to find; and which if it could be found would have no money value?" These questions come out of the timid and mercantile elements of our souls, and they regard not the importance of even unprofitable courage in the formation of national character. The Anglo-Saxon trait of conquering difficulties for the glory of conquering them is intensified in the American. It has given to him that individuality and self reliance which have made him invincible by the wild beast or the wild man. Led, often by the spirit of adventure alone, he has blazed with his axe a path for empire across the continent from sea to sea. Danger was the very spice of life to the American pioneer, and to him adventure was a stimulant like wine. Under its influence he has explored the continent, torn out the heart of the mountains for their silver, and turned the rivers into new channels to get the gold hidden in the sand. Strengthened by it he has chased the sperm whale nearly to the pole, and inspired by the charm and fascination of it, he will not stop until he has planted his flag at the very pole itself.

There seems to be an epidemic of heresy abroad in the land, and the Newtons and McQuearys and the Briggses and the Brookses

think that they can cure it by inoculating the churches with it, as if it were a matter of small pox to be prevented by the injection of some virus. It resembles a panic in the army; the fight gets hot and one or two drop out, perhaps limping, then some others follow, and then more, until at last the magnetism of alarm makes a stampede all along the line. Much of it is due to pretentious phraseology such as "advanced thought," "modern learning," "higher criticism," "exegetical acumen," whatever that is, and other fashionable phrases of like dignity. Men are willing to be accused of intellectuality or of a taste for higher criticism, and a church trial often gives them the notoriety they seek. Some of the heresy is due to a growing disbelief in punishment, especially Divine punishment of the eternal kind. This feeling was eloquently expressed by an American delegate to a Presbyterian convention in London when he was pleading for a revision of the creed. He said; "I don't know how it may be with you Englishmen, but the American people will not submit to eternal punishment. It's no us preaching it. I tell you they won't stand it." If the stampede continues at the present rate of travel for a few years more, the rival powers will change places, and we shall see men tried for orthodoxy before ecclesiastical tribunals, and condemned. M. M. TRUMBULL.

A SONNET.

BY F. J. P.

Once in the college years gone by, I read
In Hesiod of the young Earth's Age of Gold:
When men, who tired of life, did but enfold
Their eyes from light with their own cloaks, and fled
Silent and painless, homewards to the Dead.
Boy though I was, the legend took firm hold
Upon my soul; for could I not behold
Ev'n then how Grief to Joy is always wed?
How Life is vex't with cares, with sin, disease?
How high resolves and prayers are turned to dust?
And how—there lay the charm!—how sweet it must
Have been to die in such soft quiet ease?
But since those days the world seems changed to me:
Duty reveals what then I scarce could see.

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THE STORY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

THE first suggestion of American Independence was made in England. In the *London Chronicle*, Oct. 25, 1774, an elaborate article appeared entitled "American Independence the Interest and Glory of Great Britain." It was reprinted in the *Pennsylvania Journal*, but there was no response. Attachment to the mother country survived the tea-riots of that year, and in March 1775 Franklin informed Lord Chatham that he had never heard an opinion looking towards independence from any American "drunk or sober." But the "massacre at Lexington," as the first collision (April 19, 1775) was called, moved the country to indignation. It was an illustration of how great a matter a little fire kindleth. A few villagers under Captain Parker (grandfather of Theodore Parker, who kept the Captain's musket on his wall) met the English troops. Parker had warned them not to fire unless fired on, but one could not restrain himself: his gun missed fire but the flash brought a volley from the Englishmen, and independence was potentially written in the blood of the seven men who were left dead in Lexington. A few days after the tidings reached Philadelphia appeared the April number of the *Pennsylvania Magazine*, edited by Thomas Paine. It contained a summary of Chatham's speech, in which he said the Crown would lose its lustre if "robbed of so principal a jewel as America." Paine adds this footnote: "The principal jewel of the Crown actually dropped out at the coronation." This little footnote was probably the nearest approach to a suggestion of independence made by any American even then. And among all the fiery meetings held throughout the colonies only one ventured to utter the word independence. From the county of Mecklenburg, North Carolina, came resolutions passed May 31 and June 10, 1775, demanding the organisation of an independent government. Congress would not allow such treasonable resolutions to be read before it, and the written records were lost. Jefferson pronounced the Mecklenburg resolutions mythical. But lately a copy of the *South Carolina Gazette* of June 13, 1775, has been discovered containing the resolutions: it is in Charleston, and I have seen a photographed copy.

The first argument for independence, from the American point of view, was from the pen of Thomas Paine. It was printed in the *Pennsylvania Journal*, Oct. 18, 1775, under the title "A Serious Thought," and over the signature "Humanus." It presents a series of charges against Great Britain, somewhat resembling those of the "Declaration," and concludes: "When I reflect on these, I hesitate not for a moment to believe that the Almighty will finally separate America from Britain,—call it Independency or what you will, if it is the cause of God and humanity it will go on." The king is especially arraigned for establishing African slavery in America, which independence will abolish. Paine's phraseology leaves little doubt that he wrote the anti-slavery passage in the Declaration which was struck out. While writing *Common Sense* which really determined the matter, Paine was suspected of being a British spy. Nor was it so absurd, for up to the "massacre of Lexington" he had been active in conciliation. He was disgusted at the prospective outbreak, and wrote to Franklin: "I thought it very hard to have the country set on fire about my ears almost the moment I got into it." *Common Sense* appeared January 10, 1776. Washington pronounced it "unanswerable" (to Joseph Reed, Jan. 31), and indeed there was not a leading patriot in the country who did not applaud. New York had instructed its congressmen not to vote for independence, but one of its delegates, Henry Wisner, sent its leading assemblymen this pamphlet, asking their answer: as they could not give any Wisner disregarded their instructions, and the State had to come round to him. At that time many ascribed the pamphlet to Franklin, who was one day reproached by a lady for the expression "royal brute of Great Britain." Franklin assured her that he was not the author, and would never have so dishonored the brute creation.

"A little thing sometimes produces a great effect," wrote Cobbett from America to Lord Grenville. "It appears to me very clear that some beastly insults offered to Mr. Paine while he was in the Excise in England was the real cause of the revolution in America." This is more epigrammatic than exact. Paine was turned out of the Excise for absenting himself from his post (Lewes) without leave. It was not fair, for he had been engaged by the Excisemen of England to

try and get a bill through Parliament raising their salaries, and had to be much in London; and no other fault was charged. There were no insults, but he was left penniless, and Franklin advised his coming to America. Here he at once got a good position, and was editing the only important magazine of the country, without any animosity to England. However, Cobbett is right when he further says that whoever may have written the "Declaration," Paine was its author. At that time Philadelphia was full of so-called "tories." Their chief nest was the University, presided over by Rev. William Smith, D. D., who, as "Cato" attacked "Common Sense." Paine replied under the name "Forrester," and President Smith was so worsted that he lost his position, and left Philadelphia for a small curacy in Maryland. Paine resided in a room opposite the chief meeting-house of the Quakers, who, under pretext of peace-principles aided the enemy. "Common Sense" insisted that they should address their testimony against war to the invaders equally with the invaded, and as they were not ready to do this their influence was destroyed. The danger to independence now lay in the approach of peace commissioners from England. Paine issued a little pamphlet entitled "Dialogue between the Ghost of General Montgomery, just arrived from the Elysian Fields, and an American Delegate." The gallant Ghost warns the Delegate that union with England is impossible, and, were it otherwise, would be a wrong to the English as well as the American people. This pamphlet was effective in strengthening waverers.

On June 7, 1775, Hon. Richard Henry Lee submitted to Congress a resolution that the colonies are and ought to be independent. A committee was appointed to propose appropriate action, and reported June 28th through Benjamin Harrison, great-grandfather of the present President. It was found that six states hesitated—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina. Congress postponed the matter until July 1, meantime appointing a committee to draft a Declaration, another to organise a Confederation, and a third to obtain foreign aid. The committee on a Declaration (Jefferson, John Adams, Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston reported on July 2. A bare majority in Congress passed the Declaration on July 4. Congress then adjourned to July 15, in order that efforts might be made to induce New York and Maryland to withdraw their restrictions on their delegates, who were personally favorable to independence. On July 15 all were free and unanimous. On the 19th Congress ordered the Declaration to be engrossed, and signed by every member. The paper had been signed on July 4 only by John Hancock, president of Congress, and the secretary Charles Thomson. The engrossed copy was

produced August 2 and signed by the members, some signatures being added later. The first to sign was Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, and the last Matthew Thornton of the same colony, when he took his seat November 4. In Trumbull's picture of the "signing," in the Capital, more pomp is given to the affair than accompanied it. The secretary was so little impressed that his entry that the members signed is written on the margin of the journal of Congress. Thomas Stone of Maryland, who signed, is not in Trumbull's picture, and Robert Livingston who did not sign, being absent, is put in.

The earliest draft of the Declaration, before the anti-slavery paragraphs were struck out, is in the Library of the State Department; the draft agreed to by the Committee and passed by Congress is lost; the engrossed Declaration is in Independence Hall, Philadelphia.

A complete collection of autographs of the "signers" is a fortune. There are only three in existence. One of these belongs to Dr. Thomas Addis Emmet of New York. The costliness of the autographs is in the ratio of the obscurity of the signers. One of the least distinguished signers was Thomas Lynch Jr. of South Carolina. Only three examples of his writing are known, uninteresting business notes, and for one of them Dr. Emmet paid over \$5000.

The signers of the Declaration were rich men, and all of the "gentry." The British government were probably deceived by their adopting as their spokesman, and making Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the humble exciseman Paine. The first president of Congress, Peyton Randolph, and George Washington, would pretty certainly have been knighted but for the revolution. The espousal of American independence by such men, and by the Adams family, the Livingstons, the Stones of Maryland, meant that the most loyal and conservative class had gone against the king, and that America was irrecoverably lost to him. A well-informed English Ministry would have spared themselves and us the seven years war.

Paine did not use only his pen in the revolution. When the cause had been consecrated to independence he shouldered his musket, marched to the front, did such service (at Fort Mifflin) that Gen. Greene took him on his staff, shared the hardships of Washington's retreat to the Delaware, and wrote by camp-fires his "Crisis" which Washington ordered to be read to his depressed soldiers. The first sentence of that "Crisis," "These are the times that try men's souls," was the watchword at Trenton, where Paine helped to capture the Hessians. He afterwards went in an open boat, under fire of the English ships, to convey an order to those besieged in Fort Mifflin, and on other occasions proved his courage. He visited France, and

brought back six million livres. But his services were forgotten when he extended his detestation of oppression and cruelty to heavenly as well as earthly despots.

ETHICS AS APPLIED TO CRIMINOLOGY.

BY DR. ARTHUR MAC DONALD.

THE relation of criminality to the other forms of pathological and abnormal humanity is one of degree. If we represent the highest degree, as crime, by A^6 , A^5 , say, would stand for insane criminality, and A^4 for alcoholism perhaps, A^3 for pauperism, A^2 for those weak forms of humanity that charity treats more especially, and A for the idea of wrong in general, particularly in its lightest forms. Thus, crime is the most exaggerated form of wrong; but these forms are all one in essence. A drop of water is as much water, as is an ocean.

It is difficult to draw a distinct line between these different forms of wrong. This will become evident from the fact that they are dovetailed one into the other. Thus, when cross-questioning criminals, one often feels that not only are their minds weak and wavering but that they border close on insanity. The same feeling arises after an examination of confirmed paupers. Here alcoholism is one of the main causes; The individual, on account of his intemperate habits, finds difficulty in obtaining employment: and this forced idleness, gradually, from repetition, develops into a confirmed habit. Pauperism may be, in some cases, hereditary, but it is too often overlooked that the children of paupers can acquire all such habits from their parents, and so it can be carried from one generation to another, without resorting to heredity as a cause, which is too often a name to cover up our ignorance of all the early conditions. The extent to which alcoholism is involved in all forms of humanitarian pathology is well known; it is often indirectly as well as directly the cause of leading the young into crime; the intemperate father makes himself a pest in his own home; the children remain out all night through fear; this habit leads to running away for a longer time; although not thieves, the children are compelled to steal, or to beg, in order to live; and thus many become confirmed criminals or paupers, or both. The great evil about alcoholism is that it too often injures those around, who are of much more value than the alcoholic himself. It makes itself felt indirectly and directly in our hospitals, insane asylums, orphan asylums, and charitable institutions in general. However low the trade of the prostitute may be, alcohol is her greatest physical enemy.

As just indicated, some of the lesser degrees of abnormal and pathological humanity may be considered under the head of charitological. These are repre-

sented by the different kinds of benevolent institutions, such as asylums for the insane, and feeble-minded, for the inebriate: hospitals, homes for the deaf, dumb and blind: for the aged and orphans, etc., and institutions for defectives of whatever nature.

It is evident, however, that the term charitological may not only be applied to what is pathological or abnormal but also to that which is physiological or normal. Thus it can refer to institutions of quite a different order, but yet none the less charitable in nature. We refer of course to educational institutions, the majority of which are a gift to the public, and especially to those who attend them. It is obvious enough that every student is, in some measure, a charity student, from the well known fact that the tuition money in most cases pays a very small part of the expenses.

Now, no distinct line can be drawn between penal and reformatory institutions, and between reformatory and educational institutions; it is, again, a question of degree. But in saying this, it is not meant that difference in degree is of little consequence. On the contrary it is very important to distinguish between penal, reformatory and educational, for practical reasons, as in the classification of prisoners, not all of whom are criminals. In a sense, all education should be reformatory.

But it may be asked, where can a subject end. It goes without saying, that divisions are more or less arbitrary, if we are seeking reality, for things are together, and the more we look into the world, the more we find it to be an *organic mechanism of absolute relativity*. Most human beings who are abnormal or defective in any way, are much more alike, than unlike normal individuals: and hence, in the thorough study of any single individual (microcosmic mechanism), distinct lines are more for convenience. Thus the difficulties of distinguishing between health and disease, sanity and insanity, vegetable and animal, are familiar. Whatever may be said from the educational point of view about abnormal cases, is generally true, with few modifications, of the normal. Education and pedagogy are thus to be included to some extent in a comprehensive charitological system.

But although the distinct separation of one wrong from another is not easy, yet the decision as to the highest form of wrong may not be so difficult. This form consists without doubt, in the act of depriving another of his existence; no act could be more radical; the least that could be said of any one is that he does not exist. The desire for existence is the deepest instinct in nature; not only in the lower forms of nature, but anthropologically considered, this feeling manifests itself in the highest aspirations of races. In mythology, religion and theology, the great fact is ex-

istence hereafter, and in philosophy, it has gone so far as pre-existence of the soul. Perhaps the deepest experience we have of non-existence, is in the loss of an intimate friend, when we say so truly, that part of our existence has gone from us. It is death which makes existence tragic.

Now the degrees of wrong may be expressed in a general way, in terms of existence. That is, in depriving another of any of his rights, we are taking from him some of his existence; for existence is qualitative, as well as temporal; that is, it includes everything, that gives to life content.

Thus, in this sense, a man of forty may have had more existence, than another at eighty, where the former's life has been broader richer in experience and thought, and more valuable to others.

We may say in general that the existence of a person is beneficial or injurious, in that degree, in which it is beneficial or injurious to the community or humanity. This statement is based upon the truism, that the whole is more than any of its parts.

The degrees of wrong, therefore, should depend upon the degree of danger or injury (moral, intellectual, physical, or financial) which a thought, feeling, willing or action, brings to the community.

This same principle should be applied to degrees of exaggerated wrong or crime.

But, it may be said, should not the degree of freedom or of personal guilt, be the main basis for the punishment of the criminal? The force of this objection is evident; historically, the idea of freedom has been the basis of criminal law; it has also been sanctioned by the experience of the race; and although no claim is made of carrying it into practice without serious difficulties, in the way of strict justice, (difficulties inevitable to any system,) yet, it has not only been an invaluable service, but a necessity to humanity. This is not only true in criminal lines but this idea has been the conscious basis of our highest moral ideas.

But at the same time, it must be admitted, that the exaggeration of the idea of freedom has been one of the main causes of vengeance, which has left its traces in blood, fire, martyrdom and dungeon. And though at present, vengeance seldom takes such extreme forms, yet it is far from extinct. On moral and on biblical grounds, as far as human beings are concerned, vengeance can find little support; an example of its impracticability is the fact, that some of the best prison wardens never punish a man till some time after the offense, so that there may be no feeling on the part of either, that it is an expression of vengeance. The offender is generally reasoned with kindly, but firmly, and told that he must be punished, otherwise the good discipline of the prison could not be main-

tained; which means, that he is punished for the good of others. With few exceptions, a revengeful tone or manner towards the prisoner (same outside of prison) always does harm, for it stirs up similar feelings in the prisoner, which are often the cause of his bad behavior and crime, and need no development. Kindness with firmness, is the desirable combination. Vengeance produces vengeance.

But, taking the deterministic view of the world, the highest morality is possible. One proof is that some fatalists are rigidly moral. A psychological analysis will show that persons who are loved and esteemed, are those whose very nature is to do good,—that is, they would not, and could not see a fellow-being suffer; that is, from the necessity of their nature they were from infancy of a kind disposition. We admire the sturdy nature, who, by long struggle, has reached the moral goal; but we cannot love him always. He is not always of a kind disposition: this is not a necessity of his nature. As the expression goes, "There are very good people with whom the Lord himself could not live."

Is it not the spontaneity of a kind act that gives it its beauty? Where there is no calculating, no reasoning, no weighing in the balance, no choice? The grace of morality is in its naturalness. But to go still further: do we like a good apple more, and a bad apple less, because they are necessarily good or bad? and, if we admitted that every thought, feeling willing and acting of men were as necessary as the law of gravity, would we like honest men less and liars more? True, we might at first modify our estimation of some men, but it would be in the direction of better feeling towards all men.

But, whatever one's personal convictions may be, questions of the freedom of the will and the like must be set aside, not because they are not important, but simply because enough is not known regarding the exact conditions (psychological and physiological) under which we act and think. If we were obliged to withhold action, in the case of any criminal, for the reason that we do not know whether the will is free or not, (allowing for all misconceptions as to this whole question) the community would be wholly unprotected. If a tiger were loose in the streets, the first question would not be whether he was guilty or not. We should imprison the criminal, *first of all, because he is dangerous to the community.*

But if it be asked, how there can be responsibility without freedom, the answer is, that there is at least the feeling of responsibility in cases where there is little or no freedom; that is, there is sometimes no proportion between the feeling of responsibility and the amount of responsibility afterwards shown. The main difficulty however is, that in our present state of

knowledge, it is impossible to know, whether this very feeling of responsibility or of freedom is not itself necessarily caused, either psychologically or physiologically or both. If we admit that we are compelled to believe we are free (as some indeterminists seem to claim) we deny freedom in this very statement. Another obvious and practical ground for our ignorance as to this point, is the fact, that although for generations the best and greatest minds have not failed to give it their attention, yet, up to the present time, the question remains *sub judice*. If we carried out practically the theory of freedom, we should have to punish some of the greatest criminals the least, since from their coarse organisation and lack of moral sense, their responsibility would be very small. There is no objection to speaking of freedom in the sense that a man as an individual may be free as to his outward surroundings, as in the case of a strong character which often acts independently and freely in respect to its outward environment. But to say that *within* the man himself, within his character or personality (brain and mind) there is freedom, is going entirely beyond our knowledge, for there is little or nothing demonstrated as to the inward workings of brain or mind. A similar idea is clearly expressed by Dr. Paul Carus in his interesting book entitled "The Ethical Problem," where he makes an important distinction between "necessity" and "compulsion." This point is well taken. Dr. Carus says: "A free man, let us say an artist full of one idea, executes his work without any compulsion, he works of his own free will. His actions are determined by a motive of his own, not by a foreign pressure. Therefore, we call him free."

A scientific ethics must regard the question of freedom as an unsettled problem. Any ethics would be unethical, in taking, as one of its bases, so debatable a question.

Our general, sociological, ethical principle (as above stated,) is, *that the idea of wrong depends upon the moral, intellectual, physical and financial danger or injury which a thought, feeling, willing or acting brings to humanity.*

But accepting this principle, the important question is just what are these thoughts, feelings, willings and actions, and by what method are they to be determined? The first part of this question, on account of the narrow and limited knowledge at present, in those lines, can be answered only very imperfectly, if at all. As to the method, that of science seems to us the only one that can eventually be satisfactory. By the application of the scientific method is meant, that all facts, especially psychological (sociological, historical, etc.,) physiological and pathological must form the basis of investigation. Psychological facts that can

be scientifically determined, as affecting humanity beneficially or not, are comparatively few in number. Physiologically, more facts can be determined as to their effect on humanity. But it is pre-eminently in the field of pathology that definite scientific results can be acquired. As to the difficulty of investigating psycho-ethical effects, it may be said that physiological psychology and psycho-physics have not as yet furnished a sufficient number of scientific facts.

By the scientific application of chemistry, clinical and experimental medicine with vivisection, to physiology, many truths of ethical importance to humanity exist. But there is much here to be desired; for example, what is said about questions of diet and ways of living in general, is scientifically far from satisfactory. The development of pathology in medicine has been without precedent. Its direct ethical value to humanity is already very great; but the outlook into the future is still greater. It is only necessary to mention the discovery of the cholera and tuberculosis germs (*a conditio sine qua non* of their own prevention.) Immunity in the case of the latter would be one of the greatest benefactions yet known to the race. Medicine can be said to be the study of the future, especially in the scientific and prophylactic sense. It is to experimental medicine that scientific ethics will look for many of its basal facts.

In emphasising the scientific method, as the most important, it is not intended to exclude others. The *a priori* method has been of inestimable value to philosophy, ethics and theology and to science itself, in the forming of hypotheses and theories, which are often necessary anticipations of truth, to be verified afterwards. The *a priori* method is related to the *a posteriori* as the sails to the ballast of a boat: the more philosophy, the better, provided there are a sufficient number of facts: otherwise there is danger of upsetting the craft.

The present office of ethics is, as far as the facts will allow, to suggest methods of conduct to follow, and ideals to hold, that will bring humanity into a more moral, physiological and normal state, enabling each individual to live more in harmony with nature's laws. Such an applied ethics must study especially the phenomena manifested in the different forms of pathological humanity, and draw its conclusions from the facts thus gathered.

But there are many scientists who look with suspicion upon the introduction of philosophical thought and methods into their field. We may call them pure scientists; that is to say, those who believe that the term scientific truth should be applied only to that form of truth which can be directly verified by facts accessible to all. Yet from this point of view, the arrangement, classification, forming of hypotheses and

theories, and drawing philosophical conclusions are not necessarily illegitimate, provided those processes are clearly distinguished from each other and rigidly separated from the facts. Perhaps the study, which more than all others, will contribute toward a scientific ethics is criminology, the subject-matter of which touches the popular mind very closely, owing in a great measure to the influence of the Press; and though this has its dangers, yet it is the duty of this as of every science, to make its principles and conclusions as clear as possible to the public, since in the end, such questions vitally concern them.

Crime can be said in a certain sense to be nature's experiment on humanity. If a nerve of a normal organism is cut, the organs in which irregularities are produced are those which the nerve controls. In this way, the office of a nerve in the normal state may be discovered. The criminal is so to speak, the severed nerve of society and the study of him is a practical way (though indirect) of studying normal men. And since the criminal is seven-eighths like other men, such a study is, in addition, a direct inquiry into normal humanity.

The relation also of criminology to society and to sociological questions is already intimate, and may in the future become closer. Just what crime is, at present, depends more upon time, location, race, country, nationality, and even the State in which one resides. But notwithstanding the extreme relativity of the idea of crime, there are some things in our present social life that are questionable. A young girl of independence, but near poverty, tries to earn her own living at three dollars a week; and if having natural desires for a few comforts and some taste for her personal appearance, she finally, through pressure, oversteps the bound, society, which permits this condition of things, immediately ostracises her. It borders on criminality, that a widow works fifteen hours a day in a room in which she lives, making trousers at ten cents a pair, out of which she and her family must live, until they gradually run down towards death, from want of sufficient nutrition, fresh air and any comfort. It is criminally questionable to leave stoves in cars, so that if the passenger is not seriously injured, but only wedged in, he will have the additional chances of burning to death. It has been a general truth, and in some cases is still, that so many persons must perish by fire, before private individuals will furnish fire escapes to protect their own patrons. It is a fact that over five thousand people are killed yearly in the United States at railroad grade crossings, most of whose lives could have been spared, had either the road or the railroad passed, either one over the other. But it is said that such improvements would involve an enormous expense; that is, practi-

cally to admit that the extra money required is of more consequence than the five thousand human lives. And yet, strange as it may seem, if a brutal murderer is to lose his life, and there is the least doubt as to his premeditation, a large part of the community is often aroused into moral excitement, if not indignation, while the innocently murdered railroad passenger excites little more than a murmur.

There is perhaps no subject upon which the public conscience is more tender than the treatment of the criminal.

Psychologically the explanation is simple; for the public have been educated gradually to feel the misfortune and sufferings of the criminal; it is also easier to realise since the thought is confined generally to one personality at a time. But if the public could all be eye witnesses to a few of our most brutal railroad accidents, the consciousness gained, might be developed into conscientiousness in the division of their sympathies. But this feeling, however paradoxical, is a sincere, though sometimes morbid expression, of unselfish humanitarianism; for the underlying impulses are of the highest ethical order, and over cultivation is a safer error than under-cultivation. The moral climax of this feeling was reached when the Founder of Christianity was placed between two thieves.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WALT WHITMAN AS PENSIONEE.

To the Editor of The Open Court :—

ONE of General Trumbull's recent paragraphs in *The Open Court* would tend to throw upon Walt Whitman the shadow of an unjust suspicion. While vaguely written, and probably not to be compassed or explicated by the general reader, it says enough and leaves enough unsaid to make it appear that Walt Whitman sometime, if not now, and in some way, by mean insinuation if not direct, appealed or appeals for or would gladly have received or receive a governmental pension. To those who know the truth of the matter—that is to say, the ignorance betrayed by the General's reproach,—the later little paragraph from Tucker, of *Liberty*, which in substance rebukes the accuser and asks if it be not more splendid to save lives, with nurses, than to destroy them, with generals, excites appreciation and gratitude.

What happens to be the record? That a pension was mentioned for Walt Whitman and that he, in his own person, in vigorous letters and through the voices of friends, protested that he did not deserve and would not take any grant of money from the government. This is authentic history, not to be scribbled away on the smart edge of a paragraph. Whitman's immediate associates, certain editors of certain newspapers, several congressmen, at least, besides sundry observers attracted at the moment, are aware of all the attending circumstances, and value the light they throw on his purposes and character.

An abstract question might be asked, viz. whether as fulfillment of justice men who sacrifice health in hospitals (with Whitman it was health of superb majesty) are not as much entitled to governmental guarantees as men who travel the life of a forager and fighter and come home shorn of the physical gifts with which

they went. I am sure for myself that no line of logic can be drawn against a claim so clear.

Wherein is Whitman pensionee? In nothing beyond the area which comradeship yields him. Long were the years of his outlawry—long is the story of non-recognition and outrageous assault. He never complained. He cast back no retort. Keeping the path of heroic resolve—travelling with whatever soreness of foot or travail of spirit—he persevered, held his peace, continued his gospel, re-asserted his faith, accepted the human nature of foe and friend, dominated the arrogant phenomena and antagonism of the commonplace. There was need and poverty enough through mental and physical experiences following the war—paralysis. But friends came, new years brought wiser spirits nearer Whitmanic solutions, his genius provoked to shame, the conceit of mere brutal criticism, and certain material helps, till then denied, arrived plentifully to his tribute and relief. Now, in these later seasons, oppressed by bodily disasters which lead him close to the doors of death, he is free of all anxiety and acknowledges the historic and efficient rally of lovers and comrades.

Is this unseemly? Somewhere Whitman himself asks, why should he shame in the gifts of friends? He gave all he had; he labored to free literature from thralldom and democracy from clogging old-time old men of seas; he went into the subtlest service of the war, where slept and played the brood of sorrow,—where it was not the mad heroism of battle but the still patient courage of suffering that commanded; he sped lance against priestcrafts and politicaldom; he compassed and displayed science, evolution, as never before in literature; he provided the lofty vistas of personality, companioning and illustrating in himself the supreme declaration of genius, that man, the natural, must dominate and make literature and life.

These are great gifts, to-day greatly accepted by some, and to-morrow to enter the blood of the race. The little a few dollars can do to pass the word of gratitude up for this is small enough. No frank sweet word in which so great a character may describe his later ills can justly or intelligently be tortured into evidence for a charge of beggary.

Whitman is loved by as devoted groups as ever blessed the way of martyrdom. These men and women are his for their best worth. Officialdom, whether civil or military, has intrinsically nothing either to give or to withhold.

HORACE L. TRAUBEL.

NURSE AND SOLDIER.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

MR. TRAUBEL'S criticism is well made, a little acrimonious perhaps, but not more so than my supposed offense deserved, an offense which I think has been exaggerated by the imagination of Mr. Traubel, excited by zeal in defense of a friend.

According to Mr. Traubel, Walt Whitman is not on the pension rolls, and never has been there. This, if true, and I suppose it is true, gives Mr. Traubel an apparent advantage over me in this discussion, but the advantage is weaker than it might be because he admits that "a pension was mentioned for Walt Whitman," but that Mr. Whitman protested against it. The newspaper account was that a pension had been granted; and I never saw that statement contradicted until now.

Reading the offending paragraph again I do not care to modify it. Mr. Whitman's letter to the *Review of Reviews*, in which he said "I am totally paralysed from the old secession war time overstrain," so much resembled what the claim agents call "supplementary proof" to support a pension, that I might be justified in so regarding it. Whether that is so or not, the letter was another contribution to that huge mountain of egotistical cant which makes all our ailments, from consumption to corns and bunions, the result of patriotic sacrifices rendered by us in "the old secession war time."

Mr. Traubel says: "An abstract question might be asked, viz. whether as fulfillment of justice men who sacrifice health in hospitals (with Whitman it was health of superbest majesty) are not as much entitled to governmental guarantees as men who travel the life of a forager and fighter?" I do not see the use of going into the abstract here; but if "governmental guarantees" is the "Whitmanic" phrase for pensions, I do not care to act as referee, especially as we are not debating whether a male nurse of "superbest majesty" or a soldier is most worthy of "governmental guarantees." I do not believe that either of them ought to have a pension. I believe that pensioning is one of the most corrupt and corrupting of governmental usurpations; but if compelled to decide between the male nurse and the soldier, I should say give it to the soldier. If the question were between the soldier and the female nurse, I might vote the other way.

So far as the praise of the male nurse reproaches me for having been a soldier instead of a nurse, I will bear it with such penitential humility as I can. In the excitement of the great struggle for liberty I did not notice it, but I begin to see how wicked it was for me to "travel the life of a forager and fighter," when I might have been a hospital nurse; in which latter case I should not only have received the approbation of Mr. Traubel, but also I should have escaped a couple of bullets which unceremoniously knocked me out. Still, should the dispute have to be fought out again, I should probably act as I did before; for looking back at the conflict in the calm and quiet of old age, I am rather gratified than otherwise that I fought for the preservation of the American republic and the overthrow of slavery.

In reply to the "forager" sarcasm, let me say that male nurses could do more "foraging" among hospital stores, than the most rapacious of Sherman's bummers ever did among the plantations of Georgia. Whenever I am at the point of death, as I very often am, I renew the instructions which I gave to my family twenty years ago, "Tell the reporters when they come to write me up, to be kind enough to say that I did not die from disease contracted in the army."

His fervent adulation of Whitman is creditable to Mr. Traubel for it shows the goodness and softness of his nature. I have no desire to dispute the great services of Walt Whitman, outside the hospital, as eloquently set forth by Mr. Traubel. I do not doubt that he kept that rhetorically well worn path of "heroic resolve," that he "continued his gospel," that he "brought wiser spirits nearer Whitmanic solutions," that he "provided the lofty vistas of personality," and that he "dominated the arrogant phenomena and antagonism of the commonplace." These tributes are of the "abstract." They are outside the question, but they look very much as if the scheme to pension Mr. Whitman was not yet abandoned.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

James Sully has contributed to *The Monist* an elaborate essay on the "Psychology of Conception," which is the leading article of the July number. Moncure D. Conway follows with a discussion of the "Right of Evolution," throwing much light on the development of American institutions and explaining the laws of the growth of institutions. It appears that we Americans are much more conservative than we usually imagine ourselves to be. An extraordinary interest attaches to the contribution from the pen of one of the unfortunate eight anarchists, Michael Schwab, who after a careful study of Professor Lombroso's article on the "Physiognomy of the Anarchists," calls attention to several points in which the eminent Italian psychologist must have been mistaken. Michael Schwab's remarks are to the point and deserve the attention of the scholar, the psychologist and physiognomist for mere theoretical reasons. Yet they command the additional interest not only of American citizens, but also of every one who sympathises with

enthusiasts and reformers. Enthusiasts and reformers also make mistakes; Michael Schwab is not blind to that fact and his article is a contribution to the psychology of their aspirations. Next in line we have a controversy between Professor Höfding of Copenhagen and the editor, the former defending the principle that welfare or the greatest possible happiness constitutes the criterion of ethics, the latter maintaining that the criterion of ethics must not be sought in the subjective element of feeling pleasures or pains, but in the objective elements of facts. The ethical criterion must be sought in the expanse and growth of the human soul, pleasures and pains being incidental features only in the realisation of this process.

The last article is an essay on "Thought and Language" by Prof. F. Max Müller. It is the substance of a lecture delivered before the Philosophical Society of Glasgow on January 21, 1891. Prof. F. Max Müller criticises Herbert Spencer as well as Mr. G. J. Romanes. Without entering into the details of the controversy we may state here that we cannot agree with Prof. Max Müller in one important point. He speaks of "the immense presumption that there has been no interruption in the developmental process in the course of psychological history" of which Professor Romanes is guilty. The editors of *The Monist* are certainly guilty of the same "presumption," and we believe that all evolutionists who have discarded the idea of special-creation acts will have to adopt the same view which is more than a mere presumption.

The literary correspondence from France is a review of the ethical text-books which are shown to be a decided step backward. The old Christian catechisms were more humanitarian and cosmopolitan; the new French text-books for civic and moral instruction take a narrow national view which under the disguise of patriotism dwarfs the minds of the children. Christian Ufer reviews the science of pedagogics in Germany.

The book reviews are of special interest. John Dewey's "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics" and John S. Mackenzie's "Introduction to Social Philosophy" are discussed. Among the foreign books we note August Forel's "Der Hypnotismus" which lately appeared in the second edition; Carneri's "Der Mensch"; Paul du Bois-Reymond's "Grundlagen der Erkenntnis," a deeply philosophical book of an agnostic character. Dr. Krause's book "Tuisko-Land" is an important contribution to anthropological science in a popular form. It is mainly a comparative mythology the results of which would corroborate the European origin of the Aryas. C. Dillmann's book "Die Mathematik die Fackelträgerin einer neuen Zeit" is a justification of the plan to make mathematics the cornerstone of a scientific education, the author being the principal of a Mathematical Highschool at Stuttgart. The contemporary periodicals of a philosophical and ethical character, of America, England, France, Germany, and Russia, are reviewed so as to give of almost all their articles a concise synopsis.

Whatever Moncure D. Conway writes is to the point; he wields a vigorous pen and is fascinating as well as instructive. The following letter which pays a beautiful and honorable tribute to his abilities as an author, will be interesting to his many admirers:

Canterbury Freethought Association.
Christchurch, New Zealand.

Mr. Moncure D. Conway,

Dear Sir:

The members of the above association having read your articles in *The Open Court*, at their last meeting held in the Freethought Hall in this city, unanimously passed the following resolution:

"That the Canterbury Freethought Association wish to place on record their heartfelt thanks to Moncure D. Conway, for the

"tribute of respect he has paid to our late revered leader—Charles Bradlaugh."

I may state Mr. R. Thompson of Milner & Thompson of this city made an effort to get the article referred to, reprinted in the leading liberal (!) paper here, and succeeded by paying for every word as an advertisement.

Herewith I forward copies of both papers. I am, dear sir,

Very Sincerely Yours,

Francis J. Quinn, Secretary, C. F. A.

A circular to the Friends of Russian Freedom signed by a great number of most prominent names, among them Kennan, Whittier, Lowell, Julia Ward Howe, Phillip Brooks, William Lloyd Garrison, etc., appeals to the American public for aid by all moral and legal means to obtain for Russia political freedom and self-government. There is no one who will not heartily sympathise with the aim of the society founded to this noble purpose, although we may doubt whether their efforts will be of any avail. The Society of the American Friends for Russian Freedom has been formed after the model of an English society of the same kind the organ of which is *Free Russia*. The circular declares:

"We do not intend to approve and we are not asked to approve, to support, or countenance the extreme and violent section of the Russian opposition. What we wish to do is to tell all liberty-loving Russians that many Americans are in deep and warm sympathy with their aspirations, that they will watch with eager attention every new effort of theirs, will hail with enthusiasm their victory, and will mourn for their sufferings in case of defeat."

Those who wish to join this society and receive also *Free Russia* (published monthly) should send their names and post-office addresses, with the membership fee of One Dollar, to Francis J. Garrison, Treasurer, 4 Park Street, Boston, Mass.

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SELFISHNESS AS AN ETHICAL THEORY.

BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.

It is one thing to say that as matter of fact all men seek their own pleasure or happiness, and quite another thing to say that they *should* do so. The former statement belongs to the realm of psychology; the latter proposes an ethical rule. In a previous article (June 4), I questioned the correctness of the psychological statement and I now propose to inquire as to the tenability of the ethical rule sometimes derived therefrom.

At the outset, it strikes one as strange to propose as a rule what everyone is said to do of his own accord. A rule should be something to guide us, but if we always do, and cannot help doing, what the rule enjoins, the rule becomes, to say the least, superfluous. If we can no more help acting selfishly than we can help breathing, there is about as much sense in urging us to act selfishly as in putting the injunction upon us to breathe.

A "should" naturally suggests the possibility of acting otherwise; but if in the nature of the case we cannot act otherwise than we should act, the "should" is practically meaningless. There is little sense even in asking us to eschew self denial and unselfishness, if on account of our psychological constitution self-denial and unselfishness are impossible, and every act is necessarily interested and for our own advantage. And the fact that advocates of selfishness do warn us against unselfishness and self-denial looks like a giving away of their case—since it is hardly rational to warn men against what they can as little do as they can escape from their own shadow or jump over the moon. Suppose some one should say that a straight line is the line which no one can help drawing in connecting two points. There would be nothing in such a statement to guide us when we were seeking to draw a straight line; it would be the same as saying, Go ahead and draw in whatever way you like, a rule is quite unnecessary. The fact is, if all men act selfishly and must of necessity do so, ethics in general (and not merely any specific rule) is a superfluity; and the very words, "should," "ought," "obligation," "duty" would have to pass into disuse and be regarded as survivals of an antiquated mode of thinking.

Such moral scepticism or nihilism is also forced

upon us by another consideration. If selfishness is the true ethical rule, i. e. if the pursuit of our personal pleasure or happiness is the right aim, it follows that any way in which we find happiness is right. If one person makes himself happy by doing good in the world, very well; but if another finds that cruelty gives him pleasure, we must also say, very well. If this man finds it to his advantage to speak the truth and keep his word, he acts rightly in doing so; if the other gets ahead by lying and breaking faith, he acts also rightly. A recent defender of selfishness* (and one who has the rare merit of being straightforward and fearless in his logic) goes to the length of saying that *if* it made him happy to get drunk, to treat his wife as his slave and to beat his children, he should undoubtedly do those things—and he asks, why then should he condemn those who actually live that way for no other reason than that he in fact finds his happiness in doing differently? If then everything is right which gives one pleasure or happiness and the most contradictory things do give pleasure or happiness, it follows that moral distinctions break down and that love and hate, truth and lying, temperance and drunkenness, marital faithfulness and adultery, stand on the same moral plane. Such is the conclusion drawn by the writer I have quoted. He says:

"One act is just as virtuous as another; one man is just as righteous as another. The man who picks my pockets is just as good a man, morally speaking, as he who at the risk of his life pulls me out of the river. The murderer is just as righteous as the philanthropist, the ravisher as innocent as his victim, a drunkard as moral as an ideal clergyman. Each of these only does what he must, will and should under the circumstances."

And with remarkable consistency he adds:

"Men muddle their brains with such words as right and wrong, morality, duty and virtue; they say I ought to do this or not to do that . . . ; but there are no such things or powers or obligations as these." In fact, "there is no morality but what vain people have manufactured."

By no means does it follow that one must be a bad man to say such things; I believe that this writer is personally not only one of the most straightforward and fearless, but one of the most just, unselfish and tender hearted of men. But I suppose that whatever he is he regards as his idiosyncrasy; and if by accident he were mean and cruel instead, I suppose that

* Hugh O. Pentecost in the *Twentieth Century*, April 2.

he would deny (as a matter of logic) that there was any obligation for him to try to act differently.

Such seems to be the logical outcome of selfishness as an ethical theory. Practically in an individual case, it may work no harm; but in general, if men could sophisticate themselves so far as to adopt it and act upon it, the result would be grave moral deterioration. There are only two ways in which the result might be avoided; first, if all men had good instincts and dispositions to start with (which is manifestly untrue), and second, if there were a kind of pre-ordained constitution for every one, in virtue of which, whatever expectations men cherished in connection with wrongdoing, the actual and necessary result were misery and unhappiness. The latter proposition may possibly be true; for one, I confess I should like to believe it. It would be a most powerful argument in favor of a moral order and constitution of the world. If it could be made out that however we may wish to be happy, there are only certain ways in which we *can* be happy, it would look as if nature itself was on the side of those "certain ways," and gradually discovered them to us in the course of our experience and manifold experimentation.

And yet as a matter of fact there are grave difficulties in the way. It is, of course, true that to one of sympathetic disposition the reflection that he has sometime been harsh and inconsiderate brings pain. A naturally just-minded man undoubtedly finds humiliation in recollection of any incident in which his interests betrayed him into unjust treatment of another. Dryden has finely said:

"The secret pleasure of a generous act
Is the great mind's great bribe."

But can it be truthfully said that every one feels a pang in remembrance of unsympathetic conduct? If we do unjust things does it necessarily follow that we experience humiliation afterward? Is the cut and make of our nature so that we cannot do mean things without subsequent revulsion of feeling—and to us all does the secret pleasure of a generous act come like a great bribe? As I have said, I should like to believe so; but the fact seems to be that human nature is variable, and what gives pain to one person does not to another. It is sometimes by our thoughts, our speculative reason and not by convincing experiences of pleasure or pain that we learn what is right. What a noble saying is that of Sir Philip Sidney's!—"Doing good is the only certainly happy action of a man's life." But I am afraid the truth is simply that doing good is the only certainly happy action of a *good* man's life. Does giving make a miser happy? It seems to cost as much discomfort and pain for some men to part with a dollar as for a child to cut a tooth.

"Society is no comfort
To one not sociable."

says Shakespeare. Sometimes we are not happy in doing good to ourselves any more than in doing good to others. As the same great observer and critic of human life has written:

"Your affections are
A sick man's appetite, who desires most that
Which would increase his evil."

As men are, personal comfort and happiness make a poor guide for them. It is safe to have supreme regard for such a standard, only when we are already perfectly moralised and rationalised—that is, when reason and conscience have such a dominancy in us that we can have no happiness save in following their dictates. And even then, when as Wordsworth says, joy has become "its own security," joy would not really be the guide, but the effect of following the true guide, which is ever to be found in the rational nature of man. As most men are, it is actually dangerous to follow after what each thinks will make him happy and that only; it is because they do this so unthinkingly that they fall into the pitfalls that they do. George Eliot had given up all theological views of morality, and yet she once wrote, "There are so many things wrong and difficult in the world that no man can be great—he can hardly keep himself from wickedness—unless he gives up thinking much about pleasure and rewards, and gets strength to endure what is painful." What better illustration could we have of the truth of this, than in Mr. Pentecost's own words: "Don't kill the Czar unless to do so would surely make you happier, but if it would make you happier, then kill him," and, again, "Don't destroy property or throw stones at scabs, unless you are sure it would make you happier to do so, but if you are sure, then do it." There is, of course, no deed of shame, no wild act of blood, no monstrous tyranny that could not be justified for the perpetrator of it by the same logic—the Czar himself and all persecutors, monopolists, seducers of the innocent, grinders of the poor, devourers of widows' houses, being thus made blameless.

It is not in place for me at present to attempt to say what the true guide is; my object is purely critical. But I may briefly remark in general that guidance, in my view, lies in our thoughts rather than our desires for pleasure and happiness. We can find pleasure in all sorts of things, but we cannot think all sorts of things to be right. Our thoughts are ahead of our impulses; there are certain things we are bound to call right by virtue of our very nature as rational beings and to the extent men have followed reason, they have done so. It is in these progressive and enlarging thoughts that I find the clue to nature's purpose with regard to us, to the Divine plan of our being. *We cannot help thinking certain things to be right; we may not do them, we may not want to do them, our wishes may go clean contrary to them, and yet, if we are*

honest with ourselves, we cannot help thinking them to be right. The practical problem of life is to make our thoughts, and not our haphazard cravings for pleasure, rule. Here is the field of moral conflict, the occasion for the exercise of the moral will.

"And oh, when Nature sinks, as oft she may,
Through long-lived pressure of obscure distress,
Still to be strenuous for the bright reward,
Still in the soul to admit of no decay,
Brook no continuance of weak-mindedness—
Great is the glory, for the strife is hard!"

NB. The following three articles are criticisms of Mr. Salter's first article "Selfishness: a Psychological Argument," which appeared in No. 197 of *The Open Court*.—Ed.

PLEASURE IN SELFISHNESS AND ALTRUISM.

BY J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

IT was with more than ordinary interest that I read William M. Salter's recent contribution entitled "Selfishness: A Psychological Argument," to *The Open Court*—particularly because his treatment of the subject seemed to me to be most ingeniously devised. His criticism of the position held by Leslie Stephen, Lester Ward, Bain and Bentham will not, I think, hold good. He seems to think that to act for a thing such as happiness as an end is to act with it constantly in mind, as if not to do so were a possibility. He then instances the youthful player at ball who is desirous of beating all his contestants in the game, (the victory which he expects to receive will afford him the most agreeable sensation which is called happiness) but who as he warms up in the game forgets all about the real end which he has in view, viz. the pleasure to be derived from beating or from becoming the victor in the game. Mr. Salter thinks that if the end is the happiness to be received by winning the game, then he would have it always in mind. How does Mr. Salter know that he does not have this very pleasure in mind, and if so, what difference does it make, if as Mr. Salter thinks, he plays having in mind the chief or relative steps to the end in view could he get victory or the result of victory—which to him is so much pleasure—without leading his conduct on the field toward the attainment of the end which he is conceded to have in view. To change the figure, can a man who desires to be happy by using his talent rightly along the line of art, medicine, law, or mercantile business, ever expect to obtain happiness in the particular way he has chosen, by not having in mind the means to the end—whatever they may be? And is it not a play on words to say that because one does not always have in mind (how can he think two different thoughts at the same time any more than he can occupy at the same time two places) correlatively and simultaneously both the means to as well as the end for which he acts, he is not acting for happiness. The

psychological analysis of Mr. Salter seems, therefore, to me to be untenable in this instance. Then, again, he alleges that the motive of hunger, if I may be permitted to call it such, or the satisfying of appetite is not the pleasure which results from the act of eating, but it is the desire for an object such as food that prompts one to eat. This may be true as far as it goes, but this appears to me to be the fact or the real status of the case, that whereas an excessively hungry man would eat simply "to fill up," a man in a normal condition as well as a starving man would eat as much for the pleasure which would result in the general process of living from his keeping his physical organism, by eating proper food, in a sound and healthful state; or in addition to the pleasure which one is afforded by eating that which he likes, there is the ultimate pleasure which is derived from eating the proper food judiciously. This after all is the chief consideration.

Mr. Salter neglected to touch upon the pleasure which is not so much a result of choice as it is the result of action prompted by constitution and mechanism. An egotistic person acts, it is said, from the motive of self-interest while the altruistic person acts from the motive of self-love or benevolence. Egotism pleases but does not benefit a man, while altruism pleases and benefits him. Nay more than this, while egotism curses the egotist, altruism blesses not only the altruist, but humanity. In order to get the best and most permanent happiness one should seek for and use the means which will produce it. To say that one cannot seek and obtain his highest happiness rationally and resolutely is to say that we are in the world to obtain our highest good by being a blind leader of the blind.

SELFISHNESS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

BY A. H. HEINEMANN.

EUDEMONISM makes the feelings of pleasure and pain the foundation of its edifice of moral science saying, that a state of pleasure, or a diminution of pain, constitutes, in every case, the sole motive of action. An attempt to disprove this principle was made by Mr. W. M. Salter in No. 197 of *The Open Court*. Had he limited himself to a discussion of the propriety of the qualification "sole" given to "motive," he might have had a better chance of success. The pivotal point of the discussion, however, is the definition of the word "pleasure." Pleasurable feelings are so different as to render any attempt at a definition of general acceptability extremely difficult. The only definition ever offered satisfactory to my mind, is that proposed by Dr. P. Carus in his "Soul of Man," saying, that "pleasure is the feeling that naturally accompanies the gratification of wants" (p. 343).

In order to make this definition serviceable, it will be necessary to agree upon the meaning of the word "want." A want is a feeling of deficiency. Hunger, for example, is a feeling of a deficiency of nourishment, or a want of food; cold is a feeling of a deficiency of heat, or a want of warmth. Thus is love a feeling of a deficiency of society, or of the completeness of being, or a want of intercourse with another being. The sense of duty in an emergency shows a deficiency of right action, or a feeling of a want to act in obedience to conscience.

Let us see how the definition fits the cases adduced by Mr. Salter in No. 197 of *The Open Court*. He says of hunger that "it is not the pleasure of satisfying hunger the really hungry man is thinking of, but the food—it seems a direct appetite for an object." Hunger is a feeling of some shortage, or emptiness to be filled; a painful deficiency to be replenished; replenishing, or filling being the natural remedy for the want. This remedy is found in eating which, by diminishing the pain, grows pleasurable, in agreement with the eudemonistic principle.

If Mrs. Browning says: "If heads that hold a rhythmic thought must ache perforce, then I, for one, choose headaches," she clothes a eudemonistic experience in the paradoxical form of a desire for pain. She does not truly choose headaches—not fool enough for it. But not being able to secure the pleasure of rhythmic thought without the accompaniment of a painful headache, she submits to the latter rather than forego the pleasure of the former. It is a clear eudemonistic transaction.

J. St. Mill's assertion that men will "pursue sensual indulgences (i. e. pleasures) to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good," is an uncommonly strong confirmation of the eudemonistic law. The man indulging, is moved by a present pleasure so powerfully as to disregard an unmistakable warning of pain to follow in the future. Present pleasure overpowering a hope of remote pleasure, is a well known eudemonistic experience.

J. St. Mill considering the condition of a discontented Socrates preferable to that of a contented pig, pronounces every kind of philosophical thought so great a pleasure as to render the condition of a Socrates even when discontented or seemingly unhappy, more desirable than that of a hog whether such hog should walk on four legs or on two. Mill intends to gauge the pleasure of Socrates and that of the hog in order to vindicate the eudemonistic principle.

Enoch Arden desirous of possessing his wife again, feels it to be his greatest duty to provide for her happiness. He feels he would be tormented with pains were he to disturb her happy condition. But her happiness depends upon his resigning his claims on her.

His renunciation seems the only means to secure her happiness and thereby his own greatest gratification. Or, Enoch Arden's self-denial is a corroboration of eudemonism.

Every one of the examples recited in No. 197 of *The Open Court* can be treated like the above examples in order to show the application of eudemonism to every kind of human action. The above discussions, however, suffice to demonstrate that in every effective motive of action a feeling of pleasure or pain is found. Any such feeling may be called an interest, or, there is no effective motive unless the agent is interested in it. Anything indifferent can never, in a healthy being, be a want to be gratified, or an anticipation of pleasure, or an object to be desired or willed. Being interested in an object, means, being inclined to give attention to it, or to concentrate our activities upon it, or to will it. Thus, an interest, or a pleasurable emotion, says the law, is necessary to transform a conception into an effective motive of action.

The law of pleasure and pain is founded in our nature, says modern evolutionary thought, that is to say, it is a natural law acting with necessity. It says that every living creature, in a condition of health, strives to obtain pleasure and to obviate pain, or, it is these subconscious feelings of pleasure or pain, which prompt every action performed within animated nature. The muscular reactions observed in the lowest, or simplest living beings, are what is commonly called reflex motions. A reflex motion is a muscular reaction responding to a subconscious feeling. The reaction shows whether the feeling was either agreeable or disagreeable, i. e. pleasurable or painful.

Similar motions are observable in higher animals. A bull excited by pain will fly into a fury and hurry along carelessly, almost unconsciously, a proceeding hardly distinguished from reflex motion. All activity of living creatures continues of this kind until reflective thought has grown to be a power strong enough to act as a check upon reflex motions caused by feelings of pleasure or pain. Such checks may be noticed, for example, in a lion who having failed to reach his prey by making his leap too short, proceeds to undergo a special course of training in the art of jumping, by measuring the distance and practising until he has found out and learned to put forth the exact amount of exertion requisite to give to his leap the length wanted. Such rational proceedings can no longer be called reflex motions; they are distinctly conscious activity regulated by reflection and by a determination not easy to distinguish from what is called "will" in man. There is a motive in the leonine activity which can no longer be identified with a subconscious feeling of pain or pleasure, but which is the result of that mental activity called reflection. Such motives may

be called intellectual motives to distinguish them from sensitive motives as found in the subconscious feelings of pleasure or pain.

When the stage of mental reflection is reached in the animal kingdom, the immediate effect of a feeling of pleasure or pain, is checked or modified. The reflective mind begins to distinguish between its own feelings and external objects. From that stage onward the action of the natural law of pleasure and pain is complicated by the interference of intellectual motives, that is, of conceptions not immediately identifiable with feelings of pleasure or pain.

Reflex activity forms the greater amount even of the doings of the human race. Men whose senses act with sufficient energy, will perform the common acts of daily life, that is not merely those of their animal existence but also those of their business occupations according to the natural rule of pleasure and pain. They are used to attend to their daily business in a machine like manner. The various activities of business life are the effects of settled habits of thought, that is to say, the mind has formed a series of conceptions each of which corresponds to an act of business to be performed. At any given moment of the day, one of these business conceptions is uppermost in the mind, forming the centre of interest, the sensitive motive that wants to be acted out. This want has to be gratified by the performance of whatever activity the conception may suggest. Little reflection is needed. Attention to what is going on is all that is required. The performance is pleasurable because it is in conformity with habit, or agreeable to the nature of the individual. An infraction of daily habits is liable to cause pain. Or, in other words, the habitual activity of the daily life of men, like that of animals, is regulated by the natural law of pleasure and pain.

So far the eudemonistic principle reigns supreme in man as in animals. There is no conflict until intellectual motives begin to interfere with sensitive motives. Such an interference occurs in those exceptional cases which require the activity of critical reflection. But even then the conflict is apparent only, that is it ends in harmonious interaction between the natural and the moral law.

The psychic processes called reflection are subject to natural law as are the workings of the principle of pleasure and pain. It is according to natural law that we reflect and reach decisions as to which conceptions of our minds must be selected to be the strongest motives. That decision or selection determines what we ought to do. But between the "ought" and the real deed there is still a gap to be filled.

The filling out of this gap is the business of volition, and it is to this act only that the moral law applies.

The ought is determined by reflection pointing out the conception which is worthy to move the will. But the will may, or may not, make it a motive of action, or a guide in voluntary activity. By coming to a decision and assigning to an idea the position of a ruler of action, the agent makes it the centre of his interests, that is, the object of his supreme desire. He thus transforms it into an incitement of pleasurable feelings and thereby enlists the natural power of pleasurable sentiment in the carrying out of his design. In this way the harmony between the natural and the moral laws is established.

Pleasure and pain being subjective feelings, fail to determine anything concerning the nature of the motives of action. It is the particular province of the moral law of free will, by deciding which idea is to be the motive of action, to determine the nature of the objects to be pursued by moral activity.

In every voluntary action, therefore, there are these two laws found co operating: the moral law determining the subject-matter, and the law of pleasure and pain ruling the natural working, that is, the steady supply of force in the pursuit of moral action.

Summing up; the eudemonistic law of pleasure and pain finds universal application in the natural activities of life; but it has only a secondary bearing upon voluntary action. The moral law, which is the law of liberty or of free will, applies to voluntary action only, that is, to those exceptional cases of human action in which the compulsory rules of natural law acting with necessity, are of secondary account.

The principles of necessity and of morality are contradictory. Eudemonism, which is a law of necessity, may offer a good basis for a science of the natural evolution of morals. But when the stage of morality is reached in the ascending course, eudemonism must no longer be continued in the part of guide but must be assigned the subordinate part of handmaid supplying material force to the rule of liberty which constitutes the basis of the science of pure ethics.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELFISHNESS AND METAPHYSICAL ETHICS.

BY VOLTAIRINE DE CLEYRE.

IN No. 197 of *The Open Court* appeared a criticism of the egoistic conception of life from the pen of Mr. Salter in which I was deeply interested. Interested because I believe that as one of the leaders of the ethical movement Mr. Salter is aware that there is no more frequent or more fatal error to overcome, in his work, than this very philosophy of selfishness, and therefore should be one of those best conversant with the proofs of its shallowness and falsity.

It is plain that the increasing interest in the ethical problem is evidence of the unrest which sits upon

Humanity in the presence of the destruction of its temple. Science has torn the veil from the tabernacle of Fear; Man has looked within, and the space he imagined filled with terrible ghosts is seen to be empty. Only the darkness kept him from knowing it: now there is light—light everywhere, and he no longer accepts the moral code "obey." Yet knowing this, in the face of the death of God, he finds himself only at the statement of the problem. The symbols and the forms of religion, the vestments of priests, have become only mockeries, signs of the crude worship of a half savage imagination. And still, bound up in them, was a something that was true; something of which he dares not let go, something that had served to guide his actions, and give meaning to life. This was the ethical problem; to undress the truth and leave it nude, white, shining, a luminous point moving before Man into the infinite—the future: to explain what good it was, that, wrapped in the dogmas of the Church, nevertheless bound men together and served to lift the race slowly upward.

It is at this questioning point that radical freethought has too often made its mistake. It falls into one of two errors; and the most grievous, I believe, is this of making self the centre and circumference of all consideration. The most brilliant of American orators, the idol of freethought, has been so mistaken, and all his writings are permeated with the "happiness philosophy." Grieved and disgusted with a world which "for love of Love has slain love" he has conceived that the way to improve matters is to cease urging the necessity of goodness, and insist that people shall be happy (his conclusion being that a happy man *is* a good man). The same teaching, variously expressed by the most trenchant pens, is to be found throughout the radical press. It says, practically: "the universe is purposeless; man's actions are accountable to no one. Therefore let him be happy. Let him study to discover what line of conduct will increase the sum of his agreeable sensations, and follow it. The desire for such increase is the motive to all action, whether of the barbarian or the civilised man; the only difference being that the civilised man has wider knowledge and a greater number of emotions."

It was the fundamental error of this reasoning which I had hoped Mr. Salter would have pointed out. Unfortunately he falls into the other mistake, the substance of his article being comprised in the old, metaphysical formula: "Do right because it is right." People "desire certain things or objects, and while the getting of them gives us pleasure, it is not so much the pleasure, as the things we want." This is an explanation which does not explain. He is right in saying that "the getting of them gives us pleasure";

pleasure is the result of action not its cause. But to substitute for the assertion "I save a man's life because it gives me pleasure," "I save his life because I want him to have his life" is to get no farther on. It does not explain why I want a thing which is of no particular benefit to myself. And it is the why of the want that prompted the action. It serves no purpose to tell people to do right because it is right, unless they have a means of ascertaining what is right, and why it is right. Unless the ethical movement can answer this question, it has furnished no enduring structure to replace the old, it has not revealed the truth of the old. Science, which has shattered idols, must explain religion. Nor is this so difficult when once we have understood ourselves. Realising that we are parts of the universe subject to the same processes manifest in all other forms of life, realising that our egos are but social growths that develop according to inheritance and environment, as do all other growths, we are prepared to realise that our actions are prompted by the unconscious *Me*, the Man which has been accumulating, so to speak, for ages, the social Soul which is the common inheritance of all. This large *Me* which lies below our conscious selves, is the result of all the untold struggles of Man to come in harmony with his environment; and the same struggle goes on in us, will go on in the future. Our pleasure is an insignificant quantity having nothing whatever to do with the question. Indeed it is pain, not pleasure, which unbars the gate of Progress, since all progress comes through a quickened consciousness that we are no longer in harmony with our environment, an awakening to the fact that the social ideal has moved forward and we must follow it. To illustrate: chattel slavery was right so long as the ideals of men had not advanced beyond it; the yoke rested easily upon the body of the slave and the soul of the master. Both were happy. Why not have remained so? "Servants obey your masters" was to do right because it was right. Why not have continued? Because with the development of the vast economies of modern production, the chattel slave system no longer held its old relations in society: the unconscious *Me* clamored for adjustment. The social ideal of larger liberty had extended to the black men. In the end armies killed each other. For pleasure? Hardly. For duty? Yes. To accomplish their ideal of right. It is very shallow to retort, "that is the result of the duty superstition; people kill each other." As well blame those who first conceived the possibility of communication between two villages for building turn-pikes instead of at once jumping to steel rails and locomotives.

The rightness of an action is measured by its harmony with the ideal which Science points out as the

path of the social march. Upon this foundation the ethical movement may rest, knowing the truth of the old creeds, that they bound men together and developed the social character, repressing the instincts of selfishness, instead of scattering, disintegrating and belittling men, which is the inevitable result of the Egoistic philosophy—the gospel of Caprice.

CURRENT TOPICS.

IN former days, whenever the Queen of England gave a fancy dress ball at Buckingham Palace, the Lord High Chamberlain would proclaim the royal will and pleasure in these terms, "Her majesty has given orders that no foreign goods be worn on this occasion, and that the guests appear in costumes of British manufacture." The guests paid no attention to it, because they knew that it was only a political appeal to the insular prejudices of the English workmen, and an ostentatious attempt to feed seven million toilers with five loaves and two small fishes, without the spiritual grace to work the miracle. The old formula, useless now in England, has been imported into this country, for I see a proclamation just issued by the "Lord High Chamberlain" of the White House, to the effect that, "Mrs. Harrison has given orders that no foreign goods shall be used in refurnishing and decorating the rooms of the White House *except* where it is impossible to procure the *necessary* material in America." The exception is delightful for its womanly candor. A masculine politician would have left it out; but Mrs. Harrison frankly and sensibly says that she will patronise American industry if it can supply her with the exact article she wants; otherwise she will buy it in England or India, in Africa or France. The exception though honest was imprudent, for the very people flattered by the command will veto the exception. They will issue a counter-proclamation and say there is no necessary material impossible to procure in America, to furnish the Executive Mansion. And these are the people who pay for the furniture. The embargo reminds me of those ardent patrons of American industry, who when starting on their European tour implore their neighbors to buy only American goods while they themselves are going to lay in their own supplies in England, France, and Germany.

I take some pleasure in watching the expansion and development of the "Law of Limit and Overflow," on which I claim a copyright, and which I claim to be that law not written in books, which limits the rich man's power to consume, and which causes a portion of his wealth by his own voluntary action to overflow upon the poor. A very interesting illustration of this law I find in a German Jew, Baron Hirsch by name, a man with millions of dollars who lives in a fairy castle across the sea. I confess that he seems to me like a fabulous person, one of these mythical barons who lived a thousand years ago, and who have come down to us embalmed in the legends of the Rhine. So far as I can find out, he owns the mountains of Lebanon, and the mines of Ophir; also the valley of diamonds discovered by Sinbad the sailor. In spite of my doubts I am assured that he is real, and not a baron of romance, as many popular barons are. Dazzled by the splendor of the baron's wealth, an American editor wrote him a letter and asked him what he was going to do with his money. Instead of taking offense at this impertinence, and ordering the editor to be flung from the battlements of the castle, the baron politely answered the letter and his answer is printed in the *North American Review*. In that letter I behold the statesmanship of charity, that productive plan of benevolence which helps the poor to help themselves, the comprehensive almsgiving of ploughs, and hammers,

and spades, with a bit of land whereon to work and live. The baron's words are better than mine; he says:

"What I desire to accomplish, what, after many failures, has come to be the object of my life, and that for which I am ready to stake my wealth and my intellectual powers, is to give to a portion of my companions in faith the possibility of finding a new existence, primarily as farmers, and also as handicraftsmen, where the laws and religious tolerance permit them to carry on the struggle for existence."

* * *

There is beautiful pathos in this heroic ambition of Baron Hirsch to lead his afflicted "companions in faith" out of the Land of Egypt, and out of the House of bondage. He desires to transplant the Jewish victims of religious persecution from Russia and other benighted nations to some free and hospitable country where they may live in honorable industry as tillers of the soil. He proposes to establish them not in cities but on farms. I feel a twinge of conscience when he says that there is no room for them in the United States, because I think he means to say there is not any welcome for them here. This was the new Canaan of his hope; for he says, "In considering the plan I naturally thought of the United States, where the liberal constitution is a guarantee of happy development for the followers of all religious faiths." Yet he passed us by, and will carry out his plans in the Argentine republic, in Canada, and Australia. I fear it was only genteel courtesy that made him give as a reason for his action, "the enormous number of Jews already in the United States;" and that adding to the number, "would be of advantage neither to the country itself nor to the exiled Jews." It is more likely that he has heard the mutterings of that inferior public opinion which threatens to send them back under the operation of those "pauper" laws, "contract labor" laws, and other narrow-minded statutes which promise after a time to strike both hospitality and magnanimity from our national character. While we are striving to make this country wise and great, we should endeavor to make it correspondingly generous and humane; lest there be fixed upon us the character given to Lord Bacon, and the American republic become celebrated as the "greatest, wisest, and meanest" of all nations.

* * *

A new industry is coming into existence, the importation of water from the river Jordan, warranted to give a superior quality of baptismal regeneration to the children of the rich. Soon we shall see this advertisement in the drug stores, "Water from Carlsbad, best for rheumatism; also some from Jordan, best for baptism." As there is no competing river Jordan in the United States, there will not be any protective tariff on the water from the ancient stream. A sudden impulse has been given to the new business by the recent christening of a royal baby, the grandchild of the Prince of Wales. In describing this important event the court circular is careful to inform an anxious world that, "The christening water was brought from the river Jordan by Lord Rowton who recently returned from the Holy Land." This ought to confer special grace upon the royal infant, but the charm is weakened a little by the astonishing fact that the Prince of Wales himself was baptised in water from the Jordan, but in his case it didn't take. There was a hope lingering in this democratic world that the sacraments at least would remain of equal quality, and that fashion would not stimulate pride instead of humility, by providing a superior sacramental article exclusively for the rich; but our trust was vain. The church must make its ordinances luxurious and exclusive, therefore booths for the sale of water from the Jordan must be built in Vanity Fair. The Eucharist will become aristocratic also; and the royal and the rich will not partake of Holy Communion until they know that the bread is made from wheat gleaned in the fields of Boaz, and that the wine is pressed from the grapes of Naboth's vineyard.

It is told, no doubt falsely, of a famous American orator, who was a colonel in the army, that on coming into the presence of the enemy he promptly surrendered his command, shouting, "Hold on there! Don't fire! I'm willing to recognise your condemned confederacy! Let's compromise!" I see in this fable the contending sects shaken by the vibrations of the printing press, surrendering to each other's doctrines, and shouting "Let us compromise." The theological colonels, however, who so amiably surrender are very likely to be tried for heresy, the ecclesiastical name for desertion. At the present moment an eminent Christian minister and a popular Jewish Rabbi are under charges, the one for surrendering the Trinity, and the other for surrendering the Unity of God. Even the Jews as a church are dividing like the rest of us, although they may remain united as a race. It appears that the Rabbi, Dr. Aaron Wise, published in the *American Hebrew* a discourse on "Prophetism and Prophets," in which he said that the doctrine of the trinity was a Jewish dogma older than the patriarchs, and that Jesus merely revived it. This concession was immediately condemned by the Board of Orthodox Ministers, who passed a resolution that Dr. Wise be tried for heresy. This decree was for the time suspended in order that Dr. Wise might make an explanation, which he did, saying that his language had been misconstrued owing to a mistranslation from the original German, and that nothing could be farther from his mind than to question that fundamental principle of Judaism "the belief in the absolute unity of God." This ought to save him, and it probably will; but it was a close call.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

DR. E. G. HIRSCH ON THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

The Reform Advocate has published Dr. Emil G. Hirsch's address to the graduates of the Cook County Normal School, delivered at the commencement exercises. Dr. Hirsch lays his finger on the sore spot of our educational system and advocates reform. He does not want to abolish the public school system because it is faulty. On the contrary, he wants to preserve it; for it is "great" and "founded on granite," but he desires us to recognise its faults and to improve the system. Though public prints and papers are filled with the praises of our educational system, he declares, few there are that really, not merely professedly, understand what the teacher should be to the community. Teaching must be a life-work and therefore the teacher should hold a life-position, that leads up to an honorable old age devoid of the annoying sense of insecurity. At present, the teacher's position is in this country as yet too insecure, because it is too often affected by politics. The teacher must first and above all be a psychologist. Latin and Greek alone do not fit us to be teachers. The insufficiency of cramming and memorising has been acknowledged and manual training has been introduced to complement the old one-sidedness. But manual training must be more than showing some tricks at the bench or the anvil. We must not pour into the head from without, but develop from within whatever is in the child. The pupil must be left to act and to react upon the impulses given him. A Thousand failures self wrought by the pupil are educationally considered of greater and more promising worth than is one lesson perfectly recited after drill and mechanical repetition. With these aims the young teachers should go out, as it were, as "missionaries into darkest Africa." Dr. Hirsch closed with the following words: "Of Moses in the old legends it is said that from his light the others lit their tapers; his own did not diminish in brightness or brilliancy for communicating of its flame. So will your own lamp shine on all the more brilliantly for imparting to the young the spark of knowledge and the ambition to learn. This is your reward, a recompense which your profession has above all other. May then come to you that satisfaction in your work which the world cannot give but also cannot take away!"

BOOK REVIEWS.

INTIMATIONS OF ETERNAL LIFE. By Caroline C. Leighton. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

The author of this little book after twenty years separation from schools, churches and libraries was much impressed with the spirit of doubt that had crept in among sacred things. Hoping that she might be able to point out a beacon light, she attempted to let the religious feelings draw new strength from the revelations of science. The booklet is mainly engaged with the question: "What is the bearing of the discoveries of the last half century on the probabilities of our future?" The answer is very cheerful. There is no scientific proof, yet there are sufficient hints in nature, which promise a universal immortality. The book is one of the very best of its kind. It is written in a similar spirit to Drummond's works. Yet we must confess that we look upon this method of applying science to buttress the crumbling religious faith as fantastical and—futile. It will dazzle for a while some people who either believe or wish to believe. But it will soon be found out that the immortality taught by science is not that of the individual ego soul. The most characteristic chapter of the theoretical basis of the author's faith is that on the psychic body, which is found to consist of the luminiferous ether.

NOTES.

The charge of heretical teaching brought against Prof. Max Müller's Gifford Lectures as was reported in a previous number, has been thrown out of the Glasgow Presbytery by 17 to 5 votes. It was then carried before the General Assembly and dismissed. Prof. Max Müller will therefore continue his lectures at Glasgow. Two volumes of these lectures have appeared.

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EDUCATIONAL REFORM.

BY FELIX L. OSWALD.

PHILOSOPHERS have often demonstrated the fact that the products of the soil would abundantly suffice for the needs of the human race, if the labors of husbandry were confined to the cultivation of useful, or even harmless, crops, and a similar rule might be applied to the harvests of the mind. Nearly all the chief reform-problems of our age might be solved by educational reforms.

The ignorance of absolute barbarism is, indeed, hardly worse than the waste of educational efforts, for, since the dawn of civilisation, the social, moral and intellectual aberrations of every century have proved to be proportioned to the degree of that waste. The progressive culture of Greece and Rome was largely due to the principles of common sense applied to the problems of education, at a time when the welfare of the commonwealth and the hope of victory in the struggle with the powers of darkness and savagedom were known to depend on the judicious training of the young, and when the interests of the living present were never sacrificed to the traditions of the dead past.

The antithesis of that theory of life was the anti-naturalism of the monastic Middle Ages, when the claims of temporal needs and the welfare of the body—nay, of earth itself, were persistently disregarded in the pursuit of ghostland phantoms. The leaders of that pursuit, indeed, then reached the zenith of their power, but for nearly seven hundred years the noblest nations of the Caucasian Race remained in a state of abject ignorance; commerce and industry declined, monstrous superstitions raged with the destructiveness of epidemic plagues, science became a tradition of the past, common sense a stigma and free inquiry a capital offence.

The worst spectres of that dismal night have vanished at the dawn of reviving science, but its mists will not disappear till our system of education has been thoroughly emancipated from the traditions of the unprogressive ages. Our schools train the memory, rather than the judgment of their pupils, and to a degree which future ages will hesitate to credit, the work of instruction is still devoted to retrospective studies. We still sacrifice the present to the past. Not in

Spain and Portugal only, but in England, in Prussia and in the United States of America, colleges and academies still abound with students whose protracted, and yet often ineffectual, struggles with the grammatical intricacies of two or three different dead languages have left them no time to acquire a fair degree of proficiency in the use of any modern tongue, whose lore of mystic traditions obscures their perception of living facts, and who are much more at home in the legends of Egypt, Babylonia and Palestine than in the current history of their native lands.

In the acquisition of knowledge the standards of utility must, of course, vary with the choice of vocation, but the merit of completeness, or even of moderate adequacy to the requirements of the times cannot be claimed by any system of education that ignores the importance of health and the progress of secular science. But before enumerating the advantages of remedying that mistake, we should remember Thomas Carlyle's axiom that "no error is fully confuted till we have seen, not only that it is an error, but how it became one; till, finding that it clashes with the principles of truth, established in our own mind, we also find in what way it had seemed to harmonise with the principles of truth, established in other minds." In other words, the most effectual manner of exploding an inveterate fallacy is to explain it.

How then shall we account for the far-spread delusion which still persists in sacrificing the study of the contemporary world to the rehearsal of antiquated legends? How did rational beings of our species ever come to prefer the pursuit of graveyard meditations to the naturally far more inviting task of investigating the phenomena of the living world? The solution of the enigma can be best understood by an analogon familiar to the students of human pathology, viz. the circumstance that the use of certain remedial drugs is apt to become a confirmed habit, which often continues to afflict its victims for years after their apparent recovery from the evils of the original disease. During the "Millennium of Madness," the intellectual reign of terror, enforced upon forty successive generations by the ascendancy of ghastly superstitions, the study of classic literature became for thousands a refuge from the peril of insanity. Science, reason and earthly happiness seemed to have been buried under the ruins

of the Roman Empire, the sun of learning cast only feeble rays through the clouds of supernaturalism—

"Dark was that light, but bright the gloom
Around the funeral pile,"

—and from the tyranny of monkish Inquisitors hundreds of persecuted thinkers could still escape to the haunts of Homer and Virgil, as, in spite of chains and guards, a Siberian exile may in dreams return to the lost paradise of freedom. Knowledge, too, could still be delved from the treasure-mines of pagan erudition; from the heights of a classical education philosophers could still investigate the problems of life as revealed in the thoughts and actions of normal human beings, and the study of the past became thus identified with the chance of intellectual salvation.

The remedial tendencies of Nature have prevailed against the fever-dream of monachism, but the convalescents still cling to the anodyne of their ancestors, though in many respects the scientific basis of their predilection is becoming more and more untenable. The republican institutions of Greek and Rome have ceased to be supreme models of political wisdom, but even in their ideal features their value, as standards of reform, depends in a large measure upon the simultaneous study of contemporary problems of national development. We can no longer steer our way by the loadstars of pagan antiquity. Many of its, once attainable, elysiums have vanished like the lost Atlantis; we have to encounter the perils of oceans unknown to the charts of ancient navigators, and can depend upon no oracles but the revelations of each day and hour. The early study of those revelations would help to acquaint our young men with that "current of tendencies," which philanthropists and patriots cannot afford to ignore, and which has only too often thwarted the most heroic endeavors of reformers who ventured to defy the power of its stream.

And equally often the attempt to avoid the "dis-harmonising influence" of an early acquaintance with the discord of opposing factions and the contradictions and vindictive recriminations of the partisan press, is apt to defeat its own object. The peace of ignorance is sooner or later doomed to a rude disturbance of its dreams, and it would nearly always be the wiser plan to let timely experience fortify the principles of truth by the evidence of practical tests. Let me illustrate that fact by an extreme case—the virulence of the Temperance controversy. Can it benefit a young disciple of Total Abstinence to remain unacquainted with the arguments of its opponents? Have those arguments not aided the ablest champions of reform in avoiding the mistakes of their predecessors, and is there a doubt that a freer scope of investigation would frequently obviate the reproach of inconsistency? The defenders, even of a noble cause, cannot afford to shut

their eyes to the exposure of its weak points or the illusion of its devotees, for their adversaries would not fail to avail themselves of every opportunity to profit by the consequences of that blindness.

An apostle of social reform describes a school master of the future inviting the opinion of his pupils on the last debate of the legislative assembly and reading to his class a synopsis of transatlantic cable-dispatches. There is nothing improbable in that prediction. From an utilitarian point of view the cognisance of current events would, indeed, supply a serious defect in the conventional method of historical studies, and the solidarity of mankind will soon be sufficiently recognised to enhance the interest of every topic of international importance.

It would be equally safe to predict the advent of a time when the discussion of sociological problems will no longer be considered below the dignity of a public educator. The study of those problems would facilitate the rare, yet often extremely important, art of reading the signs of the times. It might have enabled the statesmen of the eighteenth century to interpret the significance of the portents preceding the cataclysm of the French Revolution, and might yet save contemporary politicians from the mistake of Scandinavian Thor, who wished to test his dead-lift abilities on a big household cat and found that he had got hold of the world-encircling Midgard Serpent.

Nor will the public discussion of religious controversies be much longer considered an offence against the canons of good taste. The right of free inquiry is the first condition of progress, and dogmatists who dispute that right, virtually impeach the evidence or the morality of their own dogmas. The genuine principles of ethics can only gain by free discussion, and, in the words of a social reformer, "it will not be really well with society until men generally are brought to recognise that there is such a thing as truth, and that its claims upon them are paramount . . . and that a child, in the course of education, should be early familiarised with the method of investigation and in every possible way encouraged to ask for proofs."

And with few exceptions our methods of scientific instruction could be greatly improved by the assiduous study of modern discoveries. Our whole system of intellectual and physical training should, from time to time, be harmonised with the advancing standards of knowledge. The triumphs of science have been achieved only by progressive revelations, and no axiom should be accepted as too conclusive to admit the recognition of modifying evidence.

Practical educators are not agreed that it would do more good than harm to obtrude that *provisional* character of human knowledge upon the cognisance of young children, but misconceptions, in that respect,

should not be permitted to bias the judgment of after years, and the frequent discussion of scientific questions of the day would be the most suitable manner of acquainting the students of our colleges and academies with the fact that the discovery of new phenomena incessantly demands the revision of established theories, and that in the realms of Science constant vigilance is the price of freedom—from error.

THE POPE'S ENCYCLICAL.

It is a most remarkable sign of the times that the very foremost representatives of the conservative powers in the world recognise the paramount importance of the labor question. The young Emperor of Germany considers it as one of the noblest duties of the throne to regulate, according to the best of his abilities and insight, the relation between employer and employee, on the ground of justice and with due consideration of the rights of the oppressed, and Pope Leo XIII. devotes a long encyclical to "The Condition of Labor," giving his well weighed and carefully considered advice to the Roman Catholic world as well as to humanity at large, as to what way in his opinion a solution of the social problem should be attempted.

This land of ours is pre-eminently a protestant country, and the constitution of the United States is founded upon Protestantism. Nevertheless we have large numbers of Roman Catholics among us and the opinion of the recognised leader and sovereign pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church will naturally not only be of interest to all of us, but we shall also respect it as coming from a man whose high position and great range of experience will make it worth listening to—although we may disagree with the views he proposes.

In our mind the main difference between the Catholic and the Protestant is this, that the Protestant, in opposition to the Catholic, considers his conscience and his judgment as free and not bound by the dictates of any other man, be his position ever so high, be he revered as the Vicar of God and be he clothed in the robes of holiness and sanctity as is, indeed, in the belief of the Roman Catholics, the holy father of the Church, the Bishop of Rome.

Protestantism has rejected, it has protested against the idea of a Vicar of God on earth; it recognises no mediator between God and man, no intercessor between the moral authority and the conscience which aspires to conform to this moral authority. Protestantism is a religious republicanism; and our political republicanism is based upon this religious idea. If the citizens of a republic are not men with free consciences who dare to judge for themselves, the republic will be a failure. Wherever the consciences can be bound by human authority, even though this authority may be exercised bona fide as repre-

senting God's will, a real republic will become an impossibility or be degraded to a mere sham. Roman Catholicism, therefore, will either come into conflict with the spirit of American institutions, and that opinion is not unfrequently pronounced, or it will have to conform to republicanism, it will have to accommodate itself to the protestant idea of the liberty of conscience, so as to let the Pope be the spiritual adviser only and not the infallible Vicar of God. In a republic the law is sovereign and not the ruler of the administration, not the president or governor. So in the spiritual realm of religion and science Truth is supreme. No priest, no pope, no infallible human authority can be recognised as the sole and supreme mouthpiece of Truth. The humblest mind has the same right to search for and investigate the truth as the highest, and the utterances of the highest, the wisest, and the greatest are not so absolute and without appeal as to be above criticism.

Judging the Pope's encyclical from this our protestant standpoint we have to acknowledge that it is a document of remarkable wisdom, and it is apparently dictated by paternal solicitude as well as by a sincere love of truth and justice. The sentiment with which it is inspired is humane. We cannot, however, agree with the Pope concerning his views of Christian charity, and we must declare that the encyclical lacks any positive encouragement of progressive ideas.

* * *

The main subject of the encyclical is a criticism of socialism and socialistic principles, and the Pope undertakes to prove that "private ownership is according to nature's law." "Every man," he says, "has by nature the right to possess property as his own; this is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self-direction." In private property is included also the private property of land, for "men always work harder and more readily when they work on that which is their own." *

While upholding the principle of the inviolability of private property, the Pope demands that the laws should first of all protect the right of the poor man, because, as he expresses it beautifully, "his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their scantiness."

The suppression of the rights of the poor is emphatically denounced in the encyclical. The employer is expressly warned "never to tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited

* This view of the matter would not condemn the single-tax idea. The single-tax idea, i. e. the proposition of taxing real estate only, is quite distinct from the abolition of private property in land. While the latter appears to be a retrogression to the old tribal socialism of semicivilised peoples, the former is a practical plan well worth the consideration. A land tax need not be so high as to make the land worthless, so that its introduction would amount to actual confiscation, but only sufficient to cover the expenses of the commonwealth.

to their sex or age. . . . To make one's profit out of the need of another is condemned by all laws human and divine." The Pope says :

"Let it be granted then, that as a rule workman and employer should make free agreements, and in particular should freely agree as to wages. Nevertheless there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or a contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice."

On the other hand the workingman is earnestly advised to be economical. "He will not fail by cutting down expenses to put by a little property. Nature and reason would urge him to do this. . . . The law should favor ownership and its policy should be to induce as many of the people as possible to become owners. . . . If working people can be encouraged to look forward to obtaining a share in the land, the result will be that the gulf between vast wealth and deep poverty will be bridged over and the two orders will be brought nearer together."

The basis of civilisation is family life and the socialistic plan to let the state supersede the family is rightly not regarded with favor by the Pope. He sums up his view in the following sentence :

"A state chiefly prospers and flourishes by morality, by well regulated family life, by respect for religion and justice, by the moderation and equal distribution of public burdens, by the progress of the arts and of trade, by the abundant yield of the land—by everything which makes the citizens better and happier."

Any measures which tend to threaten or to interfere with the existence of family life are not only unjust but also in the highest degree injurious. "The sources of wealth would themselves run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry."

Considering the right of property and family life as being in accord with the laws of nature, the pope insists also on the right of heredity. He says :

"It is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessities for those whom he has begotten ; and similarly nature dictates that a man's children who carry on as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now in no other way can a father effect this except by ownership of profitable property which he can transmit to his children by inheritance."

The idea of the continuity of life from one generation to the next following is strongly emphasised in the encyclical. "The child belongs to the father" (it is maintained in quotation of the old Roman tradition) "and is, as it were, *the continuation of the father's personality*." (Italics are ours.) The idea of futurity is indispensable in ethics. Says the Pope :

"Exclude the idea of futurity and the very notion of what is good and right would perish."

The idea of futurity is here employed in another sense than we would use the phrase. This world is considered by the Pope "as a place of exile, and not as our true country." Nevertheless we can see a truth in the Pope's saying even though we conceive of the idea of futurity as an immanent immortality and a continuation of life in this present world of ours.

The right of property is sternly insisted upon. But how should possession be used? The encyclical answers in the words of Thomas Aquinas :

"Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own but as common to all so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need."

This is after all socialism, although it is different from the socialism of the socialist agitator. That much is true that all the property a man owns, he holds and should hold for the benefit of humanity. And a rich man using his means wisely will under all circumstances promote the interests of mankind.

* * *

We cannot agree with the Pope's view of the duties of the rich. He insists on charity and he expressly states that "Christian" charity is needed. "Charity as a virtue," he says, "belongs to the church." Now we all are fully agreed that charity should be practiced ; man should help man wherever he can. But "Christian charity" as it is actually practiced in Roman Catholic countries is a grave mistake, for it is not charity that the poor want, but justice. Man should help his unfortunate fellowman, but his help should not consist in feeding the poor gratuitously and in the distribution of alms. Alms are a curse to the giver and the receiver. They make of the giver a pharisee and of the receiver a pauper. Help in need should consist only in affording the means or offering the occasion to those in need so that they can help themselves. That alone is charity in the good sense of the word. It cannot be practiced without bringing sacrifices, yet it stands in a strong contrast to the pious but mistaken theory of an almsgiving charity.

The Pope acknowledges the right of the working man to organise societies for the promotion of their interests ; he says :

"Speaking summarily, we may lay it down as a general and perpetual law that workmen's associations should be so organised and governed as to furnish the best and most suitable means for attaining what is aimed at, that is to say, for helping each individual member to better his condition to the utmost in body, mind and property."

This is a good principle as it recognises the rights of laborers to help themselves with all the legal and righteous means at their disposal. The Pope complains of the destruction of the ancient guilds and says that "no other organisations took their place." Yet

this is an error, for our labor unions are in many respects and very strangely even in several details exact copies of the old guilds. Are they perhaps not recognised as guilds in the encyclical, because they do *not* "pay special and principal attention to piety and morality" in the way the Catholic church demands it, and which the encyclical also considers as indispensable? There have been indeed conflicts between certain labor organisations and the church, because the church would not recognise them and forbade Catholics to join them. It seems as if they are to be recognised by the church only on condition that they submit to the spiritual guidance of priests. And that it appears is also the meaning of the Pope when he says:

"What advantage can it be to a workman to obtain by means of a society all that he requires and to endanger his soul for want of spiritual food."

This idea of the pope certainly is right, if it be rightly understood. The worth of a soul is more than all worldly advantages. Life is more than meat and the body than raiment. But in what consists the worth of a soul?

The worth of a soul, we deem it, is the truth it contains in its ideas as applied for doing and achieving; and the truth in a soul applied to practical life makes man virtuous and moral. Worldly advantages are nothing when compared to morality and virtue, but worldly advantages will be added unto him who aspires for virtue. The idea of the Pope concerning the endangering of the soul however is wrong if it is interpreted by another passage of the encyclical that "he who turns his back on the church (i. e., the Roman Catholic Church) cannot be near to Christ." The Roman Catholic Church, it appears to us, would be greater, if it could give up the narrow-minded claim of being an institution which alone is in possession of the truth and which alone can show us the way of salvation. "There is no virtue," says the Pope, "unless it is drawn from the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ." In our opinion, virtue remains virtue, as truth remains truth, whether we draw it from Confucius, or Buddha, or Christ, whether it comes out of the mouths of prophets, the sages of antiquity or modern scientists, be they members of the Catholic Church like Pater Secchi, or heretics like Kant and Darwin.

* * *

We take a broader view of the subject than the pope. Therefore, although we can fully appreciate the wisdom of his views, we see at the same time that he unnecessarily troubles himself about the rapid changes which take place in our time. He says:

"It is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change which has so long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy."

The spirit of this "revolutionary change" is in the light in which we view the subject the spirit of progress, it is a sign of a higher evolution of mankind. The social question and the urgency of the social question, we believe, are not a lamentable affair, they are not a misfortune which must "fill every mind with painful apprehension." On the contrary it is the indication of a further and higher growth of mankind. We have to look forward to changes, yet these changes, we confidently hope, will in the end prove to be for the better.

Says the pope in a mood of ultra-conservatism:

"Humanity must remain as it is."

This is true in a limited sense only. The natural laws of human development must and indeed will remain as they are. Yet on the other hand, humanity must *not* remain as it is. Humanity will certainly not be leveled down to a socialistic homogeneity, but if the natural laws of human development remain in full play, if they are not interfered with by the reactionary spirit of those who are afraid of progress, humanity will most assuredly *not* remain as it is; and we welcome the change as the natural result of evolution.

* * *

The papal encyclical attempts to solve the social problem through the application of right and justice. But when we ask where these principles of right and justice are comparatively most lived up to, we seek in vain among the properly Roman Catholic countries. In the protestant countries the laborer stands higher, the poor are less in need of charity, and justice is better administered. The social question is more agitated in liberal countries, not because there is more of that "general moral deterioration" of which the Pope speaks as an evil sign of the times, but because there is more progress. And progress is after all the test by which we shall recognise the worth of moral principles.

We believe in conservatism, because we believe that the future must develop out of the past. We find no fault with the pope's conservatism. There is, however, an ultra-conservative sentiment underlying the Pope's encyclical which we cannot consider as promoting progress.

In speaking of poverty, which "in God's sight is no disgrace," he advises "the rich to incline to generosity and the poor to tranquil resignation." "Generosity" together with "charity" would make a poor substitute only for justice, and "tranquil resignation" can never beget the spirit of reform. Progress is the hope and desire of those who toil and our deepest instincts move us to obey its laws. It is the motive principle of human action in its highest form. To be better and to be better off, is a virtuous aspiration, and "tranquil resignation" with our own misery

should be termed "indolence." Bad institutions that oppose our elevation ought to be improved, but they cannot be improved by tranquil resignation. We must labor to improve them, we must aspire and struggle for progress. We must study the truth freely and fearlessly, and the truth is found with the help of "right reason" and by a cognition of "the laws of nature."

It is noteworthy how much the Pope endeavors to base his arguments upon natural laws and reason. In one passage he goes even so far as to propose "right reason" as a test for what is the eternal law of God. He says: "Laws bind only when they are in accordance with right reason, and therefore, with the eternal laws of God." (*Italics are ours.*) We agree with the Pope, but we fear that many dogmas and church institutions do not agree with this saying of the Pope's, if his words mean what they purport.

Those who live up to the truth may have to pass through hard struggles and will find little leisure for tranquil resignation, but their ideals will survive, and their souls will march onward in the grand procession of mankind as the torch-bearers of progress.

"All roads lead to Rome" is an old proverb which originated in the times of the Roman Catholic supremacy in former centuries. We should say, "All roads lead to truth." Yet there are many round about roads. The shortest road and the straightest is that of "right reason," which leads to truth by a study of nature and the laws of nature. For what is truth but a correct and orderly arranged representation of nature, i. e. all the facts of reality, in the brains of feeling and thinking beings?

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

In a New York newspaper of some importance I notice the following commendation, "America for the Americans in the broadest and most liberal sense has been the rule of the administration." A curious misprint has made a discord of the whole sentence, and the sleepy proof reader did not see that the words "broadest" and "liberal," had been substituted for "narrowest" and "illiberal." Of course it may be advisable and sometimes necessary to refuse help and hospitality to a stranger, but we never boast that we shut the door against him in "the broadest and most liberal" way. We rather apologise for shutting it, on the ground that we were out of provisions, that we had no room, that the baby was cutting teeth, that the hired girl had gone for a holiday, or something of that sort by way of explanation and excuse. The very motto "America for the Americans" expresses an illiberal sentiment, in selfish contrast with the generous old 4th of July welcome, "America for all," which in former days was hope and inspiration to the weary and heavy laden of every nation under the sun.

The reason why I suppose the words "broadest" and "liberal" in the foregoing paragraph to be a misprint is that in the same paper from which they are quoted appears the triumphant solution of a portentous international problem which for several days had perplexed the "Administration." A citizen of Chicago, fond of children, had imported into this country a riksha from

Japan, and also a couple of Japanese experts to "run with the machine," all for the amusement of the girls and boys in Garfield Park. The interesting novelty was a donation from the citizen to the children's pleasure fund, but a certain Dogberry, sitting in judgment on the case, declared that it was "most tolerable and not to be endured"; so the citizen was notified that in trying to be a benefactor, he had become a malefactor with dire penalties hanging over his head. He had violated the contract labor law or some statute equally magnanimous. It was made an administration question, and the ruling of the government was that the riksha runners must be taken back to Japan. It was also mercifully promised that should the orders of the "Department" be promptly obeyed, the offending citizen should not be beheaded. He has promised to send the riksha runners back. And this is what is meant by "America for the Americans in the broadest and most liberal sense."

* * *

I am curious to know what the Japanese riksha runners thought about the littleness of the great republic when they were ordered out of its dominion. What do they think of the American eagle? And what does the American eagle think of himself? His proud crest must have drooped a little on the 4th of July when he heard the illiberal decree. What will they say about us in Japan when the runners reach home? In our self-conceit it may be of no consequence to us what they say; and yet this nation is not great enough to despise the opinion even of those poor men if their estimate of us be correct. "Madam," said a servant girl, "I am going to leave you to-morrow, but I will give you a good character." In a material way the promise may have been of no importance to the lady, and yet in a moral sense there may come a time of sorrow and trouble when a good character from the poor may be a consolation to the rich and powerful. There are thousands of Americans in Japan who are earning good wages there under contracts made in the United States. Suppose the Japanese "administration" should order them out of the country under the contract labor law; what would we think of that?

* * *

I wish that some of our immigration laws could be tested by the writ of *Habeas Corpus*. No doubt the government may lawfully prevent the landing of aliens upon its shores; and may for good reasons expel an alien enemy from the country, but after an alien *friend* has landed he becomes a part of the American population. He cannot be deprived of his liberty nor transported without due process of law, including a trial by jury. A few years ago some Irish immigrants after they had landed at Castle Garden were ordered back to Ireland by the "administration" under the plea that they were "likely to become paupers." This breach of hospitality had no sanction in the character of the American people; and that it had any warrant in the Constitution was open to doubt. A suspicion of this appears to have haunted the immigration commissioners, and they appealed for instructions to the Secretary of the Treasury. He decided that those immigrants, although they had been for several days walking about on the main land of America, had not in reality landed. He decided that Castle Garden was constructively a wharf, and the wharf constructively a ship, and that the immigrant actually walking about Castle Garden was not there at all, but constructively out on the briny sea. "The fact that a passenger arrives at Castle Garden," said the Secretary, "does not imply that he has been landed." Certainly not; there is no implication about it. A passenger walking about Castle Garden is landed, and the implication that he is on board a ship is a fantastic subterfuge within which may be hidden more serious encroachments upon liberty.

* * *

The reception of the German Emperor in England is the most extravagant and gorgeous demonstration of modern times. In

grandeur and expense it resembles the ancient meeting of the kings of England and France on "The field of the cloth of gold." This dazzling pageant is too vast and magnificent for a simple family reunion between English and German royalties. It is a national affair, with the English government behind it; a political demonstration by Lord Salisbury himself, intended as a warning to France and Russia that England will sustain the *Dreibund*. Under the outward form of a welcome to the Emperor, the English nation gives to Germany assurance of support. People who think that the Emperor has just stepped over to attend the wedding of his cousin and to see his grandmother, are innocent of statecraft. France knows better, and so does Russia. The wedding came handy to Lord Salisbury as a family reason for the visit, and he made the most of it. As the Lord Mayor of London uses a gold box in which to tender to the Emperor the freedom of the city, so Lord Salisbury used the wedding as an opportunity to tender to the German Empire an English alliance in the acclamations of the English people. It is notice to the world that war to disturb the treaty of 1871, will not be permitted; and the peace of Europe gets a renewal of its lease. I rejoice in the *Dreibund* as the beginning of European unity; and I wish that France and Russia would join the confederation, to consolidate in a league of mutual friendship the United States of Europe.

* * *

Oliver Twist was arrested again the other day, not in London but in Chicago. At least the tale told in the papers has such a close resemblance to the story of magisterial oppression told by Dickens, that I fancy the victim of it must be the genuine Oliver Twist; and again I see in active operation the municipal machinery by which children are driven devilward. I see the poor child cuffed by the beadle, tormented by the board of guardians, and condemned by the Police Justice, very much as told in the book that aroused my anger when I read it fifty years ago. The pathos in the Chicago story is not created by the imagination of a poet novelist; it springs out of the actual reality of an unjust judgment which by the law of moral retribution must rebound against the great city. Listen to this: On the 8th of July the Mayor of Chicago paid an official visit of inspection to the Bridewell. While he was there a bus load of twenty-six prisoners arrived, and the Mayor was taken over to the receiving room to see what the reporter sarcastically called their "welcome." Sure enough, right in the midst of them was Oliver Twist. The Mayor picked him out in an instant, and recognised him by his innocent face; but perhaps I had better tell the story in the language of the newspaper, thus: "In the batch was an innocent looking youth who was apparently feeling greatly embarrassed over his situation. His actions also indicated that he had never been in a prison before. His despondency and apparently honest face attracted the attention of the Mayor." By inquiring, the Mayor found out that the boy had been sentenced to fifty-three days imprisonment for the abominable crime of—peddling without a license. Listen to the rest of it; he was fifteen years old, born in Hungary: had been six days in America and had begun to earn an honest living as a merchant; his sister, a servant girl, furnishing the capital; he had bought some stationery and was selling it when he was caught in the very act, arrested, and sentenced for the crime. Not understanding a word of English, he could not have been more surprised had the Auditorium tower fallen on him than he was at his imprisonment; and better for him that the tower fall upon him than that he take a fifty-three days course in our college of crime called the Bridewell. The Mayor promptly pardoned him and gave him ten cents to pay his car fare to his sister's home. I wish that the Mayor could be at the Bridewell every day when the bus arrives with its load. Or have somebody else there.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE DISCUSSION ON FREEWILL.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

I THANK you for being so patient with my pertinacity and hope you will kindly continue, because I am not through with the argument yet. I begin to observe some chance of agreement. My only object is to plant monism upon the "Rock of Ages." The doctrine of freewill dies hard like all others which have been a part of us, but they are all dying and no logic can save them. The development of the brain is their executioner. You have nearly killed the doctrine of freewill, but another blow is needed for the finishing stroke. I understand very well what you mean by freewill, but I have to object to the term. You say you use the term because you "trust it is the truest expression of things as they actually are." Now I respectfully say that it is your *trust* that I object to after you have accepted the facts of nature in determinism. When you declare for determinism you have credentials in nature to back you, but when you cross your track and declare for freewill you have none. Another term to express action is certainly needed; one that will not be in conflict with determinism, and that term is, harmonious action by cause. Confusion is here avoided and our logic is clear and straight, because freedom implies that which cannot be affected by causes. Because the earth, for instance, does not meet with any obstacle in its orbit, it would not be logical to say that it is free from cause; if it was free from cause it would not move a peg. When I say that Nature (man is included) is a slave to law I don't mean that its actions are inharmonious like the actions of a slave who is driven by a whip or fear, but I mean that Nature is obliged to work one way and therefore is not free to work any way. And when I say that man is subject to cause in all his actions I don't mean that he is bound to inharmonious actions altogether, but that he is bound to cause whether his actions are harmonious or inharmonious, because cause is a master that we must obey while freedom implies that we need not obey. The falling of a stone is owing to attraction and the condition of the stone; attraction is a cause and the condition of the stone is a cause. The earth could not attract a balloon. To make a stone gravitate to the earth both must be adapted to the result. If a man is to be attracted to a dinner, he must be conditioned for the dinner and the dinner for him. He would not be attracted by a stone, neither would he be attracted by a dinner if he were not hungry. Although hunger is a part of a man at the time, yet it is a condition imposed upon him by nature; he is not free from the cause which makes him eat. There is harmonious action when a hungry man eats, but there is not free action, because he obeys the law of hunger which Nature imposed upon him; if he were free he would not be influenced either by hunger or dinner. Matter affects matter according as it is conditioned by that unit which is within it, so to say that the earth must be conditioned to attract and the stone to be attracted, does not express dualism, because both are conditioned by one power. The conditions of matter are legion, but all proceed from one power that is within. There is no "palpable dualism" in showing that man is subject to the causes of his condition. He sees because he has eyes, hears because he has ears, moves because he has strength, and reasons because he has brains. He does all these because Nature so conditioned him, not because he is free. When it can be logically shown that man can act without constraint, then, and not until then, can it be said that he can act freely. When a man is hungry he is not without constraint, he is constrained to eat by the natural law of hunger a condition which Nature made, not that which he made himself.

JOHN MADDOCK.

[Freedom, as I use the term, and as I have stated repeatedly, does *not* imply that which cannot be affected by causes." Free-

dom means the absence of compulsion, so that a man acts from motives which are his own. There is no conflict with determinism. We can say that the earth moving round the sun moves freely in space, because it moves according to the law of its motion and is not prevented from moving by some counter-acting force. If in the presence of a dinner there is no restraint upon a hungry man, (if his will is free, as I should say) he will eat it. If there is a restraint upon his will, if his will is not free, he will not eat it. His will is not curtailed in the former case but in the latter. If we call him in the former case the slave of the law of hunger, what shall we call actual slavery when a will is prevented from passing into act or when men are forced to act contrary to their wills? When I speak of free I mean, not under restraint and able to follow one's own impulse (see Webster). I have never used the term "free from cause"; it has been introduced by Mr. Maddock. Since that phrase is meaningless to me, I do not feel called upon to discuss it. Mr. Maddock is right in rejecting it. If Mr. Maddock prefers to call "harmonious action" what we have defined as "free action," we have no objection, although the term, in our opinion, is inappropriate. The action of a man who is not held in subjection to the will of others may be harmonious and inharmonious at the same time, all depends upon the question, Harmonious with what?—P. C.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

ST. SOLIFER, with other worthies and unworthies. By James Vila Blake. Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1891.

A delightful book, and restful to the worried and wearied soul. There are fourteen stories in it, quaintly told like the fables of La Fontaine; and like them, each with a moral humorous and wise. Mr. Blake has caught the knack of story telling in the idiom and style made familiar to us by the old English masters of the art; a style, which, even to imitate well, requires genius, and a cultivated sense of humor.

There is wit of good flavor in the artful puzzles made out of Mr. Blake's imagination, by which a little mental exercise is forced upon us as we wonder and wonder whether the characters he presents to us are in reality strangers, or old acquaintances clothed in poetical raiment entirely new, and made by Mr. Blake himself, as the boy made the wooden ship, "all out of his own head."

Some of his puzzles are made easy to us by Mr. Blake, after the manner of the riddle-man who kindly helps us to the answer by suggestive hints, nudges, mental telephoning, and clairvoyant winks. For instance, in "A Story from Meuleville," beloved old Burton, quaint and wise, is disguised as Meuleville; the "Anatomy of Melancholy" as *Maestitia Incisa*, and Dr. Johnson as Jacquesfils. This gives a French appearance to the story delightfully misleading; but when Mr. Blake, fearing lest we be lost in the puzzle, like the children in the wood, leads us right up to the solution by revealing to us that Meuleville was born at Dindley in Leicestershire, he makes the conundrum too easy altogether. And therein lies a fault.

That fault is not repeated often; far otherwise. In fact, some of the legends purporting to be adaptations from the Zend Avesta and other ancient books, are so cunningly disguised, that our early reading is baffled in the memory. We are never sure the stories are not where they seem to be, nor are we sure that they are not. It is true that in the preface Mr. Blake has placed a signpost warning us where we must not go; but his illusions counteract his warning; and we wander pleasantly along; not certain whether we are in the lawful pathway, or walking on the grass.

There is a little irony sprinkled over the legends; not enough to scald, but enough to make some of our favorite conceits uncom-

fortable to hold. The sprinkling is mercifully done, as if the author himself had once cherished the same conceits, so that we are more flattered by it than annoyed. In many respects these little stories are better than Rudyard Kipling's; and they ought to be widely read.

M. M. T.

NEW THOUGHTS FROM A NEW SYSTEM OF THOUGHT IN THE SCIENCE OF ASSOCIATION, and the Key to disclose the Ideal in the Real, it being the substratum of all intelligence as based on the *Tint*, the *Speckle*, and the *One*. London: W. Reeves, 185 Fleet St., E. C.

This pamphlet must be considered as an excellent parody of certain mystical aspiration to find the solution of the world problems in symbolism. It explains the meaning of colors (for instance: white is the all, red is motion, blue is motive, yellow is mode) and of numbers. The best parts of the pamphlet are the designs. We are presented with symbolic vignettes depicting the seeds of evil, the triumph of comprehension, the triumph of co-operation, the ideal analysis of the internality of an animated primordial molecule, the law of entwinement and many more, all explaining the profundity of "comprehension." The pamphlet is calculated only for the few who are able to receive it. "New Thoughts" the author says, "are daily disclosed to their nebulating New Ideas to the possibility of their consolidating as facts." Sometimes the tone of the little pamphlet is so serious that we are induced to believe the author is as much in earnest as a regular Christian scientist or a metaphysician.

ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND DESTINY OF MAN; OR PHILOSOPHY OF THE THREE ETHERS. By William Thornton. Boston: William Thornton

The author calls life the first, heat, light, electricity, etc., the second, and "matter" the third ether. Life was first and at the beginning, being a creation of God—God being the ocean of thought to which all men are indebted for their abilities. The thinking part of man is a loan from the Almighty which he must sooner or later deliver up. The details of the book, how to make medicine a science and the Transmission Theory of Disease show much imagination but little knowledge of facts.

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P. O. DRAWER F.

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THE UNITY OF THE SOUL.

THE main difference that obtains between the old and the new psychology concerns the unity of the soul. The old psychology considers the soul as an indivisible being whose centre is found in the ego. This ego-entity is said to be the subject of the psychical states; it is the subject in the original sense of the word; i. e. that which underlies. The soul, according to this view, is not the feelings and the thoughts which ensoul a human being, but it is a mysterious something which is in possession of feelings and thoughts, and the nature of the mysterious something, of the underlying subject, is unknown to us.

Modern psychology does not consider the soul as an indivisible being. The soul is not an ego-entity, a subject, that has feelings and ideas, but these feelings and ideas are actual parts of the soul. A man's soul is the totality of his feelings, of his thoughts, of his ideals.

This view may easily and wrongly be interpreted as if the soul were simply a heap of feelings, as if no unity existed and as if the ideas dwelling together in one and the same brain were like a bag of peas, which have no connection, no bond of union, among themselves. This is not so. The feelings, ideas, and ideals in a man form indeed a unity—only this unity is a hierarchical system, it is a unity of arrangement and does not mean that the soul is an indivisible unit or a kind of psychic atom. This truth can most clearly be expressed by contrasting the two views in two German words: The soul is not an *Einheit*, but an *Einheitlichkeit*; not a *unit*, but a *unification*.

And the unity of the soul produced by unification is by no means an indifferent quality. The unity of the soul, I feel almost constrained to say, is the soul of the soul. The way in which certain ideas are combined in a unity constitutes the most individual and most remarkable and also the most characteristic feature of a personality. Also the energy of nerve-action, the vigor with which the different ideas respond to their stimuli is of incalculable importance.

Suppose we could put together the soul of a man from a given number of ideas as we put together a mosaic from a given number of colored stones. The stones and their colors, their brightness, their shape and the variety of their colors are of importance, but the pat-

tern will after all make the picture of the mosaic. The same ideas are put into the minds of thirty or forty children in one and the same class-room, but how differently do their minds develop! Even children of the same parents who live in the same surroundings and under the same conditions, receiving the same instruction and having before their eyes the same examples, will develop quite distinct and divergent individualities. The very same thoughts in two different minds do not necessarily produce a sameness of soul. In one mind everything may be methodically arranged, so that on the proper occasion the proper thoughts turn up at once and all the ideas form a system, so that order reigns everywhere. Again in another mind there may be the very same thought-material, yet order is lacking, confusion prevails, everything stands topsy-turvy as if the brain were an old lumber-room in which things have been set aside without any plan of consideration.

It is wonderful how rich the possibilities of soul-patterns, so to speak, are! We cannot say that this one and this one only is the true ideal soul, for, provided that those indispensable soul-structures which constitute the humanity of a man are not lacking, we may have and indeed we do have, an unlimited variety of personalities, the beauties of each being peculiar to themselves.

People often show a tendency to classify the personalities of great men in higher and lower classes asking such questions as these: Who was greater Shakespeare or Goethe? Plato or Aristotle? Bismarck or Moltke? The answer is, we cannot measure the greatness of mind by a scale so as to have the great men of thought and action classified by degrees as number one, two, three, etc.

The soul of man, being the organisation of his ideas, is too subtle a substance,—indeed we should not even call it so for it is form and not substance—the soul of man is too subtle to be weighed or measured, and the worth of a noble soul is so peculiar, so unique that, irrespective of its shortcomings which we must expect even great men to have, we can compare one soul with other souls only in order to set them off by contrast and to appreciate their qualities by contrast, but we must recognise that each soul possesses a special charm of its own, each soul is an individuality

which as such is not classifiable as higher or lower, better or worse than other individualities.

Individuality being a natural and also a most valuable feature of a man's soul, it is our duty to respect individuality. Every man has a right to be individual provided the traits of his individuality do not come in conflict with the rights of his fellow-beings. And the application of this right in educational affairs is greater still. We are bound to respect the individualities of children also. Parents, educators, and teachers have to observe and study the characters of the souls entrusted to their care. They have to prune and guide the growth of individualities wherever whims and vagaries arise, yet they should do so with due discrimination and with a becoming respect for the individuality of the growing minds.

COMPETITION AND PROGRESS.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

THE *June Arena*, in an article on "Revolutionary Measures and Neglected Crimes," shows the wickedness of "squandering wealth in ostentation and luxury," while so many suffer unrelieved. The writer must have forgotten how many sermons have been preached about Dives and Lazarus, for he asserts that the Church "has never made war upon this giant sin"; and he would not have said that "It has never been opposed by legislation," if he had ever read the sumptuary laws, which have been passed by many rulers, including those of Massachusetts Bay. He is aware that the evil he denounces existed in ancient India and Egypt; but this very fact ought to make us unwilling to say, as he does, that "the fault lies in our social system of struggle and rivalry," for this system scarcely existed in ancient India or Egypt. There was very little rivalry or competition among the great mass of the people, for everything was so arranged as to enable the privileged few to keep all the luxuries, and most of the comforts and ornaments, to themselves; and the same was notoriously the case in the Dark Ages, as well as in France before the revolution. It is not because there is too much competition in Russia that the peasants are so much worse off than the princes, and that there are so few members of the middle class.

That class has increased its numbers and improved its condition immensely during the present century; and the diffusion of the comforts of life has been so general as to make even the least fortunate members of the community much better off than ever before. I have already asked in vain, see No. 176, for any facts to show that this is not the case; but the reader may find it worth while to take up Weeden's "Economic and Social History of New England," and see how Boston mechanics were obliged two hundred and fifty

years ago to spend a day's wages to buy a pair of stockings, a pound of sugar, a peck of apples, a yard of cloth, or half a bushel of corn. The chief difference, however, between our present social system and that which prevailed formerly and still survives in some less fortunate lands, is the ease with which even the poorest man can work his way up to a place among the rich and powerful. Nothing is so characteristically modern and American as the rapidity with which a fortune is made; and the maker is much more willing to help other men rise out of poverty, than if he had inherited his wealth. A great law of nature, sadly counteracted hitherto by artificial regulations in the interest of privileged classes, is now in full operation. We all know how the struggle for existence has caused flowers to take the place of flowerless plants, and the reign of reptiles to give place to the reign of man. The races best fitted to exist became permanent; and unfit races passed away. Among the members of any race some have always been better able than others to adapt themselves to circumstances, and therefore to develop themselves more fully. The same law which enabled men to take the place of reptiles, and civilised nations to become the successors of savage tribes, is continually raising the position of industrious, intelligent, and thrifty people above that of their less useful associates. The tailor's shop, where the best and cheapest coats are made, keeps growing until it becomes the largest in the city; the factory which turns out the best bargains enlarges the number of operatives; and the men at the head of these establishments have many workers under them and great business influence. The doctor who cures the most patients, and the artist who paints the best pictures become leaders in their professions; and this is the case in all callings and trades. It is to the universal benefit of our community that the management of business interests is placed in the ablest hands by the same process of natural selection which closed the reign of reptiles upon earth. Not only leading but subordinate positions in a business establishment must be properly filled, or it will not hold its own against rivals. Competency is best tested by competition; and this is what might be expected from the fact that both words come from the same roots.

Competition promotes the competent to more comfortable positions as well as more influential ones. Those who do best the work which is most difficult get the highest pay; if they could not, the work would go undone; and no work is paid for unless it is considered necessary. The manager of a railroad gets higher pay than the brakemen, because it is harder to fill his place. A brakeman must do his work faithfully in order to improve his position, or even keep it; and thus competition makes his own interest guaran-

tee safety to the passengers. A railroad which gave no brakeman a chance of promotion, and discharged none who needed work, would soon turn its cars into slaughter-houses. The shop-keeper's profits depend on the number of customers; and this ensures them much fairer treatment than they would otherwise get. The farmer works to the utmost of his strength, because he wants to make all he can of his farm. Competition brings out the best work of which men are capable, and thus maintains a high prosperity, in which all of us have some share.

Competition is more intense than ever before; but its advantages are more freely open to all members of the community; and its rivalries are attended with much less of angry strife than was formerly the case. Once it was sword to sword; but now it is brain to brain; and thus the greatest intensity of competition is accompanied by the highest and broadest mental activity. Where we find keen competition, there we find sound knowledge; and there, too, we find political liberty and enlightened philanthropy. To talk as wildly as some do against competition is really working for a restoration of mediæval or Egyptian darkness. If the present social system is all wrong, the creation of mankind was a blunder at best. Those who believe in progress ought to encourage competition.

RELIGIOUS PROSPECTS OF ITALY.

BY EDNAH D. CHENEY.

ONE cannot spend two months in Italy without feeling a deep interest in the present condition and future development of this country, so dear to us from its historic associations, and so delightful from the treasures of art and literature, from the beautiful scenery, and the rich human life which it contains. Next to one's own native land, it is the best beloved of all the nations, by the poetic and imaginative traveller. It has passed through so many changes, has sunk so low in suffering and almost in despair, and still it rises again so bravely, with a never dying faith in itself and in the cause of liberty and truth, that we cannot refuse to it, our confidence, that it will accomplish the mighty task to which it is now devoting itself so heroically, in building up again a commonwealth founded on high principles of right and equality. Leaving aside the many important political questions which occupy the friends of Italy of to-day, I would like to consider as far as my slight opportunities have enabled me to do, the religious question and ask: "How is Italy to throw off the incubus of a dead ecclesiastical organisation, and where is she to find the new religious life which is to keep her people holy and loving, and full of faith and peace?"

The part which religion, organised institutions of religion even, has played in human history is too im-

portant to be set aside, and we cannot but feel a deep interest in the question, whether new institutions can be founded which will have the good effects, without the evils of the past? Professor Villari, the present Minister of Public Instruction in Italy said fourteen years ago, "Religion is dead in Italy."* He also speaks of the passionate enthusiasm for the country which produced on the men who accomplished the regeneration of Italy, the same effect of inspiring them with courage, devotion, self-sacrifice, and unflinching faith in the right, which religion did on men of former times. But that too is no more, the calmer times of work and reconstruction require the same noble patriotism, but they do not call forth the fervor of passionate inspiration which men felt in the hour of battle and of triumph. And yet if religion is extinct in Italy, the new era is still confronted by a gigantic ecclesiastical hierarchy, which has not lost the will and the purpose, and I fear not the power, at least to block the wheels of progress if it cannot turn them back entirely. The Catholic Church still stands like a colossal sphinx at the wayside, crying out "Guess my secret or I will devour you." Must we not learn what has given this and other organised churches their tremendous hold upon men, and apply the power for good instead of for evil, before we can wholly conquer this foe of freedom and truth?

To the Italian statesman of to-day the Catholic church is not an abstract theological faith, it is a concrete organised inveterate enemy which he must fight, and must put under his feet before he can carry out his great schemes for human welfare. And here he labors under a great practical difficulty, for the very principles for which he is contending prevent his using those measures of attack and defense which the Papal church has not hesitated to employ on its own behalf. The state exists to secure freedom of speech, freedom of religious thought and expression, the sacred rights of the individual conscience, the equality of every man before the law. The church is the unscrupulous opponent of every one of these principles, and yet she claims their shelter against any infringement of her privileges. For instance, the measure of Crispi which forbids the appointment of any Catholic priest on the committees of administration of charitable funds, seems a very arbitrary step, and yet it is enforced and claimed to be absolutely necessary to prevent the arbitrary exercise of authority on the part of the higher order of priests over the lower, and the misuse and misappropriation of funds.

If religion is dead in Italy, is the influence of the priesthood and the superstition rooted in the minds of the people a mere empty shell or is it still a living

* I am obliged to quote entirely from memory, as I am writing in a little mountain town—without books at command.

force? This question pressed itself constantly on my mind, and although I would not lay much stress on the hasty observation of a tourist, I could not feel sure that in the thirteen years which had passed since I was last in Italy there was any weakening of its hold upon the minds of the people. There was an intensity of eagerness in the crowds who pressed around the shrine of St. Anthony at Padua, which did not look like mere formal service, and the churches seemed as thronged as in former days. The little children scarce able to speak muttered prayers and knelt and crossed themselves, and one saw how much influence such early training would have upon their after life. And yet I believe that much which looks so significant to the onlooker is but routine, and the influence of long habit, and that the active thoughtful mind of Italy is pretty effectually weaned from its attachment to the Papal church.

I heard but one sermon, and that might have been an old fashioned conservative Unitarian sermon on the evidences of Christianity. It was in Genoa, and the subject seemed to us most appropriate, for it was on the confusion of tongues at Babel. The argument was that the Scriptural account was proved by the recent theories of scientists, that a primitive language had existed, which had become changed into the multiplicity of idioms which now distract the world. The speaker quoted Max Müller and Cardinal Wiseman, but dropped several stitches in the links of his argument, which nobody had the privilege of picking up. It seemed entirely over the heads of his audience, and only one or two strangers appeared to listen intently, as we did.

But a more interesting question still is not only what forces can be brought to bear against the external and dangerous power of the church, but what living forces are coming into play, to have that influence over human life which the Roman church has had in the past? Is Protestantism doing anything or can it do anything for Italy? I can only answer from my own observation that I have seen very little trace of its influence. There are certain evangelical missions and Anglo-American churches which may help individuals but have very little effect on the general community. The ancient sect of Waldenses have organised churches and devoted followers in Florence and Rome and doubtless elsewhere. The members engage in charitable work—but they have no power, as one of their ministers once confessed to me, to influence the active skeptical minds of young Italy. It is from no ecclesiastical organisations at present existing, that I can hope for a renewal of true religious life in Italy.

Italy is now studying the great problems of social life and trying to organise a commonwealth on the broad principles of Humanity. I believe that it is

from a renewed sense of the sacredness of human relations, that a feeling of Universal, Eternal destinies is to come into their life. "First that which is natural, afterwards that which is spiritual." I cannot pause in Venice beside one of the fountains by which the new aqueduct from the hills on "Terra Firma" is supplying pure water freely to the poor of the city, instead of the poisonous fluid which they formerly drank, without thinking that this is a true baptism of water for the people. Rome, regenerated into cleanliness, seems to me a sign of an approach to godliness, and all the care and love which the noblest men of Italy are giving to the poor unfortunate classes seems to me "a doing it unto the least of these my little ones," that brings them near to the spirit of the teacher of Nazareth, however little they may do it in his name.

All these things lead up to the possibility of the home, and the true consecration of family life, where the spirit of true religion is born. When hunger drives the laborer to sell his children to the wandering hand organist, or send them out on the streets to beg; when the house is a dark black hole into which God's sunlight never enters, and the food only stills the cravings of hunger, but does not nourish the body—can we hope that the family hearthstone will be a sacred altar, where love and happiness will make glad and grateful hearts? The family ties so often ruthlessly broken by the church—must become holy and tender, and only in freedom can they be so.

Most necessary too is it, that woman should be elevated to a position of equal respect and honor with men. There can be no true home life, no home religion where the mother is not honored and respected. The present degree of recognition of the need of higher education for women, and the fact that all the universities are open to them, although their conditions have not yet borne their full fruition, show how faith in woman lives in the new *religious* mind of Italy. The worship of the Madonna will become respect for the mother, adoration of the Christ child, tender care and reverence for the young.

Yet all this it may be said is at best only morals, and physical welfare. It will not lead men's minds above the things that are temporal, to the things that are spiritual, will not open to them a life beyond this life, will not give them comfort in the inevitable sorrows which the wisest regulation of earthly life cannot ward off.

True, but is it not the ground out of which the finest flowers of Religion will spring? Can we doubt that a nation so thoughtful, so imaginative, living in a world of reality, surrounded by all that is glorious in nature, in History, in Art, a nation which idolises Dante, and loves Mazzini, and honors Savonarola,

will feel the yearning after the spiritual truth and religious affections which made the substance of these men's lives?

Go to the men who have been led through the wilderness by their passionate enthusiasm for their country, and who have experienced all the tyranny of the old church, with worn out dogmas, or futile imitations of old forms, and they will have no welcome for you; but if you set all these aside, and looking at life as they are earnestly looking at it with longing to raise their nation into true welfare, you go to them with such religion as made Channing and Parker and Garrison and Emerson the Saints and Heroes of our own war of emancipation, I believe you would find a welcome and a response in the hearts of these broad minded liberal men who can find no place in any of the organised churches.

As I wandered through the many beautiful buildings of the old church, I could not help pleasing myself with the thought of how they might be consecrated anew to this free religion of Humanity.

The old Duomo at Florence, whose foundations Dante watched over, where Savonarola preached, and Michel Angelo listened. What a congregation would fill it to listen to the words of a new prophet, and how it would echo to the songs of a happy and free people!

The Spanish Chapel should be a school of philosophy. I thought how serenely Alcott would have sat upon the platform with Emerson and Harris on either hand, and while discoursing on the eternal themes, have felt the presence of the noble figures on the walls as truly as those of the audience before him. In the Medici Chapel we would discourse of Art, and how many beautiful cloistered gardens seemed just fitted for "kindergarten" for the little children who need not lose a tender reverence for the past while they sing their happy songs of innocence and freedom. At Basel we visited the Cathedral, now a protestant church. Some workmen were engaged in repairing it, and at first unconscious of our presence they were singing their workmen's songs.

It seemed to me a beautiful prophesy of the church of the future, when the voice of the people shall be heard in the church, when labor shall be justly recognised as true worship, and practical service and Religion shall go hand in hand.

One Rome the capital of the world has fallen, another the Capital of Papal Christianity is crumbling to pieces—the third Rome if it becomes the capital of a free and enlightened people whose religion is based on the Faith "that the service of man is the service of God"—may be the heir of all their greatness—yet not a curse but a blessing to the world.

In speaking thus strongly of the obstacles which the Papal church puts in the way of the social regen-

eration of Italy, I do not mean to ignore the services it has rendered in the past, or the goodness of the many men who in the past or the present have honored its communion—but only to look at its present position from the standpoint of the men who have effected the regeneration of Italy.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE is no longer any doubt that the English welcome to the German Emperor was a political demonstration, and a spectacular Declaration of peace. The Declaration of war against Germany, imminent since the Franco-Russian alliance, must now be indefinitely postponed. Making due allowance for the mob enthusiasm excited by the blare of trumpets and the glare of royalty, there was behind all that theatrical pomp and show a tender of good-will to Germany from all classes of the English people. That the emperor deserved his welcome is apparent from the admirable speech delivered by him at Guildhall, a speech which has raised him greatly in the estimation of the world. It has been said of him that he speaks too much, and that he says rash and foolish things. There is a measure of truth in that, but the fault of kings in general is that they speak too little; and then, what little they say is false. It is also charged as a political fault of the German Emperor that he says what he means, and that his word can be depended on; that when he proclaims peace he means peace, and not war. In this he presents a diplomatic contrast to the Emperor Napoleon the Third, whose protestations of peace used to make Europe uneasy because their sinister meaning was war. When in 1870 he declared war against Prussia he proclaimed as an excuse for it that his object was "to conquer a lasting peace." He kept his word for once, and conquered a peace that has lasted twenty years, a peace that promises to be more lasting still.

* * *

For some time the German Emperor has been regarded as a wayward, wilful youth, suddenly seated on the tall pinnacle of Imperial power, and giddy with the premature elevation; a soldier ambitious of military glory, and willing to inflict war upon Europe for the sake of martial renown. It begins to appear that this opinion of him was erroneous, and a suspicion is growing up that he is in reality a statesman, a politician under good moral discipline, partly self-imposed, and partly laid upon him by his father and his grandfather. Only such a statesman could have made the Guildhall speech; and outside the *Dreibund* as within it, his words must appeal to the approving consciences of men. "My aim is," he said, "above all, the maintenance of peace." This from a man who commands the greatest army in the world, a sovereign whose military prerogative is itself a temptation to indulge in war. "Peace alone," he continued, "can give the confidence necessary to healthy development of science, art, and trade." It has been said by one of his critics that this was an artful appeal to the mercantile English, who have long been addicted to the ignoble pursuits of manufacturing and trade. The reproach is borrowed from Napoleon the First, who despised the English as "a nation of shop-keepers"; but after all, "science, art, and trade" are essential elements of moral greatness; and the emperor William was right when he said that peace is necessary for their healthy development. He was also right when he said, "Only so long as peace reigns are we at liberty to bestow earnest thought upon the great problems the solution of which in fairness and equity I consider the most prominent duty of our time." No doubt he would rather see his army employed in "science, art, and trade," than keeping an everlasting watch on the Rhine, but so long as that watch is necessary to be kept, the German army must remain as Moltke made it.

Speaking of war reminds me that the sovereign state of Illinois has declared war; not against England yet, but, by way of a beginning, against the English sparrow; whether by reason that he is a sparrow, or because he is English, is not quite clear. The patriot politicians, who for several years past have been twisting the tail of the British lion with rather poor success, now propose to get revenge by putting salt upon the tail of the English sparrow; and by solemn legislative enactment they have declared war against him. All the little boys in the state have been invited to enlist in the army of extermination, and the pay of these young soldiers is fixed at two cents a head for every sparrow killed. The indictment against this English immigrant is of many counts. It is charged among other crimes that he is pugnacious, greedy, and a thief; that he is a disagreeable neighbor with whom respectable birds will not associate; that he lives on a vegetable diet instead of living like other birds on such animal food as worms, and bugs, and grubs; that he does not dress well, nor sing well; that in short he is a disorderly vagrant, not good for anything; not even good to eat. This last bad quality is his chief protection, for though gentle as the dove, melodious as the mocking bird, and dressed like the parrot, if he were good to eat neither his virtues nor his voice nor his fine clothes would be able to save him from the frying pan. The English sparrow may be a mischievous nuisance and a bad bird, but if he really is English he will not be easily conquered. In order to vanquish him it will be necessary to raise the price upon his head from two cents to two dollars at least; and it is very likely that he will come victorious out of the contest even then.

* * *

The death of Hannibal Hamlin has conjured up a controversy which rages through the old politicians like a fever; and about a hundred and fifty confidential friends of Mr. Lincoln's administration are telling us through the newspapers "what Mr. Lincoln said to me, Sir, at the time, Sir," somewhat after the manner of the Club snob described by Thackeray as telling in pompous tones, "what Peel said to me about it and what I said to Peel." Those quarreling historians, calling each other pet names in the Billingsgate fashion, pretend that they cannot understand how Mr. Lincoln could possibly have said one thing to Smith, and a different thing to Jones. In other words, how in 1864 he could have been in favor of Hannibal Hamlin for Vice President, and of Andrew Johnson too. Mr. Lincoln may have been kind and courteous and even complimentary to Mr. Hamlin, but that he did not want him on the ticket with him is proven by the fact that Hamlin was not put on the ticket, while Johnson was. The convention was Mr. Lincoln's property, and nobody could have been nominated for Vice President who was not known to be Mr. Lincoln's own special and particular candidate. The result is proof conclusive that Johnson was Mr. Lincoln's choice; and the reason was that according to political appearances Johnson could obtain more votes for Abraham Lincoln than Hannibal Hamlin could. The patriotic reason is well enough, as an apology for dropping Mr. Hamlin, and it reads well, "a Union democrat from the South upon the ticket would give it more of a national, and less of a sectional character, and might prevent England and France from recognising the Confederacy." That this reason is purely ornamental is evident, because had it been applied to the presidential office where it would have had its greatest force, Mr. Lincoln would have rejected it at once as an argument applicable only to the Vice President.

* * *

The secret history of the Baltimore convention of 1864 will never be written, but in explanation of some apparent contradictions in Mr. Lincoln's action at the time the *Chicago Tribune* says, "he was not without guile." This does not mean guile in general, which would be a serious blemish in the character, but only that

special and particular guile which it is thought that every politician must have if he expects to do a successful business. There are times in the career of every aspiring statesman when he must either show his hand or hide it; and he hides it, with guile. That any man can reach the presidency or any other high position dependent upon votes, without having guile and using it is hardly possible now. Of course a man may have too much of it, as for instance Wolsey, the great Cardinal Prime Minister, of whom Queen Katherine said, "he was ever double both in his words and meaning." I once had a little patronage of my own to give away; it was not much, only the humble place of gauger, but there was keen competition for the job, and, as in most contests of the kind, there were two "leading candidates." They had circulated petitions about the town, and each petition had a yard of names on it. An official of high rank, aspiring for higher honors, and wishing to make friends all round, signed the two rival petitions, and then wrote me a private letter in behalf of a third man. Now the politician who did that was of most admirable character in private life, a judge of the higher courts, and a truthful, honest man; yet in his political walk and conversation he did not hesitate to practice a little kind hearted and amiable duplicity. This "guile" explains the phenomenon that often puzzles candidates, the difference between the number of votes promised them, and the number of votes they get.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND ENERGY.

CONCLUDING REMARKS OF THE DISCUSSION.

To the Editor of The Open Court :

I AGREE most fully with Mr. Harrison Ellis in his lament over the ambiguities of language as applied to metaphysical, psychological or philosophical questions. In theology the ambiguity is still more marked, and is doubtless useful—to theologians. I fear, however, that with the sincerest wish for the use of terms, applicable in one sense and one sense only such as we find in the physical sciences, the metaphysician and the philosopher will find it impossible to coin exact terms for the infinitely difficult science of mind. In the physical sciences we can see, feel, hear, weigh, measure; one or other of these various modes of examination are at our command. In the sciences dealing with the human mind we have nothing tangible, nothing (except in the new physical psychology) which can be submitted to the tests used in the physical sciences. Each philosopher is compelled to rely on what he perceives in his own mind; or if he endeavors to enter into the workings of the minds of other persons, he is dealing with separate worlds far more inaccessible to exact tests than the faintest nebulae revealed by our telescopes. Nor does the difficulty end here. It was supposed until lately, that we could at least understand what was passing through our own minds; that we could understand something of the mechanism of our own separate microcosm. Now we know that we are conscious of but a fraction of what is passing through our own minds, and that we are only at the beginning of our studies as to what "consciousness" or "mind" really is.

I am willing, anxious, to agree upon any definition Mr. Ellis likes of "feeling" or "sentience," as distinguished from "consciousness." A threefold division seems imperative to begin with; we want a word for the feelings which prompt the actions of the brainless frog and of the leg attached to an injured spine; a word for the feelings which prompt the actions of the lower animals, from the amoeba, up to the dog, trained elephant, and chimpanzee (can one term include all these?); and another word for the feelings which prompt the actions of man, from the lowest savage up to the mental processes of Shakespeare or Newton. It seems to

me that any man who prepares to define all these "feelings" exactly, and put each under a separate heading, may go into his task with a light heart, as Monsieur Ollivier went into the Franco-German war, but is likely to come out of it as Monsieur Ollivier did.

Suppose however that we take "feeling" (as the simplest word for the simplest process) as a definition of that which prompts the actions of the brainless frog and the leg attached to an injured spine. We have work enough for a lifetime if we try to form some clear definite idea of what this lowest psychical manifestation may be. We can study, what I have provisionally called "feeling," throughout the whole sub-kingdom of Vertebrates from the frog up to man, where the brain or spinal cord have been injured; and we can study it in the other sub-kingdoms *ad libitum*,—and limit it, if we can. We now want a name for something higher than the feelings which prompt the actions of the brainless frog, and for these psychical manifestations I will adopt the term "sentience." Under which of these terms shall we include those Sea-urchins* which a writer in *Nature* has recently described. These Sea-urchins had been placed on their backs in order to watch the curious process by which these animals turn upon their mouth surface. One Sea-urchin, however, had been left exposed to the sunshine too long; it was weak and could not rise. The comrades of the injured animal came to its rescue, and placed themselves in the respective positions from which they could most effectually raise and turn it over. I think these Echinoidea were conscious of their comrade's position, and deliberately took the best means to remedy it, as human beings would have done under similar circumstances. We have no means, it must be remembered, of judging psychical processes except by watching their results, and I, for one, will never consent to call a similar action a process of reasoning in man, and of automatism in a lower animal, just because one is a human being and the other a Sea-urchin. A volume could easily be filled with the account of psychical processes observable in the lower animals, which would be called rational if observed in human beings.†

If we agree to take "consciousness" as our highest term, can we restrict its use entirely to human beings, or shall we find on examination that the most intelligent of the higher animals must be admitted? I am afraid exact terms which so admirably fit the physical sciences, can never preserve their exactitude when applied to that which can never be weighed or measured, and of which the aspect varies with the personal equation of each mind. I say "that which" and "of which," because Mr. Ellis asks me to reflect on my use of the word "energy," and I do not know what other word to use which shall include feeling, sentience, and consciousness. I do not expect other people to arrive at my own conclusion. Personally I believe some energy, which has its own laws, as electricity has its own laws, is the *motive* power in the phenomena of life and mind; and though intangible and imponderable is—so far as I know—as much a part of our physical universe as electricity. In the utterly unknown substance about which we can certainly predicate nothing, yet which we are forced to conclude exists, the "ether" through which light waves are transmitted, we have something analogous. If gravitation also cannot be transmitted from one body to another without contact, (and Sir Isaac Newton considered it was unthinkable that gravitation could act through empty space) then we have another mysterious substance about which we can predicate nothing, except that it cannot be the "ether," and yet the existence of which must be admitted. A few years ago I thought we were on the high road to know everything; now I feel we can observe phenomena only, and are surrounded by inscrutable, unfathomable mysteries. In the words of the authors of the "Unseen Universe,"‡ "the greater

the circle of light, the greater is the circumference of darkness; the mystery which has been driven before us looms in the darkness that surrounds this circle, growing more mysterious and more tremendous as the circumference is increased."

As to the "simple supreme ego" most assuredly I should prefer to think we all possessed some entity which could be so described, and that this "I" could survive the dissolution of the physical body, and be immortal. I derive no comfort whatever from the idea of becoming one with the Universe, or being received into the bosom of the All, or in any other theory which would deprive me of my personal self-conscious existence. So too, I think no belief is more comforting in a life which is unsatisfactory to most of us, than the belief in a personal Saviour, who has known the trials and sorrows of humanity; who can feel with all we feel; yet is God, and all powerful to save and help. Yet this belief I have had to give up utterly and completely; it is most dear to my heart, but to my head it is neither more nor less real than any other of those aspirations of the human mind known collectively as religion. In the same way I have found the hope of a personal self-conscious immortality become fainter and fainter, till it dwindles to vanishing point. The recent researches of the Psychical Society have led me to the conclusion that there may be an energy, a principle [I know not what to call it] which may survive the death of the body; but even should this survival be proven, I see nothing in it that is desirable. It would be one more disagreeable truth to be accepted, and no more.

Far am I from saying that we can even have the satisfaction of knowing what *is* truth; we can only have a provisional belief founded on the best evidence at our command. We are transitory beings, whose whole existence as a species will probably occupy but an insignificant fraction of geological time. We are the denizens of a second rate planet revolving round a small sun; we have reason to be proud of what we have found out, considering what we are. But how exquisitely absurd it is to suppose that beings so situated can ever hope to attain to a knowledge of more than an infinitesimal part of the great mystery of the Universe! I could not do otherwise than endeavor to answer Mr. Ellis's courteous letter, but I feel the uselessness of the discussion. Where the acutest minds have discussed certain questions for ages, and are still hopelessly at variance; where, to employ a metaphor, the objects discussed present themselves as black, through every shade of grey to white, according to the idiosyncrasy of the observer, I expect no agreement upon exact terms.

ALICE BODINGTON.

EMOTION AND SCIENCE.

The concluding remarks of Mrs. Alice Bodington in her discussion with Mr. Harrison Ellis are extremely interesting because they throw much light not only upon the development of a thinker, but also upon the emotion which accompanies the thinker's thoughts. Mrs. Bodington's experience is no exceptional case; it is typical, and I may be pardoned for taking the liberty of adding a few comments.

The subject under discussion was originally concerning a misquotation from Mr. George H. Lewes and then turned to Mrs. Bodington's use of the word "energy" as a collective term for "feeling, sentience, and consciousness." This latter point is simply a question of correct terminology. By "feeling, sentience, and consciousness" we understand different degrees of purely subjective states of awareness, and not objective phenomena such as motions. Nerve-action is an objective phenomenon, the consciousness that is felt when a certain nerve-action takes place is a subjective phenomenon. The former is a discharge of potential energy, the latter is not energy but a state of awareness. This distinction has been made since Fechner and we cannot understand the importance of modern psychology without bearing it in

* Echinoidea.

† See *The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*. Binet.

‡ *The Unseen Universe*, p. 182.

mind. Mr. Harrison Ellis has called our attention to George H. Lewes who explains this point with brilliant lucidity in the very first chapters of his great work "Problems of Life and Mind." As collateral reading on the same subject we may refer to Prof. W. Kingdom Clifford's essay on "The Nature of Things in Themselves" and to the Editorials in Nos. 153 and 154 of *The Open Court* (reprinted in "The Soul of Man," p. 1.)

Mrs. Bodington is a very fascinating writer whose little book "Studies in Evolution and Biology" and several articles on psychological subjects in different scientific journals have earned her a well-deserved reputation. Mrs. Bodington is extraordinarily well familiar with the most important recent investigations and yet we cannot say that she stands upon the advanced standpoint of modern psychology. Is this perhaps due to her neglect of observing some such distinctions made for well considered purposes by those who labored before us in the fields of psychical investigation? Perhaps. Certain it is that without definiteness of terms, there can be no clearness of thought and a lack of clearness of thought leads into the darkness of mysticism.

Mrs. Bodington, however, has another enemy to struggle with, different from the difficulties of terminological distinction. This enemy is within her own mind; I mean the emotion that accompanies her thoughts. No one of us is free from emotions; but some of us are more, others less emotional. It is not a fault to be of an emotional nature, least so in a lady, but our emotions very often hinder us in correct thinking.

In the last number of *The Monist* I have propounded my reasons why we cannot make the pursuit of happiness the basis of ethics. One of these reasons and perhaps the most decisive one, is that happiness is a subjective state and the basis of ethics is and must be of an objective character. Happiness is that emotional state which appears welcome and is agreeable. And what states are welcome? Those to which we have become accustomed by habit. Ethics cannot be based upon the pursuit of happiness, ethics must give us information of those facts to which we have to conform, and in the obedience of the rules which can be derived in this way we have to find our happiness. As soon as we have acquired the habits of obeying these rules we shall find the same pleasure in obeying them as the drinker finds in taking alcoholic drinks.

Happiness does not depend upon the object which gives happiness, for the same thing may produce pleasurable sensations to one and painful sensations to another. Happiness is a purely subjective state which is produced through habit. We can accustom ourselves to finding pleasure in dancing, in drinking, in eating certain dishes, in smoking, in fishing or hunting, in riding on horseback, in gambling, in cheating, in gossiping or in quarreling, in hatred or in love, in imagination and self-delusion or in truth, in clearness of thought or in mysticism, in idleness or in work. One species of happiness is comfort. Humanity has been taught for centuries that man's inmost soul is an immortal ego-entity, and humanity as a natural consequence has become so accustomed to it that it finds happiness in this idea and is loth to give it up. The truth is that as soon as humanity has got accustomed to the new and more correct view it will find in it just as much comfort and perhaps more, or at least a nobler and higher comfort than in the former.

Anyone who thinks that he is "on the highway to know everything," will most likely very soon believe that he is surrounded by inscrutable, unfathomable mysteries. The Faust-like expectation of omniscience leads inevitably to the despair of agnostic nescience. Says Faust in his pessimistic mood:

"Und sehe, dass wir nichts wissen können."

Mrs. Bodington's case is normal, and the frankness with which she expresses herself affords us a valuable instance of the

law that also in the psychical world the pendulum will swing as high to the left as it swung before to the right.

Actual science is far from both extremes. The scientist never believes he is on the road of omniscience, nor is he frightened by the chimera of an absolute nescience. He studies the facts that come under his observations, formulates his problems, and if he be successful, solves them. Thus he learns at least something. Yet it is maintained that this something which a man can learn is infinitely little in comparison to all that of whose existence he not even dreams. And the authors of "The Unseen Universe" declare that the greater the circle of light, the greater is the circumference of darkness. Are they not like people who are afraid of their own shadow? Shall we put out the light of science because the more we know, the more we become conscious of the inexhaustible wealth of existence. The increase of the circumference of darkness is not an increase but a decrease of actual darkness; and let us not forget that the light of knowledge illuminates those places in which we want it. The sun shines upon our earth. Shall we weep that his rays do not reach to the planets of the remoter fixed stars? Shall we complain with the authors of "The Unseen Universe" that an electric light produces a greater circumference of darkness than a student's lamp? And is the luminary of the solar system for that reason more with darkness surrounded and mystery-looming than a dim candle?

Habit is so much at the bottom of what we consider as indispensable for our happiness that thinkers who have for any length of time grown accustomed to agnostic views imagine, everything that is grand and beautiful would pass away unless there were some inscrutable mystery in life. Darkness, then, becomes the element of their existence and they shun the light as if it were injurious. Now it is my opinion that we can just as well get accustomed to the truth as to errors, and I do not doubt that all our fears lest the truth be unpleasant, are unfounded.

P. C.

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COMMUNAL ETHICS.

WITH STUDIES OF AN ENGLISH PRINCE AND AN AMERICAN
CABINET MINISTER.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

A SUMMER School of Ethics beside Plymouth Rock is so picturesque that one longs for a Bunyan to interpret it. Plymouth Rock, as we know, is mythical: the little bit of stone in front of Pilgrim Hall which does duty for the Rock, disappoints us because we had swelled it with all the dogmatic stone which the pilgrims imported from the metamorphic world for their daily bread. When one thinks of all the liberalism developed by the descendants of the pilgrims it would be appropriate to inscribe on the bethel, "Thou makest thy nest in a rock." The gentler religions have always sprung up in reaction against such hard sacrificial systems. Jainism, Parseeism, Buddhism, were nests of the religious affections built in cruel crevices of Brahmanism; Sufism was a nestling on Mahometan, and Unitarianism on Presbyterian Puritanism. All of these movements were results of the moral sentiment, but their seed was sown on theological clouds. The milder deity came, but the régime of the old one remained. Religious culture has raised over us a new heaven, but the corresponding new earth does not arrive. The new moral world awaits the development of ethics related to our new conception of the invisible world. For thousands of years this earth was a mere altar before a universe deemed divine, but now known to be fictitious. These fictions have been largely cleared away, but at the cost of rigidly preserving the moral system based on them. It was necessary for speculative heretics to try and surpass the orthodox in what is popularly called morality, even while this was mainly an inheritance from the theology they were discrediting. It is to be hoped that the lectures and proceedings of the Summer School will be published, so that the country generally may know how far its new ethical teachers are prepared to transfer the moral world from a theological (i. e. fictitious) to a real and rational basis. The urgency of such transfer is continually pressed upon the attention of thinking men by events revealing the ethical confusion of those especially devoted to the moral welfare of society.

If we compare the deity worshiped beside Plymouth Rock two hundred and seventy years ago with the deity of Channing, or of Parker, we must discover that the difference between them is as the difference between the organic and inorganic worlds. The one is a personification of the phenomena and forces of nature uncontrolled by man, and supposed to be working with some purpose in the depths of the universe to which human purposes must be subordinated or sacrificed. The modern theistic deity is a Father, he is Love, Pure Reason; that is; he is Man without limitations. Being without limitations this new deity is without needs. We cannot therefore owe any duty to God. What does he need? If we pray to him it is not to serve him but ourselves. We cannot transgress his laws. Has the Infinite to fence in his private property, or protect his prerogatives? The word "sin," originally meaning violation of divine as distinguished from human laws, can have no application to a being who has no interests or personal enjoyments subject to the will of man. "Sin" can only mean a man's offence against his supreme moral selfhood,—a thing for which he is amenable to his own conscience alone.

Before a new foundation can be laid where one has crumbled the debris of the old must be cleared away. The new moral world involves the removal of all so called duties to God. Duties are solely for those to whom they are due, because they can be benefited by them.

The corollary of all this is that fundamentally there is but one moral law,—Justice. To a civilised community there can be but one social evil,—Injustice. No conduct is rationally punishable that has not demonstrably injured another. In the early stages of social evolution sins (offences against the deity) are punished because of the belief that the sin, if unpunished, may bring divine judgments on the community. Blasphemy could not injure a community except by exciting the wrath of God against it, and for imperilling his neighbors, who to such wrath ascribed calamities, the blasphemer was punished. It was the ignorant application of a right principle. The ignorance having measurably passed away, statutes originally enacted to protect the deity's privileges or interests have survived under the pretext of preserving morality.

But a community has no right to punish immorality. If an individual's conduct can be proved to have damaged another it is not an immorality but a crime,—that is, an injustice. A law that punishes any conduct which has injured nobody, unless the agent himself, is an unjust law. Boccaccio says, "A sin concealed is half pardoned." It sounds dangerous; yet what is it but equivalent to saying, "A transgression of what the majority suppose a moral rule, but by which nobody is injured, is nobody's business." Where anybody is harmed the "sin" is no longer concealed. Thereby it would become a crime, an injustice. Nor can conduct be justly punished on the ground that it may possibly injure others. On that ground offences against God were punished. It was for the supposed tendency of their ideas to injure the community that Socrates and Jesus were assassinated; and, if punishment of conventional immorality be admissible, all attempts to introduce a higher morality might be repressed, and ethical culture or progress rendered forever impossible. Much ancient morality is now immorality, and much that is now popularly deemed moral is immoral to the wise, and allowed to remain only because it can be disregarded at will.

The weakness of the modern community is that the awful sanctions originally devised to protect the rights of God have been alienated from the rights of Man. They have gone to enforce on one man what another thinks he ought to do, but what, in justice to himself and others, he possibly ought not to do. While it was supposed that God had interests apart from man's, but requiring legislative protection from man, these religious laws were much stronger than secular laws. Sacrilege was more severely punished than felony. And we now find the wrath of religious people turned against other peoples' alleged "vices" with such fervor that the actual communal wrongs, the injuries of others, appear venial. The inculcation of ethics has fallen chiefly into the hands of the professional guardians of God's personal and private interests, and if any instance of misconduct elicits their special fulminations it is pretty certain to be one which touches some law supposed "divine" rather than any interest of man. The Prince of Wales recently committed a most dishonorable action. He got from Sir William Gordon-Cumming a virtual confession of cheating under pledge of not revealing an incident, which, however, he did reveal. As every other party to the agreement has formally and under oath denied having disclosed it, no vague denials, unsigned and unsworn by the Prince, relieve him of the crime of this virtual assassination of Sir William's reputation. For Sir William's ruin came by his signing the paper. It was a heavy price extorted and paid for silence; the Prince broke silence; he got the confession under

false pretences; he cheated Sir William. Yet this mean injustice, this fraud on another, goes unpunished, and is almost forgotten, through the concentration of pious horror on that part of the Prince's conduct which harms only himself. In all the resolutions passed by religious bodies, and all the sermons, so far as I can learn, only the guilt of card gambling has been rebuked in the Prince. But why card gambling particularly? About the same time the Prince won \$125,000 on a horse race, and no censure was heard. Had he won a million by betting on the rise of a railway stock his shrewdness would be praised. He bets five pounds on a card and Non-conformist England talks of abolishing the throne. His broken faith with Sir William, involving the disgrace of several people is ignored in this blast against card-playing.

The wrong of gambling is its injustice: a man has no right to risk on chance his means of fulfilling his obligations to others; but those who denounce the Prince give no such argument. That their intensity of horror against card gambling is pious prejudice is proved by the indifference to wagers on horses and speculative ventures. Cards are relics of appeals to the goddess Fortune, and still used by fortune-tellers. They were deemed efforts to wrest the determination of events from the hands of Providence. The ideas of either chance or luck are especially heresies to the predestinarian mind. I have serious objections to gambling, but the Prince is equally entitled to hold contrary opinions. There is a law against public gambling, but so there is against working on Sunday; it has nothing to do with what a man chooses to do in his own castle. There is nothing wrong in a man's carrying his bacarat counters or his chess-men on his excursions. In fact the outcry against the Prince on this score is nothing more than a sort of "White Cap" propensity to coerce other people's moral ideas and habits. It is an invasion of personal liberty. The Prince is lucky to have the attack directed against his rights instead of against his wrong to others, in breaking his pledge of secrecy.

This is all the more base because there is no law by which the crime can be reached. And it is just here that the Summer School of Ethics may render good service. Society, long trained to regard offences against God—fictitious offences—as the worst, needs the instruction that its exclusive province is to restrain acts of injustice to others. And because many such injuries cannot be reached by procedures of law it is necessary that the communal sentiment, diverted by lingering superstition against conventional "vices" (which may prove virtues, and at any rate affect only the individual agent) shall be turned against the subtle forms of injustice.

I have drawn from abroad an illustration of the

ethical confusion, left by decaying dogmas. But unfortunately a more deplorable one is before us at home. At the moment when many of our moralists, of pulpit and press, were basing on the Prince's fondness for baccarat a case against monarchy, our own "republic" is involved in a scandal tenfold worse. We have an administration of boasted piety. Our President cannot be persuaded to travel on the "Lord's Day." Our Postmaster General journeys to Philadelphia weekly to superintend a Sunday school. But it is in evidence that a Cabinet Minister, secretly informed of the approaching failure of a bank, kept the secret, and prevented the bank's closure, until he had safely got out his own money and a religious fund of which he was trustee. Others were permitted to go on depositing their money in the concern which was thus able to secure the Cabinet Minister and the Almighty from loss. Having presently discovered that the bank was in the hands of dishonest officers, he does not try to rescue the public by reporting the fact, but uses the secret to blackmail the corrupt officers and induce them to pay him for some stock they declare fraudulent. That he believed the stock genuine was sufficient evidence that those trying to get it from him without payment were bandits, to be instantly denounced. But the Minister offered a bargain of secrecy with them, on condition of receiving payment for the doubtful stock. Had he gambled away his fortune, instead of sacrificing others to save it, he might have been pelted with all the stones crumbled from Plymouth Rock. Our presbyterian president would not have kept him in office. Yet that would have been morality itself in comparison with the game played by this devout suppressor of lotteries, who arranges blanks for his neighbors and prizes for himself, and for a god made in the image of that self. (Reverence requires the spelling of such a god with a small "g.")

The American is far worse than the English case, as a matter of individual morality. As the prince, by breaking his promise, gained nothing and lost a good deal, we may suppose his offence unpremeditated. But no such palliation can be found for secret transactions carried on through months. And as a national or a communal wrong the prince's offence is trivial as compared with that of our Minister, for this man remains our representative, and we are all involved in his anti-social action. We are responsible for our administration, which adopts and sanctions that action. Had a member of the English government, elected by the people, been guilty of the prince's action, and retained office, the case would be parallel to our own. But nobody ever voted for the prince; he possesses no political power; he cannot claim to represent the nation, nor determine any of its affairs. The fact that no instance of corruption in any member of an English

government is known to recent history is significant. Although England and America are under the same ethical conditions, suffering equal confusion in the transition from a superstitious to a rational moral régime, the former is an old nation, of confirmed habits, of fixed and potent traditions. The course of the country is largely predetermined by foregone ages, and does not depend much on the conduct of its people, much less of any individuals. But our young and changing nation must live, as it were, from hand to mouth; its integrity depends on the virtues of those who manage it, and are making it over and over again. There is a superiority potential in our situation, but it will require much higher ethical standards and forces, and such as are completely humanised, to build in America the new moral world. We have not made much progress. A hundred and fifteen years ago when our revolutionary fathers declared their political independence they straightway proved their moral thralldom by decreeing that there should be no more balls or dances in the city where they sat. It was a conciliation of the Presbyterians. From the same city now comes our Sunday-School Cabinet Minister who compounds for sacrificing public interests to his own by damning all the "sins" he has no mind to. Liberty is still limited by dogma; moral malaria results. The Summer School of Ethics has been too long delayed, but it comes in an hour of sore need. It is to be hoped that these builders of the Golden City will not be found in the same case with some æsthetic pilgrims who journeyed to a distant isle where they would build the beautiful city. The architects and the artists built and decorated the villas, each according to his taste, but, alas, presently the sea bit away the shores, and among all the company none was found who knew how to drive a pile, or build a digue. The Golden City perished for lack of foundations. Transcendental ethics, moral philosophies, are of much interest; but the architects of the Golden City will labor in vain if the common foundation of their varied domes is sinking. When communal justice is ensured, and the whole tribe of embezzlers, bribers, lynchers, (beside whom gamblers, fornicators, drunkards, are virtuous) we may find the nation itself a school of Ethics.

BREATH AND THE NAME OF THE SOUL.

BY THE HON. LADY WELBY.

In his article in *The Open Court* for June 11th, upon the discovery of the soul, Prof. Max Müller tells us that if we follow the most revealing of vestiges—those of language—"we shall find that here also man began by naming the simplest and most palpable things, and that here, also, by simply dropping what was purely external, he found himself by slow degrees in possession of names which told him of the existence

of a soul." I venture, not to object or differ, but to ask here certain prior questions which are by most of us more or less begged, but on the answers to which it seems to me depend all our ultimate inferences. What then is the "purely external"? Certainly not the heart or brain, for they are literally internal,—inside the "body." And when by an unexplained wrench of paradox, the early man begins to reckon the content of his skin-boundary (which is the most "purely internal" thing he knows) as "external" why should he ever "drop it" at all? Surely as well "drop" language to think, or colors and paper to paint, or violin and bow to "play"!

However by means of this strange and paradoxical instinct to "drop" the first and foremost and most emphatic reality, the external and internal which are simply as the inside and outside of a nut, we come to the conventional conception of the soul as "an invisible, intangible, immaterial object." But may I suggest that the moment any expression for We, Us, I, Me, began to emerge, they did so simply as the symbols of that personal identity which is the only value of a "soul"? Their appearance, as the philosophical philologist has taught us, was due to that growing self-consciousness which learns more and more clearly to distinguish between owner and owned, between what we have and what we are. The distinction has from the first been provided for by the contrast of I or We and My or Our. Whatever we can properly place after a My or an Our is ipso facto thus relegated to a secondary or derivative place, as a belonging, not a being. Thus we come into sight of what I would suggest as one of the most prolific sources of confusion in that chaos of ambiguity, modern civilised language. Even when we say Our or My Father, Our or My GOD, we invert and cannot help inverting the relation expressed, since Our or My imply as their principal the We or the I. And the fact that we do not notice or intend this no more effects the fact than our not noticing or intending that our retina should invert the position of external objects. Now all modern western words for soul or spirit, even for self, admit the Our or My before them. But so far as we can (if at all) speak of My Ego we are simply degrading that term to the second rank. "I AM that I AM," not what I HAVE. If we want to express that which we ARE that which possesses or uses a self, a soul, a mind, a spirit, a life, a body, and all else which we may be said to *have*, we must use the term Man itself (since only in joke or metaphor can we say Our or My Man) or simply We and Us or I and Me, as we cannot say Our we, Our us, or My Me.

But (it will be objected) as all words to denote what we now call the mental or spiritual or rational can (if analysable at all) be traced back to a material

origin, the We and Us and the I and Me must always have meant primarily that entity which can be felt, which resists, suffers, etc. Thus as the need for distinction grew, a word was wanted for the activity or power which moved "from within" that feeling, or resisting, or suffering entity. "From within" took on the meaning, from it. How then are we to name that which is not merely the "within"—since that implies no difference of nature from the "without"—but something which apparently "lives" inside and sends out "orders"? Prof. Max Müller here gives us what is constantly ignored, the claim of the blood or heart to furnish the first name for the spiritual self or soul. But he goes on to suggest as better still the breath . . . "which went in and out of the mouth and the nostrils." But now comes the question, why? What was it that the primitive mind saw to make it prefer Breath before all other possible terms,—even those of blood or heart which must so constantly have obtruded themselves as the essential marks of life? If we say that this breath was from the first conceived as an object, a thing, like in nature to those which could be taken up in the hand, or on which one could stand, against which one could lean, and so on, then this supposed object was invariably found alternately passing in and out of nostrils and mouth. But do we ever find this idea among the endless complexities of early animism? If such a notion existed—in however elementary a form—it would follow that in the pause after expiring a deep breath, the man's "self" would be supposed to be outside his body, and we should find warnings against hurting the man's spirit which for that moment was sitting somewhere in front of his chest? But do we really mean to credit the early man with thinking that the soul as breath walks in from outside and departs again at every breath? For if so why should it be reckoned as any more within the man during life than without him? It would be all against the grain to ignore the breath as drawn in from outside, and only notice it as coming forth from inside. Experience would be incessantly re-affirming the contrary.

What then shall we postulate as the real reason why breath was chosen as representative of life and identity? The word "chosen" of course does not here involve any intellectual process but rather a sub-conscious automatism, the descendant of that "rhythm of motion" on which Herbert Spencer lays so much stress. In this sense then was not the choice of breath originally owing to its being obviously conspicuous example of the interaction between what we now call "organism" and "environment"? When this "give and take" (which it actually is) ceased, so did the activities of the animal. At all events one thing is plain; we thus come to a possible explanation of the choice of breath (or pulse) as the main term for animal or

vital energy, which, in accordance with the whole drift of modern thought, is given in terms of the dynamic instead of the static. The "spirit" is thus no entity but a rhythm, a beat, a thrill, a sequence of throbs. And this stops instead of departing at death. If we hold that some "immaterial object"—the "psyche"—is inside the body during life and outside it after death, then the infant must have been inflated with a breath-soul at birth and at once well corked down until at the moment of death the cork was drawn and the breath-soul rushed out! But if ideas of this class were of later accretion and the earliest and simplest thought was that not of "dropping" this or that among the conditions of reality in order to acquire a "spiritual" world, but of giving motion and not matter the primary place in trying to express the essential "self" or "soul" of things, then the way is cleared for further inquiry on the same "dynamic" line which may prove to be rich in suggestion even if, as yet, in nothing more.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

ONE of our readers in Russia sends us the following translation from a Russian newspaper article. He writes: "I doubt whether you will accept this short note from one of our best Riga papers, *Zeitung für Stadt und Land*. I send it, to give you an idea, that even with us, public feeling is stirred up." We publish the translation of our correspondent, the copy of which was sent to Gen. M. M. Trumbull with the request to add in a few comments what he had to say on the subject.

AUDIATUR ET ALTERA PARS.

Public opinion has for the last year undergone a decided change in the United States concerning the unbounded liberty, emphatically praised by the democracy of the whole world, and the good of it, or better the evil consequences, are rightly judged, as being too great and too many. The American people begin to think that it is time to cut the root to all the evils, in this republican paradise—where as might be paraphrased in the words of the author of "Candide": *Tout est bien dans le meilleur des mondes*—healthy and poisonous develop and flourish equally well and strong, as in a hot-house atmosphere. This reaction manifests itself in the emigrant bill of the Union, which aims in the first place at the prohibition or at least restriction of the exodus of Anarchists to America and of all such elements, who have nothing to lose in the wide world and everything to gain by crime. But the law has come too late; the celebrated, heavenly praised liberty of the Union has done its duty, crime has become a part of the whole, an amputation lest the whole organism will come to grief has become impossible. Criminality has become an integral part, an ingredient circulating in the blood of this mighty organism, called the United States of North America, and there is no remedy, no purgative, no disinfectant, no antiseptic to it. A powerful revolution, a catastrophe alone are the *ultima ratio* to change the present state, and this cataclysm will, it must come.

Almost incredible is the power of criminality; look at them from which point you like, beginning with those political canvassers and economic filibusters, who by influencing through temptations of every kind and bribery the polls of voters, rule at Washington's Congress and give the impulse to the mighty state machine, filling their pockets with money, and down again to the lowest grades, that shameless, boasting mob, which under the bloody flag of communism, proclaims the regeneration of society and state by

means of dynamite. It is a mighty realm which American republican liberty has fortified in the course of its evolution to such dimensions, that all healthy and noble aspirations and elements of this great country are prone to succumb in the battle against it. Notwithstanding the very good laws of the greatest Republic in the world, excess of liberty has brought it to utter lawlessness. In no country self-help plays such a prominent role in questions of justice as in the United States. For years and years, in hundreds and thousands of cases, the bowie-knife and the revolver are the means of execution of lynch justice, especially in the southern and western States, where a general lack of confidence in verdicts from the bar are remarkable.

Under such a state of accepted criminality the late dreadful events at New Orleans might be explained, events, which, by the time this is written, can have turned to a serious conflict between Italy and America, and of which the consequences cannot be foretold. The fact that many prominent citizens of the southern capital took a most active part in this act of lynch justice, is very striking and illustrative for southern lawlessness. The massacre of foreigners, whose crime was not proved, and five others, who had nothing to do with Hennessy's death, reminds one of the time of the Paris commune, with this difference, that it took place in a great American town in the last decennium of the 19th century, and was directed by the citizens against the integrity, the holiness of an institution, sacred in the rest of the civilised world—a judge. Where is the corruption? will truth unveil the motives? It might be an expression of public opinion to upset at last an utterly rotten bench of judge and jury. In such a case judge Lynch has proved, that the time has come, where cowards, who fear for their lives, by proclaiming murder as murder, ought to be done away, unless State government in America is to be broken to pieces, and society submitted to a miserable state of lawlessness, and its existence is only a question of time.

With great anxiety the whole civilised world looks to America: McKinley's bill has not produced half the emotion that now vibrates in the old world, since this mournful news reached us from New Orleans.

Justitia fundamentum regnorum—we hope, that the epigones of George Washington will remember this eternal truth.

REMARKS BY GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.

A friendly critic in Russia grieving over the political and moral decay of the American Republic and answering our censure of Russian tyranny by the admonition, "Physician, heal thyself," presents us with a wholesome antidote to national self-righteousness; a corrective, which though bitter to the taste, may do us good.

While our politicians are bidding for the Israelite vote by resolutions denouncing Russian proscription of the Jewish people; and while the rigidly righteous assembled in humanitarian convention at Philadelphia implore the American government to interfere in behalf of the Nihilists and other political prisoners in Siberia, a Russian moralist and scholar, from the political darkness of Livonia, not in anger but in sorrow, deploring the corruption of American politics, the time-serving and self-seeking of our statesmen, and the irrational, capricious, and revengeful Czarism of Populus Americanus. This Russian by the Gulf of Riga, first mixes a little tincture of iron with the scriptural rebuke, and then prescribes it for Populus, "cast out first the beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is in thy brother's eye." And Populus must drain the chalice to the dregs.

While the Russian critic sees more clearly than many Americans can see the pustulous pimples on the face of the American body politic, and while also he perceives with remarkable clearness for a foreigner the inside inflammation of which those im-

purities are outward signs, he goes too far when he says that crime has become an integral part of us, an ingredient of our national blood. There is not yet in the American situation, nor in the American character that spiritual stupefaction which can only be thrown off by a "powerful revolution." The mental and moral energies of the American people will not grow tired for a thousand years to come; and these will reform the state by an evolutionary process without calling for help on a "cataclysm."

There are millions of Americans who will sympathise with even Russian censure of those "political canvassers and economic filibusters" who influence voters by bribery, and who gamble with ballots for office and pelf. They will not listen with patience to the doctrines of those red reformers who "proclaim the regeneration of society and the state by means of dynamite." They will accept some of the Russian criticism but they will not concede the "utter lawlessness" of American society, nor that the Americans have become savages through "excess of liberty." There is a good deal of liberty in America as there is of wealth; but like wealth, liberty is unequally distributed; and many of the evils deplored by our Russian friend, result not from the excess but from the scarcity of liberty.

As to the New Orleans affair, it was a savage thing, an ignominious thing; and our pride must bend under the scorn of the Tartar and the Cossack, who pointing to New Orleans exult in their own higher civilisation. Out of the controversy with Italy we did not come with glory, for we made our diplomatic escape by breaking a hole through the wall of our own citadel. In extenuation of the New Orleans madness we may fairly plead that it is not the habit of Americans to overthrow with violence the verdicts of juries and the judgments of courts, even when those judgments are ignorant and unjust. The high caste anarchy at New Orleans was not a fair specimen of American public temper.

POLYANDRY, PROMISCUITY AND SURVIVAL.

BY SUSAN CHANNING.

THE critic, in *The Open Court* of May 28, in arraigning the facts in my article, "The New Ethic of the Sexes," errs in maintaining "there is no testimony that tribes addicted to polyandry reared no children," and that "the testimony of science concerning these assertions is, as far as known to-day, that all people started alike in universal promiscuity," etc.

Of course all evolutionists must admit that all organised life at first united with the opposite sex as blindly and unconsciously as the magnetic needle turns to the pole, or, as the crystal shapes itself into proper form, or, as ships roll towards each other in a calm. But this state of things must have been short-lived. Instinct, whose very essence is to act without reason, and which at first ruled animal man despotically, was soon developed into a directing force or brain. As Professor Draper says in his "Conflict of Science and Religion," "What we call spirit sleeps in the stone, dreams in the animal and awakes in man." Chastity is instinctive in the race. In primeval man this instinct must have been stronger than in civilised man, for it is recognised by all anthropologists that the advance of man in intellectual power is too often but retrograde in his instincts.

Darwin maintains that man had reached quite a step in civilisation before he thought of enslaving woman. The female, he says, has no weapons of defence and yet she has been able to survive.

Males, from the first, must have treated her with great tenderness, kindness, and deference, and have respected her choice of mate, for, although most females yield to the stronger wooer, and the one best able to protect her, she has often mated with the weaker. Sexual congress therefore in primeval times had its elements of chivalry and love.

The origin of the marriage tie, as Darwin points out in his

"Descent of Man," (pp. 590-591), has been best and most carefully studied, by McLennan, Sir John Lubbock, and Morgan. But there is great divergence of opinion among these authors upon several points. Darwin differs from them in their belief in communal marriages, and advances the following argument in support of his belief: "The strength of the feeling of jealousy all through the animal kingdom and particularly among those nearest to man induces me to believe that absolute promiscuity never existed; the Orang is monogamist, as are the Indian and American Monkeys; therefore, looking far enough back in the stream of time, and judging from the social habits of man as he now exists, the most probable view is that, he aboriginally lived in small communities, each with a single wife, or, if powerful, with several, whom he jealously guarded from all other men."

"Filial, parental and conjugal affection are virtues which have existed in every gregarious association. These qualities were possessed by our progenitors before the development of language, before the separation of the foot and the hand. For, in order that the offspring may be produced two animals must enter into partnership, and in order that the offspring may be reared this partnership must continue a considerable time. All living creatures of the higher grade are memorials of conjugal affection and parental care."—Winwood Reade.

My critic finds, in the language of the Chinese and others, that there exist terms as "fossil-relic, which proclaim polyandry and promiscuity as the past condition of the society in which they were coined." The fossil-relics of a language may confirm anthropological data, but not correct it, just as the coins of a people may confirm history, but cannot correct it. It is as useless to attempt to interpret the past of our race by appealing to the fossil terms of languages, as it is to appeal to the etymological meaning of certain words which rose to the surface ages ago, and which have been changing their meaning from century to century so that now they express the very opposite of what they originally meant. In the study of the fossil-relics of a language "the danger of mistaking metaphoric for primary igneous rocks is much less in geology than in anthropology."—F. Max Müller.

"What terms and what conceptions are truly primitive would be easy if we had an account of truly primitive men. But there are sundry reasons for suspecting that existing men of the lowest type forming social groups of the simplest kind, do not exemplify men as they originally were. Probably most of them, if not all, had ancestors in a higher state."—Herbert Spencer.

There is no adequate evidence that the lowest savages have always been as low as they are now. However that may be, as Geddes says, in his "Evolution of Sex," "we cannot determine the past of our race by appealing to the practices of the most degenerate savages and races." The extinction of the people of vast regions of the earth within the last three centuries, notably in New Caledonia, West India islands, Cape of Good Hope, Australia, New Zealand, and Van Diemens-land, is due to the causes I have pointed out, and not to the pressure of the stronger races. These people were incapable of supporting civilisation with its vices. And we too, as Galton asserts in his "Hereditary Genius," "the foremost people in creating this civilisation, are beginning to show ourselves incapable of keeping pace with our own work."

We maintained and still maintain that families and nations become extinct simply from the absence of chaste customs. Some men and some women, like some savages, fail to trace the multiplied evils consequent upon the want of virtue in youths and chastity in the married. If they had read Dr. Henry Maudsley on the "Physiology and Pathology of the Mind," Bebel's book entitled "Woman," Geddes on "Evolution of Sex," Bumstead on "Venereal Diseases," Lecky's "European Morals," and "The Criminal," by Havelock Ellis, and studied the history of prostitution in modern Europe, they would have seen that *virtue* is the

key-stone of the social arch, that the family is the archetype of the State, and that from it has sprung justice. The modern sociologist has found that he cannot abolish the family and the laws of inheritance, for unless a man be married to one woman and one land and remain faithful to them, and be allowed to retain the product of his labors while he lives and to leave at least the major portion of it to his children there will be no effective desire to save, and tribes and clans would never have developed into Nations. To labor for the State and for Humanity has a far reaching sound, but like the sonorous sound of the ocean it means nothing more in the mouth of the average man than the bursting of air-bubbles. To the man of ample knowledge, great intellect and heart it means much. Humanity in his mind is associated with the vast antiquity of the race; in memory he is able to recall its past with all its scenes of strife, horror, and desolation; the relics of magnificent empires awake in him feelings of awe and dread, but his enthusiasm is kindled when he remembers that matter and its inherent spirit are eternal, that there never was a creation, that creation is only a conjunction of atoms, a mixing up of things which have always existed, and destruction a dissolution; that man on this planet is immortal "until chaos comes again." "The grandest system of civilisation has its orbit and may complete its course, but not so the human race, to which just when it seems to have reached its goal the old task is ever set anew with a wider range and a deeper meaning."—Mommson.

Therefore a man of understanding and thought accepts and acts up to the beautiful sentiment first uttered by the haughty Roman aristocrat, Marcus Livius Drusus, that nobility constituted obligation, and like him turns away from the venality of his age and becomes its martyr in fighting against the tyranny of capital and in endeavoring to lighten the burdens of his fellow citizens. But it is not given to every man to be an idealist and a philosopher, hence the rank and file in the battle of life must be spurred into action by such words as the great Bruce addressed to his brave Scottish bow-men and pike-men at the battle of Bannockburn, "Men! To-day you fight for your country, your wives, your children, and all that a freeman holds dear." The down-fall of the Greek was due to his lax notion of the sex relation. As I pointed out in my article, after the defeat of Persia, marriage became unfashionable and was avoided by ambitious and accomplished women who became avowed courtezans and consequently infertile. Galton gives ample evidence in all his writings of the extinction of some of the greatest families in England from this very cause. The early Lord Chancellors he found left few children; most of them died childless. It was the custom in their day, says Lord Campbell, when a man was elevated to the woolsack, to either part from his mistress or marry her, and to their honor be it said, most of them acted the man and made "honest women" of their former companions. But this restoration to respectability did not, as a rule, enable these wives to become mothers. As mistresses they had avoided the duties of maternity; as wives they could not restore their destroyed function.

Mr. Stead, in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, tried to do England a real service. He saw what her statesmen thirty years ago saw when they passed their "Disease Act," that something must be done to save the nation's soldiers and sailors from the results of their illicit relations, for these men were being disabled every year by tens of thousands. The poor, unfortunate women who herded in the sea-port and barrack towns of England at that time called themselves the "Queen's women" to indicate their sanitary condition. But, though they were subjected under the provisions of this Act to the most careful medical surveillance, they could not be kept free from syphilitic taint, and England in disgust soon repealed the Act, from the conviction that the violation of the fundamental laws of the sex relation imposed penalties which no medical skill could counteract.

We have never seen the argument advanced, but to our mind there is no better evidence that primitive man was monogamous, than the fact that syphilis was entirely unknown prior to 1494. It appeared in Italy in the latter part of that year at about the time that Charles VIII, King of France, entered Naples at the head of a large army. It struck terror into the heart of the troops by whose license and debauch it had been developed, for the most skilful physicians were unable to dissipate the symptoms of the new disease, and it soon spread all over Europe.

The sex question, as Geddes says, has been so much shirked, even naturalists have beaten about the bush in seeking to solve it. It is the custom to mark off the sexual function as a fact altogether *per se*, modesty defeats itself in pruriency, and good taste runs to the extreme of putting a premium upon ignorance. But, every wise law giver both before and since Moses's time has looked this question squarely in the face and has declared that no nation is safe where licentiousness is tolerated. Mahomet, though he lived in a polygamous land was faithful to his old wife. He removed the facility of divorce by means of which an Arab could at any time repudiate his wife; he also abolished and rendered for ever hateful infanticide. This one man created the glory of his nation because he had the wisdom that springs from chastity. No sensuous man ever interpreted life correctly. It has been well said that the position which women hold in a country is, if not a complete test, yet one of the best tests of the progress it has made in civilisation. "Great material, intellectual and moral progress has in every country been accompanied with greater respect for women, and by a greater freedom accorded to them, and a fuller participation on their part in the best work of the world." [Bryce's "American Commonwealth," book ii, chap. 5.] It is true that we need a higher justice, a justice that will teach the rich man to follow Shakespeare's advice:

"Take physic, Pomp
Expose thyself to feel the woes that wretches feel,
So shalt thou shake the superflux to them;
And show the heavens more just."

We want a justice, as Lord Coleridge said not long ago, that will revise the laws relating to property in order to facilitate all peoples' inevitable transition from feudalism to democracy, towards which, as Bryce says, all nations are travelling, some with slower, but all with unrelenting feet. But what we most need is the justice of justice. *Equality of virtue.*

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE "Jew" question is up again; this time in the form of a complaint by *The American Hebrew* against the publishers of the *Century* dictionary for its offensive definition of the word "Sheeny." Here is the opaque way in which the dictionary defines the word: "Sheeny, (origin obscure,) A sharp fellow, hence a Jew; a term of opprobrium, also used attributively. (Slang.)" The phrase "origin obscure," is the awkward apology of the dictionary maker for not knowing anything about the word, and a complacent insinuation that as the origin of the word was unknown to him, therefore it must be unknown to everybody else. His experimental guess at the meaning of it shows what a dictionary man can do with a word that he does not understand, "a sharp fellow, hence a Jew." Not the slightest etymological hint is given why "Sheeny" means a sharp fellow, nor why "sharp fellow" means a Jew. The insulting word is derived from *chien*, the French for dog, a pet name which for ages was given by the Christians to the Jews. In the gorgeous novel *Ivanhoe*, the insulting epithet is freely given to the meek and long suffering Isaac of York. Even that paragon of Christian chivalry, the haughty Templar, Brian de Bois Guilbert, can say nothing more courteous to Isaac than "Jew dog," and "Unbelieving dog." In the nations of the east,

"Sheeny" means a Christian, and the complimentary name by which an American or a European is saluted in Mohammedan countries is "Christian dog." Thus the law of retaliation travels round the world; and hate begets hate, and wrong begets wrong.

* * *

In one of the pictorial papers is a picture of Mr. Blaine as a diplomatic Samson armed with a club, and surrounded by the prostrate rulers of Germany, England, Italy, and various other countries, who have all been overthrown by this imaginary champion of the world, the essence of Bismark, Gladstone, and Cavour, condensed into one Herculean statesman. That kind of pictorial swagger would be very imposing if its anticlimax were not continually bobbing up in the form of some international triumph like that which the United States of America has just obtained over Frank Sherman, formerly of Milwaukee in the State of Wisconsin. Frank is a lad who wandered away to New York, and there got a job of taking care of cattle on the "Nederland," bound from that city to Antwerp. From Antwerp he went to London, but finding no employment there he became homesick, and homesickness is a disease which appeals with rare magnetic force to human sympathy. It is a virtuous complaint, either in boy or man. Frank had no money, so rather than starve in London, he stowed himself away on board the National liner "England," and when discovered worked his passage to New York. He was detained at the barge office about a week, and then the acting Commissioner of Immigration ponderously decided that he must be driven from his native land, and taken back to London. In vain the boy pleaded that he was an American, and begged that he might be allowed to go to his mother in Chicago. His plea availed not, and sentence of transportation for life was solemnly pronounced against him; not by a court, nor on the verdict of a jury, but on the despotic and arbitrary whim of an acting Commissioner of Immigration. In violation of the Constitution of the United States, this friendless and bewildered lad was doomed to perpetual expatriation for the gratuitous and illegal reason that "no decent American boy would stow away on a ship." Mr. Justice Shallow himself was too deep to give so small a reason for so large a punishment. Suppose that when the boy reaches London, the English Commissioner of Immigration refuses to receive him, on the ground that he is an American emigrant, having no means, and likely to become a pauper, or a contract laborer, or some other wicked thing. Suppose the Commissioner over there orders him back to America. Then, in this puerile game of battledore and shuttlecock the lad will have to spend the remainder of his life in traveling back and forth from New York to London and from London to New York.

* * *

It affords me great pleasure to say by way of a postscript, that the judgment against Frank Sherman has been reversed, and the prisoner set at liberty. Two or three weeks ago I expressed a wish in *The Open Court* "that some of our immigration laws might be tested by the writ of *Habeas Corpus*." The hint was not lost, for as soon as Frank Sherman's case became known in New York a public spirited local paper—I am sorry I do not know the name of it—resolved to apply the test in his behalf. Accordingly the necessary steps were taken, the papers made out, and application was about to be made to the Supreme Court for the writ, when the Acting Commissioner of Immigration surrendered; like the coon, who perceiving the famous marksman Col. Martin Scott about to fire at him, came down from the tree and gave himself up, remarking to the Colonel that he need not fire. Surely it must have been some Acting Commissioner of Immigration who provoked the contempt of Shakespeare for those tyrannical officials, who "clothed with a little brief authority play such fantastic tricks before high heaven as makes the angels weep."

It is a matter of national pride to the people of Bulgaria that the assassins of that country are very polite and gentlemanly men. A short time ago M. Constantine Belcheff, the Minister of Finance was unskilfully shot and killed while walking in the streets of Sofia in company with M. Stambuloff the Prime Minister. It was thought at the time that M. Belcheff was the victim of mistaken identity, and this belief has been confirmed by the following apology which has been carved on his tomb-stone, "Forgive us, we aimed at Stambuloff and struck you. The second time we will not fail." This explanation which ought to be satisfactory to the spirit of M. Belcheff, will have a tendency to make M. Stambuloff uncomfortable. And how do those affable assassins know that at the second attempt they will not fail? This promise is a feeble assurance to any other friend of M. Stambuloff who may be in the habit of walking with him in the streets of Sofia. The mistake reminds me of the winter of 1861 when we occupied St. Louis, and that city was under martial law. It was the duty of the patrol guard to scour the city and arrest all soldiers found out of barracks after nine o'clock at night. The saloons usually furnished a goodly number of delinquents, and it was a common practice for some of them to break away from the patrol. Then the guard would fire at them, generally missing the fugitives, and hitting a citizen or two. This caused the newspapers to request the commanding general to furnish blank cartridges for the patrol guard, or—better marksmen. The assassins of Bulgaria will do well to make a note of this, and take a course of instruction in a shooting gallery before they fire again at the Prime Minister.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

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CHRISTIANITY, ITS SPIRIT AND ITS ERRORS.*

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I.

IN human actions—in even the most beautiful actions—the negative side much sooner, and more strongly reveals its quality than the positive side. In these last years there has been observable a consoling return of society to religious interests, and yet in this also we mainly view the deleterious, wrong side. The most distressing consequence of this consists in the fact, that the mind, while stranger to true religion, or, at all events not sufficiently penetrated by it, lays hold of religion under the influence of fashion, and unable to handle the matter at issue, lingers about various fictions created by itself and others. Among the actual transformations of Christianity, the most harmless is that, which, under the name of Christian religion, endeavors to propagate an abstract morality, partly of a philanthropical, and partly of an ascetical nature. And very plausible reasons are offered for substitutions of this kind. That Christianity principally consists in love to our neighbor, and in a benevolent life, is about as true as the dictum, that grape-wine, chemically speaking mainly consists of water. Moreover, pure morals, like pure water, are not only very useful, but they actually constitute an object of prime necessity. Yet, why thus dupe ourselves by calling water wine, and abstract morality Christianity? The precepts of temperance, of justice and humanity, ascetical and philanthropic tendencies exclusively, do not belong to any particular religious doctrine, but, providentially, all this makes up the common inheritance of many religious and philosophical schools. And if the matter really consisted in those precepts by themselves, then there is no reason why they should not be set forth in a straightforward way, for their own intrinsic merit. But, why do we display that particular sign, which mainly points to objects of a different kind, foreign, and even disagreeable to the teachers of pure morals? Nobody forbids us to handle water by itself; but why distribute it into wine bottles? And why add it to the wine?

There exists another obnoxious transformation. Many people, recognising in Christianity, irrespective

of pure morals, certain other essential elements, such as dogmas, sacraments, hierarchy, imagine, that in these elements *by themselves*, consists all the force of the Christian religion. Continuing the above comparison, this would resemble a man, who, while knowing the chemical difference of wine from water to consist of alcohol, and some other ingredients, should on this basis, give us to drink, instead of wine, undiluted spirit mixed with tannic acid and some coloring matter. The deadly effects of such a treatment would be obvious. And similar effects, as history proves, always resulted from the adulteration of vital Christianity with the undiluted spirit of abstract dogmas, with hierarchical and mystic elements that cannot be reconciled with the principles of human enlightenment.

If in Christianity we behold a living religion, in which we spiritually subsist, all dispute about prevalence or prominence of this or that given element really has no meaning. It may be quite interesting, to know the chemical ingredients of our food, but no chemist, through the results of his analysis, will substitute carbon for bread, or nitrogen for meat. He himself only feeds on the concrete organic union of these elements, as other men do, who never heard of chemistry.

In the vital relation to Christianity, the essential significance, does not belong to these or those integral elements of this religion, but only to the one spiritual principle, that shapes out of those elements a definite totality, and from which all the parts receive their relative power and importance. Unalloyed Christianity is neither dogma nor hierarchy, neither divine worship nor morals, but the vivifying spirit of Christ, really though invisibly present in humanity, and acting upon it through a complex process of spiritual development and growth—a spirit, embodied in religious forms and institutions, constituting the terrestrial church, its visible embodiment, *yet not spiritually exhausted by these forms*, and not finally and absolutely realised in any given external fact. Traditional institutions, forms, and formulas, are indispensable to Christian humanity as a skeleton for a vital organism of a higher order; but, the skeleton itself does not constitute the living body. It is impossible, that any higher organism could live without bones, but when the walls of the

* Translated from the Russian periodical *Voprosy Filozofii i Psichologii* by Albert Gunlogson.

arteries, or the valves of the heart begin to ossify, that is a sure symptom of inevitable death.

I do not intend here to discuss the life itself of Christian societies, but I only wish to point out several theoretical mistakes of Christianity, that, moreover, possess a certain practical significance, as decidedly unfavorable symptoms of our own state of social sanity.

II.

All are agreed, that actual, original Christianity is the identical system once taught by the founder of our religion himself. What, precisely, did he proclaim? If we cull from the Gospels, isolated utterances, the question would receive a number of different answers. Some will find the substance of Christian doctrine in non-resistance to evil; others, in submission to spiritual power ("hearkening to you, they listen to me"); still others will persist in faith in a judgment, or, in the separation of the divine from the worldly, and so forth. All these texts gleaned at random, furnish in a fragmentary way whatever is required; but when read in their full context, they no longer afford the wished for meaning. Laying aside these exegetical abstractions, we shall only remark, that many views concerning the essence of Christianity,—although differing among themselves, yet each of them having an equal foundation on some evangelical text,—do not at all express the true essence of Christianity; but, at best, are only partial illustrations of the doctrine, and can be said to reach only so far, as the isolated utterances of Christ himself have been reached and understood. To understand the real sense of these partial truths, and to estimate their real significance, is only possible through their relation to the one central idea of Christianity. But, for the definition of the latter, it would be impossible to rely mechanically on the letter of the separate texts, but we must have recourse to another more sensible method. Is there nothing in the Gospels, which directly points to that which Christ himself, and his most intimate disciples recognised as the very substance of his teaching? As a matter of fact, also in the Gospel, Christ has spoken of his doctrine in its concreteness, and the idea of Christianity is there expressed as of one totality. And, how is it then stated? Is his teaching called the doctrine of non-resistance to evil, or that of spiritual power, or that concerning judgment, sacraments, the dogma of the trinity, redemption, etc.? Nothing of the kind. All these points, indeed, are found in the Gospel, but the Gospel itself, the glad tidings of Christ himself, are not proclaimed from these points of view. That announcement does not call itself the Gospel of non-resistance, the Gospel of heredity, the Gospel of judgment, the Gospel of faith, or even the Gospel of love; but it constantly proclaims,

and invariably calls itself *the Gospel of the kingdom*—the glad tidings of the kingdom of God.*

The word of truth, that the son of man soweth is "the word of the kingdom"; the secrets revealed by him are "the secrets of the kingdom," etc.

In this way, without doubt, the central idea of the Gospel itself, according to the Gospel itself, is the idea of the kingdom of God. To either the direct or indirect elucidation of this idea are devoted almost all the sermons and parables of Christ, his esoteric conversations with the disciples, and finally the prayer to God the Father. From the connection of the texts relating thereto, it is clear, that the evangelical idea of the kingdom is not derived from the concept of divine rule, existing above all things, and attributed to God, conceived as almighty. This supreme dominion is an eternal, immutable fact, whereas the kingdom proclaimed by Christ is a thing, advancing, approaching, arriving. Moreover it possesses different sides of its own. It is within us, and likewise reveals itself without; it keeps growing within humanity and the whole world by means of a certain objective, organic process, and it is taken hold of by a spontaneous effort of our own will. To the worshipers of the letter all this may seem contradictory, but in those, who possess the mind of Christ all this actually concurs together in one simple and all comprehensive definition, through which the kingdom of God is: *the full realisation of the divine in the natural—through the God-man Christ, or in other words, the fulness of natural, human life, united by Christ to the fulness of divinity.*

The perfect union of the divinity with humanity, necessarily ought to be reciprocal; for that union, in which one of the parties is annihilated or in which it does not preserve its freedom, is not a perfect union. The internal possibility, the fundamental condition for union with the divinity is thus found within man himself—the kingdom of heaven is within you. But, this possibility ought to pass into effect; man ought to reveal the kingdom of God, that is hidden within him, and for this purpose he ought to join the manifest effort of his own free will to the mystic effects of grace within him; the kingdom of God is conquered by exertion, and only those, who employ active efforts shall possess it. Without such individual efforts the possibility remains merely a possibility; the pledge of future grace perishes.† The kingdom of God having

* Math: iii, 2; iv, 17, 23; v, 3, 10, 19, 20; vi, 10, 33; vii, 21; viii, 11; ix, 35; x, 7; xi, 11, 12; xii, 28; xiii, 11, 19, 24, 31, 33, 38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 52; xvi, 19, 28; xviii, 1, 23; xix, 12, 14, 23, 24; xx, 1; xxii, 2; xxiii, 13; xxiv, 14; xxv, 1, 34. Mark: i, 14, 15; iv, 11, 26, 28; ix, 1; x, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25; xii, 34; xiv, 35. Luke: iv, 43; viii, 1, 10; ix, 2, 11, 27, 60, 62; x, 9; xi, 2, 20; xii, 31; xiii, 18, 20; xiv, 15; xvi, 16; xvii, 20, 21; xviii, 16, 17, 24, 25, 29; xix, 11; xxi, 31; xxii, 16, 18, 29, 30; xxiii, 42, 51. John: iii, 3, 5; xviii, 36. Acts: i, 3.

† In this respect it is remarkable that the words: "the kingdom of heaven is within you" by Christ were addressed to the unbelieving Scribes and Pharisees, of whom the majority remained unbelievers; consequently, here is only meant the pent-up potential capacity of human nature for a union with God.

thus been realised in the eternal divine idea and potentially approaching to human nature, there remains also something to be achieved for us, and by ourselves. From this side it becomes our own work, the task of our own act, and these cannot be limited by the separate, individual existence of isolated human beings. Man is by nature a social being, and the highest work of his life, the supreme aim of all his efforts, does not depend upon his individual fate, but upon the social fate of collective humanity. For the realisation of the divine kingdom, it is inevitably necessary that it pass into a personal ethical movement, and that the latter, for the attainment of its fulness, pass into a social movement of the entire humanity, extending thus at a given moment, and under given conditions to the general divine human process of universal history. If the divine kingdom is the wedding of grace unto humanity, it follows, that it will not be observable in man in his egotism, but in man as a living member of the universal whole. In this way man finds the kingdom of heaven, not only within himself, but also before himself in the onward march according to the revelation not only in the actual union of the deity with past and present humanity, but also in the ideal anticipation of a further and more perfect union in the future. In all this, without doubt, there is something foreordained fatalistic; that is, not dependent on the personal will of the individual. But, individual freedom none the less is preserved, because every man may by his own will avail himself or not of the common religious property of humanity; he may or he may not add his own vital effort to the organic growth of the kingdom of God. The latter, at all events, is not limited by the subjective, ethical world of particular individuals, but it possesses its own objective activity, general forms and laws, and is evolved according to a complex historical process, in which individuals play partly an active, and partly a passive rôle. Hence, the important significance of the visible church, as a formal, symbolical institution, by a certain number of steps realising the universal totality, in which the particular individuals participate in the constitution, into which they enter, but which latter, on the other hand, does not at all represent their arithmetical sum, or mechanical mass. And, moreover, only in this objectively organised character of the collective divine-human process, as presupposing and including our personal, moral acts, only in this *super-personal* character of this process becomes possible that given apparent *suddenness* in the approach of its final results, as directly confirmed by the Gospel.* As a matter of course, this suddenness is only relative, and fully concurring with the uninterrupted and predetermined growth of the di-

vine-human organism; and, moreover, this suddenness of outward manifestation of the inwardly prepared critical moments in its growth is purely physical. The seed corn, after growing out of the soil, in a like manner suddenly transfers its germs to the earth, and just as suddenly the ripened fruit drops upon the ground; so even the most important phases of the *divine kingdom* come, although suddenly, yet in the *fulness of time*, to wit, when prepared by the preceding process. This suddenness, accordingly, does not exclude, but on the contrary, presupposes the efficient co-operation of individual efforts, in the general growth of the kingdom of God.

Thus the superficially apparent contradictions between the internal and external character of the kingdom of God, between its progressive, and its spontaneous realisation are removed by the true conception of the fact. As existing for our benefit, the divine kingdom must necessarily be within our own spiritual constitution, particularly, through the condition of our internal union with God. A union of this kind attained its individual perfection in the person of the God-man Christ; but here it also revealed itself as super-individual. True *union with another* cannot be a subjective condition only; the union of every man with God cannot be simply personal. The divine or heavenly kingdom cannot be a psychological fact only; but, above all, it is the eternal objective truth of a positive total truth. This truth is deposited in the social character of the natural man, in the universal, all-comprehensive essence of his mind, although it is not actually given, but only potentially bestowed. The fulness of all being, in a perfect manner united to God through the son of man,—such is this absolute ideal, the realisation of which began and is continued in universal history, as a common achievement of humanity; all human souls work for its realisation, unconsciously and spontaneously; all share in the same, and, moreover, while self-acting and self-conscious, this ideal constitutes the social duty of every enlightened Christian. From this side the divine kingdom is not made up of the simple act of the union of the soul with God, but consists of a complex and all-embracing process, to wit, the physico-spiritual growth and development of the unified divine-human organism in the world. And this increase, like every organic growth, does not only represent a non-interruption of the quantitative moments, but also represents the different shades of qualitative steps and forms, of which although the highest may presuppose the lowest, and be prepared by them, yet in nowise can be entirely derived from them, and therefore also appear as something new and strange.*

* Math. xxiv, 27, 29. Conf., on the other hand, in the same chapter 31, 33.

* But these new wonders at the same time are also new revelations, that throw a light on the preceding mysteries and enigmas. Because from the

And having set forth the above central idea of Christianity, we shall easily distinguish and expose the different phases of the errors actually prevailing. Among these we shall here notice only the most obnoxious.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

FREETHOUGHT, ITS TRUTH AND ITS ERROR.

By freethought we understand the right of every thinker to seek for, to find, and to state the truth himself, and in calling freethought "a right" we are well aware of the fact that as all rights are only the reverse of duties, so freethought is at the same time the duty of every thinking being to seek for, to find, and to state the truth for himself. And this duty, in our conception of religion, is also the highest religious duty of man. The religion of science, therefore, may also be called, in this sense, the religion of freethought.

Freethought stands in opposition to authoritative belief. There have been and there are still religious teachers and institutions which maintain that man should not seek the truth for himself, because he is, as is claimed, unable to find it, and if a man has become convinced that he has found some truth for himself, he must be mistaken and therefore he should not be allowed to pronounce it, his errors being injurious to his fellowmen.

Man accordingly, because he cannot know, should believe, he should trust in what he is told to be the truth, he should give himself and his reasoning up to the higher authority of the church, "bringing into captivity every thought" (2 Cor. x, 5). Freethought has risen in revolution to the religion of blind obedience, and freethought, although first suppressed by ecclesiastical and secular authorities, has come out victorious in the end and is now almost generally recognised as the cornerstone of progress among all the nations which represent civilised humanity.

Freethought has often been misunderstood. It is not only misinterpreted by the adversaries of freethought, but not unfrequently also by those who call themselves freethinkers. Freethought does not mean that thought is free or should be free, it simply claims freedom for the thinker to think undisturbedly and uninterfered with for himself. The thought of the thinker however is not free and cannot be free, in the sense that the thinker can think however he pleases. Freethought, it is true, claims the liberty and the right to think for the individual; but that right being procured, the individual can think only by renouncing its individuality. We can dream as we please, we can imagine that this or that might be so or so just as we like. But when we think, we cannot come to a conclusion just as we please, we have radically and entirely to

give up our likes and dislikes in order to arrive at what can objectively be proved to be the truth.

The freethinker who claims not only liberty for thought, but also liberty of thought is gravely mistaken. There is no liberty of thought. The mere idea "liberty of thought" is a contradiction, for thought is strict obedience to the laws of thought and only by strict obedience can we arrive at the truth which is always the purpose and final aim of thought.

The error that there can be liberty of thought has led to another erroneous idea which is a misinterpretation of the principle of tolerance. We certainly believe in tolerance, but tolerance means the recognition of other people's right to express their opinion. It does not mean that any and every opinion is of equal value. Tolerance demands that the opinions of those who seek the truth should be heard; they should not be put down with violence or treated with contempt. Yet tolerance does not exclude criticism; it does not and should not abolish the struggle for truth among those who believe that they have found the truth. For truth is objective and there is but one truth. If tolerance is based upon the idea that truth is merely subjective, that something may be true to me which is not true to you, and that therefore an objective conception of the truth is an impossibility, tolerance has to be denounced as a superstition. Tolerance in this sense is injurious to progress, for it prevents the search for truth and leads to the stagnancy of indolent indifferentism.

The expression objectivity of truth must not be understood in the sense that truth is an object. Truth is not a thing, but a relation. Truth is the congruence of our ideas with the reality represented in these ideas. If the idea is a correct representation of the reality represented so as to form a reliable guidance in our deportment toward the reality, it is true. That truth can be more or less clear, that it can more or less be mingled with errors, that it can be more or less complete or exhaustive is a matter of course. Truth cannot be possessed as objects are possessed so that we either have it entire or not at all. Truth is the product of our exertions, it is the result of our search for truth, so that, the world of realities with its innumerable relations and unlimited changes being living before us, immeasurable, interminable, and eternal, truth can never be complete, never perfect, never absolute in the minds of mortal beings. But that proves only the greatness of the universe and the grandness of the object of our cognition. It is no fault of truth. For truth remains truth, it remains objective, and can as such serve as a guidance for conduct, even though it be incomplete and imperfect. We however are freethinkers and search boldly for a more complete and more perfect conception of truth, because we trust in

true teleological point of view even the lowest steps and forms presuppose the highest, as their ultimate aim, and because only through the disclosure of that highest aim they explain themselves, and obtain a meaning.

truth—in its objectivity, its exclusiveness, its universality, and its authority.

Freethought, if the word is conceived as the right and the duty of everybody to think for himself, boldly abolishes the slavery of blind obedience, but it does not abolish, as is sometimes erroneously supposed, any and every authority. On the contrary, its claim is based upon authority and can be maintained only on the strength of this authority. This authority is the objectivity of truth, which involves its uniqueness. There is but one truth. All the many different truths are but so many parts or aspects of truth; and although the different aspects of truth may form contrasts, although we may state them in paradoxical formulas, they never can collide so as to enter into a real and actual contradiction. Whatever is positively contradictory to truth is impossible, for truth is one and is always in harmony with itself. Truth is objective and the right to think is based upon the confidence that correct thought which is rigidly obedient to the laws of thought, will lead to the cognition of truth.

Freethought accordingly is not the renunciation of all authority, it is only the renunciation of human authority. It is not the abdication of obedience, it is only the abdication of blind obedience. Freethought refuses to recognise special revelations not merely because it disbelieves the reports made about these special revelations, not merely because it declares them to be doubtful and unreliable. Freethought would be weak if it were based on mere negations and disbeliefs, and that freethought which never ventures farther than the negations is weak indeed. Freethought refuses to recognise special revelation, because it believes in the universal revelation of truth. The God of freethought is not a God who contradicts himself, who makes exceptions of his will by miracles for those who seek after signs. The God of freethought is not far from every one of us. We can seek him, if haply we might feel after him and find him. For in him we live and move and have our being. He appears in the realities of nature and of nature's laws, and his revelation is not dual; it is one, it is throughout consistent with itself and every one is welcome to search for the truth.

Because God has been conceived as a miracle-working magician, and because the ecclesiastical authorities have again and again maintained that such a God alone can be called a God, freethought has been driven into the negativism of atheism. But if God is conceived as the objective reality in which we live and move and have our being, as that power the cognition of which is truth and conformity to which is morality, freethought is by no means either negative or atheistic. Freethought is by no means a mere

negation of belief, it is by no means an overthrow of religion, or a reversal of religious authority. Freethought is a strong and potent faith. It is the faith in truth.

The faith of freethought is as a grain of mustard seed, which indeed, is the least of all seeds, but when it is grown it is the greatest among herbs, and becometh a tree, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in the branches thereof. The faith of freethought is in the beginning a mere maxim, a hope, an ideal. But it is founded on the rock of ages; it is founded upon truth. The faith of freethought is justified. We have a right to search for the truth; yea, we have the duty to search for the truth. And why? Because truth can be cognised. Truth is not an illusion, not a mere subjective fancy, it is founded upon objective reality. It is an ideal that can be approached more and more, not a mere vision but a realisable actuality. It is a path, although a steep path full of thorns, a narrow and strait gate and few there are that find it. But we must find it for all other paths lead astray. And we can find it, and blessed are those who have found it, for it alone leads onward and upward; it alone is the way of life, it alone is the road of progress.

CURRENT TOPICS.

READING the church notices on Sunday morning, as my custom is, in order to determine where I may get the most religious instruction, I noticed with some surprise that there were five "Churches of Christ" in Chicago, and one of them was advertised as "The Colored Church of Christ." I confess that I care little about the points of doctrine that separate the sects, but in a church thus classified and branded I take deep interest, and I wonder what Jesus of Nazareth would have thought of a "Colored church of Christ," could he have imagined a solecism so grotesque, one church for the sheep and another for the goats, one temple for the white and another for the colored soul, if souls are colored, as probably they are not. It appears to me that this exclusion of colored people from the churches of Christ that are not colored, renders white christianity null and void, and many of the churches of Chicago are guilty of blaspheming in that way. They have eloquent preaching and praying in them, and sweet voices like those of angels chant psalms of heavenly splendor, forced up higher and higher by the tones of a Gothic organ wherein dwells the very genius of melody; but it appears to me that if the colored brother is not welcome there, the worship is all in vain. The preaching and the praying, and the songs and the music do not even reach to the top of the steeple much less to heaven. They grovel near the ground like the smoke of Cain's burnt offering rejected of the Lord.

* * *

In harmony with the movement already started for keeping foreigners out of this country, is the supplementary movement about to be started for keeping Americans in. In a patriotic lamentation radiating from Chicago, a complaint is made that the American tourists who visit Europe every summer take too much money out of the country; and therefore they and their money should be compelled to stay at home. One of the "great dailies," great in size I mean, points with exultant finger to the difference in value between some Exports and some Imports; and joyfully

shows a "balance of trade" in our favor amounting to several millions of dollars and odd cents. In a comical sort of burlesque its pæon of triumph dies away into the following dirge, played slowly in a minor key: "All this balance is wasted and lost by American travelers who spend their money abroad." According to the spirit of this complaint, unless we can have laws to keep within the country all Americans who have dollars, it only gives a half protection to keep out foreigners who have none. With unconscious and unpremeditated humor, the "great daily" aforesaid, while deploring the wickedness of Americans who spend in London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin, the money that ought to be kept in their own country, delightfully unaware of any inconsistency, gives through its own columns pressing and persuasive invitations to the citizens of all nations, urging them to visit America in 1893, and spend *their* money in Chicago.

* * *

The United States Mint is in peril. There are new coins to be made, with new designs, and there is only one man in this country who can make designs for coins. I have always envied the man whose head and shoulders rise above the clouds of mediocrity; who can do any one thing better than any other man can do it; but how his inefficient glory pales in the presence of the only man who can do it at all. He is the very incarnation of royalty, and monopoly is his prerogative. The thought that possibly he may die sends a chill creeping down the spine. There have been men before who thought that the world could not get along without them, but here is a man in Philadelphia who *knows* that it cannot get along without him. The art of making designs for coins is his own private property, and unlike all other property, he can take it away with him when he dies. When we lose him we lose the art also. "I have told our engraver," said the Secretary of the Mint, "to prepare me a set of designs for subsidiary coins. I will not do anything with the dollar for some time. There is no hurry about it, and the weather is too warm to worry ourselves about anything that does not require immediate attention." It is the luxurious and reposeful ethics of the "Departments," never to hurry or worry, especially in the hot weather, and over so large a matter as the silver dollar. If the Department of the Mint will focus its intellect on the small and subsidiary coins, it is all the country ought to expect of it during the hot weather. "Our engraver at Philadelphia," said the Secretary of the Mint, "is the only competent person to prepare these designs." In this country, he meant, for he languidly continued, "We might get them in France. The French coin work is of the most artistic description." And when common sense wanted to know why he did not get them in France, the Secretary answered, "Because the people of the United States would never forgive us if we went outside this country for our designs." This people are owners of half a continent, filled with natural wealth unparalleled among nations; and looking at them through the wrong end of his telescope, the Secretary of the Mint thought they were too little to forgive him for getting his coins designed in France, where such work is "of the most artistic description." The War Department, being of a more martial spirit than the Department of the Mint, is not afraid of the people of the United States, for I read that in experimenting with a great gun at Sandy Hook on the 25th of July it was loaded "with 250 pounds of German prismatic powder." I wonder if the people of the United States will ever forgive the War Department for loading American guns with German powder.

* * *

The broad, expansive, continental political economy to which I have just referred, reminds me of that antediluvian epoch when the circus first crossed the Mississippi into northern Iowa. I was living in Marbletown at the time, and I shall always remember the spiritual stimulation produced by that circus, and the munici-

pal importance which it conferred upon the town. From a drowsy, shiftless village it sprang at one bound up to metropolitan rank, and immediately put on airs of superiority over the rival village of Rockbottom which the circus had scornfully passed by. From the very day that the advance agent came along, and stuck his dazzling posters on the fences the citizens assumed a higher tone. They straightened up as it were, and adopted city forms. Men put on civilised clothes, and discarded coon-skin caps and moccasins. Women who had always gone barefoot in the summer put on shoes, and talked of being "in society"; and ladies who persisted in going barefoot were no longer counted among the "best people." The moral improvement effected by the circus, although not permanent, was very perceptible at the time of which I speak. Of course we did not get all that was promised by the bills; but I argued then, and I maintain it now, that for every half dollar paid by those who were not able to crawl under the tent, we got a dollar's worth of what the handbills called "innocent amusement blended with instruction." The jokes of the clown, while to jaded appetites they may have had a flavor of antiquity, were fresh as roasting ears to us, and as juicy. The elephant was a poem, and take it for all in all, I think that for shaking lethargy out of a country village a circus is better than an earthquake. However, all this is merely a preamble introducing the catastrophe described in the next paragraph, wherein lies the moral of my story.

* * *

This fable if judiciously studied will show the duty of keeping money in our own country, and *a fortiori* in our own town. The next evening, after the circus had gone, a lot of us, in fact all the leading citizens of the place were seated on the benches in front of Abner Clark's tavern, reveling in the good humor which the circus had left in the air. We were praising the sword swallowing, the ground and lofty tumbling, the polandering, and the somersault throwing. We were wondering how any man could jump over eight horses and an elephant, when who should come along but Deacon Shadrach Sturn, a mathematical man who had elected himself by a large majority to the office of town critic, censor, and statistician. He intercepted the rays of the beneficial sun, as his custom was, and he lowered the genial thermometer thirty-five degrees by showing that a circus was against the laws of God and Political Economy. By the aid of a pencil he "cal'lated" that, supposing the adult attendance at the two performances to be so many, and this, he said, was a "conservative estimate," and figuring the children who went in at half price at so many, and adding the two sums together, the result was as he showed with sardonic triumph the enormous sum of two hundred and seven dollars and seventy-five cents actual cash money taken out of town by the circus, and wantonly diverted from the channels of home trade; not counting the loss of time thus frivolously wasted; which, allowing that of the men to be worth only ten cents an hour, and that of the boys five cents, and estimating the time of the women and girls as worth nothing "for the purposes of this argument," then adding together the number of hours, after subtracting the women from the men and the girls from the boys, and multiplying that number by the total attendance, and this again by seven and a half the compromise medium between ten cents and five cents, and dividing the whole product by the common denominator, "we have another enormous sum of thirty-nine dollars and twenty-five cents withdrawn from the gross capital of Marbletown by the circus," said the mathematical Shadrach Sturn. The fun, good nature, and child happiness that the circus left in the village counted for nothing. Gloom and laziness again settled upon Marbletown; it relapsed into its former state of coon-skin caps and moccasins. It adopted sackcloth and shiftlessness in self-reproach for allowing so much money to be carried out of town by the circus. "And all for the gratification of a sentiment,"

said Shadrach. We are trying to shrivel the United States of America to the size of Marbletown; and the policy of the great republic will soon be under the direction of that eminent economist and statesman Sturn.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

PROF. F. MAX MUELLER ON "BRIGHT EYES AND DARK EYES."

"I sent my soul through the invisible,
Some letter of the after life to spell;
And by and by my soul returned to me
And answered, 'I myself am Heaven and Hell.'"

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

PERMIT me to make a very few remarks on what I conceive to be fallacies in the above article in *The Open Court* of June 18. Prof. Max Müller really writes as if approving the relative and materialistic system of the world while advocating what is virtually one founded on Theology and Philology (Metaphysics). As he confessedly allows that he did not always get the best of the argument in his discussions with the Japanese Buddhist priest—"his excellent friend Bunyiu Nanjio"—on the subject of prayer. Like Bishop Colenso's experience with the Zulu. The professor states, "he was quite startled when his friend declared to him that his sect considered prayer as sinful, as almost [quite] blasphemous," which surely is the verdict not only of Japanese Buddhism, but of Reason and Common Sense, and commonplace as well. The great philologist's *per contra* contention that "Prayer is a universal custom, arising from the most natural impulse of the human heart, that it is only an expression of our own helplessness and of our trust in a higher power, and that, even if not granted, a prayer would help us to submit more readily to the inscrutable degrees of a higher wisdom" is a mere begging of the question and will not hold water at all when traced to its real source. The Buddhist counter place seems perfectly inexpugnable "that, if we really believe in that supreme wisdom and power, it would be an insult to put our own small wisdom against the higher, or in any way to try to interfere with the workings of that higher power." Surely here the argument is against the unscientific plea of your eloquent contributor "that we are so made that we must believe in a Maker of the World, or in an Agent behind all the phenomena of nature, or in a First Cause." The present standpoint both of moral and physical science, especially as contained in the Evolution theory of things, is that true Ontology, as Lessing long since, though rather confusedly, adumbrated, is not for the human mind at all, which "must" limit itself to the non-absolute or relational sphere itself. And virtually, in his closing sentence, the professor seems to make at least a very palpable compromise and even in a great measure, to go over to the camp of the *Atheos*. As Cudworth and Bacon were held to do—much to the former's disgust and distress. Bacon's quotation from Plutarch to the effect "that it is better not to believe in a God at all than to hold [as we must do from the seamy side of Nature—at once *Alma Mater* and step mother]—that he devours his offspring," sufficiently interprets the *real* Baconian Verdict, and quite neutralises the whole gist of his essay on Atheism and of his unworthy depreciation of Epicurism and by implication Euhemerism—in his otherwise sublime and veracious *Essay on Truth*. Prof. Max Müller, it seems clear, is still in the bonds of Animism and Dualism, as proved elsewhere by his uncompromising hostility to Darwinism which involves also his disbelief in the doctrine of development (Becoming) of early Pan-Socratic Greek thinkers, who as Ueberweg states, were to a man Hylo-Zoists.

R. LEWINS, M. D.

*How about idolators swinging their idols when their petitions were not granted. See an article on "Divine Right" in the June number of *Cornhill Magazine*.

ENTERTAINMENT FOR THE MASSES.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :—

OBSERVING the crowds that frequent a good soda water fountain on a hot day, one is led to ask why this evident liking of the people for cool drinks of a harmless nature is not taken advantage of by those who endeavor to improve the morals and health of the workman. Why should not also hot drinks in cold weather dispensed in the same way be equally profitable and popular? Let a man who is willing to sink some money with the expectation of ultimate large returns—what he might perhaps venture in a newspaper enterprise—put a good sum into fitting up a general amusement and refreshment establishment in a good location in Chicago, and conduct it in as attractive a way as possible minus intoxicants and immorality, and he would accomplish more for the common class of workers than could be accomplished by a dozen churches.

My scheme in brief is this:

First a refreshment stand and restaurant. The windows should display some interesting novelty, and on one side should be a handsome bar for hot drinks, and on the other, one for cold drinks, with general restaurant in the rear.

Second, there should be in close connection a large hall for music and theatricals, and fitted with tables and all the furnishings of a variety theatre. In fact it should be a variety theatre with the indecency and vulgarity left out, but giving the most popular music and plays by the best musicians and actors procurable. It could also be used for panoramas, stereopticon entertainments, athletic exhibitions, etc.

Third, a smaller hall should be provided for amateur theatricals, meetings of social and literary clubs, and for dances.

Fourth, a reading room for distinctly popular literature, the daily, illustrated, and humorous papers, the popular magazines, and good but entertaining books. Photographs, photogravures, etchings, and pictures of all kinds should be provided for examination, and also to let. By this means a working-girl might easily brighten and beautify her room anew each month at small expense, and privilege of purchase being granted, might become owner of artistic things which pleased her most. This plan might also include statuettes and *bric-a-brac*. A work of art is always open to view and exercises its refining influence more constantly and directly than a book. A library which would circulate pictures, the latest and most popular as well as reproductions of the great masters of the past, would accomplish great good, and I do not see why this has not been before carried out. Musical instruments could also be rented.

Fifth, the scheme should also by all means embrace parlors attractively furnished, with piano, etc., where two or three workmen might bring two or three working girls, and spend by themselves a pleasant evening with music, conversation, cards, and dancing. A place of this kind would save many a one from the worst resorts.

Sixth, a billiard room, general card room, bowling alley, shooting gallery, gymnasium, and other features could be added when thought desirable.

All rooms should be ornamented with popular works of art yet having artistic excellence, though florid enough to outdo the gin palace. Refreshments should be served in all parts of the establishment as requested. Everything should be charged at just such a cut under ordinary rates as to be an inducement to patrons, but no more and no less. The whole should be conducted in a thoroughly business way, and in fact it should never be known outside the immediate projectors that anything else than money is in any wise contemplated. What the workman suspects is done merely for his good or out of charity, he will by a right and true instinct always avoid. He will shun those who come in a I-am-holier-than-thou attitude and with a let-me-lift-you-up-to-my-plane air

but he will quickly respond to any one who places before him things which are worth his buying. Every one, whatever be his particular opinion on temperance, must admit that the common saloon is the great foe of the workingman, and every careful observer must further, I think, grant this, that the foe must be met and vanquished on its own ground and by business methods. The manager should be not a distinctively good and philanthropic man, least of all a "reformed" man, but a keen business man with some practical acquaintance with his constituency. His zeal should be stimulated by rewards graduated by the success he attains toward making the venture pay on the general plan set forth.

The design of the establishment being to fill a large place as an amusement resort, it should always be kept purely secular. Sunday should have the most attractive bill, but no sermons or lectures should ever be allowed. The whole entertainment should always be thoroughly popular in tone, and what does not "take" should be promptly withdrawn. The object should be not to give anything conspicuously different from that usually found in common resorts, but merely something of a little better grade minus all whisky and vileness. With a good name and judicious advertising such an establishment, liberally and rightly conducted from the start, would end in a great success financially, and morally in proportion; for appreciation and interest shown by spending money is the best possible test of the hold which anything has upon the public. But he who undertakes the scheme must first make sure by thorough study of the lower kinds of resorts that he knows how to hit the popular taste. If the people want spectacle, dancing, and song, let them have it without lewdness; if they like athletic contests, let them have them without brutality; if they enjoy eating and drinking, let them do so without intoxicants; if they would have sociability and freedom, let it be without rowdiness and license. He who values the good of mankind will not care who makes their laws so long as he is able to control their amusements. The masses set over against a day of toil, an evening for amusement, and over against a six days of drudgery one day of pleasure; and this fact must be weighed well by all who undertake their elevation and improvement.

HIRAM M. STANLEY.

THE QUESTION OF MONOGAMY.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:-

ALLOW me, as one who has paid especial attention to the subject of Mrs. Susan Channing's communications to *The Open Court*, to say that, while I agree with her as to the importance of chastity for the well-being of a people, and while I reject entirely the view adopted by the writers she names, as to the sexual condition of primitive society, I strongly object to her statement that primitive man was monogamous. We can only judge, in this case, of the past by the present, and I think I may safely challenge Mrs. Channing to produce a single example of a really monogamous tribe of savages. Even if such a case, or half-a-dozen such cases exist it would not prove the rule. No doubt many individuals, from sheer necessity, have only one wife, but, as a fact, some form of group-marriage is practised by all savage tribes; although subject to the most careful restrictions for the prevention of marriage between persons near of kin. The argument in favor of primitive man having been monogamous, based on the fact (?) that syphilis was unknown prior to 1494, is more than weak. Mankind is known to have existed for at least 10,000 years, and may have existed as many centuries, and yet we can infer what was the sexual state of society at the beginning of the period from the happening of an event 400 years ago! The mere statement of the conditions shows the weakness of the argument. I heard the late Dr. J. F. McLennan say that mankind had existed so long on the earth that it is useless to endeavor to affiliate the present races. While I disagree with this opinion, the fact on which it is based should render us cautious in drawing conclusions.

Mrs. Channing has made a treble mistake in connection with the English Contagious Diseases Act. In the first place, the supposed repeal of the Act did *not* take place. Speaking from memory, only the clauses which placed its operation under government superintendence were repealed. Secondly, the cause of this partial repeal was not what your correspondent supposes. Of course the opponents of the Act affirmed that it did more harm than good, but their statements were shown to be incorrect, and the action of the government—that of Mr. Gladstone—in the matter was the outcome of pure sentiment. Thirdly, the Act was not soon (partially) repealed. It existed in its entirety long enough to prove its great value conclusively to those who could consider its object and operation in the spirit of reason. Possibly, however, Mrs. Channing and I are referring to different things; as several C. D. Acts were passed during the period the former names, and my statement relates to the last one.

C. STANILAND WAKE.

NOTES.

Professor Nicolas Grote, the editor of the Russian Quarterly Magazine *Voprosy Filosofii i Psichologii*, called my attention to Vladimir Solovieff's article on "Christianity," a translation of which appears in the present number of *The Open Court*. Professor Grote writes: "Vladimir Solovieff is at present, beside the Count Tolstoi, our most eminent thinker; he is a distinguished philosopher as well as theologian. I do not share his theological convictions, belonging myself to the small fraction of those Russian philosophers who prefer to be simply philosophers and scientists. But I cannot help admiring the extraordinary talent and originality of my friend. You Americans should be familiar with his works on religious and ecclesiastical 'questions.' Vladimir Solovieff is a professed Christian, yet his conception of Christianity, like that of Tolstoi's does not coincide with that of the established Christian institutions. Therefore, it appears, he is not looked upon with favor by the Russian government, and he named the present article 'The Frauds of Christianity.' This title being misleading, we took the liberty of changing it into 'Christianity, its Spirit and its Errors.'"

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THE LATEST PHASE OF HERBERT SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY.

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

It is well known that the Brooklyn Ethical Association has become, by means of its annual "Course of Lectures on Evolution," an important thought exchange. This has proved to be exceptionally true by reason of the discussions which have arisen out of its lecture course of the last winter. The course opened by two lectures which began the trouble—if such *that* may be called, which promises to lead to greater light. The first of these lectures by Prof. Edward D. Cope was on *Alfred R. Wallace*, the co-discoverer with Darwin of "Natural Selection," and the well-known author of "Darwinism." The second lecture by the writer of this article, was on Prof. *Ernst Haeckel*, of Jena, his Life and Work.*

In the latter lecture the well-known "Spiritualism" of Wallace; and the "Unknowable" of Herbert Spencer were classed with the "Prophecies" of Newton and the "Papacy" of Comte as warning examples of that strange fatality by which the greatest triumphs of intellect are often offset by the greatest follies. On the contrary it was boldly re-asserted that under the law of corellation no one had shown how there could be room for a Spook God, Devil, or Soul in the world which Science had proved to be one continuous process of corellation,—cause and effect!—The Daily Press caught up the phrase "No room for God," and made things lively. The Spencerians under the lead of Dr. Lewis G. Janes the President of the Association took up the discussion with the author of the lecture by pen and from the same platforms, throughout the winter, in Brooklyn, New York, and Newark. Meanwhile Mr. S. H. Wilder, a well-known Philosophic and Spiritualistic writer in New York, through pamphlets and also in the *New York Tribune* and otherwise, opened a raking fire on both combatants with abundant extracts from Spencer's works showing that he was the very worst sort of a materialist, or *nothing*; in fact, that he was the very father of that corellation philosophy which had been turned upon him in that Haeckel lecture, and which he was bound to accept or to abandon the foundation of his system

altogether. The crisis came on the last evening of the course (May 31) when the celebrated John Fiske, on "The Doctrine of Evolution; Its Scope and Influence," was expected, as the friend and exponent of Mr. Spencer, to annihilate his discordant adversaries, by proving his philosophic consistency. Instead of this he finally left the matter in what seems the hopeless condition of practical philosophic bankruptcy. For, after explaining in his very able lecture the use and progress, and glorifying the victories, of evolution, he came to its limits. It could not, he argued, explain every thing; consciousness was not a link in the chain or circle of causal sequence, or persistence of force, or corellation of phenomena; it was simply the part *perhaps* of an outer concentric psychic circle; the rest of its circumference we could never know: it vanished into the *Unknowable Reality* behind all *phenomena*, etc., etc. All of which we had heard over and over many times in varying phrases. Then, to clinch the matter, we had the following letter read from Mr. Spencer himself, which only made the confusion worse by an explanation which abuses but does not explain:

"I have had to rebut the charge of materialism times too numerous to remember and I have now given the matter up. It is impossible to give more emphatic denial or assign more conclusive proof than that I have repeatedly done, as you know. My antagonists must continue to vilify me as they please: I cannot prevent them. Practically they say; 'It is convenient to us to call you a materialist and you shall be a materialist whether you like it or not.' In my earlier days I constantly made the foolish supposition that conclusive proof would change beliefs. But experience has long since dissipated my faith in men's rationality."

This letter was a great disappointment, for the great Philosopher instead of showing his critics the way out of their honest difficulty showed that he had lost his temper, and thus deepened the belief that there was no way out.

Then President Janes *ex cathedra*, that is from the pulpit, undertook to extricate the Spencerian Philosophy from its "textual ambiguities," while we all listened with breathless interest. By an unfortunate accident no stenographer took notes of the addresses on that occasion, but fortunately the President has given the burden of his address in the *New York Independent* of July 2 as an Article "Herbert Spencer and Materialism." Therein he says, and we italicise:

* Both of these lectures can be had from the office of *The Open Court*. Ten cents each.

"Deeper than all alleged textual ambiguities, fundamental to the entire philosophy of Mr. Spencer, clearly expressed in the opening chapters of 'First Principles,' re-affirmed in 'The Principles of Psychology,' and elsewhere, is the doctrine of the *relativity of knowledge*. On this rather than on the doctrine of the '*Correlation of Forces*,' however interpreted, the Philosophy of Mr. Spencer is ultimately based. According to this conception, our knowledge of 'Matter'—i. e. *matter itself*—is wholly phenomenal: the *Material Universe has no existence apart from the existence of mind*: our knowledge of the world is conditioned by our psychical nature and its limitations.

"'Matter and mind are both known to us, not as well-defined independent-substances,' but as *mutually related phenomena of our underlying Reality*. What this Reality is in its essential nature cannot be known to us because of the finite limitations of our faculties. Our knowledge of it as existing, as the *Unconditioned Being* on which all modes of physical and psychical activity are conditioned is, however, fundamental to all other kinds of knowledge. It is implied alike in every observation of the phenomena of material world, and in every movement of our thought.

"Because of our incapacity, as finite beings, to penetrate the depths of this ultimate *mystery* of thought Mr. Spencer calls this Reality 'the Unknowable.' Reason, however, as he asserts, *declares it to be the super-personal rather than impersonal, extra-conscious rather than unconscious, quasi-psychic rather than materialistic in its nature*. Call this Reality what you will—SPIRIT, LIFE, GOD—the philosophic mind must still recognise reverently that all names are *expressions of our ignorance* rather than of our knowledge: they are vague and imperfect symbols for a Power, a Reality, on which we and the Universe depend, the conception of which transcends the finite nature of our thought.

"The perception of this truth seems to be in substantial *harmony* with the loftiest religious conceptions of all ages. *Is it not wiser, therefore, for the advocates of anti-materialistic doctrines to recognise the greatest philosophical thinker of the English speaking race as the 'friend and aid of those who would live in the spirit,' rather than to vainly endeavor to discredit his system and influence by unjustly denouncing the Synthetic Philosophy as Materialistic?*"

Dr. Janes deserves much credit for this condensed statement of the *new* Spencerism. Notice!—the law of correlation or "persistence of force" which was originally said to be the base of Mr. Spencer's Philosophy is coolly *retired*. In its place we find the "relativity of knowledge," which means nothing, unless the nature of the relation and the *termini* between which it exists are determined. It has accordingly been held by every philosopher from Aristotle down, as Mr. Spencer has well pointed out, but by each in a different way and sense. As the foundation of a philosophy it is of no value, for what it means is always to be determined by the philosophy itself;—and here the *termini* are "unknowable"!

At the close of the discussion, in which others took part, and in which a very important letter from Prof. Ernst Haeckel was read, Mr. S. H. Wilder put forward those fatal quotations, and wanted to know decisively from Lecturer Fiske whether the Spencerian philosophy had changed its base with Mr. Spencer's approval. He pointed out that this philosophy, started out in "First Principles," and had for twenty years

and upwards, been based upon the "persistence of force" or correlation. He insists that this attempt to substitute the "relativity of knowledge," whatever that may mean, "*rather than correlation*," as the foundation of that philosophy was beyond the power of "textual ambiguity," and was nothing less than a spiritism or an absurd stultification. He referred to such passages of "First Principles" as these:

"The sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it is thus the persistence of force. This being the basis of experience, must be the basis of any scientific organisation of experience, [i. e. philosophy]. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis must be built up, etc." pp. 192, 193, 202, etc.

Again: "Any hesitation to admit that between the physical forces and the sensations, there exists a correlation like that between the physical forces themselves, must disappear on remembering, that the one correlation like the other, is not qualitative only, but quantitative." p. 212.

Again, Mr. Spencer sums up thus:

"Various classes of facts thus unite to prove that the law of metamorphosis which holds among the physical forces, holds equally between them and the mental forces. Those modes of the unknowable which we call heat, light, chemical affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other, and into those modes of the unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought; these in their turns being directly or indirectly retransformable into the original shapes. That no idea or feeling arises, save as the result of some physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science: and whoever duly weighs the evidence will see, that nothing but an overwhelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory, can explain its non-acceptance. How this metamorphosis takes place—how a force existing as motion, heat, or light, can become a mode of consciousness—or how it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical changes in the train to give rise to emotion—these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformations of the physical forces into each other." p. 217.

Many other passages were referred to of the same import, and two thirds of the book is one long sustained argument leading to this same conclusion. But while this has been the voice of Spencer, the voice of Fiske, e. g. in his "Cosmic Philosophy," has been exactly to the contrary, thus:

"Have we made the first step towards the resolution of psychical phenomena into modes of motion? Obviously we have not. The closed circuit of motion remains just what it was before. No conceivable advance in physical discovery can ever get us out of this closed circuit, and into this circuit psychical phenomena do not enter. Psychical phenomena stand outside this circuit parallel with that brief segment of it which is made up of molecular motions in nerve tissue. . . . The task of transcending or abolishing the radical antithesis between the phenomena of mind, and the phenomena of motions of matter, must *always* remain an impracticable task. . . . We may here at once mark the *bounds* beyond which, in another direction, scientific inquiry cannot advance." *Cosm. Phil.* p. 442-443. Vol. 2.

Again: "In no scientific sense is the thought the product of the molecular movement." *The Unseen World*, p. 41.

The comparison of these passages, and similar ones with those above quoted from Mr. Spencer, show a

difficulty and an issue beyond "textual ambiguities" to resolve?

Prof. Fiske in concluding the discussion did not at first meet this issue, but upon further questioning stated frankly in substance: That Mr. Spencer had started into the construction of his system with the views expressed in the quotation from him referred to, but that he had not then thought them out to their consequences; that afterwards his views had changed. He mentioned one instance when Mr. Spencer came to his, Professor Fiske's, room in London in 1874, and after a long conversation acquiesced in the construction that the latter had given to the philosophy they held in common. The phrase "nervous shock" was changed to "psychic shock"; and generally the materialistic construction to which the passages referred to had given rise was repudiated: especially the idea that mind or consciousness was included in, or explainable by, correlation. "The passages referred to," said Professor Fiske, "if taken in their literal significance, teach what is not true, and is, in fact nonsense."

This statement of Professor Fiske together with Dr. Janes's exposition and Mr. Spencer's letter was a surprise to many who heard it and will be to many more. The utter irreconcilability of Mr. Spencer's earlier and later views have doubtless been much more manifest to others than to himself, to whom they have gradually, and perhaps unconsciously passed from one to the other, with the grateful concurrence and applause of his more conservative friends. But it is an entire change of base, and the truth is by this discussion made public. It was editorially duly noted as "an extraordinary statement" in the great religious journal, the *New York Independent*, in its issue of June 18. Dr. Janes replied in the issue of July 2, and Mr. Wilder gave a clincher in that of July 16.

This change of base from scientific correlation to *nothing*—nothing at least, *verifiable*, seems, as a friend remarked on the occasion, a public confession of philosophic bankruptcy. For, a system of philosophy which cannot account for the mind of man, its origin, faculties, action, relations, and consequences, on at least a tentative and *working* scientific hypothesis, if not *law*, has cut off its head from its body, and is nothing but a chaos, or a disguised theology. Must science relinquish the mind, or soul, of man—its lot and fate, to pretended revelators of "The Unseen World," or to ignorance? That is the practical question; and it is one involving the greatest philosophic and religious consequences. In the last words above quoted from him Dr. Janes makes a bee-line, as if for honey, for the theologic camp! Are we compelled to follow? Not a few of those who (as did this writer) aided Prof. E. L. Youmans to introduce Mr. Spencer's philosophy

in this country will hesitate to follow him in his recent conclusions. Of course we will be disowned by those who worship "The Unknowable in the Spirit"; much as Auguste Comte disowned those friends who could not acquiesce in the Papistic assumptions of his later years,—but all *that*, however unpleasant, is of little moment. The real and serious question is whether Messrs. Spencer, Fiske, and Janes are correct and right in the views they have taken. If not, can we find in Monistic Positivism, another, a scientific, a higher and a truer view, neither materialistic nor spiritualistic in the usual and proper sense of those words, but which contains what is good and true in both, and which will enable us to use the Spencerian Philosophy as we do the Positive Philosophy of Comte for all it is worth, in spite of the latter day tergiversations of their authors? This we will consider—at another time.

FEELING, THE MONISTIC DEFINITION OF THE TERM.

ACCORDING to the report of the discussions which have lately taken place in the Brooklyn Ethical Association, concerning the philosophy of evolution, Mr. Herbert Spencer has changed his views of feeling and the origin of feeling. In a previous summary of his philosophy he had stated:

"That no idea or feeling arises save as the result of some physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science."

But now Mr. Wakeman on the authority of Mr. Fiske himself informs us that Mr. Spencer has acquiesced in Professor Fiske's conception, that

"Psychical phenomena stand outside this circuit parallel with that brief segment of it [viz. of motion] which is made up of molecular motions in nerve tissue."

Accordingly the phrase "nervous shock" in Spencer's psychology should be changed to "psychic shock," and Mr. Wakeman states:

"The passages referred to," said Professor Fiske, "if taken in their literal significance teach what is not true, and is, in fact nonsense."

The word "nonsense" is a harsh expression, but it must not be taken here in its offensive meaning. Prof. W. K. Clifford used the very same word in the very same connection. He does not accept the idea that mind or soul (together with feeling, consciousness, etc.) is to be explained as converted force. And, to consider the soul as something unexplainable that steps in as a force imparting impulses to muscles, he says, "is not to say what is untrue, but to talk nonsense." Clifford adds:

"But the question, Do the changes in a man's consciousness run parallel with the changes of motion and therefore with the forces of his brain? is a real question and not *prima facie* nonsense."

It is probable that Mr. Fiske thought of this pas-

sage of Clifford's when speaking of Mr. Spencer's idea that psychical phenomena arise as "the result of some physical force." Mr. Wakeman interprets Professor Fiske's proposition as spiritism which would mean that psychical phenomena form a world by themselves which sometimes comes in contact with the material world. Spirit in that case would be an unknowable mystery coming into the world from without, having its own laws, yet when making its appearance, it would run parallel in brief segments of the world of motion with a special action of nerve tissue. And indeed Professor Fiske's phrase that "psychical phenomena stand outside of the circuit" together with some other expressions suggest a spiritualistic interpretation. Nevertheless, Professor Fiske may after all stand on the monistic position, considering, as we do, feeling as the subjective state of awareness which runs parallel with certain objective physical phenomena taking place in nervous tissue. He may after all, and I almost believe that he will do so, if he considers the matter, regard both, feeling and motion, as two sides of one and the same process in the same or at least in a similar sense, as Professor Clifford, George Henry Lewes, Wilhelm Wundt, Th. Ribot, and most authorities among our modern psychologists accept it.

The source of misunderstandings is here as in many other cases a lack of agreement as to the usage of terms. Vagueness in terminology will always produce a confusion of thought. The trouble in the present instance rises from the word "feeling." What have we to understand by feeling? That there is no feeling taking place by itself, or in other words, that there are no psychical phenomena without a physical basis is, indeed, as Mr. Spencer says (we take this to be the meaning of the passage in question), "fast becoming a commonplace of science." Professor Fiske, it appears, has stated the position correctly that Mr. Spencer had not thought out the idea that "feeling" is the result of physical force (i. e. motion) in all its consequences," so he used the term "feeling" where those who stand upon the standpoint of modern psychology might have said "nerve action accompanied with feeling."

We understand by feeling always the state of awareness only which accompanies certain physiological activities and not these activities themselves. The actions which take place among the molecules of the nervous tissue are motions, they are physical phenomena, observable, measurable and can under favorable conditions be made visible also. They are facts of objective nature. When some forces of nature stored up in food are changed into the vital energy of nervous tissue and utilised in nervous action, there is not one molecule of matter and not the least particle of energy changed into the subjective state of feeling.

All the forces of objective nature remain objective. The law of the conservation of matter and energy holds good in the empire of matter and energy. But under certain conditions phenomena of feeling appear which we call spiritual, or mental, or psychical. And these phenomena are subjective states unobservable and invisible, but going along with objective processes of visible motion. They are not motions, not forces, not energies, but states of awareness.

Whence do they come?

Those who maintain that feeling is a product of matter in motion are as a rule called materialists, and Mr. Spencer has often been called a materialist because he has pronounced this view. Mr. Spencer repudiates the name materialist, and I believe justly, because the agnostic feature of his philosophy is much more prominent. The underlying reality being unknowable he is at most a materialistic agnostic.

If by materialism must be understood that all concrete object-things are material, that there cannot exist feelings by themselves, that pains and pleasures, sensations, commotions, or ideas cannot hover about anywhere in empty space, in one word that there are no ghosts, then all science is materialism. But our scientists and philosophers do not understand that by materialism, and, therefore, we cannot say that modern psychology properly understood is materialistic. We would also, like Mr. Spencer, repudiate the term materialism as applied to our own views, and those who use the term with reference to the editorial views of *The Open Court* either use the term materialism in a peculiar way, or are not familiar with our tenets.

But, the conservation of matter and energy holding good, whence do the psychical phenomena come if they cannot be explained as transformed matter or energy? From the monistic standpoint we claim that the conditions of feeling are an unalienable and intrinsic feature of reality. Wherever there is physical action taking place it contains the potentiality of psychic existence. Objective nature is, as it were, the outside of nature only, its internality is potential subjectivity which, with the rise of organised life, can and will develop into the actual subjectivity of feelings.

This view of the question which is a monistic and not a dualistic explanation of the spiritual world has been recently defended with great vigor by Prof. Lloyd Morgan, who called that element of reality which is no motion, but accompanies motion and which is developing in the course of evolution as feeling, *metakinesis*. All objective phenomena are "kinesis" i. e. potential or kinetic energy and all kinesis is in possession of i. e. it is accompanied with, *metakinesis*. Feeling accordingly is a mode of *metakinesis* as much

as the motions of living bodies and especially nervous action is a mode of kinesis.

We consider Prof. Lloyd Morgan's term as an excellent invention and we hope that it will contribute to dispel the general confusion that prevails about the meaning of the words feeling and consciousness.

The origin of mind is really the main problem of philosophy and the method in which this problem is attacked may be considered as the touchstone of the different philosophies. Mr. Spencer has given much attention to this question and he has made many valuable observations in the empire of psychology, but in his endeavor to explain everything from matter and motion he became entangled in insolvable contradictions and ended in agnosticism. He gave the problem up as insolvable. Professor Fiske has understood the impossibility of deriving mind out of matter and motion, but he is so much addicted to the idea of agnosticism that he still considers the world as well as the soul as something inscrutable and still speaks about "the unknowable reality behind all phenomena," thus disclaiming and rejecting the advantages which he might derive from the monistic view of psychological facts. Professor Fiske in our opinion is right that evolution cannot explain everything, for the law of evolution itself demands an explanation. We trust that evolution will find its explanation, but we do not expect it with Professor Fiske as "simply the part *perhaps* of an outer concentric psychic circle, the rest of its circumference we would never know." For this explanation leads in its consequences to dualism, if it is not actual dualism, and we should be obliged to believe in a psychic existence by itself, which in our conception would be subjectivity without objective existence, feeling without motion, psychic processes which have no physiological basis, soul without body and a God outside of the universe.

The main advantage of the modern view that feeling accompanies motion will be found in this, that it makes a monistic conception possible. We cannot look upon reality as being endowed throughout with the potentiality of psychic phenomena. The world is as much a spirit as it is a material reality. The term matter is a thought-symbol only describing one feature of it, while metakinesis, subjectivity, or elements of feeling are another, and both are so far as we can see everywhere. Natural science teaches us to consider the development of the human soul as a gradual growth traceable in its objective and therefore scientifically observable forms. The soul is one of the products of this world of ours and the psychic nature of the soul proves that the world essence is not mere matter in motion, but it certainly does not disprove monism. The idea of "outer concentric psychic circles," i. e. of metakinesis without kinesis has no meaning to us

whose ideal is a monistic world-conception. Says Goethe :

"What were a God who from the outside stirred
So that the world around his finger whirled?
He from within the Universe must move,
Nature in him and him in nature prove,
Thus all that in him lives and moves and is
Will ne'er his power and his spirit miss."

P. C.

CAN SUICIDE BE JUSTIFIED?

We read in the *Chicago Tribune*: "Wednesday evening Prof. Felix Adler spoke before the Plymouth School of Ethics choosing as a subject for his discourse, 'Suicide.' He expressed some radical ideas, the most astonishing of which was that in certain cases of incurable sickness suicide was justifiable. He believed that it was no more than right and said that if such a plan of action should become general there should be some precaution taken. For instance, the formation of an official body designated by the State, and composed of three Judges of the Supreme Court and of three eminent physicians. This body should in every case be summoned to the bedside of the sufferer, and if the council be unanimously of the opinion that there is no reasonable hope of recovery the patient should then be allowed to receive a draught from the hands of the attendant physician that would give him eternal relief from his sufferings."

The *Chicago Tribune* publishes a symposium of opinions on the subject as follows:

"Dr. J. H. Etheridge said: I take no stock in Professor Adler's idea of killing the incurably sick. Our calling as physicians is to save, not destroy, human life. All the laws of the age tend in the same way. A few years ago an interne at the County Hospital told me confidentially of the case of a man crushed in a railway accident and brought to the hospital. There was no hope of his recovery and the interne gave him morphine, which took his life. The interne told me of this, and I said: That is an indictable offense. As long as the man lives there is ground for hope. You had no right to do that. While there are cases of injury or disease where it is impossible for the person to recover, all the instincts of humanity, all the teaching of the remedial professions of medicine and surgery, all the spirit of civilised countries are opposed to the plan of killing the patient proposed by Professor Adler. The idea is repugnant to the spirit of the age.

"Dr. Lee, resident physician of the Palmer House, said: I believe that the chronic invalid should hold out as long as there is the slightest chance of recovery—as long as the pain is not so intense and so continuous as to occupy the entire attention of the sufferer. But after this why should not the sufferer be unbound, and the agonies ended? I believe that it would be right and just.

"Dr. Purdy did not believe that Adler was correct in this or any other instance. Suicide, said Dr. Purdy, is suicide under any and all conditions. Circumstances may lessen but never eradicate the unnatural crime of such an act. With the recent advances in the medical profession a patient is never dead until the last spark has fled, and hope should not depart till then. In life there is hope, and this is an inspiration for all would-be suicides.

"Rabbi Hirsch said: If the people saw fit to sanction the passage of such a law, which is exceedingly doubtful, it would throw open the doors to a thousand abuses. Such a disposition of life should be left entirely in the hands of the sufferer. If, then, the patient is willing to take his own life I can excuse the deed, looking at it from a philanthropic standpoint. I think the laws should be drawn so that a person is not necessarily a criminal because he takes his own life, but I do not believe in appointing a committee to wait upon the patient as that would oftentimes prolong a person's sufferings. I have buried both men and women who have either taken poison to hasten death and relieve their sufferings or

have ordered operations to be performed that they knew could only end fatally. Professor Adler has advanced some strange theories, and I consider this one of them.

"Prof. George B. Charles, President of the Christian Metaphysical Society, said: I consider it a rather dangerous scheme. It is an assumption based either on the belief in a future painless existence or the utter disbelief in a future existence, neither of which is proved. It is, therefore, objectionable from a moral standpoint. Furthermore, as an act of philanthropy, it is non-philosophical, owing to the fact of the ignorance of the future existence. In taking one's life it simply robs the body of animation according to the accepted Christian belief. Therefore, as death is an assumption based only upon a supposition, it would not, in my opinion, make any material difference whether the body is robbed of its animation or left until death takes place naturally. From a humanitarian's standpoint legal murder might be charitable, but not from any other."

"Dr. S. V. Clevenger said: The celebrated German philosopher, Schopenhauer, has declared suicide cowardly and murder brutal in every case, and I reiterate his opinion and coincide with him. Another thing, I think it very doubtful whether a person would agree to welcome death. In every human being, no matter what the condition might be, the feeling that while there's life there's hope is most pronouncedly manifested when death is near. As for appointing a committee to decide upon a sufferer's condition that is absurd. If that was the case the committee would be composed of quacks or ignoramuses appointed through political machinations. The entire idea is impracticable, and a law legalising such murders would have a demoralising effect upon every community. The people will not countenance it, no matter how much Prof. Adler lectures for it.

"The Rev. Dr. H. W. Bolton of the Century M. E. Church said: The sixth commandment says plainly, "Thou shalt not kill." This, of course, includes self-destruction, and therefore I do not agree with Professor Adler because I am a Christian. There are also passages in the New Testament that condemn suicide. The heroic sacrifice of one's self for another's good cannot be called suicide, and Mr. Adler does not touch on that feature of the question. His remarks apply to suicide pure and simple. He suggests that suicide is permissible in the case of a chronic invalid when sanctioned by three judges or three physicians. In such event any man might induce the judges or the physicians to give the sanction whenever he felt that he could not face certain issues, and then where would society be? The reason that Professor Adler's system permits "justifiable" suicide is that it does not go beyond this world. The idea is purely barbaric and anything but Christian. What God has given no man has the right to take away, and there is no combination of conditions in which the Christian mind can see a justification of self-murder. The Spartan idea of forcing useless invalids to kill themselves or to be killed by some one else because they were a burden to the State is not one of this humane age. You will find this view of the matter common to all Christian men and we must hold it."

It appears that Rabbi Hirsch's opinion is not only humane but also sensible; and the most humane will in the end be found to be the most religious also. Professor Adler's proposition of summoning a body of three judges and three physicians to the bedside of a sufferer from an intensely painful and incurable sickness is not practical and would be rightly felt as an intolerable intrusion, let alone that no body of men be they ever so learned and be their opinions ever so perfect in legal matters can be of assistance to a man in such a grave question which he must settle alone within himself. A man who under so extraordinary circumstances takes his life has, undoubtedly, before he takes this most serious and irrevocable step, to consider and so far as it is in his power to attend to all his duties which extend beyond the grave. And our opin-

ion of a man will have to be weighed, and indeed it is weighed in each particular case accordingly. There is a great difference between the coward who flies from life because he shirks responsibilities or shrinks from the consequences of former ill deeds and the self-possessed sufferer who seeing that his life is a burden to himself and to others calmly makes his dispositions and departs from his family leaving his thoughts, his care, the very spirit of his soul and his love behind as an imperishable memory of a useful life.

The objections made by the Rev. Dr. Bolton may express church views, but they are neither Christian nor biblical. The commandment "Thou shalt not kill" was apparently not intended to include suicide. We might as well construe it in the sense of Brahmanists and turn vegetarians. Anyone who drinks a cup of bouillon or who eats of the meat of a lamb has no right to read his special opinion of what he calls murder into this or any other passage. I cannot find any biblical sentence which right out and unequivocally condemns suicide generally.

The Monday *Tribune* contains another contribution on the suicide problem. Rev. H. Digby Johnson says:

"The learned professor whose ill-considered utterances have led to this discussion seems to have lost sight altogether not only of the religious but also of the moral aspects of the question. How far his ethics are below those of the pagan Socrates, or the entire body of the pagan philosophers of Greece! To the Christian there can be no possible question. He regards life as God-given, and given for the highest purposes, inseparably related to the eternal life."

If Professor Adler's suggestion is impractical, his utterances should not be denounced as "ill-considered." On the contrary, his courage to discuss an unpopular problem is to be recommended, and those who disagree from him may state their objections so that we can weigh their arguments. The Rev. Johnson's letter to the *Tribune* denounces suicide including any and every case without considering the circumstances on the sole reason that "life is God-given." What strange experiences must this reverend gentleman have collected. He says:

"More than once I have seen the bodies of suicides borne to burial at the solemn midnight hour and cast into a dishonored felon's grave, without rite or ceremony of any kind, and unattended by any relatives or other persons than the officers of the county charged with the ghastly duty."

A country in which suicides are disposed of as described by the reverend gentleman does not deserve to be called a Christian country. If the clergy approve of such brutal customs and if they can witness them without becoming indignant and full of holy wrath at the hardness of men's hearts they should learn from the infidel. When a destitute woman whose lot of life had been harder than she could bear had shuffled off this mortal coil of hers, Thomas Hood sang the following touching lines:

"One more unfortunate,
Weary of breath,
Rashly importunate,
Gone to her death.

Take her up tenderly,
Lift her with care,
Fashioned so slenderly,
Young and so fair.

Make no deep scrutiny
Into her mutiny,
Rash and undutiful;
Past all dishonor,
Death has left on her
Only the beautiful."

Is not this sentiment more Christian than that of the Rev. Johnson who dooms the suicide without discrimination to a "ghastly" burial "at the solemn midnight hour" to be "cast into a dishonored felon's grave"?

And why this atrocity of a barbarous custom? Because "life is God-given." But is that not rather Mohammedanism than Christianity? Mohammedans believe in fatalism, not Christians. the Moslem says: "God suffered that I broke my leg, if it pleases him it will heal without a physician's assistance." And can we not of every moment of life and of our conscious existence say the same that God gave it. Accordingly it would be blasphemous for a physician to use anæsthetics if a patient has to undergo a dangerous and painful operation. Every single moment of consciousness is as much God-given as the whole of them.

The argument that "life is God-given" and that therefore we are not allowed to take it, is meaningless, for everything is God-given and we should not be allowed at all to tamper with nature as it is. Culture and civilisation would become blasphemous interferences with God's will.

We sum up that suicide is a sad and a grave thing and it is hard on those who leave life through its portal. We have, however, no right to place ourselves on the high seat of justice and condemn the man who finds himself constrained to pass through it. Suicide should certainly not be encouraged, but the argument of these severe judges is neither humane, nor Christian, nor religious, nor biblical—it is based upon a heathenish conception of God, which is the fatalistic idea of let things go as it pleases God.

When will the time come that our Christian ministers will shake off the bonds of paganism?

CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE was loud laughter heard last year at the mad freak of the Kansas farmers in electing rustics to congress because they wore no socks, and to the judicial bench because they knew no law. I had lived in Kansas in its Territorial era, and I knew that its mad freak had method in it. I knew that in the grim humor of the Kansas people they meant to elect judges who would not enforce the law, but who could be relied on to make judicial resistance to it. This paradox is no new thing in Kansas; indeed the spirit of it has always had its influence in state courts, and sometimes it has dominated the supreme bench of all, the National court at Washington. A great book might be written on the subject of judicial anarchy in the United States, with hundreds of examples. When the voters of Kansas elected the Alliance farmer to the bench because he knew no law, and then sent him to the Law School at Ann Arbor to learn some, I pointed out the inconsistency of their action; and when they crammed him with a six weeks course of Coke and Blackstone, as geese are crammed with meal at Strasbourg, I predicted in *The Open Court* that he would know all the law that ever was, and more; that he would break down the fences of precedent, and trample on the decisions, as his own unruly steer when in his neighbor's cornfield tramples on the corn. It has resulted as I feared it would; and Judge McKay is very busy at this moment reversing the Supreme Court and spurning its decrees. Like Judge Portia he is a very "Daniel come to judgment," and whenever a creditor comes into his court seeking the foreclosure of a mortgage, Judge McKay follows the law laid down by that famous Master of Laws in the celebrated case of Shylock against Antonio. The hard-hearted creditor is turned out of court, and all his lands and goods "are confiscate unto the State of Venice."

The character of a state, like that of a man depends very much upon the start it makes in life. Kansas was "born unto trouble as the sparks fly upward." In its very childhood it was compelled to resist the law, or forfeit freedom; and that combative spirit has grown with its growth, and strengthened with its strength. In its rebellious passion it cares nothing for the law,

and especially nothing for the law that enforces the payment of debts by the foreclosure of a mortgage. They threaten to impeach Judge McKay because he will not foreclose mortgages, but the impeachers and their constituents are the mortgagers, and instead of impeaching him they will promote him to the Supreme bench. I was vaccinated one night by the Kansas virus, in the back room of a house in Atchison; and the way of it was this: Mr. Buchanan was President at the time, and he had ordered the Kansas lands into market, to punish the Free-State settlers who would not bow down to the slavery image which Nebuchadnezzar the king had set up. The settlers had no titles, only "claims," to the lands they tilled, and few of them had money to pay for them if suddenly brought into market. Speculators were crowding into Kansas to buy the lands, and a secret conspiracy to baffle the sale was organised in the back room aforesaid, to which conspiracy I had the honor of an invitation. Many plans to stave off the sales were proposed; petitions to the President, delegations to Washington, and so on; but at last a sinewy man arose and said: "I move that we adjourn the land sales—ourselves." It was a short speech but it made a great impression, as I could see by the significant glances exchanged all around the room; and I whispered to the conspirator on my right, a United States senator afterwards, "Who is that?" And he whispered back, "Montgomery!" His motion was adopted; and, it is too long a story to tell now how it was done, the land sales were adjourned. Montgomery had also a playful habit of adjourning the courts in the way that he adjourned the land sales. The memory of him is an influence in Kansas yet, and there is a good deal of rusty rebellion lying around in that state among the old Sharpe's rifles of the Territorial age.

Another Union battle flag has been restored by the Confederate officer who captured it; and it has been restored in the usual ostentatious and patronising way. Of course a regiment may lose its flag without dishonor, but the restoration of it must awaken painful recollections, and true chivalry requires that such restoration shall be made without publicity; in a delicate, quiet way, and not so as to blazon to the world the prowess of its captors, as the present vain-glorious custom is. I have just been reading a curious correspondence between General Walker of the Union Army, and General Anderson of the Confederate army, from which it appears that Walker having been taken prisoner, his sword became the trophy of Anderson, who returns it in a rather uncomfortable way. He informs General Walker that at a certain battle "you were made prisoner and deprived of your arms," and this unpleasant reminder he follows up by stamping figuratively on Walker's corns; thus, "Your sword came into my possession and I wore it from that time until Appomattox." This is rubbed in with a little delicate sarcasm about the brightness of that sword: "I have endeavored to keep its blade as bright as when it came into my possession," says Gen. Anderson; whose conduct in keeping the sword bright was in such pleasing contrast to that of Captain Sir John Falstaff, who hacked his sword to give it the appearance of having been in fight. Gen. Anderson, no doubt, believes himself to be as polished as that sword, but a very high-toned and courteous knight would have battered the sword before returning it, and would have pretended with gentle flattery that he found it so. He would never have praised its brightness nor boast that he had worn it. More amazing than the pride of the victor is the humility of the vanquished, who in a letter of thanks promises that hereafter he "shall prize the weapon all the more because of its history since the war." The "weapon" that has been the occasion of this remarkable correspondence is blameless. It has never been stripped in battle, and therefore as a memento can be of no more value to a soldier than a worn out umbrella. General Anderson testifies that it was bright when he

got it and bright when he returned it. No doubt, General Walker would rather have had a return of the measles than a return of this innocent blade.

* * *

The retirement of Judge Altgeld from the bench may fairly be regarded as a public loss, although no doubt it will prove a personal gain to him. While as a judge he knew much of the law as a collection of artificial forms, he was not ignorant of it as a scheme of justice. Like many other judges he knew the Art of law, but unlike some of them he knew the Science of it also. He understood the humane reason and spirit of the law; and he was not afraid to show in a book how the law in Illinois was habitually perverted to the punishment of the innocent and the oppression of the poor. The revelations in his book "Live Questions" ought to raise a blister on the conscience of the State, if a sovereign State can have any conscience, which is doubtful. These considerations give importance to his criticism of the Chicago judiciary and his condemnation of the self-service rendered by our law-makers for public pay. It is the opinion of Judge Altgeld that all progress in this country is due to the private citizen, the individual man, and not any of it to the official classes. In answer to the inevitable interviewer, he said: "We have in this country more than forty governors, and it would be difficult for any man to point out wherein the whole forty had for ten years done anything of an enduring character for their country or for the progress of civilisation. We have several hundred congressmen, we have legislators without number; we count even our judges by the hundred, and taking the whole office holding class together it is difficult to point out wherein it does anything that can be regarded as raising the standard of public morals, creating a healthy public sentiment, or solving in a proper manner any of the great questions, both economic and social, that are calling for solution. On the contrary, the whole office-holding community simply follows the public band wagon. The really influential men in America are the successful private individuals."

* * *

Considering "band wagon" in the foregoing paragraph as a misprint for "bread wagon," there is much truth in Judge Altgeld's criticism. I have known brass-mounted statesmen to spend years in office by trading public patronage for private service, by begging like mendicants, by bribing, cajoling, and corrupting, by hocussing and hustling, and by wealth ill-gotten, and I have heard them claim at the end of a sinister career, honor, pensions, and respect, because of "a lifetime spent in the public service." As well might a potato bug claim reward and glory because he had spent a lifetime working on a farm. Asked for his opinion of the proposition to raise the salaries of Chicago judges, Judge Altgeld intimated that they were already too high for judges of such quality as our mob masters give us; and his views on this point are entitled to be regarded as the testimony of an expert. He said: "There are very many able lawyers at our bar who would be glad to serve the public on the bench for even a much lower salary than is now paid, provided they could get the positions without a political scramble." He exposed the common delusion that great cities must necessarily have great judges, and he showed that the country judges are abler men than the city judges, and that they do more work and better work for half the salary. He said: "It is claimed by lawyers who practice throughout the state as well as in Chicago that the bench in the country is much abler than in Chicago. Being still on the bench myself I can talk with a little more freedom on this subject than I otherwise could." That interview is a valuable addition to our political knowledge, and it will go far in dispelling the superstitious illusion that prevails concerning the judges in great cities. By the laws of good luck we sometimes get a learned, humane, and able judge, even

out of that "political scramble," but not often. Judge Altgeld knows very well, although he did not say it, that there are judges who morally do not know the difference between the writ of *Habeas Corpus* and a pair of handcuffs.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

We learn from a circular letter of Mr. George Anderson, 35 A Great George Street, Westminster, S. W., that Mr. Bradlaugh left a debt of 6000 pounds which was not incurred for selfish ends but mainly in his litigations for freedom, forced upon him especially during the Parliamentary struggle. His only surviving daughter, Mrs. Bonner, had sacrificed at a time of great pecuniary embarrassment the life policy he had assigned to her and she is now left in a most difficult condition. Mrs. Bonner nevertheless, the strong daughter of a strong father, struggles with all her power to meet her father's unsettled liabilities. Some of the creditors have reduced their claims so that if a sum of 3000 pounds can be raised, the debts could be paid. Since Mr. Bradlaugh's debts were necessarily incurred to uphold the rights of thought and speech, it is a matter of justice that the public and most so those who like him are struggling for liberty, should help to pay his liabilities, which as Miss Edna Lyall states "had he lived a few years longer he would have been able to meet." When Mr. Holyoake, the veteran leader in the struggle for equal rights and freedom addressed Miss Edna Lyall, herself being a prominent author in England, she gave to the fund of Mrs. Bonner 50 pounds in order to set a good example for others.—Go thou and do likewise!

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THE TEST OF PROGRESS.

THE word "Progress" is one of the most commonly used terms and yet its meaning is extremely vague with most people. Progress is the ideal of our time and the glory of this generation. But what is progress? Can we give a definite and clear answer to this question, or is "progress" one of the many words by which people feel much but think little?

Progress is the act of stepping forward, it is a march onward. But who can tell us the right direction of an onward march? Did it ever happen to you when travelling on your ideal highroad of progress that you met a man who marched in the direction which you left behind? It happens very often, and if you inquire of the wanderer, Why do you go backward instead of forward? he will assure you that he marches onward while you yourself are retrogressive. Those who preach progress are by no means unanimously agreed as to the right direction. Make a chart of all the directions propounded and it will look like a compass dial. All directions possible are represented and there are not a few who believe that the development of our present civilisation proceeds in the wrong direction; they call us actually backwards to stages which lie behind us in a distant past and would consider a return to them as real progress. These retrogressive reformers are not so much among the ultra-conservative classes as among the ultra-radical enthusiasts who in one-sided idealism find perfection in the most primitive states either of absolute anarchy or absolute socialism, or whatever may be their special hobby.

The question, What is progress? is of paramount importance to ethics. For if there is no progress, if the direction of the onward movement is either indeterminate or indifferent, then, certainly there is no ethics. And if there is a special and determinable line along which alone progress has to take place, it is this alone which has to be used as a compass for our course of action. This line alone can be the norm of morality. From this alone we have to derive our moral rules, this alone can give us the real contents of the otherwise empty and meaningless term of moral goodness and this alone must constitute our basis of ethics.

Our time should know what progress is, for our

generation surveys the origin and growth of life so much better than did any previous generation. We now know that all life follows certain laws of evolution and has begun from the very beginning as slimy specks of living substance developing to the present state. The man of to-day is the product of that evolution, and man's progress is nothing but a special form of evolution; it is the evolution of mankind. Our scientists have discovered the fundamental laws of evolution; so they may be able to give us a satisfactory explanation of progress. The law of evolution we are informed is adaptation to surroundings. The polar bear adapts himself in the color of his skin and in his habits to his environment; while the insects of Madeira lose their power of flight and have to a great extent become wingless. There is a survival of the fittest everywhere, but natural selection does not always favor the strongest and the best. The ablest flyers on the islands are swept by the winds into the ocean and the weak only will survive, those who are lacking in a special virtue, but not the bravest, not the strongest, not the best!

May we not imagine that there are periods or societies so radically corrupt (and history actually teaches that there were repeatedly such eras) in which the spirit of the time made it actually impossible for good men to exist and to act morally. The evil influence of tyranny, of corruption, or of hypocrisy swept the brave, the courageous, the honest, the thinking out of existence and allowed only the weak, the degenerate, the unthinking to remain? It is true that whenever a nation fell under such a blight, she was doomed. Other nations took her place and there were quite a number of peoples entirely blotted out from the face of the globe. We have progressive as well as retrogressive adaptation (as Professor Weismann informs us), and adaptation in many cases is no sign of progress in the physical world, let alone the moral progress of human beings. We may say that the law of adaptation explains survival, but it cannot afford a criterion of progress.

We will ask the philosopher what progress is. The philosopher takes a higher and more general view of life, he may give us a broader and better information as to what is the characteristic feature of progress. Progress, we are told, is "a passage from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous state." . . . "It is a contin-

ually-increasing disintegration of the whole mass accompanied by an integration, a differentiation, and a mutual, perpetually-increasing dependence of parts as well as of functions, and by a tendency to equilibrium in the functions of the parts integrated." Complexity, it is maintained, is a sign of a higher evolution, and it is true—in many respects higher forms of existence are richer, more elaborate, more specialised, than lower forms. But, is therefore complexity the criterion of progress; can we use it as a test wherever we are in doubt in a special case. Does it show us the nature of progress, its meaning and importance? It appears that this explanation is not even generally true, for there are most weighty and serious exceptions which overthrow the validity of this formula entirely. Is not the progress in the invention of machinery from the more complex to the less complex? Invent a machine to do a special kind of work simpler than those at present in use; it will, the amount and exactitude of work being equal, on the strength of its simplicity alone be considered superior and it will soon replace the more complex machinery in the market.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, the philosopher of evolution, overlooked the main point when he attempted to explain evolution as he proposed in terms of matter and motion. Evolution means change of form, and this change of form has a special meaning. Evolution is not a material process and not a mechanical process, and the attempt to solve the problem of evolution on the ground of materialism or mechanicalism (i. e. to express its law in terms of matter and motion) must necessarily be a failure. Mr. Spencer, it is true, recognises the importance of the formal element, for his view of increasing complexity involves form and change of form. Yet he selects a mere external feature (one that is not even a universal) as characteristic of evolution and he neglects the very meaning of the change of form. This meaning remaining as an irresolvable residue in his philosophical crucible might find a place of shelter under the protecting wings of the Unknowable; but this meaning of the change of form is the very nerve of the question and all other things are matters of detail and secondary consideration.

The evolution of the solar system, being a mechanical process may find in the Kant-La Place hypothesis a purely mechanical solution. But the evolution of animal life is not a purely mechanical process. There is in it an element of feeling which is not mechanical. I do not mean to say that the nervous process which takes place while an animal feels is not mechanical. On the contrary I consider all processes which are changes of place, biological processes included, as instances of molar or molecular mechanics. But the feeling itself is no mechanical phenomenon. It is a

state of awareness and in this state of awareness something is represented. This state of awareness has a meaning, which may be called its contents.

I do not hesitate to consider the meaning that feeling acquires as the characteristic feature not only of animal but especially also of intellectual life—of the life of man. It is upon the meaning-freighted feelings that soul-life originates. Let every special feeling, representing a special condition or object, be constituted by a special form of nerve-action, and we should see the soul, the psychological aspect of nerve-forms, develop together with the organism. A higher development leads naturally, as a rule but not without exceptions, to a greater complexity of nerve-forms. Yet it is not this complexity which constitutes the evolution of the soul and the progress in the development of the organism. The test of progress can be found in the meaning alone with which the feelings that live in the action of these nerve-forms, are freighted.

What is this meaning?

The different soul-forms (so we may for brevity's sake call these feelings, living in the different nerve-structures) represent special experiences and through these experiences the surroundings of the organism are depicted. The soul accordingly is an image of the world impressed into living substance and depicted in feelings. This however is not all, the soul is more than that. It is also the psychical aspect of the reaction that takes place in response to the stimuli of the surroundings. And this reaction is indeed the most important part in the life of the soul. The former may be called by a generalised name cognition or intelligence, the latter activity or ethics. The former has no other purpose than to serve as an information for the proper direction and guidance of the latter.

We do not consider the world as a chaos of material particles. We do not believe that blind chance rules supreme. On the contrary we see order everywhere and law is the regulating principle in all things and processes. The world is not a meaningless medley, but a cosmos which in its minutest parts is full of significance and purport. And this truth has found a religious expression in the God-idea. The world considered in its cosmic grandeur is divine, and when in the process of evolution the soul develops as an image of the world, the divinity of the cosmos is also mirrored in the soul. The higher animal life rises, the more does it partake of the divine, and it reaches the highest climax in men and finally in the ideal of a perfectly moral man—in the God man.

The test of progress must be sought in the growth of soul. The more perfectly, the more completely, the more truthfully the world is imaged in the soul-forms, so as to enable mankind, the individual man as

well as the race, to react appropriately upon the proper occasions, to be up in doing and achieving, to act wisely, aspiringly and morally, the higher have we risen on the scale of evolution. It is not the complexity of soul-forms which creates their value, it is their correctness, their congruence with reality, their truth. Evolution sometimes leads to a greater complexity. In the realm of cognition it does so wherever discrimination is needed. But sometimes again it will lead to a greater simplicity. Complexity alone would have a bewildering aspect, it must be combined with economy, and the economy of thought is so important because it simplifies our intelligence; it enables us not only to see more of truth at once but also to recognise the laws of nature, the order of the cosmos, and its divinity.

The test of progress, in one word, is the realisation of truth extensive as well as intensive, in the soul of man. The more truth the human soul contains and the more it utilises the truth in life, the more powerful it will be and the more moral. In this way the soul partakes of the divinity of its creator, call it nature or God; it will come more and more in harmony with the cosmos, it will more and more conform to its laws, it will be the more religious, the holier, the greater, the diviner, the higher it develops and the further it progresses.

CHRISTIANITY, ITS SPIRIT AND ITS ERRORS.*

BY VLADIMIR SOLOVIEFF.

[CONCLUDED.]

III.

While the advent of the kingdom of God does not reveal itself as a *Deus ex machina*, but through a conditionally universal-historical, divine-human process, in which God acts only in union with man, it follows, that we must regard as a rude counterfeit of Christianity the view, which attributes to man a purely passive rôle in the performance of the divine work; and which supposes that all his duty in relation to the kingdom of heaven consists in submitting to the divine facts, as symbolised by the visible church; and in a listless expectation of the final advent of the kingdom of God; meanwhile devoting all his activity to worldly and profane interests which have no connection with the divine work in question. As a plausible reason for this view, we offered the comparison that God is everything, and that man is nothing. But, this false submission in reality is a revolt against God, who in Christ has loved and exalted humanity, from whom Christians never ought to separate—for "unto them is given the power to become the children of God." The sons of the kingdom are free, and are

summoned to a self-conscious and spontaneous share in the work of the father. If among these there also are some, who spiritually have not attained the ripe age, then this only represents a fact, which must be taken into account, but which does not lead up to any final, universal principle.

The followers of the above-mentioned error confound the building up of the divine action in the kingdom of God in the growth and development of the god-man organism with the revelation of divine omnipotence in the phenomena of nature, and in the events of terrestrial life. But, by this very assertion, they expose their fallacy, involving themselves in contradictions. If indeed they regard it as unlawful to interfere actively with the fore-appointed decrees of the kingdom of God, in such case they ought not to meddle with anything whatever, because everything depends on divine will. They do not, however, proceed in this way, but with all their energy and inspiration they anxiously strive to build up all possible kinds of worldly enterprises personal, national, and others. And why must this discrimination be made? Why in their worthless actions do they deem it indispensable to assist God where he is omnipotent, but will not assist him in his exalted work? Manifestly because they are cointerested in the former, but not at all in the latter. To interfere with the work of God they think is not *their* duty, and therefore they have no business with him. And yet Christianity in reality consists only in this, that the divine work should be accomplished along with this purely human work. This divine-human solidarity also constitutes the divine kingdom, and it approaches only according to the measure in which it is realised. It is clear, that these pseudo-quietists preach to us an adulterated Christianity. They in fact surrender the more actively to Mammon, the more passively they submit to the words of the other master, whose sanctity and greatness only serve them as an ostensible pretext not to trouble about his will.

We have now pointed out the errors usually connected with the denial of every development and progress in the work of the Christian religion. Because many evolutionists hold to a one-sided, mechanical conception of evolution, excluding the action of the highest force, and all teleology; and because many teachers of the historical progress conceive the same, as the infinite self-improvement of man without God and over against God,—from all this they hastily draw the conclusion, that the ideas of evolution and progress themselves possess a kind of atheistical and anti-christian character. This is not only untrue, but those ideas, on the very contrary, are specifically Christian, or, more precisely, hebraic-christian, and have been revealed to the conscious knowledge of nations

* Translated from the Russian periodical *Voprosy Filosofii i Psichologii* by Albert Gunlogsen.

by the prophets of Israel, and the apostles of the Gospel. Heathendom, whether oriental or occidental, in its highest expressions, as in Buddhism and Neoplatonism, advocated an absolute perfection, unconditional, outside the progress of history, which to heathendom appeared either as infinite, interminable, destitute of totality, and liable to the changes of hazard, or gradually passing to worse.*

Only the Christian (namely, the Messianic) idea of the kingdom of God, consistently reveals itself in the life of humanity, imparts a meaning to history, and determines the true concept of progress. Christianity presents to humanity not only an absolute ideal of perfection, but also points out the road for the attainment of this ideal, and, consequently, it is essentially progressive; and therefore, every view, that denies to Christianity this progressive element, necessarily is an error that, under a Christian name, simply hides a kind of heathen reaction; because the aim of any such views, although not always self-consciously, will be, to detach humanity from the work of God, and to confirm them in that ungodly activity of the world, that Christ came to destroy. These pretended Christians, on their own part, are trying hard, although in vain, to undermine the victory of Christ, in different ways advocating those worldly conditions and institutions, that have nothing in common with the kingdom of heaven. Whence could be justified the prevalent conservative direction of actual, unalloyed Christianity, which, at the same time, strangely enough, in principle, is that of conservatism and radicalism? On the soil of the Christian religion, neither the conservation nor the destruction of any temporal institutions *as such* can interest us. If indeed we care for the *work* of the kingdom of God, we shall be compelled to receive that which worthily serves this end, to reject that, which is antagonistic to it, to avail ourselves not of the dead criterion of any abstract *ablutions*, but (according to the Apostle Paul) of the living criterion of the spirit of Christ—if really we ourselves partake of this spirit; and if we do not, it would be better for us, not to call ourselves Christians. Those, who legitimately wish to bear this name, ought to work, not for the conservation and confirmation of *any* existing social groups and forms, but, on the contrary, to exert themselves for their regeneration, and transformation in the spirit of Christ, and for their genuine transfer into the sphere of the kingdom of God.

In this manner the idea of the kingdom of God necessarily leads us (I mean every self-conscious and sincere Christian) unto the obligation to work, for the

realisation of Christian principles within the collective life of humanity,—for the transfiguration within the soul of the higher truths, contained in all our social relations and social forms,—in other words, the above idea ought to lead up to definite *Christian policy*. Here, once more, we stumble against a new, erroneous aspect of Christianity, or rather, against a diversified aspect of a masked anti-Christian reaction. “Christian policy,” they allege, is a “*contradictio in adjecto*.” Between Christianity and politics there can be nothing in common; *my kingdom is not of this world*, etc. But, because the kingdom of Christ is not of this world, it does, not at all, follow, that it cannot work in the world. Otherwise, it would be legitimate to maintain, that because absolute power is not derived from the people, (but conferred by the grace of God), therefore it cannot direct the people. On the very contrary, according to sound logic, precisely because the kingdom of Christ is not of this world, but *from above*, it follows, that it has a *right* to rule and to guide humanity. One of two things: either the societies, that call themselves Christian must renounce this name, or they will be compelled to recognise their duty, of reconciling all their political and social relations with the principles of Christianity, to transfer them to the sphere of the divine kingdom, and, precisely in this consist the Christian politics at issue.

If, as affirm the partisans of pseudo-Christian individualism, all political and social forms are foreign or even antagonistic to Christianity, it directly follows hence, that true Christians ought to live without any political and social forms. But, this would be a manifest absurdity, as demonstrated by their life and activity. But, if on the one hand it is impossible to annihilate the social and political forms of life, and on the other, that these forms, in their given efficiency, do not answer to Christian principles, and are still far from the heavenly kingdom, it follows that the task of Christian policy is precisely to improve, to elevate these forms, to transubstantiate them into the kingdom of heaven. It is true, that one has misapplied, and still greatly abuses this Christian policy. The kingdom of God on earth is described as a solidarity and partnership of men, who receive and profess a number of given dogmas. Recently one of the partisans of a manifestly counterfeit Christianity of this kind, declared in print, that it is impossible to have any intercourse with “the liberals,” on the ground that they do not “profess Christ coming in the flesh,” as required by the Apostle John. But, I know not upon what this assertion is founded. I know, indeed, rabid conservatives, who are totally strangers to any profession of Christ; and I know liberals who are not liable to this reproach; but this is not the real matter at issue. Our zealot of the faith, manifestly, in an

* An apparent exception to this is represented by the view concerning the progress of the world, which we find in the Persian book, entitled the *Bundehesh*. But this monument, although containing old Zendic religious elements, still by its whole composition relates to much later times (XIIth century after Christ), and manifestly supposes the strong influence of Christian ideas.

evil hour has had recourse to the Gospel of John. The alleged text, as it is known to every one, who has concerned himself about this subject, is directed against the error, then rampant, of those who recognised the supernatural nature of Christ, but who denied his actual incarnation; only beholding in his bodily manifestation, and historical personality an apparition. This false view afterwards struck root, and spread abroad in the different sects of the Gnostics. But I emphatically maintain, that I never have known any liberal, who was guilty of this heresy. Finally, the text from John, as usually, every word in holy writ, possesses a general signification, beside its direct, historical sense. It is not directed against the liberals, but against that counterfeit Christianity, which, on the one hand, leads to a faith that is dead, and, on the other, to superficial interpretations of the personal sanctity, and individual salvation of the soul. While isolating all human problems from the soul of Christ they thus really deny the whole force of his incarnation, that was accomplished in reality, not for his sake, but for the sake of humanity. While reducing Christianity to an abstract dogma, and denying its realisation in social and political life, they manifestly show, that they themselves, in fact, do not profess Christ, as coming in the flesh, and therewith render themselves liable to the anathema of the apostle, that one of them, rather incautiously, thought fit to recall to mind. At all events, the apostle of love could not refer all Christianity to only a dead faith. He surely knew that truth, so beautifully expressed by his fellow-disciple, James, in the words: "and even the devils believe, and tremble." Truly, an alliance with the liberals cannot be so dangerous as an alliance with the devils.

The same author, moreover, asks: "to whom does Vladimir Solovieff teach all this?" To this I am able to answer briefly and definitely. I have not a doctrine of my own; but in view of the spreading of the obnoxious errors of Christianity, I deem it my duty, from different points of view, in different forms, and by different roads to clear up the fundamental idea of Christianity,—the idea of the divine kingdom, as the fulness of human life, not only individual, but also social and political, united in Christ to the fulness of divinity; yet, as regards alliances, I absolutely avoid only alliance with the demons who believe and tremble.

RELIGION IN INQUIRENDO.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

UPON the island of Inquirendo Mathematics, having been personified by the inhabitants, is worshiped as a god, and the following conversation took place in the library of Mr. Mayland, an eminent citizen, be-

tween him, Festus Idler, (a mathematical moralist,) and Oliver, a high churchman of the denomination of "Decimals."

"It is absurd," said Idler, "to suppose that an infinite Mathematics would delight in what passes with the populace for his worship. Apart from doing sums correctly all that man thinks himself able to do in order to become acceptable to Mathematics is mere superstition and religious folly."

"Then," replied Oliver sadly, "you do not believe in a revealed arithmetic?"

"I believe in doing sums correctly," answered Idler, "and as to what you are pleased to call revelation, I deny that such a thing exists, or can exist."

"No man cometh unto the truth except through revelation," said Idler. "There is none that doeth sums correctly,—no, not one. Neither doing of sums availeth anything nor not doing sums, but a new creature."

"There you err," exclaimed Idler impatiently, "all you have to do is to follow the rules."

"That," responded Oliver with the utmost complaisancy, "that is a most pernicious doctrine; doing sums is of the mind,—in the spirit and not in the letter, whose praise is not of men but of Mathematics."

"You insist then," continued Idler, "that it makes no difference whether you get right answers to the sums or not? Is that your theory?"

"Quite the contrary," replied Oliver placidly; "if your mind be right in the sight of Mathematics you will get the right answers."

"Always?"

"Always."

"But take the case of an ignorant person; can he be expected to do a sum in double rule of three or cube root off hand?"

"Only believe," answered Oliver solemnly. "What saith the arithmetic?—that it is the science of Numbers,—which is the truth as it is in Numbers. Have faith in Numbers and all these things will be added unto you."

"How can that be, Mr. Oliver?" Idler asked impatiently. "How is it possible for the powers of the mind to be so enlarged as to enable an ignorant person to perform a complicated operation?"

"Ah, therein lies all the mystery. Only believe, only have faith."

"But," persisted Idler, "the mathematical organ differs in different people; some have it so developed that the doing of sums correctly seems to be innate with them, whilst others have no turn, so to speak, towards Mathematics. Are all to be judged by the same standard?"

"The arithmetic is plain," replied Oliver. "The way-faring man, though a fool, need not err,—what

could be plainer than this declaration : only like Numbers shall be added ? ”

“ But yet it is our daily experience that men who are not fools do err. I have a friend who can perform all the operations of the four ground rules with facility, but who seems absolutely incapable of even comprehending decimal fractions. Is that his fault ? ”

“ What he lacks is faith,” said Oliver staunchly. “ If he prayed in the right spirit his prayer would be answered. By the right spirit of course I mean the mathematically appointed way,—the way laid down in the arithmetic.”

“ And that is ? ”

“ That all the examples must be worked out upon a consecrated blackboard.”

“ And is there in your opinion no other way ? ”

“ There is no other way,” said Oliver solemnly, “ given among men.”

“ Do I also understand that you insist upon the use of the decimal system exclusively ? ”

“ I am not prepared,” answered Oliver, “ to deny the efficacy of common fractions. Understand me, please, I am not bigoted, and even go so far as to believe than one may use a slate ; of course one sanctioned by some orthodox denomination.”

“ How about doing sums in one’s head ? ”

“ Ah, my friend,” said Oliver mournfully, “ that is the most fatal of all errors. Mathematics, it is true, is plenteous in mercy, but I find no warrant in the arithmetic for any reliance upon our own powers.”

Idler, of course, was far from being convinced, and perhaps tired of an argument which he perceived to be futile, he appealed to Mr. Mayland as to what he called “ his views.”

“ You will, I trust,” said Mr. Mayland, “ pardon any appearance of dogmatism if I assure you that I have absolutely no views. I attend the church of Our Dividend, because I find myself there in congenial company, and in a reverent atmosphere. I use the decimal system exclusively, but only that this method of calculation is, on the whole, the most serviceable. Let those who choose employ a slate, use common fractions, or if they can, do sums in their head. I confess (he added smiling) that I have always been inclined to envy one who possessed the power to arrive at results without the mechanics, as I call it, of either blackboard or slate.”

“ Why,” exclaimed Oliver, unable to contain himself, “ this is rank heresy.”

“ Not at all. As you have yourself said, Mr. Oliver, neither doing sums correctly nor not doing sums availeth anything, but a new creature.”

“ Precisely ! ”

“ Then,” continued Mr. Mayland, “ we shall agree entirely if only we can define accurately what is meant

by the term, new creature. Mathematics has revealed himself in the mind, and only in that portion of the mind which, as we are all agreed, is his especial abiding place. The use of the arithmetic and the doing of examples are only means to an end, tests,—not of mathematical perfection, but of the final relation of the individual to all Truth. Mathematics is not,—as the churches would have us believe, the science of quantity ; He is the science of the relations of quantity. It is also quite inconceivable that Mathematics should make the eternal destiny of a being made in his likeness depend upon an intellectual process when the faculty necessary to the performance has been denied.

“ Mathematics is indifferent to either space or time ; He exists manifestly independent of these. He is infinite, for principles have no quality of quantity. He is eternal, for Truth is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

“ Science means known truth ;—how therefore can a doer of sums know beyond what he is able, or how shall Justice act otherwise than justly, or require of a mortal that,—on pain of damnation,—he establish a relation to the unknown,—in fact to the unknowable ! I say this, because Mathematics is Justice ; for Justice is nothing if not absolute, and the absolute is nothing if not mathematical.

“ Of the personality,—as we understand the word,—of The Abstract nothing can be effectually affirmed ; of the attributes and requirements of The All-Being the all-sufficient is known :—the universal AXIOMS.

“ Equity is Justice revealed, lighted with wisdom, as the dark is not added to but illumined,—may be,—as it has been called ‘ Justice touched with emotion,’ and is certainly the correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient.”

Oliver observed that this was all science falsely so called, and Idler added that Mr. Mayland’s remarks were “ more rhetorical than definite.”

So difficult is it for a human being to think without the aid of symbols.

Mr. Mayland’s argument applies, (so it appears to me,) quite as well to the faculty of conscientiousness as to that of calculation.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A CAUCASIAN complaint comes up from Washington against negro competition in the office holding trade. The bill of particulars which accompanies the complaint reads thus : “ The Indiana and Ohio negroes who want to live at government expense, and that means about all of them, have developed a very shrewd plan for getting places. These citizens have made up a list of places they want, and have sent two of their men from each state to the president in person to ask for them.” Well ; who in the United States does *not* want to live at government expense ? In cherishing this laudable ambition the negro shows that he is very much like a white man ; and his plan of making up a “ slate”

and presenting it to the president is good evidence that his bump of imitation is well developed. He has adopted this maxim of the white man, "If you see what you want, ask for it." For my own part, I wish he may get it. When the negro does not act like a white man he is proscribed; and when he does, he is condemned for his knack of adaptation. When he was made a voter it was the understanding that he was to be only a chip in the fascinating game of politics; yet now, in violation of the implied agreement, he sits at the table among the players and calls for cards.

It was my fortune to live in the South before the war; and we haughty cavaliers down there, had a habit of lounging in the shade, smoking our pipes, and deploring the laziness of the negro. Because of his propensity to idleness and luxury we "despaired of his future," much as we desired his moral elevation. At the same time, what little work was done in the South, he did it; and idleness was the prerogative of the white man. After we have made him a citizen shall we deny him the perquisites of that sublime dignity, the right to sell his vote, and to hold an office? After peace broke out, and the negro had become a fellow citizen, a friend of mine in Iowa was a candidate for office, and we had what the newspapers called a "spirited contest," meaning an excess of bribery on both sides. There was a "colored element" in the town, and heretofore this had always been reliable for our ticket, but that year it insisted on the same reward for voting as the white man got. Moralising over this reprehensible conduct, my friend the candidate, who had lost an arm in the war, said: "I call this very ungrateful; I lost an arm fighting down there to make these people free men and fellow citizens, and now I have to bribe them just like white men." And as it was with Julius Cæsar, "Ingratitude, more strong than traitors' arms, quite vanquished him; then burst his mighty heart."

It appears by the papers that M. Eifel, the French tower builder, has offered to build an Eifel tower in Chicago, for the Columbian Exposition, and the Directors with headlong daring have returned a favorable answer, in reckless disregard of the law. They seem to think that they are living in the magnanimous United States of old. They forget that should they make a bargain with M. Eifel for a tower, and he should come over to build it, he would be arrested on his arrival at New York, and be sent back under the contract labor law. To the ordinary business mind it seems that if an Eifel tower is to be one of the attractions of the World's Fair, M. Eifel is the very best man to build it; but no sooner is that thought of by the Directors than we hear the little tin trumpet squeaking that the proposition of M. Eifel should not be entertained, because "it would humiliate the profession in this country," and because "the buildings, grounds, and structures should be peculiarly American." Nobody proposes to import the "grounds," nor even the buildings, but only the genius and skill of M. Eifel in the construction of an Eifel tower. It is an irksome thing for our Commissioners in Europe who are soliciting foreign patronage for the Fair, to explain away and apologise for the ungracious attitude assumed by some portions of the Chicago press towards those people of the old world, who if not repelled by our own incivility, will from business motives as well as from friendly motives help the Fair. Either we should abandon the insular, provincial, and conceited style, or cease to call the exposition by such a large and generous name as "The World's Fair."

The death of James Russell Lowell grieves me like the loss of a battle. Poet laureate of New England, the leaves of his crown will grow brighter as the years roll on. His was the song of the Norsemen and its theme was liberty. Into a purer melody he put the bugle call heard long ago in the Scandinavian forests, and among the woods and marshes of the Weser and the Elbe; the same invin-

cible hymn that animated freedom at Naseby, at Bunker Hill, and Gettysburg. I will not cheapen him by the title "typical American," that slang praise we give to so many counterfeits. Rather will I exalt him as a type of what the American shall be. He was my senior by a few years, just enough to make him a leader of my thought, and I followed him in sentiment for forty years and more. I feel bewildered for a moment; the flag bearer fallen, and the banner out of sight, but I remember that when liberty needed help, Lowell brought Hosea Biglow on to the field, a reinforcement equal to an army corps. What Burns made the Scottish dialect, Lowell made the Yankee dialect—classic, in the speech of Hosea Biglow. In the withering irony of Biglow our apologies for slavery shriveled up and died. The speech that Biglow made in the House of Commons—of course through the medium of an English member, who recited by way of an argument the poem, "Johnathan to John,"—was a moral force in England at a critical time for us, and the warning it contained was copied into every English newspaper:

"Shall it be love, or hate, John?
It's you thet's to decide;
Aint your bonds held by Fate, John?
Like all the world's beside?"

Lowell saw with moral instinct that the civil war was a contest between liberty and slavery for the greatest stake that was ever fought for in this world, the absolute possession of the United States with its future for a thousand years. With the breath of poetry he blew down tall ramparts where the shams of politicians lay entrenched in catch phrases, emphasised by military follies like General Halleck's order No. 3, wherein it was attempted to surrender, not the arms and ammunition, but the moral stamina of the soldiers. The very religion of the great conflict glows in the Hartford Commemoration Ode, perhaps the most splendid thing that rose out of the war gloom; that stately and pathetic poem wherein the Harvard boys who fell in battle are crowned and glorified:

"We sit here in the Promised Land
That flows with Freedom's honey and milk;
But 'Twas they won it, sword in hand,
Making the nettle danger soft for us as silk."

He saw from the first onset of the opposing forces that the rebellion was "a lie in arms"; and that brave men must put it down:

"To front a lie in arms and not to yield,
This shows, methinks, God's plan
And measure of a stalwart man."

To Lowell the Union victory was a spiritual purification; and without that, the mercantile and political benefits of a restored Union would have been to him as dross. He loved his country, and he wished to behold her free from the sin and shame of slavery. The glory of that four years of sacrifice is all condensed into these last words:

"Bow down, dear Land, for thou hast found release!
Thy God, in these distempered days,
Hath taught thee the sure wisdom of His ways,
And through thy enemies hath wrought thy peace!
Bow down in prayer and praise!
No poorest in thy borders but may now
Lift to the juster skies a man's enfranchised brow."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE ETYMOLOGY OF "SHEENY."

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

I NOTICE that in your last number General Trumbull reads a mild lecture to the *Century Dictionary* for not knowing what he knows very well, namely, that the word "sheeny" is derived from the French *chien*. Now I hold no brief from the *Century Dic-*

tionary, but I did have occasion a year or two ago to interest myself scientifically, in a feeble way, in the origin of that particular word. (A lawyer acquaintance had written me about it; there was some sort of suit for defamation of character). Now my conclusion was the very one found in the dictionary, namely, that the origin of the word is "obscure." Moreover the very first derivation that I had occasion to consider was that from the French *chien*. I think General Trumbull may safely assume that that hypothesis was fully present to the mind of the Century lexicographer when he pronounced the origin of the word "obscure," and that it was rejected because he felt that it would not pass muster. At any rate I can think of three or four weighty reasons why the word cannot be so derived. At the same time these reasons would have to hide their diminished heads in presence of any real evidence that it *is* so derived. General Trumbull would confer a favor upon our National Dialect Society if he would publish any facts he may know (guesses, hearsay, and opinions don't count,) which go to show when, where and how the word "sheeny" as meaning "Jew," actually came into use.

Until such facts are in evidence it strikes me that the dictionary man's confession of ignorance should be set down to his credit. The golden rule of etymology to-day is: If you don't know, say so. A few years ago the rule was: If you don't know, guess, or cull a guess from your predecessors.

Sincerely yours,

Ann Arbor, Mich.

CALVIN THOMAS.

REPLY BY GENERAL TRUMBULL.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

Will you kindly print the following answer to Prof. Calvin Thomas:

I am sorry to see that Professor Thomas holds "no brief for the Century Dictionary." He ought to hold one and have a good fee, because he pleads the cause of the Dictionary very zealously although not in a convincing way.

As to the word "Sheeny" Professor Thomas tells us that he had occasion a year or two ago to interest himself scientifically in its origin "in a feeble way"; and this by a curious coincidence appears to be the way the dictionary man interested himself in it, as more fully appears by his definition of the word.

Professor Thomas pretends that I may safely assume that the Century lexicographer considered "Chien" and rejected it. I assume the very contrary of that, because had he thought of *chien*, he would not have said "origin obscure"; and certainly would not have given such a makeshift definition as "a sharp fellow, hence a Jew."

"Now, what I want is, facts," demanded Mr. Thomas Gradgrind, and Professor Thomas equally geometrical, demands in italics any "facts" that I may know that go to show when, where, and how the word "sheeny" as meaning "Jew" actually came into use; and he warns me in parenthesis that "guesses, hearsay, and opinions don't count." This is hardly fair, considering that the wild, haphazard "guesses" of the dictionary man did count with Professor Thomas, and very numerous too. What facts did the Century lexicographer give to show that "Sheeny" meant "a sharp fellow"? What facts did he give for his "hence"?

I am rather sorry that Professor Thomas has subjected me to such a rigid cross-examination, because it smokes me out; and that was an unkind thing to do. I had fondly hoped that through my definition of "Sheeny" I might pass for a scholar learned in the languages; and Professor Thomas's demand for "Facts" drives me to the humiliating confession that I plagiarised my definition from a little boy; which the same I am free to explain.

My next door neighbor was a German Jew, and among his children was a boy about nine years old. One day he was quarrel-

ing with a Christian boy of his own age, and the Christian called him a sheeny. The Israelite replied, "I am no more a dog than you are." Impressed by his retort, I asked him what he meant. He said, "He called me a sheeny. Sheeny is French for dog, and in Europe it is used as an insult for the Jews." "Who told you that?" I said. And he answered, "My mother told me." I have no doubt that his mother was right. Under the Norman kings occurred the persecution of the Jews in England, and as no true Norman would use a Saxon word when he could use a French word, he said *chien* and not "dog" when insulting a Jew. Sir Walter Scott makes Brian De Bois Guilbert say "Dog" when addressing Isaac of York, but the exact word he used was *Chien*, or "Sheeny."

Granting even that little boy's definition of the word "Sheeny" to be incorrect, I think it is ten times more logical and etymological than that given in the "Century Dictionary."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

The last number of *The Open Court* contained a misprint. We read on page 2911, first column, line fifteen from bottom, this sentence: "We cannot look upon reality as being endowed throughout with the potentiality of psychic phenomena." It should read, "We cannot *but* look upon reality as being endowed," etc.

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P. O. DRAWER F.

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The Open Court.

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Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF CLEARNESS AND THE CHARM OF HAZINESS.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES dwells in the very last chapter of his "Problems of Life and Mind" (he wrote it hardly more than three weeks before his death) on the potency of symbols. The essay is entitled "The Sphere of Intellect and Logic of Signs." The intellect is defined as "the symbolised logic of feeling." Man's power of thinking in abstracts goes as far as and not farther than he is able to express himself in verbal symbols. Accordingly, says Lewes, "language is to the social organism very much what the nervous system is to the body—a connecting

sciences and also in philosophy. But the disadvantages are not smaller that arise from a vague and ambiguous usage of terms. The mind is bewildered and loses itself in the poetical subumbra of profound mistiness.

We must not, however, be blind to the fact that the haziness of vague thoughts possesses a peculiar charm, which makes half-truths more acceptable to the unthinking many than truth. It is only the thinker who enjoys the survey of perfectly clear ideas; he alone can appreciate their value; he alone understands the beauty of lucidity which solves at once in one simple formula all the problems of a certain class and



FIG. 1.




FIG. 3.




FIG. 2.

medium which enhances all its functions." Mr. Lewes adds:

"How the advance of science is connected with the methods of notation (which is an extension of the primitive process of naming) is manifest in the fact that the Greeks were arrested in their course precisely at the point where their notation failed them. They had a very imperfect system of arithmetic and no separate algebra. . . . The facilities of notation enable thought to be carried on with an ease and extension which have an analogy in the facilities afforded to commerce by the manifold symbols of credit,"—or we may add, by the facilities afforded manufacturing through the invention of tools and machines.

Such are the positive advantages of a clear, perspicuous, and well-defined terminology in all the

allows our minds to penetrate into their difficulties, laying bare their most intricate complications so that we can look through them as if their substances had been magically transformed into purest crystal. The average man is, as a rule, far from being able or willing to appreciate the light which clearness of thought alone can give. He prefers the bewildering effects of the shadows that originate in the chiaroscuro of a half-revealed truth. The twilight is more suggestive than the sunshine of noon and will much better satisfy the wants of a fertile imagination.

Prof. E. Mach says in his great work *Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, historisch-kritisch dargestellt*:

"Every truly enlightening progress brings in its train a certain feeling of disappointment. We recognise that that which appeared to us as marvellous is not more marvellous than other things which we know instinctively and look upon as self-evident. More than that, we recognise that the contrary would be much more marvellous, that we have to deal with the same fact everywhere. Our problem is recognised as being no more a problem, it dissolves in nothing and is gathered to the shadows of history."

This passage is a comment of Professor Mach's upon the theories of the Flemish mathematician Stevinus who was the first to consider the mechanical properties of the inclined plane. Professor Mach describes Stevinus's explanation of the equilibrium between the two parts of a chain of unequal weight upon inclined planes of unequal inclination but equal height as follows:

"Stevinus proceeds somewhat in the following manner: He imagines a triangular prism with horizontal edges, whose cross-section ABC is represented in Fig. 1. For the sake of illustration we will say $AB = 2BC$; AC is placed horizontally. Over this prism Stevinus hangs an endless string to which 14 balls of equal weight are attached at equal distances apart. We can advantageously replace this string by an endless uniform chain or cord. This chain will either be in equilibrium or it will not. If we assume the latter to be the case, the chain, since its conditions are not altered by its motion, must, when once set in motion, continue to move forever, that is it would present a case of perpetual motion, which Stevinus deems absurd. Consequently only the first case is conceivable. The chain remains in equilibrium. The symmetrical portion ADC can then be removed without disturbing the equilibrium. The portion AB of the chain balances, accordingly, the portion BC . (See Fig. 2.) Consequently, on inclined planes of equal heights equal weights act in the inverse proportion of the lengths of the inclined planes."*

Stevinus attached so great an importance to this intuitive insight into a statical law, that he placed this mechanical conundrum, which answers a riddle as it were by sleight of hand, as the frontispiece to his book† with the inscription: *Wonder en is gheen Wonder*. (See Fig. 3.)

Stevinus's ingenuity certainly is great, and it cannot be doubted that he brings, in this almost paradoxical and startling way, a truth home to us so directly as to let it appear almost as a mysterious revelation. And it is the very mysticism of this method which charms us. We are bewildered and pleased at the same time. Yet it would be wrong on our part to regard such a statement as a definite solution or to consider its mysteriousness superior to lucidity of thought on account of its charm and fascination. We cannot conquer mysticism through mystification. We might as well propose to cast out devils through Beelzebub the chief of the devils, as to solve a problem by conjuring up an unexpected surprise which after all is the same problem only deeper rooted in our mind, more familiar to us but rather more than less mysterious.

* The three figures of this article are reproductions from Professor Mach's work, cited above.

† *Hypomnemata Mathematica*. Leyden, 1605.

Stevinus, in his way of explaining the problem, refers a fact with which we are not sufficiently familiar to predict with any certainty the sequences of certain conditions, to another fact which is so deeply rooted in our experience that we are no more conscious of it; it has become instinctive knowledge. Stevinus's solution mystifies, it takes us by surprise. We are confronted by a truth which we know by constantly repeated experience without ever having given a thought to it. The explanation is deeper than our insight, and thus our comprehension feels flattered by being brought face to face with something that even when cognised remains a mystery. It appears like a revelation of unknowable truths. This is the reason why half-truths make the impression of profundity; while to him who has never gauged the difficulties of finding the truth and cannot appreciate the grandeur of the simplicity of truth, the full truth will be a disappointment; it will appear as a flat and stale and trite truism.

Professor Mach adds about Stevinus:

"If Stevinus had developed the whole phenomenon clearly in all its aspects, as Galileo subsequently did, his reasoning would no longer strike us as ingenious; we should have obtained, however, a much more satisfactory and clear perception of the matter."

The philosophical problem is, as Mach rightly states: "How does our instinctive knowledge originate?" And he answers: "Our observations of nature impress themselves, even if they are not understood and not analysed, in our concepts, which in their strongest and most general features imitate the natural processes." In other words: all knowledge is nothing but description of facts; and comprehension is the recognition of the same feature in different facts; it is the orderly arrangement of described facts, which will result in an economy of thought. This is a very simple idea, and also its correctness is palpable. This truth, the truth of positivism, has been dawning since Kant or even longer, since Locke and Hume. Nevertheless, it is still disregarded or even rejected, because it appears to the average mind as a disappointment. It throws light upon many problems and destroys the profundity of all philosophies which have not as yet attained this lucidity. It does away with the most favorite and fashionable philosophical systems, it relegates all unknowables to the realm of idle phantasms and lays bare the bottom rock of all cognition which are found to be the facts of experience.

EVERY MAN IN HIS PLACE.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

China does only what the most Christian of nations would do, in refusing to receive Minister Blair; and we should have no right to complain if she should shut out Gospel ministers also, for it was not a missionary spirit which permitted Chinamen to be mur-

dered with impunity in this country, and which finally passed laws forbidding any more of the hated race to come and live among us. The worst of it is that we have already begun to pursue a similar course towards the Italians. They, too, have been massacred without redress; and laws for the wholesale exclusion of that nation also are demanded eagerly. No one defends the Mafia, but if anything could excuse such secret societies among us, it would be the lynching of Italians who had either not been put on trial, or else been found not guilty. If that verdict was unjust, those who gave it should have been the first culprits punished. If those eleven prisoners had been Anglo-Saxons, charged with killing an Italian, there would in all probability not have been even a mob. We honor Columbus and Dante, Raphael and Michael Angelo, Cavour and Garibaldi. Is it not possible that the nation which produced them can send us men worthy of a place among us? The charge that Italians are prone to crime is fully off-set by a second accusation, namely, that they, like the Chinese, are too thrifty and saving to be allowed to compete with Americans. A thrifty class is not a criminal one, and no residents of our northern cities are more thrifty, and at the same time more obedient to the laws, than the compatriots of Columbus. They ought to be shut out, it is said, because they are too willing to vote; but the Chinese were shut out because they were too unwilling to vote, a disposition not to be wondered at. It may be very proper to raise the conditions for naturalisation, and take more pains to see that they are complied with in every case. Closer inspection of immigrants might also be instituted with advantage. There is nothing to say against regulations designed to keep people away, on account of individual defects, from the polls, or even from our shores. What I object to is wholesale legislation directed against an entire race, on account of defects not found in all its members. To say that many millions of human beings are unfit, on account of the place where they were born, even to live among us, is trying to turn this great democracy into an aristocracy of race.

The same race prejudice, which has shut out Chinese and would shut out Italians, is already becoming so bitter against the Jews, that it is well to notice the fact that a Jewish festival or fast-day is known in the public schools of Boston, by the absence of a large part of the brightest scholars, while the stupid ones are in their seats. Consistency requires Russia to drive such people out, and us to invite them in.

It is ridiculous for English travellers in Germany to call the Germans "foreigners"; but the original inhabitants of Nebraska have been denounced as aliens by settlers who have come but recently into that state. Congress has no time to pass a law which the real friends of the Indian declare necessary for his legal pro-

tection; but there is plenty of time for voting all the tariff protection and pensions and public buildings for which white men ask. We have just had a war to punish our people for taking it for granted that any white man, however unfit for any other trust, is good enough to look after Indians. At last, however, the principle of Civil Service Reform seems likely to make its way into the region where it is most needed. Another gratifying piece of news is that our government is going to train Indians for soldiers, and to begin their education by familiarity with that part of civilisation which they can best understand, because it is most like barbarism.

It is true that this is one way to serve our country, and it must not be forgotten that it was kept closed by race-prejudice, for two disastrous years of our great war, against those of our northern citizens best fitted for withstanding the deadly climate of the South. Who can tell how many precious lives were sacrificed on the altar of a wicked spirit, whose worshipers are still finding fault with "niggers"? It was an injury to the whole nation to keep the colored man out of his proper place among our soldiers. So it is still to keep him out of his proper place among salesmen in our stores, conductors on our cars, and mechanics in our trades-unions. The prevalence of every low idea of religion and morality among millions of Americans is insured by the prejudice of even the most liberal of white congregations against colored clergymen, who are thus obliged to preach orthodoxy or not preach at all. But I am not speaking so much in the interest of the blacks as of the whites. The welfare interest of all our people requires that each man be allowed to take the place for which his own individual merits fit him, whatever the color of his skin or the place of his birth. It was once said to the abolitionists, why don't you go and do your talking down South; but I believe that there is more prejudice against colored people here at the North than anywhere else to day. It would not prevent an intelligent, well-behaved girl from getting a place anywhere in the South, as dress-maker or lady's maid; but it did just this in Iowa, where the poor creature could get no employment, except to do such menial drudgery as soon brought her to an untimely end. A Philadelphian who recently visited South Carolina declares that he found less feeling against colored office-holders among those Democrats, than in his own State. Kansas has never, until very recently, elected any but Republican candidates; but a colored one got only one-eighth of the white Republican vote two years ago. A drop of African blood might prevent a family of the highest culture and character from hiring a suitable house in Boston; and colored people have much to complain of in all the Northern cities. The race is subjected to

worse treatment at the South than the North, on the whole; but this is not due to needless prejudice, but to experience of the danger of letting freedmen rule. More just and impartial measures would be safer for the South than her present policy; but there is nothing to be gained by Congressional legislation for party ends.

What we really need, both South and North, and in the interests not only of colored people, but of Indians, Jews, Italians and Chinamen, is to recognise that the right of any man to live and prosper among us depends on what he is actually doing, and likely to do, for our community, not on who were his parents or where he was born. Some attention to race and family may help us to form a preliminary estimate of a man's probable capacity; but no merely theoretical opinion should hinder our giving full weight to actual facts; and we should always keep in mind that many a man fails to inherit the general characteristics of his family or race. We outgrew long ago the fancy that only a king's son ought to be at the head of a nation, and that a peasant's son ought never to be anything but a peasant. Why fancy that the son of a foreigner cannot do good service as an American citizen? Some foreign nations have recently contributed valuable elements of our population; why take it for granted that there is any race likely to come here, which ought to be kept out? It is well enough to exclude such immigrants as are undesirable on account of individual defects; but wholesale legislation against all the members of a race or nation is utterly iniquitous. Justice, as well as policy, demands that each man be allowed to serve mankind to the utmost of his powers, and in the highest place he is able to fill. If he is kept out of his place by prejudice against his color or race, there is a grievous wrong, not only to him, but to all who might otherwise receive his help. This principle, of course, demands the abolition of restrictions on sex as well as race; and we cannot say that prejudice has been completely driven out by justice from our people's hearts, until we see women in many a rich, easy pulpit which men now hold.

ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

BY WILLIAM EDWARD RUSSELL, A. B.

THE character of the legacy of one generation to its successor can be approximately foreknown by a study of the ethical instruction given to the members of that coming generation.

While the voice of the people is almost an unit in advocating education, it is a dire misfortune that common usage has limited the term to mean, mainly, intellectual development. Moral education, vastly more important, is deemed an adjunct worthy only of minor consideration. For the fruits of this sinful error, we

need only to turn, for convicted examples, to our penitentiaries and jails; for a more harmful class, to the dishonest and conscienceless knaves, cloaked by respectability, who openly make war on human happiness with the weapon of quickened intellect; for results, to the almshouses, pauper hovels, and dens of misery.

On History's page we find the record of a corresponding increase of vice with intellectual development unless that development is tempered by moral education; we note, further, how far more insidious and dangerous are the glossed vices of intellect than the coarse sins of ignorance. The dramatist adds to the evidence of history by giving us a Mephistopheles and an Iago. The Blind Poet makes the climax to the sad picture of intellectual wickedness by the monster Beelzebub.

But surely such apathy to the importance of moral education does not characterise religionists! Nay, and yet the sad results outlined before are due, paradoxically, more to religionists than non-religionists: each sect realises fully that moral education is the foundation-stone upon which it must build the superstructure of its religious doctrines, and each sect arrogates to itself the privilege of laying that foundation in the halls of the Sabbath-school and church. Sad error, to expect a few hours once a week to supplant the worldly impressions upon an unceasingly active and imbibing brain during the six whole preceding days!

True, says the Sectarian, I admit that the crumbs of ethical instruction taught by us to the children of our faith does not offset, as a rule, the wickedness that thrusts itself upon and around them at all times; but what else can we do! We cannot permit the prerogative of laying the foundations to our doctrines to be assumed by others who may build them in opposition to our faith. True, say I in reply, and now that we understand each other, allow me to suggest a basis of a simple system of ethics for public school instruction which will compromise the difficulties named by each of us.

In leading up to the basis, which you will find very trite, so far as theory is concerned, but unfortunately too near in application, permit me to generalise briefly upon some of the points at issue.

What is religion? What is *your* religion? Is it, according to the excellent and brief definition of the editor of *The Open Court*, your "aspiration to live in accord with truth?" Do you answer yes, with the modification that "truth" be considered not an abstract term but as synonym of the condensed result of your own tenets? May I then suggest my own definition of true religion as being: A conscientious realisation and acceptance of responsibility to God, Fellow-man, and Self.

Whatever else your sectarian views may prescribe, you, along with all religionists, must perforce agree that the prime work of your organisation is a counter-acting influence against sin. While methods may differ in nature and adequacy, there is at least, in such a purpose, a common cause and interest, a common enemy to fight. Waiving the origin of original sin, and judging from known effects, to what can we ascribe the most, if not all, of the prevalent sin? An answer seems unnecessary, since to each thinking mind the evils that curse the world flow directly or indirectly from the one great satanic attribute of humanity—selfishness. To this monstrous viper can be traced the cruelty of despotism, the persecution and oppression of the weak, the blood-thirsty wars of conquest, the brute-like antagonism in the daily battle, each man against his brother, so-called by the sophistry of selfish philosophy the "survival of the fittest." The woes of nations, the woes of families, the woes of individuals spring in great part from the same black fountain.

In fighting this prolific parent of misery and vice, united effort on a common platform will serve to lay the solid rocks with which the cement of special sectarian instruction will combine to build a sure and lasting foundation.

Wherefore then delay in adapting the ethical instruction in our public schools to that common platform upon which all sects can agree? What is that platform? Simply nothing more nor less than the Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would have them do to you."

Oh what a vast amount of misery would have folded its sable wings and flown away ere this, had the practical application of this well-named rule been a matter of conscientious endeavor and anxious work in the instruction of the young! Why shall we endeavor to impress upon youthful minds abstract ideas of right and wrong and duty, abstruse in their nature and puzzling even to mature intellects, when each child has *inherited* a trait of character which can be so easily made the criterion for a system of ethics superior to all codes laid down in text-books. The innate selfishness of the child, as yet unhardened by the cruel contest of life, will present, under the Golden Rule, a precise and ever ready standard in concrete form to guide all actions. During this impressionable period of life, when the philosophy of individual interest has no weight, the simple admonition, wisely taught, to do unto others as they would be done by, will find a ready soil and a grand harvest.

Who can imagine a more beautiful sight than innocent childhood bestrewn with the virtues of kindness, sympathy, generosity, and crude justice.

How is the Golden Rule to be taught? By those

various ingenious methods which are used in inculcating other ideas. First, and in fact mainly, by emulation. The experience and testimony of instructors and students of child-life agree that the natural pride of each child gives a subjective *abetting* force which makes emulation the strongest factor of progress. The methods based upon fear are happily being abandoned to a great extent, since it needed not a sage to discover that by such was produced in the child a natural antagonism.

If the prizes, preferments, words of commendation from teacher, parent, and public, now given to intellectual progress, were also given to moral progress under the Golden Rule, we would have a rising generation that would place the brand of shame upon the gross meanness and vileness of their ancestors. Second, by example. The far-reaching responsibility that attaches to those who mould future mankind must have an additional requirement. One of the most important qualifications of a teacher should be a conscientious gentleness and sympathetic nature. Who can wonder that manhood should so oft be contemptibly mean, when childhood so oft receives its moulding impress at the hands of a sour, disagreeable, unsympathetic and revengeful teacher.

"The pitiful wreck of the present
Bears the past's bitter-sweet on its breath."

Such a simple system of ethics in the public schools would not only remove the objection as to antagonising various religious beliefs, but what is vastly more important, would build a foundation for a moral character for each of the thousands of children who now receive intellectual education at the expense of the state, but are not included in the folds of the Sabbath-schools and churches.

Shall the state place in the hands of its future guardians mind-knowledge, and, in thousands, leave the heart, the citadel of right and wrong, to grow up with pestiferous and rank weeds! Shall we be unmindful of the causes of the fall of other republics! Shall liberty be a term with a real practical meaning rather than a topic of spread-eagle laudation on anniversaries! Shall the legacy to the coming millions be a blessing fraught with happiness and peace, or the same continued vendetta handed down from time immemorial! Shall life be worth the living! Then hasten ye men of purpose, ye leaders in the van of true progress, the day when the doctrine of peace, good-will and truth will have for its rising champions the thousands of the onmarching generation.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A RESTAURANT keeper in Chicago has been fined twenty-five dollars for serving prairie chickens out of season; that is to say, before the time when prairie chickens may lawfully be killed. The malefactor, a public officer of high rank, paid the fine cheerfully.

thinking it a small price to pay for the large advertisement that at his cook-shop game could be had in season, or out of season, law or no law. In order to be fair all round, and to give others the same benefit, warrants were issued against a dozen of the great hotel keepers, for the awful crime of supplying game birds to their guests. These prosecutions are at the instance of certain sportsmen, and sportsmen's clubs, organised for the protection of game from "pot-hunters," by which expressive epithet is meant persons abandoned enough to kill game for food instead of sport. It is curious that those bird killers for sport have the approbation and assistance of the public and the press. Some really pathetic editorials have appeared censuring the ignominious "pot-hunters," and declaring that, "no true sportsman would kill game birds before the First of September." This is true, and an amendment might be added, to the effect that no true sportsman would kill birds either before the First of September or afterwards; except for food, or because the birds injured the crops, or did some other mischief; and every one of those reasons is despised by the "true sportsman." It is the eccentricity of government that a man may not kill prairie chickens, say, on the 31st. of August, even for food, although he may kill a wagon load of them on the 1st. of September, merely for wanton sport, and for the pleasure of throwing them away, as many sportsmen do after they have glutted their propensity for killing. The "true sportsman" must of necessity be cruel, because he kills for pleasure, and wounds as well as kills.

* * *

After long searching for the "Typical American" we hear so much about, I think I have discovered him in the patriot who either has a pension or is after one. There are other American types, but this one is the most numerous and picturesque, and he is rounded into graceful symmetry by the most bountiful government under the sun. There is a "Free Lunch" counter at Washington; and the man behind it is generously inviting every American who truly loves his country to step up to it and refresh himself with a pension. So urgent is this invitation that a man of patriotic feeling is almost compelled to claim a pension as an act of patronage to his own beloved land. Last week I received a very flattering invitation to step up to the lunch counter. It came in the form of a circular from a Pension Attorney informing me that so anxious is the government to recruit the Pension Corps, that, "Soldiers or officers dishonorably discharged or dismissed from the service can now get pensions." This was a strong temptation to enlist in the noble army of pensioners, for the advantage of such good company. Deserters are also invited to step up to the counter in these words, "Charges of desertion can often be cancelled." As a further encouragement I am informed that "much of the red tape of past years has been done away with"; and, in short, that, "*Now is the time to attend to any claim against the government.*" There was once a soldier in the English army, Sir John Falstaff by name, and when informed by Prince Henry, that he, the Prince, was reconciled unto the King, his father, and had become a power in the government, exclaimed, "Rob me the exchequer the first thing thou doest." Although I do not share in the general opinion that Falstaff was a coward, I do not think him an admirable soldier, nor a good example; neither do I think it a soldierly thing to demand of the prince or the party in power, "Rob me the exchequer the first thing thou doest."

* * *

I once had for a client an Irishman who had been arrested for assault and battery. He justified the assault on the ground of "self-defense," and said, "Tim and meself wor havin' dis-coorse, and as he wouldn't listen to raison, I persuaded him wid a brick." This curious illustration of "self-defense," and the amiable definition of skull-breaking I have always thought resulted from a poetical tendency to figurative speech, or to the habit of thinking in Irish, and speaking in English; but I was rather surprised on

reading this morning's paper to find out that this apparent Irish incongruity is in reality deliberate and premeditated American. It appears from the account that Barnum's renowned circus being advertised to show on Monday, twenty carpenters were employed to build the platforms and put up seats; and it further appears that these were all non-union men. While they were at work a number of delegates representing "Organised Labor" appeared upon the circus ground, and "with sticks and stones and marrow bones," proceeded to drive the non-union men from their work, in the orthodox union way. There was nothing in itself remarkable about that, excepting the strange coincidence of thought and expression between my Irish client and the union delegates, for I find that in the ethics of "Organised Labor," those delegates are called "Persuaders"; and they assaulted the non-union carpenters in "self-defense." In addition to the "persuading," a boycott has been ordered, and all the penniless and down-trodden laborers are advised not to go to the circus, an exhortation which to penniless men appears to be superfluous. This boycott will be a fair test of the courage and constancy of working men. If they can resist the fascination of the circus they will prove themselves to be truly of heroic mould. I am "an old man and full of years," but there is not a boy in town who loves a circus better than I do; nor is there one who will follow the band and the clown farther than I will; and therefore I remark, that if those working men have sufficient moral strength and self-denial to spurn the circus, the triumph of Labor is at hand.

* * *

The International Socialist Workmen's Congress at Brussels was controlled a little too much by class prejudice and sectarian intolerance; the sect in this instance being the socialistic fragment of that uncertain and capricious aggregate known as the "working men." The aim of the Brussels Congress appeared to be the promotion of special interests at the general expense; and it was guided by the sublime precept, "Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost"; the prayer in the latter part of the sentiment being entirely unnecessary, because the devil gets him anyhow; according to the rule once followed in the British navy, when, the boatswain having piped "all hands," the last man up got a scratch from the cat o'nine tails; and as there always was a last man up, there was always work for the cat. The Brussels Congress travelled away backwards to the dark ages of caste when it required that every candidate for office should pledge himself to advocate "the protective legislation demanded by working men." This, instead of uniting mankind politically and socially, divides the human race into antagonistic orders dwelling in hostile camps. It concedes the doctrine of special interests, and justifies that class legislation which already oppresses the working men. The demand of working men for "Protective legislation" in their own special behalf is a declaration of social war, for it must provoke a counter demand for protective legislation by all other men in resistance to it. The Brussels Congress, and every other Congress that seeks for beneficent reforms must expand the demand for protection to working men into the larger demand of protection for all men. They must proclaim, not only in their preaching, but also in their statesmanship, the unity of the human race and the common brotherhood of all. Some of the acts and speeches of these Brussels Congressmen "make the judicious grieve," for they create the disagreeable suspicion that such orators denounce tyranny because they are not the tyrants, and threaten the rich because they themselves are poor.

* * *

In one of Lever's novels there was a croaking old impostor whom I always greatly admired; I forget the name of him, I think it was Corny Delaney or something like that. Corny, a petted servant in the family of an Irish gentleman, spent his time in denouncing his employer, grumbling at everything, and giving

notice that he would quit next Tuesday. For forty years Corney had complained of the oppression to which he had been subjected by his employer; for forty years he had been saying, "Things is gone to the bad intirely, but thank God, I'll be laving the place next Tuesday"; but he never went, and he never intended to go, for he had an extremely comfortable job. Well, I often think of old Corny when I am listening to some of the down-trodden orators of my acquaintance; as, for instance, Mr. Sanial, the Representative from New York in the Brussels Congress, who on being elected President for the day, made what the papers call a "stirring address," in the course of which, referring to the United States, he said, "Amid all that wealth, misery increases so fast that 'the land of the free and the home of the brave' is in reality a hell." Like old Corny, who used to talk in the same way, Mr. Sanial did not mean one word of it; and like old Corny, although he is always threatening to "lave the place" next Tuesday he never goes; and he does not intend to go. When the Congress adjourns, he will come back to New York and in the shady bowers of some aromatic beer garden he will smoke his pipe and sip the amber brew which I have heard poor Bayard Taylor call the nectar of the Gods. Mr. Sanial will then and there declare not only that there is no hell in the United States, but that there is none anywhere. Mr. Sanial and his class are not to be taken seriously; they are useful steam escapes for discontented men.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"THE QUESTION OF MONOGAMY."

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

WHEN the cat in the fairy-tale asked the ugly duckling if it could emit sparks the poor thing had to admit it could not. I am in the condition of the ugly duckling. Mr. C. S. Wake asks if I can emit sparks, or in other words challenges me "to give a single example of a really monogamous savage tribe," and then adds that if I could give half a dozen examples it would not sustain my contention that primitive man was monogamous.

The whole cry against the Darwinian theory of the descent of man from some ape-like creature was that neither he nor any one else could give a single case from history or geology of an ape-like creature ever having been developed into a human creature. The "missing-link" has yet to be found, although, without doubt, as Wallace informs us, in the Euro-Asiatic continent, a country as yet little explored, it will be found, when more extensive research has been made in the miocene and pliocene layers of the earth's crust, where are supposed to be buried ample remains of primitive man. The verification of the theory that primitive man was monogamous does not rest upon the ability to give one or more cases of existing monogamous tribes; that he was monogamous is a legitimate deduction which accords with a sound physiology and psychology. The most clear-sighted and best informed anthropologists of to-day do not accept the doctrine of some of their brethren that in the first human communities the sexual impulses were gratified without order or separation into pairs. Professor Letourneau of the Paris School of Anthropology, in his recent work, "The Evolution of Marriage," agrees with Darwin in rejecting promiscuity, etc. In chapter third of his book, he asks: "Has there been a stage of promiscuity?" and then adds: "Some sociologists have affirmed without hesitation that community of women represented a primitive necessary state of sexual association of man-kind. Surely they would have been less dogmatic on this point if, before approaching human sociology, they had first consulted animal sociology. The mammals nearest to man, those whom we may consider as effigies of our nearest animal ancestors,

"the anthropoid apes, are sometimes monogamous and sometimes polygamous, but, as a rule they cannot endure promiscuity. Now, this fact manifestly constitutes a very strong presumption against the basis of the theory according to which promiscuity has been, with the human species, the primitive and necessary stage of sexual union."

If reliance can be placed upon so distinguished a medical authority as Freeman I. Bumstead, the fact of the non-existence of syphilis prior to 1494 cannot be open to question.

My deduction from this fact may seem "more than weak" to Mr. Wake, but, perhaps, it is with the discovery of a new truth as it is with the discovery of all new inventions, it is the perception of something which true reason denies because the premises do not justify it. Imagination has seized upon the true conclusion. Shakespeare's imagination seized upon the truth of evolution when he said: "The home-staying youth bath ever homely wits." What is this but the law of the struggle for existence, that no creature can be improved beyond its necessities for the time being?

Now as to my "treble mistake," I fail to discover it. The first of England's Contagious Disease Acts was passed in July, 1864, and was superseded by the Act of 1866, which with all its various amendments, was in 1886 repealed. These are the only Disease Acts ever adopted by parliament. That they did more harm than good is made evident by their absolute repeal. It is the duty of a government, as Gladstone said, to make it easier for men to do right than to do wrong, and the Disease Acts, encouraged men to vicious practices, by inducing the belief that they could escape its penalties.

SUSAN CHANNING.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER ON CRUELTY TO CHILDREN.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

The English Society for the prevention of cruelty to children recently secured the quasi-conditional support of Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has publicly confessed that:

"To bring punishment on brutal and negligent parents seems on the whole, a beneficial function, for though by protecting the children of bad parents (who are in the average of cases themselves bad), there is some interference with the survival of the fittest, yet it is a defensible conclusion that in the social state philanthropic feeling may, to this extent, mitigate the rigor of the natural law."

While I have the greatest admiration for the synthetic philosophy of Herbert Spencer, I cannot understand how a man of his profundity cannot take account, in his system, of certain social conditions, (particularly that of public opinion, though in the majority of cases it is in error) which are potent factors in evolution.

For example, the *laissez faire* doctrine is very much like the fatalism of some religious sects, but not that government interference particularly is for the most part pernicious, but certainly an attempt at instituting merciful proceedings for the better care of our sick, our insane, our children, and even animals, are in every way justifiable. Nor do you, in arousing a healthy public sentiment in these matters, interfere with the course of nature, for so long as man aspires to be better and to do good to his fellow kind, such endeavors will be perfectly natural, even though blunders may be committed, and often as much harm as good may result, and we have reason to be profoundly grateful that such dispositions are not only natural, but that they will exist to the end of time, in spite of pessimism or narrow "let alone" policies.

S. V. CLEVENGER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

HISTORY OF CIVILISATION. Being a Course of Lectures on the Origin and Development of the Main Institutions of Mankind. By *Emil Reich*, Doctor Juris. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Company.

Our attention was called by a friendly author and reader of *The Open Court* to Dr. Emil Reich's "History of Civilisation," which was published several years ago without meeting with the success it deserves. The book contains a series of lectures which were delivered in 1886, first at the lecture-hall of the University of Cincinnati and afterwards, when the interest of the public during the course rapidly increased, at the spacious Hall of the Scottish Rite Church. The lectures were published by permission of the Board of Trustees and of the University of Cincinnati in a handsome shape with several valuable and well executed illustrations and can be recommended as one of the best books in its line, well adapted to give our youth a correct idea of what history is, how history should be studied, and what we know of the most important phases of the development of the different nations as well as mankind in general.

The book gives history itself, commencing with China and India, then explaining the civilisation of Egypt, the growth of Monotheism in Israel, describing the social, the political, and the religious life of Greece, the development of Greek science, philosophy, and art. In Rome the origin of political and social institutions is traced, the spirit of Roman law is sketched, the legislature, the senate, and the magistrates. An interesting chapter is Dr. Reich's treatment of the alleged profligacy of the emperors. The author shows that most of them are highly improbable stories not worthy of credence. He does not try to white-wash a Nero, but he convincingly explains why the accounts of his having poisoned Britannicus, murdered his own mother, and burned Rome are insipid inventions which upon critical examination are full of contradictions and without any positive evidence whatever. The next chapters are devoted to the origin and growth of Christianity. Reich treats the subject neither from the so-called orthodox nor the so-called negative point of view, but from the standpoint of an historian, and he approaches his subject avowedly with a profound reverence. He confesses that we are absolutely at a loss how to account for the development of Christianity up to the year 150 after Christ. For the time following this year our knowledge becomes more substantial and we begin to see some of the causes at work. Our author sketches briefly the history of the Church and after two chapters of a controversial nature which might better have been dropped, as having nothing to do with the subject, he winds up with a short description of the Middle Ages and of Modern Times. Concerning the Middle Ages Dr. Reich tries to correct the almost generally prevailing error that they were the Dark Ages. Men of the Middle Ages were trying to do exactly the same thing that we are endeavoring to achieve; that is to say, to live honestly and peacefully if we can and to remonstrate against everything inimical to this, our chief desire. We look down upon our fathers and are wont to glory: "My Lord, I thank thee that I am not like one of them." We parade their superstitions and other errors, but if a later historian will in later years collect our superstitions and errors, how shall we stand before the judgment of the future? The chief difference between the Middle Ages and Modern Times is found in the more extensive cultivation of science, and the history of sciences resembles, as said Goethe, a fugue, inasmuch as the voices of the different nations set in after due intervals and finally combine in one harmonious structure. The Italians with Galileo and others took the lead, the English with Harvey and Newton followed. The French, our author adds, and we do not agree with him, "never abounded in genius of the first order": he mentions, however, Lavoisier, La-

place, Lagrange, A. Comte, and others (certainly names of first degree!). The Dutch had great luminaries in science and law, and they had a Spinoza in philosophy. The Germans had Copernicus, Kepler, Kant, Goethe, and others. The Americans have almost from the beginning of their independence displayed a marvelous power of inventiveness, characterised by Franklin, and it is to be hoped that the future of their republic will manifest a still larger expanse of industrial and mental activity.

We have to call special attention to the two preliminary lectures which prove that our author takes the modern, that is the positive, standpoint of historical research. He objects to history as a description of battles and sieges and truces, and points out the necessity of tracing the growth of humanity, of its institutions, its ideas, its habits, and the leading motives of their actions. Scientific history is of very recent growth. As the first historian who treated history philosophically Dr. Reich recognises the Italian G. B. Vico. A further step was taken by a German, Herder. Next follow Comte and Littré, and Buckle is characterised as the first historian who actually treated the subject of a history of civilisation in a scientific way.

Dr. Reich's book does not contain and does not pretend to contain anything new; the treatment of the historical sketches is neither exhaustive nor is it in all parts equally reliable. Nevertheless it is a work of great merit for the author is a well disciplined scholar, an able and instructive lecturer, and he is fully abreast with the positive spirit of the modern conception of history. The illustrations make the book attractive to young minds in whom it will rouse an active interest for historical inquiries.

KPS.

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SHAKESPEARE ON THE LABOR QUESTION.

A STUDY FROM "THE TEMPEST."

BY WM. SCHUYLER.

From a study of Shakespeare we may learn much of the world of human beings, for the great dramatist not only saw clearly the facts of life but also the truth behind the facts, and embodied these truths in that marvellous series of characters, which as he himself said, "hold the mirror up to nature." To be sure no two persons get exactly the same ideas from his work, but neither do they get the same ideas from the world about them. From the reading of a book we take little more than what we bring to it; except that often the half-formed ideas, arising from the solution of our minds in experience, are crystallised by the addition of the fully-formed thought of a master mind which acts as a sort of *nucleus*, while these newly-formed ideas of ours become in turn *nuclei* for further crystallisation.

I shall not then try to give even what *I* think was Shakespeare's own meaning, but merely some of the thoughts which shaped themselves in my mind while studying the play of "The Tempest," with special reference to the characters of Prospero and Caliban.

Commentators are generally agreed in considering Prospero as one of the finest types of humanity; noble, cultured, virtuous, and beneficent. Caliban is described as really infra-human. One writer calls him "part man, part demon, part brute, each being drawn somewhat out of itself by combination with the others, and the union of all preventing him from being either." Another compares his mind to a dark cave "into which the light of knowledge falling, neither illuminates nor warms it, but only serves to put in motion the poisonous vapors generated there."

But Caliban is rather intensely human, with all the capacity for good and evil that humanity possesses. Is there anyone of us, who, in his inmost nature, is not part man, part demon, part brute? As Walt Whitman says:

" You felons on trial in courts,
You convicts in prison cells,—you sentenced assassins chained and handcuffed with iron;
Who am I, too, that I am not on trial or in prison?
Me ruthless and devilish as any, that my wrists are not chained with iron,
or my ankles with iron?"

And Swedenborg states that "the highest angels acknowledge a kinship with the lowest devils." This is the very essence of humanity, nay, even of human liberty. Without the possibility of being demon or brute there were no freedom of choice; without freedom, no responsibility. We would be mere machines for doing good. But goodness consists in regulating and directing the demon and the brute by the higher man within us. And out of this struggle springs the progress of humanity, a progress impossible under other conditions.

Caliban is then human, very human; but it is an almost dumb humanity which is striving to find expression through his heavy faculties. The difference between the slave Caliban and the master Prospero is not a difference of quality but a difference of degree. Evolution has proceeded but a few halting steps with Caliban, it has made gigantic strides with Prospero. Caliban's mind is scarcely awakened, Prospero's intellect is highly developed. Caliban is almost on a par with the natural forces about him, seems subject to them, while Prospero is the accomplished master of all natural and even supernatural powers. They stand at the opposite ends of the scale of intellectual progress. And in the relations of these two beings, Shakespeare has plainly shown forth the direst tragedy which has darkened the history of mankind; that tragedy which began with the first steps of the march of progress—the enslavement of those of lower development by those who have reached a higher stage—the domination of parents over children, of man over woman, of stronger races over the weaker, giving rise to the institutions of chattel slavery, serfdom, and wage slavery. Whenever we have human beings of different degrees of development existing side by side we find Prospero and Caliban. Generation after generation the world has resounded with the groans and curses of the ignorant toilers who wear out their lives in the service of the more intelligent, and it has echoed with the curses and threats of the masters who are holding down their weaker brethren. For the more highly developed of mankind are not necessarily the morally better, although they may be the intellectually stronger.

This is set forth very clearly by Shakespeare in the following scene; Prospero is calling Caliban:

"What ho! slave! Caliban!
Thou earth, thou! speak. . . .
Come forth, thou tortoise! when? . . .
Thou poisonous slave, got by the devil himself
Upon thy wicked dam, come forth!"

What wonder that after such language, Caliban answers with curses like these:

"As wicked dew as e'er my mother brushed
With raven's feather from unwholesome fen,
Drop on you both! a south-west blow on ye,
And blister you all o'er!"

To this the virtuous and enlightened Prospero replies in very much the same tone as many a Christian employer of our days uses to his grumbling workmen:

"For this, be sure, to-night thou shalt have cramps,
Side-stitches that shall pen thy breath up; urchins
Shall, for that vast of night that they may work,
All exercise on thee; thou shalt be pinched
As thick as honey-combs, each pinch more stinging
Than bees that made them."

These are no idle words. Prospero has the power to carry out his threats and uses it, just as the modern employers make their recalcitrant Calibans suffer "cramps" and "side-stitches" of hunger, and, if not "pinches," then bruises from the clubs of policemen or bullet-wounds from the rifles of "pinkertons."

Which is the worse of these two cursing ones—the enlightened Prospero, or the ignorant Caliban? For the present bitter state of feeling in the labor world, which is the more to blame—employer or employee?

And Prospero is still further to blame. Caliban says:

"You taught me language; and my profit on't
Is, I know how to curse. The red plague rid you,
For learning me your language."

And so it has always been. Every grade of development has its special vices, and those peoples who are lower in the scale of social development always absorb more readily the vices than the virtues of their lords. The vices of our modern civilisation are rapidly exterminating the remaining savage races of the world.

Yet this need not be, for there is no nature so dull, so savage, so imbruted as to be incapable of feeling kindness, and appreciating, in some degree at least, the dawning of higher things. Shakespeare was fully aware of this, and so he makes Caliban say:

"When thou camest first,
Thou strok'st me, and mad'st much of me; would'st give me
Water with berries in't; and teach me how
To name the bigger light, and how the less,
That burn by day and night; and then I loved thee,
And showed thee all the qualities of the isle,
The fresh springs, brine pits, barren place, and fertile:
Cursed be I that did so!"

But the saddest part of the tragedy is that Prospero will not see this, and thinks that he is doing all this evil, inflicting all this suffering, for Caliban's good, that these pinchings, cramps, and side-stitches are the only things which will keep his slave in the

the right way. A number of his remarks show his sentiments:

"Abhorred slave,
Which any print of goodness will not take,
Being capable of all ill!"

"But thy vile race,
Though thou did'st learn, had that in't which good natures
Could not abide to be with; therefore was't thou
Deservedly confined into this rock,
Who had'st deserved more than a prison."

"A devil, a born devil, on whose nature
Nurture can never stick; on whom my pains,
Humanely taken, all are lost, quite lost."

And so it is with our modern Prosperos, who, enjoying wealth, luxury, and intellectual recreation, puffed up with a sense of their own righteousness, refuse wilfully to try to understand the temptations that surround our Calibans, and so, instead of lessening their motives for evil doing, only increase them by adding bitterness and hatred.

We have heard a great deal lately from Stanley and some other explorers concerning the ferociousness of the African Calibans. According to their accounts the negroes were utterly unamenable to good influences—beating and shooting were the only things that would keep them in order. But among these same negroes Livingstone had once dwelt unhurt, and was known throughout the dark continent as "the good Doctor." It is not strange that when the tribes in the interior of Africa got news of the approach of Henry Stanley, being informed how he had treated other tribes, they were on their guard, and were prepared to give him a suitable reception. And so it is with the red-skinned Calibans of our own far West. We insist that they are utterly unable to live peacefully alongside of the whites, and so continue our brutal and savage policy, in spite of the knowledge that we should have of the Quakers of the last century, who had no trouble with the same Indians, simply because they treated them like human beings.

And so we often hear nowadays that laboring men are utterly unamenable to reason, that to try to arbitrate with them is folly, that they must be kept down by force in the form of Pinkerton's toughs, in spite of the historical fact that the past ages have borne witness to the gradual rise of the handicraftsman from slavery and irresponsibility to freedom and responsibility.

Yet at first sight Prospero seems to have some excuse. As he says:

"Thou most lying slave,
Whom stripes may move, not kindness! I have used thee,
Filth as thou art, with human care; and lodged thee
In mine own cell, till thou didst seek to violate
The honor of my child."

To which Caliban replies lightly, having, in his half-awakened moral sense, no consciousness of the heinousness of his offense:

"O ho, O ho!—would it had been done!
Thou didst prevent me; I had peopled else
The isle with Calibans."

If Prospero is no saint, it does not follow that Caliban is an angel. We often hear speakers and writers expatiate on the virtues of the lower grades of humanity, as if they were sinned against though never themselves sinning. But they too are evil, just like their masters—only from the difference in circumstances their wrong-doing takes sometimes a different direction. No doubt Caliban had attempted a foul wrong according to the code of morality accepted by the civilised world; but, as with the most of his kind, his sin was one of ignorance, of natural desire, as yet not restrained by fully awakened reason. What then was the proper course for Prospero as the representative of enlightened civilisation? To have a loving patience, to try still further to awaken the mind of Caliban to rational morality, or to beat him back again into a hopeless brutishness by means of other brutishness directed by a superior intelligence?

Of course Prospero had great provocation, and the question may be asked, "Would not you yourself do the same thing under the same provocation?" To be sure anyone might, as we are all fallible human beings. But is the act of any individual or any number of individuals to be taken as the measure of what is right, and are the effects of angry passion to be considered in the discussion of absolute justice?

It is only lately that the Prosperos of New Orleans led a crowd of evil spirits to murder some dozen Sicilian Calibans, and, in the columns of *The Nation*, a "Southern Pastor" defended the lynching of negroes on the ground that one must "save our precious society and civilisation." And, whenever it seems likely that Caliban, in trying to assert himself, may possibly do some harm, we see our sanctimonious Prosperos out-caliban Caliban in their frantic efforts to "save society."

But the question arises—can we make law-abiding citizens of our Calibans by violating the laws which we ourselves have made? Can we expect the lower classes to rise to a higher morality, when we are doing all we can to keep them from bettering their condition and coming into their inheritance? As Caliban says:

"This island's mine, by Sycorax my mother,
Which thou takest from me."

And again:

"I am all the subjects that you have,
Which first was mine own king: and here you stay me
In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me
The rest o' the island."

Come with me into the slums owned by our saintly Prosperos where our Calibans are "styed" and kept brutal. You will not have far to go—only a few blocks to the back streets and alleys near our palaces of business and pleasure. Everywhere we shall find Calibans of all colors, of all stages of degradation—or

rather of elevation—each one like us with unknown possibilities of good and evil; for in every man is the potentiality of the human race. We shall find them struggling, cursing, fighting in liquor-dens and disreputable dives, which pay a goodly rent to the Prosperos of our day. Everywhere we shall see them tormented by the mischievous spirits controlled by the Prosperos' magic. We shall see them dogged by rascally detectives, far worse morally than the Calibans, but whose claim to more consideration lies in the fact that they are employed by the Prosperos. We shall see them clubbed and dragged to jail by brutal policemen, penned in the "holdover," whether innocent or guilty, by still more brutal jailors, prosecuted by a city attorney and condemned by a judge, both of whom hold their offices by pandering to favored crime and vice—for great is the power of the "political pull." Of course these Calibans break our laws—why should they not? Let me ask you, my reader, with how many municipal ordinances and state statutes are you acquainted? If you will investigate you will find that a great number of arrests are on account of ignorance of our complicated legislation.

And when in the power of these spirits employed by the Prosperos how are the Calibans treated? The moneyed man, or he whose friends have money or a political pull, may commit equal offenses, and if arrested at all be dismissed freely, or at most with a slight fine—being bailed out during the interval between arrest and trial. The Caliban is clubbed by a policeman if he utters a word of protest, "jugged in the holdover," judged after a minute's investigation, sent to the work-house, and, when liberated, is ever after a suspected being. Do you wonder that he curses the "law that is agin the poor man"?

But our righteous Prospero will not look into Caliban's mind and try to divine his feelings—the slave is too disgusting. His highly-bred daughter Miranda naturally says with a shudder:

" 'Tis a villain, sir,
I do not love to look on."

And Prospero would gladly eliminate Caliban altogether from his existence, if he could get along without him; but as it is

"We cannot miss him: he does make our fire,
Fetch in our wood, and serves in offices
That profit us."

And therefore, in order to have the Calibans serve the more readily "in offices that profit us," in order to force them to perform the heavy, dirty, and disgusting labor, disdained by all highly developed mortals, our own Prosperos in many ways strive to hold the Calibans in utter subjection. By means of "pluck me stores," which keep the workmen always in debt, by means of black lists and combines of employers, by means of

the laws, which render it easy for a rich man, through continuances and appeals to higher courts to avoid paying debts due to poor men, by means of private armies of wicked spirits called "pinkertons," conjured up by the magic power of wealth, they sty the Calibans upon a rock while they keep them from "the rest of the island"; that being kept in ignorance of the higher things of this life, they may not desire them, and so, perhaps, become determined to possess them.

But though kept down by Prospero's superior powers, Caliban is always ready to revolt. His curses tend to become threats; his threats, deeds. Yet he needs a leader, not being himself sufficiently developed to take the initiative. And Shakespeare, with his unerring insight, sends the expected leader—Stephano, the unscrupulous drunkard, with his follower, the tipsy coward Trinculo. The scenes in which they appear are in Shakespeare's most humorous vein; yet there is in them a sad undercurrent, for they throw still more light on the tragedy of our own Calibans. Stephano, the drunken butler, although a low-lived character, is more highly developed than Caliban, who, feeling Stephano's superiority, accepts him as master as soon as he sees that he means kindly by him. Once more, after a long interval of suffering, Caliban is treated humanely, and what is still better, with no patronising condescension. He receives what he longs for more than kindness—fellowship; Stephano lets him drink out of his own bottle. What is more desirable to a hungry human soul, no matter how low in the scale of evolution, than fellowship,—especially when it is cemented by "celestial liquor"?

Then too is Caliban led to see dimly in his half awakened mind that not only are equality and fraternity beautiful things, but also that one thing can make them possible, and that is freedom—liberty! He sees that only in freedom lies his salvation. His favorite song, taught him by Stephano, and for the repetition of which he asks, is

"Flout 'em and scout 'em, and scout 'em and flout 'em;
Thought is free."

For even the dullest mind can see that there can be no progress toward higher things without the freedom of choosing in what direction to move. As was said years ago to the sophisticated Prosperos, who held that it was not safe to free the slaves *then* because they would not know how to use their freedom, "how can the slave ever learn to use freedom while he remains unfreed?" How can the blind man learn to distinguish colors while the film still shrouds his eyes?

And with this longing for freedom, Caliban has a dim insight of all the lovely things of which he can now only dream, but which would be both possible and actual in a state of "Liberty, Equality, and

Fraternity." In speaking of his dreams he becomes truly poetical:

"Be not afeared; the isle is full of noises,
Sounds and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not.
Sometime a thousand twangling instruments
Will hum about mine ears; and sometime voices,
That if I then had waked after long sleep,
Will make me sleep again: and then, in dreaming,
The clouds methought would open, and show riches
Ready to drop upon me; that when I waked,
I cried to dream again."

One of the most touching scenes in Zola's "Germinal," a book which depicts the modern Caliban most faithfully, is where the family of coal miners gather about Etienne Lantier, the labor agitator, and listen to his description of the good time coming when men will all be equal, and will not rob but love one another. Revenge for past injuries is forgotten, and the whole circle is entranced in an ecstatic dream of love for humanity—so beautiful, that when they wake, they "cry to dream again."

But while Caliban is right in his longing for freedom, it is his misfortune not to know what true freedom is. Like all others of low development, he thinks that because he has found a new master, who treats him somewhat better, and lets him have more liberty than Prospero did, he is now free; and so in a wild burst of ecstasy he sings:

"No more dams I'll make for fish;
Nor fetch in firing at requiring;
Nor scrape trencher, nor wash dish:
'Ban, 'Ban, Ca—Caliban
Has a new master—Get a new man.
Freedom, hey-day! hey-day, freedom! freedom, hey-day, freedom!"

So, exalted by this longing for freedom, and hampered by his ignorance of what freedom really is, he joins with the vulgar Stephano, and the coward Trinculo, and lays the plan to murder Prospero in requital for past injuries, and then to regain his rights to the island—that lost inheritance which the superior skill and intelligence of Prospero had taken from him.

Over and over again has history repeated Caliban's effort to throw off his yoke and kill Prospero. The Helot rebellions of Sparta, the Servile Wars of Rome, the Jacqueries, the Lollard uprisings, and Peasant Wars of the Middle Ages, the Reign of Terror a century ago, and the mobs and riots and dynamite plots of to-day, tell the story only too plainly. Sometimes there has been a gleam of temporary success, but always the final failure has been inevitable. For the leaders, if not blind fanatics, are, like Stephano and Trinculo, selfish demagogues; the strife for freedom is often by them converted into an ignoble scramble for the spoils. Shakespeare has well pictured this in the scene where Stephano and Trinculo, in spite of all Caliban's entreaties, waste precious time over the plunder hung upon a line by the cunning Prospero. For the Prosperos of this world are far-seeing and crafty, and by fomenting quarrels and disunion among

the Calibans, assisted by the spirits called up by their magic—and all know what magical power has the glitter of gold—put down the rebels as Shakespeare's hero did, and hold them still in slavery.

But each time the revolt grows more and more dangerous, for Caliban with the lapse of centuries, in spite of all efforts to keep him brutish, is growing more knowing. He not only knows how to curse, to threaten, to destroy, but he is at last beginning to know how to think. He is beginning to lose faith in his "dam's god Setebos," and in such leaders as Stephano, and is learning to trust in himself. As Shakespeare makes him say:

"What a thrice double ass
Was I, to take this drunkard for a god,
And worship this dull fool!"

So each new revolt has been more potent than its predecessors because it has been more rational, and, deny it as we will, the roar of the coming torrent of revolution is now distinctly audible.

Must the ghastly prophecy of universal destruction come to pass, or, as set forth in the play, shall a sense of justice and a reformation on the part of Prospero work the same change in Caliban? What we most need is not a society for the education of the ignorant, but a society for the enlightenment of the educated. If the wise ones of this world will not open their eyes to their selfishness, injustice, and brutality, they will be met by the same on the part of the rapidly awakening Calibans, and in the ruin of our civilisation, in a downfall far worse than that of Rome, may be destroyed not only the bad but also the good that has been built up by the ages.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FOLK-TALES.

BY L. J. VANCE.

ACCORDING to an old-time proverb "wisdom has alighted upon three things—the hand of the Chinese, the brain of the Frank, and the tongue of the Arab." This wise saw dates back to the time of the Crusades, when the Arabs impressed the European invaders as the most eloquent people in the world. Certainly, the Infidels were the most skillful *raconteurs* the pilgrims had ever listened to, and their stories the best they ever heard. What was more natural than these "good things" should have been carried away from the Holy Land? And so, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, we find Eastern tales of different kinds diffused over all Europe, they were told and retold by knights, by monks, and by minstrels, who wandered from place to place. In those days, the Trouveur was the gossip, and at present, we can hardly understand how food and lodging would be given in return for his coarse stories. Thus, in the course of time, the tales which had entertained an Arabian audience in the sandy desert or around the camp-fire

were now repeated before a company of ladies and gentlemen in the castle. Oddly enough, "chestnuts" which had wrinkled the faces and shook the sides of grave sheiks were re-roasted by Northern fire-sides.

In this connection, brief reference may be made to one curious means through which Oriental fictions were diffused over Europe. It seems that it was the practice of mediæval preachers to interlard their sermons with popular stories. Most of these stories can now be traced to Eastern sources. In the introduction and notes to his learned and elaborate edition of "The Exempla of Jacques de Vitry," Prof. T. F. Crane has shown the importance of a single preacher for the diffusion of popular tales.* The *Liber de Donis* of Etienne de Bourbon was a large collection of stories specially designed for preacher's use. Later on, or about the close of the thirteenth century, some one compiled the "Gesta Romanorum"—that curious jumble of classical, Oriental, and Gothic fictions and legends, as Mr. W. A. Clouston well describes the work. Finally, Eastern tales of great antiquity re-appear, decorated and dressed up so that the original narrator would hardly recognise them, in the *Canterbury Tales* of Chaucer, in the *Fables of La Fontaine*, and in the plays of Shakespeare.

Not alone has wisdom alighted upon the tongue of the Arab. Good sense and nonsense has loosened the tongue of the philosophic Hindu, of the pleasure-loving Persian, of the guileless Chinaman, of the simple-minded German peasant, of the garrulous Negro, and of the wild Indian. Clever story-tellers are born in all ages and among all races, and a good story receives as warm a welcome as in the tent of the wandering Arab.

That no people have a patent on, or monopoly of, popular tales may be seen from the amazing number of collections from all quarters of the globe. Within the last twenty years over one hundred volumes have been published containing the popular tales of Asia, Africa, Europe, South and North America. We find popular tales among the Zulus, Kaffirs, Bushmen, Eskimos, Tunis, Iroquois, Dakotahs, and other savage races. But the most surprising thing of all is that, we also find the same tales, more or less similar in character and in incident, among all sorts and conditions of peoples.

Hence, one of the chief problems in folk-lore is, whether popular tales originated independently in places thousands of miles apart, separated by rivers and seas, or whether such tales were invented at some one place, and thence spread through the race and over the world.

* *The Exempla*, or illustrative stories from the *Sermones vulgares* of Jacques de Vitry. Edited by Thomas Frederick Crane, M. D. Published for the Folk Lore Society, London. 1890.

The early students of comparative mythology, Grimm, Max Müller, Von Hahn, and Sir George Dant, held that certain popular tales were originally a part of the myths of the Aryan people in their Central Asian home; that offshoots from the parent stock carried with them their folk-tales into Europe. Their theory, however, fails to explain the possession of these popular tales by non-Aryan peoples, and, above all, by savage tribes. The same objection is valid against the Benfey theory, which is, that popular tales, or rather the bulk of them, were invented in India, and that, within *historical* times, they were disseminated by literary channels all over the world. While one-half or more of popular European tales or jests can be traced to ancient Indian sources, it is only by a wide stretch of the imagination that one may believe that Indian folk-tales were diffused among savage peoples in such a manner as the Benfeyites would have us believe.

As a matter of fact, students of folk-lore are at a loss to decide how far popular tales may have been transmitted from people to people, or how far they originated out of the same condition of savage thought. What the Grimms claimed as rare *exceptions*—"the probability of a story's passing from one people to another, and firmly rooting itself in foreign soil"—is now supposed to be the rule. Or, as Mr. Lang puts it: "Wherever man, woman, or child can go, there a tale may go and find a new home. Any drifted and wandering canoe, any captured alien wife, any stolen slave passed from hand to hand in commerce or war, may carry a *Märchen*. These processes of transmission have been going on, practically, ever since man was man." When Mr. Lang comes to consider the resemblances of plot and arrangement in the popular tales of unrelated and widely-separated peoples, he confesses ignorance.

But is there no way of determining whether a folk-tale is of common origin, or whether it is of local origin? The latest, and, in most respects, the best answer to this question has been given by Dr. Franz Boas in his able paper on the "Dissemination of Tales among the Natives of North America," in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore*.^{*} His methods are:

1) "Wherever a story which consists of the same combination of several elements is found in two regions, we must conclude that its occurrence in both is due to diffusion. The more complex the story is, the more this conclusion will be justified."

2) "Whenever we find a tale spread over a continuous area, we must assume that it spread over this territory from a single centre. If, besides this, we should know that it does not occur outside the limits of this territory, our conclusion will be considerably strengthened."

Dr. Boas has tested his method by taking a number of widely diffused Indian tales, and, by analysing

and comparing their "elements," or story incidents, he has been able to identify stories as common to Greenland and Oregon. He found also a close relation between the tales of the Algonquin and those of the Pacific coast, all of which goes to show that, the diffusion of tales has been as common and as widespread in North America as we have seen diffusion was in Europe.

What Dr. Boas calls the elements of a story, when combined, go to make up the "framework." By a shaking of what Mr. Lang aptly calls the mental kaleidoscope, a certain story-pattern is produced. The classification of folk-tales is based on similarity of pattern, plot, or action. Thus, by comparison, popular stories fall into well-defined classes, in which the action or leading idea is more or less the same, although the same stories may have different details and genuine local color. To illustrate: stories of the Cupid and Psyche type fall into one class; those of the Cinderella kind into another class; those of Thankful Beasts into a third; the Magical-Conflict cycle of stories into a fourth, and so on.

As the classification of popular stories is concerned with their framework or plot, so the philosophy of folk-tales—takes into account their "motive." The two studies overlap each other. Still, a complete classification of popular stories must be made before a true philosophy of folk-tales can be, or will be, evolved, but a complete analysis of popular stories must be obtained before classification is possible.

Mr. Ralston has classified folk-tales in mythological and non-mythological stories, the latter being divided into moral stories, jests, etc. Mythological stories, or rather the bulk of them, account for various natural phenomena. Their chief motive is to satisfy man's innate curiosity, and to explain things not within actual knowledge or experience. It may be a story of how men and animals were changed into stars; a Norse tale of "Why the Sea is Salt," or an Indian tale of "Why the Crow is Black." There is only a faint suspicion of a moral "element" in such stories. There is no conscious endeavor to convey a "lesson." Of course, in some stories the natural inference is, that wrong-doers will meet with punishment; but in other stories, cunning is represented as everywhere triumphant. Where the chief actor is a supernatural being, he may, or may not, work for righteousness, according as it would suit his purposes.

In the popular tales of the lower and more backward races, the chief characters are beasts, birds, or fishes. The hero of many Bushman tales is Cagu, the grasshopper; of West Indian Nursery Tales, Ananzi, the spider; of our Southern Negro tales, Brer Rabbit. Allied to these folk-tales are the celebrated Fables of the Hindus and of Æsop. "Fable," as Carlyle says,

^{*} January, 1891, Vol. iv, p. 13.

"may be regarded as the first attempt of Instruction clothing itself in Fancy." And it is generally allowed that Fables were framed for the purpose of conveying some moral teaching. In the hands of Æsop, fable came to have a twofold purpose—amusement and instruction. As Phædrus, the translator and successor of Æsop, puts it:

"Duplex libelli dos est: quod risum monet,
Et quod prudenti vitam consilio monet."

If we refer to the folk-tales of our Southern Negroes, we see that many a moral is "tacked on" at the end. Thus, says Daddy Sandy, in one of Mr. Jones's "Negro Myths," "de man wuh trus in esself, guine fail; wile dem dat wait topper de Lord will hab perwission mek fur um." In the celebrated fable of the "Hare and the Tortoise" (variants of which are found in different parts of the world) the plain teaching is that, "the race is not always to the swift; nor the battle to the strong." The framers of this class of folk-tales intended to convey lessons "drawn from the inferior creation." The greed and the avarice and the stupidity of animals are the leading ideas, while the incidents occupy a secondary place.

The philosophy of household tales, or *Märchen*, is a little different. In this class of folk-tales the injecting of a moral sentiment seldom adds to the point of the narrative, or to the pleasure of the audience. If the framers of *Märchen* wished to convey a moral lesson, their purpose is cleverly concealed in most cases. Their chief aim is action—is to hold the undivided attention of the listener. Yet, underlying the framework or setting of most household tales is a sentiment of some kind. Thus, in that large class of tales in which a woman or man is forbidden to open the door of a room, a closet, or a palace, Mr. Sidney Hartland regards the prohibition as the main idea,—and so it is in one way—but the real object is to enforce a practical lesson against undue curiosity. It is the bump of curiosity that awakens the interest in the prohibition.

The number of folk-tales that carry no sentiment, no motive of any kind is exceedingly large. According to Mr. Ralston, of the 200 household tales collected by the Grimms, as many as fifty are comic stories, pure and simple. On the other hand, Mr. Staniland Wake considers this too large a proportion, as some of the stories evidently are intended merely to amuse. Thus, he cites "The Rabbit's Bride," where a rabbit induces a girl to become his wife, and she runs away from his home leaving a straw figure in her place. So too, the stories of "Discreet Hans" are of the same character. While the story called the "Pack of Ragamuffins," he thinks, bids us beware of associating with vagabonds, if we wish to escape loss or suffering at their hands.

It is not necessary to examine the folk-tales which convey a lesson evolved from hard, every-day experience, from human customs, or from religious sanction. Directly or indirectly, certain bad traits of character are represented in folk-tales as bringing trouble to their possessors. Thus, disobedience, laziness, pride, and arrogance go before a fall. Thus, also, goodness, kindness and simplicity find a just reward.

Oddly enough, the motive of a large class of folk-tales turns on simple-mindedness, as Mr. Wake points out. Where this mental quality amounts to stupidity which is rewarded, the aphorism—a fool for luck—would apply. In the Norse-tales the stupid fellow is called "Boots," who is generally the youngest of (3) brothers. He succeeds after his brothers try and fail, and so gains the Princess and half the kingdom. The story of "The Feather Bird" in Grimm's collection is in the same line of sentiment. There, the youngest daughter is the fortunate one. The step-mother, who ill-uses an orphan girl, comes in for reprobation. In the Norse-tale of "The Two Step-Sisters," the spiteful daughter of the second wife is punished by the old witch.

In truth, the sentiments expressed in folk-tales are more or less the same, because human nature is the same. Many a pleasant discovery is in waiting for the scholar who will patiently gather these popular teachings, and combine them into a philosophy of folk-tales.

FUTURE LIFE.

Good people struggle through this life
Hoping for heavenly rest,
Where there shall be no toil or strife,
But all be calm and blest.

Where all the saints that enter in
Err not, nor ever could,
Being—in perfect lack of sin—
Machines for doing good.

But surely, such a scheme as this,
Mere goodness—nothing more,
Turns an eternity of bliss
To an eternal bore.

But may I in the future life
Still struggle hard to win
The victory amid the strife
Of righteousness with sin.

May I be free to choose the wrong,
Or spurn it with disdain,
To speed my upward way along,
In spite of lust and pain.

So shall this strife with wrong and ruth
Upward and endless be;
For, to acquire eternal truth,
Requires eternity.

BOOK REVIEWS.

APPENDIX TO THIRD EDITION OF THE EVOLUTION OF IMMORTALITY.

By C. T. Stockwell. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.

The fact that a third edition of Dr. Stockwell's book has been called for is the best proof of its being appreciated by the public. Taken by itself, however, the fact furnishes but slight evidence of scientific value, which must be judged of from a rational standpoint, and not by the agreement of certain conclusions with the prejudices of the popular mind. Whether positive proof, satisfactory to a sceptical mind, could ever be given of such a "future life," as the author conceives it to be, is doubtful. It seems to us that, at the best, it can never be more than a question of probability, unless it can be shown that the living organism contains a something which can live independently of the body it is associated with. That this is a true statement of the case is shown by the nature of the author's argument, which is based on the fact that all cells have an inner and an outer structure, a condition of existence which is found also in the human ovum. In the process of development, the cell dispenses with the external body when the internal body is ready to exist without it, these being the conditions of death and birth respectively. In like manner, the external body of the ovum grows into the placenta, the internal into the human embryo, and when the latter is "born," the former dies. Analogy, it is said, requires us to believe that an inner body is developed within the human organism, and that when it is ready for separate existence, the outer body will be got rid of by death, and the inner will be born into the next stage of life. The conclusion is that either man is to live on continuously beyond death, or Nature at this point deserts the method followed in all its earlier stages of development.

The appendix to the third edition of Dr. Stockwell's book is intended to meet certain objections to the pertinence of his analogy, chiefly in relation to the continuance of self-consciousness after death. We think the author is justified in arguing against his critics that as "consciousness of a certain form existed, or was evolved, during the past existence—the prenatal—and was brought with us into this without loss or immediate change," so the self-consciousness into which that consciousness has developed will pass on into the next stage of life—of course assuming that that there is any such further existence. Our difficulty is more fundamental, and is based on the fact that the ovum does not undergo the development into the placenta and the embryo, unless it is first fecundated by the male cell or spermatozoid. The result of this fecundation is the development of the embryo, and by analogy there can be no further formation of independent organic life except under similar conditions. But these conditions can be provided, in so far as we know, only by a further process of fecundation, the result of which will be the development of another embryo, so that the author's reasoning would seem to point to "immortality" of the species through offspring, and not of the individual through spiritual birth. But further, that reasoning is not consistent with the passing over of *memory* into the future life. The continuance of self-consciousness does not imply a remembrance of the experiences of the past, any more than in the present life we have a recollection of the experiences of our ancestors. That result is not, however, of great moment, from the author's point of view, as this leaves as little room for active personality as the philosophical religions of the ancient world. Thus it is said that in the future life *self-consciousness* rises to *selflessness*, in which "the self is sunk in the Divine Order, and a vital unity is voluntarily established and immovably fixed between the Creator and created, the Father and child," being a "harmonious merging of the true functional activity" of the individual in the Infinite Life!

Q.

NOTES.

The Rev. W. C. Pennywitt, late of the third Unitarian church of Chicago, now of Washington, D. C., will discuss in weekly meetings at the Emerson "Ought Club" the philosophy of Duty and the first principles in Ethics and Religion. Emerson is the ablest and strongest defender of transcendentalism. His transcendentalism is mainly ethical transcendentalism. He maintains that the mere idea of "ought" is beyond comprehension. Emerson says: "When man says 'I OUGHT'; when love warms him; when he chooses, warned from on high, the good and great deed; then deep melodies wander through his soul from Supreme Wisdom. Then he can worship and be enlarged by his worship, for he can never go behind this sentiment. In the sublimest flights of the soul, rectitude is never surmounted, love is never outgrown." The beauty of Emerson's language as well as the sublimity of his thoughts lend much strength to his transcendental ethics. We do not agree with Emerson, however much we sympathise with his aspirations. We believe that the ought and all ethical ideas can be clearly conceived and expressed without any mysticism. We prefer the clearness of thought to the charm of transcendental obscurity. Without accepting the hedonistic or utilitarian view of ethics we reject intuitionism and trust that morality is taught us by the facts of life. Ethics can be treated as a real science with exactness and with lucidity. The ethics of the dogmatic religions is mythological, the ethics of transcendentalism is agnostic, the ethics of the Religion of Science is positive.

The next *Monist* promises to be an exceedingly interesting number. It will contain articles by Prof. John Dewey of Ann Arbor, George John Romanes and B. Bosanquet, both of London, England, Albert H. Post, a Judge of the city of Bremen, the founder of ethnological jurisprudence, and others.

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DELUSIONS OF COINCIDENCE.

BY F. L. OSWALD, M. D.

MOSES MENDELSSOHN, the philosophical kinsman of the great composer, used to maintain that every age of the human race has a physiognomic type of its own, and that the bull-neck and the jovial cheeks of Vitellius were as characteristic of his own era as the hag-ridden visage of Louis the Saint was of the early Middle Ages—so much so, indeed, that the history of mankind might be recorded in a collection of caricatures.

A chronicle of popular delusions would answer almost the same purpose. In every epoch of human progress science has had to contend with a peculiar type of epidemic superstitions, and the prevalent fallacies of the Middle Ages might be defined as delusions of preternaturalism. The chief sources of our latter-day superstitions might be summarised under the head of *Misconstrued Coincidence*. The amazing delusions of our forefathers were founded on erroneous premises; modern fallacies arise chiefly from erroneous conclusions; in other words, science has corrected our data of general knowledge, but has failed to train the masses in the logical use of those data.

A curiously prolific source of delusion consists in the error of ignoring the most important factor among these or more coincident events or conditions. A fertile island is settled by a colony of prosperous immigrants, who happen to persist in their sentiments of loyalty to the government (or the creed) established in the land of their forefathers. Affluence naturally coincides with the development of abundant resources, and incidentally coincides with conservatism; yet the colonists prefer to ascribe their sleekness to their loyalty. Their equally prosperous republican neighbors attribute their affluence to the blessing of liberal institutions. There were observatories before the time of Mr. Lick, and some monkish astronomers had not failed to notice that the phenomenon of shooting stars became most frequent whenever the earth reached a certain point of its yearly orbit. They also remembered that those periods coincided with the festival of a special saint. That circumstance they accepted as the essential feature of the coincidence, and described the annual meteor-showers as the "fiery tears of St. Laurentius."

Happily the feasts of St. Laurentius were none of the "movable festivals," and a much more serious delusion arises from the circumstance that catarrhs and habitual indoor life coincide every year with a period of cold weather. Millions of our fellow men notice that the disorders of their pulmonary organs become most grievous whenever a low temperature obliges them to pass their nights and half their days in stove-warmed rooms, but of a thousand such sufferers nine hundred and ninety-nine ascribe their troubles, not to the lack of fresh air, but to the influence of a low temperature. Nomads are free from that delusion, because winter fails to afflict them with coughs and catarrhs; but on the other hand, bedridden invalids are equally apt to modify the popular theory because summer fails to relieve their trouble, unless such complications as fainting-fits and sick headaches should force them to open their bedroom windows.

Another very prevalent form of the coincidence fallacy is the proneness to misconstrue the importance of an incident by associating it with a wholly independent, but more or less unavoidable event. A striking instance, and at the same time a most effective *reductio ad absurdum* of that disposition is the belief in the miraculousness of the "white horse omen," alias, the "red-girl mystery." "See that red-haired girl? Now let us test the matter by a practical experiment," says your pseudo-scientific friend; "you watch that window of the street-car, and I the other; now let us see if we really come across a white horse again, or not.—Now didn't I tell you? Look this way—there it is: The fifth time the omen proves true in five trials. Let's compare these entries"—taking out his notebook and reading the record of his "experiments," with a sort of trembling exactness: "Four test-cases: four times a white horse was sighted within five minutes after appearance of the premonitory red female." "White and red," he continues, "agree pretty well from an artist's point of view: shall we assume that Nature delights in the arrangement of chromatic effects? At all events you can no longer presume to ascribe it to a fortuitous coincidence? Try it yourself, try it a hundred times, if you like, but be at last honest enough to admit that there are more things between heaven and earth than"—etc., etc. "The credulity of sceptics is often wonderful. Can you be-

lieve in 'accidents' of that sort? Don't evade the point, but say yes or no."

The simple answer is: "No." The coincidence is not accidental, nor yet miraculous, and the simple explanation is this: In a big city there are a good many white horses. In a single street of a medium-sized town like Richmond, Virginia, an observer counted 342 of them between morning and noon, and in riding from street to street of a city like Philadelphia or New York one such horse is almost sure to be sighted within any five minutes of the twenty-four hours. The circumstance that before that time the observer happened to see a red-haired female of his species is a wholly irrelevant incident, and the "omen" would have proved as true if he had seen a blue kite or a black poodle.

The originator of the delusion may have intended his hypothesis as a satire on the credulity of his neighbors, yet an exactly analogous fallacy underlies the "Evil Eye" superstition, which once pervaded the Christian world from Naples to Antwerp, and still prevails in the East of the Mediterranean coast-lands. Reginald Scott's "Discovery of Witchcraft" and Frommann's treatise on "Fascination" prove that the problem was investigated in scientific earnest, and many private investigators may have refused to accept the belief on hearsay and tried to verify its truth by practical tests. Mrs. So and So was reputed to possess the power of the Evil Eye, i. e. the "ability of injuring others by looking upon them." The evidence of public opinion did not satisfy sceptics, but the result of repeated experiments put the truth of the report out of question. The experimenter or his family had actually experienced trouble of some sort or other every time they met Mrs. S., though a resolute spirit of scientific inquiry had emboldened them to put themselves in the way of the reputed witch at least twenty times. Once or twice the result might have been ascribed to accident, after the tenth test the evidence amounted to what lawyers call a "violent presumption," and the outcome of the twentieth experiment seemed to leave no room for the slightest doubt. Sceptics thus convinced could not help applauding the verdict of the Witchcraft Tribunal.

Three out of five witches probably forfeited the tolerance of their neighbors in that very way, but the Turks go further and are said to attribute the gift of the evil-working eye to all unbelievers and even to many kinds of wild animals. A jackal sitting at the roadside and cackling in your face is supposed to taunt you with his prescience of impending trouble. The natives of the Austrian Alps cross themselves at sight of a spider dangling in an open doorway; the old Romans looked out for bad luck on hearing the cry of certain birds; Swiss peasants consider it an ominous

sign if a rabbit crosses the road from right to left a little way ahead of them; modern French travellers dislike to enter a railway-train that reaches the station in a shroud of black smoke or comes to an abrupt halt, as if checked by an unseen hand; the light-hearted Sicilians feel glum if they meet an old crone early on New Years morning. At the same time they hold that bad luck cannot be averted by passing the critical day indoors.

Perhaps they are right. Fate does not need the assistance of an evil eye, and the explanation of all similar superstitions can be found in the circumstance that life abounds with troubles, and bad luck and death, like the pale horses of our metropolitan streets, will turn up as a sequence to almost any omen. The optimistic instinct of man shrinks from the recognition of that truth and prefers to consider ill success as a consequence of abnormal circumstances, till the grim logic of experience dispels that illusion, and Time evolves that expression which, according to Arthur Schopenhauer, may be read in the wrinkles of every old man's face, and can be best defined by the word disappointment.

Fortunate events are much more apt to be accepted as a matter of course, with the exception of recovery from diseases of the self-limited class, which terminate in spite of, but as the patient prefers to believe, because of the liberal use of drugs. The *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy—the disposition to mistake sequence for consequence—maintains the credit of the African rain-maker and makes the fortune of countless quacks. The let-alone plan might often save time, as well as money, but there are non-self limited diseases, and the belief in the existence of wonder-working chemicals is too pleasant to be easily renounced. What?! achieve our own salvation by reforming our habits, if we can keep on idling, raking and gormandising, and for a few shillings a bottle purchase a miraculous specific that will protect us from the consequences of our sins against nature? Rather than relinquish the consoling belief in the efficacy of such elixirs, the heir of many ill's pays the price of consistency and manages to strengthen his faith by sticking to his medicine-man even in the crisis of disorders which he more than half suspects would have subsided sooner or later without any drugs or ghost-dances whatever.

On the treeless plateaux of central Africa, serpents and other reptiles retire to their subterranean hiding-places during protracted droughts and re-appear only after a good rain. In the midst of a heavy shower snakes as thick as a man's arm may be seen gliding the roads, apparently revelling in the abundant moisture, but often with a wholly unintended result. Whenever the natives can catch a good-sized serpent of that sort they cage it up and carefully preserve it for the

possible emergency of a severe drought, which they think can be broken by exposing their rain-loving prisoner to the full glare of the sun. That expedient they think, will soon cover the sky with clouds. Did not a good shower coincide with the former appearance of the snake? Instead of ascribing that appearance to the rain, they attribute the rain to its magic influence. In other words, they mistake the effect for the cause.

Yet even that *ne-plus-ultra* fallacy has its analogue in the delusions of various Caucasian nations. Woodpeckers and their congeners frequent dead trees in quest of insects, and thus often prevent those insects from hatching a noxious brood of larvæ. Our rustic wiseacres have not failed to notice the coincident phenomena, but ascribe the decay of the tree to the visits of the bird, and a small American variety of the picus tribe is consequently known as the "sap-sucker."

The destruction of insect-eating birds is invariably followed by the increase of noxious insects; but equally invariably the prohibition of harmless recreations is followed by an increase of vice. British patriots ascribe the neglect of archery and other games of merry old England to the epidemic increase of drunkenness. Is it not decidedly possible that the increase of drunkenness has been caused by the suppression of better pastimes?

THE BENEFICIAL ASPECT OF CERTAIN ERRORS.

BY JOHN BURROUGHS.

A TREE is known by its fruit, and it may be objected that false ideas in religion cannot be productive of good. But false ideas are and have been productive of good. The idea of sacrifice is now looked upon as a false idea, and has long been dropped from religious rites, but with the ancients it was not a false idea, but an undoubted means of obtaining immediate communion with the life of the gods. The man who offered sacrifices was for the time being a guest of supernatural beings, and he aimed to make himself worthy to sit at their table. The fruit or animals offered up must be without spot or blemish, and the body of the priest who offered it was to be without blemish. Can there be any doubt but that a man's religious nature, his sense of sacred and invisible things was quickened by such a ceremony? Before the victim was slaughtered wine was thrown upon its head that it might nod in token of consent. This too was a false idea, since any strange liquid thrown upon the head of a sheep or heifer, and allowed to run down upon the nose and into the mouth, will cause the animal to toss its head, as if in affirmation, but this only served to clinch the belief of the sacrificer, in the immediate presence of the God.

If one could only believe that the stars were so many eyes of supernatural beings looking down upon him, and beholding his every act, would he not be more careful about doing a mean thing beneath them? Yet such an idea would not be good astronomy. History is full of false or foolish ideas, that have been productive of great good. In our day we should look upon an enthusiasm like that which gave rise to the crusades as very absurd; the notion that was the parent of this great movement was undoubtedly a mistaken one, and yet it is considered that the crusades were a good thing for Europe. Such a mighty impulse of generosity and devotion to an idea, could not be otherwise than good. "He maketh the wrath of man to praise him," and the folly of man too. Whatever creates a noble impulse, or quickens our sense of the imminence of spiritual and invisible things is justified by its results, no matter how false or delusive, in itself, it may be.

The religious world of to day looks upon polytheism as a false religion, and relatively to us and our ideas, it is false; we could not be sincere in the practice of it; but was it so to the Greek? Undoubtedly the religion of Apollo has done as much for the Hellenes, some might say more, than Christianity has done for the modern world. The whole culture and civilisation of Greece was the legitimate outgrowth of the religion of Apollo, and can as much be said of our civilisation, with reference to Christianity? Granted that the oracle of Delphi was not what it pretended to be, but its answers were founded upon the widest knowledge and the deepest wisdom possible in those times. As a rule they discouraged unworthy and encouraged worthy undertakings. Moreover, Dr. Curtius says, "The oracles were sought only by those who were inwardly or outwardly oppressed and needy of help, especially by those burdened by guilt. The atonement sought from the priest could not be obtained without humiliation and self-abasement. Confession of sin and repentance were demanded." Delphi was the heart and conscience of Greece.

It is easy to see what a power for good the ordinance of Christian baptism may have upon him who thoroughly believes in it. If when the neophyte feels the water close over him, he really believes his sins are washed away and he is cleansed from all impurities, will he not arise a different man, a better, a holier man? The great point is to have faith. Truly faith can work wonders. The early Christians, the Apostles, and probably Christ himself, labored under the delusion that the end of the world was near at hand. It was a false idea, but it added solemnity and power to their lives. "As long as this error," says Gibbon, "was permitted to subsist in the church, it was productive of the most salutary effects on the faith and practice of Christians, who lived in the awful expect-

tation of that moment when the globe itself and all the various races of mankind, should tremble at the approach of their divine Judge."

* * *

It is easy enough to say what God is not, but, ah! who can say what he is? Can he be named or defined to the intellect at all? Probably not. The burden of the old prophets' songs was that God is past finding out,—past finding out by the intellect, by the understanding. We call him an infinite and eternal Being, but in doing so we commit a solecism, we trip up our own minds. The only notion of being we can form is derived from our knowledge of man; God as a being is only an enlarged man, and to make him infinite and eternal is to contradict the fundamental idea with which we start. A being is finite; add infinity and omnipotence and all idea of being disappears. Can we conceive of an infinite house, or of an infinite enclosure of any kind? No more can we conceive of an infinite being. Can we ascribe form to infinite space? No more can we ascribe personality to God.

What appears more real than the sky? We think of it and speak of it as if it was as positive and tangible a fact as the earth. See how it is painted by the sunset or by the sunrise. How blue it is by day, how grand by stars at night. At one time tender and wooing, at another hard and distant. Yet what an illusion! There is no sky; it is only vacancy, only empty space. It is a glimpse of the infinite. When we try to grasp or measure, or define the Power we call God, we find it to be another sky, sheltering, over-arching, all-embracing,—palpable to the casual eye, but receding, vanishing to the closer search; unfathomable because intangible—the vast power, or ether in which the worlds float—but itself ungraspable, unattainable, forever soaring beyond our ken. Not a being, not an entity is God, but that which lies back of all being and all entities. Hence an old writer, in his despair of grasping God, said "God may not improperly be called nothing." Absolute being, is to the human mind about the same as nothing, or no being at all, just as absolute motion is equivalent to eternal rest, or as infinite space means no space at all. Motion implies something which is not motion, and space implies lines and boundaries. Infinite being or power gives the mind no place to rest. One's thought goes forth like the dove from Noah's ark and finds nowhere to perch.

"How can any one teach concerning Brahma? he is neither the known nor the unknown. That which cannot be expressed by words, but through which all expression comes, this I know to be Brahma. That which cannot be thought by the mind, but by which all thinking comes, this I know is Brahma. That which cannot be seen by the eye, but by which the eye sees, is Brahma. If thou thinkest that thou canst

know it, then in truth thou knowest it very little. To whom it is unknown he knows it, but to whom it is known he knows it not."

* * *

Science is rubbing deeper and deeper into our minds the conviction that creation is a unit, that there are no breadths or chasms, that knowledge of one thing fits in with the knowledge of all other things and is a ground of vantage in the soul's progress in all directions. The more active a man's scientific faculties are, the more clear ought to be his view of the grounds of faith; and so it would be if the grounds of faith were continuous with the grounds of the rest of human knowledge. But they are not, they belong to another order of things.

Poetic truth, moral truth, and all other subtle truths are spiritually discerned also, and that there is any other spiritual discernment than is here implied, any other that is normal in kind and valid in reason, is what the natural man cannot admit. Spiritual discernment of the kind he refers to can be communicated, proof of it can be given. A man cannot counterfeit any real intellectual quality, or any real power of the spirit, but the spiritual discernment of evangelical theology, cannot be communicated or verified. A man says he has it, and that is all we can know about it. He says he discerns certain things to be true, but he cannot convey his mode of viewing them to us, so that we shall see them to be true also. Of course a man who has no faculty for music cannot appreciate the charm or the truth of music. No, but those who have this gift can give us proof of it. St. Paul's power of spiritual discernment was no different in kind from that of many other men before and since his time. How did it differ from Carlyle's power of spiritual discernment, or from Schiller's, or from Plato's, or from that of Epictetus? He had no deeper insight into human nature or into the workings of men's minds, or into the mysteries that shroud human life. He had great religious power, great heroism, great wisdom, a lofty spiritual nature, but it was genetically the same as that of other men. Milton did not write his poems out of his Puritanism, out of the kind of spiritual knowledge Puritans are supposed to possess. Wordsworth wrote out of the spirit of his natural religion, not out of his orthodoxy, or unnatural religion. Indeed when people have written poetry or composed any other work of art out of what they have called their spiritual life alone, the product has not been such as the world wanted to see live. In any work of prose or verse, of science or philosophy, it is only such things as put us in communication with the natural, universal, and perennial, that gives the work a lasting value. Things that appeal to Christians alone, are soon left behind. The natural man, as much as we

may profess to despise him, is the main stay after all in religion as well as in science. Religious poetry as such, has little value. In fact the only thing that will *keep* a religious book at all is the salt of the natural man. If this has lost its savor, the work is short-lived. It keeps the Bible itself fresh and makes it appeal to all hearts. What does the world value in Cowper's poetry? his discernment of spiritual truths? or rather his poetic discernment of natural universal truths. The religious idolaters who throw themselves under the wheels of Juggernaut, or offer themselves as victims at the altar of sacrifice, are heroic, without doubt, but the world does not heed and does not remember them, but it does heed and remember the three hundred Spartans who laid down their lives at Thermopylæ. This appeals to and shows the stuff of the natural man.

* * *

"In our early days," says Schopenhauer, "we fancy that the leading events of our lives and the persons who are going to play an important part in it, will make their entrance to the sound of drums and trumpets; but when, in old age, we look back we find that they all came in quietly, slipped in, as it were by the side door, almost unnoticed." The great men of a race or people, the real heroes and saviours, usually came upon the scene quietly and unknown. They do not even know themselves. The remark of Schopenhauer occurred to me in thinking of the advent of Jesus. Nothing could be more natural, nothing more in harmony with universal experience, than his coming, and his life as we may read it in the Synoptic Gospels. There was no prodigy, no miracle, no sudden apparition of a superhuman being, clothed in majesty and power, etc., as the popular expectation indicated there would be, but the Messiah came in the natural way as a helpless infant, born of human parents. Instead of a throne, there was a humble cradle in a manger. It really enhances our notion of his merit, or if you prefer of his divinity, that he should have been rejected by his race and people, that he should have come from a town of proverbial disrepute, that he should have been meek and lowly through life, a man of sorrows, the friend of the humble and the despised, that his kingdom should not have been of this world, in fact, that he should in every way have disappointed expectation. All this seems in harmony with the course of nature and of human life. It agrees with the truest experience. There is a sort of poetic verisimilitude about it. Indeed if a God were to appear this is probably the way he would come. All greatest things have an humble beginning. The divine is nearer and more common than we are apt to think. The earth itself is a star in the sky, little as we may suspect it. Had the record made Jesus suddenly appear as a great po-

tentate, or even as a full grown man, as the angels are represented as appearing, or had it represented him as the child of some nymph, like certain other heroes of antiquity, the fabulous character of the story would have been apparent. But he came as a man, lived as a man, and died as a man; was indeed completely immersed in our common humanity. Nothing God-like but his teachings. Even the reputed miracles become him not, they mar his perfect humanity. They belong to the conception of him as a supernatural being, and not as a man. The notion of the immaculate conception also jars upon our sense of the human completeness of his character. He came as the great saviours in all ages have come, and was rejected and denied in the usual way. His lot was not exceptional. His character and mission were not exceptional, except that he spoke more fully to our sense of the Divine than any man has before spoken.

* * *

I have often asked myself, What is the merit of the mingled feeling of admiration and approval which we experience toward people who devoutly hold a religious creed in the truth of which we have no confidence? In yonder house is an aged woman slowly dying of an incurable disease. She can no longer rise from her bed, or even move herself without help. Her son has come from the far West to be with her in these last days of her life. Every morning the son reads a chapter from the bible, and the old Scotch woman lying there on her back in her bed, holds the accustomed family prayers. Her voice is low and feeble, but her faith is strong, her eye is bright and her spirit serene. Long ago she left her native hills for this new country; now she was about to leave this for another country in the existence of which beyond that dark ocean, she had never had the slightest doubt, nor the slightest doubt as to the means to be employed to secure an interest there. What is the merit of the feeling which prompts us to say "how touching how beautiful," and that fills us with a vague regret that such a faith is impossible to us? We could not feel so in the presence of the ancient superstitions, the bleeding victims on the altar, or the devotee perishing in the arms of his idol. Hence our feeling, our regret is not a tribute to sincerity alone, or to courage, or to heroism. It is mainly a tribute to the past, to the memory of our fathers who held this faith, to our mothers who distilled it into our minds in infancy, to the old creeds and institutions which have played so large a part in the culture and development of our race. We are like the western emigrant turning to take a last view of the home of his youth and the land of his fathers. The old ties draw us, we are filled with a deep longing and regret; a little more and we would go back and abide there forever. The new world of faith, the great western

world, which this generation is fast entering, and which the next generation will more completely take possession of, is indeed a new land. Those upon whom the old associations have set the deepest mark will experience the keenest homesickness. The timid, the half-hearted, the irresolute will not go. But much of the best blood will go, is going. The majority of the most virile minds of the century have long since taken up their abode there. And like the other emigration, the men go first, the women and children stay behind; woman, more tender and emotional cannot give up the old faiths, she shrinks back from the new land; it seems cold and naked to her spirit; she cleaves unto the past, and to the shelter of the old traditions. Probably the bravest among us do not abandon them without a pang. The old church has a friendly and sheltering look after all, and the white monuments in the rear of it where our kindred sleep, how eloquent is the silent appeal which they make.

But what can be done? Thou shalt leave this land, the land of thy fathers, is a fiat which has gone forth as from the Eternal. We cannot keep the old beliefs, the old creeds, if we would. They belonged to a condition of mind which is fast being outgrown.

THE NEW INVASION OF THE SOUTH.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

THERE is in that remote province called the "South," a corporate brotherhood known as "The Southern Inter-State Immigration Association." In its prospectus which I have read with interest and pleasure, "The South gladly invites a Northern invasion made in the interest of peace and fraternity." To promote that invasion is the laudable object of the Association. It invites an immigration of northern genius, experience, and capital, to assist in developing the magnificent resources of the province.

I do not use the word "province" as a special reproach to the "South," for not long ago the "West" had a convention at which a great many narrow-chested speeches were made, illiberal, and sectional, threatening rebellion against an imaginary despotism vaguely called the "East"; and declaring its purpose to make the "West" not merely a geographical designation, but also a separate and hostile political division. A Provincial spirit and a National spirit cannot flourish together in this land.

More from habit than design, some of the language of the prospectus is of the antediluvian tone, and the "South" remains a personal pronoun as of old. "Loyal to its own customs and institutions; true to its honorable past; it would gladly forget; it upholds the olive branch;" and more to the same effect. This is not progress, but stagnation; and the sentiment is inconsistent with the objects of the society, and especially with its purpose to "enlarge and liberalise the National American sentiment."

"The Southern Inter-State Immigration Association will in October and November 1891, hold a Southern Exposition at Raleigh, N. C., Representing the Resources and Capabilities of the South." This announcement which I copy from the heading of a little pamphlet programme deserves a great deal of attention and respect, because the inspiration of the whole enterprise comes from the angel industry, the genius of the New South; and because in the prospectus these encouraging words are said: "There is one more instructive lesson to be given to the unthinking and

uninformed world. The negro, the once ignorant slave, stands to-day in most Northern minds an object of pity; the needless cause of bitter sectional exacerbation. The Exposition will give proof that the negro is no longer in tutelage; that he stands in no need of federal bayonets for protection; that he is no longer dependent on government rations; but that he is a *free, industrious, self-respecting citizen.*"

I mark those few last words because they express the substance of the proud congratulation. If the Exposition at Raleigh will redeem this promise and "give proof that the negro is a free citizen," it will accomplish miracles in politics, and dissipate the clouds of prejudice and misapprehension which have so long hidden the "New South" from the gaze of impartial men; but the proof offered must be full and conclusive that justice has been done, or, at least, that it is being done, otherwise the New South will hobble along like one of its own convicts, a ball and chain to its leg. The "olive branch" offer is a graceful act; but "Equal rights for All," is the only olive branch that Justice will accept, the only bough that can blossom into social or political peace, north, south, or—anywhere.

Among the interesting features of the Raleigh Exposition will be a special department for the colored people, wherein they may exhibit in material form the progress they have made in the industrial and esthetic arts, in literature, and science. This is a hopeful sign, because the motive of the managers appears to be a good one; that is, to arouse the colored people to self-help and self-respect, and to excite some educational ambition among the redeemed slaves by a promise of fair play. It is not for any one to throw suspicion upon this promise, for it is indorsed by representative men in an eloquent and somewhat pathetic "Appeal to the Colored People of the South." This appeal is signed by sixty or seventy colored men, farmers, merchants, editors, doctors, teachers, clergymen, lawyers, an ex-member of Congress, and one or two bishops. It lacks a few names that I would like to see on it, but even as it is, it carries much authority.

In this "Appeal" they say, "The gentlemen in control of the Exposition are making special efforts for the Colored Department. They want it to be a success." This testimony ought to be convincing. Further, they say: "The white South offers its stronger and helping hand to the black South," and "approves of colored labor in preference to that of foreigners." The appeal also declares that, "No politics enter into this question. It is a matter of dollars and cents; a matter of vindication of our ability to prove ourselves worthy of our citizenship"; and it concludes thus: "Let every negro who has the best interests of the race at heart join hands in this laudable effort to place the race in its proper light before the world."

It seems ungracious to be critical of a gift so cheering and auspicious as this reconciliation between the "white South" and the "black South," but there are in that "Appeal to the Colored people of the South," some bits of pride and bits of humbleness that might wisely have been omitted. Like a discord in music is that harsh note about "foreigners." People just out of the house of bondage display a pride fantastic when they seek to put the foreigner down below them in the labor market. In a just and humane social system there are no "foreigners." Perhaps it is only natural that the colored people of America seek the luxury of retaliation, for in all the northern states, the foreign born laborers were the most unrelenting defenders of negro slavery. The most oppressed peasantry in Europe hailed with rapture the land where they could be oppressors in their turn, and they voted "solid" against freedom. Perhaps, also, that was the natural recoil from the slavery which they themselves had suffered.

On the other hand, those colored men made a dangerous confession, when in rash humility, they staked Emancipation on the success of the negro exhibit at Raleigh. They betted recklessly

high and gave enormous odds when they agreed "to refute the charge that the Emancipation Proclamation of Lincoln was a failure"; and that they would "prove themselves worthy of citizenship." The white man is not fool enough to stake his freedom on the test of his fitness for it, and why should the colored man do so? Man is always fit for freedom; he is never fit for slavery.

It happened at one time during the war that there was in my command a regiment of colored soldiers, the 57th United States Infantry, and one New Year's day I ordered a review of that regiment in honor of the anniversary of American emancipation; I think that every man in the regiment had formerly been a slave, and after the review I made a few remarks to the soldiers in which I warned them never to make the concession which twenty-six years afterwards is made by those influential colored men of the South, in the "Appeal" of which I am now speaking. I said, "You are not, according to the cant of the day, on trial to see whether you are fit for freedom, but you are unconditionally free; not because I say so, not because any man proclaims it so, but because freedom is your birthright. Men may deprive other men of their freedom, they may withhold it from them, but they cannot confer it. It is not theirs to give nor to take away." And I am of that same opinion still.

On the face of the returns, the pamphlets submitted to *The Open Court*, and I have no right to go behind the returns, there is good evidence that the Exposition at Raleigh will in its results be beneficial to both races at the South; and it also appears that the white people there are finding out that free labor is better than slave labor. In due time they will discover that well paid labor contributes most to the profit and the happiness of all parties.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE DERIVATION OF SHEENY.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

GENERAL TRUMBULL'S reply to my request for information about the word "sheeny," suggests to me that I ought to point out the facts that argue against the derivation from *chien*.

The word "sheeny" in the sense of "sharper," "Jew," does not belong to English literature. It is not in Shakespeare, not in Bailey's Dictionary (1764) nor in Johnson's (1785-1818), not in Richardson's (1863). It is not in any of the editions of Webster (not even in the new International of 1890) or Worcester, not in Skeat nor in Stormouth. The word is to all appearance an American word and of recent origin. To suppose, therefore, with General Trumbull that it comes from the Norman-French is to suppose that it maintained an existence in England for some four centuries without finding its way into any English book; that it had nevertheless vogue enough among the English people so that it crossed the ocean with some of the early colonists, and that it then existed here for three centuries more without being "spotted" by any lexicographer, and meanwhile died out completely in England. All this is to the philological mind next to impossible.

Secondly: The word is not only an American word but it is a colloquial, slangy word. It has not come into our speech by way of the literary class who dabble in French phrases. But our people do not speak French; when they wish to call a man a "dog" they call him a dog and not a *chien* or a *Hund*. It could only have originated in some portion of the country where our people are in actual contact with the French. But now the word *chien* has in French no specialised application to a Jew, no more than "dog" has in English. How unlikely therefore that some American community should have picked up a French word which in French does not mean "Jew," and has no special vogue as a term of re-

proach, and then should have kept no trace of it in its natural meaning while giving it the factitious meaning "Jew."

Finally the French *chien* does not sound like "sheeny," and would not naturally pass into popular English in that form. Witness *Prairie du chien*.

These are the reasons which make the derivation seem, in absence of any facts going to show how and where the word began to be used, altogether impossible. The small-boy "fact" mentioned by General Trumbull only shows the existence of a popular impression that "sheeny" is derived from *chien*. But the question is whether this impression is correct. Personally I do not think it is, though I stand ready to change my opinion when the evidence requires it.

Sincerely yours,

CALVIN THOMAS.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

DEAR SIR:—I like to read General Trumbull's pithy remarks on almost any question. I fear, however, he has not given Professor Thomas's question that deliberate consideration which it deserves. To me the very fact that the dictionary referred to gives the derivation of the word, "sheeny" as obscure, is sufficient to lead me to thoroughly consider any objection I may entertain before entering my protest. Apart from the authority of the dictionary, I doubt very much that the French derivation of the above word will stand investigation. Who would spell the French word, *chien*, for dog, "sheeny"? I answer, no one. The sound of the word is nothing whatever like "sheeny." I have not time to give the matter that thought which should be given it by the person who would speak with any effect on the subject; but when the other day I saw General Trumbull's remarks on the word, it struck me that perhaps a more reasonable derivation of the word "sheeny" may be found in the Hebrew word *shanah* or *sanih*. In Deut. xxi. 15, "the first-born son be hers that was hated." The Hebrew word *shaney* or *saney*, therefore, means one that is hated. As I have already hinted, I cannot give this matter much thought; but it does seem to me that this word is likely the original of "sheeny," the one in question. The Jew has always, I am sorry to say, been regarded as the hated one by the Christian. It is possible that the word used as a vile epithet means, thou hateful creature. This is certainly a probable derivation; for the spelling "sheeny" is quite near enough to the real Hebrew word *shaney* or *saney*, a word meaning one hated.

4313 Lake Ave., Chicago.

HENRY TRURO BRAY.

THE UNITED STATES AND ART.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

I BEG to submit a few remarks on General Trumbull's article in *The Open Court* of August 6.

Speaking of the proposed new dies for American coins, the General refers to the very erroneous notion, entertained by the Secretary of the Mint, that "our engraver is the only competent person to prepare these designs." On the contrary there are several excellent American sculptors, such as M. St. Ange and others, who are perfectly able to execute that work artistically, as evidenced by their previous work and their successes here and abroad. Besides, I have some suspicion that the "engraver" referred to as the only American artist who knows how to make designs for coins is not much of an artist, nor even an American. For I remember that the horrible dies in use now to strike American coins, were made by an Englishman; also that the cupola of the National Capitol itself, as well as other trashy frescoes in the same Capitol were painted by an Italian—although there are many good American artists, painters, and sculptors, who would have done the work much better. It really seems to be the policy, or habit, of the government to patronise foreigners in preference to Americans.

True artists do not solicit patronage, nor do they lobby; therefore they remain ignored and neglected by their Country and their Government, whose duty it is to encourage and honor them—not so much for their own benefit as for the intellectual progress and refinement of the people at large. Neglected at home, most of the best American artists are compelled to exile themselves, not only to perfect themselves in their art, but also to meet with the material and moral prosperity they justly deserve.

I must add that the best way to obtain artistic dies is not at all to have them made by an "engraver," but by a *sculptor* who sculps them, as a *basso-relievo* on a large scale. After which they are mechanically reduced to any desired size, and cast in steel; an engraver, or better still, the artist himself retouches and perfects the dies after they have been cast; the author at least must superintend that retouching, which if badly done, would spoil the work.

In closing, I remark, that so long as this country does not possess a department of National Education and Fine Arts (like that of France for instance), America cannot hope to possess any artistic sense and refinement, although I believe that the American people, with such institutions would soon climb to the very first rank among civilised nations.

There are here departments for agriculture, for patents, etc., why not for education and Fine Arts? Material interests are well attended to, why not the intellectual and artistic interests? "Man does not live by bread alone."

F. DE GISSAC.

REMARKS BY GENERAL TRUMBULL.

MR. DE GISSAC's interesting letter is a fine example in "Basso-Relievo" of that plea for native talent which is gradually teaching the proud American to beg. It is to me as if the stately corn, standing like an army of soldiers touching elbows in solid column for a thousand miles each way, should ask for patronage and charity.

Mr. de Gissac drops unconsciously into the ranks of those advocates of native talent who boast of strength and speed while asking for government crutches to help them hobble along. He praises the skill of American artists and then declares that "until we have a department of National education and Fine Arts we cannot hope to possess any artistic sense and refinement"; which is very much like saying that the government ought to build a hospital and a nursery for strong men. Edmund Burke said in the House of Commons that the American colonies had grown to strength and manliness through the "wise and salutary neglect" of the British government. Perhaps that is the reason why the American artists are so "excellent."

"It may be true, as Mr. de Gissac says, that 'there are several excellent American sculptors who can execute that work artistically,' but the eminent American sculptor, August St. Gaudens, is of a different opinion. When consulted on this very subject, he said to Mr. Leech, the director of the mint, 'There are only four artists competent to make designs for coins; three of them are in France, and I am the fourth.' This was not vain-glorious egotism; it was only the self-confidence of a man who knew what his chisel was able to do.

Although perhaps he did not notice it, Mr. de Gissac gave to himself and all of us a good lesson in moral economics, when he said, "Neglected at home, most of the American artists are compelled to exile themselves, not only to perfect themselves in their art, but also to meet the material and moral prosperity they justly deserve." This is a confession that foreign countries are more generous to our artists than we are to theirs. In foreign countries according to Mr. de Gissac, American artists are not only allowed to perfect themselves in their art, but they obtain employment also; yet he complains because foreign artists get a little employment here. Shall the United States be less magnanimous than Germany, France, or Spain?

It is quite proper that Mr. de Gissac should complain of work done at the public expense, that it is not well done, if he thinks that way, but his criticism should apply to the work only, and not at all to the nationality of the workmen. It is also true that the farmer is under the patronage of the government, and that the Department of Agriculture is ostensibly for his benefit, but it is hardly worth its cost, and perhaps the farmer would be just as well without it. No doubt the sculptor is as much entitled to government patronage as the farmer; and if the artists had as many votes as the farmers have, there would soon be a Department of the Fine Arts with a cabinet minister at the head of it.

I would not undervalue the esthetic arts, nor their influence in the moral education of a people, for I believe with Mr. de Gissac that "man shall not live by bread alone": which, by the way, is what the preacher said to the tramp when mixing a little spiritual refreshment with a gift of bread; "Which is werry true Sir," said the tramp, "he needs also a little meat and vegetables."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

The author of the poem "Future Life" which was anonymously published in the last number of *The Open Court* is W. Schuyler of St. Louis, Mo.

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PHILOSOPHICAL AGNOSTICISM AND MONISM.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST.

BY DR. LEWIS G. JONES.

THE articles of Mr. Wakenan and Dr. Carus in *The Open Court* of August 13, are of interest to all students of philosophy, inasmuch as they clearly suggest the point of divergence between the objective monism of the writers and the agnostic monism of the disciples of Mr. Herbert Spencer. If the first-named writer is carried by the heat of his conviction into an attitude of controversy rather than of cool, philosophic argument, and manifests a somewhat premature joy over "the hopeless condition of practical philosophical bankruptcy" into which Mr. S. H. Wilder—"a well-known philosophic and spiritualistic writer"—and himself, in unnatural and unholy alliance, have reduced the system of Mr. Spencer, this defect in his statement is offset by the calm and logical comments of the editor. With a view to correct one or two misapprehensions, and to clear up, if possible, a little of the intellectual fog which obscures the mental horizon of the objective monist whenever Spencerian agnosticism comes within the field of his vision, the writer ventures to make a few suggestions bearing upon this discussion.

As it appears from the articles above referred to, the editor of *The Open Court* takes his stand clearly upon positions furnished by the data given in the modern science of psychology; in regard to which, however, the mind of Mr. Wakenan seems to be in a hopeless state of confusion. "When some forces of nature stored up in food are changed into the vital energy of nervous tissue and utilised in nervous action," says Dr. Carus, "there is not one molecule of matter and not the least particle of energy changed into the subjective state of feeling. All the forces of objective nature remain objective. The law of the conservation of matter and energy holds good in the empire of matter and energy. The phenomena of feeling . . . are subjective states unobservable and invisible, but going along with objective processes of visible motion. They are not motions, not forces, not energies, but states of awareness."

This is a lucid and admirable statement of the doctrine set forth by Mr. Fiske nearly twenty years

ago, in "Cosmic Philosophy,"—a doctrine which Mr. Wakenan interprets as essentially spiritualistic in its implications, and which, to his mind, necessitates the relegation of all logical explanations of psychical processes to the realm of the "unknowable." Now, since both Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske explicitly place these processes, equally with those which we call physical, in the realm of the knowable, and have devoted much time and thought to their logical explanation, there must be a mistake somewhere in Mr. Wakenan's understanding of the matter. That this mistake lies in a want of clear apprehension of the thought of Mr. Fiske and Mr. Spencer, appears, I think, in the confused and distorted way in which he has reported Mr. Fiske's explanation of the phenomena of consciousness. (*The Open Court*, p. 2907.)

What Mr. Fiske actually said upon this subject in his Brooklyn Lecture is substantially as follows:

"In tracing the correlation of motions into the organism, through the nervous system, and out again, we are bound to get an account of each step in terms of motion. Unless we can show that every unit of motion that disappears is transformed into an exact quantitative equivalent, our theory of correlation breaks down; but when we have shown this we shall have given a complete account of the whole affair, without taking any heed whatever of thought, feeling, or consciousness. In other words, these psychical activities do not enter into the circuit, but stand outside of it, as a segment of a circle may stand outside of a portion of an entire circumference *with which it is concentric*. Motion is never transformed into thought, but only into some other form of measurable (in fact, or, at any rate, in theory measurable) motion that takes place in nerve-threads and ganglia. *It is not the thought, but the nerve-action that accompanies the thought, that is really the 'transformed motion.'*"* I say that if we are going to verify the theory of correlation, it must be done (actually or theoretically) by measurement; quantitative equivalence must be proved at every step; and hence we must not change our unit of measurement; from first to last it must be a unit of motion: if we change it for a moment our theory of correlation collapses. I say therefore that the theory of the correlation and equivalence of forces lends no support whatever to materialism. On the contrary, its manifest implication is that psychical life cannot be a mere product of temporary collocations of matter." (*Popular Science Monthly*, Sept. 1891.)

This is Mr. Fiske's statement of the case in his own words, in the lecture which Mr. Wakenan has attempted to interpret to the readers of *The Open Court*. It will be seen that Mr. Wakenan's interpolated clause: "the rest of its circumference we could

* The italics are Mr. Fiske's.

never know: it vanished into the Unknowable Reality behind all phenomena, etc., etc.," is wholly without warrant in the language of Mr. Fiske and is a manifest distortion of his thought. It was the mental commentary, doubtless, of Mr. Wakeman as he listened to the lecture,—the product of his own vivid imagination and strong positivistic bias; but it has not the most remote warrant in the terms used by the lecturer. The comments of Dr. Carus in so far as they are based upon Mr. Wakeman's unauthorised interjection into the argument of Mr. Fiske are of course irrelevant, save as protests against the ghostly philosophical creation of Mr. Wakeman's vivid imagination. As a "spook" raiser Mr. Wakeman has few or no equals. The phrase "with which it is concentric," which we have italicised, indicates clearly that Mr. Fiske's rhetorical figure implied a definite and constant relationship between the psychic and physical processes, though not one of quantitative equivalence.

As to the nature of the relations between the psychic states and the corresponding physical processes, therefore, there does not thus far appear to be any substantial difference between the Spencerian agnostic and Dr. Carus. Speaking of feeling and motion elsewhere, Dr. Carus declares: "The abstract conceptions form two parallel systems." ("Fundamental Problems," p. 338.) He again asserts: "All our concepts, matter and mind included, are *only symbols* to represent certain features abstracted from the fact of experience. *Our abstract concepts are not realities*, but ideas; mere noumena, things of thought, invented for the sole purpose of comprehension. . . . To declare that force and feeling, and consciousness and thought are material does not prove the boldness of free-thought, it betrays an immature mind. . . . Matter, force, mind, spirit, form, feeling, are mere abstractions. To look upon any of these . . . as something else than terms or symbols, to look upon them as 'omneities' or all-comprehension realities, is a self-mystification."

All this, as we understand it, admirably expresses the idea of Mr. Spencer. The essentially disparate conceptions of material processes and psychical states, and the essentially symbolical character of each, are familiar thoughts to the student of the synthetic philosophy.

We are brought back, then, to the consideration of the nature of the Reality of which these processes and states are disparate mental symbols. That there is such a Reality is agreed both by the objective monist and the philosophical agnostic. Completing a sentence already quoted in part, Dr. Carus says: "The abstract conceptions form two parallel systems, *but the real thing can be represented as parallel only in the sense that it is parallel to itself.*" And he further declares, in terms which no Spencerian will contravene: "We

must never forget that all our scientific inquiries deal with certain sides of reality only." ("Fundamental Problems," p. 348.) It therefore appears that all mental and physical processes are disparate abstractions or symbolical interpretations in terms of consciousness of certain processes which constitute or appertain to a Reality the nature of which is not otherwise revealed to us. For if otherwise revealed, *how* otherwise? Save material processes and thought processes what can possibly constitute the object of our conscious apprehension and investigation? Does any conceivable synthesis or commingling of these two symbolical and disparate processes constitute the whole of Reality? Manifestly, not. Confessedly not, in a scientific sense; for Dr. Carus admits that "*all* our scientific inquiries deal with certain sides of reality only." Logically not: for no synthesis of disparate symbols can possibly constitute a complete knowledge of unified Being. Actually not: for it is impossible to form a concept of such a synthesised symbol in thought.

We have looked in vain through the accessible writings of Dr. Carus for any adequate definition or description of the innermost nature of the monistic Reality of which mental and physical processes are, by his own explicit admission, disparate and symbolical representations in consciousness. We find, indeed, such formal definitions as "Reality is the sum total of all the facts that are, or can become, objects of experience" ("Fundamental Problems," p. 254), but this is a definition which does not define; it amounts to no more than saying "Reality is everything," and gives us no information as to its intrinsic nature. It even helps to befog the subject rather than to enlighten it; for if mental and material processes are not "realities,"* as he assures us, how can "realities" become objects of experience at all? Our experience is transformed in consciousness to a knowledge of these symbolical processes; and such knowledge would therefore appear to be the whole subject-matter of our conscious experience.

The philosophical agnostic does not seek for any such definition of the essential nature of Reality. He recognises and confesses the futility of such search. The same psychological principle which compels the confession that mind and matter are mental abstractions or disparate thought symbols of this Reality, proves to him that it can only be known indirectly, by and through the interpretation of these symbols. What it is in its innermost constitution can never be revealed to a finite being. Such a being can only know this Reality symbolically, as it is related to his own limited

* [This is a misstatement of my position, which for brevity's sake may be corrected at once. Mental as well as material processes, in my opinion, are realities. They are no realities if considered by themselves as abstract ideas.—EDITOR.]

psychical faculties. This symbolism constitutes the very nature of our knowledge. And the recognition of this fact is the irrefragable foundation of philosophical agnosticism.

The philosophical agnostic may consistently deny, with Dr. Carus, that "legitimate problems exist that are insolvable"; but the question of the intimate nature and constitution of Reality is not, he claims, a legitimate problem for the human intellect, since its data are wholly out of relation with that intellect. All problems involved in the study of mental and material processes, on the contrary, are strictly legitimate, and such problems are undoubtedly solvable. In these regions of investigation there may be a vast unknown, but there is no "unknowable." *

Dr. Carus tells us that "unknowability is not a quality inherent in things." To affirm the contrary would be to posit an absurdity—of which neither Mr. Spencer nor any of his intelligent expositors are guilty. Manifestly, the ability or non-ability to know is a quality of minds, not of things. It is the limitation of mental capacity which renders Reality, in its essential constitution, unknowable, not the nature of that immanent constitution. Things or processes are knowable under the conditions by which they are related to the psychic nature, and are thus capable of responding to its prescient interrogations. In so far as they are not so related, they are, to the possessors of finite psychical natures, unknowable.

If, therefore, as Dr. Carus assures us, "Reality is. It is undivided and indivisible. And parts of reality [only] are symbolised in words" ("Fundamental Problems," p. 300), will he not kindly define for us the intrinsic nature of this Reality as a whole? The editor of *The Open Court* is an acute thinker, and a master of clear and intelligible forms of expression. He has lucidly defined the nature of mental and material processes. If, as he has repeatedly asserted, the incomprehensible is the non-existent, will he not render comprehensible, in clear and definite terms of the known, the nature of the one reality? Without such a clear definition which shall at once explain Reality, and differentiate it from those verbal and symbolical abstractions known as "mind," "matter," "force," "motion," etc., the word "reality" is no more intelligible as a designation than is the word "unknowable." It is equally a term used to veil or expound our ignorance.

* It is strange that the critics of philosophical agnosticism should understand the advocates of that doctrine to assert that Reality *per se* is unknowable, since to do so would constitute the complete negation of their own philosophy. It would affirm a knowledge of the nature of Reality which their philosophy expressly disclaims. Expressed syllogistically, the argument would proceed as follows:

1. Finite minds cannot know the nature of Reality.
 2. The human mind is finite.
 3. Hence, the human mind knows that Reality *per se* is unknowable!
- The third term is evidently a *non sequitur*.

The philosophical agnostic cannot agree with the objective monist that the incomprehensible is necessarily the non-existent. If the "incomprehensibility" were in the nature of Reality, then indeed this might not be an unreasonable assumption, though a dogmatic assumption; it would be in any case, not a demonstrable fact. But since that which renders Reality incomprehensible is the finite and arbitrary limitations of man's psychic nature, the determination of the truth that Being or Reality, in its essential constitution, is unknowable, is a simple logical deduction from the proven facts of psychological science. There is no "mystery" or "metaphysics" or "supernaturalism" involved in it whatever.

Dr. Carus informs us dogmatically that "A transcendent existence that exists by itself without exhibiting any effects is no existence. It is an impossibility. Existence without effects is a mere phrase without any meaning, not realisable in thought." Inasmuch as no one—at least, no Spencerian agnostic—assumes an existence "that exists by itself without exhibiting any effects," we may pass by the dogmatic character of the statement. All that appears in consciousness is the effect of the immanent presence and potency of real existence. It is admitted that Reality, to beings possessed of psychic self-consciousness, always exhibits effects which are symbolically reflected therein. It is claimed, however, that these effects are not competent to reveal to the consciousness of finite beings the intrinsic nature of Reality.

Nor can the philosophical agnostic admit that "absolute existence is impossible." Science assures him that the material world was evolved long before any individualised form of consciousness had an existence. Being could then have had no "manifestation,"* unless we conceive of the Universe itself as possessing a psychic self-consciousness. To assert that Reality can have no existence apart from manifestation in any other sense is pure idealism.

Neither Mr. Spencer nor any other advocate of philosophical agnosticism asserts that Reality is unknowable *per se*, or in any other sense than the one heretofore indicated. On the contrary, that it is known as existing, as the immanent source, life and nexus of all those disparate symbolical abstractions which are included in mental and material processes, is affirmed as knowledge of the highest assured verity—fundamental to all our other knowledge. Should man develop

* [This is a misconception of my position. Manifestation has been explained in *Fundamental Problems* as "the effectiveness of things in their relations." The term manifestation is often, perhaps mostly, used in the sense of becoming manifest to some sentient or thinking being. At the time when I used the expression, I gave the following explanation in No. 121 of *The Open Court*, Dec. 19th 1889: "Existence is real by manifesting itself somehow. It need not manifest itself to *us*. A pebble on the surface of the moon which perhaps no living creature has ever seen, manifests its existence by a pressure upon the moon, a reflection of sunbeams, and in innumerable other ways."—EDITOR.]

more and acuter faculties of sense-perception, new and finer modes of psychical abstraction and synthesis, this Reality would be related to him in ways of which he can now form no conception. The term "matter" might, in such a not inconceivable event, cease to adequately represent his symbolical interpretation of its objective relations to his consciousness.

Not, however, until he shall cease utterly to be a finite being, not until all limitations to his modes of sense-perception shall be wholly abrogated, not until he shall become in fact omnipresent and omniscient, can he ever know the ultimate Reality through and through, in its full essential constitution. He cannot know it otherwise than relatively, by means of abstractions and thought-symbols determined by his own psychical nature, and responding to its finite limitations. The unknowability of Reality in its immanent constitution is a logical and inexpugnable corollary from the admitted truth that the psychical nature of man is finite and limited.

AGNOSTICISM IN "THE MONIST"

BY ELLIS THURTELL.

THE pages of the first volume of *The Monist* contain several criticisms of Agnosticism, as understood by Dr. Paul Carus, that are of great interest and importance. Dr. Carus seems bent on demonstrating that however anxious any Agnostic may be to take rank among the Positive Monists, he can by no means consistently do so without forfeiting his right to the title of Agnostic. Well, I for one should be very sorry to think that this conclusion is the inevitable result of really clear cogitation on the matter. And when so competent a reasoner as Dr. Carus assures us that it is—despite my own conviction to the contrary—I am glad to harbor the hope that our difference of opinion may after all arise rather from explainable distinctions of definition than from inherent incompatibility of ideas.

To start with, in the first number of *The Monist* we are told: "The negative features of Descartes's philosophy naturally found their ultimate completion in Agnosticism. The assumption of the existence of a subject led to the doctrine that this subject is 'unknowable.' Now I am in entire agreement with Dr. Carus—following Kant—in holding that 'Descartes's famous syllogism *Cogito ergo sum*' must be held to contain a fallacy, so far as it is supposed to prove the positive existence of a subject apart from thought and feeling. Indeed that the state of consciousness expressed by the verb *Cogito* does not necessarily imply anything underlying itself; still less that this underlying something is unknowable.

Again we read: "The assumption of something 'that underlies the acts of thought leads to the assump-

tion of something that underlies objective existence." But neither do I pin my philosophic faith to any such underlying something. The walnut table at which I write is, I am convinced, that very sort of object which it seems to my subjective self to be. For I wholly accept the dictum of Dr. Carus that "The data of knowledge are not mere subjective states, they are relations between subject and object." And am certainly of opinion that whatever different impressions the table may produce upon different people are due not to any unknowability of its actual nature, but simply to the differences observed to exist between the brain and senses of one person and another—the subjective factor, namely, that forms one, and one only essential half in every act of knowledge. "Objectivity," indeed, as Dr. Carus says, "is no chimæra; and we are very well enabled to establish the truth or 'untruth of objective facts.' Nor can I see anything in my Agnosticism to prohibit my believing that 'the philosophy of the future accordingly will be a 'philosophy of facts; it will be *positivism*: and in so far as a unitary systematisation of facts is the aim and ideal of all science it will be *MONISM*.'" The prince of Agnostics, Herbert Spencer himself has spoken of the "tacit implication* [in his scheme] that philosophy is completely unified knowledge"; and that "unification is possible, and that the end of philosophy is the achievement of it."

Now this view of the function of philosophy—common as it evidently is to Herbert Spencer and to *The Monist's* editor—leads us on to what seems to me a prime misconception of that Spencerian type of Agnosticism by which, in the main, I hold. In the fourth number of *The Monist* Dr. Carus gravely observes: "Agnosticism is in our opinion no sound basis upon which to erect ethics." Nor is it in ours, nor in that of any one else so far as we know. Why indeed should Agnosticism be brought into the question at all? "Mr. Herbert Spencer who for some reason or other tried to escape the consequences of his Agnosticism in the ethical field," would, I fancy, be very much surprised to hear of this suggested effort. Dr. Pfeiderer—in his "Development of Theology," recently written for an English Library of Philosophy—well remarks: "The Agnosticism which Spencer adopted from Hamilton and Mansel forms but the one aspect of his philosophy; to a certain extent the convenient background into which all metaphysical problems can be relegated, so as to construct with fewer hindrances a system of natural evolution from the results of modern science." He goes on to point out that the idea of Evolution is the mainspring of the whole matter which Herbert Spencer has to impart. And that "he has placed the doctrine of the incogni-

* "First Principles," 5th Edition, p. 539.

"sability of the Absolute as a wall of separation between philosophy and religion that an eternal peace may be concluded between them."

For Herbert Spencer holds, as Dr. Pfeiderer observes "that in every one of the three main [cosmic] theories—Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism—is shown the impossibility of a satisfactory solution that is not self-contradictory. It follows that God, the Absolute, the Unconditioned is not for us cognisable." So far, in point of fact, and no farther does Herbert Spencer's Agnosticism extend. It has relation only to the three prevailing theories of ultimate Causation: and it simply and solely consists in the passing of a verdict of "non-proven" against each and all of these. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism are formally declared out of court as altogether too dogmatic. And the conclusion come to is, that about their several theses nothing can be positively known. To this conclusion—however arrived at—Professor Huxley has happily enough given the name of Agnosticism. And though the word is not mentioned in the "First Principles," Herbert Spencer has in his "Ecclesiastical Institutions," definitely adopted it as descriptive of his creed. He may indeed consider, as Dr. Pfeiderer believes him to do, that the unknowability he posits is not merely relative but absolute. Here many of us would probably not follow him, deeming ourselves to be deciding more in accordance with the evidence by declaring that we do not know how that may be. Herbert Spencer, however, has anticipated some such objection to any assertion of an unknown that is also absolutely unknowable. In the last page of his "Ecclesiastical Institutions" he speaks of "that analysis of knowledge which while forcing him [the Spencerian] to Agnosticism, yet continually prompts him to imagine some solution of the great enigma which he knows cannot be solved." The only satisfactory answer to any Agnosticism, whether absolute or relative, surely must be to show that there is some actual solution of the great enigma. And this, upon any other than already discredited supernaturalistic grounds, has never yet been done. Until it is done I for one must take leave to declare myself an Agnostic while claiming at the same time, and without any sense of self-contradiction, to be considered a Positive Monist—by belief and tendency, if not by any assertion of certainty or completed knowledge.

Prof. J. R. Seeley, in his "Natural Religion," has remarked that the most embittered war of words is usually that which is carried on between those whose differences consist only in words. Let us hope that the conflict between Spencerian Agnosticism and *Open Court* Monism is not destined to illustrate the truth of this observation. I say Spencerian Agnosti-

cism advisedly. For there is a type of Agnosticism—not altogether unfamiliar I believe to Dr. Carus—which certainly tends to be gnostic where Herbert Spencer is agnostic, and agnostic (through want of perfect sympathy with sound science) where Spencer and all strong psychologists are gnostic. It is not the Agnosticism in fine of every rhetorical writer upon my own side that I feel called upon to defend. But that Agnosticism only which, following (with the slightest modifications suggested by individual thought) the profoundly philosophic lead of Herbert Spencer, owes its existence simply to the scientific principle of judgment suspended until sufficient evidence appears. In this light the absolutely unknowable, which has hitherto been the great bugbear barrier between modified Spencerian Agnosticism and the Positive Monism of *The Open Court*, is transmuted into the merely actual unknown. That the recognition of this relative and subjective Unknowability on the part of Agnostics could ever have been a line of separation can be believed by no one at all familiar with the writings of Dr. Carus. And that all definite Agnosticism has seemed to him so essentially antagonistic to his own philosophic faith must arise from something of misrepresentation on one side and misconception on the other. Surely the time has come for this unnecessary and unfortunate misunderstanding to be removed.

SPENCERIAN AGNOSTICISM.

I. IN REPLY TO MR. ELLIS THURTELL.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER as a philosopher and as a thinker is a power in our age, not only because he understands how to deal with deep problems so as to impress his conception of them upon the reader, but also because his views strongly coincide with the *Zeitgeist* of the present generation. I am fully aware of the fact that on many most important subjects the tenets of *The Monist* and *The Open Court* are in perfect sympathy with the spirit of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, but at the same time I recognise that there are points not less important in which there is no agreement, and perhaps the most important one is the doctrine of agnosticism.

We should be very glad to learn that Mr. Spencer's agnosticism was such as Mr. Ellis Thurtell represents it. In the light in which he views the subject, "the absolutely unknowable which has hitherto been the great bugbear barrier between modified Spencerian agnosticism and the Positive Monism of *The Open Court*, is transmuted into the merely actually unknown." I am fully in sympathy with this "modified Spencerian agnosticism," and I wish that Mr. Spencer had consented to the modification himself. If Mr. Thurtell's conception of Spencerianism is different from

mine, it may arise, as Mr. Thurtell suggests, from a misconception on my part, but I doubt it. The question however is easily decided by looking up Mr. Spencer's *First Principles*. Let him declare in his own words whether his idea of the unknowable is merely relative and not absolute, whether it consists simply and solely of a verdict of "not proven" with regard to the several theses of Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism.*

The first chapter of the *First Principles* (p. 46) ends with the following sentences:

"And thus the mystery which all religions recognise, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect—not a relative, but an *absolute mystery*.†

"Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty[!]*—a truth in which religions in general are at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. And this truth, respecting which there is a latent agreement among all mankind from the fetish-worshipper to the most stoical critic of human creeds, must be the one we seek. If Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain[!] of all facts—that the Power of which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.*"‡

This passage, it seems to me, is sufficient to disprove Mr. Thurtell's allegation that I had misconstrued Mr. Spencer's position. Mr. Spencer's unknowable is not merely an unknown, it is a "transcendent mystery" and "utterly inscrutable." And this idea I deem indeed to be "essentially antagonistic to the faith of Monistic Positivism."

The importance which Mr. Spencer attributes to the Unknowable in his theoretical world-conception ought to give it a prominent place also in his ethics, for ethics is nothing but the practical application of a theory. Mr. Spencer's philosophy is not a unitary and consistent system, but an amalgamation of several incompatible systems. A consistent ethics of agnosticism would be mysticism, i. e., a theory which holds that we feel impelled to do our duty without being able to explain the nature of duty; what conscience, justice, morality, etc., really are can never be known. A consistent ethics of the philosophy of evolution would be evolutionism, i. e. the proposition "good is that which enhances the process of evolution, bad is that which hinders it or prepares a dissolution." Mr. Spencer neglects his theories, agnosticism as well as evolutionism, entirely in his ethics, and I cannot help considering this as an inconsistency on Mr. Spencer's part.‡

* By the bye, we do not believe that the propositions of atheism, theism, and pantheism lie outside the pale of science. The problems of the existence of God, the personality of God, etc., are not subjects concerning which we can never come to a definite conclusion. Indeed they are no longer open questions to him who has taken the trouble to inform himself about the present state of investigation.

† Italics are ours.

‡ Mr. Spencer's philosophy is lacking in more than one respect in consistency. This is a truth unknown only to his blind followers, which will appear as soon as anyone attempts to condense his views. Ueberweg, for in-

Of "the great enigma which the Spencerian knows cannot be solved," Mr. Thurtell says "there is an actual solution." It has not as yet been found; until it is found, he says, he for one must take leave to declare himself an agnostic. This agnosticism which recognises our own ignorance, the agnosticism of modesty as I called it in some previous articles, is a most recommendable attitude, which will help us to do away with our ignorance. I am far from having objections to the agnosticism of modesty because, on innumerable subjects, I shall have to take rank myself among this class of agnostics. We have no quarrel with the agnosticism which is simply "the scientific principle of judgment suspended until sufficient evidence appears."

This settles the point at issue between Mr. Thurtell and myself. Yet I feel urged to add a few comments concerning Mr. Spencer's philosophy.

II. THE RECONCILIATION OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE UNKNOWABLE.

Mr. Spencer's reconciliation of Religion and Science: on the basis of the Unknowable appears to us very unsatisfactory; and it will be seen to be impracticable, because it rests upon erroneous premises. It is not true that on the one side religion is based upon the unknown or unknowable, and on the other side that the ultimate ideas of science are inscrutable and representative of realities that cannot be comprehended.

Religion is everywhere based upon the known and knowable. The savage worships the thunderstorm not because it is something inscrutable to him, but because he is afraid of it; he actually knows that it can do him harm. The obvious danger connected with a phenomenon makes man anxious to adapt his conduct to it, so that he will escape unscathed. If a phenomenon is not sufficiently known in its causes, this will breed erroneous conceptions or superstitions, and there is no conciliation possible between the latter and science. It is true that the facts of nature which have made man religious were misunderstood by the savage; and most facts are still little understood by the sci-

stance, says in his *History of Philosophy* (Translated from the 4th German edition by Geo. S. Morris, p. 432) in a synopsis of Mr. Spencer's views about matter and mind, which are declared to be unknowable in *First Principles*:

"As to what matter and mind are, he [Mr. Spencer] replies sometimes, 'that we can know it, because a being is required to manifest phenomena,' sometimes because persistence in consciousness supposes correspondence in 'permanent forces, sometimes because the two conceptions are the same, 'sometimes that matter and mind are simply bundles or series of phenomena 'and nothing besides. Sometimes he reasons as though causality were a direct and self-evident relation, and sometimes as though this relation were 'nothing more than an order of sensations and our belief in it were the growth 'of inseparable associations."

Ueberweg sums up his review of Mr. Spencer in the following paragraph: "The system of Spencer is still under criticism, and perhaps may not have been fully expounded by its author. Possibly it has not yet been completely developed. Should Spencer continue to devote to philosophy his active energies for many years, it is not inconceivable that new associations may take possession of that physiological organisation which he is accustomed to call himself, and perhaps be evolved under another system of first principles which may displace those which he taught hitherto."

tists to-day. But it is not this lack of comprehension upon which religion was then and is now based; on the contrary, religion is based upon the more or less clearly conceived idea that we have to conform to a power not ourselves. The conciliation of religion with science, as we understand it, can be brought about only by a purification of our conception of the power to which we have to conform. That religion will be the purest and highest which holds forth the simple statement of provable truth as the basis of ethics; and this religion cannot be in conflict with science, for it is to be based upon that which we know, and not upon that which we do not know. If a religion, based upon that which we do not know, be found to be reconcilable with science, it will be mere hap-hazard, a matter of pure chance, and at any rate the principle of such a religion will under all circumstances be antagonistic to science.

On the one hand religion is not based upon the unknown, and on the other hand, the ultimate scientific ideas are not incomprehensible. How does Mr. Spencer arrive at the strange view that these ideas are representative of realities that cannot be comprehended? He proposes a number of conceptions of the terms space, time, matter, and motion, which are untenable and self-contradictory and then concludes that they "pass all understanding." Mr. Spencer however overlooks in all these conceptions that they are mere abstractions describing certain qualities, that these terms represent these qualities, and comprehension is nothing more or less than a proper and systematic representation. We know what matter, motion, space and time are, if considered as abstractions, although it is true we cannot know what they are in themselves. But we need not know it, for space, time, matter, and motion do not exist in themselves; they are not things in themselves; they are simply abstracts representing certain qualities of reality.

Let us take the term motion as an example. Mr. Spencer says:

"Here, for instance, is a ship which, for simplicity's sake, we will suppose to be anchored at the equator with her head to the West. When the captain walks from stem to stern, in what direction does he move? East is the obvious answer—an answer which for the moment may pass without criticism. But now the anchor is heaved, and the vessel sails to the West with a velocity equal to that at which the captain walks. In what direction does he now move when he goes from stem to stern? You cannot say East, for the vessel is carrying him as fast towards the West as he walks to the East; and you cannot say West for the converse reason. In respect to surrounding space he is stationary; though to all on board the ship he seems to be moving. But now are we quite sure of this conclusion?—Is he really stationary? When we take into account the Earth's motion round its axis, we find that instead of being stationary he is travelling at the rate of 1000 miles per hour to the East; so that neither the perception of one who looks at him, nor the inference of one who allows for the ship's motion, is anything like the truth. Nor indeed, on further consideration,

shall we find this revised conclusion to be much better. For we have forgotten to allow for the Earth's motion in its orbit. This being some 68,000 miles per hour, it follows that, assuming the time to be midday, he is moving, not at the rate of 1000 miles per hour to the East, but at the rate of 67,000 miles per hour to the West. Nay, not even now have we discovered the true rate and the true direction of his movement. With the Earth's progress in its orbit, we have to join that of the whole Solar system towards the constellation Hercules; and when we do this, we perceive that he is moving neither East nor West, but in a line inclined to the plane of the Ecliptic, and at a velocity greater or less (according to the time of the year) than that above named." To which let us add, that were the dynamic arrangements of our sidereal system fully known to us, we should probably discover the direction and rate of his actual movement to differ considerably even from these. How illusive are our ideas of Motion, is thus made sufficiently manifest. That which seems moving proves to be stationary; that which seems stationary proves to be moving; while that which we conclude to be going rapidly in one direction, turns out to be going much more rapidly in the opposite direction. And so we are taught that what we are conscious of is not the real motion of any object, either in its rate or direction; but merely its motion as measured from an assigned position—either the position we ourselves occupy or some other."

Motion is a change of place, but this change of place is not something absolute. It is nothing in itself. It is relative and can be determined only by a reference point. If we omit this reference point in our description of a certain motion we shall find ourselves unable to determine either its velocity or its direction and in this way truly "our ideas of motion" are "thus made illusive." To describe a relation without considering it as a relation to something, is impossible and nonsensical.

Let us take one more instance. Mr. Spencer says: that "all hypotheses respecting the constitution of matter commit us to inconceivable conclusions when logically developed." Now it is a trite truism that we know little of the constitution of the elements and there are innumerable problems of physics and chemistry unsolved yet and our scientists have no hope to solve all these problems within any reasonable time. If this were Mr. Spencer's meaning, we need no agnosticism to be told so, for the world has known that long ago. Yet this is not Mr. Spencer's meaning. He declares that "matter in its ultimate nature is as absolutely incomprehensible as Space and Time." And the efforts, which he makes with the foredetermined aim that they should fail and end in contradictions are upon the whole attempts to think of matter, force, motion, space, and time not as abstracts but as absolute entities, as things in themselves. They become inconceivable not by being logically but by being illogically developed. He says for instance (p. 53):

"The idea of resistance cannot be separated in thought from the idea of an extended body which offers resistance. To suppose that central forces can reside in points not infinitesimally small but occupying no space whatever—points having position only, with nothing to mark their position—points in no respect distinguish-

able from the surrounding points that are not centres of force;—to suppose this, is utterly beyond human power."

If we suppose that centres of force existed as mathematical points separated from extended bodies, we forget that our ideas of force and of bodies and of extension are mere abstractions. To think of our abstract ideas as if they were things in themselves, absolute existences, will always and necessarily lead us into contradictions.

Things in themselves do not exist, they are ghosts. If we try to conceive the nature of ghosts, we shall naturally turn agnostics, but if we bear in mind that our ideas have been abstracted from reality, that they are symbols describing certain parts or features of reality, we shall soon learn to understand that these ghosts do not exist.

It would lead us too far here to show that Mr. Spencer's method of making every one of "the ultimate scientific ideas" mysterious is throughout the same. He tacitly neglects some of their fundamental features and upon the whole treats them as if they ought to be things in themselves. This method of dealing with the problems of space, time, matter, and motion will strongly appeal to mystic minds, but it will not further our insight. The aim of philosophy is not to confound our concepts, not to entangle our minds in hopeless confusion, but to clarify our ideas and render them precise so that we shall know what they represent and how to employ them.

The actual fact is that a partial knowledge of certain natural phenomena is the basis of religious action. Monists consider the positive element of knowledge as the main thing, while Mr. Spencer on the contrary eliminates the positive element of knowledge and retains the negative element of ignorance, the quintessence of which he calls "the Unknowable,"—oblivious of the fact that in reality there are no such things as negative magnitudes. While Monism leads to the formulation of a religion of Science, Mr. Spencer's conception of religion is the acquiescence in the Unknowable. Our conception of God is the recognition of that power to which we have to conform, and our knowledge of it increases with the progress of science, while Mr. Spencer's idea of God is the Unknowable.

It is just as erroneous for a philosopher to extract that which we do not know as the quintessence of religious belief, as it would be for a chemist to extract all those substances of a body which it does not contain and to consider them as the real thing.

The negative magnitude of the not-yet known is, as all mere possibilities must be, infinite. If this negative magnitude were indeed a positive existence and the essential thing in religion, it would dwarf all progress into insignificance and would stamp upon all our aspirations the curse of vanity.

Mr. Spencer's proposition of the Reconciliation of Science with religion is the assurance that science will leave always an unbounded territory for all kinds of unwarranted assumptions and superstitions, while our proposition implies the purification of religion from erroneous notions. It is the proposition of a great work to be accomplished.

III. THE WORLD-ENIGMA OF A FIRST CAUSE.

The simplest idea, if we misunderstand it, will become a mystery. And is not perhaps also the great world-enigma which can never be solved, a mistaken proposition?

Prof. W. K. Clifford in his lecture on "Theories of Physical Forces" endeavors to explain the redundancy of the question "why?" in science. Science teaches that it is so and that it must be so. Given one moment of the world-process, and we can calculate the next following or any other one with certainty: we can say that it must be such or such a state of things. But the "why?" of things, he says, does not lie in the range of science, for the question has no sense. We should prefer to say, The tracing of the "that" is the only legitimate conception of the "why?"

Clifford's proposition is directed against metaphysical philosophers to whom there is a "why?" of facts, that is to say, a reason for the world at large, or as it is sometimes expressed "a First Cause." Clifford's conception of the "why?" and the "that," it appears to us, is simply the denunciation of the so-called great world-enigma as a sham problem which has no sense. Knowledge means a representation of facts in mental symbols and comprehension means a unification or harmonious systematisation of these symbols. At any rate we have to start with facts. As soon, however, as we attempt to start with nothing and hope by some sleight of hand to create facts or to evolve them out of non-existence, we are confronted with an insolvable world-problem. Yet the proposition of this world-problem can bear no close investigation. It rests upon a misstatement of the case, for the very demand to produce positive facts out of nothing, is itself contradictory and is as absurd as the idea of a First or Ultimate Cause.

The idea of a first cause rests upon a confusion of the terms "cause" and "*raison d'être*." A first cause cannot exist, because every cause is the effect of a former cause, but we may conceive of an ultimate *raison d'être*. Every *raison d'être* of a natural process is formulated in a natural law and all these natural laws, if they were all known and investigated, would form one great system of laws which can serve as a means of orientation in this world. The most general of these laws, being the most comprehensive statement,

of facts, would be the ultimate *raison d'être* or ground of the world.

The idea of an ultimate ground or *raison d'être* of the world is legitimate but the idea of a "First Cause" is spurious. A First Cause is inscrutable indeed, not because it is so profound an idea that "it passes all comprehension," but simply because it is a self-contradictory and nonsensical idea.

IV. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE.

My reply to Mr. Thurtell is to a great extent also a reply to Dr. Lewis G. Janes. I am glad to see that he also abandons the idea of an absolutely unknowable, of something that is unknowable *per se*, but I find him still entangled in a strange misconception of the nature of knowledge. He maintains, that we cannot know the innermost, the intrinsic, the essential nature of reality and challenges me to define it. I must confess that I do not know what Dr. Janes means by innermost, intrinsic, and essential nature of reality and if he uses these words it is an unfair demand on his part to ask me for an explanation.

Dr. Janes says, "the philosophical agnostic . . . recognises . . . that reality can only be known indirectly by and through the interpretation of thought-symbols." This he says, after having stated my position as if it were essentially the same. It comes very near our position yet it differs from it in two important points. We say, the representation of reality in thought-symbols *is* knowledge. There is nothing indirect about it, nor is there any further interpretation of the thought-symbols needed.

If we speak for instance of reality in general we mean those features of reality which are common to all real things. The term reality in so far as it is most general is at the same time most empty; it is bare of contents, it is in its kind the most vague and the least definite of concepts. The term iron is more definite than the term metal. All the diverse qualities of iron are so many features of the innermost nature of this metal. The most general term "matter" is as a matter of course the least definite. It is a mistake based upon a misconception of the functions of our thought-symbols to expect that the most general terms shall contain an explanation of the world-problem. The term "reality" means nothing but actual being and cannot give us any information about the innermost nature of being. If we speak of reality as a whole, we cannot at the same time speak of the particular qualities of reality, because these particular qualities have been purposely excluded, and I see no use in forming a concept which shall at the same time be most general and indefinite and yet reveal all the definite details, thus defining at once the innermost, essential, and intrinsic nature of reality as a whole.

Knowledge is a description of facts, but not an interpretation of the description. Certain facts are depicted in mental symbols, they stand for and represent these facts. The simplest of these mental symbols are sense-impressions of certain forms, called sensations. Through a comparison of sensations and with the help of abstraction other mental symbols of a higher degree are formed which represent realities in terms of form, so that the things or processes can be represented with objective exactness in definite numbers by measuring and counting. But even these symbols, the abstract concepts of science, remain a simple description of facts. It is not clear to my mind why knowledge is to be called indirect or an interpretation of thought-symbols. It appears to me that only through these additional elements attached to the concept knowledge can we be led to the belief in an unknowable. Dr. Janes declares, that "the recognition of this fact (viz., of symbolism constituting the very nature of our knowledge) is the irrefragable foundation of philosophical agnosticism.

Cognition is possible only through limitation. We confine our attention to one particular feature, and form a mental abstract to represent it. All our senses are organs of limitation; every sense represents one kind of effect of reality upon our sensibility. To demand a knowledge which is independent of the conditions of knowledge, is to demand something which is impossible. Man is a finite being. Certainly! And the nature of his knowledge is always finite and limited. But knowledge is possible wherever a sentient being faces reality and is affected by reality. To be omnipresent is most certainly impossible to a limited being. Exactly so and not otherwise is it impossible to be omniscient, that is, to know also all the details of those parts of reality with which we do not come in actual contact. But this truth does not imply, as Dr. Janes declares that it does, "the Unknowability of Reality in its immanent constitution."

Reality *per se* means Reality in itself, and reality in itself means the nature of reality, or reality considered objectively. Dr. Janes says: "Finite minds cannot know the nature of Reality." Since all minds are finite, infinite minds being as impossible as immaterial matter, this means: "Reality *per se* is unknowable." The gist of the footnote on p. 2949 seems to be, "Reality is so utterly unknowable that the human mind cannot even know that it is unknowable." What a bottomless abyss! If that were so, man would have to cease thinking.

V. THE UNKNOWABLE, THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL, AND SPOOKISM.

That mind and motion are not convertible terms, is an old idea which so far as we know was set forth

for the first time with philosophical precision by Spinoza. It has been maintained by Locke and by Leibnitz and is the main foundation of modern psychology since Weber and Fechner, represented at present by Wundt in Germany and Ribot in France. It found among the English psychologists a staunch defender in George Henry Lewes. But it was strangely neglected by Mr. Herbert Spencer. Professor Fiske succeeded in converting Mr. Spencer on this subject and this change of opinion alone, it appears to me, would necessitate Mr. Spencer's recasting his entire psychology.* It now needs Dr. Janes to convert Mr. Spencer to the idea that agnosticism does not involve any "mystery," and we should be highly pleased if he succeeded as well as Professor Fiske.

Mr. Wakeman has with reference to the unknowable spoken about spookism and mysticism, and Dr. Janes calls him a spook-raiser.

Dr. Janes adds concerning agnosticism:

"There is no 'mystery' or 'metaphysics' or 'supernaturalism' involved in it whatever."

This does not agree with Mr. Spencer's own words, who speaks not only of mystery but actually abounds in such expressions as transcendent mystery, absolute mystery, utterly inscrutable, incomprehensible, unknowable realities.

The principle of economy is most recommendable everywhere, in practical life, in science, and also in matters of style. Would it not be quite an improvement in Mr. Spencer's writings if he dropped throughout the term "Unknowable" confining himself only to state that which is known. Take for instance the passage quoted and objected to by Professor Fiske.

Mr. Spencer says:

Those modes of the Unknowable which we call motion, heat, light, chemical, affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other, and into those modes of the Unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought.

The same, unencumbered with "the Unknowable":

Motion, heat, light, chemical, affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other and into sensation, emotion, thought.†

Would not this simplify Mr. Spencer's ideas and render his positive propositions more concise?

Agnosticism has not freed the world from the ghosts of metaphysicism, and cannot conquer supernaturalism, although it has confessedly nothing to do with them: it lets them alone. They live a safe life in the realm of the unknowable. Mr. Wakeman, it appears, is very impetuous in his nature, and granting his zeal in persecuting the ghosts of by-gone ages to

be exaggerated, granted that the ghosts of agnosticism are tame in comparison with the ghosts of the old times of witchcraft, I see, nevertheless, that there is after all some reason for his speaking of spookism. Professor Fiske who is so clear concerning the non-interconvertibility of matter and motion, drops at once into the very same confusion against which he has guarded himself and others, as soon as he discusses "transcendental subjects." He says:

"That the Infinite Eternal Power that animates the universe must be psychical in its nature, that any attempt to reduce it to mechanical force must end in absurdity, and that the only kind of monism which will stand the test of an ultimate analysis is monotheism."

Here is a confusion of ideas. If there is an Infinite and Eternal Power at all, it must be convertible into mechanical force. If a power cannot be reduced to mechanical force, we should not call it power; and if God, the Infinite Something, the Infinite Unknowable, is not at the same time mechanical force but purely psychical in his nature, how can he produce the world of motion—supposing that there is no correlation (as Professor Fiske maintains) between the psychical and motion.* I do not intend to discuss the subject here, it is sufficient to point out that Professor Fiske's view of the psychical and of God is still different from the positive world-conception of Monism, and Professor Fiske's view cannot be said to be free from what in my mind appears as fantastic notions.

The expression that "the psychical activities do not enter into the circuit, but stand outside of it, as a segment of a circle may stand outside of a portion of an entire circumference with which it is concentric" admits of a transcendental explanation, as if the psychical could exist independent of the circuit of motions. And there are passages in Professor Fiske's works which corroborate Mr. Wakeman's idea that he believes in a transcendent psychical existence, a spirit which is not motion, a soul-being which has nothing to do with mechanical force. The psychical, in our opinion, is an abstract idea just as much as motion; it represents a certain quality of real things. And the idea of some purely psychical being, be it finite or infinite, is in our opinion a thing in itself, a chimera, a ghost. Indeed, that is the kind of ghost in the most limited and proper sense of the word. We shall be glad to learn that this is not Professor Fiske's view of the subject, but we must confess that his words strongly suggest this interpretation of his philosophy.

Professor Fiske says in his "Cosmic Philosophy" (ii, p. 445):

"But while the materialistic hypothesis is thus irretrievably doomed, it is otherwise with the opposing spiritualistic hypothesis."

* Force is mass multiplied by acceleration, and power is the ability to do work. Work is force acting through a distance. Both concepts serve special purposes in mechanics. Prof. Fiske apparently uses the word either in a popular or a metaphysical sense where it may mean anything.

* To replace the phrase "nervous shock" by "psychical shock" as Prof. Fiske proposes, will not do, for according to Prof. Fiske himself the psychical is outside the circuit of motions, and shocks are to be counted as mechanical. "A psychical shock" would be a *contradictio in adjecto*.

† Concerning my exposition that sensation and thought are not and cannot be transformed motion, Dr. Janes says (p. 2948) that it "admirably expresses the idea of Mr. Spencer." Why does Mr. Spencer then say just the opposite?

And in "A Crumb for the 'Modern Symposium,'" he says:

"It [science] does not entitle us to deny that soul may have some such independent existence."

Professor Fiske does not deny his theological bias and transcendental tendencies. He says:

"As regards the theological implications of the doctrine of evolution, I have never undertaken to speak for Mr. Spencer; on such transcendental subjects it is quite enough if one speaks for oneself. . . . I do not pretend that my opinion in these matters is susceptible of scientific demonstration."

Professor Fiske's view is at least not incompatible with Mr. Spencer's view. Mr. Spencer's philosophy is not monotheism, but the possibility of monotheism is not excluded. He says in his *First Principles* (p. 108):

"Some do indeed allege that though the Ultimate Cause of things cannot really be thought of by us as having specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to ourselves under these forms. As writes Mr. Mansel, in the work from which I have already quoted largely—'It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite.'"

"That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us *neither to affirm nor deny* personality."

The doctrine that nothing can be known about these so-called transcendental subjects, that "duty requires us neither to affirm nor to deny" is perhaps not spookism itself, but is the soil on which any kind of spookism can prosper. Agnosticism gives to the ghosts of metaphysics and theology the right patent to exist.

* * *

We do not wish to wage a war of words and should be very glad if we could come to an understanding with Mr. Spencer and the Spencerian agnostics. But this understanding, so far as I can see, can only be arrived at by agnosticism dropping some of those features which Mr. Spencer himself has made most prominent—especially the idea of the unknowable as being an absolute mystery and utterly inscrutable. And this idea it appears to me is based on a vague notion that knowledge is something more than a mere description of facts in mental signs.

P. C.

PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S MONISM AND THE IDEAS GOD AND IMMORTALITY.

FOUR LETTERS: PROF. ERNST HAECKEL TO MR. T. B. WAKEMAN.—PROF. ERNST HAECKEL TO MR. J. A. SKILTON.—DR. PAUL CARUS TO PROF. ERNST HAECKEL.—PROF. ERNST HAECKEL TO DR. PAUL CARUS.*

Mr. Th. B. Wakeman, 93 Nassau St., New York City.

MY DEAR MR. WAKEMAN: My heartiest thanks for your *splendid* essay on my studies and also for the sympathy you extend to me.

* Translated from the German.

Enclosed please find some theses for the session of the Brooklyn Ethical Association in answer to the request of Mr. Skilton.

With kind regards

Yours truly,

ERNST HAECKEL.

The enclosure reads as follows:

Mr. J. A. Skilton, Cor. Sec. of The Brooklyn Ethical Association.

DEAR SIR: I thank you and Mr. Wakeman cordially for having kindly sent me the essay of the latter concerning my works. I am glad to see that the Brooklyn Ethical Association takes so lively an interest in the progress of Monism and Transformism in Germany. You wish me to send you some theses for your discussion on the doctrine of evolution its scope and influence, which is proposed to take place on May 31st. I have expressed my views on this subject at length in the last (the eighth) edition of my "Natural History of Creation." However the following points as fundamental theses, may perhaps be worthy of special emphasis:

1. The general doctrine of evolution appears to be already unassailably established.
2. Thereby every supernatural creation is completely excluded.
3. Transformism and The Theory of Descent are inseparable constituents of the Doctrine of Evolution.
4. The necessary conclusion of this proposition is the descent of man from a series of vertebrates (Anthropogeny).
5. The belief in "an immortal Soul" and in "a personal God" are therewith completely incompatible (*völlig unvereinbar*). Very respectfully yours,

ERNST HAECKEL.

Prof. Ernst Haeckel, Jena.

MY DEAR PROFESSOR: I just received from Mr. T. B. Wakeman, of New York, your letter and theses. He requests me to publish the letter and I am willing to do so with your permission, but I should like to have a few words of explanation from you.

The fifth thesis discards the immortality of the soul and the idea of a personal God. You confess monism but you identify the latter on the one hand with Goethe's and Spinoza's pantheism, on the other hand with Lange's and Büchner's materialism. In my opinion Goethe's pantheism is radically different from Büchner's materialism; I am ready to accept the former but I cannot adopt the latter. Materialism as I understand the term attempts to explain everything from force and matter. Goethe would never have considered sensations or thoughts as material things. By monism I understand solely the unity of the universe. The soul of man is a certain abstraction which exists in connection with his body; the body of man is another abstraction; and matter is by no means an exhaustive or all-comprehensive concept. According to my conception of monism there can be no bodiless soul, but soul for that reason is neither matter nor force but an abstraction *sui generis*.

Like you I consider the personality of God as scientifically untenable, yet the existence of God appears to me indubitable as soon as we understand by it Nature, in so far as it is not a chaos but one law-regulated whole, the cognition of which is the basis of our ethical actions. The God-idea in this sense is the cornerstone of what might be called natural religion, the religion of morality, or the religion of science. I should have no objection if anyone would call this conception of God atheistic theism. I am used to calling it entheism.

If by personality of the soul is to be understood the supposed unity of a mystical soul-being, I should deny it just as much as the personality of God. The soul is not an ego which thinks and feels, but the feeling itself and the thinking itself are the soul. To discuss the immortality of an ego-entity is senseless because it does not exist, but it is different with regard to the soul as being the

thinking itself and feeling itself. The soul being that special form in which we feel and think is transferable by heredity and education. There is a transference of the soul beyond death in this sense, and the conception of this immortality is not only a scientific truth but also of an incalculable practical importance. There are no individual souls or ego-entities. Each soul consists of a system of ideas and sensations which have reference to the surrounding world. The ideas of the soul are not the product of the activity of the individual but of human society. Man becomes man through the humanity which lives in him, the soul in this sense is a spiritual treasure which is transmitted from generation to generation and continues to live. The immortality of the soul, that is, the immanent immortality is the condition of evolution.

When our ancestors spoke of the immortality of the soul, they obeyed the natural impulse of self-conservation. The hope of this self-conservation is no delusion if it is but rightly understood. Certainly an ego-entity as which the soul was considered in former times cannot be preserved and we need not mind that. The grandeur and the beauty of a human soul, that is, the humanity in man, that which in reality the soul is, cognition of truth, together with human ideals are preserved even beyond the death of the individual, and they will be preserved so long as the conditions of the existence of humanity remain upon earth.

These ideas are neither purely speculative nor are they fantastical. The spiritual life of man, the evolution of ethical ideals included, are just as well an object of exact science as are the physical and the natural of human nature. In considering the phenomena of the spiritual domain of life we must be just as careful in our terms as in physiology or in any other branch of the natural sciences. I know that you in spite of all the concentration with which you devote yourself to specialties have preserved a warm interest for philosophical and ethical questions, and you have pronounced your sympathy with the world-conception represented in *The Open Court*: therefore I wish you would give to your theses an interpretation that cannot be misunderstood. A few words of explanation concerning the points mentioned will be welcome.

In the hope that it shall again be permitted me to meet you personally. I remain with kind regards,

Yours respectfully,
PAUL CARUS.

Dr. Paul Carus,

MY DEAR SIR: Long ere this it would have been my duty to write to you. First to thank you for sending me your highly interesting work "The Soul of Man," and secondly to answer the objections which you make in your letter of June 10th against several features of my monistic conception. However, I have had eight months of trial and labor behind me, first through the long and dangerous sickness of my wife who is now well again, and then through the revision of my "Anthropogeny," which will presently be completed. A tremendous amount of work! Having ceased work for twelve years in this province I had to read hundreds of essays, to recast thousands of sentences or to replace them by others. I can only complete such a great and difficult task by doing it at one stroke in a relatively short time to the neglect of everything else, and I hope that the book in its revised form will be more valuable than before. Many of your questions are answered in it.

It seems to me that your monistic world-conception agrees with mine in all essential points. Apparent differences rest, as is often the case in philosophy, upon misconceptions or upon a difference of definition. *Your God and your immortality are also mine*, but the mass of mankind wants above all their personal ego immortality, and everything else stands in second rank.

According to my conception, everything individual or personal is a passing phenomenon of the world-evolution. All philosophical systems are according to my conception—if worked out with con-

sistent logic—either monistic or dualistic as represented in the following table:

MONISM.	FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS	DUALISM.
Inseparable.	Matter and force. God and world. Soul and body.	As a matter of principle distinct entities.
Mechanicalism. Necessary evolution.	Life.	Vitalism. Teleological creation.
Universal (conservation of energy). Determinism.	Immortality. Freedom of will.	Individual. A person's will being absolutely free.
Causae efficientes. (Efficient causes.)	Causation.	Causae finales. (Final causes.)
Regulated by mechanical law.	World-order.	So-called "Moral."
Inseparable and subject to the same laws.	Inorganic and organic nature.	As a matter of principle distinct and subject to different laws.

I hope you will have an opportunity to visit me again that we may settle in personal discussion the possible differences of our philosophical convictions. It is impossible to do it in letters. I hope that I shall soon be able to write for you the desired article either for *The Monist* or *The Open Court*. I thank you for sending me both these valuable journals which interest me exceedingly, and I wish them every success. I am sorry to say that in Germany the greater number of the philosophical schools are still tugged along by medieval scholasticism.

In my new edition of "Anthropogeny" I expect you will be mainly interested in the lectures 17, 18, 21-24, 29, 30. As soon as the whole work is ready I shall send it to you. I shall send the proofs of the new "Anthropogeny" in a few days, the work itself will appear in about six or eight weeks.

At present I need a long vacation and shall disappear from six to eight weeks in the Alps and return to Jena at the end of October.

With cordial regards,

Yours truly,
ERNST HAECKEL.

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THE ABBÉ LAMENNAIS.

THE CHRISTIAN SAINT IN OUR REPUBLICAN CALENDAR.

GEO. JULIAN HARNEY.

THE worship of ancestors is one of the oldest forms of religion, probably nearly coeval with that of the sun, the moon, the elements which alternately vivify and gladden, and destroy, and terrorise. Family worship would, probably, in the first instance, be paid to some progenitor distinguished for his bodily strength and ferocious courage,—a village Nimrod, if villages then were. The homage paid to the memory of a noted ancestor would, in time, come to be paid to all progenitors of the existing family, whether of note or nameless. Save among savage tribes that form of worship has gone the way of all things human: "Even gods must yield; religions take their turn." But a once established cult does not perish without leaving some survival, some incitement to a continuance of the devotion no longer paid to dethroned gods. Our modern Lares and Penates, our household gods, if comprising the portrait of a father or mother, and two or three photographs of members of the existing family, are more noticeable for pictures or busts of benefactors of the human race, or of men who have shed lustre on one's native land. Not many German homes having any pretensions to neatness, not to speak of elegance, but rejoice in presentments of Goethe and Schiller, not to speak of other Teutonic worthies. Englishmen will have portraits of Shakespeare and Milton, Bacon and Newton, Chaucer and Raleigh, Alfred and Nelson, Byron and Shelley, and so on. A Scotsman will exhibit mythical portraits of Wallace and Bruce, and authentic likenesses of Scott and Burns. The American will deck his library, or favorite rooms, with the lineaments of Washington and Lincoln, Bryant and Longfellow, and others who have reflected honor on "the Stars and Stripes." The custom,—the sentiment,—is good and commendable, expressing, as it does, admiration of "the men of light and leading," who have glorified our country or advanced the welfare of mankind. When Roman Catholics are reproached for their veneration of the relics of Saints, they are able to retort that those who scoff at their relic-worship exhibit just as much of condemnable weakness or praiseworthy devotion in the like pursuit,

only, instead of Saints enshrined in the calendar, the relics they seek are of poets, patriots, warriors, or other distinguished secular heroes. The pen Shakespeare wrote with, if still existing, if it could be found, unquestionably authenticated, would command even deeper reverence than the coat of Nelson perforated by the fatal ball that dimmed the glory of Trafalgar and quenched a nation's hurrahs in moans and tears.

In addition to the greater names of History, we do well to remember and pay homage to all who have sought and fought and worked, and spent their intellectual energies, their very lives, in efforts to leave the world better than they found it. This kind of homage is open to all and its exercise is a solace and a joy.

* * *

I have been led to these reflections by the recent issue of two books which ought to be widely known. Both, in a sense, are reprints; though the first—I name them presently—is a new translation from the French; the second a selection from a political periodical which, though long ago it ceased to appear, still in its ashes holds its wonted fires, at which many a torch may be illumined to throw light on the thorny path of Progress.

In my life, more nomadic than I could have wished, not from choice, not spurred on by the spirit of adventure, but driven by circumstances,

"As a weed

Flung from the rock on Ocean's foam to sail,"

I have never been able to rest and enjoy accumulated books, either torn from me, or I banished from them. But there are men to whom, though they live in a cave, or sleep under a mulberry tree, books will come; and to whom they are as necessary as the air they breathe. Among the few books I have here,—on the southern shore of the Thames, almost within view of the scenes where Pope conversed with Swift and Bolingbroke, and Thomson sang "The Seasons" and their changes,—one of the most valued is a neatly bound, thin octavo volume, the pages showing abundance of margin and blank spaces between the chapters; the title "Paroles d'un Croyant," Paris, 1833. The name of the author does not appear; but, as all conversant with revolutionary literature know, the author was the famous Abbé de la Mennais. In the year following the publication in Paris, there appeared an Eng-

lish translation published by B. D. Cousins, 18 Duke Street, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, with this startling title and announcement: "The Words of a Believer; by L'Abbé de la Mennais: And having thus spoken he was damned for ever by the Pope"! B. D. Cousins, like Henry Hetherington, also a printer, engaged in the war of "the Unstamped" to overthrow "the Taxes on Knowledge." The printing office in Duke Street should have been of interest to Americans as the alleged scene of Benjamin Franklin's "forme" exploit. This was at "Watts's printing-house near Lincoln's Inn Fields," as he says in his autobiography, where "on occasion I carried up and down stairs a large forme of types in each hand, when others carried but one in both hands," much to the surprise of the beer-drinking Britons; Franklin being a water-drinker. In Mr. Cousins's time there was still in the printing-office an ancient hand-press at which Franklin was said to have worked. That would have been a desirable "relic" for any admirer of Saint Benjamin. In Franklin's time Watts's printing-house, and in my time Cousins's printing-office, is *now* a butter and cheese store; and where the works of Bacon might have been printed, bacon is now on sale.

The name of the translator is not given on the title-page of the first English version of "*Paroles d'un Croyant*": probably the Rev. J. E. Smith, I think a Scotsman, a man of learning, but of opinions too erratic, not to say heterodox, to be trusted with a pulpit in any Scottish church, established or dissenting; so that the "Rev." was merely a little of courtesy. He was better known as "Shepherd Smith" from the name of his periodical, *The Shepherd*, printed and published by Cousins, a curious work combining pantheism and transcendentalism. I suspect *The Shepherd* never paid its printing expenses. Later its conductor became editor of *The Family Herald*, still published; its earlier volumes containing editorials suggestive—in spite of eccentricity of expression—to men of thought, but which (if read) must have sorely puzzled the lovers of "light reading" who bought the *Family Herald* by tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands. The editor did not too much obtrude his peculiar opinions, and his editing must have been a success, for he was handsomely paid and found such work much more remunerative than preaching philosophy or acting as the propagandist of Pantheism.

* * *

A new edition and translation by L. E. Martineau of the "*Paroles*," has recently been issued by Chapman and Hall, London (price 4 shillings). I have compared the two translations and may say that probably the new version is the better rendering. Moreover the volume issued by Chapman and Hall contains also a translation of "The Past and Future of the People,"

by the same author. To the two works is prefixed an interesting memoir, the first part of which is a reproduction of an incomplete sketch by Mazzini. The translator has chosen to put the name of the famous Frenchman in its perhaps more democratic, certainly more prosaic, form of Lamennais. The memoir opens with this striking paragraph:

"In 1815 a young foreigner of modest aspect and timid bearing presented himself at the town residence of Lady Jerningham, sister-in law of Lord Stafford. He went with an introduction, I know not from whom, to seek a humble situation as teacher. He was poor, and poorly dressed. Without even bidding him be seated, the lady put a few laconic questions to him, and then dismissed him without engaging him, because—as she told a friend—*he looked too stupid!*"

"That young man was Lamennais!"

"Nine years later—in June 1824—a priest well known to fame through the rapid sale of 40,000 copies of his works, and through the warfare he had carried on against the revolutionary spirit of the age, with an eloquence equal to Bossuet, and learning and logic superior to his, was travelling full of faith and hope, from France to Rome in order to hold a conference with Leo XII. In the Pontiff's chamber the only ornaments he saw were a painting of the Virgin and his own portrait. Leo XII. received him with friendly confidence and admiration."

Imagine the discernment of the fine pensive aristocrat! I wonder if Lady Jerningham ever became aware of, and had the grace to blush for, her silliness!

One of those illustrious Bretons who have done so much for the *true* "glory" of France,—a list including such names as Abelard, Descartes, Chateaubriand, and Rénan,—Robert Felicité de la Mennais was born at St. Malo in 1782 (one would have liked to have known the full and exact date as a Saint's day in our Republican Calendar). He was the son of a wealthy commercial family, not very long before his birth ennobled for generous help to the starving poor in a time of famine; let me say not more honorable to the family than to the tottering Monarchy already doomed. Two circumstances, perhaps also a third, hindered the young Lamennais from passing through a regular course of education: the death of his mother whilst he was yet in his infancy, the disappearance of his father's wealth amidst the storms of the Revolution, and, lastly, his own restless disposition and dislike of prescribed forms of tuition. But genius and enthusiasm may attain to the mastery of knowledge without the aid of schools and colleges.

Here I had best pause nor attempt to fill column after column of *The Open Court* with a bald enumeration of the principal points of Lamennais's career; when for a sum so small as a dollar the reader may obtain the volume containing the memoir and the two translations; my object is to promote the sale of an excellent book, not to render its purchase unnecessary.

Briefly, let me say Lamennais began his young life inclined to scepticism; but finding therein only the

torment of doubt, but no rest, no satisfaction, he, like many other ardent spirits to whom religion of some kind seems to be a necessity, took refuge in Belief, and naturally fell back upon the church of his forefathers. But not therein did he find rest, for the position of that church was to him a burthen and an indescribable pain. It was the slave of the State under the Imperial discipline of Napoleon and made subservient to the upholding of his despotism at home and the furtherance of his aggressive and insatiable ambition in relation to Europe at large. Very soon Lamennais discovered that he could write, and the Imperial police discovered that here was a rising young man to be closely watched, none the less dangerous for being profoundly religious. And now began the publication of a series of works,—pamphlets and books asserting the freedom of the church, its independence of the State and the right and duty of Catholic education not cramped and fettered by State restrictions. After the final overthrow of Napoleon, Lamennais brought his brief and hapless sojourn in England to a close and returned to France. He soon found that the church was as much in bonds under Louis XVIII., and, subsequently, Charles X., as it had been under Napoleon. He, therefore, continued to write in the character of champion of the church much to the satisfaction of Rome, as evidenced in the above extract noticing his reception by Leo XII. It is said that so highly were his talents and enthusiasm rated that even a Cardinal's Hat was proffered him, but which the modest priest humbly declined.

There was a side of Lamennais's character to which Bishops, Archbishops, and Cardinals, all the hierarchy of the Roman church up to and including the Pontiff himself, were as blind as Lady Jerningham had been in her estimate of the intellectual powers of the poor tutor; namely his Christian devotion to the cause of the poor and the oppressed, whether the poor of France and Ireland, or the oppressed of Poland and Italy. The church in his view must be the church of Jesus, not of Constantine. He accepted the *status quo*, but on condition that the Gospel on which the church professed to be founded should be practically preached and be made the guardian of the weak, the comforter of the oppressed, the champion of the wronged. The church took the alarm; ecclesiastical censure and prohibition was brought to bear upon the man who it was feared might turn out a Rienzi and Luther combined. He had never the opportunity of the first, and he had no thought of following the example of the second. Persecuted by his enemies he appealed to Rome. He went thither in person, and was coldly received by Gregory XVI. He was bidden to abjure his errors and cease to plead the cause of the peoples; and he left Rome well-nigh broken-hearted. The Rev-

olution of 1830 had previously occurred, and when the Polish insurrection burst forth Lamennais had dared to advise the Pope to make himself the leader not only of the Poles but all oppressed nationalities. The alarmed despotisms had stimulated the action of Gregory, and Lamennais found to his dismay that the Pope was but a mere kingling and the willing tool of kings and autocrats. For a moment, like Galileo, he faltered. But soon reflection pointed out to him the path of duty, and though that path was fruitful only in thorns, though on either side the wild beasts of Temporal Tyranny and Ecclesiastical Despotism menaced him with their fangs and threatened him with destruction, he entered upon that path and never faltered, not even on the brink of his grave, confident in his own rectitude and invincible in his devotion to "God and Humanity."

In 1833 he launched his "*Paroles d'un Croyant*," and his "Words" shook Europe from shore to shore. The London *Times* described it as "a fire-ship launched into the midst of the moral world," and the journals and other organs of the European governments and privileged orders denounced the book as a baneful production intended to inflame the minds of the poor and suffering against governments, authorities, and all social order. Lastly, as was to be expected, the Vatican hurled its bolts at the daring offender. In an encyclical letter to the prelates of the Catholic World the Abbé was compared to John Huss and Wickliff, and in one account the Pope is represented as saying "We damn for ever this book of small size, but huge depravity."

Under the reign of Louis Philippe, in November, 1840, he was condemned to twelve months imprisonment for his pamphlet on "The Country and the Government." He was then nearing his sixtieth year. His health suffered, but he continued his labors; and his book "The Past and Future of the People" was published whilst he was yet in confinement. The dedication was simple: "To the People. F. Lamennais, Sainte-Pélagie, 12th June, 1841."

Then came the *bouleversement* of 1848. Lamennais was then sixty-six years of age, in feeble and failing health of body, but with undiminished intellectual powers and a heart strongly beating in sympathy with the people. Three days after the proclamation of the Republic he commenced the publication of a daily paper, *Le Peuple Constituant*, which was continued until October, 1848, when the reactionary press laws under the dictatorship of Cavaignac caused its discontinuance. He was elected one of the deputies for Paris to the National Assembly. But the days of reaction and disaster soon succeeded to the Parisian working men's triumph, culminating first in the election to the Presidency of the traitor Louis Napoleon,

and, in the second place, the blood-reeking *coup d'état* of the 2nd of December, 1851. This closed the political career of Lamennais. Still he remained busy with his pen, his last work being a translation of Dante's "Divine Comedy" into French prose. Finally, attacked by pleurisy in January, 1854, he succumbed on the 27th of February—the anniversary of the day on which six years before he had commenced *Le Peuple Constituant*—and passed away at the age of seventy-two.

His death was worthy of his life. He died free and fearless—so good and true a man could have naught to fear—he forbade the admission of any Catholic priest to his bed-side; he would allow of no opportunity for mendacious stories of "recantation of errors." He directed that his long-suffering body should be laid among the mouldering remains of the poorest of the poor, without the superfluous ceremony usual over the unconscious clay. No memorial marked his grave save a plain staff from which was suspended a scrap of paper bearing the name of Felicité Lamennais.

The length of these remarks forbids quotation from "The Words of a Believer," but I venture to hope that many of the readers of *The Open Court* will obtain for themselves the full copy together with "The Past and Future of the People."

A Frenchman, Lamennais more resembles two illustrious Italians than, perhaps, any celebrity of his own country,—Savonarola in the past, and his contemporary Mazzini, who was his fervent admirer and devoted friend. There was a narrow fanaticism in the composition of the Italian martyr from which Lamennais was free; but they resembled each other in their early illusion as to the practicability of making the Church of Rome the Church of Christ, and in their fidelity to truth, righteousness, and the welfare of the commonweal. A later convert to the faith which came to the Italian patriot intuitively in his earliest years, Lamennais rivalled his illustrious contemporary in absolute, self-sacrificing devotion to that cause which took for its banner's motto: "God and Humanity."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S RELIGION.

In the September number of the *Westminster Review*, Mr. Theodore Stanton brings to a close his series of four articles on Abraham Lincoln. We quote these paragraphs from the final article, sent to us by Mr. Stanton:

"A word still remains to be said about Lincoln's religious belief—or shall I say non-belief? Messrs. Nicolay and Hay and Mr. Herndon devote considerable space in their Lives to this aspect of their hero. That Lincoln was an orthodox Christian nobody pretends to assert. But his friends and biographers differ as to

how much of a Christian he was. If Lincoln had lived and died an obscure Springfield lawyer and politician, he would unquestionably have been classed by his neighbors among Free-thinkers. But, as is customary with the Church, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, when Lincoln became one of the great of the world, an attempt was made to claim him. In trying to arrive at a correct comprehension of Lincoln's theology, this fact should be borne in mind in sifting the testimony.

"Another very important warping influence which should not be lost sight of was Lincoln's early ambition for political preferment. Now, the shrewd American politician with an elastic conscience joins some church, and is always seen on Sunday in the front pews. But the shrewd politician who has not an elastic conscience—and this was Lincoln's case—simply keeps mum on his religious views, or, when he must touch on the subject, deals only in platitudes. And this is just what Lincoln did.

"Lincoln thought little on theological subjects and read still less. That, when left to himself, he was quite indifferent to religion is frequently evident in the acts of his life. Thus the text of the greatest moral document of his Presidency, the Emancipation Proclamation, contains, as originally drawn up in secret with his own hand, no mention of God; and, what is still more significant, when the 'omission' was pointed out to him by one of his Cabinet officers, he simply incorporated into the text the religious paragraph offered him. In his criticisms on the original draft, Secretary Chase wrote: 'Finally, I respectfully suggest that on an occasion of such interest, there can be no just imputation of affectation against a solemn recognition of responsibility before men and before God; and that some such clause as follows will be proper: 'And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice warranted by the Constitution, and of duty demanded by the circumstances of the country, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.'

"Perhaps it is also significant that while adopting this paragraph, the only change made in it was of a political and constitutional nature, substituting for 'and of duty demanded by the circumstances of the country,' the phrase, 'upon military necessity.' In other words, when he came to weigh Judge Chase's paragraph he turned his attention only to the mundane portion of it.

"More than one instance of this kind might be cited. Thus, when a convention of clergymen passed a resolution requesting the President to recommend to Congress an amendment to the Constitution recognising the existence of God, Lincoln prepared a first draft of a message to this effect. 'When I assisted

him in reading the proof,' says Mr. Defrees, Superintendent of Public Printing during Lincoln's administration, 'he struck it out, remarking that he had not made up his mind as to its propriety.'

"In dismissing the subject, I propose giving the testimony of a few witnesses *against* Lincoln's orthodoxy; the testimony *for* his orthodoxy is always so well presented and made the most of that it need not be dwelt upon here.

"The testimony I have to cite is contained in the following utterances.

"'We have no purpose of attempting to formulate his creed; we question if he himself ever did so.'—Messrs. Nicolay and Hay. 'Scientifically regarded he was a realist as opposed to an idealist, a sensationist as opposed to an intuitionist, a materialist as opposed to a spiritualist.'—William H. Herndon. 'His only philosophy was what is to be will be, and no prayers of ours can reverse the decree.'—Mrs. Abraham Lincoln. 'He was an avowed and open infidel, and sometimes bordered on Atheism.'—John T. Stuart, Lincoln's first law partner. 'He had no faith, in the Christian sense of the term—had faith in laws, principles, causes and effects.'—Justice David Davis. 'I have no hesitation whatever in saying that whilst he held many opinions in common with the great mass of Christian believers, he did not believe in what are regarded as the orthodox or evangelical views of Christianity. . . . If I was called upon to designate an author whose views most nearly represented Mr. Lincoln's on this subject, I would say that author was Theodore Parker.'—Jesse W. Fell, to whom Lincoln first confided the details of his biography.

"A man about whose theology such things can be said is of course far removed from orthodoxy. It may even be questioned whether he is a theist, whether he is a deist. That he is a free-thinker is evident; that he is an agnostic is probable. Addison's line seems to fit the case: 'Atheist is an old-fashioned word: I am a free-thinker.'"

A LANCE FOR ANARCHY.

BY VOLTAIRINE DE CLEYRE.

THE perusal of Dr. Carus's article, "Freethought: Its Truth and its Error" in *The Open Court* of Aug. 6th, has impelled me to a parallel line of thought concerning a doctrine, a principle, less understood, more misinterpreted, both by enemies and followers, than even that much abused, much misunderstood, much misinterpreted principle of freethought; and, as is the case with the latter, the greatest damage proceeds not so much from the opposition of prejudice as from the profession of ignorance.

"Freethought," says Dr. Carus, "has arisen in

revolution to blind obedience." It was indeed the great revolt against human authority over the action of the mind. It was not merely a negation; no revolt ever is: it was the assertion that the individual mind must think according to necessity, according to its own law. And this assertion rooted the negation of that authority which sought to interfere with the law, in the confusion-working effort to build all minds after one fixed pattern. Mark, it was the very fact that thought is not, cannot be free, in the absolute sense, is not a thing of caprice "willing" to think this or that, but a thing of order constantly adapting itself to the relations of all other things, constantly progressing in the knowledge of truth as it fulfils the law of its growth—it was this which justified, nay made at all conceivable, the revolt against "dressed authority,"—that is God, that is—Priests! Here was a contradiction, or, as he would prefer to call it, an antinomy, to delight the heart of Proudhon; thought struggled for liberty because of its fatalism; conceiving the implacable authority of Truth, it denied authority; it would be free from men because it could not be free from self; with the light of a widening infinite in its eyes, it denied the supremacy of the Sun; "Come," it said, "you are great, but you are not all; do not think by your near shining, to shut out the stars."

Now this, precisely this, lies at the root of that doubly abused, misunderstood, misinterpreted word Anarchism. "Anarchism is negation," you say. True. Of what? The authority of rulers, precisely as free-thought negatives the authority of priests. But why this negation. Because of the affirmation that every individual is himself, ruled by the fatalism of existence; within himself contains the law of right being, from which he can no more escape than sunlight can exist independent of the sun, and a "strict obedience" to which is necessary to that morality which Dr. Carus has called "living the truth": disobedience, in its stead, creating ever increasing confusion only to be wrought out and purified after many lives, the weary Karma of the race, and never wholly purged till the wronged law receives its recompense,—Understanding and Fulfilling. Hence this negation of "Archism," which would maintain a puny, false authority, denying the real one, hindering true order and progress. And the real anarchist can truthfully say to the Republican, "it is you, not I, who deny self-government." I say a *real* one, because as there are free-thinkers and freethinkers, so there are anarchists and anarchists; and as I have intimated the greatest damage to either cause proceeds from the ignorant profession of them by people of whose lives they form no part. No real freethinker, comprehending the laws of racial growth, will for a moment deny the value of the creeds so long as they were the highest possible

conception of life; that is while humanity yet remained below the creed; nor will he deny that until a thinker has risen above the creed, comprehending himself, realising that the laws of his mind's guidance exist with it, cannot be conceived apart, the one from the other; until this conception of right guidance from within has taken the place of the old idea of a law descended from Heaven, the freethinker will admit that such a mind is better left among the orthodox, than to become so poor an apology for a reformer, as he must become by throwing away his old beliefs, not replacing them with the faith of truth.

So the real anarchist, instead of maintaining as Prejudice would have it appear, the utter abolition of social restraint, the bursting of every bond which man by slow experience has found necessary to order, the inauguration of chaos, maintains, on the contrary, the higher principle that "every man must be a law unto himself," embodying in himself all the truth of the Codes, and denying their authority beyond this, because he realises this; knowing the glory of the truth he holds he would maintain his freedom to reach out after that which is higher still, unknown but not unknowable. Anarchism is, in fact, the assertion of the highest morality; a conception of society without officials, police, military, bayonets, prisons, and the thousand and one other symbols of force which mark our present development; a dream of the day when "each having mended one, all will be mended." To him who has arrived at such a conclusion there is no morality in obedience to outward authority, neither in the observance of formulas; neither in doing what is writ in statute books; one is moral only so far as he (by long struggle it may, probably will, be) makes right his nature,—*him*. What then? Does he therefore deny the value, and the present necessity of Codes? Not at all. He would not, if he could, sweep them at once from existence, well knowing that as long as men are incapable of receiving the authority of "the inward must," they are incapable of living without statutes. Yet Prejudice and Ignorance cry: "Anarchy is the destruction of the law." It is not the destruction of the law; it is the fulfilling of the law. It is the only logical outcome of freethought—the ripened fruit of which freethinking is the potent seed. A small seed, as Dr. Carus says. But it is a seed which was planted in hard soil, watered by red rains, and nurtured among jealous thorns. And yet the tree is scarcely blossoming, and still we dare to dream of that russet warm day of Autumn future when the promise of the seed shall be fulfilled: when every mind shall think according to its own law, and every life express itself freely, bounded only by the equal freedom of others, so finding the more quickly, the more surely, the truth which alone shall live.

THE RELIGION OF PROGRESS.

VLADIMIR SOLOVIEFF, a Russian thinker of uncommon depth calls attention to the fact that the central idea of Christianity must be sought in the glad tidings of the kingdom of God. He says: * "To either the direct or indirect elucidation of this idea are devoted almost all the sermons and parables of Christ, his esoteric conversations with the disciples, and finally the prayer to God the Father. From the connection of the texts relating thereto, it is clear, that the evangelical idea of the kingdom is not derived from the concept of divine rule, existing above all things, and attributed to God, conceived as almighty. The kingdom proclaimed by Christ is a thing, advancing, approaching, arriving. Moreover it possesses different sides of its own. It is within us, and likewise reveals itself without; it keeps growing within humanity and the whole world by means of a certain objective, organic process, and it is taken hold of by a spontaneous effort of our own will."

This conception of Christianity is strikingly correct. Taking the gospels of the New Testament as our source of information, we find none of the Church dogmas proclaimed, but we hear again and again that the kingdom of God is near at hand, and that the kingdom of God cometh not with observation, i. e. with ceremonies or rites. It is not an institution as are synagogues and churches. It exists in the hearts of men. We must create it, we must make it grow within us, Our own efforts are needed to let it come. Says Christ: "From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force."

Is this not a strange conception of the kingdom of God? Indeed it is, if we preserve the orthodox God-idea of a personal world-monarch. But it is not a strange conception of the kingdom of God, if we understand by God the divinity of the universe and the potentiality of spiritual life which has produced us and leads us onward still on the path of progress to ever greater truths and sublimer heights.

What is the meaning of the kingdom of God if we state it in purely scientific terms without using the symbolism of allegorical expressions? God means that reality about us and within us in which we live and move and have our being, and the kingdom of God which has to come, which grows within us, is our knowledge of God, it is our cognition of reality, it is the evolution of truth. What is truth but a correct conception of reality and what is all religion but our agreement with truth in thought as well as in action?

When asked by Pilate whether he was a king

* "Christianity: Its Spirit and its Errors." *The Open Court*, Vol. V, No. 206, p. 2900. Translated from the Russian Quarterly *Voprosy Filosofii i Psichologii* by Albert Gunlogsen.

Christ said: "Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end I was born, and to this cause I came into the world that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth, heareth my voice."

Christ considered himself as a king of truth. "My kingdom," he said, "is not of this world," meaning thereby the world in which the ambition of Pilate was centered. Christ did not intend to exercise political power and the accusations of his enemies as well as the hopes of his followers that he would create a worldly kingdom were unfounded. His kingdom was a spiritual kingdom—the kingdom of truth. Truth however is not something that exists somewhere as objects exist in material reality, truth is the correctness, the validity, the adequateness of our conceptions of reality; and truth does not come to us, we must produce it, we must work it out through our own efforts, we must build it up in our own souls. The more we have acquired of truth, the more we shall partake of the kingdom of God. For Truth is the kingdom of God and the kingdom of God is Truth. Every other conception of the kingdom of God is pure mythology.

Christianity being the gospel of the kingdom of God, it became the religion of progress. Its aim is the growth of truth within us, and all our efforts are needed to develop truth. Thus a spiritual realm of truth and of obedience to truth, i. e. morality was created; and this spirit of progress remained the living spirit of Christianity in spite of all the vagaries of the Christian churches.

Dogmatic Christianity is dead. Yet it still exists as a dead weight. Dogmatism is barren like the thorns and thistles in the parable, and it is choking the spirit of the Christian religion, but this spirit will not die, it will spring up again and lead mankind upward and onward to higher and grander goals.

The test of progress is ever increasing truth, i. e. an ever more comprehensive conception of the world we live in; yet the test of religion is progress.

He alone is Christ the Messiah, the saviour who leads us onward on the path of progress, and he only is a disciple of Christ who courageously follows on the path of progress. Those who attempt to make mankind stationary, who try to lock up the stream of life, and prevent the soul from growing and expanding, from increasing in the knowledge of the truth and thus developing the kingdom of God, are false prophets who come to us in sheep's clothes. They preach the letter of the gospel but suppress its spirit.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A DENOMINATIONAL newspaper of my acquaintance, accuses Col. Ingersoll of stealing religious comfort from the poor. It also complains that he mischievously knocks from under the weak-minded the crutch of belief by which they hobble to heaven. In

another column the paper itself unconsciously commits a like offense by denouncing the Holy Coat of Treves as "the most outrageous imposition upon human credulity in these modern times." Very well, but if a belief in the Holy Coat is a religious comfort, why steal it from the poor? If the pilgrims who have gone to Germany to adore the Holy Coat find spiritual refreshment in the worship, and a hope of reward, why should a protestant paper seek to deprive them of that hope? The complaint, if just, applies to all critics of theologies, and especially to those missionaries who wander into foreign lands to steal from the heathen the consolations of his faith. "The Holy Coat," says the paper, "is a Holy cheat, which ought to be resented and denounced; more especially as the pretence is made that miracles are wrought in connection with it." In a religion based on miracles this jealousy of miracles is wonderful. One day a miracle worker came to Marbletown, and the citizens wanted to decorate him with tar and feathers, and to ride him to the city limits on a rail. I said, "Let him alone; never hinder a man from working miracles; we need them." My appeal prevailed, and then the miracle worker said that persons of such little faith did not deserve any miracle, so he left us unredeemed. When a man offers to work miracles he ought to be encouraged, especially when he promises to work useful miracles, like the casting out of devils, for instance, of which most of us possess too many. And if a Holy Coat can do the same thing, give it a chance to do it; the world needs a good deal of miracle just now. When a man says he can make the dumb speak, the deaf hear, and the blind see, don't laugh at him, for he may do it. At least wait until he has tried and failed.

* * *

It is the vision of some seers and sages that the Chinese are to become the masters of the world; and that all they need to make them so is a little more learning in the science of destruction. The soothsayers tell us that, leaving out the art of killing, China holds within herself greater elements of conquest than any other nation has; and they warn the English that in forcing the gates of China to let themselves in, they have let the Chinamen out, and thereby put Christendom in danger. These fears have been rather increased than diminished by the action of the Americans at Amoy in China. They had a 4th of July banquet, at which was present the governor of the province, Tsin Chin Chung. Of course he was called on for a speech, and a wonderful speech he made. In profound political speculation it was more than was bargained for, and in the course of his remarks he said, "China having followed its own principles of advancement during more than 5,000 years, is now compelled to change, and move along European channels. It has begun to own steamships and railways. Its telegraphs now cover every province. It has at last mills, forges, and foundries like those of Essen, of Sheffield, and of Pittsburg. China is to-day learning that lesson in education which Europe has obliged her to learn, the art of killing, the science of armies and navies. Woe, then, to the world, if the scholar, profiting by her lesson, should apply it in turn. With its freedom from debt, its inexhaustible resources, and its teeming millions, this empire might be the menace if not the destroyer of Christendom." Portentous as that menace is I do not fear it. Excellent in imitation as the Chinaman is, it will take him centuries of study and practice before he will excel the Christian in the art of killing.

* * *

Representatives of the American Sabbath Union appeared before the World's Fair Commission with such vehement appeals for Sunday closing that it looked as if their liberties were threatened, and that a law had passed commanding every one of them to attend the Columbian Exposition every Sunday. It appeared, however, that their protest was not against any proposed assault upon their own rights; it was directed merely against the freedom of others to go to the exposition or to church as their preference

might be. The sentiment of it was this, "As we, the members of the Sabbath Union do not care to go, therefore we demand that nobody else shall go." A delegate from New York appeared as trustee for Divine punishments, another from Chicago had the disposal of Divine rewards, and they made liberal promises of both, dependent of course on the decision of the question, one of them going so far as to say, "God is now waiting to see what answer you will give." It is only fair to say for them that they spoke not so much for themselves, or the Sabbath Union, as for the working man. They were anxious that he should have rest on Sunday. It was proof of their sincerity, and of their interest in his welfare, that they did not care how hard or how long he worked on Monday or on Tuesday, but they did want him to rest on Sunday. One of them, a minister of the gospel, in a tumult of applause, took the opportunity to issue a comic challenge to all the nations of the earth to bring on their deities and enter them in a contest with his particular champion for the prize of Divinity. Defiant as a prizefighter, he said, "Let the Brahmin, the Buddhist, the Moslem philosophers, the Parsee, and the Mohammedans come on the platform and show the best they have got. Then let the representatives of Christian civilisation bring forth one, the 'Man of Nazareth.' When the award shall be made and the premiums distributed, I do not question but that the verdict will be, Truly, this man was none other than the son of God." By a careless oversight the Directors have made no provision for this competition of theologies, and no premiums have been offered to the various Divinities to induce them to come to Chicago, and "show the best they have got." Even if they did, they would hardly get fair play, for the challenger would insist upon Christian judges to make the award, and "distribute the premiums."

* * *

I have read somewhere about a man escaping from a crocodile in the river to the hospitality of a tiger on the shore; and this appears to be the dilemma of the Russian Jew. Fleeing from Russia as he did from Egypt, he finds himself again in the wilderness but without the pillar of cloud for a guide, and with Canaan closed against him. The great American republic literally carpeted with golden grain, pleads poverty, and says to him, "Go away my good man, I have nothing for you to-day"; and when the wanderer says, "I want nothing from you; I can earn my own living," the welcome he hears is this, "Therefore you must not come in." The Attorney General requires him to give bond that he will work, and the Secretary of the Treasury wants him to promise that he will *not* work; so that like the lamb in the fable, wherever he goes to drink, he troubles the water up stream as well as down. He is to be shut out lest he become a charge upon capital, and also for the opposite reason, lest he compete with the "American workman," himself most likely an alien guest, and a foreigner. Precisely the same dilemma is presented to the Russian Jews in England, but they will probably squeeze themselves between the horns of it and escape. Their immigration into England was opposed for the alleged reason that they were not producers, and that they lived by trade, usury, and speculation. This was contradicted by an object lesson worth more than all the moralising of the magazines. I present it as I find it in an English newspaper:

"A noticeable feature in the proceedings at Worship Street Police Court lately is the increased number of cases in which the parties are foreign Jews, and in which the services of an interpreter are necessary. This was the case in three separate instances on Wednesday, when in a summons for assault, the whole of the witnesses, as well as the complainant and defendant, were Polish Jews, exiled from Russia. Recent cases have shown that the newer immigrants are working as carpenters, cooks, writers, painters, etc., and in the period of the present strike of the building hands, some find employment by working at home."

Thus it became known that the Jew exiles were mechanics and laborers, whereupon arose the "British workman" to de-

mand their exclusion because they were too useful altogether. This harsh alternative is pressed upon the Jew; he must not work, and he must not become a pauper. It is another form of the ancient persecution when he was reviled for wearing mean clothes, as, for instance, when Antonio spit on Shylock's gaberdine; yet when a Jew tried to correct this fault by wearing a fine coat with a little embroidery on it, or some golden ornament, the first Christian that came along, took it away from him on the pretence that it was very unbecoming in a Jew to wear vain trinkets and gorgeous raiment. Let the Jew come here and go to work if he wants to do so, because every man who works for a living increases the demand for labor. He crowds more men into employment than he crowds out of it. This must be so, otherwise the whole industrial system would fall, like those crowded buildings in New York; and the workmen would be under the ruins.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

The autobiography of George Jacob Holyoake which appeared in the *Newcastle Weekly Chronicle* under the title "Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life" is now complete and we hope that it will appear in book-form. It is brimful of wise thought and interesting matter and we learn to love and admire its author. In one of the last installments he says: "It was part of my mind never to hold opinions unless I could dare the judgment of others as to their truth. I was by my nature a combatant of ideas. I gave quarter, but never asked any. . . . My rule in debate has always been never to give my reasons against an opponent's arguments unless I could state his case with a fullness and vividness which satisfied him that I understood it. Often when an adversary had put his case badly, I have put it better for him."

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PHYLOGENY AND ONTOGENY.

A FEW REMARKS FROM THE PREFACE OF THE FOURTH EDITION
OF "THE ANTHROPOGENY."*

BY ERNST HAECKEL.

WHEN in the year 1874 the first edition of "The Anthropogeny" appeared, and when its third edition appeared three years later, the general conditions of the biological sciences were different from what they are now. The animated struggle regarding the cognition of the highest truths which had been called forth in 1859 by Charles Darwin's epoch-making book on the Origin of Species, it is true, had been decided in all main points in his favor. Yet the most important conclusion to be drawn from the doctrine of evolution, firmly founded upon his selection-theory, its application to man, was still objected to in large circles.

I had made in my "Morphology," 1866, and more particularly in my "Natural History of Creation," the first attempts to approach the hypothetical series of the human ancestry and to discover the diverse historical stages which lead to the formation of man. In this work I always bore in mind of what fundamental importance the treasure of the empirical knowledge of the history of the human germ is for the construction of the history of our race. Having been occupied for years with human embryology and having delivered academical lectures upon the elementary basis of physical anthropology, I felt encouraged to make the difficult attempt of applying it to our Phylogeny, i. e. the history of the origin of our race.

The full application of the basic biogenetic law to man, it appeared to me, was the more demanded and allowed, because the greatest number of embryologists did not want at that time to have anything to do with it. There was only one text-book on the subject which was much in use and that had appeared in four editions, I refer to the work of Albert Kölliker. It represented the science connectedly and in its general principles since 1859, but it took the opposite standpoint. Even in its latest edition of 1884, its meritorious author still clings to the opinion, "that the evolutionary laws of organisms are even yet entirely unknown, and that in opposition to the Darwinian idea of a gradual transformation, it will accept the idea of a transformation of the organisms by leaps."

* Translated from advance proof-sheets, sent to us by Prof. Haeckel.

In opposition to the dualistic conception which at that time was still adopted in very large circles, I attempted to propound in 1874 in the first edition of my "Anthropogeny" a monistic conception of the embryological phenomena. I was guided by the following principles:

1) There is a direct causal connection between the empirical facts of the history of the human germ and the hypothetical history of the human race—the latter being hidden from view for obvious reasons.

2) The mechanical causal connection finds its simplest expression in the following biogenetic law: Ontogeny is a brief and imperfect recapitulation of Phylogeny.

3) The phylogenetic process, the gradual evolution of the higher vertebral ancestors of man out of a long series of lower animal-forms is a very complex historical phenomenon which consists of innumerable processes of heredity and adaptation.

4) Each single process is based upon physiological functions of the organism, and is either reducible to the activity of propagation (heredity) or that of nutrition (adaptation).

5) The facts of human embryology can be explained solely from phylogenetic processes. Yet the palingenetic phenomena must be carefully distinguished from the kenogenetic phenomena.*

6) The palingenetic phenomena alone (for instance the formation of the chorda, of the original renal organs, of the gills) are very instructive they alone give valuable information concerning our animal ancestors, because they represent inherited adaptations of certain full grown animals.

7) However, the kenogenetic facts (for instance the formation of the yolk-bag of the embryo, of the allantois, of the double heart) have only a minor and an

* The term "palingenetic process" (or reproduction of the history of the germ) is applied to all such phenomena in the development of individuals as are exactly reproduced in consequence of conservative heredity in each succeeding generation, and which therefore enable us directly to infer the corresponding processes in the race-history of the full grown ancestors. However, the term kenogenetic processes (or disturbances in the history of the germ) is applied to all such processes in the germ history as are not to be explained by heredity from primeval parent-forms, but which have been acquired at a later time in consequence of the adaptation of the germ itself to the special conditions of its development. These kenogenetic processes are recent additions which do not allow us to make conclusions concerning the genealogy of the race. On the contrary, they falsify and conceal the latter.

The term *palinogenesis* is derived from *παλιν*, again, and the term *kenogenesis* from *κενός*, meaningless.

indirect interest for Phylogeny, because they have originated through an adaptation of the germs to their embryonal development.

8) The numerous gaps of phylogeny which remain in the empirical materials of ontogeny, are filled out to a great extent by Palaeontology and comparative anatomy.

The application of these general biogenetic principles to the special case of the history of human evolution, as I have attempted it for the first time in the "Anthropogeny," being the first independent invasion of science into a new field, had, as a matter of course, to be very incomplete. Its sole main success could be to bring the new conception of scientific inquiry to the front and to suggest to other naturalists to try its value in their special province. When I compare the state of things of former times with that of the present time it seems to me that the "Anthropogeny" has amply fulfilled its purpose. The greatest number of naturalists who have ventured upon the attractive field of comparative evolution-history, have come to the conviction that the two main branches, contrasted by me as Ontogeny and Phylogeny, stand in the closest causal connection, and that the one cannot be understood without the other. The majority of the valuable results which have been brought to light through their diligent researches, can find appreciation only if the ontogenetic facts have found their phylogenetic explanations. Twenty-five years ago when my "Morphology" appeared, the history of the human germ seemed to be to many like a strange fairy-tale in which a series of odd and enigmatic phenomena was concatenated without any apparent causal connection. Today this chain of strange transmutations appears to us an historical document of first rank, it contains the history of our creation which gives us a reliable information concerning the most important changes in body and in habits, in the inner structures as well as the outer formation of our animal ancestors.

The great progress made in comparative evolution-history during the last two decades is often sought in other causes, in the great number of workers who give their attention to this new field and in the perfected technical methods of investigation, especially the improved instruments. Certainly this progress, especially that which we owe to the improvement of the microscope and the microtome, must be taken into consideration, but they receive their value through the application of the phylogenetic methods. We owe to the latter the immense expansion of our intellectual horizon so that we now understand the great wonderland of organic life from the beginning to the present time as one great mechanical process of nature in its historic growth. It is the duty of phylogeny to reduce the formative forces of the animal body to

the universal forces and life-phenomena of the universe. When the history of the race throws the light of explanation upon the enigmatic chaos of the history of the germ, it reveals the true laws of evolution.

That this is the sole road which leads to our goal, and that the facts of ontogeny can be explained through the hypotheses of phylogeny alone, has become plainer every year. The number and the weight of facts which are furnished by the two sister sciences of palaeontology and comparative anatomy, are also increasing annually. The more we know of them, the more do we appreciate the inner connection in which the historical documents of these two sciences stand to ontogeny. And the greater grows our conviction that all three are equally valuable for a construction of the history of our race.

* * *

If my "Anthropogeny" possesses any merit it is this, that it has kept in view its historical task to be one single and unitary whole and to have traced the relations of its parts to the whole. Here also Goethe's line is applicable: "Everything depends upon the relations." The evolution of a man from a simple cell, the wonderful chain of forms through which the primordial cell passes during the process of germination, is in my mind one of the grandest and most interesting natural phenomena. And certainly it is a fact which fascinates every thinking man, for it contains the riddle of the life of man. The principle of the solution is contained in Lamarck's theory of descent which considers the heredity of acquired properties as the true mechanical cause that has produced in the course of a long history of the race the gradual evolution of our animal ancestors to higher planes. The difficulties which the old theory of descent, i. e. the Lamarckism of 1809, was unable to conquer were most successfully dealt with by Charles Darwin in 1859, who introduced the theory of natural selection as the great regulator, adjusting in the struggle for life the natural effects of heredity and adaptation.

It is an error of later days to have brought "Darwinism" as a matter of principle in opposition to "Lamarckism." A new school of transformism (we might call it Hyper-Darwinism) attempts to explain all transformation of organic forms through selection alone and thus excludes strange to say that factor which in my mind is the most important of all, viz. the inheritance of acquired adaptations. This conception has been represented with great success in Germany by August Weismann, in England by Galton, Wallace, Ray-Lancaster, and others. Notwithstanding the great merits which Weismann has gained through his excellent work in the enhancement of zoölogy and transformism, I must confess that his theories of the germ-plasm and the immortality of unicellular beings,

so much-praised at present, appear to me untenable.

When with Weismann and Galton we deny the inheritance of acquired properties, we exclude for good the formative influence of the outer world. If adaptation, that is, transformation through the conditions of existence, cannot be transmitted by heredity, it possesses no phylogenetic value. The great fundamental idea of Lamarck's theory of descent as well as of Darwin's theory of selection, consists in this: that the cognition of the relations between the inner world of the organism and the outer world of its surroundings reveals to us the true causes which effect the slow historical transformation of its structures. In this process however the inheritance of properties acquired during the time of an individual life is an indispensable condition. Weismann maintains that there are no proofs for it, while in my opinion all the facts of Morphology and Physiology, of Comparative Anatomy and Ontogeny, of Palaeontology and Chorology, are one great arsenal of arguments. Even the direct proofs of experiments demanded by Weismann have been brought forth. Our whole artificial selection rests upon this premise. I am convinced that not one thinking and impartial experienced raiser of animals will deny the inheritance of acquired properties.

Through the new theories of Weismann, Naegeli, and others, the theory of Descent loses the greatest part of its explanatory value. For if we discard the known external causes of transformation, we are referred to the unknown internal causes which have to regulate the evolution of the organic world teleologically. These are found in such vague notions as "a great law of evolution," or "a physiological law of growth," or "an inner instinct to progress," or "an inner and pushing evolution principle," etc. All these indistinct "inner laws of evolution" which do not admit any formative influence to the outer world, rest ultimately upon dualistic and teleological conceptions; they are incompatible with monistic and mechanical principles, which according to our views of the physico-chemical conceptions of modern Physiology, regulate the activity and life-formation of the organic world.

WILLIAM JAMES LINTON.

THE WOOD ENGRAVER AND A PIONEER OF REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES.

BY GEO. JULIAN HARNEY.

The February Revolution (1848) caused immense and universal sensation and excited either agitation or insurrection in most European countries. Addresses of sympathy and fraternity to the Provisional Government poured in from all quarters, England included. One of the English addresses was taken to the chiefs

of the Republic by Mr. W. J. Linton, the well-known wood engraver, poet, and political writer, who seized the occasion to seek and hold enviable converse with the author of "The Words of a Believer."

In a former article I have spoken of Lamennais as one of the Saints of our Republican Calendar and I shall now speak of Mr. Linton. Mr. Linton would not thank me for classing him as a saint; and indeed the hour is not yet come for his apotheosis, for he is still with us, or rather with *you*. Why, like Byron, he chooses self-banishment from his own country I do not pretend to know and will make no attempt to guess. Suffice it to say that England's loss is America's gain.

WILLIAM JAMES LINTON was born on the 7th of December, 1812, in London—another illustration of the many that could be cited, I will name but two: Milton and Byron, of the silly prejudice that classes all born in London as "Cockneys," i. e. effeminate, indolent, and ignorant, a kind of semi-fools! After serving the usual apprenticeship to G. W. Bonner, a wood engraver well known in his day, Mr. Linton began work on his own account, subsequently joining Mr. Orrin Smith, a clever artist. The partners had premises at 85 Hatton Garden. Mr. Orrin Smith died early, but Mr. Linton continued to exercise his profession for a number of years at the same place, perhaps not better known to those who sought the services of the artist than to those who sought his co-operation in movements for the promotion of Freedom and Progress. His adoption of advanced principles of Liberalism as then understood, whilst still a very young man, induced his first venture as a writer in a publication named *The National, a Library for the People*. Each number contained a spirited engraving. From that time he became connected with various publications, or those launched at his own risk, the work on the latter being, I suspect like virtue—its own reward, "only that and nothing more." Had Mr. Linton "stuck" to his wood engraving and left politics alone—as no doubt he was often counselled to do by well-meaning advisers, he might to-day have been a comparatively rich man. Whether he would have been any happier than he is now, I question.

Without naming the several books and publications with which Mr. Linton's name is associated as writer—both in prose and poetry—and illustrator, I limit myself to saying that, having become the trusted associate of Mazzini and the Polish exiles, he, at the beginning of 1851, commenced *The English Republic*. This publication underwent several changes but continued under the same name until April 1855. A full set cannot now be obtained, though odd volumes may occasionally be found among the London dealers in second-hand books. The happy thought has occurred

to Mr. Kineton Parkes of Birmingham to make a selection of the articles of permanent interest on "Republican Principles," "Republican Measures," "Methods of Government," "Combination and Strikes," "Nationality," "Non-Intervention," and other topics as much demanding attention and reflection to-day, as when the articles, or essays were written. To the publication of this selection Mr. Linton has given his consent. Mr. Parkes has prefixed a memoir, the whole making a neat volume of above 200 pages, published under the title of "The English Republic," by Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, price 2s. 6d.

In a review, or notice of the new volume, the *Anti-Jacobin* spoke of it as a "Chartist Remnant." It is, if a remnant, a remnant of which no Chartist need be ashamed. But the description is hardly just to Mr. Linton. The superfine gentlemen of the London press always stupidly blunder when they meddle with Chartism. Mr. Linton was a Chartist, but "a Chartist and something more," as the title of his chief periodical sufficiently indicates. Associated with a particular section of the Chartists, he was as regards the greater number of the party with them but not of them. Perhaps he but imperfectly understood that the majority of the Chartists, or the bulk of that majority, fully sympathised with his ideal, but held that the obtaining of the Charter was the first practical work. The Charter was not obtained, save in part and by piecemeal in subsequent years; and apparently we are not yet nearing the English Republic as conceived by Mr. Linton; no more than we are near to that reformed and genuine Christianity which was the holy dream of Lamennais; but who will affirm that these ideals have been exalted in vain?

Mr. Parkes says that Mr. Linton, now in his seventy-ninth year, is enjoying excellent health at his home, Appledore Cottage, New Haven, Connecticut. A biographical sketch of Mr. Linton appeared in the *English Illustrated Magazine* for April last, rather treating of his artistic than his political career, and his great and original talents as a wood engraver. That sketch was accompanied by a portrait which I can vouch for as accurate and striking, having seen Mr. Linton within the last two years. He looks now the patriarch, and looks, too, as if he might experience and enjoy some approach to the traditional patriarchal age.

It happens that though issued by different publishers, the two volumes: "The Words of a Believer" and "The English Republic," appearing nearly at the same time, present in their outward aspect a close resemblance, and the one may be regarded as the complement to the other. Every lover of choice books, not choice in the sense of expensive printing and book-binding, but in the higher sense of intellect-

ual power consecrated to the service of mankind, Truth, and Freedom, should possess both. Felicité Lamennais is at rest, and the dull cold ear of death is insensible to our homage; W. J. Linton is still with us, still working and hopeful. Perhaps in all things their methods cannot be our methods, nor their thoughts exactly our thoughts; any more than the workers of the present may hope to dominate the future, for that is not to be expected. What then? It is not the Pioneers upon whose heads Victory places her laurel wreath, but they clear the way; not unfrequently with their brave hearts paving the path of the coming victors. Or, perhaps, it were better to regard them as the inspired harbingers of that gradual evolution which we may hope will take the place of the disappointing Revolutions of the past. Honor to such Pioneers, whether numbered with the illustrious dead or still to be counted among the living leaders of Advanced Thought! We may be unable to share in the simple belief and glowing devotion of Lamennais, and may be unable to exactly follow the lines laid down by Linton; but appreciating the value and the beauty of their ideals, we may best express our gratitude by urging thoughtful perusal of their writings, believing with Byron that

"Words are things; and a small drop of ink
Falling, like dew, upon a thought produces
That which makes thousands, perhaps millions, think."

PROMETHEUS AND THE FATE OF ZEUS.

THE Greeks possessed an old myth which in philosophical depth somewhat resembles the Teutonic Faust. The story of Prometheus is told in different versions by Hesiod in his "Theogony" (511 et seqq.) and in his "Works and Days" (48 et seqq.). Aeschylus, the first of the three great Athenian dramatists, gave in his great trilogy of the Fire-bringer Prometheus, the Bound Prometheus, and the Liberated Prometheus a third and undoubtedly the best, the most philosophical, and the profoundest version of the legend. And since these three great dramas exist only in fragments which bear witness to the grandeur of the Greek poet's thought, this greatest of all ideas, that of aspiring and conquering man—conquering through forethought—still awaits a great poet to give it a modern form. As Goethe created the final conception of the Faust-myth, so the poet of the future, perhaps still unborn, will let us have the final conception of the Prometheus legend.

Prometheus is the son of Themis, and Themis is the Goddess of law. Prometheus with the help of the eternal laws of existence has acquired the faculty of forethought. Prometheus means the man who thinks in advance.

Prometheus had a brother and his name was Epimetheus, that is the man who thinks afterwards, when

it is too late. There is a story about an old Gotham magistrate who had very wise thoughts, but they did not come to him until the session was over and all the foolish motions of the fathers of the town had passed. His best thoughts came when he walked down stairs in the city hall. This same kind of wisdom, the wisdom of the staircase, was the wisdom of Epimetheus, and thus the two brothers were very unlike each other.

In those days Zeus kept the fire for himself; he allowed the sun to shine upon the earth and when he grew angry he threw down his thunderbolts upon oaks and mountain-tops. But he was envious and feared that man might become too powerful. Prometheus foresaw the great advantages which the usage of fire would have for mankind. So he stole the fire from the heavens and brought it to the people on earth, teaching them how to build a hearth and to use it wisely. But Zeus punished Prometheus severely for his theft, he chained him to a rock and had an eagle swoop down upon him daily to devour his liver which always grew again during the night. Prometheus was afterwards liberated by the skill and courage of another daring man—by Hercules who shot the eagle and rescued the sufferer.

Why did Zeus not kill Prometheus? First we are told that Prometheus was immortal. But there is another reason still. Prometheus knew a secret which Zeus did not foresee, although it foreboded evil to the father of the gods. This secret, as we can surmise for several reasons, consisted according to the old mythological tradition in this: Zeus loved a goddess; her name was Thetis, and it was written in the books of fate that the son of Thetis should be greater, infinitely greater, than his father. According to the version of Aeschylus, Zeus became reconciled with Prometheus on the condition that he should reveal the fatal secret to him so that he might protect himself against the imminent evil. And we are told that Zeus resigned his love and ordered Thetis to be married to a mortal man whose name was Peleus, and the son of Peleus was the greatest hero of Greek antiquity, the noble, the brave, the proud Achilles.

This is the version of Aeschylus, but there is another version still left. That is the version of the poet of the future. Aeschylus believes that Zeus was saved. Zeus being reconciled with Prometheus knew of the danger and evaded it. Yet we now know, that he could not evade it. Let a god have a son and the son will be greater than the god, even though the son of God may call himself the son of man. Says Goethe: "The son shall be greater than the father,"—that is the law of evolution, the law of life, the law of progress. We now know that Zeus was actually dethroned by a greater God than himself and this greater

God was the son of man—the aspiring, the suffering, the conquering son of man.

Zeus is dead, but Prometheus is still living. Who is Zeus and where is Zeus? Zeus is the phantom-god of pagan antiquity. Zeus is a personification of the Divine in nature, he is a grand picture of God, but he is not God himself. If we expect that the picture we have made of God is God himself, if we imagine him to be a mind like ourselves, we shall fall into the same errors and pass through the same disappointments as did Prometheus. Says Goethe's Prometheus:

"While yet a child
And ignorant of life,
I turned my wandering gaze
Up toward the sun, as if above
There were an ear to hear my wailings,
A heart like mine
To feel compassion for distress."

It was most likely necessary that Prometheus should pass through his errors to arrive at truth, it was indispensable to brave the evils of life and to undergo severe sufferings in order to conquer. The errors as well as the sufferings, the very evils of life are good in so far as they help man to struggle and to progress. But in order to gain the victory, Prometheus ought to know that he must fight himself; he cannot rely upon the help of his phantom-god—of a Zeus above the clouds. The real God of nature is deaf to the prayers of those who pray in the hope that he will do the work for them.

There is more divinity in Prometheus than in Zeus. The God of the present time is the son of man and his symbol is the cross, which means that the way of suffering is the way of salvation, struggle is the condition of victory, the path of toil only is the road to a higher existence, the narrow gate leadeth unto life. The Zeus-idea of God is doomed and an infinitely greater, because truer, idea of God is dawning upon mankind. There is truth in mythology and there is a meaning in parables, yet the parable is told for the sake of its meaning and the truth is greater than mythology. Let us not be satisfied with mythology, but let us look out for the truth.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

I THINK it is told in Æsop's fables, that once upon a time there was a dry season; and as the crops were very thirsty, the farmers prayed for rain. Jupiter, moved by their supplications, promised rain if they would call a public meeting and appoint a day for the shower. As the meeting broke up in a row because they could not agree upon a day, they got no rain, and the harvest failed. The fable has found its application at last, in the controversies latent in the newly discovered art of making rain at will. Shall the rain maker be allowed to make holes in the sky, and let the waters which are above the firmament drop down to the earth, forty days and forty nights, if it shall please him so to do? Or shall the practice of his art be regulated by law according to the needs of the land? If so, who shall decide when it shall rain, and when the rain shall cease? Every day in the year some persons want sunshine while others want rain, and there is no

tribunal to decide between them. It involves a question of human rights, for if I want fine weather for picnic purposes, or for business reasons, shall my neighbor be permitted to make it rain? In such a case ought I not to have a remedy by injunction against the rain maker? If the skies are to be put under lock and key, the key ought to be kept in the Department of Agriculture, for no private citizen should be allowed to say where and when it shall rain. This new discovery is inopportune, for the list of social problems and political puzzles is already full.

* * *

That it is out of harmony with our political and commercial system is a grave objection to artificial rain. Natural rain is bad enough, but artificial rain menaces an important industry, the business of irrigating the arid plains of the west. This occupation is threatened with ruin. For several years past, enterprising corporations have employed capital and labor in damming the mountain streams; and from the reservoirs thus made, those companies furnish water to the farmers in the valley. For moistening a quarter section the farmer pays to the irrigators about fifty or sixty dollars a year, and at a proportionate rate for larger quantities, according to the degree of dampness given to the land. An "un-American" scheme is now in operation to cripple the irrigating industry, by importing foreign water from heaven wherewith to fertilise the dry soil of Colorado. Unfortunately, this importation baffles the protective tariff. Rain cannot be confiscated at the custom house, and the supply of it appears to be large. The Dakotas too are preparing to provide themselves with water by the sinking of artesian wells, an infant industry which if blessed with twenty-five years' drought will give employment to many men. The owners of those wells promise to sell water to the farmers at reasonable rates. If a flood of cheap foreign rain can be kept out of Dakota for twenty-five years, this infant industry will be of age, and will no longer ask assistance from simoons and sand. As we cannot have any custom house officers on the boundary line between heaven and earth, to stop the importation of rain, we can at least make laws for the punishment of those who attempt to make rain by artificial means.

* * *

Seeking a little inspiration as I sometimes do from communion with my friendly pipe, I saw in the fantastic smoke of it two scenes of a weird and pathetic drama, having the everlasting land for its theme. In the one, I saw the Land problem bewildered by a multitude of rival theories, seeking its own solution behind the broad forehead of Herbert Spencer in the calm quiet of a little room in London; and in the other, I saw fifteen thousand sunburnt men working it out on the prairies of Oklahoma, not with any books or moral commandments, but every man of them with a persuasive pistol buckled on his thigh. And every pistol, had it the gift of speech, would say, "I am here to fight for land; the sentiment of hunger is more logical than the reasoning of Spencer." Fair is the dream of "Justice," but the reality of life is dark; and what shall we do when there is no longer left in America any more of what Mr. Spencer calls "primitive" land? In the present case there were thrown open to settlement five thousand quarter sections; and for these, there struggled and wrestled fifteen thousand men,—and one woman, but she was shot by the United States Marshall for "impatience," and thereby "lost her chance," such as it was. That was an object lesson more instructive than anything in the philosophy of Spencer, and more ominous.

* * *

The advent of Herbert Spencer's "Justice" is hailed by thousands as a new book of inspired scripture, and in its infallible chapter and verse many weary inquirers will seek rest for their own opinions on the land question, the labor question, the woman question, and other tumultuous problems of our day. Herbert Spencer's gospel of the land appears to be a compromise between

sentiment and reason, and it will not stand, because on the land question those disputants will not be reconciled. Speaking of land ownership, Mr. Spencer says:

"The landless have not an equitable claim to the land in its present state—cleared, drained, fenced, fertilised, and furnished with farm buildings, etc.,—but only to the land in its primitive state; . . . this only it is which belongs to the community."

The latter part of this doctrine was greatly overstrained by the pressure of fifteen thousand men at Oklahoma on the 22nd of September. At sunrise on that day, a million acres of land "in its primitive state" belonged to the community known as the United States; at sunset it had been broken into five thousand separate lots, each under individual ownership, the United States having surrendered its communal interest at noon. A piece of land larger than Derbyshire was communal in the morning, but individual at night, while its primitive character remained unchanged. The man who can read his title clear to a quarter section of that land may cultivate it, or he may let it remain in its "primitive state," and in either case, it will not belong to the community. What is the "primitive state" of land? And, speaking of land ownership, does Mr. Spencer mean by the "community," the State at large, or the People as individuals, the right of ownership in primitive land being in the first one who chooses to occupy it? And if three men seize it at the same time shall one of them have it; or shall it be divided equally among them all. At Oklahoma five thousand men got one hundred and sixty acres each, and ten thousand men got none. Should not the territory have been divided into smaller lots so that each claimant might have had an equal share?

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

EMULATION VERSUS COMPETITION.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

MR. F. M. HOLLAND, in an article on "Competition and Progress" in No. 204 of *The Open Court*, treats those terms as in great measure synonymous, and concludes his observations with the remark that "those who believe in progress ought to encourage competition."

This seems to me to need qualification. If reference is had only to such pursuits as fall under the general term "business," competition unquestionably should be encouraged, for it insures lower prices, and perhaps brings out in the trades "the best work of which men are capable," both of which facts are in the interest of the general public. But this question has a broader significance than its mere business aspect. It is a question of civilisation, and a civilisation animated by and developed under the spirit of mercantile competition cannot be of the highest order. Under the influence of that spirit there must be retrogression rather than progress. For the spirit of competition, good, if restricted to mere mercantile affairs, when extended outside the shop to social life and thought becomes a very great evil rather than the good which Mr. Holland seems to consider it. For what is competition but an assertion of self-interest—an effort to promote one's own material good at the expense of that of others? Its very essence is selfishness. It has nothing of the spirit of benevolence or helpfulness. Consider the various trades. Is the competition everywhere rife rooted in a generous rivalry in good works? Does it lead to the production of "the best work of which each is capable" because men feel that to work out what is best in them is a duty which they owe to their fellow-men? Is it in any sense philanthropic, altruistic—or is it not on the contrary purely selfish, and does not each man in the competitions of business strive to excel almost solely for the money return that it brings?

Now if you carry into the social organism this spirit of selfishness that lies at the basis of all trade the result can be nothing

but hurtful. A society from which the altruistic spirit is eliminated and whose basis is pure egoism is necessarily dwarfed, sickly, incapable of attaining to full growth and vigor—for the health of society requires in large measure the subordination of self to the general good. Altruism rather than egoism must be its animating principle.

Surely the effect of this "system of struggle and rivalry" upon the intellectual life of society may be readily seen. The spirit of trade is essentially anti-idealistic. Not that the successful business man may not be a man of fine mental organisation and acquirements, or that the successful conduct of business does not require a tact, that is closely allied to genius, but that having no other object than the making of money, its tendency is always toward the suppression of that part of the intellect—generally the highest—which may be made pecuniarily profitable. It is therefore opposed to all speculative knowledge, to all purely philosophic inquiry, to all investigation whose object is the ascertainment of abstract truth, and to all those intellectual endeavors and ideal perceptions, which, without the hope or expectation of reward, but with only an intense love and enthusiasm for science, have built up for us the splendid fabric of our knowledge. For all the purposes of trade if a man knows how to "drive a good bargain" there is little need for any other knowledge, and therefore the demand is for just that amount and quality of knowledge which is helpful to that end and for no other. For this reason I think the spirit of trade at war with the intellectual life of society. It sets up a false and vicious standard of intellectual qualification. It says to the young man just starting in life: "All knowledge that does not yield a proper return in money is useless and burdensome," thus fixing the limit of mental development at the point where knowledge ceases to be profitable in money, and discouraging all progress beyond that point. What we need in society is not competition but emulation—emulation to do good. Competition eliminates the ideal—emulation is the ideal in action. Competition is the rivalry of egoism. Emulation the rivalry of altruism in pursuit of the ideal for the benefit of human society. Therefore let us relegate competition to the shop and the stock-exchange, and trust to emulation only the inspiration of human civilisation and progress.

WM. MYALL.

REJOINDER.

I AM glad to find Mr. Myall think so highly of enthusiasm for science, and of love of truth for its own sake; and I certainly did not mean to encourage the idea that society can advance far without such inspiration. There seems to me however to be no sufficient reason for believing "the spirit of trade at war with the intellectual life of society." In ancient times, Athens was the centre of the world's intellectual life; but there were no keener merchants than the Athenians. Both commerce and science flourish to-day at London as they do nowhere else; and the harmony between them is as perfect there as it is in Boston and Chicago. A plan for starting a new scientific museum would meet with at least as much favor from leading merchants and bankers as from idealistic enthusiasts for what they call abstract truth. As for the tendency of competition to suppress the highest part of the intellect or hinder the production of the best work, it is well to remember that Shakespeare wrote his dramas in keen competition with his rivals in the theatrical business. When he was not trying to make money, but merely under the influence of emulation, he wrote "Lucrece" and other poems which scarcely any one reads. Competition forces an author to think of pleasing somebody besides himself, and thus leads him to his best work. Another fortunate fact is that the man who is merely trying to promote his own material good at the expense of others is not likely, under our present competitive system, to succeed as author, clergyman, physician, merchant, mechanic, or anything else. Society understands its

own interests too well to let the highest rewards fall to the most selfish. If I am not willing to do anything for the benefit of my neighbors they will not help me gain much success. Let me also point out the fact, that Mr. Myall, in admitting that competition is so necessary to business prosperity that it should "unquestionably be encouraged," concede's its place as an indispensable part of civilisation. A community must be able to make both ends meet, or it cannot make progress. Business, at least, must be based on competition; and therefore the schemes of Bellamites and Nationalists, are not adapted to make wealth but poverty universal.

F. M. HOLLAND.

JEFFERSON AND THE MECKLENBURG RESOLUTIONS.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :—

I HAVE to correct an error in my paper on "The Declaration of Independence," in your issue of July 2d. The Mecklenburg resolutions which Jefferson pronounced mythical were not those passed May 31, 1775, and now known to be genuine, but another set said to have been passed at the same place on May 20th. There is a good deal of testimony to the effect that on receipt of the news of the massacre at Lexington a popular indignation meeting was held May 20th, and an aged gentleman, J. McKnitt Alexander, compiled from memory resolutions which he believed then passed. The actual resolutions, of May 31st, were passed by the County Committee, and may have tempered the popular expressions of eleven days before, if these were put in resolutions. This, however, is conjectural. It may be ascribed to Jefferson's age that in 1819, when the supposititious resolutions were published, he did not remember the real ones, which were sent to Congress and, though not read in that body, industriously circulated. The memory of the whole country was, indeed, at fault, but in the North the resolutions had only in part reached the public. *The Religious-Philosophical Journal*, in pointing out my mistake, says the resolutions "were printed in Northern and Southern newspapers of that period, and there are several copies of the papers now in existence. A newspaper containing the resolutions was found at Washington in 1838." Your contemporary is in error. Dr. Welling, the final authority, says: "Mr. Force announced the discovery of these resolutions in the *National Intelligencer*, of December 18, 1838. We found them at first, as they had been partly reprinted in the *New York Journal*, of June 29, 1775, and subsequently he met with another condensed copy of them in the *Massachusetts Spy* of July 12th in that year. In the year 1847, Dr. Joseph Johnson found a copy of the entire series in the *South Carolina Gazette*, of June 13, 1775." There seems to be no paper in existence containing the entire twenty resolutions except the *South Carolina Gazette*, of which one copy is preserved in Charleston and another in the English State Paper Office. These resolutions do not, like the supposititious ones, declare independence, but they assume it; they declare all laws and commissions of the crown "annulled and vacated," and all who shall accept or attempt to exercise such commissions enemies; they organise, and prepare the further organisation of, a government "independent of Great Britain," to be in force until "the legislative body of Great Britain resign its unjust and arbitrary pretensions with respect to America." It was, therefore, a *virtual* declaration of independence," as Dr. Welling has shown, and the first attempt in the country "to cut this gordian knot" of determining what should take the place of the lapsed authority. (*North American Review*, April, 1874.) The resolutions made an impression on the British Governor of North Carolina, who wrote home, "they surpass all the horrid and treasonable publications that the inflammatory spirits of this continent have yet produced." That they should have made no impression on Jefferson seems incredible; his memory was feeble in 1819, and he had become jealous concerning his paternity of the original "Declaration." I have, however, done him an injustice by a lapse of

my own memory in supposing that he had discredited all alleged resolutions and movements for independence in Mecklenburg. For there was ample evidence elicited in 1819 that there had been such resolutions in May, 1775, though the particular ones produced by an old man's memory were untrustworthy. Soon after the appearance of my mistake a member of Congress wrote me about it; my delay in correcting it has been caused by a wish to refer to documents not very accessible at the seaside.

MONCURE D. CONWAY.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE AGNOSTIC ISLAND. By F. J. Gould. London: Watts & Co.

Mr. Gould has done well to give us a professedly freethinking piece of fiction. For "many people read a song who will not read a sermon." And there is much scope for the treatment of the rationalistic idea upon lines hitherto almost entirely unworked.

The story begins with a capital scene in Exeter Hall, London, where a meeting is convened to inaugurate the Oceanic Society's mission to the Agnostic Island. The characters of Bishop Crozier's two colleagues in the difficult—nay possibly dangerous—work he has undertaken are excellently drawn. Mr. Phylactery is confident that "Agnosticism inevitably results in chaos, in desolation, in Egyptian darkness." Mr. Clerestory however cannot find it in his heart "to anticipate that the Agnostic Islanders are altogether profligate and given over to the spirit of evil."

The trio are therefore not quite unanimous in the unqualified astonishment with which even the kindly Bishop receives the courteous and refined hospitality of Governor Marlow and his family. The charm and culture of the Governor's daughter indeed strike Clerestory with even more of admiration than surprise; while it fills the good Bishop's mind with apprehension from the first. Attendance at the meeting-hall of the Island gives the missionaries an unequivocal insight into the principles of the Agnosticism they had so much misconceived. Readings from Matthew Arnold and Emerson, with singings from Shelley, and even Bonar, prelude a "sermon" from Janet Marlow. Herein the fair freethinker shows her eclecticism by the exhortation: "Job shall teach us patience; Socrates shall tell us what is virtue. Aristotle shall declare unto us the golden heroes; Jesus shall preach the Sermon on the Mount. Buddha shall repeat his parables." This cosmopolitanism is assuredly not borrowed from Christianity. And it seems a pity that Mr. Gould should have enshrined it in "our Agnostic Church," or "this new Catholic Church"—a conception that plainly is so borrowed. Still the author otherwise consistently uses the language of an Agnostic Monist. "Does this Church exclude God?" Miss Marlow asks. And answers herself that the ordinary ideas of God must be "beyond us"; continuing, "Will you who cannot interpret a handful of earth presume to interpret the illimitable All?"

The "Sermon" of course creates a situation that the three missionaries have to discuss. They do so with great perturbation. The deep impression that the discourse has evidently made upon Clerestory adds to the general perplexity. Yet the Bishop determines to make one grand effort for his cause by the erection of a gospel-station that may yet prove a successful counterblast to the only too plausible preaching of sophistical scepticism. Marlow gives every assistance in the selection of a site and of a constructor. While building operations are in progress further examination of the settlement's institutions, with exploration of its own and neighboring territory fills up the time. Inspection of the school is the most important work undertaken by the missionaries. They are greatly struck with the deference paid to the instructors by the Agnostic youth. The educator, they learn, holds there the position occupied in Europe by the priest. The children surprise their interrogators even more by the sound moral notions than by the general information and intelligence that they

possess. And Clerestory feels another blow struck to his always broad and sympathetic Christian faith. A visit to another Island gives occasion to a scene in which Clerestory and Janet Marlow are in danger; and out of which they escape only to fall into the embraces of mutual love.

The next stage in the story is Clerestory's confession of Agnosticism before the Bishop and Phylactery. This leads to the final abandonment of the mission, and the return to England of its two surviving members. Clerestory of course has found his Eden and his Eve.

So ends a little religio-philosophical romance of much merit. Its hundred and a quarter pages contain indeed small space for any intricacy of plot and detail of description whether of people or of places. But whatever is attempted is drawn with clear insight, healthy humor, and firm touch. Every character and every scene stands out distinctly. Moreover all exaggeration is avoided. There is no illiberal blackening of opponent's views in order that personal opinions may stand out in unnaturally bright relief. Mr. F. J. Gould's "Agnostic Island" breaks new ground in a most admirable manner. It must be strongly commended to all interested in the treatment of our rationalistic religious problems upon the fresh and attractive lines of philosophic fiction. E. T.

NOTES.

The *Century* of October contains another richly illustrated article by Mr. George Kennen "My last days in Siberia."

We are in receipt of Prof. F. Max Müller's recent address which he read as the President of the Anthropological Section to the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

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THE PRESENT RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION.

BY J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

THE spirit of a neo-protestantism has finally dawned upon the world. Society is consequently passing through an intellectual revolution. The human mind everywhere is in a ferment. Old forms of thought and doctrine are decaying in the midst of new-born truth. Conceptions of life and duty consistent with knowledge and reason are superseding the old notions. Much is being destroyed, but more is being built. While the old creeds are being abandoned loftier and more rational views of conduct are being developed. The period is both destructive and constructive. It has formative and established as well as transitional and developing features. While the process upheaves, it shapes, while it floats it anchors the intellectual life. While it changes the state of morals and annihilates the basis of the old untenable system of theology it carries the mind into safe, permanent, and fundamental motives for action.

The first protestantism beginning chiefly with Luther but extending back into the years of the fifteenth century awoke the world into such a new life that it changed the character of western civilisation, giving a fresh spirit and devotion to the Renaissance and creating the era in history known as the Reformation. The new protestantism while it promises as much to society as the first, differs from it in the scope and nature of its aims. The former was a revolt from the tyrannical and degrading spirit of the Roman hierarchy, the latter is a demand for the largest possible intellectual freedom. The one exalted the Bible as the infallible and immaculate word of God, the other, with no reverence for traditions as permanent guides to conduct, but with a love for truth wherever it may be found, looks to the law of being as the basis, authority, and source of all morality and religion. The old protestantism was purely intellectual in its aims; the new is dominated by the politico-economical and social question.

The subject will be here treated in three parts. First, an inquiry will be made as to the theological aspect of the revolution—for what is the battle at present being waged and where will the argument inevitably carry the mind? In the second place the question will be asked: Is there any real authority for morals and if so what will the ethical outcome of the

present revolution be? The third part will be comprehended by the discussion of the position society should maintain to practical ethical reform movements in deference to organisations which chiefly if not altogether exist for the furtherance of theological ideas or denominational propagandism.

The present revolution which has already begun to show dynamic results is superficially styled, *theological*. It is this to be sure but it is more than this. It displays itself in theology and while it reaches far and wide, making the pulpits throughout Christendom tremble, yet its occult influence like fire is radical and while it burns away the old barriers which have offered a refuge and retreat to the fearful, it inspires with a new spirit and transports into a new world of environment and responsibility, the thousands who have felt that existence would be unendurable without the old beliefs. From the time Christianity passed through its first serious transformation, when the traditionary and genuine utterances of Jesus were by the council of Nicea put into theological form up to the present period of its history the authority of the Bible was denied only by the free-thinker and extremist. Internal dissensions were neither atheistic nor ethical, but schismatic and doctrinal. Gradually, however, the power of criticism among the liberals began to effect the intellectual life of the church, and it remained for the nineteenth century to cast upon the world even from the church skeptical and faithless followers. First one doctrine and then another came into dispute, and although council after council was called to consider every new heresy, yet neither the belief in the Bible as the repository of the revelation of God to man or in Christianity as an alleged supernatural religion, was disturbed. The first serious storm broke over the church when Arius in the year 521 A. D., at the council of Alexandria was deposed from the ministry. The fire kindled by Arius was kept alive by such men as Servetus and Socinus, but heresies of all sorts were as quickly suppressed as created and the church cycled through the centuries still intent upon maintaining the Bible as the immaculate word of God and still glad of any triumph gained by extolling the Christian mythus. Matters drifted, but not in the direction which the church had signalled or preferred. As the spirit of denominationalism spread and became more

pronounced, ultra reform parties sprung up in the midst of the church and dogmas once regarded as an essential part of the Christian religion—indeed as an integral unit of the universal process of salvation, involving nearly every creed of Christendom, were seriously questioned if not silently repudiated. The discussion is still on in all religious sects and although its unimportance is being minimised by some, yet it is forcing the Christian apologist into a new and dangerous field for controversy and battle. The contra argument to many is irresistible and there is, they think, but one inevitable conclusion. It is this, that the Bible is neither the repository of the revelation or the infallible word of God, but that it is a record of the literary social and religious history of the Jewish race. With this view I thoroughly concur. The real question, therefore, the one which rises above every other one in importance is not whether the doctrine of the old genesis as displayed and elaborated in Calvinism or particularly in the old theology is true or whether any special dogma of theology is false, but it is this whether the Bible is what the radicals declare it to be, and if so whether the vertebræ—in fact whether the entire structure of theology which is built upon the Bible as the infallible word of God, does not fall to the ground. Neo-protestantism means this if it means anything, and the challenge has gone forth to the entire Christian church to cease waging war over creed and come boldly forth either in favor of or against the true and rational view of the Bible. The position of the Presbyterian church is rendered necessarily ambiguous and hypocritical by her own conduct,—especially regarding Rev. Dr. Briggs of the Union Theological Seminary—as is that of the Episcopal church respecting the heresy of the Rev. Dr. Heber Newton. What is to be done? one of two things! The church is either to struggle on, pursuing an inexplicable and ambiguous course, burdened by a theology which is irrational and which has lost its hold on society, until she decays ignominiously, or she is to drop her nominal appellation, her theology, her spirit of denominational propagandism, and become as she ought and will an organisation for humanitarian and ethical work. These may seem to many to be fearful alternatives—yet they are the only alternatives now open to the church. It is no longer a matter of doubt that the church as organised is fast losing its power as the custodian of human rights. Nay more than this, the church is no longer the oracle of universal truth, nor is it any longer regarded as the savior of humanity. It is a deplorable fact, which is to-day obtruding itself upon the attention everywhere, indeed, a fact admitted by all those conversant with the facts, that the average non-church attendants and members represent nearly if not more than eighty per cent. of the entire popula-

tion of the United States. It would be impossible to tell all the various causes which tend to produce this state of things, but it is patent to all that the masses of the people, not excepting much of the class element, have lost a working interest in the Christian church. As much as the church may be condemned for its creed, its bravado, its partial and sectarian work, the estranged classes have in a measure played a dangerous part. They have cut themselves loose from that which has proven to be one of the most powerful factors in society, if not ameliorating and aggressive, at least restraining in its nature. True, there seemed to be no other alternative, for with the many the question was not one of heartless indifference, but one of conscience. The disaffected and the estranged classes grew up not as the representation of a day's revolt. They were the slow gathering aggregation of all who thought that greater results could be attained by going out of rather than by remaining in the church. They were as the fearless Brutus who "set honor in one eye and death in the other" rather than prove false to an ideal or to the highest perception of truth. In this although they were honest and honorable they yet dealt unconsciously a terrible blow at the church, for no institution, organised for the good of mankind can afford to be divorced from and free of the power and usefulness of those who maintain a love for freedom, reason, and truth. All this leads to the assertion that the age has outgrown not only the use of the Bible as a fetish and as an infallible, intellectual guide to conduct, but that it is really neither disposed to put new wine into old bottles, rehabilitate in fashionable and modernised intellectual dress the ghost of the old theology, nor to pervert and distort the creed of Christianity to meet the exigencies of man's present life. To reconstruct Christianity upon a basis of pure reason is to explain Christianity away. It is the folly of modern religious enthusiasts to so distort and differentiate the doctrines of Christianity that they will conform to certain preconceived ideas. Indeed, it is this folly which is accountable for the establishment of creed-anity and denominationalism, which in this century has grown into a spirit most fatal to unity of aim and work among the churches, and which has grown so complex as to cause some to wonder not only as one of the persons in Longfellow's *Hyperion* did—whether Jesus was a Catholic or a Protestant, but whether he was not a Methodist, Presbyterian, Unitarian, or what not. All this medley of beliefs has been devised to please the man with one idea or to help to satisfy the vanity of those who seek after conformity, or who in many respects do not know what they wish. Daniel Webster tells the story that the three most troublesome clients he ever had were a young lady who wanted to be married, a married woman who wanted a divorce,

and an old maid who did not know what she wanted. The fact is that the church is literally besieged with the class who like the old maid really do not know what they want. They neither wish to see unity, diversity, nor conformity in the church. They claim to be willing to be guided by truth and yet they are like the man who said that he was open to conviction but he would like to see the man who could convince him. They are indeed the Judases who are betraying the church to her enemies, they are the ones who while they carry the cross they press the heaviest upon him who bears it. They oppose all aggressive ideas—they condemn all innovations—they declare themselves against all radicalism.

Now the question may be asked, granted that the Bible is literature, and that theology as taught by the church is false to reason and nature, and that Christianity is no longer adapted to the needs of the present generation or future generations, How is Jesus to be disposed of? It is admitted that he is no longer to be regarded as a God. It is remarkable how and what man has thought of him. Kant thought him to be the ideal of human perfection while John Stuart Mill regarded him as a very extraordinary man. Gerald Massey considered him to be a fiction while Renan judged him to be an effeminate idealist. All of these critics seemed to have based their opinion upon the available history of his life and teaching. There is every reason for believing that Jesus will take a place among the reformers of the world and that such of his teaching as accords with reason and meets the needs of mankind will be exalted into evidence of the utility and authority for the practise of morals. That this is really the place he deserves in history is no longer a question of doubt. It is to be regretted that it took nearly 1900 years to strip him of the divinity with which an idolatrous and an affectionate Christendom had generously invested him. When Jesus as "ecce deus" becomes "ecce homo" his character is none the less beautiful and inspiring, his teaching none the less real and severe, his conduct none the less exemplary and exalting. Indeed, he becomes when divested of all supernaturalism a magnificent illustration, either as a real or an ideal character of the incarnation of the principles of spirituality. His work was altogether humanitarian. His teaching was, so far as history goes, a conglomerate of the mythical and mystical notions of the day rationalised by his own knowledge. His doctrines cannot become the measuring line of science as also he as a man cannot become the permanent, the sole and infallible social guide of humanity. As a man all of his conduct and teaching must pass through the continuing refining processes of thought—indeed they must stand the test of what might here be conveniently called the law of permanent

utility, before the human mind can stamp them as infallible truth—before it can say as it says of mathematics, here are either self-evident axioms and propositions which can be demonstrated or proven. Thus is the life of Jesus as that of every other reformer or teacher when reduced to experience to be rejected or utilised for the good of mankind. Thus does Christianity as all the other ethnic religions pass into and become a part of the stream of knowledge which grows apace with the growing mind of man.

Such a position will be objected to first on the ground that it makes Christianity either an illustration of natural religion or morality and thus strips it of its miracle or its supernatural feature, and second that it is an impractical if not a dangerous expedient. The fact is it neither robs Christianity of the miracle nor reduces it to a morality. It challenges the rationality of its claim. When the Christian apologist declares that Christianity is the only revealed religion of God to man because it is contained in the Bible, thus alleging the Bible to be authority unquestioned and affirms that it is a miracle or nothing the critic is forced to ask the reasons for the statement. As wise and comprehensive a scholarship as may be found, including in a list of names many of the ablest men the world has produced, endorses the view that Christian evidences need to be retested before all the data which they give regarding the genuineness and authenticity of the gospels can be accepted as history of the life and teaching of Jesus—and further, that so far as it is able to decide Christianity as a mythus and Christianity as a morality may be the exegetical deductions of parties interested in the vindication of their particular ideas. The question should not be, Can Christianity be so rationalised as to conform to the growing intelligence of mankind? but, Is it what it purports to be or what theologians declare it is, and as such is it of universal and perpetual value to man? Says the critic: If it is not the product of that which is involved in the uniformity of the laws of natural causation and inseparably bound up with the world's life, it must stand forth as inexplicable in consciousness. This position of the rationalist is fastening itself upon the world's thought and life and bids fair to overthrow and revolutionise the Christian church. The controversy is not merely theological but it is scientific and for practical results. Herein arises then the question regarding the impracticability and danger of the expedient. For my own part I believe that the downfall of the Christian church as the advocate of a supernatural religion is not only possible but it is imminent if not now and here at hand. Nor can the fall be prevented any more than the fall of a bird that is suddenly shot through the heart can be prevented. Destroy the vitalising organ of the church—its belief in the Christian myth-

ology—and whatever it may do for humanity along the line of morals (which work, by the way, it has always regarded as only secondary to converting a man to its creed, and giving him a title to an imaginary heaven) and its usefulness and power is at an end. What danger can come to man by casting out of his life a false creed or a pernicious idea of living? What harm or what matters it indeed if, in order to convert the world to an intellectual cult consistent with knowledge and its best life, the attempt will be made to tear down from its throne the god of stone and brass and desolate temples where the voice of truth is hushed and where knowledge is poisoned at the fountain. A writer in *The Open Court* touching upon the need of fostering the new life said that in considering the cost of reform he had not forgotten the fact that civilisation can build itself up again and that we cannot afford to slight and destroy that spiritual germ which is so indispensable to the life of mankind. "It will be worth our while," he declares, "to have our civilisation ruined fifty times over for the sake of planting the new life among the nations." There is little need however of alarm or of looking into a clear and bright sky for a storm. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. The beautiful feature of the present revolution is that it is going on silently and daily and the new life like Venus in the midst of the troubled sea is arising into form and beauty and is coming like an angel to place a better civilisation at our doors.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

IS GOD A MIND?

WE read in the first chapter of Genesis :

"And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.

"So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."

These verses are significant. They have a scientific meaning. To us who define God as that power which has produced man such as he is, that is as the thinking being that aspires to ever higher and nobler ideals, the view that man is created in the image of God becomes self-evident and almost tautological. But primitive thinkers starting from the supposition that man is a likeness of God were led to the strange error that God in his turn must be a likeness of man. Thus arose all the anthropomorphic conceptions of God.

That power which produced man—let us at present call it "nature" so as to avoid the old confusion of anthropomorphism—cannot have been matter and nothing but matter, it cannot have been force or energy and nothing but force, it cannot have been sentiency or the conditions of sentiency, and nothing but poten-

tial sentiency. Nor can it have been form or a formative principle alone. It cannot have been law and order only. It must have been all this together. Matter, force, sentiency, form, law, and order are only aspects of nature, they are only abstract ideas representing some qualities of reality, which alone is the One and All. And this One and All is not a meaningless chaos, as it represents itself in minds that are confounded, but an orderly and living whole bringing forth out of itself sentient beings in whom its existence is mirrored. Existence mirrored in minds is not a mere *Fata Morgana*, a beautiful mirage, but it serves the practical purpose of guidance, to let the children of nature live in accord with its great mother, to show them the way of salvation, the gate that leadeth unto life.

When we speak of nature we think as a rule of certain single phenomena only of this One and All; we think of mountains and trees but not so much of man's mind and his interferences with the rest of nature—for properly considered man's mind is a part of nature. When we speak of reality, we think above all of its actuality, its efficacy, its immediate presence, but when we speak of God, we think of it as an authoritative existence, as our standard of ethics, as the moral law, allegorically represented as our Father, that is, as the power that created us and guides us still, to which we have to conform in our ethical aspirations. Nature, Reality, God, or whatever other expression we may have for the One and All of the great Cosmos in its infinite manifestations and in its eternal being, are all names only, abstract ideas representing now this and now that quality of one and the same existence.

Sentient creatures, the children of God, in so far as they are psychical are called minds. And we ask, What do we understand by minds?

A mind, in brief, is a description of the world in ideas. "Ideas" means literally "images." The different things are represented, and the interaction among these representations is called thinking.

How ideas originate is a question the solution of which can only be hinted at in this connection. Mind can originate only in feeling beings. The feelings of feeling beings are different according to the different sense-impressions through and with which they make their appearance, similar sense-impressions being associated with similar feelings. Thus feelings acquire meaning. The various causes of the different sense-impressions are symbolised in various feelings as well as in the memory pictures of these various feelings. Ideas again are symbols representing whole groups of such feelings as are somehow constantly associated. And the glorious evolution of the realm of ideas in living beings is easily explained if we consider its usefulness as a means of information concerning the surrounding world. They afford the possibility of orientation and

serve as a guidance for action. With the assistance of representative images plans of action become possible, and a conception of a better arrangement of this or that state of things—generally called an ideal—is of the highest importance to the further development of life and mind. A growth of mind leads to an increase of power. Each acquirement of truth means an expanse of the dominion of mind in nature.

Minds naturally grow by degrees; they start with simple feelings in irritable substance, and in the long run of millenniums through a preservation of soul-structures (generally called hereditary transmission) and, in the higher grades of life, through a direct transference of mind by means of education they gather a rich store of soul-structures, of pictures representing innumerable objects as well as the subtle relations among these objects.

Let us now ask whether God can be a mind. Our answer is decidedly negative. Every mind is a world of representations, of pictures, of ideas; and these ideas, pictures, and representations have a meaning. If they are true they represent realities. Now if there is a God, and we say that there is, God is not ideality but reality; he is not a mental representation of the actual world, of nature, of the Universe, of the Cosmos; he is much more than a mere representation, he is the actual world, nature, the Universe, the Cosmos itself. He is the One and All, not a part of it, or a mere picture of it. God is also the picture, and he is that quality of the world which makes the picturing in minds possible. God is in the mind, he reveals himself in the human soul; he appears in Truth. But God is not only the truth; he is infinitely more than the truth, he is the reality represented in the truth.

Truth is truth because it is an image shaped unto the likeness of the original. The human mind is created as an image of God. Now the theologian comes and says, Man is like God, man is mind—i. e., a world of images or ideas—therefore God must be a mind. Is this not like saying, This is a picture of George Washington, it is like George Washington. Therefore George Washington is a picture! No! George Washington is more than a picture; he is the original of the picture!

It is often said that man is a finite mind and God is an infinite mind. But what has either infinitude or finiteness to do with mind? Mind, every mind, is infinite in its possibilities, there is no limit to its growth, there is no boundary which it cannot reach and transcend. But at any special state, as at present or at any moment in the future, mind is and always will be something definite. Consider that all mental representations are possible only through limitation. Thus vision is possible only through focusing the eyes upon

one spot. Comprehension in mental pictures, is a focusing of the mind's attention upon one thing or one feature of things. Accordingly minds in this sense are always finite, always limited. Every mind is always the mind of a concrete being and the contents of every mind are also of a concrete kind. Think of infinite pictures, or infinite ideas! What a meaningless combination of words! If God, the One and All, is infinite indeed, he certainly cannot be a mind.

We might and some people indeed do understand by mind the nature of mind, mentality. The nature of mind may be found in sentiency or in that quality of nature which produces sentiency—we call it potential sentiency. Or it may be found in the order prevailing among the mental representations, which order is representative of the objective world-order, of the cosmic law and the rationality of the universe as represented in cosmic laws. Very well. If "mind" means the nature of mind, then certainly God is mind, but he is not *a* mind.

If God were a mind, it were necessary for him to have ideas. Otherwise his mind would represent without representations and symbolise without symbols. He would have to think his ideas consecutively as we do and form different associations at a time. Yet, what would mental representations avail him? He need not think, he need not speak to himself in order to make up his mind to act in this or that way. He simply acts. He in his all-sufficiency is always himself and thus he is consistent with himself.

In the catechism this truth is mythologically expressed in the idea of omniscience. Nature, as it were, obeys the law everywhere. The falling stone falls as if it knew the law of gravitation and had correctly computed the present case. Nature need not know the law in order to obey it. She need not employ the symbols of mental representation to remain consistent with herself. She is herself everywhere, and the laws of nature are a part and feature of nature. We say, Nature is as it were omniscient. Actually nature is more than omniscient. As omniscient, she might communicate information about all things of herself to herself. This communication, however, is so direct, she being herself everywhere, that its means, i. e. the symbols, which are the crutches of communication, disappear into zero. The communication is received before it is pronounced.

That God should be the One and All, and at the same time a mind, would be something like saying, that a man in order to be a man and himself, should always have his passport or his picture in his pocket. No! If we speak of the man, we mean the man and not his picture. If we speak of God, we mean the All-Being and not a mind, we mean the original and not the copy, we mean the creator and not the creature.

Is it Atheism to deny that God is a mind? If you understand by God that he is a person like ourselves, it certainly is Atheism. But if the conception of God as a mind and a person were the only allowable God-idea, then theism would be paganism. What is paganism but the personification of parts of nature or nature as a whole and the acting accordingly. Pagans try to bend the course of nature and natural laws not by their own efforts and honest work, but by prayers and sacrifices—as if God or the Gods were human beings like ourselves influenced by flatteries and bribable by gifts! Christ has done away with the vain repetitions as do the heathens, but the Christians still cling to Pagan customs, pagan rites and a pagan conception of God.

People who have given little thought to the subject might think, that if God is not a mind, it is as good as if he did not exist. Then he would only be brute force and crude matter. But this is a mistaken conception of God. The materialist runs to the other extreme. God is not mere force and God is not crude matter. How grand and divine this wonderful All-Being is, can only be learned from its manifestations. The heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Yet grander than all the starry heavens in their glorious concert is the soul of man, the mind that yearns for truth, the spirit that understands, and aspires to achieve, the work of truth.

The All, the Cosmos, God, or by whatever name we may call the great whole of which we are parts and phenomena, is not a heap of material atoms nor a chaos of blind forces. The most characteristic feature of his being is order and law. And this order and law is called in the New Testament Logos—i. e. rationality, reason, logical consistency. God would be no God without the logos. This Logos is a constitutional part of God. God is not a mind, but he is mind, he is logos, and he appears in mind. God is not truth, but he appears in truth. This is the revelation which Christianity has brought into the world.

Says St. John: "In the beginning, [that means from eternity] was the Logos and the Logos was with God and the Logos was God. All things were made by him and without him was not anything made that was made. . . . And the Logos was made flesh."

This last sentence is the kernel of Christianity. The divinity of the world appears in humanity, and and true humanity embodies all that which we call divine. The son of man is the child of God and the ideal of humanity is the God-man. God is not a mind, but nevertheless God is mind, and when we come to ask, where is the Father, Christ answers very positively and unmistakably 'I and the Father are one.'

Those who believe in God as being a mind are more pagan than they are aware of. It may be said that God is mind, but not a mind. Suppose he were a mind, is that not actually polytheism only with the number of Gods reduced to the singular? Christ does not say, God is a spirit, but "God is spirit." Yet the pagan conception of God has been so influential that the translator has inserted that little word which changes a most radical, a philosophical and a monistic idea into the very same superstitions against which Christ had protested so vigorously.

Science is not dangerous to religion, and clear thought is not against the teachings of Christ. Science is dangerous to superstitions and clear thought is incompatible with many dogmas and conceptions which are upheld at present by the Christian churches. The dogmatist rightly shuns the light of science, but the religious man, that is, he who wants truth unadulterated and is ready to conform to truth, to live it and to act according to his best knowledge of truth, he will not lose his religion but purify it through thought and scientific exactness of thought.

Says Lord Bacon:

"A little philosophy inclineth Man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."

Bacon's view of God is not clear and thus this famous saying of his also lacks lucidity. We understand it and quote it in the sense, that a little philosophy is sufficient to make apparent the contradictions and absurdities contained in the traditional idea of God. But a deeper insight will reveal the profound truth that is contained therein. Depth in philosophy will help us to purify the fundamental conceptions of religious thought, above all the idea of God. When we maintain that God is not a mind, we do not deny that he is mind, taking mind in the sense of the Greek "logos"; and at any rate he is greater than the greatest human or other mind can be, for he is the reality itself of which a mind is only an image, a symbol, and a representation.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HAS a man a right to make a discord in music and thus give pain to persons of rhythmical nerves and classic taste? May the owner of a fiddle provoke it in the hearing of others? I admit that if I ask him for a tune, I am bound in courtesy to listen to his torture of the strings, and even to say falsely that the torture pleases me; but suppose he thrust his notes upon me, or suppose I buy them, may I not insist that they be true, and have I not a right to complain if they be false and counterfeit? And one question more, if a man may not break "the concord of sweet sounds" in music, has he a right to make discords in rhetoric? I maintain that these offenses are very much alike. I grant you there are people of coarse fibre to whom the question is of no concern, but there are also men and women whose nerves are finely strung in sympathy with all the tunes and cadences of pure and classic language. They are as loyal to their native tongue as to their na-

tive land. To them the limpid flow of our literature from Chaucer to Longfellow is an eloquent melody, whose notes may not be rudely jarred, nor its symphonies destroyed. To them false grammar is like any other falsehood, the sign of an uncultivated soul. To them a barbarism in verse or prose is barbarism in conduct. A solecism in speech gives them actual pain, so finely are their sensibilities attuned to all the harmonies of words. They like words too that are honest and void of all duplicity. Rocked in a cradle, and not in a "layette," they want to be buried not in a "casket" but in a coffin. They do not say, "My heart is in the casket there with Cæsar"; nor "Stand back my lord, and let the casket pass." This plaintive overture was caused by a grievance which I will now bring into court for judgment.

I have the honor to belong to a military society, and an invitation from the commander to assist in unveiling the Grant statue offers this inducement, "In addition to the Nation's Chief Executive, other dignitaries of rank will be present and participate in the ceremonies of the day." This is well meant, but what I object to is the insipid attenuation "Chief Executive," by which the President of the United States is habitually diluted in his own country. We might as well call him the Chief Adjective. There is something masculine, dignified, and personal, in the high sounding civic title "President of the United States," while there is a tin-whistle squeak in the explanatory, abstract, and impersonal subterfuge, "Chief Executive"; which, by the way, is an official name not known to the American constitution. Substitute for the inferior sentence this, "in addition to the President of the United States, other dignitaries of rank will be present," and how strong and stately it looks and sounds in comparison with its former equivocal and meagre form. I have just read that in a recent hunting expedition "The Chief Executive shot thirty-two ducks." In speaking of the President why should we conceal his official title behind pedantic jargon only half descriptive of his prerogative and duties? That executive power is vested in the President is merely one quality of his office. He has also the pardoning power, the veto power, the treaty making power, the appointing power, and he is also Commander in chief of the army and the navy. All his official prerogatives and duties, and also his personal rank are expressed in the title "President of the United States." In the illegitimate phrase "Chief Executive" there is hardly any meaning at all. "Commander in chief of the army" would have been more fitting for a military occasion than "Chief Executive," but "President of the United States" is best of all, because it is the most respectful and the most comprehensive; it needs no explanation, and besides, it is the title conferred upon the chief magistrate by the constitution.

I have received through the office of *The Open Court*, a letter from Mr. F. de Gissac, enclosing a newspaper article headed, "How Europe Beats Us," wherein it is asserted that European labor is more skilful and intelligent than American labor, and that the superiority "is the result of careful training in technical schools where the art of designing and finishing are taught by the best authorities." Mr. de Gissac does me the honor to submit this article to me, "as evidencing the necessity for a National provision for the artistic education and refinement of the people." The evidence he refers to is taken from the school statistics of Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland, where technical schools are provided for giving "a scientific and artistic knowledge corresponding to the profession of those who frequent them." It appears that Belgium has founded thirty-six industrial schools; Holland thirty-two industrial, and twenty-five professional schools; Switzerland eighty-seven schools giving to apprentices and workmen professional instruction; and that's "how Europe beats us." The premises do not sustain the conclusion,

nor can it be allowed that the mechanics of Europe as a class excel the Americans in skill, intelligence, and scientific and artistic knowledge. No doubt that in some special branches of the mechanic arts the Frenchman is more skilful than the American, as the German is in other branches, the Italian in others, and even the Turk in some; but taking all the industrial occupations together, the Americans cannot be excelled by any other people in artistic design and finish, nor in quickness of hand and eye. Therefore, before proceeding to show the reason why a fish thrown into a pail of water adds nothing to the weight of the pail and its contents, we had better find out whether the assertion itself is true. It is very likely true that in the matter of industrial schools, the European nations are ahead of us, and that it will take us a long time to catch up to them, because our national conceit is so continental and so vast, as becomes a people with such a large country, that we do not like to put ourselves under obligations to foreigners for any instruction or examples; like some Englishmen I was once with in a shipwreck, who preferred to go down with the ship rather than be saved in a lifeboat commanded by the second mate, because he was a dutchman from Rotterdam.

It is due largely to our jealousy of Government that we have no National or State schools of art and industry. The dividing line between "Public" and "Private" has not yet been drawn across the field of education. The limit of State power is in dispute. A strong sentiment prevails that the state has no right to raise lawyers, doctors, painters, and sculptors, any more than it has to raise melons and cabbages; and few of our statesmen are brave enough to vote for public schools of instruction in the mechanic arts while "organised labor" denies to boys the freedom to learn a trade. In France, the principle of State socialism has been adopted into the theory of education, and it has been carried courageously, if not wisely, into practice, even to the extent of teaching trades; and further than that, even to the extent of giving free dinners and decent clothes to the poorer children who otherwise might not be able to go to school. It is worthy of note that the free dinner question is being agitated in England, and candidates for parliament find themselves embarrassed, when called upon to declare themselves either for free dinners or against them. So, in the development of the fine arts, the French government is extremely liberal, and France has paid a great deal of money for the encouragement of painting, sculpture, music, and the drama. After all, it is not by any means proved that the esthetic taste of the French people is due to the patronage given to the fine arts by the government. Probably much of it is due to the influence of natural scenery on the character of a people; a spiritual influence, hereditary from generation to generation for a thousand years; to the picturesque and poetic scenery, exuberant in the sun; or as Macaulay has it, to "thy corn fields green and sunny vines, Oh, pleasant land of France."

In the Reports from the Consuls of the United States, for the month of July, 1891, is one from Francis B. Loomis, consul at St. Etienne, France, on the subject of "National aid to art." From this it appears that M. Fedière, attached to the Luxembourg museum, was recently sent by the French Minister of Public Instruction to make a careful study of the question of Government aid to art in Great Britain. In his report M. Fedière says, "The French system, established immediately after the revolution, possesses a homogeneity and freedom vainly sought for in England, where the fine arts are subjected to the restrictions of certain traditions, some of which are obsolete, being indeed of mediæval origin. Furthermore, whereas in France the State claims all the institutions, the English government abandons willingly everything that might be left to private enterprise. Consequently, there exists in England no minister of the fine arts, nor a minister of pub

lic instruction properly so-called." This explanation will apply to the United States, as well as to Great Britain. The development of the fine arts is left to private enterprise. This is not entirely true in either country, but it is true enough to be asserted as a rule. And whether art flourishes more under public patronage than under private enterprise, is yet an open question. Further, speaking of the attitude of Great Britain towards a school of the fine arts, M. Fedièrre says, "The State, except in the case of primary artistic education, leaves to private initiative the care of forming painters, sculptors and musicians, and the only school is that of the Royal Academy, which is a private society. . . . England gives facility to the art student to acquire the first notions of the subject, multiplies the models in the museums destined to form his tastes, but proceeds no further. The artist is obliged to shift for himself without the hope of receiving any decoration or pecuniary encouragement, which is the reverse of the system which obtains in France." It may be painfully strained sometimes, but after all, the "shift for himself" policy lies at the foundation of England's greatness, and that of her colonies in America. It also stimulates the sentiment of liberty. M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MATERIALISM VERSUS SPIRITUALISM.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

KINDLY permit me, when convenient to supplement my letter of 6th August on Prof. Max Müller's philological interpretation of physiological results, by the following very brief minute. My position is nothing else—call it Hylo-zoism or Hylo-idealism as you choose—than the present established standpoint of physical and moral science; militating as it does, against any possible *eirenicon* between Science—of which Philosophy is only a form, viz. the Science of general principles—and Religion as utterly impossible. If I may be allowed to say so in a journal devoted to their "Conciliation," Religion is based on Animism, on the synergy of Matter and "Spirit" a quite unthinkable supposition, for how can two such Incompatibles interact and synergise? Science, true knowledge, including Philosophy, or *Weltweisheit*, on Hyllism or Materialism, of which the somatic brain is the workshop and instrument (*Werkzeug*), and hence centre, radius, and periphery, alike of self and not self, but of that ring fence mortal thought is quite impotent to escape. All empiric science is a mere case of experimentalising on states of *our own* Consciousness, a fact which quite excludes aught but Anthro-po-, and in the last analysis, *Auto-morphism* from the field of human vision, unifying thus percept and concept, an idea so repugnant to Lord Bacon, who ridiculed men for spinning, like spiders, webs out of their own entrails, a procedure which is to them a case of Hobson's choice. And, though Bacon was not of their tribe, all special scientists, as such, and just because they are specialists, follow his lead, it being with them a necessity to postulate two factors in Life and Mind, a thing perceived and a percipient perceiver. This dualism has been "justified" by the analogy of a musical instrument and musician. But on reflection this correspondence is realised as quite a fallacy, the human organism (I take no notice of the mere sentient animal or brute) resembling an *automatic* instrument, like a musical snuff box, which acts, when wound up, by virtue of its own indwelling properties or constitution. So that human thought and objects of thought are identical, and necessarily a mere *Autopsy* or *Self-inspection*. Out of the region of the Ego, defining it as the sum total, or *ensemble*, of the organic functions into that of the Non-Ego, human wits never can pass. *Unser Latein* (as the German proverb, equivalent to being at our wit's end has it) *ist da zu Ende*. And what rational being will care to set rationalism at defiance by groping, like a blind Polyphemus, among objects, which in the nature of things, i. e. of himself, are quite alien and taboo as

supra nos and therefore on which Reason sets her interdict. Alienism, concrete and practical or abstract—synonymous in modern medicine alike with Lunar—is thus quite an illusion, all being Subject, Self-Objectivism being thus only the projection of the all-containing Ego into a seemingly separate state of the Non-Ego. So that though Acosmism does not follow, but the reverse, the Macrocosm is immersed in the Microcosm, which latter, so far as we ever can be judges, is, what God has been taken to be, Creator and Creation, Demiurge and Demiurgy combined, a state of matters, utterly, and for ever fatal, to all Dualism whatsoever. Strict Egoistic Monism is thus the sole charter of our being. We gain *immensely* and lose nothing, by this change of front. Absolute immortality becomes, of course, a mere *Hirngespinnst*, in the vulgar sense, all "things" being, in the esoteric one, such. But as we have, in every pulse-beat this sense of eternity and immortality, we may still claim for ourselves the virtual reality of æonial existence, while in our present bodies and world. We never can be "launched into eternity," as we never are elsewhere. Every true abstract thinker has this habitual sense of endlessness at *all* times and seasons. The vulgar realist and *bête humaine* has it in epochs of pain and anguish, suspense and anxious fear. As Byron well puts it in his "Island," describing the tragedy of the mutiny of the Bounty. Speaking of the crucial crisis in the doom of the mutineers that great revolutionary poet writes: "Moments like to these rend men's lives into immortalities" (eternities). So that we are immortal and eternal, I repeat, even while alive, and indeed only while alive. God, therefore, as "Spirit" drops, as the dying Valentine says to Gretchen in Faust, *Aus dem Spiel*. He, if he be a He, is left entirely out of the human comedy altogether. He is a superfluity and therefore a paralogism if our Titan-Self is his surrogate and substitute. So that we may rest secure in the belief that the Brain of man, and ultimately of the Self, is all that Deity now replaced by Egoity has been provisionally credited with being. We need him not, if *autochthones*. For, if so, originally Life springs from Not-Life. We are therefore quite in our proper place in this world ever in a state of Becoming. It bore us. Organic and Inorganic are identical. No doubt "Nature" is *nevercal* as well as maternal. But "her" cruelty and torture chambers are to be conquered in no other way than by *Self-exertion*. As indicated in the fable of Hercules and the Wagoner. R. LEWINS, M. D.

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A CRUMBLING CORNER-STONE.

BY CHARLES K. WHIPPLE.

THE assumption that Jesus of Nazareth was and is the Christ is the corner-stone of Christianity; and the buttress of this corner-stone is the claim that, after dying on the cross, Jesus returned to bodily life by the exercise of his own will and power. Are these assumptions firm enough to support the superstructure raised upon them? Or do they themselves fail to be supported by either facts or probabilities?

Up to the time when Jesus began his ministry, the meaning, and the only meaning, of the epithet Christ or Messiah was a personage not already existing, but expected some time to appear in Palestine, there to accomplish certain things predicted by Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, namely:

Deliverance of the children of Israel from Roman and all other oppressors; the assembling of all of that race in the land of Palestine, and the permanent establishment of them there in peace and prosperity, under the rule of a descendant of their famous king David. This, I repeat, was the real meaning, and the only recognised meaning of the word "Christ" when it was asked respecting John and Jesus—Is not this the Christ?

Not only have these minutely specified and oft repeated predictions of three of the chief Hebrew prophets never been fulfilled, not only has no such Messiah ever appeared, but the history of the Jews since that time has reversed every one of the specific predictions in question. Far from having been delivered from oppression, the Jews have never ceased to be oppressed, even to the present day. Instead of having been collected in Palestine, they have ceased to be a nation, and have been scattered more widely than ever among all nations. Instead of having a ruler of their own, of Davidic stock or other, they are vassals of other rulers all over the world.

Since the Jewish people remain thus scattered and oppressed, it is plain that no such Davidic ruler and deliverer has appeared, and plain therefore that Jesus of Nazareth was not that personage. If the title Christ or Messiah, bearing a new signification, and in utter disregard of its original and appropriate meaning, has been fastened upon him, those who thus pervert it must justify themselves as they can; but it is certain

that the prophecies in question remain unfulfilled, and that the claims of Christians in regard to accomplished Messianic prophecies are false, misleading, and utterly without foundation as far as the three great prophets above mentioned are concerned. Jesus can be claimed as the Christ of their predictions only by disregarding and reversing their manifest meaning, and the understanding of them current in the time of Jesus himself.

The claim which may truly be made in regard to Jesus is that his teaching not only made needed modifications in the doctrines of the Jewish faith, not only excelled that system by emphasising that spiritual part of it which had been neglected and undervalued by the official teachers of Israel, but that it formulated such great religious truths, and gave such an eminent example of practical adherence to them, that the nations called civilised have felt constrained to profess allegiance to him, and to accept as the true religion that which claims him as its leader and ruler. It is plain, moreover, that the spiritual truths declared by Jesus have given us a far higher and juster idea of God, and have accomplished a vastly greater welfare for human beings than the fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies would have done.

The religious system now recognised as Christianity, (founded on the claim set forth in Paul's epistles that Jesus was really the Christ,) and the creeds and customs of the Christian churches of the present day, show material differences from the body of religious truth taught by Jesus. The dogmas on which those creeds and customs are founded are merely such "traditions of the elders" as Jesus stigmatised in the system conducted by the scribes and Pharisees of his time. And when, in our own day, Tolstoi claims that those who pretend to be "followers" of Jesus ought to live as he lived and obey in their daily lives the most characteristic of his precepts, it is pre-eminently the Christians who denounce and oppose him.

One special feature of all the Christian churches is that they follow Paul in making more account of the death of Jesus than of his life or his teaching. It is true that they praise his teaching, even while they notoriously fail to follow it; and that they call him Lord and Master, while their daily lives disregard both his precepts and his example. But that upon which they lay most stress in propagandism is the doc-

trine that Jesus died on the cross as an atonement for their sins, and that occurrences so wonderful and so unexampled as his spontaneous resumption of life and appearance in the body to his disciples amounts to proof of such divinity that it entitles him to be received by all mankind as Lord and Master.

The question now arising is—Did the wonderful and unexampled occurrence so claimed really occur? Did Jesus really die on the cross, or was this statement as void of foundation as the claim that he accomplished the work assigned to the Messiah by the Hebrew prophets?

The best statement of evidence in regard to this subject I have ever seen has been furnished by a French author, who prefaces his investigation by the question—How came Mary Magdalene to think, when Jesus spoke to her, that he was the gardener? The true answer obviously is that he was dressed in the gardener's clothes. His own clothes, the Evangelists tell us, were divided among the Roman soldiers, and his body, supposed to be dead, was wrapped in a linen cloth by Joseph of Arimathea, in whose tomb it was to be placed, with the assistance, as John's gospel tells us, of Nicodemus, who brought spices to embalm him. The question now is—How came the living body of Jesus, which Mary Magdalene saw after the crucifixion, to have the gardener's clothes on?

The narratives of the Evangelists leave no doubt that Joseph and Nicodemus applied themselves Friday afternoon to the work of embalming the body, which could not be lawfully done on Saturday, the Sabbath. If, under their hands, in the process of washing and anointing, the supposed corpse revived, showing that it was in a swoon, and not dead, when it was taken from the cross, what could they do with the awakened Jesus? The first thing to be done was to clothe him; and the readiest means for that purpose were the clothes of Joseph's gardener, in whose house, adjoining, he would probably be placed for shelter, concealment, rest, and food. How otherwise can we account for the statement in John's Gospel that Mary Magdalene, looking upon her intimate friend Jesus, and after hearing his voice, supposed him to be the gardener?

Those who accept the theory current among Christians that the death on the cross was real, and the revivification miraculous, are wont to lay great stress on the closing and sealing of the sepulchre by request of the chief priests and by the order of Pilate. But in Matthew's Gospel we find that even the request for this sealing was not made until some time on Saturday, the Sabbath. From the entombment on Friday afternoon then to the execution of Pilate's order for sealing the sepulchre some time on Saturday, Joseph and Nicodemus were free to make such arrangements as were needful for the awakened Jesus, to clothe,

shelter, warm, and nourish him, and to conceal him both from priestly enemies and from Roman soldiers.

It is commonly assumed also that the spear-wound in the side gives absolute assurance that Jesus was already dead; whereas, on the contrary, the flowing blood gave proof that, though insensible, he was still alive. A dead body does not bleed when wounded.

Of the precise time when Jesus recovered consciousness of course no one knew but Joseph and Nicodemus; and equally of course there was every reason why they should keep silence respecting it until Jesus had decided in regard to his own course. He was probably at rest in the gardener's hut on the estate of Joseph of Arimathea in which was the sepulchre, while his enemies supposed themselves to be securing the prison of his dead body. But when, very early on Sunday morning, Mary Magdalene came to finish the work of embalment, Jesus felt sufficiently restored to accost her, and to send brief information of his survival to the other disciples. His next appearance to any of them seems to have been on the road to Emmaus, when, weary with the long walk, and hungry, he supped with two of them who, like Mary Magdalene, failed at first to recognise him in the gardener's clothes. Afterwards it is related that he made his way to a place where the eleven apostles were assembled, and there again asked for food. A third occasion of his meeting some of them was on the shore of the sea of Tiberias, where he ate with them of the fish which they had caught.

Thus it appears that, at every interview of the revived Jesus with his disciples, he took food with them. This was first, no doubt, because travelling on foot in an enfeebled state, he was necessarily hungry; and then because it was really needful to dissipate their superstitious fears by showing that he was not a ghost, but a mortal needing food and drink like themselves.

Had Jesus really possessed the deific character ascribed to him by the popular Christian traditions he might have openly appeared, confounding both Jews and Romans by the obvious exercise of supernatural power, and causing his disciples to triumph in sight of their opponents. But he evidently avoided those opponents, held himself apart from the general population, both friends and enemies, and held only short and rare interviews even with those who had been most intimate with him.

To sum up, the theory of the anonymous Frenchman above sketched has the advantage of accounting better than any other, for several statements in the Gospel narratives, namely:—it explains the strangeness, at which Pilate himself wondered, of apparent death so soon succeeding crucifixion; it shows that the spear-wound after apparent death did not prove

the death actual, while, on the contrary, the effusion of blood proved the continuance of life ; it shows the worthlessness, as evidence, of that sealing of the sepulchre which was done only after the resuscitated Jesus had left it ; it explains, without miracle, the absence of a dead body from the tomb on Sunday morning ; it explains why Mary, and afterwards Cleopas and his companion, and still later some of the eleven apostles, did not recognise the resuscitated Jesus when they saw him ; it explains why, after his revival, Jesus held himself aloof not only from the chief priests, scribes, and pharisees, but also from that populace of Jerusalem who had so lately shouted hosannas before him, hailing him as the son of David, because they expected him to assume the throne and the regal authority of David ; it explains that reality of his bodily presence of which he felt obliged repeatedly to offer proof to Thomas and others ; and it explains that hunger, the relief of which is three times recorded after his supposed death.

As to a final disappearance of Jesus by the ascent of his body of flesh, blood and bone into the air in sight of his disciples, our French writer notices that this ascension is reported only by Mark and Luke, who were not there, having become converted to Christianity only years after. John and Matthew, who might have testified as eye-witnesses if the occasion had really taken place, do not mention it. And he adds, The writers of the Gospels have told us what they really believed about these things ; but their narrative itself demonstrates that they believed without either serious examination or scientific proof. They judged by appearances, in an age which was accustomed to believe strange things miraculous.

Since the credible accounts of the appearance of Jesus after his crucifixion represent those events as few, and as soon finished, it is probable that his actual death soon followed. How and when this took place was probably known to Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus ; but since they did not reveal it, this information is hopelessly lost. Why, indeed, should they reveal it ? Disappointed in their expectation of a Messiah, knowing the rumor of a resurrection to be erroneous, and liable to reproach and punishment if their concealment of the life of Jesus after his entombment should become known, it was both natural and probable that they should keep silence.

The official defenders and eulogists of Christianity, assuming the reality of a fulfilment by Jesus of the predictions of Hebrew prophecy, of his death on the cross and his resurrection afterwards, confidently claim that religion to be divinely authorised, and thus assured of steady increase, permanence, and ultimate universality. Its present prosperity seems assured by the number, zeal and assiduity of its officials engaged

in the work of propagandism. The statistics given in their publications, unless carefully scrutinised, give an impression of enlargement and prosperity ; but sundry existing facts throw grave doubts upon the ultimate success of their efforts.

If, as above suggested, there be no basis of fact for the claims, either of a fulfilment of the Messianic function by Jesus, or of his death on the cross, or of a return of his body from death to life, a system which rests on these unfounded assumptions as its cornerstone can neither rationally claim divine origin nor expect ultimate success. The time is past, never to return, when either State or Church could prevent free inquiry on all subjects, and free criticism by the voice and the press. The thorough examination of church creeds and church customs now taking place everywhere must necessarily cause their revision, abridgment and simplification, and tend to bring them more and more into harmony with truth and fact. And the prospect seems to be that a gradual decay of Christianity (the assemblage of doctrines which have clustered around the Christ-theory) will leave a better field for the influence of those two great truths, the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man, in which the great Teacher Jesus summed up his doctrine.

The statistics of religion and theology, of late more accurately collected and recorded than ever before, give small encouragement to those who claim prosperity and predominance for the system founded on recognition of Jesus as the Christ.

Of the 1200 millions of the world's population, 390 millions are nominally Christian. Less than one-third of them, perhaps 110 millions, are Protestants, and these Protestants declare the Christianity of the others to be seriously defective, both in regard to faith and practice. The Protestants in the United States number 30 millions, but of these only 9 millions are church-members or communicants, that is, Christian in the meaning assumed to be the correct one by the clergy and the churches. But since these 9 millions of actual Christians are divided among forty-five sects, which seem to insist more on their distinctive and divisive peculiarities than either on the beliefs which they hold in common or the purpose they pursue in common, they surely cannot have the efficiency of an army under a single leader. Their character as churches militant is shown rather by their contests with each other than by united warfare against the vice and ignorance everywhere around them. Holding very diverse and often opposite opinions, they all refer to the Bible as their rule, and as the only and sufficient rule of life and duty. And yet this assumed allegiance to the Bible, far from tending to unite the five varieties of Presbyterians, eight of Baptists and twelve of Methodists, actually helps to keep them

separated. Investigation and criticism, though opposed by a majority of the clergy, are constantly tending towards still further division. Thus, contact with American ideas has caused division even among Roman Catholics; and the Episcopal church, ranked as one among the forty-five above-mentioned, has its practical division into High, Broad, Low and Reformed.

Critical investigation, as I have said, is now pursued in all civilised countries more persistently than ever. Nevertheless, so far has clerical teaching effected a popular distrust of reason in reference to religion, that an immense majority of the church-members in this country still hold firmly to beliefs which research, scientific and literary, has thoroughly disproved; such, for instance, as the unitary character and divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments.

If the foundation fails, what will become of the edifice? If the corner-stone crumbles, what will avail the claim that the building was founded on a rock?

THE CORNER-STONE OF CHRISTIANITY.

MR. CHARLES K. WHIPPLE'S article "A Crumbling Corner-Stone" suggests the questions: What is the corner-stone of Christianity? What in general are the corner-stones of such religious institutions as is the Church? and also, What is the corner-stone of Religion?

Life is development and history brings changes. What was Christianity at the beginning, when the first congregation of Christians was founded at Jerusalem? What did Christianity become under the influence of the Apostle St. Paul? What did it become in Alexandria, in Constantinople, and what in Rome? What did it become among the Franconians, what among the Saxons in Great Britain, what among the Saxons in Germany? How does the Christianity of the Nicene Council differ from that of Pope Gregory the Great, and how does Pope Gregory's Christianity differ from Luther's? And in fine what resemblance to these many conceptions has the Christianity of a modern savant who has imbibed all the knowledge of the nineteenth century without being willing to give up the spiritual treasure of the Christian tradition which has become holy to him?

Christianity in all these phases is sometimes as different as black and white. And if we ask the different representatives of all these many conceptions "What really is the salient feature of Christianity?" they will make and they did make most prominent their special vagaries. Original Christianity was communism and when Ananias and his wife Sapphira kept secretly back a part of the money which they had received for the sale of a possession of theirs, they were declared to have committed the greatest sin imaginable—to have

tempted the spirit of the Lord; and their sudden death was considered as sufficient proof that God had condemned them. The report in the Acts (chap. v) is too mythical to derive any conclusions from it; yet if there is some fact in the account, it might have been a similar event as happened in the case of Arius, who taught that Jesus had been a most perfect man and that therefore he deserved divine honors. He was not equal to God, but like God, i. e. similar to him, not *ὁμοούσιος* but *ὁμοιούσιος*. Arius suffered from a fatal disease and it happened that he died suddenly as soon as he had recanted his so-called errors. Had he died as suddenly before recanting what a strong argument would it have been for the imputation that he committed the sin against the Holy Ghost.

David Friedrich Strauss devoted a chapter of one of his books to the question "Are we Christians still?" and taking Christians to mean those who believe that Jesus was Christ, he answered the question in the negative. I observe however that there are many Christians who continue to call themselves Christians without believing that Jesus was Christ. Whether Jesus was Christ is a mere historical question. And should the affirmative of it really be the only possible corner-stone for such a great institution as is the church? Have those who have ceased to believe in Jesus as being Christ lost the right to call themselves Christians? The disciples of Jesus believed that he was the Messiah to rescue the Jews from the Roman yoke. Later Christians ceased to believe in a worldly Messiah and yet they called themselves Christians. Should not the Christians of to-day have a right to purify their idea as to the meaning of the title Christ? Do they cease to be Christians because they surrender the mythological views of Christianity and try to reconcile their religion with scientific truth? According to the opinions of the dogmatic believer there can be no doubt that Christians who have ceased to believe in the Christ of orthodox Christianity have lost the right to the name Christian. But is the dogmatic believer an impartial and a competent judge? How do matters stand with himself? Does he believe in the original Christ or Messiah? No, that idea has been surrendered for ever. Has the Roman Catholic the right to call himself a Christian when we consider how little of the spirit of Christ is preserved in that church and how many heathenish customs, traditions, beliefs, rituals have crept in? Has the Presbyterian a greater right to that name? Were the rigidity, the narrow-mindedness, the lack of charity, the eagerness to have as many people damned as possible, traits of the figure of Jesus, the Christ of the Gospel? It seems to me that the most rabid infidel who calls our church authorities, the present pharisees and scribes, hypocrites and a generation of vipers has the same right to

the title "Christian" as any one of the faithful. For he also resembles Christ in one point; he resembles Christ in the boldness of denunciations, and according to Josephus's account the Jewish pharisees, the saducees, and the scribes were serious, honest, aspiring men, some of them having great virtues, some of them erring yet striving after the truth. We have no reason to believe that they were vicious; and upon the whole they were no worse than are our clergy to-day.

Who has a right to call himself a Christian? I might just as well ask, who has a right to call himself this or that? Who has a right to call himself a Knight? There are lodges of the Knights of Pythias, of the Knights of Honor, and of the Knights of Labor. Have they a right to the title Knight? Is not a knight a man in an iron armor sitting on horseback or lying somewhere in ambush? What is a title, what is a name? All depends upon what we mean by it. If people mean by "Christian," that their religious views, whatever they are now, developed historically from that great mythical figure called Christ, they have a right to do so. One of the ancestors of Mr. Smith was most likely a real smith. Has Mr. Smith of to-day lost the right to his name because he no longer is a smith. Has an Athenian only a right to call himself an Athenian so long as he believes in a personal goddess Athene as the protector of his city?

I do not say that we should continue to call ourselves Christians although we have ceased to believe in the various details of Christian mythology, but I do say that those who actually continue to call themselves Christians, as do for instance the Unitarians, have a right to do so, as much and perhaps more than the most orthodox believers.

The question of the historical origin of the gospels is a very complex and difficult problem. The literature on the subject is immense. It is a most fascinating and interesting problem, but it has not much more practical value than the investigation of Greek or Hindoo mythology. Christianity as an institution does not depend on the results of such investigation. The corner-stone of Christianity is not whether Jesus was Christ—Christ in the mythological sense of the word—or whether Jesus was at all an historical person; or whether Jesus did really revive after the crucifixion. The corner-stone of Christianity, as of any religious institution, is the need of Christian ethics in humanity. The question is, Are the ethics of Christianity sound and is humanity in want of such ethics? Is the Christian conception of life desirable?

The rationalistic interpretation of the gospel accounts have been as much abandoned as the rationalistic explanations of Greek or Roman mythology. We are told that Romulus and Remus were nursed by a she-wolf, and one of the rationalistic expositors says,

that the shepherd's wife who found the babes was called "Lupa" or Mrs. Wolf. And similarly Jesus's resurrection was really a revivification from a deep swoon. That which made Christianity is not its myths, but the ideas conveyed in these myths. If we read Homer, or Faust, or any poem of a mythical nature, who would think of a rational explanation of the wonderful stories? We are moving in a mythological atmosphere and it is not necessary to explain the appearance of spirits as hallucinations of Faust's or perhaps as the effects of a magic lantern. The marvellous is a matter of course in the world of fairy tales and the supernatural is natural in mythology.

The corner-stone of the city of Rome was not the legend of Romulus and Remus, but the courage, the virtue, the greatness of the Romans. Rome's life, strength, and growth depended upon the ideals of her citizens. In the same way the corner-stone of Christianity is not this or that legend concerning its mythical, or at least half-mythical founder, but the ideals of the present Christians. And these ideals in order to be valuable should not be ideals of the past, but of the living presence which will help to build the future of mankind.

Whether Christianity will remain the religion of civilised mankind is not an historical question to be settled by the investigations of comparative mythology. It is a live question of to-day which can only be settled by the Christians of this generation. Humanity has grown and its horizon is broadened. If our churches decide to grow with the times, they will live. If they attempt to stifle the spirit of progress, they will not only not succeed but they will also perish. The spirit of Christ is the true cornerstone of Christianity; and the spirit of Christ is rather to be found in the denunciations of the infidel than in the pedantic conservatism of churchiness, rather in the bold scientific search after truth, than in the blind belief of obsolete dogmas, rather in the spirit of social and religious reform than in the suppression of the aspirations of progress.

What road the churches will choose, is difficult to foretell. Let us hope that they will find the narrow gate that leadeth unto life.

THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS AT NEWCASTLE.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

THROUGH the kindness of my old friend Mr. George Julian Harney, of England, I am in receipt of a large book containing a full report of what was said and done at the Newcastle Congress of Trades Unions in September. This book is printed and published by the *Newcastle Chronicle*, at the low price of sixpence, and it gives more useful information about the "Labor Problem," than any ten books of the same size

written in scientific and theoretical cold wisdom. Here we have the visible facts of labor hot from the mine, the factory, and the shop. Six hundred delegates were present, representing more than a million of working men, and the moral force of such a convention must be very great in England. In this book we see the "eight hours" question, and other questions, beaten into political shape by strong men, as iron is beaten on an anvil, but with more noise and less music than the hammers and the anvil make. A few chapters by way of introduction give an admirably condensed history of English labor from the days of Wat Tyler to the present time. The congress was unwieldy because it was too large, but its turbulence was the sign of a rude and healthy zeal. The delegates had the good sense to put an autocrat in the chair, whose amiable despotism saved them from utter dispersion in a Babel of tongues. Without his imperial domination they would have accomplished nothing. It was hard to resist the humor of his candid intolerance, when he said of his own ruling, "This is gagging discussion; it is stifling debate. But it is necessary. And it will be carried out."

Every delegate had his mouth with him, and billows of oratory dashed against the chairman like the sea on Beachy Head. The most animated contest was over the "eight hours" question; not over the necessity and importance of the "eight hours" principle, for all were agreed on that, but as to the mode of enforcing the eight hours rule, whether by Act of Parliament or by Act of the Trades Unions. There was a fierce dispute upon this question like that quarrel between the two negroes who went out to hunt a possum. They disputed all day as to whether they would broil him or boil him. When they reached home at night, the problem had solved itself; they had not caught the possum. There was a good deal of kettle-drum speech, and at the end of it the state socialists, or as they called themselves, the "legalists," had the worst of the argument and the best of the vote, for they carried their doctrine through by a good majority, and decided that the "eight hours" reformation must come from the State in such form as might be ordered by the Trades Unions. Said the most vigorous of the kettle-drummers, "We must by our votes get the State to step in and confirm by law what the Trades Unions have secured." And the possum still in the tree.

A gleam of the good time coming when they could oppress others as they themselves had been oppressed, comforted many of the delegates, and inspired them with hope of retaliation. They prophesied the time when the Trades Unions were to become a social tyranny with political power, dominating Parliament as the Jacobin club did the National Assembly. "We must

make the masters adapt and assimilate themselves to the standard which the men by law impose on them," said Mr. John Burns, who appears to be the Denis Kearney of England, so much does he resemble in style of speech the orator of the sand lots. "We are going to use the State," he said, "against those who have used the State against us." This may be a very proper policy after they have caught the possum, and got possession of the state; but the threat is premature now. It serves to array all the influential classes against the Trades Unions, and helps to postpone indefinitely the just cause of the working men.

Not only the masters, but also brother craftsmen are to be made outlaws without rights if they refuse to become subject and abject when required by the Trades Unions. Parliament at the dictation of the Unions is to pass a law forbidding employers to give work to any man who is not a member of the order. "The time is fast coming," prophesied the inexorable John Burns, "when the man who could not show a Union ticket would get no work." Fifty-five years ago, at the time of the "Document" the masters decided among themselves that the mechanic or laborer who *could* show a Union ticket should get no work. This was very properly resented as an attempt to enslave the working men. The parties to the wrong are changed, but there is no moral difference between the scheme of Mr. Burns, and that of the masters when they required their men to "sign the document" or starve.

There were present at the congress a number of women delegates, armed with needles and pins to prick bubbles with, and torment the men. One of these was Miss Abraham, Treasurer of the Women's Trades Union, London, who said that she "had little sympathy for the man who wanted eight hours for himself, and yet had a ten or twelve hours wife"; and another was Miss Whyte, Secretary of the Employed Women's Bookbinders Society, who, referring to "equal work, equal wages," said, "If it was contended that women who did men's work should have the same pay, it meant driving the women out." These were very sharp needles, and they stung like hornets, for it is always an unpleasant revelation to men that they have been found out; and Miss Abraham well knew that in the congress were plenty of eight hours men with twelve hours wives; and Miss Whyte was shrewd enough to know that under the plea of justice for women lay a sinister conspiracy of injustice, a scheme to drive women away from the trades and the professions altogether. In the "Wheelbarrow" papers, I warned the women long ago, to beware of this beautiful nosegay offered by "organised labor." If this demand of "equal wages for equal work" could be made into law by the "legalists," it would at once

drive women back to what according to the Pottawatamie idea is their "proper sphere," the very narrow circle bounded by washing, ironing, scrubbing, cooking, nursing, and sewing. I am proud to know that there are many men in the trades unions who make that demand in good faith, as an act of justice to women, but they give proof of their sincerity by demanding equality for women in other things; and in this they include their own wives.

The president of the congress was Mr. Thomas Burt, a working-man member of parliament, a Northumberland miner, I believe. He occupied a giddy eminence; and the temptation to play the demagogue, and speak in the "rantin' roarin', rantin' roarin'" style was very great. He resisted it, however, and while he commanded like a Field Marshal, he spoke like a statesman. Such leaders, in parliament or out of it, compel respectful attention to the demands of labor, and under such leaders the workingmen will eventually win all that ought to be won. It was a pleasant thing to read that the congress was welcomed by the Mayor, and feasted by the Common Council; so unlike the style of doing in my day, when we spoke for justice under menace of the soldier's bayonet and the policeman's club. By a curious coincidence, a few days after the meeting of the Trades Union Congress, there was, in that same old town of Newcastle, a Conference of the Liberal party, at which Mr. Gladstone made a Chartist speech that fairly bewildered me, because I remembered him as a tory statesman back yonder in the forties. I had to rub myself to make sure that I was awake, it seemed so like a dream; and I could not help asking with Bret Harte "Is things what they seem, or is visions about?"

CORRESPONDENCE.

EDITORIAL SUPERVISION.

Madras, India, June 12, 1891.

To the Editor of *The Monist*:

SIR: Having seen the advertisement of *The Monist*, I obtained the three first issues of it. The first article I read was that on "Immortality" by a Dr. Gould and which appeared in the April number of the magazine. I enclose for your information a copy of a letter I have addressed to the author of the article.

I consider it was a great pity that such a paper should ever have appeared in *The Monist*. If *The Monist* is to become worthy of the position its promoters desire it to hold, it will evidently be necessary that some supervision be exercised over the contributions, for it is impossible to conceive that the paper in question could have been published, had it been even superficially examined by any man of science. I am Sir

Yours truly,

R. E.

To R. E. Esq., Madras, India.

Your letter and enclosure are at hand. Your criticism of Dr. Gould's article is in many respects correct; but your supposition that the Editor of *The Monist* has been blind to the faults of Dr.

Gould's article is an unfounded assumption. If you had read the editorial of the same number of *The Monist* (No. 3), you would have become aware of the fact that Dr. Gould's article "stands in direct opposition to the views that have been editorially upheld in *The Open Court* as well as *The Monist*."* Dr. Gould's article was accepted because it was antagonistic to our views.

You say "that some supervision be exercised over the contributions." That is a good rule for a certain purpose. But we have another rule according to which we publish the severest and ablest criticisms of our own position. Dr. Gould's article was published for that reason.

The rule to exercise supervision over contributions must not exclude the raising of points by the unschooled, it must not produce an aristocracy of the learned, who do not deign to stoop down to the not-learned. The misunderstandings of the not-learned must also be heard, and the learned can profit by considering them. I do not mean by this to rank Dr. Gould among the unschooled. On the contrary, he is a very learned man and the author of valuable scientific works. But I regard his opinion in several most fundamental points as faulty and cannot approve of his manner of presentation.

An editor has in my opinion the right to exercise a supervision over his contributors, but he should use it as little as possible. We Americans are not very fond of police either in politics or in science. I have not used this editorial police right with regard to Dr. Gould's article at all, because I felt it least justifiable to tamper with the manuscript of an adversary.

You blame Dr. Gould for using such language as "confused and confusion breeding philosophers." Let me call your attention to the fact that this expression having reference to men who speak in "the interest of a theoretical monism" is directed against the editors of *The Monist*. In my answer to Dr. Gould (Vol. i, No. 3, p. 416 et seqq.) I have attempted to show that the basis upon which Dr. Gould founds his view is untenable ground. The dualism which he so boldly defends is self-contradictory and thus all the conclusions he draws from it must fall to the ground.

Although your criticism of Dr. Gould's article may upon the whole be correct, it is nevertheless not fair to call attention to the faults of a man without doing justice to his virtues. Dr. Gould is of an impetuous nature, he always paints in glowing colors, he exaggerates, he makes people crawl, he uses strong language, even such as in my opinion is out of place. He is rash and assuming, and he takes an attitude as if his antagonist was not worthy of being listened to. These are great faults in one respect, but they are not without redeeming features in other respects. He is at the same time brilliant, and having a conviction, he convinces—that is to say he convinces a certain class of people who are influenced by his forcible way of saying things.

Dr. Gould is not a thinker, but a preacher. He is not a quiet investigator, but an advocate of an opinion, he is not in search of the truth, but a champion of what he thinks to be the truth. And such men of enthusiasm are as much wanted as scientists and patient enquirers. I should be glad if I could convince Dr. Gould of his errors so as to use the strength and vigor of his fervid mind in the direction which I take to be sound science and philosophy. But I have little hope of converting him.

Professor Lloyd Morgan of Bristol writes to me:

"Dr. Gould's 'Immortality' only wants a very slight modification to represent the monistic view. You have put your finger on the non-monistic assumptions. If a young man, he will (or would) come into the true philosophical fold."

Your letter is a severe criticism of our principles in editing *The Monist*, and it is for that reason of interest to our readers. We do publish articles which we cannot approve of; yet we did not expect that our motives for doing so would be misunderstood.

* This phrase is literally quoted from *The Monist*, Vol. i, p. 416.

I hope that you will consent to the publication of this our correspondence with the omission, perhaps, of your name.

Very Truly Yours,
PAUL CARUS.

A FEW COMMENTS ON SUICIDE.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

I AM sorry that I did not see in *The Open Court* the article "Can Suicide be Justified" before this. Though a month has elapsed, I should not think it too late to refer to the mistake made by Dr. S. V. Clevenger in citing in the above article Schopenhauer in a misrepresentative manner. As proof of my assertion I enclose correct translations, covering the ground of the above mentioned matter. Schopenhauer treated this subject especially in his *Parerga and Paralipomena*, Vol. II, also in the book of *Ethic*, and saying what he says there, he never could contradict himself, in saying what Dr. S. V. Clevenger cites of him.

ON SUICIDE.

"The surest manner to hide from others the limits of our knowledge is not to trespass them."—*G. Leopardi*.

"We have to hear suicide is the greatest cowardice, and only possible in insanity, and more such absurdities, also this entire senseless sentence, 'SUICIDE IS UNJUST, although it is evident that everyone has nothing in this world, less indisputable than the right over his own person and life.'" (P. & P., Vol. II, Chap. XIII.)

"There are certain mistakes which are generally favored, and firmly credited, and by the countless daily with self-sufficiency repeated, and to those belong the sentence, 'SUICIDE IS A COWARDLY ACT.'" (*Ethic*.)

"The right to anything means the right to do it, or to take it, without injuring thereby anybody else. This is illustrated in the absurdity of the question as to the right of taking our own life, but as to the claim which others perhaps have on our person, rests on the condition that we are alive, and expires after. That he who does not desire to live any longer, should live only the life of a machine for the benefit of others, is an absurd claim."

"The forbidding of suicide by law is ridiculous, because what penalty can deter him who seeks death? To punish the attempt of suicide means to punish the awkwardness of ill-success," etc.

Yours respectfully,
AUG. D. TURNER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

HARMONIES DE FORMES ET DE COULEURS : Démonstrations pratiques avec le rapporteur esthétique et le cercle chromatique. By *M. Charles Henry*, Bibliothèque à la Sorbonne. Paris : Librairie Scientifique, A. Hermann.

This little treatise reproduces a lecture delivered by M. Henry, at the Forney Municipal Library of Art and Industry, before an audience of persons engaged in the manufacture of furniture and of colored papers in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, Paris. The object of the lecturer was to make known the principal facts relative to the physiological action of light, of color, and of form, and the laws of harmony to which he had been led by his personal inquiries. The subject is of a most interesting and important character, but it loses much in its present form of treatment from the absence of the illustrations by which the facts were verified. M. Henry shows that agreeable sensations can be correlated with the increase of reflex movements, and disagreeable sensations with the decrease of reflexes which usually accompanies hyperesthesia. It is possible, therefore, to express the pleasant and unpleasant character of sensitive impressions numerically. The rhythmic numbers which mark a variation of excitation are found in colors and forms, in the sensations of weight, muscular effort and sound. M. Henry illustrated the law of successive and simultaneous contrast of color by the use

of his chromatic circle which, in combination with certain other simple mechanisms, will become of pathological value in determining the commencement of nervous affections, as these disturb the senses. The law of contrast is applied by the author to the study of form from the esthetic standpoint, and certain rules are laid down for the construction of figures which will not weary the sight, and which will enable a vast science, that of *morphology*, to be constituted on a rigorously mathematical basis. M. Henry and M. Signac have treated this important subject more fully in a work already in the press entitled "Education du sens des formes." M.

BOOK NOTICES.

We desire to call the attention of our readers who are engaged in practical literary work, to a publication that is especially designed to further and facilitate their labors—*The Writer, A Monthly Magazine for Literary Workers*, Boston, Mass. This magazine (24 pages) is made up, each month, of a series of short practical articles on literary topics, methods, and aims, of interesting stories and sketches of the literary profession, of a department of "Queries" in which the editors answer all manner of grave problems that perplex rising authors and discuss questions of style and the correct use of words; further, of a department called "The Scrap Basket" in which the subscribers discuss, criticize, or supplement the answers in "Queries," of "Book Reviews," and a department on "Helpful Hints and Suggestions" which is a vast storehouse of the experiences of practised writers on matters of literary technique and the material tools of composition. Each number contains a list of the literary articles that appear in the periodicals of the day, and also "News and Notes" touching the profession generally. Annexed to *The Writer* is a valuable Literary Bureau of which all authors who have not an established reputation should avail themselves. Primarily, *The Writer* addresses itself to the strugglers and the aspirants, but its close contact with the real world of literary activity and its current treatment of fundamental things, so often neglected, make it an instrument that even the thick-skinned virtuoso cannot afford to despise.

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HERBERT SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY.

BY DR. LEWIS G. JAMES.

WHILE the article of Dr. Carus on "Spencerian Agnosticism," in *The Open Court* of September 17th, is of interest as clearing up some possible misunderstandings of his own position, on the main point at issue between objective monism and that form of agnosticism which appears to its advocates to be the only logical outcome of modern philosophical thought, Dr. Carus's statement seems to be an explanation which does not explain.

While I have no desire to prolong the controversy, or to weary the readers of *The Open Court* by the reiteration of the positions taken in my former article, a clear understanding of the question at issue, and justice to Mr. Spencer, seem to require a brief reply to Dr. Carus. As to Mr. Spencer's position, I prefer to permit him to speak in his own language, in passages selected from his published works. By reference to such passages as most clearly represent his agnostic attitude and his anti-materialistic philosophy, I hope to show that his position does not essentially differ from my own as set forth in the article on "Philosophical Agnosticism and Monism"; that his agnosticism is a natural and logical deduction from the dictum of modern psychology respecting the nature of our knowledge, and that his anti-materialistic position is clearly defined and logically maintained. First, however, permit me a brief word in reply to Dr. Carus's comments on my previous article.

Commencing with the confession that he does not know what I mean by the innermost, intrinsic and essential nature of reality, he proceeds to affirm what I have never denied—that "the representation of reality in thought-symbols *is* knowledge." Undoubtedly it is knowledge; but of what? Of the thought-symbols, of course; this, and nothing more. And these thought-symbols by Dr. Carus's own clear definition, quoted in my previous article, are "mere abstractions" to look upon which as realities "is a self-mystification." When he affirms in the note, (p. 2948) that "mental as well as material processes, in my opinion *are* realities," I confess to a mystification on my part which is in no degree enlightened by the additional explanation that "they are no realities if considered by themselves as abstract ideas." Consider them how

you will, as "processes" or as "abstract ideas," they are disparate and dual. If "mental and material processes *are* realities" then reality is not one but dual. This assertion of Dr. Carus's is the logical negation of Monism.

But perhaps my critic meant to assert, not that "*mental and material processes are realities*," but that the actual process which appears in our consciousness on the one hand as mental and on the other as material, under the necessary interpretation of our thought-symbols, is a reality. If so, my question is again to the point: What is the *nature* of this process, regarded as monistic, apart from its symbolical mental and material interpretations?

In further confirmation of the agnostic position, asserted by myself, moreover, Dr. Carus finally confesses, (p. 2955): "The term 'reality' means nothing but actual being and *cannot give us any information about the innermost nature of being*." This is precisely what the agnostic claims. The "particular qualities of reality," i. e. its modes of affecting our finite consciousness, can be definitely described and defined. Its innermost nature, however, is incapable of definition. The fact that the objective monist "*can see no use*" in forming a concept of "the innermost, essential and intrinsic nature of reality as a whole" does not imply that Reality possesses no intrinsic character apart from its modes of affecting our consciousness; it implies rather that the mind of the objective monist *ceases to think* just as this particular phase of the problem comes in view, and that his agnosticism is therefore implicit merely, though no less actual; while that of the Spencerian is clearly thought out, explicit and frankly confessed. The realms of admitted knowability of the Monist and the Spencerian are identical and co-extensive. No possibility of thought and investigation which is open to the former is closed to the latter. The Spencerian, however, perceives that parallel and co-ordinate with the infinite realm of relative knowledge which symbolically interprets the effects of Reality in dual and disparate terms of mental and material processes to our finite consciousness, lies an infinite realm of Reality in its essential, intrinsic constitution, which the finite mind can never penetrate. Yet there are not two infinities, but one and the same infinite Reality. The idea of modes of existence which are "ab-

solutely unknowable" to the finite mind is, therefore, not abandoned by the disclaimer that agnosticism implies the assertion of the unknowability of reality *per se*. If the perception of this truth is indeed a "bottomless abyss," as Dr. Carus declares, which "impels man to stop thinking," the only difference between the objective Monist and the Spencerian agnostic is that the former stops thinking before he reaches the edge of the abyss, and plunges blindly in, while the agnostic clearly sees it before him, and declines to attempt the hopeless task of fathoming its unsearchable depths. That the agnostic conception implies a profound mystery at the heart of Being I have nowhere denied. With Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske I confess that I can see no complete solution of this mystery while finite consciousness endures. What I did affirm and hereby reaffirm is that the *doctrine* of the Unknowable does not rest upon any "mystery"—any supernaturalist or metaphysical basis, for its explanation,—but is a logical deduction from the simplest demonstrated facts of psychological science.

This doctrine as asserted by Mr. Spencer rests primarily upon "the antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts."* Precisely here I have rested it in my own argument. In "First Principles," additional arguments, based on the well-sustained claim that this is "the deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts,"—a fact in which science unites with philosophy and religion in recognising,—and supported by the considerations deduced by Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel from the nature of mind and consciousness, are brought forward in its support. Finally, from the nature of Life itself as the continued adjustment of inner-relations to outer relations, the necessary relativity of our knowledge is argued, and the actuality and reality of the Unknowable is maintained against those writers who claim that the words "Infinite" and "Absolute" express merely negative ideas. But it is in the "Principles of Psychology," where the nature of mind and knowledge is expressly treated, that the clearest statements of the fundamental principles of Spencerian agnosticism are to be found.

In the section entitled "The Physical Synthesis," (Principles of Psychology, Vol. i, pp. 616-627.) Mr. Spencer fairly states the position of the Materialist, the Spiritualist, and of that yet more refined school of thought which makes Motion the supreme reality underlying all mental activities, and shows why neither of these views is illustrative of his own philosophical position. The passage continues (§ 272):

"Comparatively consistent as is this answer, and serving though it does to throw back with added force the reproaches of the spiritualist, it is not the answer to be here given. In the clos-

ing paragraphs of 'First Principles,' and again in the earlier parts of the present work, the position was taken, that the truth is not expressible either by materialism or by spiritualism, however modified and however refined. Let me now, for the last time, set forth the ultimate implications of the argument running through this volume as well as through preceding volumes.

"Carried to whatever extent, the inquiries of the psychologist do not reveal the ultimate nature of mind; any more than do the inquiries of the chemist reveal the ultimate nature of matter, or those of the physicist the ultimate nature of motion. Though the chemist is gravitating towards the belief that there is a primitive atom, out of which by variously-arranged unions are formed the so-called elements, as out of these by variously-arranged unions are formed oxides, acids, and salts, and the multitudinous more complex substances; yet he knows no more than he did at first about this hypothetical primitive atom. And similarly, though we have seen reason for thinking that there is a primitive unit of consciousness, that sensations of all orders are formed of such units combined in various relations, that by the compounding of these sensations and their various relations are produced perceptions and ideas and so on up to the highest thoughts and emotions; yet this unit of consciousness remains inscrutable. Suppose it to have become quite clear that a shock in consciousness and a molecular motion, are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing; we continue utterly incapable of uniting the two, so as to conceive that reality of which they are the opposite faces.* Let us consider how either face is framed in our thoughts.

"The conception of a rhythmically moving mass of sensible matter is a synthesis of certain states of consciousness that stand related in a certain succession. The conception of a rhythmically moving molecule, is one in which these states and their relations have been reduced to the extremest limits of dimension representable to the mind, and are then assumed to be further reduced far beyond the limits of representation. So that this rhythmically moving molecule, which is our unit of composition of external phenomena, is mental in a three-fold sense—our experiences of a rhythmically moving mass, whence the conception of it is derived, are states of mind, having objective counterparts that are unknown; the derived conception of a rhythmically moving molecule, is formed of states of mind that have no directly-presented objective counterparts at all; and when we try to think of the rhythmically moving molecule as we suppose it to exist, we do so by imagining that we have re-represented these representative states, on an infinitely reduced scale. So that the unit out of which we build our interpretation of material phenomena, is triply ideal.

"On the other hand, what do we think of this ideal unit, considered as a portion of mind? It arises, as we have seen, by synthesis of many feelings, real and ideal, and of the many changes among them. What are feelings? What is changed? And what changes it? If to avoid obvious implications of materiality, we call each element of this ideal unit, a state of consciousness, we only get into similar implications. The conception of a state of consciousness implies the conception of an existence which has the state. When in decomposing certain of our feelings we find them formed of minute shocks,† succeeding one another with different rapidities and in different combinations; and when we conclude that all our feelings are probably formed of such units of consciousness variously combined, we are still obliged to conceive of this unit of consciousness as a change wrought by some force in something. No effort of the imagination enables us to think of a shock, however minute, except as undergone by an entity. We are compelled, therefore, to postulate a substance of mind that is affected, before we can think of its affections. But we can form no

* See my similar argument, *The Open Court*, Sept. 17, p. 2948.

† The word "shock," certainly in Mr. Spencer's use of it, does not imply materiality.

* "Principles of Psychology," Vol. i, p. 62. (English Edition.)

notion of a substance of mind absolutely divested of attributes connoted by the word substance; and all such attributes are abstracted from our experiences of material phenomena. Expel from the conception of mind every one of those attributes by which we distinguish an external something from an external nothing, and the conception of mind becomes nothing. If to escape this difficulty we repudiate the expression 'state of consciousness' and call each undecomposable feeling 'a consciousness,' we merely get out of one difficulty into another. A consciousness if not the state of a thing is itself a thing. And as many different consciousnesses as there are, so many different things there are. How shall we think of these so many independent things, having their differential characters, when we have excluded all conceptions derived from external phenomena? We can think of entities which differ from one another and from nonentity, only by bringing into our thoughts the remembrances of entities which we distinguished as objective and material. Again, how are we to conceive these consciousnesses as either being changed one into another or as being replaced one by another? We cannot do this without conceiving of cause; and we know nothing of cause save as manifested in existences we class as material—either our own bodies or surrounding things.

"See then our predicament. We can think of matter only in terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer; and when we have got the final answer of the second we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y ; then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may continue forever without coming nearer to a solution. *The antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended, while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united.*

"And this brings us to the true conclusion implied throughout the foregoing pages,—the conclusion that it is one and the same Ultimate Reality which is manifested to us subjectively and objectively. For while the nature of that which is manifested under either form proves to be inscrutable, the order of its manifestations throughout all mental phenomena proves to be the same as the order of its manifestations throughout all material phenomena."

This somewhat lengthy passage, I think, shows clearly, (1) the irrefragable psychological foundation of philosophical agnosticism in the antithesis of subject and object, "never to be transcended while consciousness lasts"; (2) the anti-materialistic character of Mr. Spencer's psychology; and (3) the monistic foundation on which his entire philosophy is based: "it is one and the same Ultimate Reality which is manifested to us subjectively and objectively."

Those critics who persist in asserting that Mr. Spencer's philosophy is materialistic in its implications constantly ignore the fact that he everywhere affirms that the reality underlying what we conceive as matter and motion can by no means be identical with matter and motion, but must be something essentially different. Importing into their own and his thought the ordinary conceptions of matter and motion, they find no difficulty in showing how absurd is the incongruity when consciousness is supposed to emerge from them.

If they would keep constantly in view the fact that Mr. Spencer regards the Ultimate Reality as one; as

something entirely different from matter and motion as we conceive them; as so much higher in its nature than even the highest manifestations of human consciousness that it transcends consciousness "as much as consciousness transcends a plant's functions," then they would perceive how futile and unfair is an argument based upon the ordinary materialistic conceptions of matter and motion. To no careful and sympathetic student of Mr. Spencer, however, is such a misapprehension possible.

THE CASE OF AGNOSTICISM REVISED.

WE freely concur with Dr. Lewis G. Janes in the main point on which he so vigorously insists, that Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy is not "materialistic in its implications," for undoubtedly it is agnostic. According to Mr. Spencer, the underlying reality is and remains unknowable. Dr. Janes, however, goes too far, when he characterises Mr. Spencer's philosophy as anti-materialistic. His position is not anti-materialistic, but non-materialistic. According to the agnostic principles, we do not know anything about "the reality underlying what we conceive as matter and motion," it might be spirit, it might be matter, it might be anything natural, yet it might be something of which we have no notion, it might be something that is not found in the realm of nature, it might be supernatural.

I. MR. ELLIS THURTELL'S AGNOSTICISM.

Dr. Janes is not satisfied with my explanation, because it does not explain the main point at issue between monism and agnosticism. But the trouble with agnosticism is that it is a Proteus constantly changing under our hands. Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy admits of many interpretations. Whom have we to accept as the orthodox Spencerian, Professor Fiske or Mr. Ellis Thurtell? Mr. Ellis Thurtell comments in *The Agnostic Journal*, (xxix, 12) September 19, 1891, upon the discussion of agnosticism which appeared in *The Open Court*, No. 207, saying that he wants to know Dr. Janes's own construction of "living in the spirit." He says:

"It would be a most remarkable thing if so representative a Spencerian as the President of the Brooklyn Ethical Association seems to be, had any ardent yearnings toward the supernaturalistic short-cut of theological lore. . . ."

I do not see that Dr. Janes's and Professor Fiske's position can be characterised as a yearning toward supernaturalism or theology. Nevertheless, their interpretation of Spencerianism differs widely from that of Mr. Ellis Thurtell. The latter is by no means ready to accept their view of Spencerianism. He says:

"Herbert Spencer is perpetually, throughout his various volumes, impressing upon his many misunderstanding readers that his implications are neither necessarily Materialistic nor necessarily

Spiritualistic, and that the strife between Materialist and Spiritualist is substantially a war of words. Quite unequivocal are his continuous statements that it is immaterial in which of these two terms of thought we choose to express our conceptions of mind and matter; that, in point of fact, the terms of both *Materialistic* and *Spiritualistic* thought are merely symbols, such as those of algebra, for the expression of what is, in the last resort, a reality unknown, if not, indeed, unknowable as well. Herbert Spencer is most evidently *agnostic* on this point. It is to his mind as much beyond the present scope of human knowledge as is the *question of the ultimate causation of the universe itself*.

"These clearly and strongly put views of our great philosopher are to be found not only in an earlier edition of his works, but also in the very latest, which, in its entirety, is now before me. This fact, together with the equally indisputable one of Dr. Fiske having built up a certain far from Agnostic theory called 'Cosmic Theism,' may serve to cast some doubt upon the importance of what Dr. Fiske himself is said to have revealed to the assembled company on this eventful evening. The revelation was nothing less than the assertion that Herbert Spencer had confessed, in 1874, to a change of opinion upon the 'Correlation of Forces' question, and had acquiesced in the construction Dr. Fiske had placed upon his philosophy as a whole. With every respect for the author of 'Cosmic Philosophy,' it seems to me that, failing any positive written statement from Herbert Spencer upon the precise point at issue, we should all do well to content ourselves with the exposition of his views, so lucidly and (as I think) so consistently set forth in the fifth edition of 'First Principles,' and in the third edition of 'Principles of Psychology,' both published during last year. Upon the authority of these volumes, I submit that both Dr. Janes and Dr. Fiske have, in some measure, misrepresented the matured views of our great philosopher of Agnosticism and Evolution, and that Herbert Spencer has neither changed the base of his philosophy, by putting into the background the principle of 'Persistence of Force,' nor has repudiated, with his latest breath, any one of the assertions contained in the passages quoted by the Spiritualist from New York."

Before I proceed to discuss Dr. Janes's position and the passage quoted by him from Mr. Spencer, I have to make a few comments on Mr. Ellis Thurtell's proposition. We maintain in opposition to Mr. Herbert Spencer's or anybody's agnosticism, that knowledge means description in mental symbols and reality can be described in mental symbols. Reality is not unknowable. And we maintain at the same time that the different problems of causation are by no means beyond the present scope of human knowledge. Mr. Thurtell speaks of "the question of the ultimate causation of the universe." Does that mean how the universe originated out of nothing? That question is answered by the law of the conservation of matter and energy. The universe did not originate out of nothing; it is eternal. The term "eternal" means that it exists, that it has existed, and that it will exist; it has never been created out of nothing and can never disappear into nothing.

By the bye, I cannot approve of such word-combinations as "ultimate causation." To speak of causation as "ultimate" implies at the start a lack of clearness concerning the meaning of "cause" and must necessarily implicate us in inextricable contradictions.

The recent discussion of the Brooklyn Ethical Association grew hottest concerning the question: What is the corner-stone of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, the correlation of forces, or the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge? Mr. Spencer has repeatedly spoken of sensations, emotions, and thoughts as being transformed motion; yet on other occasions he has also expressed the view that mind and matter are opposite faces of one and the same unknowable reality. Now it was maintained by the disputants, that if these two "faces" could not be transformed the one into the other, Mr. Spencer would have to give up his doctrine of the correlation of forces.

Let us stop here. The correlation of forces cannot be given up either by Mr. Spencer or by any one. The doctrine of the correlation of forces is not specifically Spencerian or agnostic, or positivistic, or monistic. It is common property. No sound thinker at the present age doubts that any one force is transformable into another. What Mr. Spencer and with him his followers, Professor Fiske included, will have to give up, is simply the idea that psychic states are shocks. Psychic states, i. e. feelings, are states of awareness; they are neither forces nor transformed forces.

Says Leibnitz:

"We are constrained to confess that perception and whatever depends upon it, are inexplicable upon mechanical principles; that is by reference to forms and movements. - If we could imagine a machine the operation of which would manufacture thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, and could think of it as enlarged in all its proportions, so that we could go into it as into a mill, even then we would find in it nothing but particles jostling each other, and never anything by which perception could be explained."

If we could go into the brain, we should see blood rushing through nervous structures, we should see certain parts of the latter, receiving the blood, oxydise and thus change its potential energy into kinetic energy. Our cicerone, supposing we had some one who knew all about it, might point out the different spots where feelings are taking place, and yet we should see no feelings. We should only see "particles jostling each other." And why? Because feelings are not motions. Feelings are not objective processes, they are subjective processes, they are not visible, they are not observable. They can only be felt, for they are states of awareness.

How we think subject and object as one, has been explained in other places and need not be discussed here. (See "The Soul of Man" pp. 1-46.)

Sensations in one sense are transformed force. By "sensation" we generally understand a physiological process which in some part is accompanied with feeling. The physiological process of a sensation is a breaking down of nervous substance, it is the setting free of a certain amount of potential energy. As such

it is mechanical. But the feeling of the sensation is not mechanical. A sensation in so far as we consider it as a special kind of feeling, a feeling of sight, or a sound, a taste or an odor is *not* transformed force. By feeling we understand that state of awareness which appears while a certain kind and amount of nerve-substance is being disturbed through some irritation. The physiological process is a shock; the psychical state is no shock, it is simply awareness.

Concerning the non-interconvertibility of feeling and motion, Professor Fiske and Dr. Janes cannot be said to have, as Mr. Thurtell declares, in some measure misrepresented Mr. Spencer's views; they have simply tried with a friendly hand, to eliminate the consequences of a mistake.

II. DR. LEWIS G. JANES'S AGNOSTICISM.

Dr. Lewis G. Janes's agnosticism is based upon the idea that knowledge, being the representation of reality in thought-symbols, is a knowledge of the thought-symbols and nothing more. This is a fundamental error, that calls for explanation and refutation.

"Knowledge is the representation of reality in thought-symbols" means that some process affects a sentient being and causes a physiological disturbance together with which a definite state of awareness arises. There is a tree from which innumerable rays of light proceed. The tree is different from the picture on the retina, and again the picture on the retina (the latter being to some extent a chemical process) is different from the disturbance caused in the cortical centre of vision. This disturbance again considered purely as a physiological process is different from the state of awareness which accompanies the process. Yet all these events preserve a certain something in their forms which they have in common and so the feeling element in the sensation of a tree comes to represent the tree. The representative value of a feeling is called its contents. Every kind of sense-impression is followed by a special kind of feeling and thus the world around us is mapped out in feelings. Ideas, abstract thoughts, concepts are higher kinds of representative feelings. They are symbols which represent whole groups or generalisations i. e. composites of many similar feelings.

Now we ask again with Dr. Janes, What is knowledge? We answer and so does he: Knowledge is the representation of reality in thought-symbols. Dr. Janes proceeds to ask, "Knowledge; but of what? Of the thought-symbols, of course; this and nothing more." Here is a mistake. No man has a direct knowledge of his thought-symbols as being thought-symbols. Every state of awareness is an awareness of the contents of that state; and we assume that the contents of each state of awareness depends upon the special form of

the action that takes place in some nerve-structure. Popularly speaking, feeling beings are not aware of their physiological brain activity, but of the purport and meaning of their physiological brain activity alone. No one seeing a tree and thinking of it is aware of or has a knowledge of a thought-symbol. Every one seeing a tree and thinking of it, is aware of and knows a certain contents of a thought-symbol of his which we call a tree; he is aware of the tree itself. That the means through which a man knows a tree is the symbolism of sensations and the activity of nervous structures, re-constructing in some way the picture of a tree in feeling substance, is not at all immediate knowledge; on the contrary, it is the result of most difficult and subtle investigations.

Sensations and thought-symbols are realities just as much as any other processes of nature; and the objects represented in thought-symbols are, if true, also realities. There are some thought-symbols which represent certain qualities or features abstracted in thought from objects; they are called abstracts. Such abstracts are matter, motion, spirit, etc. The qualities represented in abstracts are real also. They exist in and with things. But abstracts have not an existence by themselves. There is no absolute motion and there is no gravity outside of gravitating bodies. Indeed all things, (ourselves included) are such as they are only in connection with the whole universe. Every single object is inseparable from the whole cosmos, and if we speak of a thing we separate it in our thought from the rest of the world. This separation however is a fiction, which if persisted in, leads us to the absurd idea of things in themselves.

The whole universe is a vast system of relations, and these relations are reality itself. There is nothing unconditioned, nothing unrelated, nothing absolute. Everything real is, and necessarily must be, relative. A correct description of the relations of reality in the mind of a feeling being is knowledge. To say that we can know the relative, but cannot know the absolute or the unconditioned, is equivalent to saying that *we can know that which exists but we can never know that which does not exist.*

That which is or can be represented in our mental symbols, the contents of our sensations, i. e. of our sense-symbols, being that with which we have to deal in actual life, is generally called reality. Now we are told that beside it there is another reality which cannot be represented in mental symbols and which can neither directly nor indirectly affect man's consciousness. The former kind of reality is relative, the latter is absolute, the former can be comprehended the latter is incomprehensible and unthinkable. The former is the province of the sciences, commonly considered as nature, the latter is the innermost nature of reality, which "in

its essential, intrinsic constitution the finite* mind can never penetrate,"—"while consciousness lasts." We can understand reality as a whole, i. e. we can systematise our knowledge of the former in a unitary world-conception; yet we cannot understand the innermost nature of being. Says Dr. Janes:

"The mind of the objective monist ceases to think just as this particular phase of the problem comes in view and his agnosticism is therefore implicate merely, though no less actual."

The objective monist ceases to think that which according to the agnostic's statement is unthinkable and incomprehensible. Suppose but for a moment that this unthinkable kind of a reality did not exist and imagine that the former kind of reality, that which can be represented in sense-symbols and with which we have to deal in actual life existed alone, should we then not be able to have a clear monistic world conception without the superimposed additions of agnosticism? Indeed we can do without the supposition of a reality behind that which is usually called reality; and if we take our concepts of matter, motion, spirit, feeling, thought, etc., as symbolising certain features of nature, we need not furthermore ask for the innermost nature of reality as a whole.

Nature is nature; degrees of innermost-ness do not exist in Nature. Says Goethe:

"*Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.*"

In a way similar to that of Dr. Janes on the innermost nature, Mr. Spencer speaks of the ultimate nature of things—of mind, of matter, of motion, etc. The ultimate nature is always said to be unknowable. What can the innermost or ultimate nature of a thing mean? It can mean the essential quality of a thing or a process. That however is not at all incapable of definition or incomprehensible. So for instance the essential quality of mind is symbolism; every mind is a system of representative symbols in feeling substance. The innermost and ultimate nature of something can also mean its most general quality. Thus, for instance, what is the most general quality of all matter? It is that which all kinds of matter have in common. Matter is that which directly or indirectly can affect any one of the senses. In either sense the innermost and ultimate natures of things are knowable. What other meaning the phrase can have I know not and am unable to surmise.

* Parenthetically I may state that the terms "finite mind," "finite consciousness," and also "infinite reality" are illegitimate word-combinations. (See *The Open Court*, No. 215, p. 2979.) Realities are always definite and concrete. The infinite and infinitude are not objects, but unlimited, unfinished, and not to be finished processes or possibilities. Every atom is infinite in certain respects. It has infinite possibilities of motion, of combination, etc. When we use such phrases as infinite reality or finite minds, we become naturally involved in a confused conception of things. The terms "infinite" and "absolute" are by no means "negative" ideas.

III. MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S AGNOSTICISM.

Dr. Janes quotes a long passage from Mr. Spencer's psychology which contains several strange mis-statements and ends with the usual refrain of his *ergo ignorabimus*. Mr. Spencer artificially produces an inextricable confusion and concludes that all knowledge is impossible. I cannot enter here in a discussion concerning the possible meaning of "primitive atoms," or "primitive units of consciousness," or "the rhythmically moving molecule which is our unit of composition of external phenomena." Still less can I discuss Mr. Spencer's belief in "the substance of mind;" such a thing as "a substance of mind" is a meaningless and self-contradictory, a misleading, and therefore a dangerous phrase. Nor do I intend to investigate the old paralogism that "the conception of a state of consciousness implies the conception of an existence which has the state." This is the basis of the old ego-psychology which has been refuted a century ago by Hume, by Kant, and many others after Kant. I shall limit myself to the main point at issue. Mr. Spencer declares:

"We can think matter only in terms of mind and mind only in terms of matter. . . . We find the value of x in terms of y ; then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may continue forever without coming nearer to a solution. *The antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united.*"

There is some truth in the statement, that "we can think matter only in terms of mind"; yet the word "term" is incorrect. We do not think matter in "terms" of mind, i. e. in expressions which denote mind, which characterise mind. We think matter in terms which characterise matter. We ought to say "matter as we think it," the idea "matter" is a mental symbol. This is a truism. Everything we think, is thought only in so far as it is put in mental symbols. This is true of matter and of motion, of possible and impossible things, of mind itself and of anything we can imagine, even that which for some reason or other is said to be inconceivable or, in case it contains self-contradictions, is actually inconceivable.

There is some truth also in the statement that "we can think mind only in terms of matter." Yet this statement also wants a correction. We can think mind only as being the mind of some real and material being. Or negatively expressed we cannot think of bodiless minds, of ghosts. Some people believe in ghosts and imagine they can think bodiless minds as realities. At any rate mind has to be thought, as everything else, in mental symbols and we can define it only in terms which denote mental or psychical processes.

Mr. Spencer in slightly altering these two truisms, (1) that the idea of matter is a mental symbol and (2) that the idea of mind must always be thought in connection with material bodies, produces an ingenious antithesis which hides a fallacy under the impression of profundity. In this way he enters into a vicious circle out of which he cannot escape. Finding himself hopelessly caught in the trap which he set for himself, he declares that there is no way out of it. This while consciousness lasts renders impossible all knowledge of that ultimate reality in which subject and object are united.

Indeed, such fallacies make knowledge impossible.

But, then, what is the Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united? Why, there is no "ultimate" reality. Reality is either real or it is not real, there are no degrees of a more or less ultimate reality. Can there be anything realer than real?

Reality is that which exists. This is a broad and general statement, and from general statements you cannot expect detailed explanations. If you wish to know what characteristics reality possesses you must study it in detail and that is exactly what our scientists are doing. If you wish to know the nature of reality go to science, study physics, chemistry, botany, zoölogy, physiology, astronomy, and above all study the propædeutics of science, especially mathematics and logic, the sciences of formal thought. All the results of these sciences are more or less actual knowledge. No science represents the whole of reality; every science investigates one side of nature only, it moves in some one special kind of abstraction. None of them represents in a special degree "the innermost nature" of things, but all of them represent some real actual qualities of nature, and in this sense we might say that every one of them represents the innermost nature of reality. That we know little in comparison to what we wish to know, that in addition to some actual knowledge we propose guesses called hypotheses, and that, however much we shall know, the whole world of reality is so immeasurable and its relations are so infinite that we shall never and can never know it out, is a fact that nobody disputes. But no amount of ignorance (which by the bye is something negative only) justifies Mr. Spencer's agnostic proposition that all knowledge is rendered impossible.

Agnosticism in whatever form it may appear (with the sole exception of the Agnosticism of Modesty which means judgment suspended so long as sufficient evidence is missing) is throughout the outcome of some erroneous reasoning. The faults of a lens appear on the picture in the camera, and if no other information can be had, are indistinguishable from the objects pictured. So agnosticism is the confusion of the thoughts of a thinker taken by him to be the objective reality of the world mirrored in his thoughts.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE is a story travelling round by the newspaper line, and probably false, to the effect that the President of the United States is about to send an autograph letter of congratulation to the German Emperor thanking him for admitting the American pig into Germany. According to the story, a man-of-war ship will be specially appointed to carry the letter, thus giving it a sort of regal and imperial dignity; which it would not have if simply dropped into the post office, or even entrusted to the American Minister at Berlin. The President, say the newspapers, is anxious to thank the Emperor, "for an act of such signal importance to the entire West, and in particular to the great pork industries of Chicago." And, a member of the cabinet, name not given, is quoted as saying, "The elections West are near at hand, and the President wishes to accentuate his success for the farming community in practically opening the European markets to a great product." The "man-of-war" part of it gives a brackish flavor to the story, and makes it look like a yarn prepared exclusively for the marines. Such a letter would be diplomatically dangerous, and it might provoke the Emperor to write in reply, "Go thou and do likewise." To thank the Germans for doing what we refuse to do, would be to stultify ourselves for nothing. The President knows enough to let well enough alone. We may congratulate whomsoever it may concern that the Germans have opened their gates to our swine, but for all that, we shall continue to maintain a jealous barrier against the pigs and pork of Germany.

Vicarious atonement is no longer a theory, but a condition, at least in the state of Maine. In that commonwealth the prohibitory liquor law is vigorously enforced, and vigorously evaded. It has lately been discovered that in some parts of that state men can be hired for two dollars a day to expiate the sins of others, by acting as dummy saloon keepers in those very dry neighborhoods where the prohibitory law actually prohibits. The duty of a dummy substitute is to stand at a window, and by touching an electric button notify the real proprietor whether an approaching customer is genuine or counterfeit, an orthodox disciple of St. Bacchus, or a spy. This duty requires that a dummy possess intuitive perceptions keen and true as those of a pointer dog. It is also the duty of the dummy, when the police make a raid on the saloon, to represent himself as the proprietor, and go to prison without grumbling, thus making a vacancy for another scapegoat, who will hold the position until the old one returns from the wilderness, which in this case means the jail. This kind of atonement is not unusual in the world, but it is ruinously cheap when furnished for two dollars a day; although during the war, many a man died for his country by means of a substitute costing less than five hundred dollars. I once knew a soldier to falsely accuse himself of stealing from the sutler, and take his punishment like a man, the real culprit paying him for so doing a plug of tobacco down, and promising him five dollars in money "after pay day," a time indefinite as the farmer's "after harvest." I regret to say that when pay day came the latter part of the bargain was repudiated on the ground that it was against good morals and contrary to public policy. The expiator complained to me about it, but I could only advise him never to expiate in future except for cash.

We are a hero-worshipping people, but we like our heroes dead; for example General Grant. The statue of him was unveiled a few days ago in Chicago, and the ceremony of unveiling it caused the most popular and populous demonstration ever seen in the city. For hours, military and civic societies marched through the streets in high procession on their way to offer incense to the statue, while enthusiastic citizens rallied by swarms around the monument to assist in the ceremony. Of this cheering multitude of worshippers tens of thousands had censured General Grant in

his lifetime as a man worthy of utter detestation, a corrupt magistrate, and a Caesar meditating the overthrow of liberty. At the unveiling ceremonies those very same unrelenting critics bowed before his graven image in reverent adoration. Shall it become a precept of American party spirit, that we speak nothing but good of the dead, and nothing but evil of the living?

Speaking of soldiers, and effigies, and images, reminds me of this newspaper paragraph which I had nearly forgotten, "Skirmish shooting was the order of the day at Fort Sheridan yesterday. The skirmish is a novel feature, in which a dozen scouts advance towards dummy Indians and fire off hand. The scores were good, two contestants making 130 points out of a possible 200." This kind of skirmish drill amounts to something; it has a stimulus in it almost equal to the taste of blood. There is a martial humor about it which is nowhere to be found in the dull sport of shooting at a blank target which even when you hit it, gives back no suggestion of death nor portent of a broken bone. I agree that "the scores were good"; 130 Indians for 200 shots appears to be extremely good; but I account for the victory by this good luck that the dummy Indians had no guns in their hands, and could not fire back. I am confirmed in this opinion by the fact that in actual fighting our soldiers never get 130 Indians out of a possible 200; although the Indians have been known to do much better than that, and even to get 700 soldiers, out of a possible 700, a record which has not been broken yet. Of course as a matter of taste the drilling of soldiers to shoot at dummy Indians is open to criticism; and if we should hear that in Arizona or Dakota the Indians were shooting dummy soldiers by way of practice, we should sadly say that it was a proof of their bloodthirsty disposition, and the evidence would be conclusive; it would prove them to be savages. The deplorable effects of such training on the mind was made visible in that Clark Street tragedy when a dummy Indian had his neck broken by a soldier from the fort. It appears that the soldier being in town, "on pass," as they call it, came under the inspiration of Chicago whiskey, a nectar which in its fine effect upon the imagination has no equal in the world. Passing along the street he saw a dummy Indian in front of a cigar store, and the martial spirit of the soldier was immediately aroused. The Indian, in a friendly way, offered the soldier a bunch of dummy cigars, but the white brave thought it was a tomahawk, and immediately attacked the Indian. He beat him severely about the face, and then after a desperate wrestle flung him heavily to the ground, the Indian's neck being broken in the fall. The soldier was unreasonably fined for his conduct; I say unreasonably, because the punishment ought to have been assessed against his commanding officer, who had taught him to make war on dummy Indians at Fort Sheridan.

Field Marshal Von Moltke's Third Volume is just published wherein he treats of 1870-71. What he says as a soldier is interesting, but what he says as a statesman is not encouraging, for we feel as if a cannon were talking to us, logical, passionless, and stern. Our sentimental hope of peace through commerce, love, charity, ethics, religion, and all the other gentle agencies vanishes before this hard moralising of the old Field Marshal, "Only the sword holds the sword in the scabbard." If this is true, then it is only its sword and not its cause that gives a nation peace; and Shakespeare was wrong when he said, "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just"; for, according to Moltke, justice counts for nothing in a quarrel between two nations. Unfortunately, in this matter the soldier is wiser than the poet. The wars of old in comparison to the modern wars were as a skirmish to a battle, for, says Moltke, "Wars to-day draw the whole people to the battle field—hardly a family without its sufferer. The future is almost without hope if the following opinion is correct, "So long as na-

tions maintain separate lives there will be strife which can be settled only with arms." Still more dreary is Moltke's prophecy of relief, "It is to be hoped," he says, "that wars will become less frequent in the degree in which they become more terrible." So, that, until wars make the whole earth a desolation, and "the multitudinous seas incarnadine," there will be no hope for international harmony; and gospels of peace and good will to men must remain a mockery, and a conjurer's jingle of words.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

BOOK REVIEWS.

NATIONAL LIBERAL CLUB. Political Economy Circle. Transactions, Vol. I. Edited by J. H. Levy, Honorary Secretary of the Circle. London: P. S. King & Son. 1891.

The Political Economy Circle of the National Liberal Club, of London, resembles in its essential features the Sunset Club of Chicago. At certain times the members dine together; and after dinner, a paper is read on some economic subject by some competent person, perhaps a member of the club, and perhaps not, after which criticisms of the argument are in order. The papers then are carefully edited, and published in book form. The Right Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers, M. P., is President of the club.

The volume of "Transactions" before us contains six addresses, on the following subjects respectively: "The Economic Principles Which Should Guide Legislation With Regard to the Occupation of Land," by the Right Hon. Leonard H. Courtney, M. P., Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons; "International Migration and Political Economy," by J. S. Mann, M. A., of Trinity College, Oxford; "The Report of the Gold and Silver Commission," by Alfred Milnes, M. A.; "The Rate of Interest," by Sidney Webb, LL. B., Lecturer on Political Economy at the City of London College; "Distribution as a Branch of Economics," by J. H. Levy, late Lecturer on Logic and Economics at the Birkbeck Institution; "The Migration of Labor," by Hubert Llewellyn Smith, B. A., Late Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

The merit of papers like these is, that the writers of them, being limited in time by the rules of the club, are compelled to say as much as possible in the fewest possible words. Books have been written on these themes which do not contain as many ideas and reasons as are condensed into these essays. They are all of them of the highest quality both in matter and style. μμτ.

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WOMAN'S MARTYRS.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

JOAN OF ARC and Hypatia will always be famous; but few people know that the early rulers of Massachusetts banished a woman for denying the infallibility of the clergy, and hung another for pleading in behalf of the persecuted.

Anne Hutchinson came to Boston in 1634, and soon gained great influence through her religious zeal, powerful intellect, and kindness to the sick. The women were in the habit of coming together for religious conversation, as was admitted at her trial; and the meetings soon came to be held at her house, where from sixty to a hundred women met regularly to hear her opinion of the Sunday sermons and Thursday lectures. One of the two ministers, in Boston, John Cotton, seemed to her much more spiritually minded than the other clergymen. Her censures were freely quoted, and the disparaged ministers sharply questioned, even in the pulpit, by her adherents. The governor, Sir Henry Vane, believed like her in the supreme authority of the indwelling Spirit, and lost his place on that account in May, 1637, when Winthrop, Dudley, Endicott, and other champions of the clergy came into power.

Mrs. Hutchinson's opinions were grossly misrepresented and severely censured by a Synod, which tried to bring the women's meetings back into safe limits; but she was justly called by one of her persecutors "More bold than a man"; and she would not submit to the Synod. She was summoned before the little Legislature, and Paul's unfortunate words, "I suffer not a woman to teach," quoted against her by Governor Winthrop. She maintained that she had done nothing wrong, but declared herself willing to obey the rulers. Wilson and half-a-dozen other ministers complained that she had spoken against their inspiration at a private meeting to which they had invited her. She tried for a long time in vain to have them put on oath, saying "My name is precious; and you do affirm a thing which I utterly deny"; and it was not until Cotton had testified to her having been misrepresented by them, that two were sworn against her, to their own evident reluctance as well as to that

of the rulers. Her sentence to be banished, "for traducing the ministers," was a foregone conclusion; but its passage was made easier by her declaring herself under special inspiration, and saying to those who drove her out, as they had already done Roger Williams for remonstrating against their intolerance, "If you go on in this course, you will bring a curse upon you and your posterity."

Many of her friends left Boston with her; and among them was Mrs. Dyer, who had been delivered in October, 1637, shortly before the trial, of a deformed child, who died just before birth. Governor Winthrop had the body dug up and carefully examined, in order to make it appear that the Lord was angry with the heretics. Twenty years more brought Mary Dyer back to Boston, on her way home to Rhode Island from England; and she was at once put into prison, because she had become a disciple of George Fox. Other Quakeresses were arrested also and flogged, naked to the waist, until their backs streamed with blood; but Mary Dyer's ignorance that any law had been passed against Quakerism enabled her to go home unscourged. In 1658 it was enacted by one vote in the majority, that all Quakers who might come into the colony should be "sentenced to banishment upon pain of death"; and in September 1659, Mary Dyer, who had come back to Boston to visit two imprisoned preachers, Stevenson and Robinson, was told, as they were, that all three must depart at once, and would be hanged if they returned. Conscience urged them to come back to testify against the bloody statute; and all three were condemned to death by Governor Endicott and the Legislature. When Mary Dyer heard her doom, and was ordered back to prison she said, "Yea, and joyfully I go." She told the sheriff, "Let me alone, for I should go to prison without thee." "I believe you, Mrs. Dyer," said he, "but I must do what I am commanded."

Immediately after the Thursday lecture, in the afternoon of October 27, 1659, there was another Puritan solemnity in Boston. The three martyrs walked hand-in-hand, Mary Dyer in the midst, through the streets, guarded by pikemen and musketeers, with drums beating to drown any appeal to the people. On they went, "with great cheerfulness," to the gallows, which they mounted one by one. Mary saw her friends

murdered, and went up after them. The rope was around her neck; her garments were tied about her feet; and her face was covered with a handkerchief brought by Wilson; when she was told that she had been reprieved, and might come down. She did not move; but said "Here I am, willing to suffer as my brethren have done. Unless you will 'null your wicked law, I have no freedom to accept reprieve." She was carried back to prison, where she wrote a letter, still extant, saying "I rather choose to die than to live," for she would accept nothing from those who were "guilty of innocent blood." She was carried out of the colony, but soon came back for the last time to Boston, because, as she told Endicott, when she was brought before him and the Legislature, on May 30, 1660, the Lord had sent her again to bid them repeal their unrighteous law. She freely avowed herself the same Mary Dyer who had been banished, and on being asked if she was a Quaker replied, "I own myself to be reproachfully called so."

She was led accordingly on Friday morning, June 1, to the gallows, with drums beating so that she might not speak. She had mounted up the ladder, when she was told that she might still live if she would leave the colony. "Nay," said she, "I cannot; for in obedience to the will of the Lord I came, and in his will I abide, faithful to the death." She was charged with being guilty of her own blood, but answered "Nay, for I came to keep blood-guiltiness from you, desiring you to repeal your law of banishment upon pain of death. My blood will be required at your hands, who do this wilfully. But for those who do it in the simplicity of their hearts, I pray the Lord to forgive them." Wilson bade her repent and not be deluded by the Devil, but she said "Nay, man, I am not now to repent." She was asked if she would have the elders pray for her, but replied, "I know never an elder here." The request was repeated, perhaps in compliment to Wilson who had written a ballad on the previous execution, but she said: "Nay, first a child, then a young man, then a strong man, before an elder in Christ Jesus." Her last recorded words were these "I have been in paradise several days."

Mary Dyer is sometimes spoken of as a sufferer for offense given by other Quakers; but her crime, in coming back to Boston, was the most serious which had been committed by her sect in New England. Her prophecy and that of Anne Hutchinson were so far fulfilled that the colony lost its charter in 1684, in punishment for an intolerance which had not spared even members of the Church of England. The memory of such champions of free speech against persecution, ought not to be forgotten; and Mary Dyer's statue should mark the spot where she died on Boston Common, "faithful to the death."

PARETIC DEMENTIA.

BY S. V. CLEVINGER, M. D.

The Open Court being a journal devoted to mental phenomena, a popular presentation of the phases of insanity may be appropriately contributed to its columns.

It is a mistaken idea that insanity consists of a jumble of symptoms. There are many different kinds of mental diseases, and each one presents distinct peculiarities. One of the most formidable mental troubles is now known as paretic dementia. Formerly this disease had a variety of names, such as "general paralysis of the insane," "paralytic dementia," "progressive paresis," etc., terms which were so misleading that they were abandoned in favor of the more recent designation. It is a very common affection, in some asylums including one-tenth of the inmates, and numbers among its victims more business and professional men than any other form of insanity. Its onset is often very sudden, usually after business strain and worry. The former careful and respectable head of a family or business house may suddenly undergo a complete change of character, either so extreme as to be noticeable at once, or in ways not likely to attract the attention of others at first.

The most usual manifestations being in unsystematized ambitious delusions, the most common direction of which is that the patient possesses vast wealth. He may claim that he owns all the railroads in the world, that he is worth billions of dollars, or that he is the Almighty. The politician may content himself in asserting that he is the President of the United States, and an incident affords an amusing instance of the universal relativity of things, and shows that to both the sane and insane, ideas of magnificence are purely comparative: A female paretic in an asylum once told me that she was a very rich woman, and upon asking her how much she was worth, she said with an emphasis that was intended to overcome doubts, "Between two and three hundred dollars." The poor old woman had been a pauper all her life.

Paretics in asylums will often form great commercial combinations and may draw up contracts to dispose of all the coal mines on earth, or build a five hundred story house, or a trans-Atlantic tunnel or bridge, or they may engage in other as extraordinary enterprises. The once thrifty and methodical person will neglect his business, frequent low resorts, descend the social scale in intimacies, wander aimlessly about, contract debts for the most absurd purchases, and may even commit theft, usually in a very stupid way.

It may so happen that an act of this kind may be the first thing to attract the attention of relatives or friends, to anything unusual in the behavior of the individual, and very frequently, friendless paretics have

undergone imprisonment for such deeds long before the insanity was fully recognised.

There are a few physical changes that accompany the disorder and are quite characteristic of it: One eye may differ from the other in the size of pupils, and there is a peculiar drawl in the speech; there may be at times a fleeting paralysis, the use of an arm or a leg may be lost temporarily; the memory becomes imperfect for some things, but not for all; appointments are neglected, the wrong train taken, and there are frequent fits of empty abstractions. Wrong entries are made in records; there may be complete indifference to the affairs of the family, great irritability of temper over trifles, while an actual calamity may be laughed at. Occasional convulsions of an epileptic or apoplectic nature sometimes appear.

There is what is known as the quiet and furious types, though one of these may change into the other. During a furious outbreak murder may be committed, and with a view to building a magnificent palace, he may set fire to his abode to get it out of the way.

In keeping with their delusions of grandeur, paretics are prone to victimise life insurance companies by taking out large policies, through the medical examiner not recognising the insanity, and as the usual duration of the malady is three years, when death occurs, the policy beneficiaries soon realise, nor can there be any valid contest in such cases where the patient alone is responsible for the application. A ludicrously feeble attempt to escape payment was made by one insurance company raising the question as to whether the applicant did or did not know that he was insane at the time of taking out the policy. The gradual changes that take place in the brains of paretics are well known to pathologists, and the morbid anatomy of this mental disease has been worked out better than has been many bodily ailments.

Many paretics are surprisingly insensible to pain and touch impressions; wounds and burns being often unfelt; and a philosophical consideration of the connection between mental and physical anæsthesia is thus afforded. Schopenhauer claimed that pain was the positive experience, while pleasure was negative, and the latter consisted in the absence of pain. While it is not necessary to accept this view entirely, some mental and nervous diseases, such as paretic dementia, prove the close relation between physical and mental states of feeling.

For example, blunted sensibilities seem to lie at the root of the grandiose delusions, the perfect content and good feeling of the paretic. He claims to be happy and well, and what would to the sane person be bad news does not in the least affect him. The action of certain drugs bears out this analogy; opium allays

both bodily and mental pain, cocaine blunts intellectual as well as physical sensibilities, and notoriously, the drunkard "drowns his grief" and begins to be happy in his cups at the point where feeling of all kinds is impaired. So Schopenhauer's notion, that pain was real and pleasure existed only through absence of pain, seems justified in the fact that when by disease or drugging, sensibility is lessened, delusions of grandeur or a fictitious happiness is often induced.

THE PRESENT RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION.

BY J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

[CONCLUDED.]

An important consideration is that which is implied in the general but false belief that when once Christianity is adjudged to be morals and nothing more, when once religion is divested of mythology, of an eternal hell for the wicked, the element of fear and those features which are restraining factors in man's life, then the basis for morals crumbles and there is no need of church, or ethical institutions. It is said that it is because of the fear lest those who are now devoted to the Christian church may plunge into all manner of excess and immorality that the effort is so strongly made to keep the Bible intact and hold it up as the book of books among the people. It is the fear that spirituality may pass from the lives of men and that it is better "to be a pagan sucked in a creed outworn" than a sensualist under the power of ethics. Such a statement, however, is not built upon facts and is therefore misleading.

That there are people who might be led into fearful and disastrous paths of conduct by a sudden destruction of that power which keeps them in the path of duty is true, yet that is due to the fact that they have been falsely educated as to the authority of the moral law. Religion has been represented to them as that which they can receive only by becoming a new creature—by being born again forgetting or neglecting to say that it is in reality that which teaches us conformity to the law of being or it is nothing. The natural state in which man is born was taught to be the state out of which by a miracle he must be born anew into the condition of grace. And hence many have been lead to suppose that to be good, or to obtain grace, man must not rely on any human faculties but must rely altogether upon a miracle.

Ethics denies the miraculous in conduct and traces all acts to the law of being. Man is so constructed that he is made to move along lines which morals have defined as right or wrong. The right path is right because it is the path of least resistance and affords man the greatest possible and the highest quality of enjoyment. The wrong path is wrong because it is the

path of greatest resistance and affords man the least possible and the poorest quality of enjoyment. Ethics which has been thought to be a set of rules, gathered from experience, without authority except in reason and suggestive of no law other than that of expediency or utility, is this and more, viz. the science of the law regulating conduct. Man is constitutionally moral—that is he has within himself—indeed, he is himself the law of conduct. There can be no law for his conduct inseparable from his being. If an analytic physiologist or biologist could sum up and define the nature of man as a chemist defines the molecule of water he would say that man is first of all a microcosm. God—that has been defined as the infinite, omniscient, omnipotent personality externalised from creation, is indeed that of which everything in the universe is a part. Will a man look for gravity in Sirius he will find it in the planet earth. Will he look for power, wisdom, benevolence in any form of life he will see it in life everywhere. Will he look for law in all creation he will see it in man who lives and moves and has his being in the divine presence of which he is an entity and illustration. As all power, wisdom, and benevolence is identical, so all law, whether one behold it in the movements of a star or in the conduct of society, is a unit. This is not so much an *a priori* assertion as it is a fact of life; and being a fact of history so far as history is a record of human life and its affairs, it emphasises the inevitableness and omnipotence of law. Destroy the subterfuge upon which the general argument employed by the theologian in defense of the Bible is based and religion as was shown is nothing if not morals founded upon the law, structure, or nature of the universe. Blot out of existence all the historical evidences which are extant of ethnic religions and still man could not escape the irresistible and inevitable law of his being. The ethical outcome of the present revolution will be the intense reassertion of the claim of the moralist that it is not only better but best for man to do right.

The final question to be asked is this—In view of all these facts what position should society maintain to ethical reform movements in deference to organisations which chiefly if not altogether exist for the furtherance of theological ideas and denominational propaganda? Such a question includes the politico-economical and social one, for there can be no reform movement, whether political, social, or industrial, that is not after all a matter of ethics. The answer is irresistible, that man should encourage and support all genuine ethical reform movements. Two reasons in particular may be assigned for this conclusion. The first is that morals is the science of conduct, and the second is that ethical results are radical and positive and ameliorating. Take from religion its moral fea-

ture and then you will see and understand how very little it has done for the civilisation of mankind. The very virtues which the Christian church have belittled when not involved in or unassociated with the Christian religion are the material upon which morals was fostered and from which it received its stamp of approval. That religion as interpreted by the theologian can exist without a basis in morals is tantamount to saying that the tree can exist without the earth or the ocean exist without water. For whatever relation man sustains to God he sustains to that law which exhibits itself in life everywhere, and which is the basis of the science of conduct. A science of morals proves to man his duty—a duty which was clearly defined in the decalogue and in the principle of love which in Jesus blossomed into the golden rule. Then in the second place ethical results are radical, positive, and ameliorating. Ethics has no use for fear. Fear, it declares, which by the Christian church is appealed to as a restraining power in society, is not a legitimate incentive to right action and produces results which, however, beneficent they may appear, are in every respect, unreliable and unsatisfactory. Fear as a motive for action is the lowest in the scale of incentives and it is the producer as well as harbinger of the worst possible civilisation. The use of fear in the church as a spur to right action is villanous to say the least, yet so downright inexplicable have the motives for pushing sectarian and denominational propaganda become that any means for obtaining success is courted and practised. It is one of the astounding facts of the present moral status of the world that while the bulk of the people manifest no interest in a religion which once appealed to their fear they have settled into the belief that morals could consequently make no imperative demands upon them. And this, I take it, is the reason why, unless a church that is purely ethical and utilitarian in its methods of work is powerful by virtue of wealth or attractive by virtue of fashion, it appeals to a small following or draws about itself a miserable support. It was as if men have been educated to think that right living was associated with the idea of reward and punishment, and that when that motive for conduct was removed there would be no need of churches or any use for ethical teaching. This is the danger into which society has drifted and this is the crying error of the hour.

Carlyle said that if one make himself good he will rid the world of one less scoundrel, and surely such doctrine is sound and practical. This mission to inspire men with the need and use and glory of lofty, intellectual, and moral ideals—to inculcate principles of temperance, thrift, fraternity, honesty, frugality, and purity, this should be, indeed, this is I think to be the office of the church. What then should be the

relation of society to any institution which works along this line? It should consider the cost of supporting by taxation the police, jails, penitentiaries, idiot, and lunatic asylums, pauper institutes, and the numerous other means which society has created for defending itself and those who have proven to be helpless in defending themselves. Is it cheaper to restrain society by surrounding the unfortunate classes with a Chinese wall and thus keeping up a perpetual and exorbitant expense by taxation, or would it not be not only the most economical, the wisest as well as the beneficent process to assist the church and ethical institutions in putting into practice Carlyle's admirable doctrine? We can better afford to let our present civilisation sink into oblivion than perpetuate with heartless indifference the present state of society which to millions of human beings is but a mockery and a sham. Nor is the condition of thought into which these people have sunk the result of caprice or of a false generalisation of facts. Their inevitable state of poverty which deprived them of the opportunity to grow as nature designed is too forcible a fact to cause them to lean toward optimism in philosophy or rose water views of religion. They can no more transcend their fate than a man can lift himself to the sky by the straps of his boots, and to preach to these unfortunate ones a gospel of cheer without setting to work to give them freedom and the opportunity to live is as foolish as to pray with a starving man without giving him food. If the church as a representative body of people intent upon the salvation of mankind to the noblest kind of living will not strike broad and deep at the evils which produce industrial depressions and social depravity, it cannot expect to fulfill its mission successfully. This is its chief, its important duty. Nor have I any one remedy to offer. Any good method is better than a false method or no method at all. The millions of oppressed and enslaved cry to us for help and justice, and woe be to us if we close our ears and hearts to their appeals. See then what the church can do if it will along ethical lines yet observe how, in many respects, she shrinks from performing the duty which is at her door.

A more profound and serious aspect is given to the problem of civilisation when one is reminded of the fact that the ceaseless, grinding toil in which the bulk of the people are engaged seems to be in results similar to the weary work of the daughters of Danaus. The days increase into years and the years roll into oblivion but no cheer or rest comes to man. Popular Education brings ever a fresh multitude of duties while the increase of inventions, public and steel highways, and the thousands of labor saving devices which the genius of man produces to ameliorate human life seem to press the masses into yet deeper industrial

slavery. Why all this greed, competition and roar of business? Where and when will it end? Does it happen because the human mind is demoralised by a false ideal? Is it because the people have not awakened to the real worth of knowledge and the power which it has to create and glorify the new life which at present exists as a germ in the soul of man? Why this chase after and accumulation of gold? Is it for the hope of buying nature's favors when nature herself is dead to desire? Did the human mind ever labor under a more transparent delusion than the one which cheats man into believing that all things come to him who waits. Can the immeasurable and inexhaustible wealth of Cræsus buy or procure for man eyesight when the eyes are blind, hearing when the ears are deaf, health when the stomach and digestive organs are diseased? What avails it for a man to toil fifty years of his life at a pursuit to obtain the means by which he thinks he will be able to attain certain more desirable ends—when, in reality it is not the money which he so much needs as it is the daily and wise use of all of his powers. This is the folly into which so many men sink—a folly which proves itself in the experiment. It is the folly of the man who built a house upon sand—who, in other words, prospected most beautifully upon that which in the very nature of things could promise nothing but wreck and ruin. In dealing with the science of mechanics men seem wise enough. Why is it that they so disregard the law which relates to their highest well-being. Surely life becomes a mockery, if man endowed as he is, contents himself with the life which is but the shadow of the real and ideal. Now all this is said not by the way of a criticism of the method of the universe but rather as suggestive of that which he can expect of himself when he turns his attention to the beneficent lines of conduct. The science of ethics calls man away from the pursuits which enslave and degrade him to the life which blesses and glorifies.

It would be a grievous fault if I closed this essay without remarking that the world is passing through a sensational, materialistic, commercial age. The masses of the people join the classes in the pursuit for pleasure. Man seems to be more fond of chic and gayety than of piety and culture. Happy the man who, amid these days of sensualism, lives obedient to his highest perception of truth. Happy those who whether in the palace or hovel feed the fires of love and justice even amid the roaring and beating of the storms without. The dawn will soon break when the world will be baptised in a new morning and when the millions of earth's children through the spirituality, zeal and toil of her new prophets and saviours may lift their eyes to the hills whence comes salvation. In the wilds of India there is a tree which is practically meat, drink and clothing to the inhabitants of that country.

Wonderful is the tree but most wonderful because it is a paradise to those who feed upon and profit by its gifts. May the church set at work to be a tree of life to the children of the world.

THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION.

THE first chapter of Genesis is at present interpreted by the greatest number of our theologians in a sense which is hostile to the theory of evolution. It is nevertheless one of the most remarkable documents that prove the age of the idea, for no impartial reader, either of the original or of a correct translation will find the dogma of special creation acts out of nothing justified in these verses. The first verses of Genesis tell us that God "shaped" the world beginning with simple forms of non-organised matter and rising to the higher and more complex forms of plants and animals. God shaped the heaven and the earth, is the correct translation, he made the greater and the lesser light, i. e. he formed them; he made man and the breath of man's life is God's own breath. If Darwin himself or a poet like Milton, thoroughly versed in Darwinian thought, had been called upon to present the evolution theory in a popular form to the contemporaries of Moses they could not have described it in a more striking manner. Any improvements upon the Mosaic account which could be suggested are mere trifles and matters of detail.

It is a fact that ethical aspirations, the ideal of elevating humanity, of raising men upon the higher level of a divine manhood, of creating a nobler type of human beings, of saving the souls that would go astray and showing them the narrow and strait gate which alone leads into life,—in short the *sursum* of evolution,—have been the kernel of all religions, especially those great religions which in the struggle for existence have survived up to this day—Brahmanism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. Nevertheless the idea of evolution is still looked upon with suspicion by the so-called orthodox leaders of our churches. Do they not as yet understand the religious nature of the idea? Or is it perhaps exactly its religious nature of which they are afraid? For being a religious truth, it will in time sweep away many religious errors which are fondly cherished and have grown dear to pious souls.

The idea of evolution as a vague and popular conception of the world-process is very old, but as a theory based upon exact science it is not much older than a century.

Kant told us in his "Natural History of the Starry Heavens" that an evolution is taking place in the skies, forming according to mechanical laws solar systems out of the chaotic world-dust of nebulae. Cas-

par Friedrich Wolff,* Lamarck,† Treviranus,‡ Karl von Baer,§ and others came to the same conclusion with regard to the domain of organised life and Baer pronounced the proposition that evolution was the fundamental idea of the whole universe.¶ The work of these men is the foundation upon which Charles Darwin stood. This great hero of scientific investigation collected with keenest discrimination and most careful circumspection the facts which prove that the struggle for life will permit only those to survive which are the fittest to live and will thus bring about not only a differentiation of species, not only an increasing adaptation to circumstances in the animal world at large, but also the progress of the human race.

The evolution in the animal kingdom has a peculiarity which distinguishes it from that of the starry heavens. It takes place exactly in the same way according to mechanical laws, being a complex process of differentiation, yet there is an additional element in it. Animals are feeling beings.

When certain motions pass through the organism of an animal there arises an awareness of the motion, and this awareness, which is a mere subjective state, is called "feeling." The same impressions produce the same forms of vibrations in the organism and the same forms of vibrations in the organism exhibit the same feelings. Every impression however leaves a trace in the system which is preserved and when properly stimulated will be reawakened together with its feeling element. When new sense-impressions are produced, the old memories of the same kind reawaken together with them, and all their feelings blend into one state of consciousness richer than the present sense-impression could be, if it stood alone and unconnected with the traces of former sense-impressions. In this way the whole world of an animal's surroundings is being mapped out in the traces left in the organism according to the law of the preservation of form, as after-effects of sense-impressions and of their correlated reactions. Many of these traces when stimulated into activity exhibit states of awareness and thus consciousness rises into existence constituting a realm of spiritual life.

This spiritual life has been called the ideal world in opposition to the world of objective reality—ideal meaning pictorial, for the ideal world depicts the real world in images woven of the glowing material of feelings.

Evolution in the animal world concentrates more and more in a development of the ideal world and this ideal world is not something foreign to the world of objective realities which it mirrors, it is intimately in-

* *Theoria Generationis*. 1759.

† *Philosophie Zoologique*. 1794.

‡ *Biologie*. 1802.

§ *Entwickelungs-Geschichte der Thiere*. 1828.

¶ *Ibid.* p. 294.

terconnected with it. Reality must be thought of as containing in itself the conditions of bringing forth feeling beings and through feeling beings the ideal world; and this ideal world is not merely a phantasmagoria, a beautiful mirage without any practical purpose, it is to the beings which develop it the most important and indispensable thing, for it serves them as a guide through life and as a basis for regulating their actions. If the world of objective realities is correctly depicted in the ideal world, it will help them to act in the right way, so as to preserve their lives, their existence, their souls. Ideas which are correct, which faithfully represent the realities which they depict, are called true, and actions which are based on and regulated by true ideas are called right or moral.

Thus the ideal world contains in germ the possibilities of truth and of morality.

Evolution in the spiritual world means the development of truth, it means an expanse of the soul, a growth of the mind as well as a strengthening of the character to live in obedience to truth.

When Mr. Spencer undertook to write a philosophy of evolution, he was fully conscious of the sweeping importance of the evolution theory, but when he approached the ethical problem, he became inconsistent with his own principle and instead of establishing an ethics of evolution, he propounded an ethics of hedonism regarding that action as right which produced the greatest surplus of pleasurable feelings.

Pleasurable feelings are experienced under most contradictory conditions. Pleasures cannot form any standard of ethics or a regulative principle to guide our appetites. Pleasures on the contrary are often dangerously misleading and many a life has been wrecked by trying to choose that course of action which promises a surplus of pleasures.

Feelings are mere subjective states and their importance depends entirely upon the meanings which they convey. It is not the pleasurable nature of feelings and of ideas which ought to be considered when they are proposed as norms for action, but their correctness, their truth. That which brings man nearer the truth and harmonises our actions with the truth is right, and that which alienates man from the truth is wrong. Accordingly that which makes our souls grow and evolve is moral, that which dwarfs our souls and prevents their evolution is immoral.

There is but one ethics and that ethics is the ethics of evolution.

P. C.

THE METHODIST ECUMENICAL COUNCIL.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

THE Methodist Ecumenical Council has met in Washington and adjourned. It was a very important conference, as its members represented a constituency of millions, and its discussions were marked by ecclesiastical statesmanship and great ability. It

was a storage battery of social electricity that suggested political thunderbolts, and the President of the United States mounted the platform to speak studied words of praise; a sure sign in a land of universal suffrage that the Council had behind it a ballot potency commanding national respect. There is a toy barometer consisting of a little wooden man in a little wooden house, and so sensitive is the little man to meteorological vibrations that he goes into his house whenever the signs portend rain, and comes joyfully out whenever they promise fine weather. Like the little wooden man, the American politician knows enough to go in when it rains, and to come out with a joyful chirrup at the prospect of political sunshine. There can be no doubt that the President's visit gave distinction to the conference, because, figuratively speaking, it impressed on the proceedings the sanction of the great seal. The President avowed that he was there in his official character, saying: "You have to-day as the theme of discussion the subject of international arbitration, and this being a public and enlarged view of the word makes my presence here as an officer of the United States especially appropriate." The excuse was unnecessary, for surely the President of the United States may speak without apology in any assembly when in sympathy with its aims and sentiment. As an element of discord his appearance in any convention would be in questionable taste.

These ecumenical councils are valuable as chapters in the great volume of human history. They are as milestones recording the steps of man in his weary march towards truth, and light, and liberty. Between the milestones we find the road strewn with rags of doctrine which the church has flung away in its march; and at every council the confession appears in a new suit of clothes, improved in pattern and quality. As the church travels faster and farther in one country than in another, ecumenical councils are useful in showing us the difference in miles travelled. At the council of the Congregationalists held in London a few months ago, it was discovered that the English were several miles ahead of their American brethren on the Liberal road; and the recent council at Washington revealed a similar difference in the rate of progress between the Methodist church in England and the Methodist church in America. It appeared incidentally that the Methodist church in England had abandoned the fight against the doctrine of evolution, and this drew forth a brotherly rebuke, coupled with a warning, from Bishop Keene, who said: "I greatly admire my English friends now in the conference, but I have a word of advice for them: 'Go home; get rid of this doctrine of evolution that puts a bomb at the bottom of the Pentateuch and Moses that will blow you up if you don't get rid of it. If you cannot get rid of the doctrine, get rid of the men and the institutions that teach it, no matter how dear they are to you. Knock the time out of Darwinism and there is nothing left of it.' And the bishop was answered by an English ecclesiastic, who said: 'The church cannot ignore evolution. Any church wilfully blind cannot be the church of the future.'"

As was inevitable, we saw on the platform of the conference the truth classified into grades and qualities. There were divine truth and human truth, religious truth and secular truth, God's truth and man's truth, spiritual truth, and truth of the earth earthy. Said a delegate from Mississippi, "Let agnostics and atheists sneer as they would, yet the glorious fact remained that God's truth is marching on." What he meant by God's truth was the doctrine of his own church. When the conference meets again those doctors of divinity will probably have learned that every truth is God's truth; and that every lie is an enemy of God, though spoken in his worship and chanted in his praise. The earth, the heavens, and all that in them is, the infinite and eternal worlds, are but the visible forms of God, and the truth is the essence of all these; as we may learn by the infallible almanac, whose prophecies never fail. If an atheist has any truth at all in his possession, though it

be only the multiplication table, he has God's truth so far, and his own opinions about God affect not the truth in the smallest degree. It is not altogether certain that God's truth is marching on. On some roads it is, but on others it is being beaten back, as the records of legislation prove. Much that passed current with John Wesley as "God's truth," is rejected as counterfeit by his disciples now, as it would be rejected by Wesley himself had he the learning of the nineteenth century to guide him. I have seen the basis of ethics laid down by men whose genius and character I admire and love, but I have as much right as they have to lay down a basis of ethics, and I say that truth is the basis of ethics, no matter who preaches it, nor whether it is qualified by the name of deity or not. The old Scotch fishwoman who in the song of "Caller Herrin'", says, "Truth will stand when a' things failin'", is to me as much an apostle of religion as the Archbishop of Canterbury, or the most learned ecumenical council that ever made a creed. I believe in the dogma of the fishwoman, "Truth will stand when a' things failin'."

CORRESPONDENCE.

ON SUICIDE.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :—

MR. AUG. D. TURNER cites from Schopenhauer to show that I was mistaken in supposing that the latter opposed suicide. The article in question was copied from a newspaper interview on the subject and the statements alleged to have been made by me concerning the views of one of my favorite philosophers were surprisingly inverted.

Yours respectfully,

70 State St., Chicago.

S. V. CLEVENGER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE AFRO-AMERICAN PRESS, AND ITS EDITORS. By J. Garland Penn. Springfield, Mass.: Willey & Co., 1891.

This is a book of about 550 pages, showing what has been done by the Afro-Americans in the field of journalism. It is the pathetic story of a brave effort to lift the colored people out of the depths of ignorance into which they had been crowded by centuries of bondage. It was a hard struggle, and it is not ended yet, for even the dawn of this brighter day is cloudy, cold, and dull. As a rule the colored people are too poor to support their own papers, under so many disadvantages, and against the competition of the rich and powerful journals of the dominant race. Still, they have accomplished wonders, although at great pecuniary sacrifice and by much unrequited labor of hand and brain. This book gives an interesting history, and biography, so to speak, of all the Afro-American papers and magazines that have been published in the United States since 1827. That most of them have consumed a great deal of hard earned money and then failed is the melancholy part of it. The survivors continue the struggle for existence with a patience and a courage worthy of all praise.

The book also contains brief sketches of nearly all the colored editors who have attained prominence in their profession. There are nearly a hundred of them, including some twenty women who have been successful in the various departments of journalistic work. Some of the editors here described have achieved national celebrity, and many of the others are young enough to do so. The author of the book is himself a very young man, for which fault he makes a suitable apology. He is principal in the school of Lynchburg, Va., and ex-editor of the *Lynchburg Laborer*. His literary style is good, and he is never tiresome.

Some of these biographies expose the tragedies of slavery, and they are the more shocking because they appear as incidents only, and not as the theme of the book. Here we behold "Uncle Tom's Cabin" as a reality, its characters alive and speaking. We hear the crack of the whip and feel the sting of it when we read this of

the Rev. Joseph A. Booker, "his mother died when he was only one year old. Two years afterward his father having some knowledge of books was whipped to death for teaching, and spoiling the good niggers." In that short sentence we see Uncle Tom himself, and Legree with the whip in his hand. Of the Hon. John H. Williamson, we learn that he was born at Covington, Ga., "his parents being James and — Williamson, the property of Gen. John N. Williamson." Here we get a glimpse of St. Clair, and let us hope that General Williamson, like St. Clair, was kind and gentle to his "property." Although his father and mother were the property of General Williamson, the Hon. John H. Williamson is his own property, a paradox which appears to be unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void.

There is in the book a sketch of the Afro-American League, and a great deal of miscellaneous information, bearing on the Negro question, all of it interesting, and some of it very valuable. It is a sad story, but after all there is a fascination in the cry of an outcast race appealing against wrong.

M. M. T.

NOTES.

"We are supposed to be a peaceful nation," writes Col. Theodore A. Dodge, the well-known authority on military subjects, in the October *Forum*, "but we have had our fair share of strife, foreign and domestic. Since the Revolution there have been wars with England and with Mexico, with Tripoli and with Algiers; broils with Paraguay and Corea, and a gigantic civil war; rumors of wars with France, England, Spain, and Italy. There have been the John Brown raid, the Barnburner and Fenian raids to Canada, many incursions across the Mexican border, and the filibustering expeditions to Cuba and Nicaragua. We have had the Whiskey and Shays rebellions; the election, draft, railroad, reconstruction, and sundry serious city riots; we have had well on to two hundred deadly Indian fights and many awful massacres. We have lost more men in active war since 1776 than any nation of Europe. This is a startling record for a peaceful people."

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▲ WEEKLY JOURNAL

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NEW LABOR FORCES AT THE SOUTH.

BY T. THOMAS FORTUNE, PRESIDENT OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN LEAGUE.

THE article in *The Open Court* of September 10th, by M. M. Trumbull, "The New Invasion of the South," suggests some reflections upon an industrial phase of the situation at the South which he referred to by implication rather than by direct statement. I quite agree with Mr. Trumbull that the promoters of the Inter-State-Exposition at Raleigh are rash to stake the results of Emancipation upon the industrial showing of Afro-Americans at that Exposition. Nothing of the sort can be done, or "staked." It could not have been done had the management of the Columbian Exposition at Chicago consented to give Afro-Americans a separate department for their exhibits. The most that can be hoped from the Raleigh exhibit will be evidence that substantial progress has been made under the conditions of free labor. For a comparison of the relative benefits of free over slave labor we shall have to consult the agricultural statistics of the South for the past four decades. They not only tell an eloquent story, but they leave absolutely no room for doubt or cavil.

"Man is always fit for freedom; he is never fit for slavery." Nowhere and in no epoch has this fact been more conclusively demonstrated than in the tremendous enhancement of the productivity of free over slave labor in the Southern States. Indeed, the resources of the South along agricultural lines, did not begin to be suspected until tickled by the irresistible genius of free labor. And, in a larger sense, does this observation apply to the mineral and manufacturing resources of the Southern States. As an unskilled laborer, it was the late Henry W. Grady, of the *Atlanta Constitution*, who declared that the South had the most contented and efficient labor force in the world.

While Mr. Grady's broad statement is undoubtedly true, it remains a fact that as a skilled laborer the Afro-American has not been so fortunate in maintaining his supremacy to the same extent that he has done as an unskilled laborer; not because he is incompetent as such laborer, but the reverse. During the period of slavery he supplied the entire labor demands of the South, of whatever sort; simply because labor was degraded, and white men preferred to starve or

live upon charity rather than perform it. As Horace Greeley contended, it has been shown that the abolition of slavery has made labor both honorable and dignified; freeing alike the black and the white man in this respect, because of the necessity it imposed upon all alike to get their daily bread out of the sweat of their faces. If no other result than this had been accomplished, the blood and the treasure expended to save the union were not a ransom too dear to pay for it.

Unconsciously mindful, perhaps, of the disparity of opportunity offered him in the skilled and the unskilled avenues of labor, the gentlemen at the head of the Inter-State Exposition, gentlemen well and favorably known to me, declared that "the white South offers its stronger and helping hand to the black South," and "*approves of colored labor in preference to that of foreigners.*" I quite agree with Mr. Trumbull in shying a stone at the sentiment that would circumscribe the opportunities of foreign laborers, as they are styled, because I believe in equality of opportunity and of equality of benefits. The hard fact remains, however, that the foreign laborer (including all such as are not of the South) has from the very start made war upon the black home laborer of the South wherever he has become numerous enough to form dominating organizations. As it has been impossible to do this in the unskilled trades, it has been done in the skilled trades. White mechanics have worked side by side with black ones until they imagined that they were strong enough to dictate to boss carpenters, masons, and machinists, when they have promptly "gone on strike." They have not always succeeded, but they persist in applying the Draconic test of color.

When I first came North to attend college, sixteen years ago, nearly every switchman in the round-houses and car shops of the South, nearly all the stokers on the engines and brakemen on the trains were black men; but when I went South within the current year, from New York to Florida, I found that all this had been changed. The Associations of Locomotive Engineers, of Locomotive Firemen, of Railroad Switchmen, and of Railroad Trainmen had entered the field, with inhibitions in their several constitutions against the membership and the employment of black men, and the managers of railroads,—Northern men, for the

most part, who knew nothing of the Afro-American as a laborer and cared less,—had acquiesced in the cruel proscription. Men often send up a wail to the Great Unknown, unconscious of the thoughts they think and of the words they utter. Wherever a sufficient number of Northern (foreign) skilled laborers find themselves strong enough in the South to do it, they proscribe the black skilled laborer. They do not believe in equality of opportunity and of benefits. And, yet, they should be the chief exponents of the doctrine, as they claim to be the chief exemplars of Him who proclaimed: "I am the light, the truth and the way."

It is absolutely true that Southern white men prefer black labor of all sorts to white labor. More than this, they are quicker to give black boys opportunities in clerical and other such positions than are Northern men.

The extraordinary development of Southern mining and manufacturing industries during the past two decades, industries that have practically uncrowned King Cotton, emphasises the position here taken. These industries have been developed almost entirely by Northern and Western capital, managed by Northern and Western men.

As a result of this development, and the disposition of white laborers to draw the color line, the miners and operatives employed in them are almost exclusively white men and women who have emigrated from the Northern and Western states. They form among themselves strong trades-union organisations, and stoutly resist any attempt, when such is made, to give employment to black men and women. Instead of taking the supply from the labor force at hand, when needed, these proscriptive combinations force employers to import the required additions. From having become too degraded to be performed by white men, a quarter of a century has sufficed to so dignify labor at the South that black men are finding it difficult to get any labor there to do. Of course there are exceptions, but these do not affect the rule; nor do they justify the existence of the spirit of unfairness on the part of white laborers to which attention is here directed, and which was the inspiration of the Interstate Exposition managers' reference to foreigners, and of which Mr. Trumbull gives the following left-handed explanation:

"Perhaps it is only natural that the colored people of America seek the luxury of retaliation, for in all the Northern States, the foreign-born laborers were the most unrelenting defenders of negro slavery. The most oppressed peasantry of Europe hailed with rapture the land where they could be oppressors in their turn, and they voted 'solid' against freedom."

But I do not endorse the philosophy of the cynicism that pervades Mr. Trumbull's explanation. It is

true that the Afro-American generally does not. I never heard of a black combination of laborers combining against white laborers. On the contrary, the black laborer is the most fraternal and generous creature on earth. He will not only share his opportunity to make a crust of bread but he will share the one he has made with a necessitous brother, of whatever race or condition.

Because of the new industrial forces that have grown up in the South since the war, some remarkable results have followed. Almost as fast as Northern and Western skilled and unskilled labor has found employment in the South, black labor of the same sort has sought employment in the North and West. This tendency is now in full swing. It may be that this pressure may cause that more general distribution of the Afro-American population throughout the Union, which would be the safest and speediest and most desirable solution of the so-called race problem, from my point of view. The black man must live. If he is crowded out of the labor market of the South he will seek employment in some other section of the country, and he will find it; because, say what we will, our industrial conditions are capable of furnishing labor enough to clothe, house, and feed all the labor force in the United States, when properly distributed. How long this will remain true will depend entirely upon the increase of our population and the consequent pressure upon subsistence.

A FEW INSTANCES OF APPLIED ETHICS.

BY DR. ARTHUR MAC DONALD.

"Be virtuous and you will be happy," "Honesty is the best policy," are two sayings generally held as true. The reason why these are so easily accepted, is the fact that it is natural to state our ideals as truths. It would be nearer right to say, that the virtuous man ought to be happy, and honesty ought to be the best policy. But taken as facts, these sayings are very questionable. A simple test would be the case of two men having stores upon the opposite sides of the same street. One tries to be honest and sell, for instance, pure sugar charging two or three more cents a pound than his neighbor, who marks his sugar "pure" also, but three cents less a pound. A practical business man knows who would sell the most sugar.

Misunderstanding arises in many cases as to what is meant by honesty. In ethics in general our method is, to seek the basis of right by first studying that of wrong. This gives a more definite result. What honesty signifies will be clear, if we define dishonesty. *Dishonesty is misrepresentation.* By whatever ingenious or plausible method this is accomplished, the fact of misrepresentation remains.

In looking through books on practical ethics, one finds many good and sensible statements, but they are too general to be really practical. Single cases must be considered, and general propositions developed from these, rather than *vice versa*. We will take a few familiar examples given to us by individuals out of their own experience. In some drug stores if you ask for Witch-Hazel instead of Pond's Extract, you obtain exactly the same thing much cheaper. A religious and good man defended this. He said, that if you told the people this, they would not believe you, they would have Pond's Extract and nothing else. If the druggist actually tells the buyer this, then he has done his duty. But while some might not believe him, many would believe him. In any event if the druggist says nothing, he keeps back part of the truth; this not only amounts to dishonesty, but is hardly according to the golden rule. But the druggist smiles and hints, that if that kind of honesty were practiced, it would be difficult to carry on business. However true this statement may be, the fact of dishonesty remains.

In a certain first class ready-made clothing house some goods were advertised at *cost price*. The uninitiated would naturally suppose that this meant what the goods actually cost; but it was a misrepresentation, there was a third price (the real cost) called the *raw price*, which was only known to a few in the store. Officially the cost price was the cost of the goods. Among knowing ones this use of the word "cost" may be understood but the public are deceived by it. Another case of a convenient use of a word, is where "finest quality" is marked on writing paper for instance; a very respectable clerk when told that that was not the finest quality of paper, said in defense, that "finest quality" was only the name of the paper. Not quite so plausible a method of dishonesty, is where a clerk was reprimanded for not saying "We are just out of those goods," when in reality the goods were never in the store. When you do not find just the goods you want in a store, it is not an uncommon experience to be told that, "Such goods are not to be had in town." This may turn out to be true; but the clerk does not know, but takes the risk of lying; for if the purchaser believes the statement, he is more likely to buy some similar goods of the clerk. This is one of many illustrations in business of taking the risk of dishonesty for the sake of possible gain. A husband goes to buy some articles instead of letting his wife do it for him. Here is often a good opportunity (not always neglected), of selling him old stock or stock out of style, etc.; as if it were up to date. The clerk may be conscientious enough not to say (if the proprietor allows him), "that is in style," etc., etc., but simply shows him the goods; this nevertheless amounts

to a misrepresentation; it is the ignorance of the man, that allows the goods to be put off on him. But the clerk might defend by saying that he did not know that the customer desired goods of the latest style, etc., etc. The clerk simply kept back one or two facts about the goods that any inexperienced purchaser would like to know.

The numberless arguments of this nature used by business men, sometimes conscientiously, but more often with an inward suspicion, belong to the category vulgarly called "tricks." Again the clerk may smile and hint that with such principles of honesty, business would hardly be possible. Special packing which is very common at present, amounts in many instances to misrepresentation; where for instance the larger and undecayed strawberries are put closely together on the top while those under have plenty of space between them, and may be touched with decay. Prunes are sometimes very nicely packed especially on the top of the box thrown open for inspection. But it may be answered that the buyer has the privilege of looking deeper into the box. Many purchasers however are in a hurry, nor do they like to look at anything suspiciously, or to handle it. And we may add, they would not have to do this with a strictly honest man. Many good grocery men, who would not steal any money outright for the world, have plenty of spices to sell, marked "pure." Their defense may be that they bought them for good(?) spices, and they sell them for that. Yet not one of them would guarantee that the spices are pure; in fact they are morally certain that they are not pure. But the groceryman says everybody knows they are not pure, so there is no deceit or misrepresentation. If this is so what is the use of the word "pure," except in a few cases (much more numerous than one suspects), where the purchaser is simple and uninitiated in these matters. In such cases it is a misrepresentation, and the grocer and manufacturer both know it is; one will often defend himself by blaming the other. It is the duty of both of them to know what they are making and selling. All such arguments used by many respectable men are sophisms, which are without doubt advantageous to the manufacturer and seller, rather than to the purchaser. It may be added that it is the poor and ignorant who are imposed upon most by these and similar misrepresentations. If the conductor forgets to collect one's fare, one is not legally bound to pay it. But he is morally; and yet not a few who would never think of stealing five cents or more, actually do this by being passive. Sometimes they excuse themselves because they were crowded or were obliged to stand. However disagreeable their ride, the fact remains that value has been accepted without return.

But misrepresentation, of whatever kind, is by no

means confined to commercial life. A minister over an orthodox church gradually and often naturally develops by study a superior insight beyond certain doctrines of his church. Unfortunately he may have a large family and depend wholly upon his small salary. He may say to himself, "If it were not for my family, I would preach *all* that I believe, and if the church were willing to keep me after this, then my conscience would be clear; but in my circumstances it won't do to preach concerning the doctrines I disbelieve, or am simply in doubt about; perhaps it's only a temporary aberration, and if I remain silent I may come to believe the doctrine as the church does." Or he argues to himself, "Why should I stir up strife in the church unnecessarily; it does no good, it may divide the church; why should I preach my doubts, how will that aid the church; I believe all of the fundamentals except one doctrine, which I do not consider a fundamental; but the church does; but if the church had time to study, it would believe just as I do." Now all these and many other conciliatory arguments are not only making a virtue out of what one thinks to be a necessity, but are not to the point, and really amount to misrepresentation. In almost all the cases above cited, is illustrated the fact, that the sins of omission are much easier than those of commission. A minister in an orthodox pulpit is supposed generally to be orthodox by the majority of his congregation; and if he remains quiet about his heterodoxy, he is a misrepresentation to every member of his congregation, who believes him to be orthodox. Similar reasoning applies of course to a professor in a theological seminary; he should tell the whole church, whose trust-funds he draws, *all* the new truths he gives to his students; and what the church may say is not for him to consider, if he is an earnest and fearless seeker after truth; he cannot serve two masters, truth, and fear of losing his position.

Among many questionable social customs, there is a very common one of saying, "you are out." When this is understood by the caller, there is no misrepresentation; but in case the caller does not understand this (and there are many such not only from ignorance or thoughtlessness but who do not like to think of their friends in this way), it is a misrepresentation. It may also be a misrepresentation in the case of the knowing ones, if you really happen to be out, and may be taken as a hint, which you did not intend.

One of the many forms of dishonesty in thought, is where one has a point to carry, and uses all sorts of arguments good and bad; of course it is desirable to make the bad ones appear valid; or where one getting into a difficulty, or fearing it, takes up the first argument that occurs to him, however sophistic it may be, and tries to carry the point by assertion or by his po-

sition or authority. A teacher can easily take advantage of the honest argument of a pupil by some secondary issue, making him believe he is wrong and the teacher right. It is generally admitted among physicians that they cannot trust denials of insanity as to antecedents, etc., from members of the most respected families. This is owing to family pride, which is here preferred to honesty.

Instances of ingenious or partial misrepresentation exist in all departments of life and in all grades of society; but the cases of misrepresentation mentioned above are found in the better and higher classes. And it would seem that the pressure of competition and struggle tends to increase dishonesty to such a degree, that many respectable people defend it. This silent misrepresentation, this keeping in the dark, this hedging about, this dodging (names varying according to the degree of misrepresentation), is what I call "the pedagogical," for want of a better term. It is so convenient to be pedagogical, it saves so much trouble, there is often much to be gained by it; yes, it even does good at times. We admit that in certain instances (comparatively rare), the pedagogical spirit does good, as in the case of those very near the point of death, to whom telling the truth might make the case hopeless; or in circumstances, where keeping back things, we avoid wounding the feelings of others. But if the pedagogical spirit were only used in such cases, there would be little dishonesty. But as a matter of fact, it is almost always resorted to, where the one using it thinks it is of advantage to himself.

But is this pedagogical spirit justified by the pressure of modern times and by the commercial spirit which seems to be penetrating all fields? The young man after leaving college and desiring to advance further, in deeper and more special study, is soon told that he had better seek a good position and be wise, rather than have his advanced study and crust of bread. The college president is learning to be a general after-dinner speech-maker and financier to collect money. In short, the world may be said to be becoming commercial rather than moral or intellectual. Thus the pedagogical spirit comes to be unduly developed, so that a painful inconsistency is quite apparent. It is this. If we asked what characters in history the world has worshipped and still worships, the undisputed answer is: the Founder of Christianity, Buddha, Mohammed; in all these characters the pedagogical spirit was conspicuously absent, in fact such a spirit would have been a fatal blemish. Christ did the most impolitic things, told the Pharisees just what he thought of them to their faces, there is not the least indication that he kept back any of his thoughts through fear. Yet many who worship his character to-day are far from practicing his method, and even advocate the

pedagogical. They may say the times have changed and the conditions are different. But there is very little evidence but that human nature is the same now as then. One of the cries of the present is for a man whom the public can implicitly trust. The pedagogical spirit is contrary to the idea of true friendship, which means openness of heart and sincerity. As soon as a friend begins to keep you in the dark, to hedge about or to misrepresent in any way to you, he ceases to be a friend. The ideal of Christianity is love, and this love is manifested by characteristics directly antagonistic to the pedagogical spirit.

MORALITY AND VIRTUE.

MORALITY is taught in our churches and in our schools; it is preached in our religious and liberal congregations. And yet there is a strong doubt in the minds of many whether obedience to moral precepts will be a help to a man who wants to get on in life. We hear it again and again that the moral man is the stupid man, the dupe of the smart impostor, while the man of the world, the man of business and of success must use misrepresentations. Strict honesty is said to be impossible. Says Dr. Arthur MacDonald in his article of the present number "A few Instances of Applied Ethics": "The two sayings 'Be virtuous and you will be happy' and 'Honesty is the best policy,' are very questionable." And it is claimed by many that if that kind of honesty which never misrepresents nor ever keeps back part of the truth, were practiced, it would be difficult to carry on business.

This view of life according to which the utility of honesty is of a doubtful character, which induces us to incline toward trusting in dishonesty as a good policy, which makes trickery and the methods of misrepresentation appear as promoting our interests, is the worst error, the falsest conception of life and the most dangerous superstition that can prevail, and woe to that community where it becomes prevalent.

The grocer who sells impure goods as pure, the merchant who inveigles people to buy by false labels will succeed in cheating the public time and again. But let us not be hasty in forming our opinion, that cheating is advantageous; we shall find that in the long run this man cannot prosper through misrepresentations. There is but one thing that will wear, that is truth, and truthfulness is the only good policy.

The man who intends to cheat must be very smart, very wide-awake and very active in order to succeed, and in the end he will find out that better and easier rewards are allotted to the industry and intelligence that are used in the service of straightforward and honest purposes.

Several curious counterfeits are exhibited under glass to the inspection of the public in the treasury of

the United States at Washington, and among them are two bills, one of fifty the other of twenty dollars, both executed with brush and pen only and yet they are marvels of exactness, and it must have been very hard to discover that they were imitations. No wonder that they passed through several banks before they were detected. The man who made them was an artist and he must have spent on their fabrication many weeks of close work. For the same amount of similar artistic and painstaking labor he would have easily realised more than double the return of the value which these counterfeits bear on their faces.

Is there any character more instructive than Ephraim Jenkinson in Oliver Goldsmith's world-famous novel "The Vicar of Wakefield." How successful Jenkinson was in his calling as a trickster and a rogue! and yet to be caught but once in a hundred times is for a rogue sufficient to ruin him forever. The Vicar and Jenkinson meet in the prison, and when the Vicar, having recognised by his voice the man who cheated him out of his horse, expresses surprise at his youthful appearance, the man answered, "Sir, you are little acquainted with the world; I had at that time false hair, and have learned the art of counterfeiting every age from seventeen to seventy." Jenkinson indeed appears as a master of his trade, yet he adds with a sigh: "Ah! sir, had I but bestowed half the pains in learning a trade that I have in learning to be a scoundrel, I might have been a rich man at this day."

Jenkinson is too smart to be wise enough to follow the experience of millenniums, laid down in the moral rules, and he found this out when he had leisure enough to think of his life within the prison walls. He says on another occasion to the Vicar:

"Indeed I think, from my own experience, that 'the knowing one is the silliest fellow under the sun.' 'I was thought cunning from my very childhood: 'when but seven years old, the ladies would say that 'I was a perfect little man; at fourteen I knew the 'world, cocked my hat, and loved the ladies; at 'twenty, though I was perfectly honest, yet every one 'thought me so cunning that not one would trust me. 'Thus I was at last obliged to turn sharper in my own 'defence, and have lived ever since, my head throbbing with schemes to deceive, and my heart palpitating with fears of detection. I used often to laugh 'at your honest, simple neighbor Flamborough, and 'one way or another generally cheated him once a 'year. Yet still the honest man went forward without suspicion and grew rich, while I still continued 'tricksy and cunning, and was poor, without the consolation of being honest."

Only a very superficial experience leads us to the assumption that wickedness is a help in the world and that the unscrupulous have an advantage in life. And

this is a sore temptation to those who believe that it is so. Says Asaph in the seventy-third psalm :

"But as for me, my feet were almost gone. My steps had well nigh slipped.

"For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked.

"They are not in trouble as other men; neither are they plagued like other men.

"Therefore pride encompasseth them about as a chain; violence covereth them as a garment.

"Their eyes stand out with fatness: they have more than their heart could wish."

But the prosperity of the wicked is mere appearance. It is the state of the world as things seem to be, when only isolated instances are considered. The wicked may succeed a hundred times, but in the end they are sure to fail, and if they fail they are done with forever. An honest man may fail a hundred times and yet he may rise again, for his hands are clean and his conscience is not weighed down by guilt. Asaph continues :

"Then I went into the sanctuary of God and I observed their end.

"Surely thou didst set them in slippery places. Thou castest them down in destruction.

"How are they brought into desolation as in a covenant, they are utterly consumed with terrors."

Honesty is after all the best policy and he who does not believe it will have to pay for it dearly in his life.

But let us not go too far in our trust in honesty as well as in all negative morality. Honesty is not enough to make success in life; honesty is not as yet virtue, and obedience to the several injunctions of the "thou shalt not" conveys by no means an indisputable claim to prosperity. True virtue is active not passive, it is positive, not negative.

What is virtue?

Morality as the word is usually understood is merely a refraining from wrong-doing; it is the avoidance of all that which does harm to our neighbor, which injures society or retards the growth and evolution of mankind. However, morality in order to be all it can be, ought to be more; it ought to be virtue, and virtue is the practically applied ability to do some good work. Virtue is activity, it is doing and achieving. And what is the good work which stamps activity as virtue? Virtuous is that kind of work which enhances the growth and evolution of mankind, which helps society, which promotes the welfare of our neighbors as well as of ourselves.

Mark! virtue is not exclusively altruistic; it is not opposed to egotism. Virtue may be altruistic, but there are sometimes very egotistic people who possess great virtues. Their virtues may be employed first and even so far their intentions go exclusively in the service of egotism. Nevertheless, they will de-

signedly or undesignedly enhance the progress of mankind, and therefore we have to consider their abilities, their methods of action, their manners of work as virtues,

There are men of great virtue who have conspicuous moral flaws and it is not uncommon to judge of great men according to the pedantic morality of the Sunday school ethics. The bad boy who plays truant possesses sometimes more positive virtue than the good boy who is pliable and obedient to his teachers. It is a narrow view of morality and indeed an actually wrong ethics that cavils at the heroes of mankind, pointing out and magnifying their peccadilloes in order to obliterate and forget their virtues. Goethe whose greatness has often been detracted by the smallness of such dwarfs as have the impudence to speak in the name of morality said of Napoleon, the great conqueror and legislator :

"At last before the good Lord's throne
At doomsday stood Napoleon.
The devil had much fault to find
With him as well as with his kind.
His sins made up a lengthy list
And on reading all did Satan insist.
God the Father, may be it was God the Son,
Or even perhaps the Holy Ghost—
His mind was not at all composed—
He answered the Devil and thus began:
'I know it, and don't you repeat it here;
You speak like a German Professor, my dear.
Still, if you dare to take him, well—
Then, drag him with you down to hell.'"

Lack of positive virtue is often considered as moral. Lack of courage is taken for peacefulness, lack of strength is taken for gentility, lack of activity is taken for modesty. If moral people are deficient in energy and ability, do they not deserve to be beaten by the wicked who possess energy and ability? Says Goethe in a little poem :

"The angels were fighting for the right,
But they were beaten in every fight.
Everything went topsy-turvy
For the devil was very nerry,
He took the whole despite their prayer
That God might help them in their despair.
Says Logos, who since eternity
Had clearly seen that so it must be,
'They should not care about being uncivil
But try to fight like a real devil,
To win the day, to struggle hard,
And do their praying afterward.'
The maxim needed no repeating
And lo! the devil got his beating.
'T was done and all the angels were glad—
To be a devil is not so bad."

Let us not be pusillanimous in ethics. It is pusillanimity which produces squinting views of morality. The morality of the pedant, the exhortations of the Sunday-school teacher, and the ethics of professors and lectures are not always correct, and if they are not exactly incorrect they are often insufficient or merely negative. The opinion that morality is no good guidance in life, that honesty is not always the best policy, that the unscrupulous, the deceitful, the immoral have

a better chance in the struggle for life rests either on an insufficient experience or an insufficient conception of what ethics means.

Let us not be shaken in our trust in truth. Truthfulness toward ourselves and others is the best policy, it is the only possible policy that will stand for any length of time. Trickery, misrepresentation, deceit, imply certain ruin. At the same time let us remember that negative morality is not sufficient, we must have or acquire positive virtues. The omission of sins is not as yet the fulfilment of the law, the ideal of moral perfection is infinitely greater, it consists in building up the future of mankind in noble thoughts and energetic works.

P. C.

PROGRESSION.

BERTHA H. ELLSWORTH.

THEY climb no heights whose way has only known
Life's flowers and sunshine on an easy path :
Who think their ease God's love, and that deep moan
Of far-off human sorrow is God's wrath.
With lofty summit, and steep, rugged side
Truth's mountain tow'rs beyond the flow'ry plain ;
They who go upward meet a sad-eyed guide,
And shrink, but follow, in the steps of Pain.
Weary and bruised they tread the toilsome way
Where awful chasms yawn, and storm-clouds break ;
And many, on that journey, cease to pray :
'Tis prayer enough, if, for the dear Truth's sake,
They search with hearts sincere, and strive to keep
What seems most true ; and if, in hearts that ache,
Is born a tenderness for all who weep,
A yearning to supply all human needs,
That soul has climbed far up the rugged steep,
Whatever is its creed, or lack of creeds.
When generous souls, hearing the sad world's cries,
Deem Heaven deaf, and scornfully disdain
To enter an eternal paradise
That leaves their brothers in eternal pain,
If God is *Love* and *Justice*, is their wrath
Not dearer to him, than the selfish praise
Of those who walk content an easy path,
Thankful that they gain heaven though they gaze
In depths of woe all fathomless, which teach
The favored soul, secure on heights above,
A greater thankfulness and strength "to reach
Immeasurable heights of God's great love?"
God's love hath *depths* ; and they, whose love will dare
To seek "God's sobbing world" in lowest hell,
Despising any Heav'n all may not share
Shall reach the shining heights where "*all is well*."

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE AMERICAN RACE: A LINGUISTIC CLASSIFICATION AND ETHNOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF THE NATIVE TRIBES OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA. By Daniel G. Brinton. New York: N. D. C. Hodges. Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company. 1891.

This latest work of Dr. Brinton is confessedly a supplement to his volume of lectures on general ethnology, published under the title of "Races and Peoples," which was reviewed in *The Monist* for October, 1890. The author states that it is an expansion of the ninth of those lectures, but we observe certain changes in connec-

tion with the subject of classification which are not without significance. Formerly he divided the American tribes *geographically*, because as he asserts, their physical and mental traits mark a unity of type throughout the whole continent ; and in making that division the Arctic group was separated from the North Atlantic group, and the Mexican Group from the Inter-Isthmian group. The author still adheres to the geographical arrangement, but he drops the Arctic and Mexican groups, and divides the native tribes of the American continent into five groups only, the North Atlantic ; the North Pacific ; the Central ; the South Pacific ; and the South Atlantic. Although this division is adopted for convenience alone, yet Dr. Brinton claims a certain ethnographic importance for it. He says, "There is a distinct resemblance between the Atlantic groups, and an equally distinct contrast between them and the Pacific groups, extending to temperament, culture and physical traits. Each of the groups has mingled extensively within its own limits, and but slightly outside of them." Such being the case, it might have been thought that a serious attempt at a classification on the basis of physical characters would have been made. Not so however ; language is the simplest clue and therefore language is taken as the basis of classification.

It is quite probable that for the American continent, as possibly also for Africa, the linguistic test of affinity may give the most reliable general results, but we must protest in the name of Anthropology against classification being allowed to remain there. Such a superficial view will answer the purposes of the State Departments of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, but science requires that every available class of data shall be utilised. Language alone, valuable as it is for first mapping out the ground, can never give a complete classification of races. Of this the vexed Aryan question is sufficient evidence. Dr. Brinton does, it is true, think that the shape and size of the skull, the proportion of the face, and various other measurements, "are in the average highly distinctive family traits." But as he considers that the shape of the skull is not "a fixed element in human anatomy," it cannot be of much importance to him as a race character. The fact is that at one time the existence of a distinctive type of American skull was asserted but it has since been discovered that there is a marked diversity in cranial forms throughout the whole continent. The consequence is that this physical character has been dropped by many ethnologists as a test of affinity. It is evident, however, from a broad survey of the aboriginal peoples of North and South America that they are divisible into two great stocks, the dolichocephalous and the brachycephalous. These stocks have intermingled at various places and are not always easily separable, but it is the work of the Anthropologist to unravel the tangles, by reference not merely to language and crania, but to all other physical and mental characters and the products of culture.

Fortunately this has not been altogether lost sight of by other ethnologists. For instance, Professor Putnam, of Harvard University, has come to the conclusion, judging from the archeological remains brought to light by himself and other explorers, that there were anciently four great races on this continent which are resolvable into two—long-headed people and people with short and broad heads. The former he supposes to have come from northern Asia by Behring Strait, and the latter, who resembled the Malays, indirectly from southern Asia. It is interesting to compare Professor Putnam's views with those of Dr. Brinton who, while not claiming an antechthonous origin for the American race, affirms that they could have come from no other quarter than western Europe before the close of the last Glacial Epoch. Notwithstanding this and other conclusions which might be questioned, Dr. Brinton's book contains a large mass of valuable material, the accumulation of which has required much labor, and which will be of great use when a really scientific classification of the American peoples is attempted on other than a linguistic basis.

U.

THE SAGA LIBRARY. Vol. I. The Story of Howard the Halt. The Story of the Banded Men. The Story of Hen Thorir. Done into English out of the Icelandic. By William Morris and Eirike Magnússon. London: Bernard Quaritch. 1891.

The three Sagas contained in this first volume of the projected Saga Library, graphically illustrate the "leonine" state of society that prevailed in Iceland throughout the "land-take" period and even during the first five decades after the introduction of Christianity. It is superfluous to recapitulate here the historical causes to which Iceland owed her unique national literature, or the peculiar local causes that directly called forth the domestic or family-sagas of Iceland. Besides an instructive introduction presenting to the reader the general outlines of Icelandic history and literature, the translators have also thoughtfully furnished a correct map of the country in which each of these sagas took place. The reader need only cast a glance at these maps, and observe the close boundary-lines of the respective settlements or "land-takes," at the same time recalling to mind the fierce independence and individuality of character of the settlers themselves, to easily understand that frequent feuds and tragedies were almost unavoidable, while also the customary law of the time made vengeance for injuries "not a mere satisfaction of private passion, but a public duty, owing to the tribe or family, by no means to be neglected by a man of honor." But not only did the stirring events come to pass, but they were described, chronicled, and handed down by Icelandic saga-men and historians in a highly dramatic, national form, created by themselves, and entirely free from the irksome fetters of medieval pedantry and latinism. Of all historians the Icelandic saga-man is probably the most forgetful of his own personal self. He is entirely absorbed by the reality of the events that he is relating; he even avoids making any commentary on the same, discussing the motives or feelings of the actors, or betraying his own private feelings. On the other hand, the actors themselves furnish to the reader a really interesting psychological and ethical study. Men are seen to act bravely, nobly, to be just and temperate without any apparent external inducement. There is no one present to reward, no one to applaud the humane or brave action, and yet the arduous course of virtue and goodness is freely adopted, without heeding the consequences. Overweening pride, oppression, cruelty, like-wise, are seen revelling in the superabundance of their physical strength, their intellectual gifts and talent of racial leadership. And yet, whether good or bad, we are forced to recognise a certain moral soundness in the inmost nature of the men themselves. The peerless *Gunnar Hamundsson*, for example, after in self-defence killing a number of men, one fine day sits musing on the stirring events of his own life, and suddenly he declares to his own inner self, "that somehow he always had felt that killing your own enemy was not by any means the test or token of true bravery." But he did not, could not go any further; this painful consciousness to him remained entirely an inexplicable riddle. Another interesting trait. In all of these heathen sagas, base actions, and moral deformities, meet with no approval or encouragement, but are constantly held up to scorn and contempt; while invariably they close with the triumph of all those qualities which at all times ought to adorn brave and honorable men. In this volume, in the saga of Howard the Halt, the first of these sagas so admirably "done into English out of the Icelandic" by Mr. William Morris, the subject matter is the un hoped for triumph of an old and seemingly worn-out man over his oppressive and powerful enemies. In the second saga, the saga of the "Banded Men" we have a dramatic and masterly denunciation of the administration of justice in those days, of judicial red-tape and of the empty formalities of law. The third saga—the saga of "Hen Thorir" illustrates several interesting points relating to the organisation and legislation of the Icelandic Commonwealth at the close of the land-taking period.

By the publication of this Saga-Library the energetic and intelligent publisher Mr. Bernard Quaritch of London has rendered an important service to the general reading public of England and America, and to the students of history throughout the civilised world.

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NOTES.

There has just been published for general circulation a most interesting pamphlet, containing a good likeness of Col. Robert G. Ingersoll and articles from the following well-known writers: R. G. Ingersoll, Thaddeus B. Wakeman, Matilda Joslyn Gage, Helen H. Gardener, Rev. Henry Frank, Nelly Booth Simmons, A. B. Bradford, Parker Pillsbury, Lucy N. Colman, Capt. R. C. Adams, Prof. A. L. Rawson, Lyman C. Howe, Susan H. Wixon, Allen Pringle, Wm. Emmette Coleman, Harry Hoover, Mrs. M. A. Freeman, Rev. J. C. Grumbine, J. J. McCabe, Lydia R. Chase, Henry M. Taber, J. C. Watkins, Dr. Edward Montgomery, Emma Rood Tuttle, Dr. Juliet Severance, Hudson Tuttle, E. C. Walker, Judge C. B. Waite, Dyer D. Lum, Voltairine de Cleyre, Lewis G. Janes and Dr. Richard Hodgson.

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THE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION MOVEMENT.

BY FRANCIS CHURCHILL WILLIAMS.

NO IDEA, perhaps, has been more generally misunderstood than that expressed in the words University Extension. To the people at large, who have not made themselves conversant with the movement and its aims, the idea is a vague one, referable to some sort of attempt to increase the scope of our Universities and higher educational institutions. Or, perhaps, when a little investigation has been made, it is declared an effort to educate the lower classes. Both these conceptions are, as they stand, erroneous. University Extension is an attempt to increase the influence of the Universities, not as a finality but as the means to an end:—namely—the higher education of the masses. Neither does it aim at reaching the lower and more ignorant classes alone. In fact a certain amount of preliminary learning must be possessed by every one before he can reap the advantages of the system.

Still another misapprehension, which has greatly hindered the progress of the work, has been that the taking up of study under the movement involved an abandonment of other occupations, and the artisan with ambitions rising above his tools, saw starvation in the near future, if he should embrace the opportunities afforded him for realising his hopes. The idea of the daily routine of the school, and the daily enforced hours of manual labor has become so fixed in his mind, as to render absurd to him the conception of attending to education and livelihood at the same time. The school has always been introductory to the life work. Here is the flaw in all education systems up to this time, and this evil is the one which University Extension seeks to remedy. It would equalise and harmonise the education of the mind and the performance of life's every-day duties, and, by inducing a proper balance, make the future man symmetrical. The public schools teach the a, b, c's; it is for the new system to open to every man and woman opportunities for research and cultivation.

University Extension is the natural outcome of a need for a higher, a broader education among the people. The same desire for learning, which led to the foundation of such Universities as Cambridge and Oxford in past years, is now crying loudly for popular

education. Originating in such a source and having such a force constantly urging it on, University Extension is inevitable. It is but a question whether, we or a future generation shall witness its final establishment. The great results achieved by, and the immense enthusiasm displayed in, the movement in England, and the rapid advancement of the recently formed American Society for the Extension of University Teaching seems to indicate that the right system has been arrived at.

The success of the American Society, while it was expected by those interested in the movement, was one in the path of which were many obstacles. The problem of the education of a population, such as the United States possesses, was a radically different one from that presented to the founders of the Extension system in England, and those desirous of the establishment of the movement here, saw that they would have many difficulties to overcome before they could hope for success. A careful study of the English Society strengthened this feeling, but at the same time discovered that a modification of the methods might be made which would render possible its successful establishment.

Those opposed to the movement, or not sanguine of its success, declared that it was uncalled for; that the demand was not sufficient to support it, and in proof of their statements, showed, that we were already possessed of a far larger proportion of colleges than any other country. They seemed to lose sight of the fact that University Extension does not aim at giving the same education as that furnished by the Universities themselves. The plan addressed itself to the busy people of the country, not to the "leisure" class, if such there be. The Universities afford instruction only to the latter. University Extension limits its power of educating only by the length of life of its pupil. The University's curriculum is bounded, at the most, by a post graduate course or two.

At present instruction at Universities is compulsory,—though there is a tendency to allow more freedom. The new method is voluntary in the broadest sense of the word. It is therefore easy to be seen that the greatest differences exist between the methods pursued by the two systems.

Though in their nature so different, University

Teaching and the Extension instruction are by no means opposed. The first can be of the greatest assistance to the latter, in increasing its power and effectiveness. Through the colleges the movement can progress, and usually does, far more rapidly than when obliged to depend solely upon itself; though the presence of such educational institutions is by no means necessary to success. If the colleges afford aid to the Extension movement, they can, in a measure, influence it and advantages are certain to accrue to both sides through their mutual relations. The University professor represents the scholastic side of education—the Extension lecturer the practical side; reciprocal advantages will be reaped wherever they work together.

The one, through constant association with the scholar, obtains a deeper and more accurate insight into the subjects of study. The other, through contact with people of average culture, in an atmosphere entirely unlike that of the classroom, is brought more closely in touch with human nature and his views thus become broadened, while, upon the people whom he seeks to instruct, the result of the intercourse is a stimulating of the general desire for learning and an elevation of the popular educational standard.

In America the available material is so diversified and so widely distributed, that the organisation of the extension system demands new methods of procedure.

How we can best treat this mass, so changeable in character, is a question which is more easily answered than may be imagined. We have here, in one community, and perhaps equally anxious for instruction; the man who labors all day at breaking stones and whose education is probably limited to an ability to read and write, and the poor scholar whose literary attainments are of a high order. Between these are to be found people varying in every degree of knowledge.

To meet the needs of widely different classes is the task presented to the American Society. The effort of education heretofore has been to fix upon principles and then compel the learners conformity thereto. The new system proceeds according to a directly opposite method. The pupil is not to be fitted to rules already determined on, but, by studying his characteristics and discovering the limitations of his ability, the effort is made to adapt the methods to him.

No system of education which binds the student to preconceived regulations will achieve as great success as that which formulates those regulations upon a study of *each* pupil. It can never be expected that every man drinking at the Pierian spring will take away with him an equal quantity of the waters of learning. Each has his capacity and must drink in his own way; it is the Educators part to supply the waters in plenty and of a nature to benefit. This, then, is the general character and aim of the movement.

To the end that we may understand how the Society has sought to reach the people, let us take a look at its practical workings in America. And, first as to organisation.

Philadelphia, owing to the nature of its surroundings and the large number of tributary suburban places, was selected as the most available city for the introduction of the system. The city itself being of large area, and possessing a population so varied in degrees of intellectual activity, offered every advantage for the experiment.

The presence of a great number of colleges within a short distance was also of importance, as it was from these that the organisers saw they must draw their first aid. The effort met with almost universal approval from the beginning, and nearly every educational institution called upon, responded nobly. Here, then, was the means; the next step was to arrive at the correct method. The English movement offered the groundwork for this latter, and the American Society for the Extension of University Teaching was organised.

Now comes the practical work of the Society—the establishment of the “local centres,” as they are called. It is through these that the movement first shows its effects, and it is in the organisation of these and in the methods of their conduct that the greatest skill is required.

Almost every locality, which includes a population possessed of some central interest, offers facilities for the establishment of a centre. The important matter is to understand what that subject of central interest is. Upon this preliminary study of the people who will hereafter form the material upon which the lecturer will have to work, depends largely future success. Very often those anxious for the establishment of the centre, can, and do advise, as to the subjects of general interest. If this can be discovered at an early day, much time can thereby be saved. It is the effort of the Society in the organisation of local centres, however, to work as much as possible through institutions which have already established themselves. Very generally such organisations are willing to aid the Society by allowing the use of their rooms or halls as lecturing places. This securing of one fixed place in which to draw together audiences is of the greatest importance, as it gives a character of permanence and stability to the new centre in every way advantageous.

A committee of those interested in the movement in that vicinity is then formed and, as soon as it is seen that there is need for the centre and that it is possible to carry it on, an organisation is effected by the election of a president, secretary, and executive committee. The future work is then laid out and the centre is established. The centre *now* has become

largely a self-governing body. It will be dependent upon itself for the future direction its study may take, and though the central Society will always be ready to aid it by advice, the shaping of its course will be left in its own hands.

Until recently the central Society found itself capable of managing the local centres—but the time has now arrived when this is impossible and the foundation of branch societies has been begun in each state, whose business it shall be to exercise just such a supervision over the local centres within their several boundaries as does the central Society over those now in existence. When this shall have been done, the American Society will confine its supervision more directly to the branch societies.

The funds necessary to the support of these branches have been so far supplied by generous contributions from prominent men and by the liberal efforts of many well-known teachers. For the next five years a guarantee fund which has been raised, insures the continuance of the movement, and it is hoped by that time so general will have become the recognition of the merits of the system, that the support will continue to be forthcoming.

Having now seen the plans of organisation and the means by which the movement seeks to reach the people, it will be well to look into the methods pursued by the lecturer and, in a general way, the system of instruction.

It is hardly necessary to state that *all* instruction is *primarily* by means of lectures. These lectures, however, do not assume the form usually attributed to that method of teaching. The usual position assumed by the lecturer is that of superiority. He is giving to his audience information on his subject which they must accept if they would learn. The extension lecturer does not strive so much to actually teach as to *suggest* to the minds of his listeners ideas which they for themselves must afterward develop. He selects the more prominent and striking points which his subject presents and brings these forcibly and clearly before his audience. He should not only understand the subject himself but should possess the faculty of imparting his knowledge in a way which the people before him will understand. To accomplish this he must be versatile in his treatment of all subjects upon which he undertakes to lecture. He should have studied his audience at previous lectures and each meeting will naturally bring him into sympathy with them. The method of treatment which suits the auditors of one lecture, may be entirely unsuited to the assemblage before which the lecturer must come later on the same day. Not only will this diversity of mental attitude be found at lectures given at different times, but at the

same lecture—men and women of widely divergent intellectual perceptions will attend.

To suit the particular taste of each one will of course be impossible—but, though each be individual in his liking, all are presumably possessed of a common thirst for information and the effort must be made to suit the subject and treatment of it to the gathering as a whole. To do this the lecturer must have examined his subject under those lights which his audience separately may have used or will use in their study. In other words, he must put himself in the place of his auditors, and realising that the practical view of life must govern his treatment in order to bring it home to those who listen, he must endeavor to establish a connection between his knowledge and that before possessed by them. He must be *en rapport* with his audience. But more than anything else he must evince a true earnestness in the study of his subject. By far the most successful teachers have been those who have not allowed themselves to present to their hearers the instructor's side only, but who, when the lecture was over, stood ready to answer questions and to advise all who came for help. Indeed it may be doubted whether any one can accomplish the results desired unless he be willing to do this.

Apart, however, from the personal qualities and abilities of the lecturer, the choice of subjects for study is one requiring considerable consideration and insight into character. Since it has been found, as we have said, impossible to suit every person who will attend the lectures, the only resource is to make the system of instruction of such a nature that each may develop the subject on his own lines. The system must be an elastic one. To accomplish this, the work is commenced in any one locality with what is known as a unit—in other words, six or twelve weekly or fortnightly lectures on a single subject. When the public's pulse has been felt as it were, its wants can be judged more accurately and the lecturing can be suited to the community. It is the aim of the system, however, not only to give detached courses on separate subjects, but as the demand grows for a more extended and detailed study of one subject, to make certain courses introductory to others. This will generally be accomplished, not by a continuance of study on a single subject through more than one course, but by the simultaneous development of different divisions of that subject at various centres within easy reach of each other, each course being complete in itself.

The period during which courses of lectures are delivered has been divided into terms, the three months preceding Christmas being known as the first term, the three immediately following it as the second. Each lecture consumes about an hour in delivery and all courses are open to the public upon the payment of a small fee.

As may be supposed, among those who attend any of the courses, a certain number will be found who are possessed of a desire to make a more systematic study of the subject, and to these the Class; the second element in the system,—offers the means for accomplishing their purpose. This class may either precede or follow the regular lecture, though in America it has been found best generally to have it follow, and its object is to allow the student, by personal contact with the lecturer, to come to a better understanding of the principles of the subject and to have elucidated his particular difficulties. Here the opinions expressed in the papers, (to be spoken of later on,) are discussed. The lecturer reads extracts from those which express some new or original view and a discussion follows, in which some retiring student, who has been thought to have possessed but little interest in the matter on account of his very quietness, is probably drawn into the argument and proves himself not only an attentive listener, but a powerful and original thinker.

A stimulus is imparted to every student in the class and many a side light is thrown upon the subject which the lecturer would never have developed. Indeed by many persons, and with justice, the class is considered the most interesting and useful part of the system. Though criticism is general, when derogatory, its object is always the class, when favorable, the individual. In this way all ill feeling is excluded and the students separately are encouraged.

Next in order, and that which the student can if he desires make more useful to him than any other part of the system, is the syllabus. In this the entire work is contained though by reference not in detail. What is to be studied is laid down in systematic order and the questions and directions for the future exercises or weekly papers are given. Here are marked those works which bear on the subject and by means of a study of which it can be more thoroughly understood. It is by the syllabus that the lecturer guides the course taken by the mind stimulated to effort through his lectures. These syllabuses, of course, in a measure must be modified according to the character of the students and the effort to keep in sympathy with the class must be sustained.

Prof. R. G. Moulton, one of the Society's most brilliant and successful lecturers, says, in speaking of the syllabus: "In the question of method I have been led by experience to adopt as a rule of thumb the principle that the logical order is sure to be the wrong order for exposition. The great difference between a specialist and a general audience is that he is at home in abstract thinking while they are accustomed to the concrete. Thus it pays to get without delay in each lecture to the concrete actual facts or observations, or

(in literature) extracts, etc., and let discussions of these come after. Popular audiences will stand a good deal of refining if they have first been warmed up with something tangible and human."

The arrangement of Weekly Papers for which the syllabus has suggested material contains the very essence of the system, as it brings out the individuality of each student, and at once shows to what extent he has profited by that which the lecturer has said and what amount of original thinking and research he has done. In so far as it furnishes subjects for discussion at the next class, it both demonstrates to the writer his mistakes, and shows to his fellow students points they had overlooked or neglected. In every class, of course, there will be those who, though they have the desire to do original work, lack the creative power. These must be trained to instruct; and the only way to accomplish this, is to give them questions to work on, which are within their power to discuss intelligently. It has been found that capability, for original work has been greatly increased through the stimulating example of others and through individual practice.

On the other hand, there are frequently those who possess an unusual amount of creative ability and who are anxious to pursue still more energetically the original work than even the regular system of syllabus class and lecture affords facilities for. The formation of what are known as students associations is the outgrowth of the needs of these persons. These associations are, as the name implies, bodies composed of those who attend the class and who meet prior to the regular assemblage to discuss any questions which may arise. The result of such meetings has been found very beneficial, as previous arguments having probably stripped many questions of all useless and confusing appendages, they can be brought forward in a way to be readily explained to the class as a whole.

Open to all those who have done the weekly work to the satisfaction of the lecturer, are the examinations, upon the results of which, in connection with the worth of the exercises, are awarded the certificates. This point, however, is of the greatest importance; that these can *never* rest upon the quality of work done in either exercise or examination, but upon that done in both. By this method is avoided all unfairness to the student. Some of those who attend the class and who are incapable of giving papers of a very high order, have an ability to grasp the entire subject which enables them to show examination papers of great excellence; while others whose tendency it is rather to concentrate their minds upon points immediately under consideration, lack the quality necessary to pass a good examination.

The plan of issuing certificates adopted by the University Extension Society allows an equal chance

to each. In England these certificates have a decided value and the English Universities do not refuse to recognise their worth, often, indeed, taking them as the equivalent of a stated amount of work.

What the value of the certificates will be in America, it is yet too early to say, but inasmuch as residence is necessary to a degree in England, while no such limitation is operative here, there is good reason to expect a yet fuller recognition of them than that accorded abroad.

As the American Society has increased in size and the requirements of its work become more numerous, it has been obliged to meet the wants of still another class than those to which University Extension teaching was an actuality. This class is one which is unable even to take advantage of the lectures and regular methods of the movement.

The new side of the question is the extension of the University teaching to home students—those unable to attend lectures, etc. There has been no question of course but that the most advantageous system was that which brought the teacher and his pupil together and that that he taught by word of mouth, was the most beneficial and lasting; but the Society saw that it had become a duty to meet the needs of this new class.

The Home Study method attempts this. It is guided by the same thought and aims at the same end as University Extension proper. There are six means by which the attainment of the desired result is sought.

The first of these is the Prepared Courses of University Institution. These are printed arrangements of certain graduated courses; extending over seven months study, and of which in all there are twenty-eight, making a complete four years course, certainly sufficient, if the student apply himself honestly to his work, to acquire a thorough understanding of the subjects they treat of.

Second. The Appointment of the Best Text Books, Books of Reference and of General Study. The object of this is to make a proper selection of text books for the student who is at a loss what to choose from the wealth of knowledge before him.

Third. Prepared Lectures. These are as their name implies, series of prepared and printed lectures which are sent to the home student for study. In order to bring the student as much in contact with the lecturer, as possible, a regular correspondence between the two is carried on. Here the Home Study nearly attains to the perfection acquired by the regular methods of University teaching.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth points are, the issuing of *examination papers* upon the completion of each course, to be answered before some authorised person. *Theses*, which the students are expected to write from

time to time. Here the personality of the student is brought out and the teacher obtains an insight into his mind.

Sixth. *Periodic Examinations Conducted in Person.* These are the regular examinations of the system and are the criterion by which a decision as to the issuing of certificates is reached.

Here we have a system reaching the most isolated and hard worked student, and continuing the greater work of the regular system to completion.

Can we expect anything but entire and lasting success for such a movement?

BEN-MIDRASH, THE GARDENER OF GALILEE.

It is now many hundred years almost two thousand years ago when there was a gardener living in Galilee by the lakeside who raised fine grapes, figs, peaches and all kinds of good fruit and also flowers. The gardener's name was Ben-Midrash and he was an industrious man who worked hard and all his heart was in his work.

It happened about that time that a prophet arose in Galilee who was called Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus went about the country preaching and saying: "Repent for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," and his fame went throughout all Syria.

Ben-Midrash had a friend whose name was Zebedee and Zebedee was a fisher. Zebedee had two sons whom he named James and John. One evening Ben-Midrash was watering the trees and the vines in his vineyard, when Zebedee entered and said: "Be glad in the Lord and rejoice with me, for my old days shall see the glory of my sons. I was sitting yesterday with my sons on the ship mending my nets and Jesus of Nazareth passed by. He saw us and watched my boys for some time, and when they looked up to him and greeted him with the holy word Shalomlecha, Peace be with you, he said unto them: 'Follow me and I will make you fishers of men.' And my sons immediately left the ship and me and followed him."

Said Ben-Midrash to Zebedee: "What sayest thou? Thou rejoicest at the behavior of thy boys who have left their father in his old age, following the voice of some unknown prophet? Jesus of Nazareth may be a false prophet. The scribe of our synagogue has warned me not to listen to the speech of this man."

Said Zebedee: "Thou didst never hear Jesus of Galilee speak to the people. If thou hadst heard him speak, thou wouldst not say that which thou dost say. Thou wouldst know that he is Christ and the time will come when he will be the king of Israel and my sons will share all the glory of his kingdom."

Said Ben-Midrash: "Thou art a fool to be merry on account of a misfortune that has befallen thee. Jesus

of Nazareth confoundeth the souls of men. He has confounded also the souls of James and John, thy sons."

Since this day Zebedee and Ben Midrash ceased to be friends.

And it happened that Jesus came into that region of the country near the sea of Galilee and multitudes went out to hear his voice and to listen to the speech of his mouth and Zebedee went also, but his heart was full of misgivings and he said unto himself: "This man is a deceiver." But when Jesus opened his mouth and spoke his blessings over the poor in spirit, over those that mourn, over the meek, over those that hunger and thirst after righteousness, over the merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers and over those that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, he grew cheerful and forgot all his misgivings. A strange joy came over him and he felt light as if he had shaken off all the burdens of his soul. He now understood the power that had drawn James and John to this wonderful man.

Jesus spoke about the fulfilment of the law, he spoke about the perfection of God and about the kingdom of God and all the words of Jesus were like music to his ears. Jesus warned the people of false prophets and said: "Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles? A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit."

When Ben-Midrash heard Jesus speak of fruit, he thought of his garden at home and said to himself: This man speaketh of things of which he knoweth nothing. And bitterness came over Ben-Midrash's soul and he listened no longer to the words of Jesus but went away full of indignation.

Ben-Midrash's garden was sheltered by a strong hedge of thorns and he went about and cut off with a sharp knife a stalk thereof. He grafted the twig of a sweet vine into the stem of the cut off thorn and took good care of it.

Some time had passed and the inoculated thorn commenced to blossom and to bear fruit. And lo! the blossoms were blossoms of the vine and the fruits promised to become good sweet grapes.

On one morning in the fall Ben-Midrash stood at the gate before his garden looking at the grapes which he expected to gather from his thorn and he said unto himself: Now I know in truth that Jesus of Nazareth is no prophet of God but a deceiver. And when he lifted his eyes, he saw Jesus pass by in the street. And he stopped Jesus and said to him: "Art thou not Jesus of Nazareth and didst thou not speak to us from the mount?"

Jesus answered: "Thou sayest so. I am Jesus of Nazareth and I spoke to you from the mount."

Said Ben-Midrash: "Didst thou not say that men

cannot gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles? Lo! I have raised grapes that grow upon thorns. What sayest thou now? Art thou truly a prophet, and hast thou truly been sent by God?"

Jesus looked at the grapes that had grown on the thorn and then he looked Ben-Midrash straight into the eye and his look went deep into his heart.

"Ben-Midrash," he said, "thou hast done well to graft the vine upon the thorn of thy vineyard. Thou askest me whether I am a true prophet. Observe what I am doing. I do the same unto men which thou hast done unto the thorn. David cried to the Lord: 'Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me.' As the thorn can be inoculated with nobler plants so the heart can be with a divine spirit. My work is to graft purity and righteousness into the souls of men. Thy thorn hath ceased to be a thorn; it hath become a vine. The thorn of thy hedge is hardy, and I see in thy eyes that it is as hardy as thyself. Thou art a man of strength and thy hands are the hands of a worker, but the fruits which thou bringest forth are not grapes. The briars and brambles of bitterness are the harvest of thy heart. Why dost thou not do the same unto thy heart as thou hast done unto the thorn? Plant the word of truth into thy soul and it will bring forth the sweet grapes of divine grace, of righteousness and of love."

Ben-Midrash bowed down before Jesus and said: "What is my soul but a thorn; cut down its prickly branches and graft thy own soul into me."

Jesus laid his hand upon his head and said: "Be it so!"

The souls of men are like trees. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. The wickedness of man is great. Nevertheless there is salvation for his soul. The thorns that are inoculated with the sweet vine will bring forth no thorns but grapes.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

It is a blemish in government by party, that the gravest questions of state policy are looked at through the medium of party spirit, and "enterprises of great pith and moment" are decided by party needs. That the dispute with Chile would assume a party form was inevitable, especially as the quarrel broke out when the people were in the fever of a political campaign. The party in power urges the administration to chastise Chile in a prompt and spirited way; while the party out of power advises moderation, magnanimity, and a stately diplomacy worthy of a great nation; standing ready, should its advice be adopted, to denounce it as a surrender of the national dignity, pusillanimous, and weak.

Some years ago, when Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State, in place of Mr. Evarts, Col. Ingersoll said, "Now we shall have more of the Eagle in our foreign politics, and less of the Owl." Although the owl is considered wiser than the eagle, he does not "soar" so high; he is not so theatrical in public, nor so "aggressive"; hence, under the rule of universal suffrage the eagle will be for a very long time to come the most popular of all the fowls

of the air. Thus it is, that in government by party, the Ins and the Outs, on most questions of foreign policy, become respectively the Eagles and the Owls. There are, however, men, inside and outside of all parties, who, regardless of the elections, apply moral statesmanship to the solution of all international disputes, and sometimes those higher-law politicians prevail, even against the eagles and the owls. Privately, I doubt the martial prowess of the eagle. I think that his bold and spirited ruffle is a humbug and a show. In the army I had an eagle for a comrade. He belonged to the 8th Wisconsin, and was familiarly called "Old Abe." I saw him often on the march, and he always appeared to be disgusted with a soldier's life and with all the paraphernalia of war. I verily believe that if he had not been chained to a perch, he would have deserted.

* * *

In the controversy with Chile the United States is embarrassed by the tragedy at New Orleans, and although the political difference between the murder of the Italians there, and the murder of the Americans at Valparaiso can be demonstrated, the fact that it has to be explained is awkward. It is true that we have only the American side of the Chilean story, but it has official sanction, and may be considered authentic in all important parts. It is clear that the tragedy at Valparaiso was not a fight, for no Chileans were injured in the riot; and this verifies the statement that the Americans were unarmed. It was an international murder, if such a thing can be, an attack upon the American people, and the President of the United States is justified in demanding reparation and apology from the Chilean government. It is not to be presumed that he will do so like a cowboy, but in a calm and magisterial way. It is finely sentimental to talk about the magnanimity due from a great nation to a small one; but the obligation is reciprocal, and the weak nation cannot be permitted to take refuge in its own insignificance. Magnanimity is due from the weak to the strong. I have seen an old man, safe in his infirmity, revile a young man, but that was not magnanimous. At the close of the war, just after the surrender of General Lee, in a certain city of the South which was under my control, I had occasion to assert the national authority, and protect the flag from petty insults, by some orders of which the citizens complained; and one of them, a very important personage, reminded me that magnanimity was due from the victors to the vanquished. When I retorted that magnanimity was also due from the vanquished to the victors, he confessed that he had never thought of that.

* * *

There are cynical moralists, mostly aged men, who find a stimulating pleasure in contrasting the physical greatness of a nation with its political smallness. They laugh ironically when the great American republic in its wealth, condescends to statesmanship too small for the little Swiss republic in its poverty. They indulge in the sneer sinister when they see the Americans, complacent and contented, submitting to petty tyrannies which other peoples not so free would not endure at all. Hamlet gravely contemplated suicide when he thought about "the insolence of office, and the spurns which patient merit of the unworthy takes"; but the Americans endure all that, not only without contemplating suicide, but at last with a sort of inverted national pride. We acquire a relish for it after long suffering, as people do for olives. We get laws made, at higher prices than any other people pay, and then we allow them to be construed, interpreted, modified, expanded, and contracted by an expensive bureaucracy, until the administration of them becomes a complicated and uncertain system of Government by the Departments; the Hon. Secretary, and the Hon. Commissioner, with deputies by the hundred, twisting the laws out of all shape and symmetry to fit the necessities of special cases, or to gratify the whims of the hour; and every eccentricity of government by the Departments is called "a new

construction of the law." A fantastic specimen of this irritating style of government, was exhibited a few days ago. A book, worth a dollar and a quarter, was sent by a gentleman in England to his friend in Chicago. At the post office it was promptly "seized" for non-payment of duty, and the owner was duly notified. He went to the Custom House and was told that he must not only pay the tariff, but also a fine equal to the full price of the book. "Why," he said, "you never extorted that before." "No," said the officer in a tone of mournful reprobation, "but this is a new construction of the law. However, as this is your first offense, we will not exact the penalty this time. Pay the tariff, take your book, and don't do it again." "But," said the victim of this new construction, "I haven't done anything." "Well," replied the officer, "Don't do it again."

* * *

Hercules looking for a butterfly that he may knock its brains out with his club, will fairly represent the United States of America looking for a baby's night cap in the mails to devour it as contraband of trade. I know a baby, an American baby too, who received from his grandmother in Europe a present in a letter which immediately became "suspect." This letter was arrested by the Post Office Department, and committed for trial to the Custom House Department, on the felonious charge of containing something liable to a tariff tax. The baby's father was notified in proper official jargon to appear and open the letter in the presence of the authorities duly commissioned and appointed to try suspected letters. He went up to the department, the "suspect" was produced, and the judges sat upon it solemn as a coroner's jury. The letter was opened, and the felonious contraband within it was dragged from its lurking place. It proved to be a jacket for a little boy baby; and it was knit for him by his grandmother across the sea. The guilty jacket was ordered for instant execution, but the baby's father, on payment of the fine assessed against it, was allowed to rescue the jacket and take it home to the baby. That same lady, still unlearned in the laws of the United States, sent also a pair of silk stockings in a letter, and these went through the same ordeal as the baby jacket, but they were saved from confiscation by the opportune payment of a tribute amounting to one dollar and a half, the fine duly assessed by the jury that sat upon the stockings. I am told by persons who have studied political economy that in this case "the foreigner paid the tax"; if so, I think it was very diminutive statesmanship that required her to pay it. And even if the American baby paid it, or his father, it would still be a Cheap John stroke of business very well adapted to the pygmy government of Lilliput.

* * *

What is a prose poem? Is it an exciting story born of the imagination, stirring the pulses like a drink of wine, and teaching by its moral; or is it a story real and true, which by its pathos and its fascination seems like some wonderful creation of the brain? I know what a verse poem is; for instance, this:

"When can their glory fade?
O the wild charge they made!
All the world wondered,
Honor the charge they made!
Honor the Light Brigade!
Noble six hundred!"

There is a stirring sound in that, like the bugle stimulus itself, and I know that it is poetry; but what is this? A story told by one of the "noble six hundred." Is this a poem too? First, let me preface it with a prose introduction, a commonplace police report which I find in a London paper, "James Kennedy, a tall, white-haired old man of seventy-four, had some drink given to him on Sunday because he was one of the 'six hundred,' who charged the Russians at Balaclava. He became so noisy as the drink took effect on him, that he was taken into custody. When arraigned

before the magistrate on Monday morning to answer for his crime, he made an excuse which appears to me like poetry; and I have thrown it into blank verse, preserving the words of the prisoner as he spoke them:

"I am getting very old sir; nearly seventy-four,
I was in the charge at Balaclava; and if I said,
What I should not have said, I am sorry.
Sir, I am destitute; and for several nights,
I walked the streets in the cold. I had nothing to eat,
And when somebody gave me drink, it came over me.
I was in the 17th Lancers in the charge at Balaclava.
I will go into the workhouse if you will not punish me.
I am getting too old for this world altogether."

I think the speech of that old soldier is a prose poem which might fittingly go along with Tennyson's own "Charge." The London paper from which I copy, heads its account ironically, thus: "When can their glory fade?" To that I answer: It has faded. It is a sad story.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE STORY OF THE ERE-DWELLERS. Done into English out of the Icelandic by William Morris and Eiríkr Magnússon. London: Bernard Quaritch, 15 Piccadilly. 1892.

This second volume of "The Saga Library" contains an English version of the "The Ere-Dwellers," and, as appendix, a translation of the stirring story "The Heath-Slayings." The saga of the Ere-Dwellers admittedly ranks high, both as family-saga, and as a quaint, faithful picture of the turbulent public life of the several temple-communes of the early days of the Icelandic commonwealth. The whole extent of the northern shore of the Snowfjellness, on the west-coast of Iceland, the Thorsness, with the adjacent country, between the Hvamm- and Burg-firths, is given as the scene of the Ere-Dweller's saga. Sir Walter Scott, in his English abstract of this saga (published in 1813 in "Illustrations of Northern Antiquities," and reprinted in P. Blackwell's "Northern Antiquities") admits, that the principal actors impressed him as a high-spirited breed of men, eagerly intent on building up an orderly commonwealth; who, by their relative stage of social culture, and racial connections, were quite equal to the task. This splendid English translation, as might be expected, is a rare specimen of "saxonised" Norse, and of even more than saxonised English. Old English, Early English and Scottish dialects have also delivered their quota of words.

There are not a few pages in which there does not occur a single word of Latin derivation, and scores of pages that only contain four or five Roman words. Others may decide, whether this clever *tour de force* really renders adequate justice to the characteristics of original Icelandic saga-style. Icelandic, like any other language, possesses its own peculiar style, that does not straightway amalgamate with every other style, even the style of kindred dialects. If the "Eyrbyggja," and many other sagas had, on this principle, to accommodate themselves to Faroese, or to the style of the modern Norwegian "Bygdemal," would they not almost entirely lose their true literary identity? There are passages, also, in this saga, in which Roman words—and Roman words only—can adequately render the classical elegance and grace of the original; and, as I have said, this also applies to many other Icelandic works.

The generally well-informed translator's note to page 4, ll. 25-30, might legitimately call for a few critical remarks. "Ketil Flatneb gave his daughter Aud to Olaf the White, who at that time was the greatest war-king west-over-the-sea," etc. Mr. Morris comments on this passage: "We have here an instance of the manner in which Icelandic aristocrats would connect their ancestors," etc. The "Icelandic aristocrat" here particularly alluded to is none other than the meek and learned priest Ari Thorgilsson; because Mr. Morris admits, that the descent of Olaf the White is due to Ari,

the learned, who, in his capacity of national historian, was bound to write down the genealogies of the Icelandic settlers, and the record agrees with a number of other sources. But, in a contemporary Irish record, "Three Fragments," ed. by O'Donovan, 1860, "which scholars agree in regarding as a generally trustworthy source for Irish history, the descent of Olaf is also given"; but it disagrees with the genealogical record of Ari the learned.

This Irish genealogical record however shows, that it did not even know the correct names of the men themselves. The Irish record gives: Ragnall-Godfred-Olaf (no surname). Of course, the two former are utterly un-Norse names. Instead of "Godfred," the Icelandic record has "Guthrod"; and here Mr. Morris at least might have consulted Prof. A. P. Munch's "Chronicle of the Kings of Man." Olaf, surnamed "the White," from policy, perhaps, affected the popular white mantel of the brotherhood of St. Columban. That, moreover, points to the direction, whence he came. From the same motives he may also have married an Irish princess, even during the life-time of his wife, queen Aud, the daughter of Ketil Flatneb; for such double, political hymens and alliances in those days would frequently occur "west-over-the-sea." Thorstein the Red, the son of Olaf the White and of Aud, had in his father's life-time conquered the northern half of Scotland. Olaf Feilan, the son of Thorstein was a child when his father was murdered in Scotland. Olaf Feilan accompanied his grandmother to Iceland. Before her departure she married her daughter Gróa (in the Gaelic form, *Gruach*) to Thorfinn, earl of the Orkneys, and, according to Professor Munch, Lady Gruach Macbeth was her descendant. The democratic Broadfirthers of Iceland did not concern themselves about King Olaf the White; descent from the Norse "hersir" Ketil, and from his daughter, queen Aud, entirely satisfied their family pride. The genealogy given by Ari to King Olaf the White, was for the king's own benefit, because, if genuine, it would, naturally, have added to the racial and historical prestige of King Olaf the White himself.

A. GUNLOGSEN.

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Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

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IMMORTALITY AND SCIENCE.

It appears as though the problem of immortality had to be solved anew by every generation. How often has the question "When a man dies shall he live again?" been answered in the affirmative as well as in the negative? But it appears that a final answer has not as yet been given. Before the court of science the religious answer "Man *shall* live again!" is a mere assertion. It is the expression of a sentiment, and we may grant that the sentiment is quite legitimate, it is a strong sentiment, and to many people it is the most religious, the most sacred sentiment. It is a holy hope without which they cannot live. How deep the roots of this sentiment are buried in many souls will be seen from the following extract from a letter which I received from a well educated gentleman whose life has been spent in teaching and who was devoting the leisure of his old age to philosophical studies. Having explained some of his scientific doubts concerning the immortality of the soul and having rejected at the same time the arguments that are generally brought forth against this belief, he adds these thrilling words:

"I am now seventy-four years old, but instead of growing more cheerful and assured, the reverse has been the case. Accordingly my present state of soul is lamentable and pitiful. Whether I shall end my life in distraction and insanity or in confidence in myself and God, I cannot say."

Granted that the belief in immortality is a legitimate sentiment; it may be a postulate and an indispensable condition of our religious life, yet as long as it remains the mere expression of a sentiment, it is one-sided and insufficient.

However, the unbeliever's answer, which so often boasts of being the voice of science, is no less one-sided. And the denial of immortality is religiously not so heterodox as most unbelievers suppose, for it has been forestalled in the Biblical sentence of Solomon:

"I said in my heart concerning the estate of the sons of men that God might manifest them,* that they might see that they themselves are beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast: for all is vanity. All go unto

* The Hebrew *leharom ka Elohim* is more correctly translated in the Septuaginta, *ὅτι διακρίνει αὐτοὺς ὁ θεός* "that God will distinguish them." The sense is: I pondered on the nature of men, whether God distinguishes them, but it appears that they are beasts.

one place; all are of the dust, and all turn unto dust again." Solomon in Eccl. iii, 18-20.

It appears from this quotation that either side of the question is quite biblical.

Goethe says:

* * *
"Hast immortality in mind
Wilt thou thy reasons give?
—The most important reason is
We can't without it live."

The belief in immortality is of paramount importance because it is a moral motive. It is perhaps the most powerful moral motive man has, and it is of great importance because if man regulates his life as if he were immortal, he will survey a larger field than if he limits his interests to the narrow span of his own individual life. In other words, the belief in immortality is useful; it induces men to adapt themselves more fully to the great social organism of mankind; it makes their life more moral. On this account it has been proposed: Let us foster the belief in immortality among the masses, although it may be untenable as a scientific conception.

This proposition has been called a *pia fraus*—a name invented for its justification, and the pious fraud method has sometimes received more credit than it deserves. Is it necessary to add that pious fraud should be denounced as immoral and objectionable under all circumstances?

If, however, the belief in immortality is indeed useful, I maintain that it must contain a truth. A falsity may be useful once or twice, or a hundred times, but it cannot be useful in the long run, for centuries and millenniums. The belief that death is no finality and that man shall live again, which so generally prevails in all our many churches and religious societies contains a truth in spite of the apparent and undeniable counter-truth that man is "like grass which groweth up; in the morning it flourisheth, and groweth up; in the evening it is cut down and withereth." [Psalm xc, 5-6.]

What is this truth? Has science, especially through the discovery of its latest great truth, the doctrine of evolution, shed any new light upon the problem? and if it has, what is the new conception of immortality as it appears from the standpoint of the evolutionist?

This magazine has been founded mainly for the

purpose of throwing light upon the idea of immortality. The founder and publisher of this magazine has repeatedly expressed his view on the subject. We quote from his articles in *The Open Court* the following pertinent passages:

"A deeper insight into the nature of the soul is furnished by modern psychology; an erroneous conception of its individuality is destroyed, but its immortality is given back to us. The souls of posterity, it is shown, will be the further evolved souls of men of to-day.

Modern psychology has been called a psychology without a soul. This is a great error. Nothing but the bad egotistical part of the soul-conception has been destroyed, the barrier between our soul and that of our fellow-beings, and also the barrier between each of us and the great continuous All has been removed." (No. I. p. 21.)

"I imagine I had died and another man was formed of living matter, so that in him the atoms were in the same relative position as in me; he would be my continuance, he would be the same man that I am, as I am the same man that I was yesterday; he would know all I know, he would feel as I do, would act as I do under the same circumstances, would give the same answer to the same question; he would have the same character, the same conscience, the same morals, *he would have my soul.*

"We can preserve and elevate the soul of the present generation and of posterity. To preserve and to elevate the quality of the human soul, that is the basis of ethics." (No. 15, p. 396.)

"And the mightiest instigation to such a preservation of the soul seems to me to be the conviction that we thereby again build up ourselves." (No. 127, p. 2068.)

The question of immortality is not beyond the pale of science. It is not only our right to investigate whether man's instinctive longing for a continued existence is justified, it is also our duty to attain to clearness concerning one of the most important and basic problems of psychology, and also of ethics. Also of ethics! For the immortality idea forms the centre of all ethical questions. It affords the strongest motive to moral action. Indeed what is morality else but the regulation of our actions with an outlook beyond the grave, it is a building up not only sufficient to hold for our life-time, but for eternity.

* * *

All living beings have a dread of annihilation; everything that exists has a tendency to continue its existence; and it will continue to exist, for there is no annihilation. Being can never change into not-being. There is annihilation only in the sense of dissolution. A certain combination ceases to exist in this form because it changes into other forms. Being exists, it is eternal, and it cannot be annihilated. Not-being does not exist and will never exist. Not-being is a nonentity, a mere fancy of our imagination. There is no reason whatever for anything that exists to fear annihilation. We may dread change, but we need not dread annihilation.

Our dread of losing consciousness is not justified. We lose consciousness every night in sleep, and it is a most beneficial recreation to us. The boiling water

may be afraid of being changed into vapor. But its fear is groundless; nature will again change the vapor into drops of water. From the surface of our planet all organised life may die off. Our solar system may crumble away into world dust, but what is that in the immeasurable whirl of suns? There are other parts of the milky way in which new worlds are forming themselves, and we have sufficient reasons to believe that the tide of life ebbs and swells in the whole universe not otherwise than autumn and spring change alternately in the northern and southern hemisphere on this planet of ours, not otherwise than waking and sleeping, activity and rest, day and night change in our lives. The single forms of life can be destroyed, but life remains eternal; life is indestructible, it is immortal.

This truth has been maintained again and again; yet many declare that it gives no satisfaction to them unless their persons are included in the general law of preservation and it is generally supposed that before the tribunal of science there seems to be little chance for proving the persistence of personality.

Nevertheless, there is a truth even in the idea of the preservation of the individual soul, and we do not hesitate to say that it is the most important aspect of the immortality idea. That the individual features of our souls are preserved has been proved by evolution. Evolution takes a higher view of life. It considers the whole race as one and recognises the continuity of life in the different generations.

Humanity lives and the individual is humanity incorporated in a distinct and special form. Humanity continues to live in spite of the bodily deaths of the individuals—and truly it continues to live in the distinct and special, in the personal and most individual forms of the individuals. Bodies pass away, but their forms are preserved and their souls are here still. The preservation of experience from generation to generation, is the condition of intellectual growth. The preservation of that which is contained in and constitutes the very personality of man is the basis of progress. In one word the immortality of the soul makes its higher evolution possible.

Evolution teaches a new conception of the soul. It destroys the old-fashioned idea of an individual. It shows that the birth of an individual so called is not a new beginning, but it is only a new start of prior life. The baby which is born to-day is a product of the sum total of the activity of its ancestors from the moment organised life first appeared upon earth. And organised life, what else is it but a special form of the cosmic life that animates the whole universe?

What is man's soul but his perceptions and thoughts, his desires, his aspirations and his impulses which under certain circumstances make him act in a certain way. In short, man's soul is the organised totality of

his ideas and ideals. These ideas and ideals of man have been formed in his brain through experience which is transmitted from generation to generation, and in preserving them we preserve the human soul.

Man's soul is not the matter of which he consists at a certain moment. Man's soul is that particular activity of his which we call his thoughts and motives. So far as our brother has the same thoughts and the same motives, he has also the same soul; and since the doctrine of evolution has become a truth recognised by science, we can with a deeper meaning repeat the ancient saw of the Hindoo sages, "*Tat twam asi*—That art thou." All living creatures are ourselves; they are in possession of souls like ourselves, and the more they feel and think and act like ourselves, the more have they our souls.

It is true that from this standpoint our souls are not something exclusively our own, they are not, as it were our private property. Our souls are in part inherited and in part implanted into us by education. The former part consists chiefly of our physical constitution and general disposition, the latter part embracing our thoughts and ideals is by far the most important one; it represents the highest and most human elements of our souls.

There is accordingly a truth in the Buddhistic doctrine of a pre-existence and migration of souls. And this truth holds good for the past as well as for the future. Soul is not an essence, but a certain kind of activity; it is a certain form of impulses, on the one hand conditioned by innumerable experiences of the past—"inherited memory" it has been called by physiologists—and on the other hand conditioning in its turn the future. This latter fact, viz. that our present soul-life is conditioning the future, it will at once be understood, is the most important ethical truth. It must be borne in mind when we are about to act, that every act of ours continues in its consequences. The act may be unimportant, and the consequences may be unimportant too, nevertheless it continues with the same necessity as that every cause has its effect.

Death is no finality, and we must not form our rules of conduct to accord with the idea that the exit of our individual life is the end of all. Says W. K. Clifford in his essay "The Unseen Universe":

"The soldier who rushes on death does not know it as extinction; in thought he lives and marches on with the army, and leaves with it his corpse upon the battle field. The martyr cannot think of his own end because he lives in the truth he has proclaimed; with it and with mankind he grows into greatness through ever new victories over falsehood and wrong.

For you, noble and great ones, who have loved and labored yourselves not for yourselves but for the universal folk, in your time not for your time only but for the coming generations, for you there shall be life as broad and far-reaching as your love, for you life-

giving action to the utmost reach of the great wave whose crest you sometimes were!

The preservation of the special and most individual contents of man's personality, the preservation of that something in him which he regards as the best and most valuable part of him is the strongest motive for moral action. Even an unclear idea of the immortality of the soul is therefore better and truer than the flat denial of it. And this is the main reason why the churches survived in the struggle for existence against those people who looked upon death as an absolute finality. The ethics and ethical motives of the churches come nearer the truth than the ethics of those who believe that the death of the individual ends all of the individual, body and soul.

* * *

Here I might rest my case. But I feel that those who attach to the belief in immortality the idea of a transcendent existence in some kind of heaven, are disappointed because I have not as they suppose, touched the most vital point of the subject. I grant that from their standpoint, I am guilty of this mistake. The reason is that I have tried to state the positive view of the problem and not its negative aspect.

Immortality means the continuance of life after death; continuance means a further duration of the present state. If you mean by immortality, the soul's existence in the shape of a bodiless ghost, you should first prove the existence of bodiless ghosts. Our experience knows only of souls which are the activity of organisms in their awareness of self. You cannot preserve what you do not have, and you should not worry about losing something you never possessed; in fact you cannot lose it. If immortality of the soul means an existence as pure spirit, this would not be a continuance of life after death, but the new creation of an entirely different being about the mere possibility of whose existence we can form no more a conception than about an immaterial world in which there would be no display of forces. What is the use of racking our brains as to whether an ethereal world can exist and what comfort can we derive from a belief in its possibility?

The old view of "the resurrection of the body" as it has been worded in the apostolic creed, is certainly more in agreement with modern science and with the doctrine of evolution, than the later belief of a purely spiritual immortality.

* * *

Let me add here a few words in answer to the anxiety of the old philosopher who finds himself on the verge of despair because his hope in an unbroken continuance of his consciousness after death somewhere in an unknown cloudland finds little or no support in science. The scientist, the philosopher, the thinker, should never trouble himself about the results to which

his inquiries lead. A sentimental man who wants his preconceived views proved, who hopes for a verification of favorite ideas, is not fit to be a thinker. I do not mean to say that sentiment is not right, but that sentimentality is wrong. It is not right that sentiment should perform the function of thinking. Thinking requires courage and faith, it requires faith in truth.

Truth often appears to destroy our ideals. But whenever it does destroy an ideal, it replaces it by something greater and better. So certain features of the old immortality idea are untenable before the tribunal of science; yet the idea of immortality which is taught by science, is surely not less sublime, not less grand and elevating than the old one. It teaches us not only a general persistence of all that exists, but a continuance even of that which constitutes our personal individual life.

In looking around and studying the facts of life, we find that we can everywhere improve the state of things; there is no place in the world where there is no chance for improvement, for useful work, for progress. Yet there is no chance whatever for improving the cosmical conditions of the world, the order of the universe, or the laws of nature. And truly it is good for man that he cannot interfere here, because he could never succeed with his improvements. Dominion is given to man over the whole creation, but his dominion ceases where the divinity of nature, the unchangeable, the eternal, the unalterable, of cosmic existence begins.

If there is a God, it is this something "that is as it is," expressed by Moses in the word "JAHVEH." Confidence in God, if it means that we expect *him* to attend to that which can be done by *ourselves* is highly immoral, but confidence in God in the sense that the unalterable laws of nature just as they are, are best for us and for everything that exists, and that it would be mere folly on our part to wish them to be different, is a great truth, and belief in it is no superstition; it is true religion, it is the faith of the scientist, of the philosopher, of the thinker; it is our trust in truth.

The idea of a purely spiritual, a transcendent immortality would be possible only if the name and being of Jahveh, if the revelation of God in the reality of nature were either a great sham, a lie on his part, or a huge error on our part. The view that nature is unreal and that outside of this great cosmos of ours exists another and purely spiritual world is called dualism. There are no facts in experience to support dualism or a dualistic immortality. However, the idea of an immanent immortality is based upon facts demonstrable by science. It is an undeniable truth—undeniable even by the dualist, who in addition to it believes in a purely spiritual immortality somewhere beyond the skies.

Goethe whose view of life was an harmonious and consistent monism, expresses his belief in immortality in the following lines:

"No being into naught can fall,
The eternal liveth in them all.
In all-existence take delight—because
Existence is eternal; and fixed laws
Preserve the ever living treasures
Which thrill the All in glorious measures "

THE PRINCE OF WALES.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

In the Library of the British Museum there is an old book entitled: "Directions for the Education of a Young Prince, till Seven Years of Age. Which will serve for the Governing of Children of all Conditions. Translated out of French by Pierre du Moulin, the Younger. London, 1673." The following sentence, from a chapter on "Pride," is a fair sample of the work. "Let him learn that because he is a Prince he must be humble; if he is born to be a King, he is born to be a great Servant, and that he has need to subdue those by humility and kindness that must one day be subject to his authority."

Last year, after finding this old book, I was conversing with the venerable Professor F. W. Newman, who related an anecdote which he gave me leave to use. While a Professor in University College, London, he was invited with other eminent educators to dine at the house of a Cabinet Minister. Something being said at table about the importance of educating the Princes, the Minister said, "I cannot agree with you; our Princes need no education except how to amuse themselves." I withhold the name of the Minister, who is not living; but he was a good liberal, and I have heard somewhat similar opinions from so-called "radicals" in England.

Between the book on the education of Princes, and the Minister's declaration that they are better without it, stretch two centuries with their revolutions and evolutions, which brought about the bizarre conditions of English self-government. George the Third's mother instructed him daily, "Be a king!" That moral and religious king, who despised amusement, lost for his country the greater part of its domain, and bound his subjects in chains, which only began to break when George the Fourth left politics for pleasure. The English republic has been developed under the long reign of a Queen who renounced politics as unbecoming her sex, but the régime has yet to undergo the ordeal of kingship.

The secret of Napoleonic despotism was to keep the people amused. If the people would rule must they not keep their king amused? The Prince of Wales would appear to have accepted the situation. He has kept out of politics, and lived a life of pleasure. But apparently the English Nonconformists are

not satisfied unless he takes their pleasures instead of his own. They have made a great ado about his card-playing,—a general amusement among the gentry of England,—and talked of abolishing the throne. The Prince of Wales, however, is no fool, and he has utilised the editorial enterprise of a Nonconformist spokesman to remind the country of the position in which it places an heir to the throne, and suggest a limit to their authority over him.

Before considering Mr. William T. Stead's important article on the Prince (*Review of Reviews*, August,) I hasten to note his denial of the wide-spread belief that the Prince broke his word of honor by revealing the charge made against Sir William Gordon-Cumming. In a recent paper of mine in *The Open Court*, on "Communal Ethics," the indifference of the religious bodies, which censured the Prince for what he had a right to do, to this dishonorable action, was cited in illustration of the theological bias in morality. Should Mr. Stead's denial be verified my illustration remains unaffected, as the indifference was shown while there was no denial. It would be a satisfaction to know that the Prince did not this wrong, but Mr. Stead's denial does not relieve him. Somebody revealed the secret which all had promised to keep. All have declared under oath that they did not reveal it, except the Prince. If he is acquitted one of his friends at Tranby Croft is liable to a suspicion of adding perjury to the dishonorable disclosure. It is conceivable that the secret leaked out through a servant, but the Prince ought not to be content with a merely imaginable alternative. According to Mr. Stead, the Prince, during the trial, keenly felt the imputation cast on him by the oaths which relieved the others, and "appealed to his counsel to be allowed to re-enter the witness box" and rebut the same. "The Prince's urgent application was overruled, and so the trial came to a close without any opportunity being afforded him of clearing up the suspicion." On this it must be remarked, (1) The unwillingness of the Prince's counsel looks as if he feared a cross-examination on this point, and rather increases the suspicion; (2) If the Prince felt the imputation so keenly he might easily have added a denial of it when apologising, through a member of the government, for his "error of judgment" in not reporting Cumming to his commanding officer; (3) The Prince's "opportunity" for denial did not end with the trial; it still remains; no oath is necessary, but simply his personal declaration that he did not reveal that which his honor was pledged to keep secret.*

Mr. Stead having summoned the public to judge the matter cannot have his vicarious testimony ad-

mitted when direct testimony is accessible. How would a law court act? A. and B. come before the judge. One or the other has committed a crime. A. swears he did not. B. is present, but silent. But C. rises and declares that he has "the highest authority" for saying that B. did not do it. The judge can only say, "As B. is here to speak for himself, but remains silent, your 'highest authority' is insufficient to convict A. of both the offence and perjury." That Mr. Stead's authority is not the Prince is shown by the fact that elsewhere he quotes the Prince's private talk in quotation marks, which are not used on this point. But even had he given the Prince as his authority it would be inadequate because irresponsible, and liable to a suspicion of misunderstanding, as against the formal and responsible disclaimers of those whose characters are equally involved.

Personally I incline to the belief that the Prince did not make the disclosure; but it is well enough for him to be reminded that there are regions where there is no royal road to acquittal. In America the Prince will be judged like any other man, and nothing short of his own declaration will prove his innocence of culpable thoughtlessness, if nothing worse. But in England Mr. Stead's asseveration will probably find loyal acceptance, and the way be cleared for a consideration of the alternatives which, with the Prince's authority, he sets before the English nation. The plea of the Prince is, virtually: "You compel me to a life of idleness, and if I relieve its tedium by baccarat you have no right to complain. There is nothing unconstitutional in playing cards in a private house. If you want me to do something more serious give me something serious to do."

This is the square answer Mr. Stead has received, as spokesman for the Nonconformists, and their pious horror of gambling. The spokesman, feeling all the English fears of admitting a Prince or sovereign to political influence, suggests two fields of activity in which he may be employed. One is that of the colonies, the other that of the amelioration of the social condition of the people. He may be placed at the head of a commission for uniting the colonies more closely to the mother country, and on the royal Labor Commission, which deals with questions at issue between employer and employed." Mr. Stead states his case with ability, and points out that in both of these directions the Prince has expressed opinions and sympathies in harmony with those of the wisest Englishmen. He quotes the Prince as having recently said, "The time has come when class can no longer stand aloof from class, and that man does his duty best who works most earnestly in bridging over the gulf between different classes which it is the tendency of increased wealth and increased civilisation to widen." The lat-

* On this point *The Open Court* disagrees from its honored contributor. See Notes.

ter clause is rather enigmatic, and sounds a little as if the Prince contemplated a new departure in the democratic direction. However, there is no danger that the Prince will turn out either a demagogue or a despot.

The only danger lies in establishment of a precedent that may play into the hands of some future monarch. In Mr. Stead's August *Review of Reviews* the article on the Prince of Wales is immediately followed by one on "Cromwell and the Independents; or, the Founders of Modern Democracy." The sequence is notable, if not purposed. Cromwell was King Stork; and though it was not a King Log he superseded, that would be the case should another such dictator get the upper hand in England. A strong and ambitious Prince with official power over a colonial commission, and over a commission where he might make friends with the mammon either of Labor or Capital, might control England to a perilous extent. It would be difficult also to draw around such positions a rigid line that would restrain all political influence. The English Constitution is the result of a long evolution by which the happy result has been reached of separating artificial and hereditary lustre from the honor gained by actual service. Were Gladstone Prime Minister he would not obtain social precedence over the stupidest lord. In America an ignoramus, with money and dishonesty enough to buy a seat in Congress, would have precedence over the ablest unofficial man in the nation. Of the two absurdities that of England is at any rate beneficial, in that political honor can be gained only by ability and real services. Should the fictitious lustres proceeding from the throne be again mingled with political influence the English republic, of which the crown is but a historic ornament, might relapse into the miserable corruptions of a hundred years ago. On the whole it would appear an unsafe experiment to confide public duties to any man merely because he was born to a certain social position. The colonies, and the laborers, and the employers should have their interests and issues entrusted to the most competent and trained men. Let the Princes enjoy themselves in their own way, and keep up the ornamental part of the nation. Their best service is to draw off the decorated butterflies, and leave the serious work of government to those who prefer honors gained in the service of their country and of mankind.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE hoodlum is not peculiar to Christendom, and it seems to be the intention of England and Germany to punish China for the wrongs done to the Christian missionaries by the riotous heathen there. The United States has been invited to make a sort of *Dreibund* of it, and to take a hand in the pious duty of chastising the Chinese, but has not yet accepted the invitation. There is a

proper delicacy in thus declining to take part in the ceremonies, for our well-known hospitality to the Chinese in this country, is what the lawyers call an *estoppel*, a record that prevents us from resenting the wrongs inflicted upon Americans in China. "Not only have you offended God," said an Eaton schoolmaster to some boys he was flogging for stealing apples from his garden, "but you have injured me"; and this really appears to be the plea of England in this quarrel, "You have rejected God's word, and my calico." It is a question of merchandise not missionaries. This appears very plainly in the English dispatches, which inform us that "The Foreign Office here hopes that the ultimate result will be the extension of trade to important centres on the Yang-tse-Kiang which are now closed." Thus the heralds of the gospel become the agents of commerce; and thus the same guns can serve both God and Mammon by defending the missionaries, and at the same time opening to trade "important centres on the Yang-tse-Kiang."

* * *

I was taught when a boy that it was flying "in the face of providence" to waste anything, or to complain of plenty; and it was little short of blasphemy to say that we could have too much of a good thing. Yet there are times when abundance appears to be a burthen. I once knew a man who gave as a reason for attending the Unitarian church, and paying for his pew, that he got less religion there than he could get at any other church in town for the same amount of money; and I have known persons when buying medicine, to beg of the druggist that he would give them the smallest quantity that he conscientiously could for a dollar. These, and similar instances, which will readily occur to us all, prove that there may be too much of a good thing; but I never thought that we could have too much fine climate, too much fertility of soil, or too many bushels of corn to the acre. While I approve of grumbling as a healthy and useful exercise, I think it is open to criticism when carried so far as it was by the "National Farmers' Congress" in a resolution thanking the Secretary of Agriculture for his efforts in "creating new avenues of outlet for our markets "overburdened by the excessive production of our fertile and prolific country." This appeals to the charity of the world, and all the nations will sympathise with suffering America, where the farmers are overburdened with the excessive production of a fertile and prolific soil.

* * *

It seems that Nature herself can sometimes be a little inconsistent and capricious; for while it appears from the proceedings of the "National Farmers' Congress," that the crop of corn for making pork is "excessive," it also appears from the proceedings of the "National Broom Makers' Congress" that the crop of corn for making brooms is deficient. The Broom Makers' Congress was held in Chicago, and it was attended by representatives from twenty-four of the leading broom factories of the country, furnishing, indeed, nine-tenths of all the brooms used in the United States. It appeared from the figures presented by the chairman, that there is a shortage of 80,000 tons in the crop of broom corn; and owing to the shortage, the price had more than doubled, it had risen from \$70 to \$150, a ton, making it necessary to increase the price of brooms in proportion, according to the decimal system, which regulates the price of brooms; "every dollar a ton advance in the price of broom corn," said the chairman, "increases the cost of brooms one cent a dozen, so that an advance of \$80, a ton increases the cost of brooms 80 cents a dozen." It was then illogically resolved, in violation of the decimal system, to raise the price of brooms 50 cents a dozen although the cost of making them had increased by 80 cents a dozen; so that in a truly philanthropic spirit, the broom makers will patriotically continue for another year to make brooms at a loss.

At the recent election the Australian ballot was tried in Illinois for the first time. This importation from Australia may have been lively enough in the country, but in Chicago it made the elections extremely stupid and dull. Besides, it abolished a very important industry, the business of the ticket pedler, who may now be heard exclaiming, "Othello's occupation's gone," an occupation which formerly gave employment to several thousand men, at the liberal wages of five dollars a day for a day of eight hours. Election day was a lonesome day for me, because the polling place was desolate. In fact I had to inquire where it was, although I was not more than a few yards away from it; whereas, heretofore, I knew it a quarter of a mile away, by the mob in front of it, that overflowed the sidewalk and made the air sulphurous with slang. And when I did get there the proceedings were very insipid, for I was not hustled by the hustler, nor slugged by the slugger, as in the good old times. Neither was I required by a prizefighter with a low brow and a high cheek to explain to him why I voted for Horrigan and why I did not vote for Corrigan. It seemed so dismal not to be knocked down by a brass-knuckled patriot for having "de wrong ticket," and not to be afterwards dragged off by the policeman for "making a disturbance." So, also, I missed the curbstone debating club where I formerly got so much information about the tariff, coinage, banking, taxation, monopoly, and all the other burning questions of the hour. Not a drink nor a cigar was offered me, and unless a plan can be devised for stuffing the ballot boxes, or stealing them, the Australian system must be pronounced a failure in Chicago. And this is the opinion of many public-spirited citizens who regard the law as a premium on dishonesty, because after a man buys a vote and pays for it there is no method of telling whether he gets it or not.

* * *

Out of the furnace of debate comes the purification of doctrine, and the revision of creeds; even Presbyterian creeds, which formerly we thought were made of granite like the Alps. When we revise our creed we confess its errors, and proclaim that we believe not as our fathers did, nor as we ourselves believed in our younger days. To revise a creed is not a humiliation, but a virtuous achievement, and the man who has never done it is a consistent fool. That the "Westminster Confession" should hold authority as a creed for two hundred and fifty years, is a marvellous feat, when we consider the quantity of printing done in that eventful time. When a ship is leaking at sea the captain is always bewildered in deciding what part of the cargo he must throw overboard; and this appears to be the puzzle of the Presbyterian church; "How much of the creed shall we throw overboard in order to lighten the ship?" Some of the clergy think that all of it ought to go, while others believe that only that portion of it should be abandoned for which there is no longer any market. The Chicago presbytery appears to be of the latter opinion according to its new declaration wherein it advises a revision to be made "only in the light of holy scripture as now understood by the church, and not limited by the views of any one man, or of an assembly held in peculiar conditions two hundred and fifty years ago, which accepted interpretations of God's word many of which are discarded by nearly all the Christian scholars of this day, and were not approved by John Calvin himself." Startling is the avowal that for two hundred and fifty years the Presbyterian creed was based upon erroneous interpretations of God's word; but the most wonderful part of the recantation is the claim that Calvin was not a Calvinist, a vindication of that famous theologian, which coming from a presbytery will go far to redeem his name. Last year, during the "Little Red Schoolhouse" debate, a German scholar asserted that Luther was not a Lutheran, and proved it. People will form a better opinion of Calvin when they learn that he was not a Calvinist.

The plan to revise the Presbyterian creed has divided the church into three parties; the conservatives, who advise merely a new lock and stock for the old gun; the radicals, who want to give it a new lock, stock, and barrel; and the Bourbons, who maintain that the old flint lock musket is perfect as it is. At the meeting of the Chicago presbytery, a great sensation was created by the Rev. Dr. Stryker, the leader of the radicals, who, speaking of the "Confession of Faith," said, "If we are to make an alteration let us make it all over again. The General Assembly wants us to patch up the old creed, but they won't let us make a new one. We want a less metaphysical and a more biblical creed." He also accused some of the brethren there present of what he called "Theological Bourbonism." His proposal was defeated by 28 to 15, the majority favoring, "A radical recasting of our present confession"; but not the substitution of a new one. The thought that comes uppermost in reading the debate is this, Can a church survive its creed? And does not a new faith make a new church? Does not the rejection of the old creed carry the church with it? Dr. Stryker fits together a new lock, stock, and barrel, and throws away the lock, stock, and barrel of old. Very well, but after awhile some "Theological Bourbon" as Dr. Stryker calls him, finds the old lock, stock, and barrel, and fits them together again. Now, which of the two men has the genuine, orthodox, Presbyterian gun? There are two professions, divinity and medicine, which confess that for hundreds of years they have been wrong, and have just got right at last.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

AGNES.

TRANSLATION FROM ISEN BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA.)

AGNES, my charming butterfly

Soaring in ether so clear,

A net I am weaving to catch thee in:

And songs are the meshes, my dear.

"If I be a butterfly bright as gold

Flying through gardens fair,

And you be a gallant handsome and gay,

You may hunt me,—but must not ensnare!"

Agnes, my charming butterfly,

My meshes encircle thee round,

Why flutter in vain, sweet innocent thing?

In my net thou shalt surely be found!

"If I be a butterfly, delicate, light,

Born to hover o'er land and sea,

And you should entice me within your net,—

My wings would you spare to me?"

I'll tenderly set thee upon my hand,

And welcome thee into my heart,

Where freely, securely, henceforth thou shalt play,

Nor ever from it depart.

BOOK REVIEWS.

MEMORIALS OF JOHN DANIEL MORELL, M.A., LL.D., Her Majesty's Inspector of Schools. By Robert M. Theobald, M.A., M.R.C.S. London: W. Stewart & Co.

This little memorial volume of the late John Daniel Morell is elegantly got up and is a fitting tribute to the memory of a gentleman who is held in such high esteem by his friends and who has done so much by the industry of a long life to leave a noble impress on the thought and character of many of his nation. This last he did in his capacity as Her Majesty's inspector of schools, the former as an author of some well-known works in philosophy and pedagogics, the chief of which in philosophy are "An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century" and "The Philosophy of Religion."

The memorial sketch is written by Dr. Robert M. Theobald; but the volume also contains estimates of Dr. Morell by other hands. Excellent portraits of the subject of the sketch and of some of his relatives accompany the book. This volume will be supplied to old friends of Dr. Morell, wishing to possess some such memento, by applying to Mr. M. Theobald, 23 St. Swithin's Lane, London, E. C.

THOMAS CARLYLE'S MORAL AND RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT. A Study: By Ewald Flügel. From the German, by Jessica Gilbert Tyler. New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co. 1891.

The translator has well performed her work in the rendering from German into English of this little essay of Edward Flügel's. It is one of the most interesting and appreciative estimates of Carlyle that we have. Carlyle's attitude towards the great problems of the mind and of religion are finely emphasised by appropriate quotations. "A man's religion," says Carlyle, "is the chief fact with regard to him." And again, "The notion that each man forms of the Universe is the all-regulating fact with regard to him." "Do you ask why misery abounds among us? I bid you look into the notion we have formed for ourselves of the Universe, and of our duties and destinies there. If it is a true notion, we shall strenuously reduce it to practice,—for who dare and can contradict his faith, whatever it may be, in the Eternal Fact that is around him? and thereby blessings and success will attend us in said Universe, or Eternal Fact we live amidst: of that surely there is no doubt." "The thing a man does practically believe (and this is often enough without asserting it even to himself, much less to others); the thing a man does practically lay to heart, and know for certain, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious Universe, and his duty and destiny there, that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the rest. That is his religion; and I say, if you tell me what that is, you tell me to a very great extent what the man is, what the kind of things he will do is. Of a man or a nation we inquire, therefore, first of all, What religion they had? . . . Answering of this question is giving us the soul of the history of the man or nation. The thoughts they had were the parents of the actions they did; their feelings were parents of their thoughts: it was the unseen and spiritual in them that determined the outward and actual;—their religion, as I say, was the great fact about them."

A few (unimportant) misprints occur in the book.

HAPPINESS FROM THOUGHTS, AND OTHER SERMONS. By James Vila Blake. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1891.

The following are the titles of the sermons and discourses of this new volume (of 291 pages) by Mr. Blake: "Peace"; "Authority"; "The Earth's Friendliness"; "Forgiveness"; "Freedom, Fellowship, and Character in Religion"; "The Natural Man"; "Burden Bearing"; "A Happy New Year"; "The Undertone of Life"; "Losses"; "Religion and the Bible"; "Happiness from Thoughts"; "Perhaps."

They are characterised by the practical sense and beauty of presentation which has always distinguished Mr. Blake's homiletic efforts.

Freethought Readings and Secular Songs. Compiled by J. M. Wheeler. "I have undertaken this work," says the author, "in the hope that it may help to supply a need frequently expressed in connection with the meetings of Secular Societies, as well as to offer to the general reader some popular and musical expression of Freethought views. . . . My compilation will, I think, be found to include some of the choicest productions of the Freethought muse. But it makes no claim to represent these and these only. . . . I have sought to represent many moods of many minds and to provide for a diversity of palates; something for both old and

young, grave and gay." The pamphlet contains forty-eight pages. Mr. Wheeler gives reasons in the preface, for inserting some songs which we think it will be the opinion of the majority of his readers, should have been omitted. Still, it is really difficult to decide for all. (R. Forder: 28 Stonecutter Street, London, E. C.)

NOTES.

WITH reference to Mr. Moncure D. Conway's article concerning the Prince of Wales, we have to say that we do not know of any charge from any responsible person against the Prince for having broken his promise. It is true, imputations were made, but no one is obliged to, and under ordinary circumstances no one should, take notice of mere imputations. In the present case a violation of his promise on the part of the Prince is extremely improbable, as it was to his own interest to keep the secret and to avoid all public slander. There is only a slight possibility that he inadvertently revealed the secret. If the Prince is to be considered as free from the imputation of having broken his word, this does by no means implicate any one of the other witnesses, for not in words but certainly in actions toward Cummings, they could not help betraying the whole situation. We need not even take into consideration the ears of the servants who waited at table and whose quick perception will comprehend the slightest allusion incidentally made if it be interpreted by a certain demeanor of their masters. A secret of such a kind will always ooze out.

The following are the new officers of the American Secular Union: President, the Hon. C. B. Waite, Chicago; Secretary, Mrs. Mattie Freeman, Chicago; Treasurer, M. Reiman, Chicago; Vice Presidents, John F. Geeting, Dr. J. H. Greer, E. N. Geer, all of Chicago, and W. S. Andrews, Portsmouth, Ohio.

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WHAT WAS ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S CREED?

BY GEORGE M. MC CRIE.

In the *Westminster Review* for September Mr. Theodore Stanton draws to a close the fourth of a brilliant series of articles upon Abraham Lincoln with the following words:

"A word still remains to be said about Lincoln's religious belief,—or, shall I say, non-belief? Messrs. Nicolay and Hay and Mr. Herndon devote considerable space in their Lives to this aspect of their hero. That Lincoln was an orthodox Christian nobody pretends to assert. But his friends and biographers differ as to how much of a Christian he was. If Lincoln had lived and died an obscure Springfield lawyer and politician, he would unquestionably have been classed by his neighbors among Free-thinkers." (*Westminster Review*, p. 264.)

Then follows a sentence which at once recalls the Westminster Abbey ceremonial over the remains of Charles Darwin:

"But, as is customary with the church, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, when Lincoln became one of the great of the world, an attempt was made to claim him. In trying to arrive at a correct comprehension of Lincoln's theology [?] this fact should be borne in mind in sifting the testimony." (*Ibid.* 264-5.)

It may be added that the "attempt" in question is generally more vehement in proportion to the scantiness of the evidence in favor of orthodoxy. And this for obvious reasons. No man thoroughly, or even mainly, "at one" with the popular religious belief of his age, requires any orthodox verification, or identification, after his decease. In such cases, not to have condemned current religious beliefs implies acquiescence in their reasonableness and utility. And it is just here, I think, that Mr. Stanton, in face of the very evidence, so carefully and minutely gathered by himself, comes to a wrong conclusion in Lincoln's case. I italicise in the following extract:

"Another very important warping influence which should not be lost sight of was Lincoln's early ambition for political preferment. Now, the shrewd American politician with an elastic conscience joins some church, and is always seen on Sunday in the front pews. But the shrewd politician who has not an elastic conscience—and this was Lincoln's case—simply keeps mum on his religious views, or, when he must touch on the subject, deals only in platitudes. And this is just what Lincoln did." (*Ibid.* p. 265.)

In support of this Mr. Stanton quotes from Herndon's "True Story of a Great Life," p. 439, as follows: "Inasmuch as he was so often a candidate for public office, Mr. Lincoln said as little about his religious

"opinions as possible, especially if he failed to coincide with the orthodox world." Now, this is evidence of Lincoln's declinature to mix up religious opinions with politics, but it is evidence of nothing more. But how about the following passage, which Mr. Stanton also quotes from Herndon's "True Story," p. 446-7. "In 1854," says Mr. Herndon, "he asked me 'to erase the word God from a speech which I had written and read to him for criticism, because my language indicated a personal God, whereas he insisted no such person ever existed.' This was not 'keeping mum on his religious views.' It was asserting the position of an *Atheos*. According to the testimony of Justice David Davis, Lincoln 'had no faith in the Christian sense of the term—had faith in laws, principles, causes and effects.' I fear also what Mrs. Abraham Lincoln says of him: 'His only philosophy was that what is to be will be, and no prayers of ours can reverse the decree.' I not only say *Atheos* then, in this case, but *Hylō Atheos*. Seeing that his was not mere indifference, no mere universal Scepticism or Pyrrhonism, but a self-argued-out conviction of the suffering of the Cosmos without an *Anima Mundi*, and of the human organism without an *Anima humana*.

"Lincoln thought little on theological subjects and 'read still less,' continues Mr. Stanton (W. R. 265). Read this in connexion with the testimony of Mr. John T. Stuart, his first law partner, quoted in the following page, and it becomes no longer remarkable. "He [Lincoln] was an avowed and open infidel, and sometimes bordered on atheism." A distinctly two fold attitude is here indicated—infidelity towards, or rejection of, current orthodoxy and negation of, at all events, a personal Deity. Now, an honest mind, such as that of Lincoln cannot "border on" Atheism and, at the same time, show Theistic or Deistic leanings. And, this understood, a light is thereby shed on some of his utterances which might otherwise be open to misconstruction. Thus, for example, to say, as Lincoln did, according to Mr. Herndon's record, "All such questions [moral and social reforms] must first find lodgment with the most enlightened souls who stamp them with their approval. In God's own time [I italicise] they will be organised into law, and thus woven into the fabric of our institutions," "True

Story," p. 167) simply means that, *in the march of events* such and such would happen. A mere passing phrase like this can no more be construed into a profession of Theistic belief than can the slang invocation vulgarly associated with the act of sneezing. Mr. Stanton sees this and, accordingly, does not reckon with the expression in his summing up, which runs as follows :

"A man about whose theology [?] such things can be said is of course far removed from orthodoxy. It may even be questioned whether he is a theist, whether he is a deist. That he is a free-thinker is evident; that he is an agnostic is probable. Addison's line seems to fit the case: 'Atheist is an old-fashioned word: I am a free-thinker.'" (W. R. p. 266.)

This is merely playing round the fringes of the issue. "Old-fashioned words" have often a definite meaning which newer coinages lack. "Free-thinker" means anything or nothing. Thought—of the *cor cordium*—is ever unbound, though the written or spoken expression of it may be fettered. The term has no dynamic character. As well might one speak of an "Opinionist." "Agnostic," again, simply equals the *minus* sign, and has, moreover, associations of a superfine and superficial nature wholly foreign to Lincoln's sturdy personality. *Falsetto* negation is fashionable;—as a writer in the *National Reformer* (Sept. 6, 1891) neatly puts it—"Great is the virtue of a large "octavo page, good type, the words 'an agnostic,' and 'the imprint of Williams and Norgate.'" But plain words are best. That he was *Atheos* connotes a definite attitude towards the great religionist chimæra, and, apart from some minor disadvantages of association, really defines Lincoln's position more closely than any of Mr. Stanton's epithets. It is positive not negative, indicates what the man professedly *was*, rather than what he was *not* or what he oppugned. The immemorial two-fold problem—"What *is* and what do I "know?" demands not a quibble, but a rational, definite reply. Only one synthetic system faces this two-fold issue. All Free-thinking, Agnosticism, Parkerism, etc., but palter with this supreme *creed*. And that is the Scientific Idealism which, based on the concrete, yet focuses the rays of all possible knowledge in the individual self, knower and known in one. The answer is complete only in Hylo-Idealism.

It is not necessary to stretch the point too far by crediting Lincoln with having excogitated a "world-scheme," so profoundly simple yet simply profound, from the perusal of "tomes of metaphysic lore." These in all probability would with him have confused the issue. Though he rationally apprehended it, possibly he might not have been able to give a logical reason for the faith that was in him—but his already-quoted expression points unquestionably to a solipsistal conclusion. "All such questions [moral and social re-

"forms] must first find lodgment with the most enlightened souls who stamp them with their approval." This is *true Meliorism, from the brain outwards*, as opposed to the dream of a ready-made New Jerusalem descending from the skies. Not unnaturally, however, his formula invites amendment. For the phrase "*find lodgment with the most enlightened souls should be substituted, spring from the most powerful individual intellect*," The individual Ego—not a group of Egos is the last recess of thought. It is dualism not Auto-Monism which views all Egos as on one plane. The common phrase of Secularism "One world at a time" has an inner meaning which Secularists miss. The world is to every man as it affects him—to each "a different world." That *other* Egos are in my self-created Cosmos can only be a secondary, never a primary, conclusion. With my own Cosmos I alone have to do,—but, inasmuch as it is indissolubly one with me, I apprehend the existence of other Egos. In the words of the late Miss Constance Naden "the Ego in its entirety *is* the universe as felt "and known." Empiricism has to do with the manifold—Scientific Idealism with the simple unit, including all its content and intent. But to continue. Note Lincoln's complete and significant indifference to popular religionism. Mr. Stanton furnishes us with the following instances of this (W. R. p. 265) "The text "of the greatest moral document of his Presidency, "the Emancipation Proclamation, contains, as originally drawn up in secret with his own hand, no "mention of God; and what is still more significant, "when the 'omission' was pointed out to him, by one "of his Cabinet officers, he simply incorporated into "the text the religious paragraph offered him." And again "When a convention of clergymen passed a "resolution requesting the President to recommend to "Congress an amendment to the Constitution, recognising the existence of God, Lincoln prepared a first "draft of a message to this effect. 'When I assisted "him in reading the proof,'—says Mr. Defrees, Superintendent of Public Printing during Lincoln's administration,—'he struck it out, remarking that he "had not made up his mind as to its propriety.'"

I emphasise these specially notable words. "*He "had not made up his mind as to its propriety.*" In plain words an affirmation that the God-idea is fathered by and comes and goes, not only with the individual consciousness, but with individual opinion as to its "propriety" in given circumstances. Could the supremacy of the individual Ego be more explicitly stated? But I need scarcely add that a Deity thus shelved or not shelved, according to the dictates of political expediency, or of individual opinion as to the "propriety" of either course, is no Deity at all. He is as fictional as the "John Doe" or "Richard Roe" of a legal

writ, and anyone making use of such a creation—the puppet not the parent, of his own Egoity—is supposed to know with what he is dealing. Orthodox religionism may well despair of Abraham Lincoln as of George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, or President Jefferson. And this being the case, we are in a position to define his life-creed with all due measure of exactness. The only possible alternatives open to a mind so sincere as his, are two in number. They are competently indicated in the following extract from a recent philosophical treatise by Professor Veitch:

"The natural outcome of the Hegelian conception on what may be called the abstract side is simply that the individual is a 'reflection,' the passing reflection of the all-comprehending substance. . . . The absolute is the flow of the individuals of time and space—thought is the thought of conscious individuals—the sum of natural law is the divine. On the other hand, as the individual contains the abstract universality, and gives it meaning and being, the supreme principle or ground of all is simply a projection of the likeness of the individual himself on the mirror of his own consciousness." ("Knowing and Being," p. 310.)

Looking at the evidence above stated, there can be no hesitation in applying Abraham Lincoln's life-persuasion to the latter category.

CONTROVERSIAL MATERIALISM, OR WHAT DO WE MEAN BY MATTER?

BY EDMUND NOBLE.

"Informatio sensus semper est ex analogia hominis non ex analogia universi: atque magno prorsus errore asseritur, sensum esse mensuram rerum."
[Bacon, *Instauratio Magna*.]

HAS so-called "materialism" a real, or only a controversial value? This issue has been raised anew by many recent discussions on the relation of science to religion, and it may be well to attempt at least a provisional reply to the question. It is by no means generally appreciated by those who take part in such discussions that the names they use do not in any case correspond with the things indicated by them, but are always simply representations of those things, and representations of them in terms of human knowledge. Even clever dialecticians and profound thinkers sometimes lose sight of the truth that the concepts which their terms stand for always mean and only mean, not the thing indicated in its actuality, as existing independently of them, but only that knowledge about the thing which the mind possesses at any particular stage of mental development. In any scientific view of the meaning of knowledge, we can know nothing of objects in the external world apart from the effects which they produce in us—apart from the particular way in which we, as human organisms, feel and deal with their actions upon us and upon one another. Our idea of a thing, though it may represent that thing with more or less accuracy, is thus simply made up of the effects which the thing produces in us, is no

more than our way of knowing it purely special to us, and not a universal way which would be valid for every kind of organism whatsoever. Our knowledge of things has thus several important limitations. In the first place, we can only directly know such things as are capable of acting on us; secondly, we can know objects only in ways that are imposed by our own organism—that is to say, by the senses through which we directly know their qualities; thirdly, we can possess only such kind and amount of knowledge as, up to any particular time, we may happen to have accumulated. The error which most people commit by neglect of these limitations is the error of taking appearances for the things themselves, and this alone has led to some of the most serious defects of the subjective method. But there is the still graver error that has eaten its way into the fabric of all popular thinking until the wisest heads may well begin to despair of its elimination—the error, that is to say, of regarding our concept of a thing at any given period as representing the total qualities of the thing, the sum of its powers and characters, and of believing, which most of us tacitly do, that we may use our concept, as if we were dealing with the thing in its totality. Why is this an error, and why is it an error of the gravest kind? It is an error because our concept of an object has a content of qualities or characters that varies according to the stage of our mental growth. It is an error of the most serious import for thinking because, by using the concept we have at any particular stage of knowledge as representing the whole of the characters of the thing known, we are led to make assertions regarding that thing which, while seeming true for the few qualities by which we know it, are often totally untrue for the thing itself, and even for the thing as it is represented by the concept at a more advanced stage of our knowledge.

That our concept of a thing undergoes gradual increase in its content—that it begins with only a few qualities and ends with many—may be shown by the history of terms. The most simple and most salient characters of an object—characters of sound, action, color, or shape—are always the first to be known, and it is the most prominent of these which the mind describes in the act of conferring the name. Thus the ant was called "swarmer" because "swarming" was the character by which it attracted attention; serpent was so named from its "creeping" motion; heaven was regarded as a thing "heaven" up; and "sky" came into existence to indicate that which seemed to "cover" the earth. Now all these names, when first used, were alive with the meaning thus given to them; but they remained thus vital only for the early stage of man's knowledge of the objects named. For as men came to know more of the ant, the serpent, the heaven,

and the sky—as their concepts of these grew richer in content—the descriptive meaning of the term died away, and the name originally alive became a mere symbol signifying not one quality of the thing named, but the whole of its qualities. Thus nobody thinks of the ant as a “swarmer,” of the serpent as a “creeper,” or of the heaven as “heaven” up, for the reason that so much is known concerning these things in addition to “swarming,” “creeping,” etc., as to dwindle such meanings into insignificance and make it unnecessary to preserve them as elements of the name. By a like process, the Russian called the duck *utka* because he saw it plunge its beak into the water; the Pole called it *kaczka* because he noticed that it waddled in walking; and the Bosnian gave it the name of *plavka* because he observed it swimming; yet in their survival, none of these terms suggest to the user of them the character from which they originally sprang—they imply and designate the duck in all its characters. So when we speak of the cuckoo we mean, not a bird making the *ku-ku* sound, but an organism of a particular kind, with particular size, plumage, character, and habits. In the last application of it, then, we mean by a name the total quality of the thing named, and the passage from the primitive value of our term to its final symbolic value takes place *pari passu* with our advancing knowledge of the qualities which it connotes.

The commonest experiences of the individual and the race tell the story of this gradual increase in the richness of the concept. The growth of the child mind illustrates a steadily increasing knowledge of the qualities of things; progress from ignorance to knowledge in the adult is largely an advance of the same kind. “Stone” to the uncultured man is merely a hard substance of a particular size, shape, color, and weight; to the geologist the concept has a rich content of both chemical and physical characters, and demands for its thorough realisation as an idea familiarity with the whole history of the planet. So to the ignorant man, “stars,” originally things “strewn” are little more than

“Specks of tinsel fixed in heaven
To light the midnights of his native town:”

while to the educated, and above all to the scientific mind, the concept “star” is rich with thoughts of cosmical processes and has a content of materials drawn from well-nigh every department of knowledge. Look next at the concept of “matter.” Not very long ago the characters connoted by the term were very meagre. The first known “matter” meant little more than the most simple and more obvious qualities, such as those of color, size, shape, weight, hardness or softness; so that when a man spoke of “matter” he meant nothing but these. Note now how enormously

this primitive idea has been enlarged, even within the last hundred years, by the constant addition to it of new qualities in “matter” that have been brought to light by modern investigation. It is within the memory of men still living that the possibility of “matter” existing in a gaseous and invisible state was unknown, and the effect of such ignorance was to deny to “matter” the power of assuming the gaseous condition. Up to a period still more recent, the luminiferous ether was excluded from the category of “matter” through the mind clinging to its old concept and refusing to believe that “matter” could manifest the characters which the ether was known to possess. Yet the advanced modern physicist no more hesitates to regard the characters displayed by ether as characters of “matter” than he hesitates to accept the material character of the phenomena manifested by gas. In these two particulars alone, therefore, the concept “matter” has been enlarged from its former narrow meaning of “tangible” and “visible” to that wider meaning which claims the term for the whole range of the invisible world—whence it may be said that the universe no more means earth, sun, planets and stars, but the total ether system in addition to these. The same modern research, moreover, which has thus extended the domain of “matter” has also given us a vastly richer knowledge of its qualities in detail. We now know it to possess physical, chemical, and electromagnetic characters that only a few years ago were not even suspected. Yet when the knowledge of these new characters first dawned upon the mind, the hard, rigid framework of the old concept of “matter” refused to yield them admission, and for a time men tried to find a place for the mysterious qualities outside the category of “matter.” Once, for example, light was regarded as due to luminous corpuscles projected at immense speed from heated bodies: now we know it to be wave-disturbances of the same ether so long believed to be non-material. Once heat was a subtle immaterial something that could be poured as it were, from body to body: now we know it to be due to the movements of the parts of the masses heated. Once electricity was deemed to be a mysterious fluid: now we recognise in it a mode of ether motion implicating the parts of tangible bodies. In a word, the numberless qualities which, because they did not seem to harmonise with our earlier and imperfect concept of “matter,” we excluded from our notion of “matter,” have in recent years not only been included in the concept, but have become essential to our modern idea of “matter.” The same is true of our idea of “matter” as it exists in organisms. How hard, inert atoms could display the phenomena of life was for a long while inexplicable, and men, rightly rejecting such a supposition as absurd, were driven to the ex-

pedient of regarding life as non-material—of inventing for its explanation a subtle vital force, present specially in the organism, but to be found nowhere else in all the inorganic world. Yet nothing is now clearer than that, highly special and peculiar as are the characters of life, they are no more and no less than characters of "matter" aggregated under the highly special and peculiar circumstances which condition "matter" in the organism. The like may be said of mind and consciousness. Clinging to our narrower concept of "matter," we have long resisted the notion—not that consciousness can be "matter" or its movements, for that idea is obviously irrational—but that "matter" in particular states of aggregation can manifest the characters we call consciousness and mind. Yet in the growth and increasing richness of our concept of "matter" we are finding out that even characters like consciousness and mind must be brought into our concept—not that they must be narrowed into the petty limits of the early idea of "matter," but that the concept of "matter" must be widened to take them in—not that we must regard consciousness and mind as "matter," or even as the movements of "matter," but that we must view them as ultimately due to the power which "matter" manifests.

Let us now apply these principles to some of the popular discussions which have taken place from time to time on the subject of religion and science. It is still quite common among writers who oppose so-called "materialism" to bring the old narrow concept of "matter" into contrast with some of the new qualities which have been discovered in "matter," and to base upon the contrast an argument which relegates such qualities to a completely non-material sphere. Thus Dubois-Reymond wrote:

"It remains entirely and forever inconceivable that it should signify a jot to a number of carbon and hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen, and other atoms how they lie and move: In no way can one see how from their concurrence consciousness can arise:"

The same idea has been expanded by Prof. G. F. Barker, of Yale College:

"Is there not behind this material substance a higher than molecular power in the thoughts which are immortalised in the poetry of a Milton or a Shakespeare the art creations of a Michael Angelo or a Titian, the harmonies of a Mozart or a Beethoven?" But perhaps the best known example of this kind of reasoning is from the vigorous pen and cultured mind of Dr. James Martineau, who wrote during the Tyn-dall controversy:

"By what manipulation of your resources will you educe consciousness? No organism can ever show you more than matter moved. . . . Surely you must observe how this 'matter' of yours alters its style with every change of service; starting as a beggar, with scarce a rag of 'property' to cover its bones, it turns up as a Prince when great undertakings are wanted. Such extremely clever matter—matter that is up to everything, even to writing Hamlet and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a mole-

cular plebiscite for a divine monarchy of the world, may fairly be regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of mind."

All these positions, representing arguments that constantly recur in the discussions of the hour, are generically alike, and their validity depends wholly on what is meant by the term "matter"—on the number and kind of qualities which it connotes. If in using the word "matter" the arguer has already abstracted from the conception that which he has included under other conceptions, such as those of "mind," and "consciousness," his position will be substantially this: "I have divided phenomena [we may suppose him saying] into three classes. To certain characters presented to me in knowledge I give the name of 'matter'; to certain other characters which appear to me to differ from 'matter' and from one another I give the names 'consciousness' and 'mind.' Therefore, this mental separation effected, I must protest against any attempt to say that the phenomena I call 'mind' and 'consciousness' are identical with and of the same kind as the phenomena which I call 'matter.'" When, in other words, a man deliberately believes and confirms himself in the belief that "matter" can only be hard, and inert, and move, and cannot produce the phenomena which he calls "mind" and "consciousness," and believes this because he has already abstracted from his concept of "matter" and of what "matter" is capable of producing, that which he has determined to call by other names, then all attempt to show that from his "matter," "consciousness," and "mind" must follow is naturally resisted by him. But in dealing thus with "matter" he is dealing all this time not with "matter" as it acts and operates externally to him, independently of him and his knowledge, but with a particular concept of "matter" which is in his mind, with what his mind knows of the external reality at a particular stage of mental development. For his attitude to be correct he must know, not that "mind" and "consciousness" are not identical with "matter"—for that is conceded—but that "matter" cannot under any circumstances manifest the characters which he chooses to describe as characters of "consciousness" and "mind." Otherwise his claim is quite intelligible, and,—admitting the validity of his concept—even reasonable. For if we persist in narrowing our concept of "matter" down to the simplest qualities—if we regard it as made up of hard, inelastic atoms only, capable only of movement, and therefore capable only of the limited powers of producing phenomena which we attribute to movement—then we shall find no room whatever in our concept for the characters of "consciousness" and "mind." But we might with just as good reason deny to our "matter" thus simplified the various physical,

chemical, electro-magnetic, and vital characters which modern research has imported into the concept. We might say, imitating Du Bois-Reymond, that it is inconceivable how from the concurrence and movements of the ultimate parts of "matter" a flash of lightning should result. Could any one, holding to the ancient concept of "matter" explain from it the phenomena of light? By what manipulation of the material resources of 200 years ago would the theorist educe the mysterious stresses in ether out of which electro-magnetic phenomena arise—could any gross, tangible, mechanical process ever show him anything more than "matter" moved? Where is the logician of to-day who, with nothing but the old concept of "matter" to guide him, would undertake to declare why a current of electricity should turn a bar of soft iron into a magnet, or why a solar disturbance should set all the compass needles on the earth vibrating? To the savage, still shut out from the new knowledge of "matter," it must remain for ever inconceivable that he can talk for twenty miles through a telephone wire: in his mental world the transmission of speech over such distances and by such means is not to be explained by any concurrence of atoms, or by movements of them. And he would be a cultured barbarian indeed, who, were you to show him some of the simplest modern experiments in physics and chemistry, would not at once separate the new qualities disclosed to him into a class apart from "matter"—would not, that is to say, regard them as belonging to some non-material sphere, some mysterious realm of "spirit."

Note, moreover, how totally beside the question at issue is the contrast so often set up between "ideas," "thought," "consciousness," "molecular movements," and "material particles." As nobody has ever claimed that the size, color, velocity, or the temperature of a body is "matter," so nobody has asserted that ideas are "matter," that thought is "movement," that "consciousness" and "mind" are the "dance of molecules." Yet size, color, velocity, temperature, are characters manifested by "matter," and so "consciousness" and "thought" are characters displayed by "matter" in the living and highly organised state. Life, again, is not "matter"—it is the total series of structural arrangements, activities, processes, and feelings which "matter" manifests in the organised form. So light, heat, electricity, magnetism—these are not "matter," but special modes in which "matter" is active. In a word, the qualities which we associate with "matter" are not anything that "matter" *is*, but are what "matter" *does*. They are not always the acting of "matter" pictured by us as the separate acting of individual atoms and molecules, but are sometimes, as in the organism, characters in which are expressed the associated and co-operating activity

of countless millions of atoms and molecules. It is not that "matter" "alters its style with every change of service," but that it alters its service with every change of condition, and that as its worldly circumstances improve it exerts higher powers and displays finer raiment. Do we expect to find in the simple dust-heap the sensitiveness, the mobility, the complexity, and the stored up energy of a mass of protoplasm? This very change in the powers of "matter" by change of its circumstances is an idea rendered familiar to us by the commonest experience of our individual and racial life. How constantly do we not, by some new collocation of our resources, attain results which at first, in the apparent poverty of those resources, would have seemed quite impossible of achievement. When instrumental music had not yet been born, what human being with his simple ideas about wood and metal, could have conceived that by mere manipulation of such resources men could have educed the complex and ravishing notes heard in our modern concert rooms. Or when a picture was a mere "scratching," as its name implies, into whose imagination could there have entered the thought of modern art and its magic possibilities?

It is true enough—and no genuine scientist will be found to deny it—that between the thing ordinarily conceived of as "matter" and some of the phenomena to which "matter" is capable of giving rise, there is a difference amounting to a total difference of kind. Dr. Paul Carus is indisputably right in saying [Fundamental Problems, 2nd edition, p. 353], "A motion is a change of place; and force is expended wherever a change of place occurs. The thing moved is material, but the motion itself is not material. When we speak of a man's ideas we mean his ideas, not the material particles of his brain. . . . To define matter as an all-comprehensive term which has to include all features of reality is an unjustifiable license." But these positions, as laid down by Dr. Carus, are not really disputed for a moment by the so-called materialist; and the only persons who assert that he denies them—and claim that by "thought" he merely means particles of "matter" or the movements of such particles—are the very controversial theologians who have so wofully misunderstood what they term the materialistic tendencies of modern scientific thought. All the scientist seeks to show is that the thing called "matter," whatever it be in its nature, gives rise not only to movement, but also to subjective phenomena which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be identified with the bare concept of "matter" or even with the concept of "matter" moving. What is asserted by the scientist, is not that "consciousness," "mind," and "life" are "matter," are the movements of "matter," are so much dancing of molecules fore-posed

as dead and inert and therefore as incapable of the very powers in issue, but that "life," "mind," "consciousness" are phenomena potential in all "matter," but displayed by it only in certain states of material aggregation. However much, therefore, from the standpoint of the old concept of "matter" we may sympathise with the sneer at the "gospel of dirt," and "the mud philosophy," we cannot but regard it, from the standpoint of the new concept of "matter" and its capacities, as the self-ridicule of a low and base view of things, soon to be outgrown.

Finally, it rests with ourselves whether our "matter" shall be the mere beggar in rags which it still remains for the barbarian, or whether it shall appear to our enlarged vision in the Princely vestments with which modern knowledge has clothed it—whether its raiment shall reflect the poverty of human thought at its very beginnings, or represent the comparative affluence of the modern mind—whether, in a word, we shall mean by it, not the "molecular plebiscite" of Dr. Martineau, but the divine monarchy in which every man of science implicitly, if not explicitly, believes by the very act of believing in the reality of the universe and its processes. Modern scientific conceptions are clearly in favor of a unitary conception of things—of the view that the power out of which phenomena arise, diverse as are its products, is fundamentally one in kind. And when this conception shall have established itself, the old reproach based so long on an unduly narrow concept of the nature of "matter" will pass away until the world of the much buffeted and long misunderstood "materialist" shall be grander than any yet dreamed of by the theologian.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union lately in convention at Washington, censured the fashion of wearing birds on bonnets, because it encouraged cruelty and the destruction of useful and innocent fellow beings. Ornamental feathers were also condemned unless plucked from the birds in a painless way. This is delightfully sentimental, and there is a sweet and womanly inconsistency in it that reminds me of a like resolution passed a few months ago by some ladies in Rhode Island, who afterwards had what they called a "lovely time" at a clam-bake, where the clams were all roasted alive. Nothing was said in the platform of the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union against the wearing of seal skin cloaks, which really belong to harmless fellow creatures, who have been beaten to death with clubs to furnish the costly raiment. The answer to this charge of inconsistency is very familiar, "We may kill and torture animals for food and clothing, but not for decorations and adornment." Why not? The bill of sale given to Adam in the garden of Eden makes no distinction, but confers upon him "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth on the face of the earth." And, says the psalmist, in answer to his own question, What is man that thou art mindful of him? Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet; all sheep and oxen, yea, and the beasts of the field, the fowl of the air, and the fish of

the sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas." And from this charter comes the logical deduction that man may do what he likes with his own. A Sicilian peasant, rebuked by an American for cruelly beating his mule, retorted, "He has not been baptised"; meaning that the mule was not a fellow creature, but a piece of property that might be beaten at his owner's will.

* * *

In the Eastern states there is a useful society called "The Band of Mercy," and the object of it is the prevention of cruelty to animals. Its pledge is this, "I will try to be kind to all harmless living creatures, and will try to protect them from cruel usage." Simple as the pledge appears to be, the society itself was not quite satisfied with its conditional and qualified character, for by a supplementary rule the members are permitted to strike out the word "harmless," if they choose to do so. The chief merit of the society is its valuable influence upon children, teaching them to be merciful to the lower animals. It has an organ published in Boston called *Our Dumb Animals*, in which the beautiful doctrine of kindness is advocated in a very attractive way. It is not always logical, but it is not to blame for that, because the whole doctrine is full of difficulties. For instance, I find in *Our Dumb Animals* a little poem asking mercy for the toad, on grounds which appear to be somewhat out of harmony with the doctrine. The first verse of it is this:

"Don't kill the toads, the ugly toads,
That hop around your door.
Each meal, the little toad doth eat
A hundred bugs or more."

This reduces the whole doctrine at last to a mere question of human interest, and human pleasure. Be merciful to the toad, because he is unmerciful to the bugs; and the bugs are a nuisance to us.

* * *

What, in the classic vernacular of the schoolboys, is called "a dead give away," was the charge of Judge Adams to the Grand Jury impanelled at Chicago for the November term. Said the judge, "In a community like this, where crimes and misdemeanors, and proceedings of courts, and almost all matters of public interest are reported with substantial accuracy in the papers, it seems almost superfluous to instruct a grand jury of intelligent men with regard to their duties." This patronising flattery was no doubt swallowed like a select oyster by the "intelligent men," and relished in the spirit of thanksgiving; but when it comes to impanelling the trial jury, Judge Adams will reverse himself, and decide that knowledge obtained through the public press disqualifies a jurymen, at least knowledge concerning the matter to be tried. Persons who have had occasion to observe the tendency of Illinois courts will not be surprised that the intelligence which qualifies one jurymen disqualifies another. This judicial paradox is not law; it is one of the "fantastic tricks" played in the name of the law; and funny as the antics of a jester in a comic play. Not at all comical, but altogether serious and significant was the instruction against "permitting the process and machinery of the court to be used for the collection of debts." To this he ought to have added, "or for purposes of persecution and blackmail." Even as it is, the instruction reads like a sentence, for it includes an intimation that to such base uses have Grand juries been perverted in Chicago. Critics of our courts, who expose their illegal practices, do so under peril of contempt and ridicule; but if they will only possess their souls in patience, and wait, the time will surely come, when some talkative and affable judge will confess them from his place on the bench itself. Then, and not till then, will the revelations get the "public ear"; and a very long ear it is.

* * *

It is a trait of human weakness that we take pleasure in the tribulations of others, especially if we have suffered the like tribu-

lations ourselves. When I was campaigning in Missouri, a citizen came into camp one evening and complained that the soldiers had stolen all his chickens. He demanded "reparation and apology"; and when he got neither, he sardonically said: "Well, gentlemen, Mr. Brooks, who lives just beyond me in the timber over there, has a much finer lot of chickens than mine; suppose you try them." The hint was taken, and the chickens too. In a spirit equally generous, I laughed at that crowd of Chicago clergymen, mostly Congregationalists I believe, who recently received letters from the "Department" informing them that packages from England awaited them at the Custom House. As it was too early for Christmas presents, and too late for April Fooling they wondered what was in the packages. Perhaps dynamite, for another anarchist plot had been uncovered, and it might be that the revolution was to begin by blowing up all the clergy. When they arrived at the proper bureau, they learned that the packages had been "seized" at the Post Office by the collector of customs, on suspicion that they contained lottery tickets or smuggled goods. On opening the packages the mischievous character of their contents was made known. They were deadly books, Reports of the proceedings had at the International Congregational Council which met in London last June. Only that, and nothing more. They were all released from custody, and given to their owners on payment of the fine levied upon them by the tariff law. A reverend canon of the Episcopal church received a book from England at the same time. It was entitled "Holy Communion," and was, I think, a present from the Bishop of Salisbury, the author of the book. By convincing the inquisition that the bishop had not concealed any lottery tickets between the leaves, the Canon was allowed to take the book on payment of a tribute of twenty-five cents. "A heavy tax," he said, "when you consider that the book is worth but a dollar. Twenty-five cents tax on a dollar's worth of property is a good deal." And yet for twenty years, and more, the reverend Canon has paid without noticing it, twice that percentage of taxation on his clothing, and other things. The payment of a visible and tangible tax of twenty-five cents, is an object lesson in political economy more instructive than the payment indirectly of a thousand dollars. This proves that General Othello was not so mad as he looked when on a memorable occasion he remarked:

"He that is robbed, not seeing what is stolen,
Let him not know it, and he's not robbed at all."

One gratifying result of the "higher criticism," as they call it now, although it used to go by the name of "infidelity," is that the eternal prospects for little children who die in infancy are very much improved. So also is the chance of the heathen, and the pagan, and "many other persons who have not been called by the ministry of the word." That quotation is taken from some resolutions offered by Dr. Briggs before the Presbytery of New York, during the debate on the revision of the Presbyterian creed. They did not mean it so, of course, and yet some of the delegates talked as if salvation was in the keeping of the Presbyterians, and only to be had on terms prescribed by the Synod and the General Assembly. Dr. Briggs proposed that those terms be made more liberal than formerly, and that the Presbyterians allow more people to go to heaven in the twentieth century than they did in the nineteenth. "Some provision should be made," he said, "for the salvation of those incapable of being called by the ministry of the word, and for the heathen." I hope the Presbyterian church will take the advice of Dr. Briggs, and make provision for the salvation of those persons; but should it fail to do so, I shall console myself with a hope, that the Creator has attended to that matter, and that the necessary provision has been made. The resolution of Dr. Briggs expands the horizon of hope, but it leaves a little comfort still for the dear old lady, who said, "The Universalists

believe that all will be saved; but we hope for better things." Here is the resolution:

"Infants dying in infancy and other persons who are incapable of being called by the ministry of the word are regenerated and saved by Christ through the spirit which worketh when and where and how he please;h; also many other persons who have not been called by the ministry of the word."

It seems to me that God knows his own children and can pick them out without the help of the Presbyterian church. As there is no body so diseased that it cannot be refined into its original elements when laid in the bosom of its mother earth, so there is no soul so corrupt that it cannot be purified in the bosom of the Universal Spirit where every soul will go.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

Mr. G. M. McCrie is engaged in editing a book containing posthumous essays by Miss Naden and other articles that have reference to her. In the preface to the forthcoming volume, the editor declares that "the interest and attention which have been aroused by the publication of Miss Naden's Essays, and by the succeeding Memoir, which appeared last year, suggested the compilation of her further literary *Reliques*. In the arrangement of the volume the Editor has endeavored, by introducing several reprinted papers, culled from the *Journal of Science*, etc., to add variety to the list now before the reader. The papers which have already appeared, either in periodical or pamphlet form, are marked with an asterisk in the Contents. The other papers have never been published. The appendices are numerous. They consist of some valuable additions and illustrative notes contributed to the already published papers by Dr. Lewins, and by the Rev. E. Cobham Brewer, LL. D.—the latter gentleman having kindly acceded to his notes being reprinted above his signature. To this department the Editor has also ventured to add a reply written by himself and forwarded to the Editor of the *Contemporary Review*, on the appearance in the number for April, of a sketch of Miss Naden's life, from the pen of Rev. Dr. R. W. Dale of Birmingham."

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AN UNPUBLISHED LETTER OF THOMAS PAINE.

WRITTEN TO JEFFERSON, AMERICAN MINISTER IN PARIS.

No. 13 Broad Street Buildings,
London, Feb. 16, 1789.

"DEAR SIR:—Your favour of the 23d Dec'r continued to the — of Jan'y came safe to hand; for which I thank you. I begin this without knowing of any opportunity of conveyance, and shall follow the method of your letter by writing on till an opportunity offers. I thank you for the many and judicious observations about my bridge. I am exactly in your Ideas, as you will perceive by the following account.—I went to the Iron Works [Yorkshire] the latter end of Oct'r. My intention at the time of writing to you was to construct an experiment arch of 250 feet [an iron Bridge], but in the first place the season was too far advanced to work out of doors, and an arch of that extent could not be worked within doors; and *nextly*, there was a prospect of a real Bridge being wanted on the spot, of 90 feet extent. The person who appeared disposed to erect a Bridge was Mr. Foljambe, nephew to the late Sir George Saville, and Member in the last Parliament for Yorkshire. He lives about three miles from the Works, and the river Don runs in front of his house, over which there is an old ill-constructed Bridge which he wants to remove. These circumstances determined me to begin an arch of 90 feet, with an elevation of five feet.—The foreman of the Works is a relative of the Proprietors [Messrs. Walker], an excellent mechanic, who fell in with all my Ideas with great ease and penetration. I staid at the Works till one-half of the Rib, 45 feet, was compleated and framed horizontally together, and came up to London at the meeting of Parliament on the 4th of December. The foreman, whom, as I told him, I should appoint "President of the Board of Works" in my absence, wrote me word that he has got the other half together with much less trouble than the first. He is now preparing for erecting and I for returning.

"Feb. 26. A few days ago I received a letter from Mr. Foljambe in which he says, 'I saw the Rib of your Bridge. In point of elegance and beauty it far exceeded my expectations, and is certainly beyond anything I ever saw.'

"My Model and myself had many visitors while I was at the Works. A few days after I got there, Lord Fitz William, heir to the Marquis of Rockingham, came with Mr. [Edmund] Burke. The former gave the workmen five guineas and invited me to Wentworth House, a few miles distant from the Works, where I went, and staid a few days.

"This Bridge I expect will bring forth something greater, but in the meantime I feel like a bird from its nest [America], and wishing most anxiously to return; therefore as soon as I can bring anything to bear I shall dispose of the contract and bid adieu. I can very truly say that my mind is not at home.

"I am very much rejoiced at the account you give me of the state of affairs in France. I feel exceedingly interested in the affairs of that nation. They are now got or getting into the right way, and the present reign will be more immortalized in France than any that ever preceded it: they have all died away, forgotten in the common mass of things, but this will be to France like an Anno Mundi, or an Anno Domini.

"The happiness of doing good, and the pride of doing great things, unite themselves in this business. But as there are two kinds of Pride, the little and the great, the privileged orders will in some degree be governed by this division. Those of little pride (I mean little-minded pride) will be schismatical, and those of the great pride will be orthodox, with respect to the States General. Interest will likewise have some share, and could this operate freely it would arrange itself on the orthodox side. To enrich a nation is to enrich the individuals which compose it. To enrich the farmer is to enrich the farm—and consequently the landlord;—for whatever the farmer is, the farm will be. The richer the subject, the richer the revenue, because the consumption from which taxes are raised are in proportion to the abilities of people to consume; therefore the most effectual method to raise both the revenue and the rental of a country is to raise the condition of the people,—or that order known in France by the Tiers Etat. But I ought to ask pardon for entering into reasoning in a letter to you. I only do it because I like the subject.

"I observe in all the companies I go into the impression which the present circumstances of France have upon this country. *An internal Alliance* [of

Throne and People] in France is an alliance which England never dreamed of, and which she most dreads. Whether she will be better or worse tempered afterwards I cannot judge of, but I believe she will be more cautious in giving offense. She is likewise impressed with an idea that a negotiation is on foot between the King [Louis XVI.] and the Emperor [of Germany] for adding Austrian Flanders to France. This appears to me such a probable thing, and may be rendered [so] conducive to the interest of all parties concerned, that I am inclined to give it credit and wish it success. I hope then to see the Scheld opened, for it is a sin to refuse the bounties of Nature. On these matters I shall be glad of your opinion. I think the States General of Holland could not be in earnest when they applied to France for the payment of the quota to the Emperor. All things considered, to request it was meanness and to expect it absurdity. I am more inclined to think they made it an opportunity to find how they stood with France. Absalom (I think it was) set fire to his brother's field of corn to bring on a conversation.

"March 12. With respect to political matters here the truth is, the people are fools. They have no discernment into principles and consequences. Had Mr. Pitt proposed a National Convention at the time of the King's insanity, he had done right; but instead of this he has absorbed the right of the Nation into a right of Parliament,—one house of which (the Peers) is hereditary in its own right, and over which the people have no control (not as much as they have over their King); and the other elective by only a small part of the Nation. Therefore he has lessened instead of increased the rights of the people; but as they have not sense enough to see it, they have been huzzing him. There can be no fixed principles of government, or anything like a Constitution, in a country where the government can alter itself, or one part of it supply the other.

"Whether a man that has been so compleatly mad as not to be managed but by force and the mad shirt can ever be confided in afterwards as a reasonable man, is a matter I have very little opinion of. Such a circumstance, in my estimation, if mentioned, ought to be a perpetual disqualification.

"Had the Regency gone on and the new Administration been formed I should have been able to communicate some matters of business to you, both with respect to America and France, as an interview for that purpose was agreed upon, and to take place as soon as the persons who were to fill the offices should succeed. I am the more confidential with those persons, as they are distinguished by the name of the Blue and Buff,—a dress taken up during the American war, and the undress uniform of General Washington

with lapels, which they still wear. But at any rate, I do not think it worth while for Congress to appoint any Minister to this Court. The greater distance Congress observes on this point, the better. It will be all money thrown away to go to any expense about it,—at least during the present reign. I know the Nation well, and the line of acquaintance I am in enables me to judge better than any other American can judge, especially at a distance. If Congress should have any business to state to the Government here, it can be easily done thro' their Minister at Paris; but the seldom the better.

"I believe I am not so much in the good graces of the Marquis of Lansdowne as I used to be. I do not answer his purpose. He was always talking of a sort of reconnection of England and America, and my coldness and reserve on this subject checked communication. I believe he would be a good Minister for England with respect to a better agreement with France.

"Remember me to the Marquis de la Fayette, Mr. Le Roy, Mr. De Corney. Please to inform me if anything further has been done about the Bridge; and likewise how the new Bridge in your neighbourhood goes on.

I am, Dear Sir, with much respect,

Your sincere Friend,

and ob't H'ble servant,

THOMAS PAINE."

AMERICAN PROGRESS.

BY VOLTAIRINE DE CLEYRE.

In a very able article in the October *Monist*, Mr. T. B. Preston gives a bird's-eye view of American Politics, for the purpose, it would appear of pointing out the coincidence of American political development with the more general theory of Evolution. This article commands admiration for its evident spirit of fairness, and desire to bring out the truth concerning the purpose of the rise, growth, and decay of political parties. Nevertheless he has arrived at certain conclusions which, in my opinion, are incorrect, and should not pass without criticism.

If I rightly apprehend the general tenor and particularly the concluding paragraphs of "American Politics," Mr. Preston falls into a common error of interpreting all evolution as progress; for he alludes to the two opposing forces which alternately gain the political ascendancy as in turn, "bringing the nation to a higher plane of progress." This, he observes, is neither Socialism nor Anarchism, but EVOLUTION. No one who accepts the dictum of modern science will dispute that the several triumphs of the centralising and decentralising political parties are evolutionary; but that they are always *progress* can and will most certainly be gainsaid. The spirit of free inquiry which

should possess the searcher after truth should nevertheless work no confusion of right and wrong principles; "Truth is intolerant," to quote the editor of *The Monist*. Therefore the sociological student, however he may recognise the inevitability of opposing political successes, will never mistake social disease for health, but test each by the exacting Law of Progress.

To deduce the law of progress from the history of social experience was one of the main purposes of modern sociology. As pointed out by Dr. Post in his article on "Ethnological Jurisprudence," scientific jurisprudence and scientific sociology alike, demanded that the facts concerning their respective subjects be gathered from all the peoples of the earth. In the one as in the other the task is necessarily still very incomplete. Nevertheless sociology has already passed from the "purely empirical" stage. The far greater task of examining and interpreting these facts; of establishing their relations; of constructing a theory which should unite them into one meaningful whole; this task also has been accomplished, and the "increasing purpose" running through the ages has been formulated in the law of progress, viz.: *that society progresses proportionally to the diminution of the powers of the state, and corresponding increase of scope to the activity of the individual.*

It was possible to have deduced this law even without the record of American politics; yet the story of no other nation more thoroughly verifies it than our own. In the process of examination, Sociology was obliged at the outset to take cognizance of the two tendencies which Mr. Preston has pointed out and likened to the centripetal and centrifugal forces of associative life. It recognised in one the conservative element, in the other the progressive. It recognised that each political party has generally a platform of mixed principles, in which either the conservative or progressive element is dominant. It recognised that a progressive party, having accomplished its dominant purpose, generally becomes conservative with continuance of power. But it also pointed out that wherever progress ensued, it was due to the libertarian spirit; never to the authoritarian. It did not confound political success with sociologic progress.

Let us now apply the test of progress to the most notable case instanced by Mr. Preston—that of the civil war. Our writer says that the republican party, the avowed party of what he denominates the socialistic principle, or the centripetal force, "grandly and patriotically fulfilled its mission" of liberating the chattel slaves. He alludes to the abolition agitation, previous to the war, as advocating the principle which shaped the policy of the republican party. He endeavors to show that, in accord with his declaration, this party was liberal in comparison with its prede-

cessor in power. To a careless student this will appear true. Travelling in an unknown sea, without a compass, the unskilful mariner may call east, west. But let us be more careful. If it be true that the republican party, representing the authoritarian principle (which term I prefer to "socialistic" for, as I shall hereafter try to point out socialism does not necessarily imply centralised power), if it be true that, by virtue of an authoritarian triumph, progress was wrought, then it is an anomaly without parallel in history. Is it true? Those familiar with the history of the war, know that the principle of equal right advocated by the abolitionists had nothing to do with the policy of the republican party. The war was fought on other grounds, viz.: States' right versus United States authority. The majority of those composing the republican party cared nothing about the negroes; their motive was to compel the southern states to remain in the Union. As one old soldier expressed it to me, "All I knew was I was fighting for the flag." Mr. Lincoln declared: "If I could preserve the Union without freeing the slaves I would do it."

Why then did the Union party free the slaves? As a matter of fact they did not. There are two aspects in which the condition of the negroes at the close of the war must be viewed, an ethical and a material aspect.

There had been an ethical progress, in the recognition of the black man as an individual, included in the social law of equal freedom; a recognition, which it is true, was but a partial one, and, for the most part, is as yet barely an ideal. It has not, as yet, been incorporated into the lives of the old masters and the old slaves; they are not really free men, and will not be until the old inheritance of slavery has been obliterated by many generations of social adaptation. Notwithstanding, it was a step in progress; but it was not achieved by the authoritarian party. The Emancipation Proclamation made no one free; ethically speaking it had no value save as an agitator of thought. Freedom cannot be accomplished by declarative pieces of paper; you can make no one free by taking away his master. Every ethical advance must be wrought out in the life of the individual before it is an accomplished fact. Such advance as had been made resulted from the contagion of the abolitionist religion of human rights; and, as is well known, the question of Union or disruption was of little moment to its agitators. If with Mr. Lincoln it was, "save the Union at whatever cost," with them it was "free the slave at whatever cost." With, or without war, as Mr. Preston admits, this idea was and is bound for ultimate victory. His mistake is in supposing that the war precipitated the victory.

The other aspect of the situation, the real effect of

the triumph of authoritarianism, was an economic change; a substitution of the wage system for chattelism, cheap labor for dear labor. This was evolution, but not progress. It is hard when we have been long accustomed to the evils of any particular institution to survey them with the same detestation as that which possesses us at the description of those with which we are unfamiliar, or which we have outgrown. Our ideas of justice are so much matters of habit, that, what to one with a higher ideal seems the blackest enormity, is to us altogether natural. Hence the daily recitals, and the facts staring in our eyes in evidence of the horrors of wage-slavery do not torture us, do not shock us, often scarcely rouse us. To paint them as they shall be one day painted is the task of the poet and the novelist of the close future, for to such is given the mastery of the emotions. But the cold logician who cares nothing for tears or graves save as factors in his problem, can both theoretically and practically prove that where, in chattelism, the cost of human labor was higher than any other, in the wage-system human life is maintained at less cost than that of working animals. As the subsistence line goes down, down go the powers and capacities of the individual, down goes society, backward turns the wheel of evolution. So much for the civil war in its most vital aspects.

Concerning Mr. Preston's prediction of alternating triumphs for the opposing principles, I think it altogether likely they will be fulfilled. None the less I earnestly hope they may not. I hope America will take no more backward steps in the direction of government aggrandisement. Yet there is a profound truth touched by Mr. Preston, in regard to the "centripetal and centrifugal forces" of society, a clearer grasp of which would render his utterances of more value as teaching. Socialism and anarchism are indeed co-existent with Society; and *they are not at war with each other*. On the contrary the greater the recognition of individual liberty, the greater the socialisation of human effort. Any ideal of society which ignores either of these great factors, is like trying to conceive God apart from the Universe, or the Universe apart from God, if I may be allowed the term "God" to express the *rationale* of the Cosmos, a matter in which I am not altogether clear myself.

Many socialists however, anxious for speedy deliverance from the horrors of Wager, conceive their half-truth to be a whole, and invoke Authority to utter a "be it enacted." Many anarchists conceiving *their* half-truth to be a whole, cry for the immediate abolition of government, fancying that paradise will bloom at once where hell has raged. He who is both socialist and anarchist, and a student of history, knows that neither victory can come to man by any royal road. In

the imagery of Olive Schreiner the bridge to the "Land of Freedom" must be built of human bodies; and of those living now scarce any one will help to form the foundations of its piers; "they will be swept away and drowned." This is a sad thought viewed from the standpoint of individual existence, as indeed all life is. It is only in rising to that point from which he whom I have criticised took his view, when he looked away back to the dim morning of the dark old earth, and saw the divinity in it all, that personal pain or pleasure ceases to be of moment. Then racial life stands out in a grandeur which makes the suffering of Now, glorious as the gateway of Then. And we learn—PATIENCE.

THE LESSON THAT HARD TIMES TEACH.

THE REV. BROOKE HERFORD's remark, as quoted by Gen. M. M. Trumbull in this number, that he believed occasionally in "a good wholesome starvation" appears at first sight brutally inhuman, and I am inclined to think either that he never said it or that the context in which it was said would supply us with the key as to his real meaning. It reminds of Moltke's famous phrase "*ein frischer fröhlicher Krieg*," which well harmonises with the same general's saying that "a war even though successful is a calamity." Moltke's opinion is: This world is a world of struggle; struggle is an indispensable element in the household of nature: therefore let us act accordingly, let us struggle unflinchingly whenever duty calls upon us to fight.

Struggle, hard times, war, and other calamities come upon mankind, and the evolution of mankind takes place as a reaction against the evils of life as well as in the fierce competition for progress. This does not mean that we should seek the struggle for the sake of struggle, or go to war for the sake of war, or enjoy to see hard times come upon mankind; this means that we should learn the ethics of struggle, to struggle nobly and bravely, that we should be ready to go to war, if need be, for a just cause, but shrink from misusing a superiority of power, because an unjust war even victorious will be a blot on our escutcheon and in some future time its curse will come home to us; further it means that in good times we should prepare ourselves for bad times. We had a plentiful harvest this year, but its lesson is not to waste, as is actually done on an outrageous scale in this country, but to lay it up for times of scarcity. Do not think that such times will not come. They are constantly near at hand, for times of tribulations which try the souls of men may come, they can come at any time, and they do come occasionally.

There is no use in arguing or remonstrating against this state of things; such is nature and nature is as stern as the God of the Bible. Says the Apostle:

"Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" We cannot change the laws of nature, we can only change ourselves by adapting ourselves to the laws of nature; yet in doing so we shall progress, we shall grow stronger, nobler, and more moral.

Professor Lloyd Morgan shows in his book "Animal Life and Intelligence" that the change between good times and hard times is an important factor in evolution. Good times produce an expansion of life, they develop many varieties good and evil. Hard times however eliminate; they prune the opulent growth and let the fit alone survive. He says:

"During the exhibitions at South Kensington there were good times for rats. But when the show was over, there followed times that were cruelly hard. The keenest competition for the scanty food arose, and the poor animals were forced to prey upon each other. 'Their cravings for food,' we read in *Nature*, 'culminated in a fierce onslaught on one another, which was evidenced by the piteous cries of those being devoured. The method of seizing their victims was to suddenly make a raid upon one weaker or smaller than themselves, and, after overpowering it by numbers, to tear it in pieces.' Elimination by competition, passing in this way into elimination by battle, would, during hard times, be increased. None but the best organised and best adapted could hope to escape. . . .

"The alternation of good times and hard times may be illustrated by an example taken from human life. The introduction of ostrich-farming in South Africa brought good times to farmers. Whereupon there followed divergence in two directions. Some devoted increased profits to improvements upon their farms, to irrigation works which could not before be afforded, and so forth. For others increased income meant increased expenditure and an easier, if not more luxurious, mode of life. Then came hard times. Others, in Africa and elsewhere, learnt the secret of ostrich-farming. Competition brought down profits, and elimination set in—of which variety need hardly be stated."

This is one instance that demonstrates the error of hedonism. The happiness theory in ethics is wrong and dangerously misleading.

At present we have good times; yet how few people learn the lesson of life, how few know that this is the time of a preparation for hard times. Is it not a cruelty to feed paupers and make them more unfit still in the struggle for existence than they are already? There should be no charity except it be educational so as to teach people to help themselves and show them a way out of being in need of charity. Yet for those who refuse to learn any lesson from life, there is no other hope than an eventual extermination in hard times.

CURRENT TOPICS.

MR. MCCRIE'S article in *The Open Court* of November 26th presents to us again that intricate puzzle called "Abraham Lincoln's creed." It is very interesting that such a question should have any interest at all. The religion that begs the patronage of presidents doubts its own theology, for the true God needs not the favor of men. Shall we think of Abraham Lincoln as having had a dual character? That he was a Christian is proved by abundant evidence; while the testimony is overwhelming that he was an

unbeliever and an atheist. He invoked the aid of prayers; and in some of his public acts, he made appeals to God in words of worship and in a tone of adoration. Some of his tributes to Deity were merely rhetorical emphasis, but others were not. Cicero often swore "By Hercules," as in the oration against Catiline, although he believed no more in Hercules than Abraham Lincoln believed in any church-made God. We know little of Lincoln's moral principles and theology, but we know his actions and his politics. The Emancipation Proclamation was not "the greatest moral document of his presidency": it was not a moral document at all. It was a political document, and Mr. Lincoln himself never claimed for it any moral quality. It was issued, with much parade of apology, as a bit of military strategy, and a "war measure." It had a dual character. It is anti-slavery now, but had its terms been accepted by the confederates, it would have been pro-slavery. By the very terms of it slavery was to be preserved should the states in rebellion return to their allegiance within a hundred days. And, as it was, it abolished slavery only where we had no jurisdiction, and retained it where we had.

* * *

I see by the papers that the Rev. Brooke Herford told the Associated Charities of Boston last week that he thought there was danger sometimes of too much assistance to the paupers. He believed, occasionally, in "good, wholesome starvation." Not for himself, of course, nor for his own children; not for the nobility that buys his pews, but for the mob-ility, who have no money to buy either pews or bread. I wonder how it happens that such Anti-Christianity is generally proclaimed by a gentleman with "Rev." before his name. True, Mr Herford did not mean what he said, but his gaunt, grim wit makes an excuse for others to lock up charity. A man ought to be sure that he himself is very good before he recommends "wholesome starvation" for his fellow men. No doubt that alms are often misapplied, but better that than starvation. Charity, even to the shiftless and unworthy is a mistake that leans to virtue's side. The Associated Charities organisation means well, but it believes too much in the doctrine of "good, wholesome starvation" for the poor. Charities, when "associated" become jealous of retail charities, and freely assert that they do more harm than good. Charities, "associated" in a corporation or a syndicate, sometimes practice the methods of monopolies, and try to crush out all retail competition. The spiritual influence of alms-giving on the giver who bestows directly upon the object of his bounty, is weakened when he gives through the medium of the Associated Charities, although it is better to give through them than not to give at all. If "good, wholesome starvation" came only to those who deserve it, how many children of the self-righteous would go hungry on thanksgiving day.

* * *

There is no cause for alarm just now at the prospect of an "over-production" of charity. The demand for charity still exceeds the supply. Several years ago, I pompously declared in an article on the labor problem, that the working men "ask not charity but justice." Since then I have seen the sentiment quoted so often to the prejudice of charity that I begin to think I made a mistake in placing those two qualities in contrast. They are in reality kindred virtues, and I now believe that a man cannot practice charity very much without wishing to do justice too. For that reason I hail with benedictions the thanksgiving dinner bestowed by almsgiving people on a thousand "waifs," as they call them, in Chicago. So far as it goes, I welcome the dinner as a pledge of justice to come; when, because of justice, there shall be fewer "waifs" than there are now. I see that General Booth of the Salvation Army gives a banquet to six-hundred thieves in London, and I approve of that also, because the spirit of the gift moves the six hundred some little distance at least along the way that

leads to salvation. This banquet is given to them, not because they are thieves, but because they are men, every one of them with some good in him somewhere. It is an offering, not to the thief, but to the scourged and disfigured Christ within him. In some religions this feast will rank as a sacrament; and that it will confer spiritual grace I have no doubt whatever. I believe that although six hundred thieves may sit down to the banquet, less than six hundred thieves will rise from the table, I am sure that some of them will be converted.

* * *

There was eager bidding by rival cities for the next republican convention, and the bids all came from the Nor', and the Nor'-west by Nor'; the South made never a claim. The proceedings before the national committee resembled an auction, with this difference, that the highest bidder did not get the prize. The bids had a sectional tone which grated harshly on the ear, a tall young giant of the cowboy order, called the "Northwest" mixing a good deal of swagger with his bids, and menacing an elderly gentleman in civilised clothing called the "East." New York, Cincinnati, and Pittsburg put in their claims, and then Detroit offered the electoral vote of Michigan, promising that Michigan should be "redeemed" from democratic rule; and not only that, but Detroit would provide "a hall capable of holding 10,000 people, a wigwam in the centre of the city, and a floating raft in the river." The last part of it was fatal to the bid, for the proposition to anchor the convention on a raft in the river, although a wise precaution on the part of the citizens of Detroit, alarmed the committee, and the bid was rejected. Omaha put in a bid as "the gateway to the new empire of the Nor', Nor'-west," but the "gateway" metaphor having been so much ill-used and over-worked, hurt the bid. The impassioned plea of San Francisco to come to that city "for God's sake," made a deep impression on the committee, backed as the appeal was by an offer of luxurious living, and free tickets for all the delegates; "not that we would offer a bribe," said 'Frisco, "Oh no, certainly not." The disclaimer had an unpleasant suggestion in it, which was fatal to the bid. Never say "bribe" to the man you are bribing. Just bribe him and have done with it. "I wouldn't presume to offer you a bribe," said the lobbyist to the statesman he was tempting; and the honorable member answered him, saying, "Then send somebody that will." The bid of Minneapolis was "a hall with 14,000 seating capacity, and plenty of hotels. The coming fight would be won or lost in the Nor'-west," said Minneapolis, "and the convention should go there as a stimulant." The word "stimulant" had a great effect. "Are you all done, Gentlemen?" said the auctioneer. "Gone! to Minneapolis."

* * *

It is curious that in a land theoretically so jealous as ours of the people's "rights," the right of social privacy is continually invaded, and the luxury of being nobody placed among the forbidden fruit. Not long ago, a modest lady of New York died at her own home, and as her life had been spent in doing good, some admiring friends took measures to honor her memory by a public monument. This was so arrogantly out of harmony with her unostentatious character, that her family, by means of a writ of injunction forbade the building of the monument, the courts deciding that the right of social privacy was under the protection of the law. This was well; but as a writ of injunction is not always available, the protection is imperfect. Within the past few years a new terror has been given to life by the woodcut caricature of himself, called a portrait, which any man is likely to see in the newspapers on the smallest provocation. If editors knew how much pain those woodcuts give, they would not publish them. I know a man, fearful of celebrity as he is of hydrophobia, who rashly consented to "make a few remarks" at a public meeting in Chicago. The next day he saw in one of the papers a full length portrait of himself as he appeared in the very act of talk. Slowly

and sadly he carried the paper home, and showed it to the folks. His daughter, a proud and sensitive young lady, very nearly swooned at the sight of it, and bursting into tears, exclaimed, "Oh, look at them feet!" The innermost sanctuary of the home is not secure in its right of privacy, and even little children may be dragged into notoriety, whether their parents like it or not. Surely the instinct of good manners ought to have prevented that burlesque election, when Baby McKee, and Baby Cleveland were pitted against each other as candidates for a doll, or something of that kind. This, for the mercenary object of raising funds for the society that "nominated" those little children, and made them an innocent and unwilling part of an "entertainment." More surprising than the rest of it is the fact that the papers, without a word of reproof, proclaimed that Baby McKee beat Baby Cleveland so many hundred votes; and that the society "cleared" so many dollars by the parody.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

EVOLUTION AND IMMORTALITY.

MR. THOMAS B. PRESTON does not take that idealising view of American politics and especially of the motives of the Republican party in freeing the slaves that Miss Voltairine de Cleyre attributes to him. On the contrary, he makes out, as he states himself, "a pretty bad indictment of corruption against our politics," but he recognises at the same time that "the moral forces which are operating in the world are fortunately not dependent upon the changeable methods or the selfish objects of men." Evolution takes place in spite of the sometimes extremely insincere motives of parties and party leaders, which are most instrumental in effecting progress.

Miss Voltairine de Cleyre quotes from Olive Schreiner the sentence that the bridge to "the Land of Freedom" must be built of human bodies, and of those living now scarcely any one will help to form the foundations of its piers. They will be swept away and drowned. Miss de Cleyre adds: "This is a sad thought." It is a sad thought that so few will help to form the foundations, but that the bridge to the land of freedom, indeed the bridge to any higher existence is to be built of human lives—lives rather than bodies—is not a sad thought; it is a great thought and a sublime idea, it is an elevating, refreshing, and strengthening idea. It is the idea of immortality. The lives of all those who have labored and aspired for freedom and progress are not swept away; they form the living building-stones of the temple of humanity and our present civilisation is their embodiment. So far as certain ideals have been realised in our political or social life we of the present generation are thinking the thoughts of the martyrs of these ideals; the better parts of their souls have entered into our psychical constitution and form part of ourselves. In this sense Schopenhauer says that our beloved dead are always with us; they live still.

Is this a sad idea? It is only a sad idea to him who considers death as a finality. He who imagines that his present existence from his birth to the grave is all of his life must feel disheartened. But he who recognises that this span of life is but a fragment, and that that element of his soul which gives it worth, will continue to live, has no cause for being overpowered by melancholy and pessimism. It appears that almost all the mistakes of ethical and philosophical errors arise from a wrong conception of man's personality. If we take the ego to be a real entity, being the subject or substratum, the bearer of the actual facts of psychical existence, and if this mythical ego is assumed as the main constituent of man's personality, the whole world is rent in twain, a veil wraps our mental eye; it is the veil of Maya which prevents it from recognising itself in the not-me. The belief in the ego produces the erroneous idea of considering death as a finality. If we take the actual facts of psychical existence as the constituents of personality the gap between ourselves and mankind disappears. We ob-

serve the souls of our ancestors, our teachers, our friends, and even of our enemies floating into and out of this vessel of our existence which we are wont to call our personality. But our personality, our soul, our best self is not the vessel, but its contents. The vessel will be broken, but the contents will not be wasted. The tissues of man's body are dying away daily, hourly, nay at every second of his life; but his soul lives on amid all these changes. The soul can be made immortal and it is our highest religious duty to shape our lives with a constant outlook upon that which lies beyond the grave. The work to be done for immortality is the problem, the aim, and the basis of ethics.

P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

JUSTICE, THE BASIS OF ETHICS.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :—

THE able article from your pen, "Immortality and Science," appearing in *The Open Court*, Nov. 19, is worthy of the most candid consideration. Solomon might be assured that what "befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, and that they all go to one place," but Solomon being an orthodox Jew, no doubt had sublime confidence in the immortality of his race. It evidently never occurred to the ancient Hebrew that the one indispensable requisite thereto was morality. There were certain rituals to be observed, certain customs to which the people were to conform. Man was not to oppress his brother. But here was the weakness of the Jewish theocracy. Humanity was limited to race. Against the nations about the chosen people, any amount of iniquity might be perpetrated. In an act of injustice is incorporated its own retribution. It becomes a Nemesis unto itself. The Jewish race thus created its Karma, and received only that which it had sown—destruction.

Christianity was so far grander than Judaism, that it included in its fellowship all the nations of the earth. The latter had faith in the eternal existence of a race, the former in the immortality of the soul. Accepting the evolution embodied in the later idea, personality, individual responsibility becomes prominent. Not the mighty forest itself is to be called to account, but each unfolded acorn thereof.

The chicken picks its way from its shell, instigated to the act by the chicken soul inherited from many generations of shell-picking ancestors. The little duckling plunges into the pond, guided thereto by the soul of uncounted, pre-existent plungers. And that the chicken emerges from its shell, and the duckling sports in the water, enables the chicken and the duckling of the future, to indulge in the same grand privilege, to manifest the same sublime possession of a soul. For it is quite inconsistent, and altogether illogical, that the Monist should create a subdivision of the kingdoms. Says Professor Draper, confirming by the thought the unity of the cosmos: "What we call spirit sleeps in the stone, dreams in the animal, and awakes in man."

Mr. Hegeler, the brave founder of *The Open Court*, says: "We can preserve and elevate the soul of the present generation and of posterity. To preserve and elevate the quality of the human soul, that is the basis of ethics."

Upon this broad definition it would seem that all schools should be enabled to unite. But the difficulty is that in all ages there has existed a grave disagreement as to the real meaning of morality. The metaphysicians of to-day—and I accept Comte's classification, placing priests of every creed in the category—are discussing the question pro and con with the old-time vigor and acrimony, relinquishing, however, in the enforcement of various autocratic decisions the once popular and effective accessories of rack and torture, fagot, stake, and dungeon. The philosophers have apparently arrived at what may be accepted as a crystallised conclusion, and that is that the basis of ethics is justice, thus

placing the question as it were among the Positive Sciences. Reciprocity—the correlation of forces is the eternal, fixed fact of the universe. In the "Ignorant Philosopher" Voltaire says, and I quote from memory, "that while two savages might not hesitate to cheat each other in the trading of jack-knives, or a Catholic might regard it as a sin to eat meat on Friday, and an Esquimaux would swallow without any compunctions of conscience a tallow candle on that day, or on every day in the week, yet each would recognise the justice of returning to the other the money borrowed to procure food with which to sustain life." Justice, then, if this reasoning be accepted is the natural basis of morality. Hence it follows that immortality of the individual or the race, can only be attained by a strict conformity thereto. Were the chicken only to pick its way partially into existence, future generations of chickens would come into the world with shells sticking to their backs. If the individual then only partially performs his duty to himself—which non-performance necessarily includes his lack of duty to his fellow man—he depreciates in so far the quality of the soul he is creating, infringing thereby upon the soul inheritance of his future fellows. It is agreed then that whether the soul hereafter rejoice in a conscious, individualised existence, or whether it mold into grand proportions the future of the race, that justice is the one standard whereby to measure its work, and consequent worth.

"In order," as Mr. Hegeler says, "to preserve and elevate the quality of the human soul," it becomes a vital necessity that this basis of ethics—justice, should be strictly conformed to. When we behold little children perishing for the necessities of life, labor robbed of its rights, the people bending under a grievous burden, of unjust taxation, and the great Christian church adding to that already heavy burden with its taxless temples, and pagan, un-American privileges, certainly the conclusion is inevitable, that it is building up for itself a very perishable soul.

For the sake of the unborn future, and in the interest of self-preservation, we insist that it build better, broader and higher, in fact that it stand honestly and squarely on its own foundation. If it resist the appeal, if it remain indifferent to the sharp cries of the people's agony, then the inferior inheritance of soul it has created will crumble—its boasted civilisation be ground into dust, and as Babylon, Tyre, Athens, and Rome,—fallen through the same fatal process of disintegration,—its former grandeur will be but as the memory of a brilliant dream.

MRS. M. A. FREEMAN.

Cor. Sec. Am. Secular Union.

[It appears to us that Mrs. Freeman is not just toward the "Jewish Theocracy." To a certain extent, it is true that to the Jew "Humanity was limited to the race." But so to the Greek other nations were Barbarians. From the standpoint of secular criticism we must confess that the ethics of the old Testament were much superior to the ethics of the sacred books of other nations and this its superiority is the reason why it became the Bible of mankind. The New Testament with its glorious gems of noble sentiment was a combination in which not only Jewish thought but also Greek philosophy and Hindoo wisdom coalesced in a peculiar way. It is time for freethinkers to recognise the value of the Bible. In order to conquer the errors of the old orthodoxy we must be just to acknowledge its merits. It is true that grave disagreements prevail as to the nature of morality; and Mrs. Freeman says that morality consists in justice. Most certainly! But we are embarrassed by the same difficulty, for the same disagreement prevails as to the nature of justice. The communist has other ideas about justice than the anarchist, and an anarchist again differs from our lawyers and judges. I have not as yet found two anarchists who hold the same view of anarchism; how can they agree on the meaning of justice? Among the adherents of ethical culture the word justice is often used, but I have found no definition of the term.—ED.]

BOOK NOTICES.

FIFTH REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ENTOMOLOGICAL COMMISSION. Being a Revised and Enlarged Edition of Bulletin No. 7, on Insects Injurious to Forest and Shade Trees. By *Alpheus S. Packard*, M. D., Ph. D. With wood-cuts and 38 plates. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890.

This book has been published by the United States Department of Agriculture following the resolution in the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is a voluminous work of 928 pages with several hundred wood-cuts and 38 plates, a great part of which are most accurately colored. The book contains invaluable instruction concerning the injurious insects of this country and suggests the best known remedies against them. After an introduction on the literature of forest entomology and insects in general (pp. 1-47), the subject of injurious insects is discussed in twenty chapters, the material being arranged according to the trees which are the object of their attacks. This makes the book handy for practical purposes. Three good indexes of the insects, the plants, and of names of authors referred to, increase the usefulness of the work.

The December number of *The Century* will be especially welcome to lovers of art. It contains a collection of engravings after several paintings of different styles. There is the Madonna of the Goldfinch, Æneas rescuing his father, from the "Incendio del Borgo," the famous Parnassus Fresco, the portrait of Maddalena Doni, all four by Raphael. In addition to these classic pictures we find a number of modern pieces of art. "The Holy Family," by Frank Vincent du Mond, an American artist, is peculiarly effective. While Raphael's Madonnas are ideally human, Du Mond depicts Catholic Saints. Fritz von Uhde's "Holy Night" appears to be the work of a Protestant artist. It is difficult to detect any beauty in "The Annunciation to the Shepherds," by J. Bastien Lepage. One of the shepherds looks silly, the other old and wretched and the angel is misdrawn. P. Lagarde's picture "The Appearance of the Angel to the Shepherds" is very dramatic. It is in one respect the most modern conception of all. The landscape and the shepherds are oriental without phantastic or ideal additions and the angel's hazy figure is like the indication of an hallucination. A strongly ascetic feature lies in Dagnan-Bouveret's "Madonna"; Mary is dressed like a nun and the infant is lightly wrapped in swaddling clothes. But the severity of the dress is well contrasted by the sweetness of the holy mother's face.

The Century may be proud of its staff of engravers. The engravings are, as usual, all executed by competent artists. Through some coincidence it happens that the December number of *The Cosmopolitan* contains the last mentioned picture, Dagnan-Bouveret's Madonna, as frontispiece in the shape of a well done photographure. Connoisseurs will find interest in comparing the effect of the engraving with that of the photographure.

The "Freidenker Almanach" of 1892 (Milwaukee Freidenker Publ. Co.) appears in its wonted shape, containing articles and poems by many representative German Freethinkers of this country. Dr. H. H. Fick's article "Der 22. Februar," winds a double wreath for George Washington and for Karl Heinzen, for it is the birthday of both. C. Hermann Boppe, the editor of the *Freidenker* discusses the "Culturaufgaben der Republiken der Gegenwart." His article is mainly directed against the European system of the Sovereignty Emperors and Kings by the grace of God, yet he indicates sufficiently his criticism of our own republic. His ideal republic would not be the administration by party government, but a commonwealth in which "individuality is developed as the bearer of general ideas." There is a rich store of poetry by E. A. Zündt, Hugo Andriessen, Otto Soubron, Hermann Rosenthal, Johann Straubenmüller, Karl Knortz, (a clergyman himself, but sat-

irising with good humor the comfortable life of an orthodox country pastor), Max Hempel, Rud. Puchner, and others.

We have received from the Messrs. Willey & Co. of Springfield, Mass., publishers, a book of four hundred and sixty-six pages entitled *Africa and America, Addresses and Discourses*, by the Rev. Alex. Crummell, Rector of the St. Luke's Church, Washington, D. C. The work consists of a number of addresses and papers on the various problems that the presence of the negro race in our midst has occasioned, and are written with fervency and earnestness. The titles of the principal papers are: "The Need of New Ideas and New Motives for a New Era"; "The Race-Problem in America"; "The Black Woman of the South: her neglects and her needs"; "Defence of the Negro Race in America"; "The Responsibility of the First Fathers of a Country, for their future life and destiny"; "Our National Mistakes, and the remedy for them," etc.

The New Reformation, A Lay Sermon, by Prognostic, is a neatly got up pamphlet of seventy-six pages, in which the author deals, from the standpoint of a practical business man and the Gospel of Jesus, with the social and religious problems of the day. The pamphlet is written in a contained and simple style and with the air of conviction. (J. Van Buren: New York P. O.)

Lee & Shepard of Boston have again published under the title "All Around the Year," an artistic little Calendar which will be a welcome guest to any lady's desk.

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THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR.

BY DR. R. N. FOSTER.

IN *The Open Court* for Oct. 22 there occurs, as part of a continuous discussion, the following sentences (p. 2995):

"Indeed all things, (ourselves included) are such as they are only in connection with the whole universe. Every single object is inseparable from the whole cosmos, and if we speak of a thing we separate it in our thought from the rest of the world. This separation however is a fiction, which if persisted in leads us to the absurd idea of things in themselves.

"The whole universe is a vast system of relations, and these relations are reality itself. There is nothing unconditioned, nothing unrelated, nothing absolute. Everything real is, and necessarily must be, relative. A correct description of the relations of reality in the mind of a feeling being is knowledge. To say that we can know the relative, but cannot know the absolute or the unconditioned, is equivalent to saying that we can know that which exists but we can never know that which does not exist."

The fundamental idea here set forth is one which was also expressed in the last number of *The Monist*, and we do not hesitate to say that it is the most important and comprehensive thought of all philosophy. And it is therefore of the utmost importance that it should be carefully thought out and thoroughly explicated. The correlation of forces and the conservation of energy are laws of great and universal import, but they have no such exhaustive significance or such far reaching consequences as the preliminary law of the relation between the universal and the particular, and the antecedent fact that all existences are grouped in the order of a universal and its particulars. The doctrine lacks not abundance of evidences. Every whole and its parts, a world, a man, or an apple, or anything, is but a repetition or image of the universal and the particular in a new form.

Nearly three thousand years ago this problem showed itself in Greek philosophy, although it had been, latent or expressed, the very axis of theosophy and religion ages before. Indeed religion is the recognition of this law of being as the relation subsisting between man as the particular and God as the universal. In Plato and Aristotle it received full recognition, and so likewise through the Neo-Platonists and the Scholastics its study was continued, and likewise in the modern philosophy of Leibnitz, Hegel, and others. No great thinker has failed to do it reverence. And yet at the present day, so concentrated is mental

activity upon questions quite subordinate, that this primal question is almost entirely neglected, or worse still, is ignorantly estimated as so much antiquated philosophical rubbish.

Yet it is not difficult to discern the universality of the idea in question. Thought itself is a universal which exists in its particulars. Fix the attention upon particular thoughts exclusively, that is to say by abstracting them from the universal, and the universal disappears. On fixing our attention upon the universal in like manner, the particulars disappear. They do not disappear into nothing. Each vanishes into the other. An example of the correlation of intellectual forces. They exist nevertheless as actual being in indissoluble union. The human body is a universal, in which the parts are the individual cells, or even more minute subdivision may be made if we choose. Each cell lives only in and from and for the whole body, even while it lives also for itself. And the whole body lives only in all of its parts, while also living for itself. Or again the physiological cell is a whole existing only in its parts. And so on infinitely. No division is so small or can be that it will not submit to this analysis. We may try to pause at a supposed indivisible atom. But that is only, as one of your correspondents aptly phrases a similar movement, because we elect to "cease thinking" when we have reached that point. The truth is, the finite will vanish into the infinite, resist as we may—if not into the infinitely great, then into the infinitely small, and these exist indissolubly.

As metaphysicians, Lotze and Bowne, among others, have done justice to this mode of thinking the universe. It is inevitable, and it is the cure for the barrenness of all thinking that pauses in mere abstractions.

Of course from the very nature of the subject the existence of universals has been often denied. But this arises exclusively from the abstractions in which thought must employ itself in order to reach the particular. Abstracting thought, thought temporarily arresting its own process, is what creates "isolates," or makes particulars. But trying to grasp the entire process, it is the particular that must be denied as self-existent, and the universal that we are compelled to assume.

The truth must be that each new movement or each new thing is but another phase of the whole. There exists no other form of actuality whatever. Kant's "thing-in-itself" was and is the universal, but Kant did not so recognise it. Herbert Spencer's Unknowable is the universal—the abstract universal—the universal without particulars—which has no existence. His unknowable energy exists however in all particular energies, and all particular energies subsist in it. In knowing the particular energies we are knowing the universal energy, for they are the outcome and revelation of the universal. It is a contradiction of all being to say otherwise. The universal and the so-called unknowable is the one only actual known in all particular knowing. That or nothing. Indeed many from Pyrrho to this day affirm the latter statement, even to the extent of declaring that we cannot even know that we know nothing. Quite different is the dictum that knowing itself is a phase of universal being, which indeed exists only as and in knowing.

But now this much talked of Universal must be reached by adequate thought. Otherwise our universal will be but a larger particular, and another miserable abstraction. Our universal must be conceived concretely, abstractly, unitedly, and quite universally. It is not the universal of time, which can give us but an indefinite succession of moments past and future. Our universal must not be temporal but eternal—otherwise it contradicts itself. The true universal may appear in the particulars of time moments to finite thought, but is not actually so. A moment's thought will show us this. For the Past time is past, and is not. The Future has not come, and is not. The present is—not an infinitesimal of time between the past and the future—but the timeless actuality that lies eternally between these two. Its eternity here emerges at once. Time has vanished, not into nothing however, but into eternal and universal being. The true universal is that timeless actuality, which nevertheless gives origin to the time thought in a mind that advances towards it from particulars. This universal is not a somewhat abstracted from and "set over against" the universe of particulars. It is the universal *and* its particulars each of which exists only in the other. This union of the two is what constitutes the particular as a real, and not a delusion or vain show. The "thing-in-itself" is a delusion and an impossibility. The thing in the universal is the real.

Moreover the true Universal is ideal as well as real; potential as well as actual; temporal as well as eternal. It is the veritable all in all "ourselves included"—all thinking of it and all consciousness of it being itself displayed to itself in its infinite variety.

It was the abstract universal that led to the scholastic disputes as to whether the universal was *ante*

rem, *in re*, or *post rem*. The true universal is the *res* itself in its fulness and entirety. Of course it transcends finite and particular thought—but not the thought which is infinite and universal.

But now this actual universal is neither disputable nor dubitable. Neither can we say of it as is said in the quotation made near the beginning of this article, that it is a "vast system of relations" only, and that "these relations are reality itself." These "relations" are relations merely; reality is the universal itself, which includes relations, and more too. To have relations we must have a series of related somewhats. To consider the Universal as Unity, as a One, would give us no relation except that of Identity. In a duality, still more in a plurality, and therein only, is relation possible. But the true and universal unity implicitly and explicitly contains plurality. Between and among the plural particulars there is possible and actual relation—we have relativity. But in the one only universal there is only one identity, and not relativity. That is to say the whole is unconditioned, without possible relation, and therefore absolute. This contradicts the statement previously quoted that "there is nothing unrelated, nothing absolute," and that "everything real is, and necessarily must be, relative." All particulars fall of necessity under the category of the relative. But the universal as necessarily falls under that of the absolute. And in so considering them thought is complete and symmetrical.

Still more untenable seems the further statement that "to say that we can know the relative, but cannot know the absolute, is equivalent to saying that we can know that which exists, but we can never know that which does not exist."

This is not only in contradiction to the previous statement that every single object is inseparable from the whole cosmos, which means that there is a whole Cosmos, but it is equivalent to affirming that the various parts of a whole apple do exist as a system of relations, but the whole apple has no existence at all. An apple is just as good an illustration as any other thing, as a world, for instance. Let us suppose that one apple is all that is—that it is the totality of being. Then obviously the whole apple is our universal. It exists as a unit, and as a whole, and as such it is absolute. It has no other being to which it can relate. It stands related only to Nothing, and that is incapable of relation, if we may use such language. The apple as a whole exists in and for itself. But it contains a plurality in which it also exists. It lives in all its particular parts, and each part lives in the whole, although at the same moment both the whole and each part live for and in themselves. The relation is subtle, but is an obvious matter of fact. It is impossible to abolish the universal, the absolute, the uncondi-

tioned. It is, and it is eternal. The kernel of the whole matter is involved in the expression, "the whole universe is a vast system of relations." In this expression the particulars are clearly thought as "relations"; but the universal is involved in the word "system." To what is the system related? Here we are apt to be ensnared by the suggestion that it is related to the particulars. But the particulars are included in the system. The system is the relations, and something more. It is the organic unity of all the relations or of all the related particulars, in such manner that it is an independent whole in and for itself as a whole. One ought to apologise for so much repetition, were it not that the failure to clearly think out the Universal is the vice and emptiness of much that passes for modern philosophy. The search for reality in the particular alone leads to endless attempts at formulating which end in various platitudes. Such for instance, as the dogma that only the individual exists. Or the attempt to explicate Life as the "continuous adjustment of internal to external relations." Or the reduction of all Logic, to the principle of Identity. Or the construction of a solid by beginning with a point; stringing together a lot of points without dimension until they form a line; adding line to line, each without breadth, until they make a surface; and compacting surfaces without thickness until they form a solid. Or again, constructing the world of living organisms from chemical elements, or from the simplest forms—that huge hysteron-proteron called Evolution. In this process the architect forgets that there are universals which never develop, and never evolve, and were never made. Because he acquired the addition table successively, unit by unit, he supposes it to have been so "evolved" in actual being, whereas the mathematical relations are eternal realities, that were true before any man thought them, if there ever was such a time, and would be true if all thinking were to cease. Mathematics too is a "vast system of relations," and just one of the phases of the universal, which however is more than mathematics.

So also with the evolution of particular forms of organic being. Universal being is eternally organic. It never *became* so. It simply is and was so. The particular may become and cease—but not the universal. The particular may unfold from ovum to adult, *after* it has first unfolded from adult to ovum, but we know of no other process by which this change is wrought. And if we ever lose the connection of events in the vain pursuit of the particular, we shall find the thread again in the Universal. The particular organism may grow bigger from day to day, but if so, something else must grow smaller in precise proportion; for the equilibrium of universal relativity is never disturbed. But the whole does not grow bigger or smaller. It needs no microscope to discern here the line between the

particular and the universal—between the relative and the absolute—between that which undergoes change or evolution, and that which cannot. And we must not yet forget that the two are indissoluble. That changing particular is a movement of a whole which does not change—that growing organism is an evolution from and of that which never grows. And it is the latter which truly IS.

Here we reach the ground of old philosophic and still older religious thought. Here we find the God of antiquity and of all ages. He is the universal, the unchangeable, the eternal Being; the Universal All in all particulars. Here lies the ground of a real difference between religion and philosophy on one hand and mere science on the other. Here also lies their reconciliation. For we see where the doctrine of the particular ends and that of the universal begins.

For it is by applying to one of these concepts the categories that belong only to the other that confusion and error arise. For example, the process of evolution cannot be pronounced necessary and eternal. If that is true, then we may assert that the mathematics of all spatial existence are an evolution and not the eternal truth of eternal being. We can say not that twice two is, was, and will be four, but that twice two has grown to be four, and heaven alone knows how much more it may grow to be in the fullness of time! Is it not clear enough, on the contrary, that the universal, spatially manifest, is intrinsically mathematical, and as unalterable as eternity?

In like manner considered in relation to thought, the universal is all Logic. This, and not the particular doctrine of identity, is the real ground of Logic. The particular proposition of identity gives us nothing but the empty formula $a=a$, over and over again. But logic, the logic of universal being, gives us the whole of being as a universal, and all its particulars, as a "vast system" of logical "relations," in which not only identity, but also difference, change, contradiction, relativity, absoluteness—the whole again appears in logical formulæ. Logic is not a particular, but a universal.

This we approach in reverse order, it is true. But this is only another way of saying that it approaches us in reverse order. Thus it actually is both ways—both inductively and deductively.

Again it is the solid which gives us at once surface, line and point. We can deduce them as necessary from the solid. We cannot deduce the solid from them. The solid is prior. And the solid ground of logic is also *a priori*. It is the logical universe. The finite has no other ground than the infinite.

Schopenhauer would view the Universal as Will; Hegel as Reason; Spencer as Energy unknowable; Plato as an eternal Idea; Democritus as a chaos of

clashing atoms; and Philo or Paul or St. Augustine as the living God; and so on. But no one of these, except Mr. Spencer, failed to seize the thought of the universal and eternal, or attempted to deduce them by a process of evolution from transient phases of themselves. On the contrary, all evolution, or creation, or becoming, was with them a continuous manifestation or revelation of that which eternally was. The particular of to-day is not that of yesterday. It has changed. The universal of to day is that of yesterday without change, only with a new manifestation of itself.

Again we find an attempt to define Life by one of its particular moments or phases, viz. adjustment of internals to externals. But the universal life means infinitely more than "adjustment." A river or a haystack complies as fully with such a definition as does any other object. All particulars, dead or alive, are incessantly employed in adjusting their relations, internal, external, and eternal. Life is the living universe. You cannot explain it in narrower terms. Each living organism is this same universal repeated. To tear an object from its universal setting is to destroy it. Therefore all abstraction tends to nihilism, unless held in strict relation to the universal. When so held abstracting is true thinking. Otherwise thought itself becomes an abstraction. Philosophy is not abstract thought, it is the Universal appearing as Plato and the rest. Religion is not abstract theosophy. It is God, the Universal, appearing as Christ, angel, Buddha, or a simple pious man or woman. Neither is it necessary to follow *The Monist* or Professor Fiske to the abode of an impersonal vagueness called God by philosophic courtesy. For the Universal makes Personality its supreme expression, to which all else is subordinated. An impersonal God is the Unknowable resuscitated under still another name.

We know of no such abstraction. We know the Universal in the particular, we know the particular in the universal; and thus we know God in man and man in God, and both as Personal.

In conclusion, any principle that presumes to define itself most perfectly in terms of the particular is a foregone failure. Only that which is grounded in the universal has validity and fullness. The particular principle, like the point in Geometry, the atom in physics, $a=a$ in Logic, evolution in biology, are mere nothings unless constantly related to that universal in and through which they perpetually are. Evolution reaches no universal. If evolution is truly universal, then every thing has been evolved. But if so, from what? The answer is not impossible. All Being is evolved from All Being. There is no alternative. But is this evolution in any true sense of that word? Not only Darwin failed to be a consistent evolutionist,

when he postulated a creator to breathe life into his few primordial forms, but all evolutionists are in the same condemnation when they postulate any primitive being whatever which was not evolved from a preceding. Thus the system is lost in the infinite regress. *The Monist* boldly leaps one chasm with the averment that there is no difficulty in obtaining living organisms from inorganic matter, for we see it done every day. We do not see it done any day, nor has any one ever seen, what this is intended to favor, viz. the transformation of inorganic into organic being, except when a previous living organism is given to effect the transformation. This world-wide phenomenon, if it proves anything, proves that living organisms arise only from living organisms. In all such utterances the original and greater principle is naively forgotten, that every movement of the particular is at the same time a movement of the universal.

SCIENCE AND IMMORTALITY.

FROM an article in the *Christmas Century* by Professor Du Bois of Yale, on "Science and Immortality" we quote as follows:

"Mastery of self can be attained only in a world where temptation and sin are possible, where voluntary disobedience is the outcome of ignorant transgression. These are necessary to the end; not merely allowed, but designed. The purpose of such a world is plain to read. It means that not happiness here is the end for which we are to strive. That is a means to help us, to encourage us, to lead us on. Not the avoidance of pain is the end. That also is a means to warn us, to guide us, if needs be, to compel us. But the great end which science itself is forced to recognise is the mastery of self through the struggle with sin and temptation, and the formation of a personality—of a character self-attained, of a spiritual influence in the midst of a universe governed by such influences which, disciplined by pain and trial, strengthened by the sweet uses of adversity, guided by reason and knowledge, voluntarily brought into accord with supreme will through the stress of sin itself—is thus made capable of coöperation with that will both here and hereafter. This is the significance of the process we observe. This alone harmonises all the facts. For such a personality there must be a future. Such a personality belongs to the meaning of the universe. Not, therefore, the production of automata who may pass a few years of blissful irresponsible ease and then cease to be; nor the development from lower forms of an animal who can for a time explore nature, increase in power and civilisation, develop a higher nature, stretch forth hands of entreaty to an unseen God, and then, just as the universe opens to his gaze, when higher possibilities and hopes and yearnings begin to dawn, when he has grown completely out of his physical environment, and with an endowment far beyond his needs catches glimpses of glories he can never share, and with heart filled with loving longings that can never be satisfied, sinks into a hopeless grave—such is not the end indicated by the facts. Such an end is worse than futile. It is a cruel mockery.

"But the development of a conscious, indefeasible personality, 'One soul against the flesh of all mankind,' of a spiritual energy in accord with eternal purpose, capable of coöperation and fit tool for higher things—this is an end which alone satisfies reason, science, revelation, faith, and hope. This alone is commensurate with the whole mighty process. The attainment of such a

personality we begin here. So surely as we begin it has our true life begun, and opportunity must be afforded to complete the work—else is the whole process a failure. And this personality, science tells us as certainly as she can tell us anything, is not born to die."

We agree with Professor Du Bois that life can only be explained when considered as immortal. Man's ethics point beyond the grave. Yet for that reason we need not conceive of an immortality as an existence in some heaven outside of this world. 'The beyond the grave' is here in this world. Not that some future generations are to live in a state of perfect happiness, for future generations will also have to work for a further progress. The value of life does not lie at all in happiness, but happiness lies in the making life valuable by working for progress, by living for immortality, for the life beyond the grave.

Some say life ends with death, or at least our life will end with death. This is the main error based upon the dualism of thinking that we possess a separate existence apart from the world. As our schooldays live on in our life and remain a living presence with us in their individual particularities, so our life and the most personal and characteristic features of our soul become living building-stones in that revelation of mind which we call humanity. This is no mere dissolution in the All, but a preservation of our very personality.

Professor Du Bois proposes as one objection of science to immortality that "to begin implies to end." Professor Du Bois would perhaps be inclined to adopt the monistic view of immortality, if he took into consideration the answer of science given to the question of the origin of the soul. The soul did not originate out of nothing, nor does it dissolve into nothing. Whenever parent, teachers, or friends impart to us a truth, they hand over to us part of their souls. The soul originates in the dim past of days long gone by, and, like the Eleusinian torch, it is handed down to future generations. While men die, their souls live on.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSAL.

THE Directors of the Columbian World's Fair have made arrangements to have in addition to the exhibitions of industry and art, some representation of philosophy, religion, the sciences, and the aspirations to social reform. The ways and means of an exhibition of ideal pursuits are not as yet clearly understood, but the good-will of men willing to think of such ways and means and able to devote time to their execution is busily at work. Dr. Foster, the author of the article in the present number, is one among them. He is president of the philosophical section of the World's Fair Auxiliary.

Dr. Foster is greatly interested in philosophy, and he has shown his interest by keeping a philosophical club alive in Chicago, under the name of the "Aristotelian Society" which is frequented not only by Chicago thinkers interested in "the Universal" among whom may be mentioned Professor Block, but also by such non-residents as the Professors Davidson, Snyder, and others. The di-

rection in which the interests of the "Aristotelian Society" aspire is faithfully characterised by Dr. Foster's article of this number.

Concerning the Universal, as it is understood by Dr. Foster, we must confess that for expressing analogous ideas we should prefer other words. The universal, as we conceive it, is any most general term of its kind. The universal "horse" is a name which comprises all the common qualities that are found in all horses. The universal in this way is an abstract. We should not say that it is "a miserable abstract" only, for abstracts are important thought-symbols and they are not meaningless: they possess representative value; there are certain features of reality represented by the universal.

The problem of the universal was the main object of philosophy among the schoolmen. The extreme Nominalists were wrong when they said that universals are mere products of the mind, mere *status vocis*, as if they had been made arbitrarily, and there were no correspondent objective reality. But their opponents the extreme Realists were wrong also when they maintained that universals existed by themselves independent of their particulars.

Dr. Foster's view of the universal is widely different from ours. Our universal is a logical term, being that term which is of universal application. His universal comprehends many qualities which ordinarily exclude one another; it is temporal as well as eternal; it is universal as well as particular; it is the All, it is God, and this God is conceived as being personal.

We recognise fully the importance of the deductive and universal application of certain truths, but we no longer consider the universality of such truths as mystical. We consider the problem of the universal as solved and thus we have outgrown the interest that the schoolmen attached to the idea of the universal.

I have to add a few words in answer to some passages in Dr. Foster's article. First concerning evolution. The All-being has not evolved, but the things in the All-being have evolved, viz. they have been transformed from other things. Mr. Charles S. Peirce in *The Monist*, Vol. I, No. 2, made the proposition, that not only things but also the formal order of the world and its rigidity had been evolved. Necessity and natural law itself thus would be the product of evolution. This thesis, however, was attacked in the same number by the editor of *The Monist* in his article "The Criterion of Truth," which considers law as eternal and evolution as a transformation in conformity to the nature of existence, which we formulate as so-called "natural laws."

That in plants non-organised matter, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, etc., is changed into organised matter is a fact which constantly takes place before our eyes. A special organism is needed to produce the special structure of that organism and we have not yet succeeded in making in a chemist's retort that simplest kind of organised substance which has been the starting-point of evolution on earth. But what of that in the face of the fact that animate and inanimate bodies consist of the same substance which of course cannot be absolutely dead matter. There is no other difference between animate and inanimate bodies than that the former are organised, the latter are not. The difference is a matter of form, of combination, of relation.

When I said in a former article of mine "the whole universe is a vast system of relations" I purposely intended to exclude the idea that there are "related somewhats." The conception of "related somewhats," as if there were unknown things and in addition relations between these unknown things leads, to the proposition of things in themselves. Reality does not consist of such somewhats with relations between them. These so-called "somewhats" and "the relations" are one thing, they are inseparable; they are separable in thought only and when separated in thought, they are called abstracts. Reality is no compound of absolute

objects knitted together by the glue of relations, reality is effectiveness, it is the working of cause and effect; reality is *Wirklichkeit*, as the Germans so properly express it; and the action of taking effect (the *Wirklichkeit*) is nothing more or less than a relation. Think of an absolute existence which would produce no effect and thus have no relation whatever, could it be said to be real? Certainly, it could not be called *Wirklichkeit*. The relation of cause and effect, i. e. the act of producing effects alone is reality. Unrelated absolute existence would be tantamount to absolute non-existence.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

LIKE a drink of bitters before breakfast, in its appetising qualities, is the contest for the Speakership of the "House" on the eve of a Presidential election. In the present Congress the democrats are nearly suffocated by a majority too big for their statesmanship; and they would give a large reward for a Speaker able to hold that majority in hand; for example, a democratic Thomas Reed. At the present moment, viewing the battle from the vantage ground of Illinois, Mr. Springer is an easy winner, and the only question is as to the size of his majority; the other candidates are just clinging to the fringe of the caucus. I learn that Mr. Springer's forces are the most "aggressive"; and I can readily believe it, for they work twenty-four hours a day, and seven days a week. They do not support the Sunday closing movement; in fact, Sunday is their busy day, for it appears by the dispatches that, "The Springer headquarters have been open all Sunday"; although it is added by way of apology, that they were kept open "more as a haven for incoming Congressmen than as a political camp." This generosity ought to win votes from those poor Congressmen, who like tramps at a police station on a cold night, having no other shelter, found a "haven" at the Springer headquarters. It is incredible that this kindly hospitality was used by rival candidates as a club for Mr. Springer's head; but such is the depravity of statesmen that I am not surprised to learn that "Messrs. Mills and McMillan are trying to make a little capital out of the fact that their respective headquarters have been closed on Sunday." This may be after the manner of the Scribes and Pharisees, but it is very likely that Messrs. Mills and McMillan will make a little capital out of that sacrifice; and make it at the expense of Mr. Springer.

* * *

As it was in the struggle for the national republican convention, so it is in the canvass for the speakership, the "Nor'west" is determined to have it, if there is any virtue in an "aggressive" contest for it. Those of us who saw the gentle football game in Chicago on Thanksgiving day, will rejoice to know that the following proclamation has been issued from the Springer headquarters; "From this time on the 'North-West' will be the watchword of the Springer forces." It ought to be, and I hope the incoming Congressmen from the effete "East" will appreciate the following example of our North-West manners: "The tactics of the Illinois men are thoroughly aggressive. Some of the candidates wait for members to come and see them. Springer's forces do not wait. They go to them. Committees watch the trains and take charge of congressional gripsacks as soon as they emerge from the cars." This is purely amateur work, and the supposition that the "Illinois men" have all been hotel runners is erroneous. Nearly all those "incoming congressmen" will get their gripsacks again, although from the manner of seizing them, they may have some doubts about it; but that is merely our playful North-West way. We have learned also in the North-West, that although "the office ought to seek the man," it never does it; and that the best way to get an office is to waylay it, and sandbag it, and kidnap it immediately on the arrival of the train.

A few weeks ago I called attention to a benevolent society known as the "Band of Mercy," founded for the encouragement of kindness to animals, and especially to birds, whose innocence and beauty appeal to sympathy. Thousands of children belong to the society, and its influence upon them is good. It is gratifying to see that a "Band of Mercy" was organised in Chicago on the 29th of November, and that boys and girls from sixty schools took the pledge of kindness, and were each of them presented with a star, the badge of the order. A lecture on birds was given by a lady, and the sin of killing them was pathetically shown. The very same paper that contained this information antagonised its moral by reminding the boys that the law giving two cents a head for dead sparrows would go into effect on the First day of December; and the bad character of the sparrows was made the pretext for their destruction. Between pledge and bribe the dilemma of a Chicago boy will be a painful one. With the badge on his breast and the two cents in his pocket he will feel very uncomfortable. Perhaps, however, the sparrow is not within the sphere of mercy. According to the paper I spoke of, he needs killing, as a disreputable fellow. I do not know whether the charges made against him are true or not; but I think they are, for I can believe anything bad of a being endowed with wings who prefers to live in the smoke and mud of a great city, when by twenty minutes healthy exercise he may luxuriate in the beautiful woods and fields. That he can be so recreant is an example of inverse evolution that requires the genius of some new Darwin to explain. I am amazed at such degeneracy, as Charles Dickens was amazed when moralising on the shiftless depravity of London chickens, he wondered how anything born of an egg, and having wings, could hop down a ladder into a cellar at night and call *that* going home. I would be glad to have the opinion of the "Band of Mercy" as to the ethical value of a law that bribes children to kill birds.

* * *

They have a society in England something like the "Band of Mercy" in America; although apparently with a more definite object. It is called the "Society for the Protection of Birds." It already contains 10,000 members, and its President is the Duchess of Portland. Among its rules is this; "Lady members shall refrain from wearing the feathers of any birds not killed for food, the ostrich only excepted." Can anything be more lady-like than that exception? There is a charming candor about it that men very seldom show. I once heard an "Anti-Monopoly" partisan declare that he was opposed to every monopoly except his own; but this avowal was made in private conversation. He would never have had the frankness to put it in the "platform" of his party. The Duchess of Portland, and the lady members of the "Society for the Protection of Birds" are honest enough to say, "The feathers that we do not care for, we will abandon, out of mercy to the birds, but the feathers of the ostrich we must have." This comes of having a duchess for president. I saw a duchess once, when I was a boy, and on her head majestic was an ostrich plume. I have seen an Indian duchess too, of the Winnebago tribe, and her noble brow was also adorned with feathers in a similar way. The sight of that English duchess made such an impression upon my boyish imagination, that a duchess not adorned with an ostrich plume is to me an impossible ideality, and such appears to be the mental condition of the "lady members" aforesaid. Therefore, out of consideration for the Duchess of Portland, the indispensable ostrich is very properly excluded from the mercies of the "Society for the Protection of Birds."

* * *

A brilliant and brave woman is Miss Kate Field of Washington, whose latest "mission" it is to remove the duty on art. To that end Miss Field has visited Chicago, and obtained the assurance of influential citizens that "Chicago sympathises with her patriotic project." The adjective electrifies us for a moment, be-

cause we have been taught that if there is in this country one supremely "patriotic" blessing it is the tariff, guardian of American genius, and protector of American labor. How, then, can the repeal of it, or of any portion of it, be a "patriotic" scheme? Is it patriotic to leave our painters unprotected against the pauper genius of Rubens, Titian, and Raphael? How can our sculptors compete with the cheap labor of Canova, Phidias, and Michael Angelo? What chance have our musicians if Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven may enter our ports free of duty? And if it is patriotic to abolish the tariff on statuary and paintings, the luxuries of the rich, why is it not equally patriotic to abolish the tariff on clothing, a necessity of the poor? For instance, I have an old friend of the farmer class, a strong partisan republican, who during the reign of Hayes was a member of the United States Senate; and in that reign, the House of Representatives passed a bill abolishing the tariff on works of art. When the bill came up for hearing in the Senate, my old friend tacked on to the clause admitting classic sculptures free of duty, this amendment, "*and also all salt used in the curing of meat.*" His amendment was adopted, and the "old masters" went back to the House of Representatives, literally "in brine." They were then laid on the table; and there they are yet. Will Miss Field explain the "patriotic" difference between the tariff on statues used in fine houses, and the tariff on salt "used in the curing of meat"?

It is told in the newspapers, quite seriously too, that an American gentleman, representing the "Human Rights League," has gone to Russia with a petition signed by five hundred thousand American citizens, asking better treatment for some of the subjects of the Czar. This is a perilous enterprise, for it may provoke an ironical retort in the shape of a petition from five hundred thousand Russians, begging of our government better treatment for some citizens of the United States. A profound study for political philosophers is the reaction against liberty, which for the past twenty-five years has been stealthily growing in this country, with the passive approval of the American people. It may be that fears for the public safety have compelled us to adopt the methods of arbitrary governments, but that we have adopted them will hardly be denied. Torture, for instance, long obsolete in England, is practised freely in Chicago, to compel suspected persons to criminate themselves and others, although, no doubt, it is as violently illegal in Illinois as it is in England. Col. Ingersoll in his lecture lately delivered, referred to the instruments of torture still preserved in the Tower of London, as if they were merely historical curiosities; and he spoke of torture itself, as if it were nothing but the spectral memory of a barbarous age gone by. I have no doubt that torture is illegal in Colorado, and yet I see that it is practised there by the officers of the law. A dispatch from Denver, dated Nov. 30th says that some suspected persons just arrested there, proved themselves "dead game, refusing to give up a word of information although barbarously tortured in the sweat box more than once." We have it on the authority of Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, that torture, although often practised by the English government, never was legal in England; and it is quite certain that it never was legal in the United States. Some day the American "sweat box" will be put with the English rack and thumb-screw among the relics of barbarism.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CUSTOM HOUSE CHICANERY.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

I TRUST you will admit a few lines anent custom house folly in Canada, as well as in the United States. I have felt all the contemptuous indignation that General Trumbull so well expresses, for the mischievous and exasperating folly of the tariff on this Continent. The "baby's jacket" incident I know well; small ar-

ticles owing their only value to the loving hands that worked them are stopped, and duty levied which has represented the *full value* of the various things in England. Moreover, articles which cannot be made in Canada, and repairs which cannot be executed are mercilessly taxed. A sewing machine which had been eighteen years in wear, was sent from Canada to New York, as the repairs it required *could not be executed in this country*. Before the machine was re-admitted to Canada a heavy duty was charged. There is sometimes a great outcry that the mineral riches of British Columbia remain undeveloped. But who that was not on the spot could imagine this condition of things; that no firm in Canada can produce the class of machinery requisite for reducing British Columbia ores, yet that a heavy duty is levied on mining machinery, so heavy that the ores remain unworked, because it is impossible to import the necessary machinery from England, pay duty and transit dues and work the ores at a profit. Nothing is too trivial to be taxed; sailor's pet canary birds are seized for non-payment of duty; tame monkeys pay their tax. If the articles are necessities for the "working classes" the excuse is that these intelligent voters (as they are called at the polls) will not stand direct taxation, and can be taxed in no other way. If the articles are not every day necessities of life, then they are "luxuries of the rich" and are heavily taxed, with the utmost applause. Under which heading does the cruel tax on medicines come?

The one blind idea seems to be to create manufactures, whether they are natural to the country or not; whether they divert labor from vitally necessary objects or not. This idea reigns triumphant in Vancouver; above all things establish manufactures, and the colony will flourish like a green bay tree. Under free trade the great torrent of trade of the British Empire with the East would roll through British Columbia; commerce,—the natural interchange of goods—would bring untold wealth if not one manufacture existed; though as a matter of fact manufactures, as in Venice and Genoa, *follow* commerce. The vital need of this country is development of her material resources; that her corn, her fruit, her minerals, her timber, her fish should be exchanged for the manufactures of the teeming populations of older countries. Labor in the country districts of British Columbia is not to be had; the colony is still so thinly populated that each man hitherto has been able to pre-empt his own quarter section. The greater part of the quarter section consequently remains unimproved, and those who bring capital into the country and desire to develop its resources, would be paralysed but for the Chinese. And this is the state of things in which the great object of Government is to develop manufactures in the towns!

I said the other day to a very shrewd American business man, who had probably never looked at the tariff from a theoretical point of view, "What would Vancouver become if she had free trade?" He said quickly "Why it would be bigger in five years than San Francisco, and this country would be filled in no time from the States." In the mean time the Upas tree of Protection will continue to flourish here; manufactures that are not wanted will be artificially fostered; we shall pay from two hundred to two hundred and fifty per cent. for most of the things we want, (for heavy transit dues must be added to a heavy tariff) and those of us—who do not know what it is to have lived in a free trade country—will feel "protected" and happy. The thing passes my comprehension; how the most ignorant of voters can be persuaded that his crushing indirect taxation is paid by the producer, and not by the consumer!

ALICE BODINGTON.

BOOK REVIEWS.

PRINCIPES DE MORALE ET D'ÉDUCATION LAÏQUES. Ouvrage, publié par le comité d'études morales, sous les auspices et avec l'approbation du conseil central de la Fédération Française des Libres-Penseurs. Paris.

This book is a catechism of secular morality written at the suggestion of the universal congress of Freethinkers which met in Paris in 1889. The "Comité d'études morales" founded in 1890 under the presidency of Jean-Paul Cée (Paris) went to work and presents us now with this little volume which embodies their views and moral principles. The book is written in a country where the existing religions neither compromise nor develop. Hence religion means to the French freethinkers hostility to progress. This condition is the reason of an animosity against every thing that goes under the name of religion. This again is also the reason of a certain spirit of negation pervading the book. They are fighting still with errors and the bitterness of the fight is noticeable still in the pages of the book. Under present conditions this is natural, but we hope that the movement will gradually develop in positive strength, so that it will be enabled to leave the churches alone and become itself a religion, not a system of dogmas and ceremonials, or a belief in something supernatural, but a confidence in truth as a guide through life, which would be "the religion of science."

Aside from this objection, we are much pleased with the "Principes de moral et d'éducation laïques." It is written in a fluent and simple style as such a book ought to be and the material is arranged in a practical way. It begins with the definitions of "a free man" and "a free thinker." License is contrasted with liberty. Knowledge and belief are contrasted and it is maintained that the religions are in conflict with scientific truths. Belief in God is rejected as a fiction. The idea "God" however is not defined and it is a matter of course that it is taken in the sense of a supernatural personality. Everything supernatural is discarded. A soul that should constitute a personality distinct from the organism is not admitted to exist and with its existence also its immortality is denied. All these ideas the freethinker rejects, but "he places his trust in the principles contained in these three magic words": *Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité*.

The second part of the book treats of the moral law. "Ethics (*la morale*) comprises the knowledge, love, and practice of the good. . . . Ethics is the science of the duties based upon justice. . . . Ethics is not an arbitrary discipline imposed by some dogmatism, the truth of which is not demonstrated, it is a natural law. . . . Obedience to this law insures the conservation and progress of individuals as well as societies. We acquire ethical knowledge through a study of ourselves and of the universe. . . . Ethics is not dependent upon any dogma or religious ceremonial. . . . Our present generation is accustomed to regard certain religious dogmas as the pedestal of which ethics is the statue. Accordingly if the pedestal is overthrown, and this will come to pass, the statue will fall and break, and man will be without rule or law."

After these general explanations which in their positiveness please us much more than the mere negations of the first part, we enter into the details of moral principles. Right, duty, and liberty are shown to be correlative terms; whereupon a discussion follows of diverse virtues and vices. The third part treats of the subject of education, developing in detail the principles of physical, intellectual and moral education.

The book represents the ethical views of the freethinkers of France and is in this quality alone of importance. The Secular Union has published a work on the same subject and it would be well to compare both publications.

NOTES.

A study of the changes which theology undergoes is a good lesson to the laymen as well as to the clergy, and will open their eyes concerning dogmas and the infallibility of dogmas. The *Atlantic Monthly* for December contains a good article by Alexander V. G. Allen on "The Transition in New England Theology" which is interesting as well as instructive. It expounds the religious views of two men, of Jonathan Edwards and his disciple Dr. Samuel

Hopkins. The former died in 1758, the latter lived to meet not only John Murray, the first preacher of Universalism, but also Channing, the apostle of a new conception of Christianity, less stern and more humane. Edwards was relentless in his denunciation of the Arminians, but, says Allen, he "was right in his main contention—that Arminianism was the solvent of the Calvinistic theology." There was the great problem of evil, and of God electing the one to salvation, the other to perdition. The Calvinist position is that "the Deity will not demean himself before man by rendering account or seeking to justify his procedure. With this doctrine Arminianism waged incessant warfare; the Arminian maintained that God's reason must be known."

Dr. Samuel Hopkins was less stern than his master and thus paved the way of progress, and the view he took is strange enough. He did not flinch from the conclusion that God was the author of evil and he maintained that both damnation as well as salvation were for the glory of God. His doctrine was "called the doctrine of disinterested benevolence or submission; man should be willing to be damned in *majorem Dei gloriam*,"* and it is characteristic of Dr. Hopkins that he was willing himself to go to hell, and it is said that while other preachers usually feel sure of escaping that doom,—he never felt certain.

Dr. Hopkins, living in one of the centres of the slave trade, was one among the first who awoke to its evils and demanded a suppression of the traffic in human flesh. He was not an abolitionist, but he began a crusade which ended in abolitionism. Channing said that he was "grateful to the stern teacher [Dr. Hopkins] who had turned his thoughts and heart to the claims of impartial universal benevolence."

* Dr. Hopkins's view reminds us of Luther, who said: "This is the height of faith: to believe that he who saves so few and damns so many is most merciful; that he who places us among the damned as he pleases is most just. Says Erasmus: He seems to enjoy the torture of the unfortunate and to deserve more hatred than love. If I could, by the power of reason, understand how God, who shows so much wrath and malice, can possibly be merciful and just, I should have no need of faith."

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PROFESSOR BRIGGS, AND THE HERETICS' SHEOL.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

I HAVE just listened to a lecture on "The Bible and the Reason," by the Rev. Dr. Charles A. Briggs, professor in Union Theological Seminary, and leader of the Presbyterian Church in America. It was given in the Church of the Covenant, New York, to an audience including many persons of influence. The lecture was learned, lucid, impressive; still more, it was phenomenal. The inaugural lecture for which he was indicted was but as a tentative preface to the bold and far-reaching principles affirmed in this lecture. The Doctor began by pointing out the impregnable hold of his freedom inside the Westminster Confession. He frankly admitted that the Westminster Divines in opening the door of private judgment did not imagine what explorations would ultimately result. When they condemned "blind obedience" to authority, in matters "not decided and determined by the Word of God," they could not foresee that such liberty from papal and episcopal bonds could be maintained equally against all religious bodies. There is a considerable list of things on which the "Word of God" has given no decision,—for instance, on Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Rationalism, and the salvability of Martineau. Here be wide fields and pastures new into which the presbyterian youth are henceforth to be led, unless the door of Private Judgment be closed. And who, Dr. Briggs asked, with a solemn confidence that answered his question,—who can shut that door?

As Dr. Briggs uttered his similitude of the Open Door, the arches and pillars of the church about him shaped themselves in my fancy to a semblance of a mediæval picture in my possession of Christ delivering spirits out of Sheol (for Dr. Briggs never uses the word "Hell.") In the picture Christ appears armed with what is known in iconography as the "Resurrection Cross,"—a long staff of which the cross bar is a mere ornamental symbol at the end, as it is in many "orthodox" sermons nowadays. At the touch of the end of this staff which is not cruciform a door has fallen; from the gaping mouth of a monster the souls emerge led by Adam and Eve, who are followed by a number of others long held in durance for their sins. All about are little devils,—Christ has accidentally

trod on one,—gnashing their teeth as the process of deliverance goes on. Dr. Briggs appeared engaged in similar work. Through the unbarred door of the rationalists' Sheol came a procession of the tormented freethinkers of all time, the lecturer unconsciously treading on those who damned them, declaring that "Reason is the great fountain of Divine authority." In my mediæval picture Christ grasps the hand of Adam, whom he notably resembles, and welcomes Eve just as if instead of depraving the human race she had founded in Eden an "Annex" to utilise the tree of Knowledge. So in my fanciful vision I thought Dr. Briggs particularly gracious to the most notorious heretics. He only called Martineau by name, (and Martineau is more heretical than Theodore Parker ever was,) because that great name was part of the indictment against him, but he showed his appreciation of others by allowing them to speak parts of his lecture. Not that he was conscious of this; Dr. Briggs is an original man; but when he had flung open his own mental door, and at the same time the prison of the reasoners, I noticed that some of these whispered in his ears and that he uttered thoughts familiar to the readers of their works. I recognised a touch of Parker's humor here, of Emerson's subtlety there, and of other recent forerunners gone silent. But the liberated spirit who got in most through the Presbyterian medium was no other than the despised and rejected Tom Paine!

Professor Briggs was speaking on the Centenary of Paine's first manifesto concerning Religion. It was in 1791 that "The Rights of Man" appeared, in which spiritual freedom was affirmed.

"Who then art thou, vain dust and ashes, by whatever name thou art called, whether a king, a bishop, a church, or a state, a parliament or anything else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of Man and his Maker? Mind thine own concerns. If he believes not as thou believest it is a proof that thou believest not as he believeth, and there is no earthly power can determine between you.

"With respect to what are called denominations of religion, if every one is left to judge of his own religion there is no such thing as a religion that is wrong, but if they are to judge of each other's religion there is no such thing as a religion that is right; and therefore all the world is right, or all the world is wrong. But with respect to religion itself, without respect to names, and as directing itself from the universal family of mankind to the divine object of all adoration, it is *Man bringing to his Maker the fruits of*

his heart. And though these fruits may differ from each other like the fruits of the Earth, the grateful tribute of every one is accepted."

And now, after a hundred years of experience passed while Paine was in the Heretics' Sheol, this supersacred right of free thought was reaffirmed by Professor Briggs in the same accent. He said that the religious world was now represented in three classes: those who respectively approached the divine Spirit through a church, a book, and reason. Neither of these could attain completely their own ideal so long as they exalted it by depreciating the others. These three spiritual elements were in the world; they are here to stay; by mutual respect they would all be harmoniously developed, and find that the Bible is higher than Protestantism, the Church higher than Romanism, the Reason higher than Rationalism. Then the religious demoralisation of the world would cease. And in this large tolerance Professor Briggs carefully included Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and other religions called heathen; in this also being anticipated by Paine, who pointed out the great truths discovered by the Persians, Confucians, and other religionists without church or Bible, through reason enlightened by the revelation of God in nature without and the moral sense within.

Apart from these general principles of spiritual liberty and catholicity, the fundamental relationship between the new presbyterian apostle of Reason and the author of "The Age of Reason," was disclosed in the references made by both to Quakerism. Professor Briggs pointed out that the Westminster Divines had omitted all of the Proem of John except the first and fourteenth verses. They said nothing of "the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world." It was left to the Quakers, he said, to bear witness to this universal Light. Thomas Paine, brought up in the Quaker meeting at Thetford, described that as "the religion that approaches the nearest of all others to true Deism," and I believe it can be historically shown that Hicksite Quakerism is the monument of Thomas Paine. But Paine, discovering that the Quakers had "contracted themselves too much, by leaving the works of God out of their system," pursued his scientific studies, and also studies of the "inner light," and developed his fundamental faith. This was that the Reason was the common organ for the revelation of the divine in external nature, and of the divine in the spiritual and moral nature of man. Now compare Professor Briggs and Thomas Paine on the religious function of Reason.

DR. BRIGGS.

"The Scriptures . . . appeal throughout to the human reason. They are sealed to those who do not understand the human reason as a means of ac-

THOMAS PAINE.

"It is only by the exercise of reason that man can discover God. Take away that reason and he would be incapable of understanding anything; and in

cess to God . . . The Christian knowledge set forth in these writings, the soul possesses through the witness of the divine spirit within the forms of reason. . . . Rationalism is historically the reaffirmation of the independence of the conscience and the reason, and of immediate communion with God."

this case it would be just as inconsistent to read even the book called the Bible to a horse as to a man. . . . Though I admit the possibility of revelation, I disbelieve that the Almighty ever did communicate anything to man otherwise than by the display of himself in the works of Creation, and by that repugnance we feel in ourselves to bad actions, and disposition to do good ones."

To the largely determining influence of environment may be ascribed the difference between Professor Briggs and Paine: the man of Quaker training sees the immeasurable Light of God in the universe; the man of Presbyterian training sees there the Light of the Logos. The difference is not essential; it is the same Light, whether personified separately or not; Paine himself talks of Providence as "she." Nor is belief or disbelief in miracles material. Paine says "everything is a miracle"; Dr. Briggs believes in particular miracles; but, since both believe in the providential order of the world, the difference is not in the religious plane but in that of historical criticism. The most important difference is that one emphasises the Hebrew and Greek scriptures, the other the scriptures of science, but the Deity they derive is identical,—a just, moral, parental ruler of the Universe. Though Paine disbelieves the dogma of the deity of Jesus, whom he much admires, he assumes the humanity of God, equally with Dr. Briggs, by allying man's moral sense (as in the above parallel extract) with the revelation of God in nature. Apart from man's moral sense evil is displayed in nature equally with good. This moral sense is the Quaker's "inner light of God"; it is the neo-presbyterian's Holy Spirit. There is no real difference here.

There was another striking correspondence between Professor Briggs and Paine. The Professor described a mediæval globe he had seen in which only seas and impossible monsters were visible in certain regions where now appear continents and nations. This represents fairly the small conception of the moral and religious world from which some dogmas are inherited. But meanwhile as exploration has done away with the old geography, commerce has brought us into communication with remote nations, with their religions, and the old theology must follow the mediæval geography. It is impossible for us to enjoy the science and arts of the nineteenth century and still hold on to the theology of the sixteenth or seventeenth. All this was eloquently stated by Professor Briggs. Now Paine, amid the early splendor of Newton's discoveries, spoke of the enlarged ideas consequent upon a larger knowledge of the universe. "The solitary idea of a solitary

world, rolling or at rest in the immense ocean of space. gives place to the cheerful idea of a society of worlds, so happily contrived as to administer, even by their motion, instruction to man." "What," he asks, "are we to think of a system of faith formed on the notion of only one world, into which the Almighty, quitting the care of the millions of other worlds, comes to die because a woman eats an apple?" It is a Mythology, not "true Theology," that naturally persecutes science whose progress renders it incredible. Paine also pointed out how small was the section of religious history to which Christian superstition had confined its victims, and he proposed to found "A society for inquiring into the truth or falsehood of ancient history, as far as History is connected with systems of religion ancient and modern." While the Jews were as yet an unimportant tribe, "the nations of Egypt, Chaldea, Persia, and India, were great and populous, abounding in learning and science." He had studied the cosmogonies of India and Persia in a work by the Rev. Henry Lord, dedicated to the Archbishop of Canterbury (1630), in which it is stated that, in the Persian cosmogony "the name of the first man was *Adameh*, and of the woman *Hevah*." "There is good reason to believe we have been in great error with respect to the antiquity of the Bible, as well as imposed upon by its contents."

These ideas of Paine, whose crudeness is that of a hundred years ago, show that he had already perceived the inadequacy of the theologic "globe" which Professor Briggs comprehends with the added light of a century. The gesture is the same. No doubt some of the Professor's champions will be scandalised by any association of him with "The Age of Reason"; but there is no escaping the fact that by opening the church door to Reason the new teacher has admitted Paine to be weighed in the balances of reason. It may be admitted that Paine misunderstood or rejected some things in the church and the Bible, but Dr. Briggs has solemnly asked whether such rejections by rationalists have not been largely due to those who have required "blind obedience to dogmas about the Bible that destroy liberty of the conscience and reason"? During all Paine's life there existed no Professor Briggs. And during all that time there was no writer who so nearly anticipated the religious principles of Professor Briggs as that leather-girdled feeder on locusts and wild honey, that voice in the desert—poor "Tom Paine."

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL.*

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

OF all the burning questions of our time is there one more far-reaching in its consequences than this, "What is the Soul of Man?" All conclusions about

* A reply to John Fiske.

immortality, duty, religion, ethics, life—nay, everything—rest largely, if not entirely, upon the verdict of science upon this question. Therefore the lecture of Prof. John Fiske upon "Evolution" printed in the *Popular Science Monthly* (of New York) for September last, and which was originally delivered (May 31, 1891) before the Brooklyn Ethical Association has been deservedly commented upon. By reason of the discussions growing out of that lecture much has been done especially in *The Open Court* to open up and to popularise the scientific views upon this soul-question. (See *The Open Court* for August 13, September 17, etc.) The following reply to that lecture, a part of that evening's discussion, is submitted as a proper continuation of the subject.

We all wish to express in words the hearty applause which closed this admirable lecture. It is one of the author's happiest descriptions of the origin and progress of the great modern rising river of human thought, which we name in the now sacred word *Evolution*.

But while thus expressing our profound acknowledgments for this grand foundation of human work and hopefulness, we must ask for the rejection of elements that may render that foundation unscientific and untrustworthy.

For two thirds of this lecture, hearty thanks! For the latter third, thanks—with leave to dissent from the Agnostic position taken as to the consciousness, mind, soul, etc. Such dissent would surely come from all phases of the Positive and Monistic Schools of thought, and it deserves earnest attention.

For the concluding part of this lecture left the impression that the lecturer was laying the foundation for a first class spiritualistic medium. He quoted some words from Goethe, which I will explain presently, but the words from that great monist which his lecture recalled to me, were his most true and impressive complaints against the spooks, which occur near the end of Faust, and which I will try to recall:

"Nun ist die Luft von solchem 'Spuk' so voll,
Dass Niemand weiss, wie er ihn meiden soll.
Wenn auch ein Tag uns klar vernünftig lacht,
In Traumgespinnst verwickelt uns die Nacht."

Now the important word here is *Spuk*, which Bayard Taylor mistranslates "Shape," in order to hit a rhyme; but the lines tell us this:

"Now fills the air so many a haunting Spook
That no one knows how best he may escape.
What though one Day with reason's brightness beams,
The Night entangles us in its web of dreams."

And like to these words is the grand confession a little further on in Faust, where Goethe sums up his life, admonishes man to stand firmly on *The Knowable*, and then adds:

"Wenn Geister 'spuken,' geh' er seinen Gang."

"When Ghosts spook, let Man go straight on his way."

Now the trouble is that our distinguished lecturer instead of following this sound advice of Goethe, and getting us clearly out of the old spookdom has left the air as black as night with it. His uncorrelated "psychical" has left him to us a sublime Mercury, or Psychopomp, reintroducing the phantoms of that "Unknowable" and ghostly realm which we supposed science had left to priests, mediums, and ancient poetry. Certainly the best use that can be made of ten minutes now is to indicate, if possible, some way out of this night of the Unknowable into the clearer day of "reason's brightness."

Fortunately our lecturer has just dropped the clue to guide our way out in those other precious monistic lines from Goethe's *Sprüche*, which he and we can never quote too often :

"Willst du ins Unendliche streiten?
Geh' nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten."

"Into the Infinite wouldst thou stride?
Go in the Finite only on every side."

These lines give no quarter to agnosticism. They are the essence of monistic positivism. They say that the infinite world is but the continuation of the knowable correlations of the finite, and that there is no conceivable way out of that unending circle of "eternal brazen laws" of cause and effect. That there is no "thing in itself, or outside itself," but that every transaction is a fact and a reality all the way and forever! There is no room for an unknowable, or a spook of any kind, and that this ghost-world simply does not exist except in the imagination of agnostic philosophers. Professor Haeckel in his letter read here to-night says that such is the verdict of evolution, and that it makes the end of the spook, that is, the "personal" God, devil, and immortality.

But our lecturer says, No. He has discovered that the motion or force-changes of correlation are not convertible into feeling, consciousness, or mind. Once Mr. Spencer said that they were, but now it seems that he was mistaken. We too, think he was mistaken. This immaterial, imponderable nature of mind is certainly if not an old yet a true story. I have always taken it as a fact certain, and have consequently disclaimed being a materialist as vigorously as Mr. Spencer in his letter read this evening. The Monists and Positivists all do the same just as they disclaim Atheism; and Professor Haeckel used the word "Monism" to get free from materialism, Atheism, Agnosticism, etc.

It does not reach them nor me to say that the mind is not a motion correlate of force or motion, e. g. that so many units of heat, etc., equal so much mind, and *vice versa*. This purely material and mechanical correlation is not feeling, but it is the fact which accounts for feeling, and of which feeling is a concom-

itant fact, or *time* correlate. People do not understand this because they have no scientific or proper classification of the sciences the making of which should be the first step in philosophy. We must remember, that in each special science the law of correlation holds, but in a way disparate and incomparable with its application in every other special science. Thus from the stars to the mind of man we have Physics as the foundation of Chemistry, which is the foundation of Biology, which is the foundation of Sociology, which is (though Mr. Spencer and many fail to see it) the real foundation of Psychology, or of man as an individual. Now, each of these scientific domains may be said to be correlates of each other in a diminishing scale, that is from Physics to Psychology, when we consider them objectively; and in the reverse or enlarging order from Psychology to Physics and Astronomy, when we consider them subjectively, i. e. looking out from the individual man towards the stars. But in each of these sciences the correlations are incomparable with those which occur in each of the others. Thus the law of "foot pounds of heat" correlates mechanically only in Physics and Chemistry, but it has vital concomitants in Biology, social in Sociology, and psychical in Psychology; which invariable correlates can only be measured or known by the methods applicable to and in those sciences, and which methods are not "foot pounds" at all.* The attempt to apply mechanical measurements in the higher sciences of Sociology, Ethics, and Psychology, is in the highest degree absurd, and not what we are trying to do at all. Our distinguished lecturer should have left it to our President (Dr. Janes), who in sundry lectures has been trying to force it upon me in our discussions from the platform during the past winter. To him I am accustomed to reply that though all things are subject to correlation and are certainly related, yet each thing or fact is correlated according to its nature and in the domain in which it is found. I often ask him how many hours are there in a hundred miles, or how many miles does it take to make a ton, or a hogshead of molasses. Will he give up arithmetic or correlation because he cannot tell? So, because no one can answer the equally absurd questions: How many units of heat, force, motion or electricity made the Novum Organum, The French Revolution, or the Love of Dante, or the Patriotism of Washington? Because we cannot answer, shall we conclude that they were not natural, knowable correlates of this world—its matter, facts, events, history, and qualities in space and time? Or shall we go to supposing some divinity or "unknowable reality" back of them, "from which all

* Thus, the hours are the *time* not the *motion* correlates of the force in the clock. The feelings are similar correlates of the forces of the nerve changes.

things flow"? This latter was the old way of explaining things, but science has dropped it as to every thing but "mind." Were it not for the enormous religious bribe for keeping it up there we would all be laughing at the absurdity. To quote Goethe once more, for when I find a quoter of Goethe it is hard to forbear :

"Ist's denn so grosses Geheimniss, was Gott
Und der Mensch und die Welt sei?
Nein! Doch niemand hört's gerne:
Da bleib es geheim."

"Is it then so great a secret, what God
And Man and the World may be?
No! But no one is willing to hear it.
So a secret it remains."

Thus our Agnostic or Unknowable friends seem unable or unwilling to have this great "mystery" explained. They keep telling us that if feeling is not a space-motion-force correlate, it must be some inscrutable, indescribable kind of power, entity, or spook. But the monist says, No; it is not such at all, but simply the *fact side* of nervous changes which as *facts* are being *noted* by the organism. Such noting is a fact, and the continued repetition of such noting of facts is a process constantly going on and called awareness, feeling, consciousness, etc. This new Fact is simply the *time correlation* of the mechanical and chemical force correlations: for facts are only measurable in and by time, by which some of them are distinguished from others. This fact of awareness of the changes in and about the nervous system is simply *feeling time*, for time at bottom is measured only by feeling. And feeling is *our* time, i. e. the constant fact of distinguishing differences. It is *the fact* made by one change contrasted with others,—as before, after, or together with them. The comparative easiness of repeating such facts and processes give rise to memory and continuous thought-forms, which are the foundation of intellectual life, and finally of reason, and then the whole data of Psychology result. But all these facts of feeling are simply the event-side of the nerve changes, and no mystery unless we wish to make them so. If we are simply scientists, we may be Positivists or Monists, but not properly or consistently Materialists nor Atheists, nor Agnostics, nor Spiritualists, nor Spookists. If we bottom on the *fact* as Goethe says in the opening of Faust (line 880) and not on the *Word*, nor the *Thought*, nor the *Power*, but the *Fact*, (*die That*), we shall have a sure bottom to our mental and all other philosophy. The fact (*die That*) is, to us as to him, the final word; and it is not an entity or spook but the true fact-correlate of the factors which invariably precede it. This feeling, or organic time notation, under natural selection increases rapidly and soon becomes the governor of the organism—its very soul, but it is always a continuous activity, and thus *living time*. The organism notes its

own time, viz. in and as feeling, and learns to tell its time to itself, and that is consciousness—a continuous correlate-time fact. The integral calculus of the minute changes of organism noted as a fact in and by itself.*

Truth and Time only permit me to say that there never was a fifth wheel to a coach so utterly useless as this imagined "substantial" soul-entity. We have banished the spook from every other one of the sciences, now let us get it out of our own heads; that is to say, out of the science of modern psychology.

But in so doing don't for a moment suppose, but that this subjective time-process, or fact-correlation, will sustain real and true Religion, God, Christ, Immortality, and Sound Ethics, far better than the old entical illusions. How this is the result of Science, I have said in my Haeckel lecture, and need not repeat. But also remember that Professor Haeckel in his letter read to-night only refers to the nothingness of the old spook forms of a "personal God and Immortality" as wholly incompatible with Evolution. The modern monistic, scientific *realities*, which underlie and make true those fundamental words of all religion, I have just named, he would doubtless assert and defend as bravely as any one in the proper time and place.

We must learn, however, to courageously translate the old and illusory entical into the new and true time and fact conceptions of the soul. To quote Goethe once more: "There is no wisdom save in truth."

THE ETHICS OF STRUGGLE AND ETHICAL CULTURE.

HERACLITUS takes exception to Homer's wish that the immortal gods should abolish war; for war, he says, is the father of all things. It is understood that the word war is here used in the broader sense of struggle or contest; and certainly Heraclitus is right in holding that the world as a cosmos in its differentiated existence spatial as well as temporal (the temporal cosmos we are at present wont to call evolution) exists only through struggle. Life is a constant struggle for existence, and no force can take effect unless it be resisted; force is measured by the resistance overcome. What would force be without resistance?

Ethics being the science of right conduct, and life being in its innermost nature a constant struggle, it appears to us that the ethics of struggle are of paramount importance and it is this point in which the societies for ethical culture are decidedly lacking. They exhibit an inclination to avoid struggle and many things indicate that their lecturers look upon struggle as something wrong in itself. Their very platform pre-

* See on this subject my lecture on Haeckel; "Fundamental Problems," and "The Soul of Man," by Dr. Paul Carus; and "The Diseases of Personality," by Th. Ribot (Introduction); also "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," by Alfred Binet—(all published by The Open Court Publishing Co. of Chicago.)

scribes a noncommittal policy, in the hope of going along with the rest of the world without any collision. They seem to expect that their moral ideals will quietly displace the other and older ideals without being obliged to meet them in a square fight. If the leaders of the ethical societies have not by this time found out that their maxim and the ethics upon which it is based are wrong, they will have to learn the lesson still, and it is not likely that it will be spared them.

These considerations naturally suggested themselves when we read Dr. Francis Ellingwood Abbot's pamphlet "Professor Royce's Libel" and ensuing thereupon the controversy on the same subject in the *New York Nation*. We have no interest in siding with either Dr. Abbot or the Professors Royce and Adler, and we feel no ambition to figure as a judge in a case so delicate and complex as is the present one. But a few remarks concerning the paramount importance of the ethics of struggle may not be out of place. The lesson which this case teaches seems to be, that if you attempt to avoid struggle, you will the deeper implicate yourself in struggle; the struggle forced upon you will be worse than if you had faced it bravely from the beginning.

We found as one explanation of Mr. Darwin's remarkable success in life, that he carefully noted every objection made to his theories, nay he was constantly hunting for such facts as would bear upon their significance most unfavorably. The average theorist and social reformer have eyes only for the things that appear to be favorable to their hobby and it happens very often that such men cherish some ideal, which appears to them very grand but is in itself untenable and nonsensical. The way to truth leads through struggle, and Darwin's success lies in the fact that he knew and obeyed the ethics of struggle.

We have repeatedly taken occasion to criticise the ethics of the ethical societies, but there has been no answer to these criticisms. Mr. Salter replied to some criticisms, but his reply was rather a personal matter, in defence of his ethical transcendentalism. The official organs of the ethical societies never attempted to answer or refute our arguments, they simply ignored our criticisms as if they did not concern them. So little are they conscious of the truth that ideals can grow only and be purified through struggle. It is an advantage to them to have a struggle offered and to enter into a competition for the search of truth.

Prof. William James of Harvard in a reply to Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the former siding with Professor Royce, the latter with Dr. Abbot, makes the following remarks:

"Now as to Mr. Peirce's talk about Prof. Royce's 'cruel purpose' of 'ruining Dr. Abbot's reputation.' When did a critic ever deny the value of a book *without* the purpose of ruining the au-

thor's reputation—his reputation, namely, for competency in that field?"

We have a great respect for Professor James's ability as a scholar and also for his personal qualities, especially his amiability and sincerity, but we must confess that we consider the above statement as radically wrong. Two men may have quite contrary opinions on a certain subject, take for instance Darwin and Agassiz, and yet both may be the highest authorities in this very subject. Is Professor Agassiz's reputation as a naturalist ruined because he was wrong in the most essential point concerning the truth of the doctrine of evolution? Even though he held the wrong view, did not his comprehensive knowledge remain, was he not, in spite of this error of his, one of the greatest naturalists of his time? If Darwin personally had written a review of Agassiz's works, would he ever have attempted to ruin his reputation in natural science, would he ever have denied that he was after all a great authority in the same field in which Darwin himself was an authority? Nay more, that if any one, he was competent to pass an opinion on the evolution-theory.

It happens not unfrequently in literary controversies that the man who deservedly is the greater authority and, at the same time, possesses a wider reputation, defends a wrong cause against a weaker adversary. The fact is that a man's reputation has nothing to do with his being right or wrong in a certain question.

I do not doubt that Professor James agrees with the view I take, and so my objection is directed only against the words in which he expresses himself. These words, however, are apt to mislead and might affect, in another way than Professor James intends, the growing generation of American scholars.

It is noteworthy that the controversies among European scholars are generally distinguished not only by mutual politeness but also by a mutual and candid respect, while we Americans, I am sorry to say, are famous for rudeness in scientific discussions, because most of our combative sages try to morally kill their adversary and to ruin his scientific, sometimes even his personal, reputation. The fact is we have not as yet in this country learned the ethics of literary controversy.

But let us return to the main point of the subject of this article, viz. the ethics of struggle.

The secret of the success of the Teutonic nations, it appears to me, lies not only in their combative nature which made them strong to conquer the world, but also, and especially, in their recognition of and obedience to the ethics of struggle; and one of the first commandments of the ethics of struggle is the injunction, "Honor your adversary as yourself."

There is an episode told in the *Nibelungen saga* which characterises the ethical spirit of the combativeness of Teutonic heroes. Markgrave Rüdiger has to

meet the grim Hagen and to do him battle. Seeing, however, that his enemy's shield is hacked to pieces, he offers him his own, whereupon they proceed to fight.

It was no disgrace for the Teutonic warrior to be slain, no dishonor to be vanquished; but it was infamy worse than death to be a coward, it was a disgrace to gain a victory by dishonest means. The enemy was relentlessly combated, may be he was hated, yet it would have been a blot on one's escutcheon to treat him with meanness. It was not uncommon among these barbarians for the victor to place a laurel wreath upon the grave of his foe, whom in life he had combated with bitterest hatred.

General Trumbull tells a story, that at Vicksburg once the boys in blue and the boys in gray long lay peacefully opposite each other, the former besieging the latter. The hostile outposts had become quite familiar with each other, and had often for fun met in boyish encounters without arms romping with and chasing each other in the trenches. Similar things have happened in almost all wars. Thus the Prussians and Danes in the war 1864 sometimes indulged in a mutual snow-balling. The French and the German pickets before Metz traded in victuals, exchanging, according to their needs, bread and meat. Such friendly relations between enemies are nothing extraordinary. But to finish General Trumbull's story, one day the order was given to the boys in blue to take the fortifications of the rebels. This might have been an easy thing, because the confederates allowed the union soldiers to approach without expecting an attack. Such being the situation, the union soldiers sent word over to their enemies to be on their guard, because they had to take the rifle pits. It was neither generosity nor foolishness not to take the advantage which was offered by this occasion; it was simply a noble obedience to the ethics of struggle. The ethics of struggle which have been practised by the Teutonic nations through millenniums have perhaps become hereditary in our race.

The scientist, the scholar, the moral teacher, it appears, can learn some moral lessons still from our soldiers. Shall there be an ethics of actual warfare while no ethics is needed in the battles of science? Shall the ethics of the sword and the cannon be nobler than the ethics of the spiritual struggle? Our ethical theorists and reformers refuse too much to learn from actual life; they are too apt to judge the conduct of the men of action according to self-made principles or general maxims, while they should study the history of great men, they should investigate the facts of the conditions of social growth in order to state the natural laws of ethics and then derive their moral principles from such natural laws, instead of

relying upon their own opinion of goodness, right, and justice. Ethics is neither something to be paraded in a show as an ornament of life, nor is it something mystical, of unknown origin and unknown purposes, it is extremely practical and must therefore be applicable to real life and to the struggle that prevails in life.

Ethics like all the other sciences is to be based upon the facts of life and has again to be applied to the facts of life. But life being a struggle for existence, we should first of all try to understand the ethics of struggle.

The ethics of struggle are of paramount importance in life, and the ethics of literary controversy are of paramount importance in the field of science and in the scientific inquiry into truth. Practical morality is impossible without a clear conception of and a strict obedience to the ethics of struggle. P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE National Swine Breeders Association has never been suspected of superabundant piety, although it is a strictly orthodox communion, and rigidly Sabbatarian. At their convention recently held in Chicago, the National Swine Breeders resolved in favor of closing the World's Fair on Sundays, in order that the nation "may be spared the strain of a conspicuous and flagrant act of disobedience to God." In the code from which that bit of theology is taken, the eating of pork is also condemned as "a flagrant act of disobedience to God"; now if the law against eating pork, and the law against breaking the Sabbath be enforced with strict impartiality, what will become of the National Swine Breeders Association?

Once upon a time, a minister of the gospel in San Francisco was preaching the funeral sermon of a boy member of his congregation; and after praising the bright and shining virtues of the deceased, he said: "Mourning friends, I can hardly realise this bereavement; it has come so sudden and unexpected. It was only last Tuesday that I saw this blessed bud of promise, out on Sacramento Street, a-heaving rocks at a Chinaman." I was reminded of this, when reading in this morning's paper that a girl 14 years old was locked up at the Des Plaines Street station on a charge of malicious mischief. "It is claimed," says the paper, "that she playfully tried to snowball a Chinaman, but her aim was bad, and the missile broke a pane of glass at 57 South Halsted Street." Her crime was missing the Chinaman, and hitting a window. Had she missed the window, and hit the Chinaman, all would have been well. Pelting the Chinaman was "playfully" done, but her bad aim converted the sport into "malicious mischief." It is announced that a convention of all religions will assemble in Chicago in 1893, and surely such a conference is needed here, when a girl 14 years old can be degraded by imprisonment in a convict cell, for accidentally breaking a pane of glass at 57 South Halsted Street.

"Alas, for the rarity, of Christian charity,
Under the sun."

The opening of Congress is our great national show, where law-makers play to galleries filled with applauding crowds. As youths enchanted worship actresses by offering bouquets, so lobbyists, friends, and flatterers offer homage in flowers to senators and representatives, a silly reverence that lowers the dignity of Congress, and makes those "potent, grave, and reverend Signiors" look frivolous. Those love tokens, and compliments are private

favors which ought to be bestowed in private. When flaunted in public they become theatrical, invidious, and suggestive of anything but serious duty. "At this opening," say the papers, and their description of it makes me think of the opening of a millinery store,— "At this opening, the flowers came in cartloads, and some of the devices were so enormous that they could not be got through the door of the house. Mr. McAleer of Pennsylvania was the main recipient. He got two chairs 'life size,' a floral harp seven feet high, the head of a huge floral gavel, which looked more like a beer keg than a gavel, and innumerable baskets of flowers." As the flummery grew around him, the mental calibre of the honorable member shrunk, and at last the floral nonsense made a statesman look like a fool. As a citizen of Chicago, interested in its glory, I rejoice that "the three democrats from Chicago were remembered by huge baskets of red roses," but a cloud of sorrow steals across the paper as I read that "Col. 'Ab.' Taylor sat flowerless and disconsolate in the back row." Not altogether disconsolate, I hope, for it must be a consolation to Col. Taylor that there is a strong belief growing up in the very highest quarters, that the "flowerless" members are the only men of sense in congress, and that they themselves have sent out the command, "No flowers."

Notwithstanding the premature band playing, and the clarion crowing over the anticipated victory, it now turns out that Mr. Springer was not elected Speaker, although he made a good showing, and came within a hundred votes or so of getting the nomination. What is more surprising still, the invincible battle cry, "The North West," which was "emblazoned on his banner" had no inspiration in it; and the prize, as if in banter and fun, perversely went in the opposite direction as far as it could go, and actually fell to a man from the "South East." I shall never again believe in the false prophets at Washington, who assured me that Mr. Springer's election was a certainty; because he was not only working all night, and Sundays, but also had a faithful band of political kidnappers on his staff, who from an ambushade at the railroad station sprung upon incoming congressmen, seized their gripsacks, and steered them away from where they wanted to go, up to the Springer headquarters, where they were tortured in a sort of "sweat-box" until they promised to vote for the candidate from the "North-West." Those deceitful soothsayers now try to apologise for misleading me by the worthless information that "Although the Illinois candidate did not win, he did the next best thing. He commanded the situation at the climax." Considering the extravagant pretensions made, I think that last word must be a misprint for "Anti-climax," for it seems to me that the man who commands the situation at the climax of it ought to win. The comfort, such as it is, reminds me of the boast of Stephen A. Douglas, that although not elected president himself, he held Mr. Lincoln's hat at his inauguration.

A noteworthy affair was the banquet of the Presbyterian Social Union at the Palmer House last Tuesday evening; not because of what the papers called its "rich menu," whatever that is,— something extremely good to eat, I think, for I often see it mentioned,—but for the feast of reason furnished after the "menu" in the address read by the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst of New York. His theme was the need of more heart and less brain in religion, and especially in the Presbyterian church. The very fine comparisons used in the address gave proof that much labor had been used in its preparation, and there was in it a very interesting mixture of Psychology, Theology, and Physiology; while even Geology was drawn upon for one of the best illustrations made. Dr. Parkhurst easily showed that brain, although a physiological fact, was heretical, or at least unscriptural; for he said: "The word brain does not occur in the scriptures, while heart is a word that the Bible is full of." This is true and the moral intended to be drawn from

it was that therefore brain is not needed in any scriptural church. According to Dr. Parkhurst, the soul of man dwells in the heart, and not in the brain; and in the heart is established the basis of morals; or, to state it in his own words, "You can never put morality in a better place than that in which the Bible puts it; that is in the outcome of the holy enthusiasm." This was the thought that inspired Ignatius Loyola, John Wesley, and the spiritual evangelists of all time; and it leads logically enough to this mistake of Dr. Parkhurst, "The moving energy in the world's history to-day, is not a philosophy but a cross, and the consummating act by which Christ fitted the church for its work, was not the founding of a college, but the baptism of the church with the Holy Ghost, and with fire." The evidence of Dr. Parkhurst's mistake is the following contradiction of himself, "A great deal of the part that passion used to play in Christianity, has now come to be played by sheer thought, cool, bloodless ratiocination." This concession puts his argument in danger, for it is the testimony of Dr. Parkhurst himself, that holy reason and philosophy, not holy enthusiasm and the cross constitute "the moving energy in the world's history to-day." The extinct volcanoes and the Dead Seas represent the creeds.

In his remarkable address, Dr. Parkhurst made good anti-theoretical use of the opposites heat and cold, as ideal qualities respectively of heart and brain; the former, warm, passionate, impulsive, and religious; the latter, cool, reflective, analytical, and sceptical. Dr. Parkhurst wants his religion hot from the heart, not cool from the brain. He said: "Geology tells us that the world began hot; so every thought that has had a history began as a passion." The comparison is rhetorically good, but rather perilous for Dr. Parkhurst, because Theology tells us that the world began cold, or just as it is now. For a long time Geology and Theology have quarrelled about the origin of the world, and if Dr. Parkhurst takes the side of Geology in the controversy, his heresy is probably due to "the founding of a college." Dr. Parkhurst draws a curious indictment against the Presbyterian church, and accuses it of having too much brain; a charge that many people think is without any foundation. On a fair and impartial trial the church would very likely get a verdict of not guilty. "The Presbyterian church is brainy," says Dr. Parkhurst, "and one of the best things that could happen to the church would be to have fifty per cent. of its brain taken out, and made over into heart." I believe that is another mistake. It is true that the Presbyterian church with its doctrine of wholesale punishments needs more heart, but let it not be at the expence of the brain, for it is the brain that improves the heart.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

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Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

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NEW YEAR'S EVE AND NEW YEAR'S DAY.

THE beginning of the year was celebrated by different peoples at different seasons. The Israelites began their year on the first of Tisri, i. e. on or immediately after the new moon following the autumnal equinox. The Mohammedans begin the year with the first day after Mohammed's flight from Mecca to Medina, which fell upon the night between the 15th and 16th of July, 622. The Egyptians had not a regular commencement of the year at a certain and definite season. Their New Year's Day changed from year to year, slowly moving backward in the Calendar. Their months consisted of thirty days invariably, and at the end five supplementary days were added. This leaves about one fourth of a day in every year, so that in every period of four years the New Year's Day receded by one day. This difference caused the commencement of the year to make in the long run a revolution through all the seasons constituting one whole year in 1461 years. Thus 1461 Egyptian years are equal to 1460 years of our calendar.

The beginning of the year as it is customary now among us is due to the Romans, and according to tradition it was Numa Pompilius who let the year commence with the winter season soon after the time when the days began to increase again. The first month was dedicated to and named after Janus, the old two-faced god of the door (*janua*), of the beginning, of time, who looked with aged features upon the past and youthfully upon the future.

The Saxons, like all the Teutonic nations, celebrated the winter solstice as the most joyous festival of the year under the name of Yule, and when Christianity was introduced changing the symbol of Ygdrasil into a Christmas-tree, they called the New Year's Day "Aefter-Yule," celebrating it in the fashion of their forefathers with the Wassail Bowl in hand. Those who were too poor to enjoy a feast at home, went about with a wooden cup, begging for a gift, and sang :

"Wassail! wassail! over the town,
Our toast is white, our ale it is brown;
Our bowl it is made of the good maplin tree,
We be good fellows all; I drink to thee."

A pretty children's song runs :

"Here we come a-wassailing,
Among the leaves so green ;

Here we come a-wandering,
So fair to be seen."

CHORUS—"Love and joy come to you,
And to your wassail, too;
And God send you a happy New Year,
A happy New Year.
And God send you a happy New Year.
Our wassail cup is made of rosemary tree,
So is our beer of the best barley."*

The division between the old and the new, between New Year's Eve and New Year's Day is artificial. In reality there is not a certain moment in which by a sudden rupture the old year ceases and the new year begins, there is not a special break in which the present is turned into the past to make room for the future. There is always New Year's Eve and New Year's Day at the same time, and this state of things is the eternal present in which we live and move and have our being.

Every day is at the same time a doomsday and a day of creation, a day of judgment and a new start in life, a day of reaping the harvest of the past and a day of sowing seeds for the future. But on such special occasions as are New Year's Eve and New Year's Day, we are inclined to pause, in order to enjoy the good things we have, to be merry and to wish one another good luck and happiness. Yet at the same time it is well to reflect upon our life and work, upon our duties in the past as well as the future, and upon the results of our labors as they actually are in comparison to what they might be or ought to be. And the severer we are with ourselves, the more wholesome our self-examination will prove to be for our ideals as well as for us and for those with whom and for whom we work, and struggle, and aspire.

The last day of the year reminds us of the transiency of all things. All things will pass away, pleasures and pains, happiness and misfortune, grief, sorrow, hope, and enthusiasm, struggle and toil, laurels and the fruits of toil. All the things of the world are transient. Yet the last day of the year is not the end of time, it is New Year's Eve, and New Year's Eve ushers in the New Year's Day. New Year's Day, however, reminds us of the constant and uninterrupted regeneration that is going on in the world. There is change in this world, but no annihilation. Death is a phase of life, and life is inexhaustible, eternal, immortal.

* Both rhymes quoted from *American Notes and Queries*, II, p. 97, 98.

ENTHUSIASM AND INTOXICATION IN THEIR
ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

BY E. D. COPE.

THE word intoxication as ordinarily used, is applied to a mental sensation where the inhibitory power of judgment is absent or is reduced in relative importance. An intoxication may have physical or emotional causes, so that the English term applied to it, which is derived from *τοξικον* poison, is not as appropriate as the German *Rausch*, which has no specific implications.

Since mental exhaustion always follows intoxication, it is evident that it is associated with a more rapid expenditure of energy than other forms of mental action, relatively to recuperation. This will be more apparent if we review the various forms of it. Of physical intoxication there are several kinds, which are natural or artificial. A mild form is experienced by vigorous persons in coming in contact with fresh, cool, and pure air; or after eating a properly composed meal when the digestion is vigorous. A more intense degree of it is experienced in the reproductive act. Artificial forms are produced by drugs, as morphia, hasheesh, alcohol, etc. Intoxications of which the causes are mental, are passions in general. Even the depressing passion of fear might be included in the broad definition given above.

Intoxications, with the exception of fear, are pleasurable. This is due to two causes. First; expenditure of energy is always pleasurable, so long as it does not exceed the supply; second, such expenditure involves no labor of direction, such as is furnished by the intelligent judgment. The exercise of the intelligence and the judgment does not supply such pleasurable mental sensations as intoxication.

Since expenditure beyond the power of the machine to furnish energy cannot go on without exhaustion and pain, it is evident that intoxication cannot be continuous, but must be suspended at least long enough to permit recuperation. And since the action of the judgment is of the highest importance to our safety in every respect it is evident that its eclipse must be only temporary if permitted at all. In any case then intoxication must play a subordinate rôle in human affairs.

An important conclusion is derived from the facts of intoxication, parallel to that which may be learned from the observation of physical sensations. Physical sensations do not repeat themselves in memory; a shadow only persists in the record, which is very unlike the original. Thoughts (defined as ideation) repeat themselves much more precisely; emotions less clearly than rational processes. It seems that persistence in the record is inversely as the distinctness

of the original state of consciousness. From this it may be inferred that the less violent mental processes are the better builders of brain tissue, while the more violent are the worse.

The same reasoning applies with greater force to intoxications. Those of physical origin cannot be reproduced by an effort of memory, but require fresh stimulus for every occasion. Those of mental origin are reproduced but feebly. Both leave traces, which are the physical bases of habits. Such traces are a condition of tissue which facilitates a rapid expenditure of undirected energy, and might be compared to the destruction of the cogs in a cog-wheel in some part of a machine. This destruction will be injurious or not, as the cogs are or are not replaced. When the cogs are replaced soon after they are lost, the machine is not destroyed; but there is here no progressive building.

An important reflection arises from these considerations. *Pleasures, physical and emotional, are not active agents in our progressive evolution, even from a physiological standpoint.* The rational faculty is the leader in this process. Mankind however does not desire to live without pleasure. Our organisation is capable of experiencing it, and it is an accompaniment of several of our important physical functions. Without it, some of them would not be performed. The exercise of the rational faculties requires intermission for recuperation, and at such times pleasure plays a most useful part. Moreover the ends for which we exercise our rational faculties include physical and emotional pleasure.

Such pleasure may be experienced with the rational faculties more or less active in control. But this is not intoxication. One of the fundamental problems of ethics is to define the extent to which it is safe to permit the observation of the rational powers of control by intoxication. It is customary to decide the question by reference to the actual effect of such states on their subjects and on other persons. This utilitarian standard is a safe one, but requires much critical definition. From an ideal point of view it might be urged that any obscuration of the judgment is injurious. But this cannot be admitted, since the phenomenon accompanies the satisfaction of some of our necessary physical appetites. A rule of universal application which is self-evident, is that intoxication should never be permitted to exceed the power of prompt recuperation. Another is that it should never be permitted in such form and degree as to induce violation of the rights of others. These rules define excess in this direction, and if observed, would cause the disuse of a large amount of physical intoxicants. The intoxications of passion are principally exhibited in anger, sexual love, and fear. Anger is for the most

part injurious in its effects, but in exceptional cases it is useful. The love between the sexes is generally beneficial, but in some cases it is injurious, causing total self deception. Fear as an intoxication may be said to be always injurious; as fear in the presence of an active rationality is necessary and beneficial. A mental source of intoxication is beauty or harmony of form, color, and sound, and it is only effective with persons of æsthetic capacities. No injury can result from such intoxication except when carried to excess, as above defined.

The management of one's physical (and therefore mental) organism is like the administration of an estate. Every man is interested in not living in excess of his income, and in not injuring the productive capacity of the property. Every man must be to a large extent the judge of his own resources and needs, but many men lack both the knowledge and experience necessary to guide them. To such, the cautions contained in the preceding paragraphs may be useful. To those in whom the love of intoxication has passed beyond the limit of rational control, I would offer the suggestion that they place themselves in an asylum where they will be under the control of others, before it is too late.

THE MONIST.*

A REVIEW OF ITS WORK AND A SKETCH OF ITS PHILOSOPHY.

THE MONIST is an exponent of philosophical thought. It is a magazine which counts among its contributors the most prominent thinkers of all civilised nations. There are American thinkers such as Joseph Le Conte, Charles S. Peirce, E. D. Cope, Moncure D. Conway (the latter a native Englishman, but a resident citizen of the United States). There are English savants such as George J. Romanes, James Sully, B. Bosanquet, and the famous Oxford Professor, F. Max Müller. There are Germans such as Justice Albert Post, the founder of ethnological jurisprudence, Professors Ernst Mach and Friedrich Jodl. The former is the author of "Die Geschichte der Mechanik," the latter of "Die Geschichte der Ethik," both being the best works of their kind up to the present day. French and Belgian authors such as Dr. A. Binet and Professor Delbœuf. The Italians are represented by the great criminologist Cesare Lombroso and the Danes by their most prominent thinker Prof. Harald Høffding. Each number contains one or two letters on bibliographical and literary topics from French, German, or Italian scholars.

The international character of the magazine appears also in a rich review of English and foreign

publications. Each number contains a synopsis of the most important books and periodicals in the philosophical, ethical, psychological, and physiological fields. Not only American and English magazines, such as *Mind* and the *American Journal of Psychology* are regularly reviewed, but also the *Revue Philosophique* and all the important German magazines, among them the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, *Philosophische Monatshefte*, *Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie*. The great Russian quarterly *Problems of Philosophy and Psychology* (*Voprosui Filosofii i Psichologii*) receives full attention, and occasional reviews of several Italian magazines such as the *Revista Italiana di Filosofia*, and *Minerva* have also been added in several numbers of THE MONIST.

* * *

THE MONIST represents that philosophical conception which is at present known by the name of "Monism." Monism, as it is represented in THE MONIST, is in a certain sense not a new philosophy, it does not come to revolutionise the world and overthrow the old foundations of science. On the contrary, it is the outcome and result of science in its maturest shape.

The term "Monism" is often used in the sense of one-substance-theory that either mind alone or matter alone exists. Such theories are better called Henism.

Monism is not "that doctrine" (as Webster has it) "which refers all phenomena to a single ultimate constituent or agent." Of such an "ultimate constituent or agent" we know nothing; and it will be difficult to state whether there is any sense in the meaning of the phrase "a single ultimate constituent or agent."

Monism is much simpler and less indefinite. Monism means that the whole of Reality, i. e. everything that is, constitutes one inseparable and indivisible entirety. Monism accordingly is a unitary conception of the world. It always bears in mind that our words are abstracts representing parts or features of the One and All, and not separate existences. Not only are matter and mind, soul and body abstracts, but also such scientific terms as atoms and molecules, and also religious terms such as God and world.

Our abstracts, if they are true, represent realities, i. e. parts, or features, or relations of the world, that are real, but they never represent things in themselves, absolute existences, for indeed there are no such things as absolute entities. The All being one interconnected whole, everything in it, every feature of it, every relation among its parts has sense and meaning and reality only if considered with reference to the rest of the whole and to the whole itself. In this sense we say that monism is a view of the world as a unity.

The principle of Monism is the unification or systematisation of knowledge, that is, of a description of

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facts. This means, in other words: There is but one truth, two or several truths may represent different and even complementary aspects of the one and sole truth, but they can never come into contradiction. Whenever a contradiction between two statements appears, both of which are regarded as true, it is sure that there must be a mistake somewhere. The ideal of science remains a methodical and systematic unification of statements of facts, which shall be exhaustive, concise, and free from contradictions—in a word the ideal of science is MONISM.

Monism, as represented by THE MONIST, is a statement of facts, and in so far as it is a statement of facts, this Monism is to be called Positivism. The hypotheses of science are often formulated with the help of analogies, and these analogies contain figurative expressions. We speak for instance of electric currents as if electricity were a fluid. This method of using analogies which is of great service for the unification of knowledge must not be taken as real science, it is the mythology of science. The mythology of science is no less indispensable in the realm of investigation than it is in the province of religion, but we must not forget that it is a means only to an end, the ideal of scientific inquiry and of the monistic philosophy being and remaining a simple statement of facts. The progress of science and philosophy in this direction will be the same as in religion. Progress, in addition to a formation of new ideas, means a purification of our old ideas. The mythological elements must be separated from the pure statement of facts, the latter being the grain, the former the chaff; the latter are the truth, the former our methods of reaching the truth. The chaff is the husks, and grain cannot grow without the wholesome protection of the husks. Thus the truth contained in mythological analysis is their all-important element which has to be sifted out and preserved. The rest is to be discarded; it has served an educational purpose and will have to be relegated to the history of science.

Religious progress, no less than scientific progress, is a process of growth as well as a cleansing from mythology. Religion is a world-conception regulating man's conduct. Our world-conception grows with every new information, and in this way scientific ideas become religious ideas. Religion is the basis of ethics. As science commenced with the crude notions of primitive animism, so did religion begin with a mythology full of superstition. And the ideal of religion is the same as that of science, it is a liberation of the mythological elements and its aim is to rest upon a concise but exhaustive statement of facts, to be constantly enlarged by a more complete and more accurate experience. The ultimate goal of religious development is the re-

cognition of the truth with the aspiration to live in conformity to the truth.

THE MONIST in this way unites two apparently contradictory but really complementary qualities. It is conservative and yet unflinchingly radical. It advocates progress, reform, and a further evolution in all spheres of human life, but it recognises the truth, that progress, reform, and a further evolution are possible only by a development of the present state of things. A revolution, a break with that which has historically grown up, can bring harm only. The evolution of the future must be the fulfilment of the hopes, aspirations, and ideals of the present which have grown out of the seeds sown in the past.

Although the editorial management of THE MONIST takes a decided and well defined position with respect to the most important philosophical questions of the day, its pages are nevertheless not restricted to the presentation of any one special view or philosophy. On the contrary, they are open to contributors of divergent opinions and the most hostile world-conceptions, dualistic or otherwise, are not excluded. Criticisms of the monistic and positive views are solicited and the more vigorous they are, the more welcome they have been and will be in the future.

* * *

To give a more complete exposition of the character of THE MONIST, we shall review the first volume of 1891 and sketch the work partly done and partly to be done in the second volume now under publication. It is impossible to present a full outline of the articles. Suffice it to characterise them in brief notices:

VOL. I, NO. I.

The first number opens with an article by GEORGE J. ROMANES on Physiological Selection, criticising Mr. A. R. Wallace's views of the subject and stating his own opinion. In a private letter to the editor of THE MONIST, Professor Romanes writes:

"The article refers to a completely new departure
"in the theory of evolution, striking in the principle
"of homogamy, the root-principle of the whole, and
"in physiological selection, one of the main branches.
"Yet neither principle has so far been perceived except by Mr. Gulick. . . . The theory of physiological selection has been better understood in America than in this country; and I should like the naturalists there, who have taken such a warm and appreciative interest in it, to see my reply to Mr. Wallace published in an American periodical."

Dr. ALFRED BINET, the French Psychologist and Physiologist discusses the question of the immortality of protozoans as represented by Weismann. Having presented many interesting details concerning the con-

ditions under which agamic propagation is replaced by sexual reproduction, Dr. Binet rejects Weismann's idea and in agreement with Maupas and Balbiani declares that "when a ciliate *Infusorium* multiplies by "agamic division a great number of times, the offspring that appears after from 50 to 100 bipartitions "has not the same physiological value as its original "progenitor; and that agamic multiplication ends in "exhaustion and in natural death." To a certain extent, however, Binet concedes the truth of Weismann's immortality idea. He adds: "But it must "be taken into account, on the other hand, that this "process of senescence is counteracted by that of conjugation, which consists in a nuclear renovation; and "since the substance, the protoplasm, of the rejuvenated individual escapes death, a new argument "might be found in these last mentioned facts for the "theory of the immortality of *Infusoria*."

Prof. E. D. COPE is a conservative on the problems of sex relations. He winds up his article on the subject with the following paragraph:

"The principles above laid down are those out of which have grown our laws on the subject. Some women and men appear to think them unjust to women. It is true that in some respects, woman is at a disadvantage. This disadvantage is, however, of natural origin and cannot be overcome. On the other hand, she has a full equivalent in the advantages which she also derives from the natural order of things. The result is that there is no real cause of complaint, unless the correction of the faults is a part of the process of ethical development which is going on in human society. And perhaps the most effective agency in this development is the relation of the members of the family to each other, where affection takes the place of force, since it is the source of our deepest pleasures and our severest pains."

ERNST MACH is Professor of Physics at the German University of Prague. Moreover he is an authority of first rank in mechanics and must be regarded as one of the keenest and profoundest of philosophical thinkers. His philosophical theory of knowledge was akin to that of the late Professor Kirchhoff. He presented similar views in the construction of a positive conception of mechanics in particular and of science in general. One of his fundamental ideas is the proposition that the principle of science is economy of thought. His best known works are: "Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung," "Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit," "Die Gestalten der Flüssigkeit und die Symmetrie," "Die ökonomische Natur der physikalischen Forschung," "Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen."

The present article on the Analysis of Sensations

explains the basic ideas of his world conception. Professor Mach proceeds descriptively. He calls the relations the elements of the world and says:

"Thing, body, matter, are nothing apart from this complex of colors, sounds, and so forth—apart from their so-called marks, or characteristics. That Procrustean, illusory philosophical problem of a single independent thing with many properties, arises from the misunderstanding of the fact, that extensive comprehension and accurate separation, although both are temporarily justifiable and profitable for a number of purposes, can not and must not be employed simultaneously."

This is the ground from which so many sham problems arise to which even the man of philosophy at times succumbs. Also the ego, as well as the relations of bodies to the ego, occasions the rise of analogous seeming problems. Says Mach:

"The primary fact is not the *I*, the ego, but the elements (sensations). The elements constitute the *I*. *I* perceive the sensation green, means, that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When *I* cease to perceive the sensation green, when *I* die, then the elements no longer occur in their customary, common way of association. That is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist."

Professor Mach rejects the idea of an absolute ego and so he rejects also the idea of a thing in itself. He says:

"I have always felt it as a special good fortune, that early in my life, at about the age of 15, I came in the library of my father across Kant's 'Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics.' The book made at that time a powerful, ineffaceable impression upon me, that I never afterwards experienced to the same degree in any of my philosophical reading. Some two or three years later I suddenly discovered the superfluous rôle that 'the thing in itself' plays."

Dr. PAUL CARUS, the editor of THE MONIST discusses the problem of the Origin of Mind. He begins his task like Professor Mach descriptively, taking the facts as data. The simplest facts of mind-activity, the facts originally and primarily given are feelings of any descriptions. These feelings however acquire meaning, they come to represent something, they are interpreted. Thus given facts develop what may be called inferences or deduced facts. And mind is the organised totality of deduced facts as it is developed in feeling substance. Deduced facts are the elements of mind, and mind is not their root, but their fruit. The following topics are discussed on the basis of this conception of mind: The nature of subjectivity

and objectivity.—The origin of feeling from the elements of subjective existence.—Feeling with the help of memory acquires meaning.—Neither feeling nor mind can be considered as incidental phenomena.—The projection of objective facts.—Projection, an economy of labor.—The subject-superstition and agnosticism.—The objective element in subjective states.—All data are states of subject-objectness.

□ Concerning Idealism and Realism, it is stated, that "From this standpoint the differences between the schools of idealism and realism appear as antiquated. The question whether matter is real, whether objects exist, and whether there is any reality at all, have lost their meaning. That which produces effects upon the subject and against which the subject does or can react, is called object. The sense-effects produced by the object upon the subject, and also the reactions of the subject upon the object, are realities; and every name of a special object signifies a certain group of such effects and their respective reactions."

In the further elucidation of the subject the following topics are touched upon:

Inferential facts, if true, are real.—Facts and reality.—Truth and mind.—Facts and truth.—The problem of the origin of mind.—Telepathy.—Continuity in the transient.—Mind and Eternity.

Extremely interesting reading, but light in contrast with the other articles of THE MONIST, will be that of Dr. MAX DESSOIR's essay "The Magic Mirror" which is a study of the psychological problem of fascination. Dr. Dessoir quotes old German sources and abounds in quotations of many recent experiences in this line.

VOL. I, NO. 2.

CHARLES S. PEIRCE is one of the subtlest thinkers and logicians not only of America, but of the whole globe. His field of work is rather recondite to the general public, for he writes with great ease and masterly accuracy upon what might be called the higher mathematics or the differential and integral calculus of logic. "The Architecture of Theories," the leading article of the second number is the first publication of his in which he propounds not mere criticism or the discussion of abstruse logical subjects, but his own positive opinion, presenting in great and clear outlines the foundations of his philosophy.

It is almost impossible to abbreviate or sketch Mr. Peirce's views. He undertakes to explain the origin of natural law and expresses the results of his thoughts in the following sentences:

"Without going into other important questions of philosophical architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be

"constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning,—infinitely remote,—there was a chaos of unpersonalised feeling, which being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a generalising tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and from this with the other principles of evolution all the regularities of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallised in the infinitely distant future."

Mr. Charles Peirce's article is an attempt to construct a unitary world-conception and to apply the law of evolution to everything, even to the laws of nature. The editor of THE MONIST in his article "The Criterion of Truth" applies the criterion he constructs, to Mr. Peirce's theory. Having stated that "the criterion of truth is the perfect agreement of all facts, of all interpretations and explanations of facts among themselves," he criticises Mr. Peirce's propositions saying:

"The world-conception of Mr. Peirce agrees in one fundamental maxim with our own, but it disagrees with the latter in the main and most important application of this maxim. Mr. Peirce says, 'Law is *par excellence* the thing that wants a reason.' This maxim was the guiding star of our inquiry into the fundamental problems of philosophy. The world considered as a universe displaying in all its innumerable actions one and the same law is called a cosmos; if considered as a heap of processes with no common law pervading them it is called a chaos. We found in our inquiry into the forms of existence that the laws of form possess intrinsic necessity. . . . The truth 'one plus one makes two' contains the universal applicability of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy. Taking this ground we arrived at the conclusion that the world is a cosmos: there is no chaos and there never has been a chaos. A chaos, in the sense of an absolute non-existence of law, is an impossibility.

"Accordingly, we cannot agree with Mr. Peirce that the occurrence of chance 'calls for no particular explanation.' There is no chance, if chance means absence of law. Chance, if the word be admissible, is a mere subjective conception produced by limited knowledge and signifying a state of things not determinable with the means of knowledge at our

"disposal. Law once recognised is the death of 'chance (in the objective sense of the word); and 'chance, or sport, or chaos, or indeterminacy, or 'whatever one may call the absence or at least the 'imperfect cogency of law, far from 'calling for no 'particular explanation,' must be classed *prima facie* 'among those theories that are *per se* impossible."

Professor LOMBROSO analyses with masterly clearness the criminal characters of Zola. It is an article fascinating as well as weird, that sets one a-thinking concerning the abysses of human nature. Lombroso adds two short articles on criminal anthropology and psychiatry and on morphological anomalies.

A work of classical importance is Prof. HERMANN SCHUBERT's essay on the "Squaring of the Circle," an historical sketch of the problem from the earliest times to the present day. The history of this problem has reached its consummation since Prof. F. Lindemann of the University of Königsberg actually and rigorously demonstrated in June 1882 that the number π is not algebraical, "thus supplying the first proof that the 'problems of the rectification and the squaring of the 'circle, with the help only of algebraical instruments 'like ruler and compasses, are insolvable. Lindemann's proof appeared successively in the Reports 'of the Berlin Academy (June 1882), in the 'Comptes 'Rendus' of the French Academy (Vol. 115, pp. 72 'to 74), and in the 'Mathematischen Annalen' (Vol. '20, pp. 213 to 225)."

Professor Schubert's article is a concise, and considering its limited scope of 38 pages, a very complete exposition of this most interesting problem and its historical development.

An illustrated article by CARUS STERNE "Five Souls with but a Single Thought" is a contribution to the psychology of the star-fish.

In addition to these essays this number contains an excellent article in the department of literary correspondence by FRIEDRICH JODL on the German philosophy of the Nineteenth Century, sketching in great outlines the philosophical development of Germany since Kant.

VOL. I, NO. 3.

Prof. JOSEPH LE CONTE of the University of California shows in a lucid article that there are several factors of evolution which enter successively into the growth of organised life upon earth. With each stage that is reached new conditions are created, and these conditions produce a new factor which without obliterating the old factors grows more prominent and decisive than they and quickens the march of progress.

There are the following five factors recognised. First two Lamarckian factors: (1) Pressure of a changing environment, (2) use and disuse of organs. Then

there are two Darwinian factors: (3) Natural selection or the survival of the fittest, and (4) Sexual selection. Recently Gulick and Romanes have added another factor: (5) Physiological selection, an exposition of which was given by Professor Romanes in Vol. i, No. 1, of *The Monist*. Professor Le Conte insists upon the efficacy of a sixth factor, which he calls "human evolution or the voluntary co-operation in the work of evolution." This last factor, when analysed and reduced to its simplest terms is naught else than the consciousness in man of his relation to the world as a whole and the attempt to realise the divine ideal in human character.

Professor Le Conte's essay throws much light upon the dispute which is at present raging between the two schools, the so-called Lamarckians and the so-called Darwinians. It combines both views in a higher unity.

Prof. CESARE LOMBROSO continues his sketches of criminal anthropology by adding thereto an article on "The Physiognomy of the Anarchists." He says of them that their heroic deaths, with their ideal on their lips, proves that they were no common criminals. Although Lombroso is an extremist in his partisanship for the death penalty, he cannot, he says, approve of the shooting of the communards of Paris and the hanging of the anarchist martyrs of Chicago. Lombroso sees in the features of the anarchists indications of philoneism, a love of innovation which is one of the characteristics of originality. He adds:

"I deem it highly necessary to suppress born criminals, when they reach the persuasion that being 'born for evil they can do nothing but evil; and I believe that their death thus saves the lives of many 'honest men. But we have to do with a very different thing here, where the criminal type is, as shown 'above, less frequent than among born criminals.

"There is no political crime against which the 'punishment of death can be directed. An idea is 'never stifled with the death of its abettors: it gains 'with the death of the martyrs if it is good, as is the 'case in revolutions; and it falls at once into vacuity 'if it is sterile, as is the case, perhaps, with the anarchists."

A remarkable study is Professor Lombroso's other article "Innovation and Inertia in the World of Psychology." Love of innovation is called philoneism; love of inertia, i. e. an aversion to innovation, is called misoneism. Professor Lombroso shows that misoneism is the character of mankind, or more generally expressed that inertia is the law of the psychical world no less than of the physical. Professor Lombroso's position had been misunderstood and misinterpreted. He now explains it by reference to the French and other so-called philoneistic people, showing how

strongly monistic they are. And if innovations crowd one upon the other like an avalanche which once started can no more be stopped, is this not also a proof of the law of inertia? Inertia is the rule, and mutations are produced by special external incidents which being usually less persistent, less tenacious change more the appearance than the reality.

Dr. Max Dessoir had alluded in his article "The Magic Mirror," Vol. i, No. 1, to a psychological theory of his according to which man's soul consists of a "double ego," a consciousness and a subconsciousness. Mr. R. MEADE BACHE explains through examples taken from his own experience that the subconsciousness of man which is a psychological fact does not imply any duality of mind.

Dr. GEORGE M. GOULD believes in immortality, but his immortality is of a peculiar kind. His article is a vigorous attack on the one hand against any conception of bodily or individual resurrection as usually taught by the churches, and on the other against a monistic view of the world. Dr. Gould is an outspoken dualist, believing that life is not an immanent feature of the world, but that it came from without. He goes over all the possibilities of what we may reasonably demand to be preserved of us and says:

"We have at every hour to clutch ourselves by the throat and cry, 'Stay! Who art thou?' And lo! while we ask our protean self the question, we have become another. We seek perpetuity of existence for something ever becoming other. We seek personal identity after death, but we have no personal identity before death: how then can we have it afterward?"

This conception of ourselves is not intended as a denial of immortality; on the contrary, he believes that life is immortal. He says:

"Matter without free life is inert, moved only from without: the dead body is simply matter without life. It is not the blacksmith's arm that is strong: without nerve-force it cannot raise an ounce, cannot raise itself. Whence the nerve-force? From the ganglionic gray cells of the spinal cord and brain. And whence these little gray cells? The dear stupid physiologist has now reached his limit, and you can confidently answer for him that it was Life created these things, Life that existed before muscles, nerves, and cells, and that slowly fashioned them; Life, an order of existence in no imaginable way analogous to, or to be confounded with matter or mechanics."

In answer to Dr. Gould's dualistic position, it must be stated that matter without free life (meaning thereby the life of plants and animals) is by no means inert, or moved only from without. If the chemist unites two elements such as hydrogen and oxygen which possess a strong affinity, who or what is it that moves

these substances from without. The inherent and intrinsic qualities of these substances are the momenta which combine them. The force is within, not without or behind as a *vis a tergo*. Matter is not inert in the sense Dr. Gould maintains and the difference between so-called living things and dead things is not the presence and absence of spontaneous motion, but the organisation of the former and the lack of organisation in the latter. (See Carus, "The Soul of Man," Chap. Organised and Non-Organised Life, p. 54 et seqq.)

The third number of THE MONIST contains also an important controversy between Professor MACH and the Editor on "Some Questions of Psycho-Physics." Professor Mach's views are in many respects closely allied to those of the editor. Yet there is a difference which appears to be more than merely verbal. The controversy originated out of a private correspondence concerning Professor Mach's article in Vol. i, No. 1 of THE MONIST. Professor Mach distinguishes between facts, i. e. the given sensations and thoughts or noumena, the former alone are real, the latter are theories concerning realities, they are mental tools. He says:

"Physicists have accustomed us to regard the motions of atoms as 'more real' than the green of the trees. In the latter I see a (sensory) fact, in the former a *Gedankending*, a thing of thought. The billions of ether-vibrations which the physicist for his special purposes *mentally annexes* to the green, are not to be co-ordinated with the green, which is given immediately."

Professor Mach objects to the editor's conception of contrasting motion and feeling and also to his proposition that feeling accompanies motion. And to meet this criticism openly, the editor published with Professor Mach's consent two letters of his in the shape of an article, saying:

"When a man who has done so much valuable work for the progress of science as Prof. Ernst Mach finds it necessary to change the position he has taken,—a position which has appeared to many thinkers as a satisfactory solution of the most intricate problem in the philosophical and psychophysical field,—there must exist in the solution some difficulty which has either been overlooked or at least too little appreciated. If there is a flaw in it, I wish it to be exposed. And convinced that its discovery must be of general interest, I take pleasure in publishing Professor Mach's criticism of the view which I have defended in a former article of mine."

Dr. CARUS in his reply to Professor Mach justifies the juxtaposition of motion and feeling as two terms that are the most general of their kind. The term accompany is granted to be inadequate and the monistic or unitary conception of reality insisted upon. The

abstract conceptions form two parallel systems, but the real thing can be represented as parallel only in the sense that it is parallel to itself. The contrast of sensation and thought, phenomenon and noumenon is fully conceded, yet it is shown that this contrast does not imply any dualism. Sensations are according to Mach the elements of the world; they are the elements of psychic life, but they are not elements *per se*. They admit of further analysis, although it is true that, if further analysed they cease to be sensations, and the units of this analysis are as all our concepts not things in themselves but abstracts representing not full and concrete facts, but parts or features of real facts.

An important chapter is "The Origin of Feeling" from what Clifford calls "the elements of feeling." The impropriety of this term is conceded since there is no reason to believe that the elements of feeling are feelings on a smaller scale. The indisputable fact is that there is no interconvertibility of feeling and motion. Feeling is not motions transformed, as for instance electricity is transformed mechanical motion. Feeling is something *sui generis*. Feeling cannot be seen, cannot be observed, it is no objective process. Its nature is subjectivity. Feeling can only be felt. It originates from the subjectivity of existence and may be characterised as a state of awareness. The potential subjectivity must be supposed to exist throughout the domain of objective nature; and it is from this potential subjectivity that actual subjectivity, awareness, feeling, and consciousness originate. In this sense we may speak of the animation of all nature.

Occasion is taken to refute the error so common at present that physiology and psychology are applied mechanics only. Mechanical, chemical, physiological, and psychical processes exhibit radically different conditions. The student of mechanics, the chemist, the physiologist, the psychologist, each one of them attempts to solve a different problem. They accordingly deal with different sets of abstraction. For instance, the abstraction of the so-called purely mechanical excludes such processes as chemical combinations, it excludes such phenomena as those of the irritability of plant and animal substances, it excludes the modes of psychical life; how can it explain any one of them? All these sciences deal with certain sides of nature only, they observe certain and well defined features only without taking notice of the others. "This how-ever does not overthrow monism. We believe none the less in the unity of all natural laws and trust that if the constitution of the cosmos were transparent in its minutest details to our inquiring mind, we should see the same law operating in all the different provinces; we should see in all instances a difference of conditions and consequent thereupon a dif-

ference of results that can be formulated in different natural laws, among which there is none contradictory to any other."

VOL. I, NO. 4.

JAMES SULLY, the author of many valuable books on psychology and kindred subjects opens the fourth number with an article on the "Psychology of Conception." The following subjects are discussed:

General Nature of Thought.—Thought as Activity.—Directions of Thought-Activity.—Analysis, Abstraction.—Synthesis: Conscious Relating.—Comparison.—Likeness and Difference.—Conditions of Comparison.—Connection between Analysis and Comparison.—General Ideas and their Formation.—Generic Images.—Relation of Generic Image to General Idea.—Transition to Conception Proper.—The Progress of Generalisation.—Conception of Naming.—Is Generalisation Possible Without Language?—Psychological Function of General Names.—Use of Names in Early Life.—How Names Further Conception.—Formation of more Abstract Notions.—Conception as Dependent on Social Environment.

Professor Sully concludes his essay with the following remarks:

"It is evident from this brief sketch of the development of the general idea that it is a process that is largely dependent on the action of the social environment. . . . The results of ages of thought-processes embodied in the language of educated men and women are brought to bear on the growing mind, and these constitute a main ingredient in the educational influence of the community upon the individual."

Mr. MONCURE D. CONWAY'S article "The Right of Evolution" should be read together with and compared with Lombroso's article "Innovation and Inertia in the World of Psychology." Mr. Conway investigates the growth of social institutions and proves that no revolution ever overcame the institution against which it was directed. Revolutionary changes invariably retard human progress. There is accordingly but one way left to progress, that is evolution. Mr. Conway says:

"Though many of the modern socialists believe themselves 'infidels,' their movement is the after-glow of Christianity. Their method is millennial. They look for the destruction of the old political world in much the same way as the early Christians looked for the destruction of the physical world. There is to be a grand transformation scene. Some Bellamy is to sound a trumpet, a lucifer match is to be scratched, and, puff! away go the pomp and glories of this world. The high are to be laid low, the low raised high, and a new social kingdom to be established. All this, though uttered by some athe-

"ists, is supernaturalism. It is a survival from the
"millennial superstition."

But what of America? Mr. Conway says:

"There appears to me nothing more important
"than that the world should be undeceived about
"America, whose political history is, really, the great
"warning against revolution,—a handwriting on the
"walls of the world, the misunderstanding of which
"is a peril to mankind."

England has secured something like republican government under its mask of monarchy. But America is in many respects not so far advanced.

"When the colonies met to frame a constitution
"for their union the majority had no notion of any
"constitution save that of England, and little accurate
"knowledge of that. What they framed was a crude
"imitation of the undeveloped English constitution of
"a hundred years ago. They made two legislatures
"because England seemed to have two; but made
"them equal, not knowing that in England the two
"were not equal. They supposed England was really
"governed by the king; so, having knocked down
"George III. they set up a monarch much more powerful, who to-day under the name of president possesses more power than any throne on earth. They formed a Senate, able to defeat the popular House.

"Command of the Army and Navy, there nominally lodged in the crown, was really lodged with the American monarch, so that he may slip from his civil to his military throne, and rule by martial law. This powerful monarch is not elected by the people of the United States, but of the states separately, through electors proportioned to their members of Congress. Consequently, as New York has the greatest number of electors, the monarch in nine cases out of ten, is chosen by one state. Mr. Harrison got a trifling majority in New York, and was elected. Mr. Cleveland received some 100,000 majority of votes in the nation, and was defeated. A popular superstition calls that the Great Republic.

"Political and social evolution must not be confused with natural selection: it is human selection. Some years ago a cotton-planter in Georgia observed that the leaves on one of his plants were unlike the usual leaf; they were divided as if into fingers. So far nature had gone. The planter added his intelligence. He concluded that such a divided leaf would let in more sunshine on the cotton. Also such a leaf would not be comfortable for caterpillars. So he searched out one or two of these peculiar plants, transplanted them to a field by themselves; as they propagated, he plucked up those with the old leaf, cultivated those with the new,—and now these new cotton plants, finer than the old, free from caterpillars, are spread through many regions. That

"is human selection based on natural selection, securing the fruits of evolution. It is just as applicable to man as to vegetation. A better man may be bred as well as a better kind of cotton.

"Stanley says that when in sore trouble, in the African forest, he made a vow that if God would only help him, he would acknowledge his aid among men. His troubles began to clear next day. God was in—different, it seems, so long as man and beast were suffering, but when this great temptation was held out to Jehovah—this promise of distinguished patronage—he at once interfered. There is nothing new about that God. In the Bible, his providence is always purchasable by glory. There are thousands of such gods in Africa. But Europeans are going there as representatives of civilisation, and will say to them in the name of German and English Science, in the name of Berlin, Oxford, and Cambridge,—“These be thy Gods, O Africa! Only agree to call their name Jehovah, who helped Jephtha, when he vowed a sacrifice which proved to be his daughter, and who helped Stanley on condition that the service would be reported in the press.”

"There is as yet no civilised nation; civilisation exists in oases, which gradually encroach on the deserts. They have largely encroached on some of these already, but civilisation can only extend as it is real."

A peculiar interest attaches itself to the article of MICHAEL SCHWAB, one of the convicted anarchists, the same of whose physiognomy Professor Lombroso says (*Monist* Vol. i, p. 339) that he "has the physiognomy of a savant, of a student." Schwab makes some comments on and corrections of Professor Lombroso's article "The Physiognomy of the Anarchists," and what he says is to the point. Several statements of fact alter the value of the Professor's observations; we are told, for instance, that "Johann Most has an unsymmetric face, this however is not the fault of nature, but of an unskilful surgeon." Schwab shows convincingly that the Professor is entirely mistaken concerning Fielden. Commenting upon the remark that "Almost all the sons of men of genius are lunatics, idiots, or criminals," Schwab adds humorously: "I hope the Professor, mindful of this, is not married."

Schwab concludes his article with these remarks:

"One thing more, Anarchism is a collective term like Liberalism. People understand by it many different and sometimes contradictory theories. That part of it which is not in harmony with human progress will fail, shall fail, and must fail, but that part of it which is good will live in spite of all. The mistake, however, which has been made in our special

"case will not again be made in America; and that
"also will be for the general good."

Prof. HARALD HÖFFDING's and the Editor's articles belong together; they form a discussion on one of the most important subjects of philosophy, viz. on ethics. Professor Höffding is a Utilitarian; he bases his ethics upon what he calls "the principle of welfare," meaning thereby a permanent state of pleasurable feelings. Says Professor Höffding:

"If we accept the principle of welfare as our test
"or criterion in judging of the value of actions and of
"institutions, these are then good or bad according
"as in their effects (so far as we can trace them) they
"produce a predominance of pleasurable feeling or a
"predominance of painful feeling in a larger or smaller circle of sentient beings."

The Editor objects not to the principle of welfare, but its definition as "a permanent state of pleasurable feelings." It is true, as Professor Höffding declares, "a test principle of judgment must be established that will furnish guidance," but this test principle should not be sought in the subjectivity of feelings—be they pleasurable or painful—but in the objectivity of natural facts. The criterion of ethics, Dr. Carus says, is not a subjective matter of my or your or any one's pleasurable feelings, it is an objective reality. To obey it may be painful to me and pleasurable to another man. The feeling element in it has nothing to do with ethics, it is of a secondary consideration. Dr. Carus says:

"The aim of nature is not the happiness of living
"beings, the aim of nature, in the realm of organised
"life, is growth, development, evolution. Pleasures
"and pains are phases in the household of life, they
"are not life's aim. Experience shows that in reaching a higher stage we acquire an additional sensibility for both, for new pleasures and new pains. The pleasures of human existence in comparison with those of animals have been as much intensified and increased as the pains. The ratio has on the average remained about the same and it has rarely risen in favor of pleasures. Rather the reverse takes place: the higher man loses the taste of enjoying himself without losing the sensitiveness of pain.

"Ethics, as a science and from the standpoint of
"positivism, has to inquire what according to the nature of things we must do. It has to study facts and from facts it has to derive rules (the moral precepts) which will assist us in doing at once what we shall after all have to do. The criterion of ethics is not some standard which we put up ourselves, the criterion of ethics is agreement with facts."

The controversy brings out many important points on both sides. Professor Höffding touches such subjects as the relation of pain to pleasure, the conditions

of happiness, the desire for activity and progress even though its aims have to be bought dearly with troubles and great anxiety, the possible conflict between civilisation and Professor Höffding's view of welfare and the position of the ethical societies whose leaders attempt to teach ethics without a basis of ethics, be the latter religious or philosophical. Professor Höffding approves of this maxim. Dr. Carus discusses the following points: The Definition of "Good."—The Authority of the Moral Command.—Ethics and Welfare.—Feelings and Judgments.—Pleasure and Pain.—Pleasurable Feelings as an Ethical Criterion.—The Superindividual and Society.—Professor Adler's Position. The latter is characterised as Kantian agnosticism, in so far as Professor Adler looks upon ethics as something that lies outside the pale of human knowledge. His ethics are based upon mysticism.

Prof. F. MAX MÜLLER criticises in his article "On Thought and Language" Mr. Spencer as well as Professor Romanes. He says:

"It is the greatest mistake to suppose that language, such as we know it, what we might call historical language, always begins with the particular and then proceeds to the general.

"I do not blame a philosopher who is ignorant of the results obtained by the Science of Language, so long as he abstains from touching on the subject. But constantly to appeal to language, and yet to ignore what has been achieved by comparative philologists, is unpardonable. No one is a greater sinner in that respect than Mr. Herbert Spencer.

"Mr. H. Spencer constantly calls on the facts of language, to confirm his views, but his facts are hardly ever correct. For instance: after having explained that, according to his ideas, greater coherence among its component motions broadly distinguishes the conduct we call moral from the conduct we call immoral, he appeals to the word *dissolute*, when meaning immoral, as proving this theory. But *dissolutus* in Latin meant originally no more than negligent, remiss. *Dissolutio* meant languor, weakness, effeminacy, and then only licentiousness and immorality. Language, therefore, in no way confirms Mr. H. Spencer's speculations, still less does experience, for no man is so coherent in his acts, so calculating, so self-restrained, as the confirmed criminal; no one is often so careless, so little shrewd, so easily duped as the thoroughly moral and therefore trustful and confiding man."

Prof. F. Max Müller's disagreement with Professor Romanes turns on the question of the continuity of evolution. He says:

"My learned friend, Professor Romanes, labors to show that there is an unbroken mental evolution from the lowest animal to the highest man. But he

"sees very clearly and confesses very honestly that the chief difficulty in this evolution is language and all that language implies. He tries very hard to remove that barrier between beast and man. . . . I am not going to argue with Professor Romanes, as he says himself (p. 276), if I were right, his whole theory would collapse. I hope this is not the case, but I feel sure that, if it were, Professor Romanes would only rejoice at it. Anyhow why introduce so much of the *meum* and *tuum* into these discussions?

"If, like Professor Romanes, we begin with the 'immense presumption that there has been no interruption in the developmental process in the course of psychological history,' the protest of language counts for nothing; the very fact that no animal has ever formed a language, is put aside simply as an unfortunate accident. But to students to whom facts are facts, immense presumptions count for nothing: on the contrary they are looked upon as the most dangerous merchandise and most likely to lead to shipwreck and ruin."

These criticisms form the background upon which Prof. F. Max Müller develops his own theory of language which was suggested to him by his late friend Prof. Ludwig Noiré. The old theories, which are characterised as the Bow-wow and the Pooh-pooh theories are replaced by what Noiré called the synergistic theory, meaning thereby that language originated through the sounds uttered by people engaged at one and the same common work. To forestall nicknames Professor Müller proposes to call his theory the Yo-he-ho theory after the sailors' song when engaged in hoisting or hauling.

The book reviews in the first volume form an important part of the work. No less than forty-six books are reviewed, most of them with great care. We call special attention to the comments made on Prof. Paul du Bois-Raymond's ideas of gravitation (p. 608); on the scheme of "General" Booth (p. 451); on Dillmann's proposition to make mathematics the basis of education (p. 617); on W. T. Harris's philosophy (p. 438); on Höffding's ethics (p. 139); on Ernst Krause's studies in comparative mythology, etc.

VOL. II, NO. I.

The second volume of *The Monist* continues in the line of the first. Questions raised in the last number of the first volume, find their counterparts in the first number of the second volume, and it is not likely that those who have pursued with interest the elucidations of the past year will tire of them in the year following. Especially Prof. F. Max Müller's objections to the continuity of evolution find a counterstatement in two articles on the same subject, one by Prof. George John Romanes, the other by the Editor.

The leading article is a lucid exposition by Prof. JOHN DEWEY of the University of Ann Arbor of "The Present Position of Logical Theory." The article is of importance as it explains the factors which make a reform necessary in the field of logic. According to Professor Dewey "formal logic is at present the *fons et origo malorum* in philosophy." He says:

"Nothing is more surprising than the fact that while it is fashionable to reject, with great scorn, all the results and special methods of scholasticism, its foundation-stone should still be accepted as the corner-stone of the edifice of modern doctrine.

"According to the old theory, it is assumed that thought has a nature of its own independent of facts or subject-matter; that this thought, *per se*, has certain forms, and that these forms are not forms which the facts themselves take, varying with the facts, but are rigid frames, into which the facts are to be set.

"The especial problem of logic, as the theory of scientific method, is the relation of fact and thought to each other, of reality and thought. . . . Yet it is presupposed here that there is some sort of fruitful and intrinsic connection of fact and thought; that thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process of translation from brute impression to lucent meaning.

"The two main forces, which have been at work against the formulæ of formal logic, are 'inductive' or empirical logic on one side, and the so-called 'transcendental' logic, on the other. The inductive logic does not furnish us with the needed theory of the relation of thought and fact.

"'Transcendental' logic, while usually conceived as utterly opposed in spirit and in results to inductive logic, has yet been one with it in endeavoring to abolish formal logic as the sufficient method and criterion of scientific truth. The very meaning of 'transcendentalism' is not only that it is impossible to get valid truth from the evolution of thought in the scholastic sense, but that there is no such thought at all."

Professor Dewey in the course of his exposition discusses the theories of Kant, Hegel, and Mill, and it is noteworthy that he throws a new light upon Hegel. Without being blind to the faults of Hegel's system Professor Dewey recognises in him the man who endeavors to establish the objectivity of thought. Dewey says:

"When Hegel calls thought objective he means just what he says: that there is no special, apart faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind existing separate from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective thought is the meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by methods of

"thought he understands simply the processes in which this meaning of fact is evolved."

The same topic is briefly discussed by the editor on page 119, who says:

"There is no such a thing as transcendental thought, or pure thought, thought by itself, and there is no such a thing either as fact, crude irrational chaotic fact. The world of fact, indeed, is a cosmos and no chaos; there never was a chaos and never will be a chaos, for the laws of form are an essential and the most characteristic feature of the world."

"Our pure, i. e. merely formal, thought is an abstraction which serves the purpose of comprehension. And so is the concept 'matter,' being that which produces sense-impressions. There are no such ghosts as pure matter or pure thoughts in reality. Modern logic, so far as we conceive it to be right, is by no means an overthrow of the old formal Logic, generally called Aristotelian. It is simply an amendment made in order to exclude an erroneous interpretation. And so is modern mathematics not so much a revolution as an extension of the old Euclidian system. It is a revolution only against a certain unclear conception of mathematics."

The problem of "Modern Logic" is treated in its connection with the problem of "The Origin of Thought Forms." The diverse topics discussed under this caption are: Thought Forms and the Forms of Existence; The Problem of Apriority; Conservation of Matter and Energy, and Causation; Why is Mr. Mill's Proposition Untenable? The Meaning of Necessary.

Mr. B. BOSANQUET discusses the topics of Will and Reason. The inner monitor of Socrates was negative, and there is a sentence of Aristotle "Intelligence as such moves nothing. The admonition "be reasonable" generally means give up something you want very much. The problem is:

"How can we get across from perception or calculation to anything that can interfere with desire?"

"Of course there is a meeting-point in the idea that attends desire. Human desire, at least, is not blind. It is desire of something, which is before the mind as an idea; here we have one way in which reasonings about fact do help to modify our actions. If we know distinctly what we desire, then it is reasoning about matters of fact that will tell us what we must do to get it. The foreseen consequences come in with all the other circumstances in determining whether you like the action or not, and is the connection between action and reason."

Concerning Hedonism Mr. Bosanquet incidentally remarks: "There is one great doctrine of reasonableness which does reduce it to a question of means

"and ends, and that is, the doctrine that everything else is a means to pleasure, whether that of the agent or that of all sentient beings. The ultimate theory would then be that this uniform purpose, pleasure, is a natural or obvious, or, so to speak, a *given* purpose, and that all definite action is or has been prescribed by the intelligence dealing with matter of fact, as a means to the realisation of this given purpose. Here, though I wish to avoid hackneyed criticism I must note that there is a certain difficulty in getting across from the idea of one's own pleasure to that of other people's pleasure as a natural purpose. Yet we say that the whole complex of our moral life is a means to a partial though necessary incident in it, it seems to me that we are putting the cart before the horse."

In the course of the article Mr. Bosanquet explains what he understands by the maxims of reasonableness and insists that what is reasonable must be so in virtue of a positive content. Moral reasonableness must be a characteristic which we ascribe to purposes of action. The idea of a reasonable purpose (1) is irreconcilable with abstract Hedonism, (2) it is not the most intellectual purpose, and (3) it is such a purpose as possesses a self-consistent relation of the parts to the whole.

Mr. Bosanquet concludes:

"If I have read at all correctly the lesson of the new psychology which owes its origin largely to Herbert, it is an instructive meeting of extremes, that the most analytic of psychologies should more than ever represent the individual as the incarnation of a progressive order in ideas."

Justice ALBERT HERMANN POST, the founder of ethnological jurisprudence, lays down in bold outlines the origin and the methods of this science. Jurisprudence was no science up to the time of the foundation of the historical school by Gustav Hugo and Carl von Savigny. It was an art, the practice of traditions. The only part of jurisprudence of a scientific tendency was the philosophy of law; and to a great extent the history of law and the philosophy of law still pursue their solitary ways as independent branches of knowledge.

"In recent times, through the influence of ethnology, jurisprudence has entered on a new epoch. . . . Ethnological jurisprudence places the centre of gravity of the science of law not like the previous juristic philosophy in the individual juristic consciousness, but in the law viewed as a province of ethnic existence. It regards the laws of the nations as the precipitates of that which is now active and has been active as a juristic instinct in the entire human race. . . . It does not regard the individual juristic consciousness as something innate in man and exempt from the altering effects of time, but as a product of the social

"conditions in which the individual has grown up. It assumes, therefore, that the individual jural consciousness changes with a change of the social conditions, so that a man who grows up under different social conditions possesses a different jural perception."

THOMAS B. PRESTON in sketching some of the most prominent features of American politics seems to make out a pretty bad indictment of corruption. Nevertheless he sees that all this petty thievishness and striving for place are on the surface only, and below the surface there are powerful undertows working in quite a different direction giving promise always of better times to come.

"When Washington organised his administration it was no doubt regarded in Europe as highly revolutionary and anarchistic. But such a class government, with laws of entail and slavery, and cruel punishments for petty offences, as existed then, would not be tolerated for a single year at the present time."

Since then almost every administration or change of party government has brought some progress which later administrations could no more undo even though they might have had a mind to.

"And so it will go on, first one principle acting and fulfilling its mission, then the other, each bringing the nation to a higher plane of progress and uniting it more and more closely with the grand upward march of the human race."

"What is this, after all? It is not socialism. It is not anarchy. It is neither democracy nor republicanism. It is evolution."

"Can the course of such progress be turned back? Can we despair of the future in the light of all the past? Is not the general movement onward and upward? Will not the sneers at ephemeral phases of our American politics pass away with the incidents which they justly condemn, while the principles of progress remain forever?"

HIRAM M. STANLEY means by artificial selection "all conscious and purposive arrangements between men and women which have in view character of offspring. This is opposed to natural selection which is merely instinctive unteleological union with one of the opposite sex as impelled by animal passion or romantic love."

He takes the view that "the true refinement which refuses to obtrude the things of sense, and true purity which refuses to dwell on them salaciously, are perfectly compatible with the fullest knowledge and the consequent action. Lubricity breeds best upon a half knowledge acquired in dubious ways."

"The plan of artificial selection which seems to

"me most feasible at the present time would be voluntary associations of men and women who bind themselves to learn and apply the laws of heredity in their marriage relations, to seek for expert guidance, and in all their life to live not merely purely, but according to reason and science."

Prof. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES in reply to Prof. F. Max Müller's criticism takes up one point after the other justifying his propositions. A résumé of any single point would here lead us too much into the details. Suffice it to mention one topic only:

"Prof. Max Müller makes some disparaging remarks upon 'babies,' 'parrots,' and the lower animals generally (*The Monist*, pp. 586-7), and, says Professor Romanes, he 'refuses to argue' with me, 'or any other philosopher, either in the nursery or the menagerie.' So be it. As a philologist, of course, he is assuredly right; no one would expect him so to argue. But as a philosopher, who has written a large book on the 'Science of Thought,' he is no less assuredly wrong. And one may be pardoned for wondering at this intentionally ostrich-like attitude on the part of a philosopher—who is 'going beyond the origin of roots'—with respect to the fundamental germs of the sign-making faculty."

In the last paragraph Professor Romanes says:

"Thus I invite Prof. Max Müller to state the grounds of his assertion in *The Monist*, that 'all the facts of real language are against' me as an advocate of what he calls the biological theory of the development of man. This theory, he says, 'derives no support whatever from the Science of Language.' I believe, on the other hand, that these are wholly unwarranted statements; and that the Science of Language does support the theory in question to as high a degree as is possible from the nature of the case."

Professor Romanes discusses chiefly the details of the problem of the continuity of evolution. He refutes the idea that language can be considered as a break. The editor presents the same subject from the philosophical standpoint. Noting that Prof. F. Max Müller calls himself an evolutionist, he says:

"The Greek myth tells us that the Goddess of Reason, the blue-eyed Pallas Athene, was not born like other gods and mortals in the natural way of a slow development. She jumped out of the head of Zeus full-armed in all her beauty and gifted with the powers of her unusual accomplishments. Is this myth true after all? Does the Logos of rational thought present us with an instance in which the development process has been interrupted? If so, we shall have to abandon the evolution theory as a theory and return to the old-fashioned view of spe-

"cial-creation acts. The difference between these two views is not of degree, but of kind. He who accepts the principle of evolution as the law of life abandons forever the idea of special and unconnected beginnings as much as that of special-creation acts. He cannot with consistency believe in an evolution with interruptions, for the theory of evolution is serviceable only if evolution is conceived as continuous. Prof. Max Müller of course has a right to define and use the word evolutionist as he sees fit, but if he excludes continuity from the idea of evolution, we declare that he has taken out the quintessence of its meaning and the core of its truth."

The theory of evolution has been proved by empirical facts; it rests nevertheless upon another and a stronger basis than isolated observations. If we call the doctrine of a continuous evolution an hypothesis or an assumption, we must also call the law of causation and the conservation of matter and energy assumptions. Then, all formal truths are mere hypotheses. "Twice two is four" might hold good to-day, but not to-morrow. It might not, as says Mill hold good in other worlds. The doctrine of evolution and the continuity of evolution is nothing but a corollary to the law of causation and the conservation of matter and energy, it means that new creations are transformations.

If we have to give up the idea of special-creation acts, the question arises "Is not the religious idea of God destroyed and the whole system of religion overturned?" The answer is:

"We think not. An old and very powerful system of theology which has been considered as orthodox for centuries will become untenable as soon as the idea of evolution and the continuity of evolution are recognised in their sweeping importance; but religion itself will enter into a new phase of evolution and the idea of God will not be cast aside as a mere superstition of the Dark Ages, it will be purified and appear in a greater and sublimer, in a nobler, higher, and in a truer conception than ever before." We must cease to seek for God in the breaks of the world-order, and we shall find him in the world-order. "Any kind of theology which still recognises special-creation acts, or miracles, or breaks in evolution, we do not hesitate to say, is not yet free from paganism, for it still sticks to the religious conception of the medicine-man that God is a great magician. The God of the medicine-man lives in the realm of the unknown and he appears in man's imagination where the light of science fails. The God of science however is the God of truth, and evidence of his existence is not found in the darkness of ignorance but in the light of knowledge."

VOL. II, NO. 2.

The second number of the second volume opens with an excellent essay on "The Development of Consciousness" by Prof. LLOYD MORGAN, who does not intend to be put off with the assertion that consciousness and intelligence are "potentially" present in the germ. Consciousness is not found in the changes of energy, nor is it anything material, yet it is closely associated as a concomitant with the orderly transformations of energy in the brain. The most satisfactory explanation appears to Professor Morgan to be the hypothesis of "scientific monism" which regards energy and consciousness as different aspects of the same phenomena. The term "metakinesis" as the concomitant of kinesis is a happy expression proposed by Professor Morgan as the most general term of consciousness, feeling, and that which is often called potential consciousness.

The second article will be a surprise to many. Our commissioner of education is generally credited with living in the realms of pure thought and Hegelian speculations only; here his truly American nature comes to the front. Dr. W. T. HARRIS, the head of the Concord School and the well-known Nestor of American philosophy shows that the new civilisation depends on mechanical invention.

"Religion and Progress, interpreted by the Life and Last Work of Wathen Mark Wilks Call" by MONCURE D. CONWAY is not only a sketch of the Rev. Mr. Call's life, but it contains also valuable reflections on the duties of liberal clergymen to stay in the church and help it advance in scientific spirit and broaden in goodwill toward mankind and the secular interests of mankind, so that the church may fulfil its sacred mission here on earth.

Professor MACH gives a further explanation of his views in connection with his controversy with the Editor of THE MONIST showing that our mental symbols are artifices to represent facts, or scaffolds erected for their reconstruction in the mind.

Mr. F. C. CONYBEARE of Oxford criticises W. K. Clifford's views from the standpoint of the late transcendentalist Prof. T. H. Green. This article maintains that the mind does not consist of single feelings, thoughts, etc., but that the mind *has* feelings, thoughts, etc. The faculty that brings feelings in relation is said to be the self of the human soul or its ego. This view is combated in the following article, "Are there Things in Themselves?" written by the Editor, who maintains that by considering things as if they were things in themselves, we are surprised to find them related to one another and thus a relation-producing entity is to be assumed which leads to mysticism. This assumed relation-producing entity in the human soul is supposed to be the transcendental self of man.

Yet we must bear in mind that things as well as relations are abstracts only which describe certain features of reality. The soul of man possesses in its parts as well as in its unity which is the product of the relations of its parts, an immanent reality and there is no need of assuming something transcendental behind it which would then have to be supposed as being the inmost self of man so that this transcendental assumption would be something more real than the actual reality. This question of "the thing in itself of the soul" however is a mere side issue of the article which discusses the following topics: 1) Kant's thing in itself? 2) Kant's view of space and time. 3) Form not imported by the mind into reality. 4) Professor Jodl's view of the thing in itself. 5) Clifford's and Schopenhauer's conceptions of the thing in itself. 6) Things and relations. 7) Is the ego a thing in itself? 8) The ego-centric view abandoned. 9) Personality and evolution. 10) Professor Mach's position. 11) Truth in mythology. 12) The oneness of subjectivity and objectivity. The Editor of THE MONIST does not deny the existence of objective things, but he rejects the idea of things in themselves as independent of time and space, in the sense of Kantian or any other transcendentalism. This question touches almost every subject of philosophical inquiry and it is the most important problem by which the minds of the old and the new world-conception are most readily discriminated. Clearness on this subject is indispensable to every thinker, be he a scientist, a man of practical life, or a philosopher.

CURRENT TOPICS.

In his message to congress the President throws a selected lot of burning indignation over that useful political device known as the "gerrymander"; the best abused, and the most highly prized institution in this land. Pointing to it with his ominous forefinger, he says, "If I were called upon to declare wherein our chief national danger lies I should say without hesitation, in the overthrow of majority control by the suppression or perversion of the popular suffrage." According to the political sooth-sayers, the chief causes of the coming rush of the American republic are more numerous than the post mortem reasons given for the decline and fall of the Roman empire. I once collected in a note-book the reasons for the downfall of the Roman empire as I heard them given in the warning speeches of statesmen, preachers, and reformers. When I had placed on record the forty-second reason I quit counting, as I have quit counting the "chief national dangers" of the American republic. This nation is perfectly safe so long as the people get something to eat; and it really seems to thrive on the "gerrymander." It must be said in praise of the gerrymander that it is absolutely fair. In a republican legislature it will cheat the democrats, and in a democratic legislature it will cheat the republicans; in both cases with strict impartiality. Both parties denounce it until they need it, and then they both hail it as the redeemer of the state. In the course of my political career I have seen more than thirty states "redeemed" from democratic fraud and corruption, and from republican corruption and fraud, by means of the gerrymander; and in some cases I have seen the same state redeemed back and forth more than half a dozen times from the "scandalous misrule" of the opposite party. When I hear an

American statesman denounce the gerrymander I immediately suspect that in the particular instance under condemnation his own party has got the worst of it; and thus it appears to be now; the democratic legislature of Michigan has gerrymandered the state so as to cheat the republicans out of a few votes in the electoral college next year; and that's why it appears in the message as our "chief national danger." The gerrymander is a contemptible style of larceny, but it will flourish until our presidents and our legislators oppose it on principle when it works for the benefit of their own party; and not merely for expediency when it works the other way.

* * *

Will the philosophers explain to me on scientific principles why the wish to be a Santa Claus acts with irresistible fascination on some people at the Christmas time of the year? For instance, a stranger enters the office of Judge Tuley, and remarks to the Judge like this, "I understand that Mrs. Tuley is engaged in charitable work?" "Yes!" says the Judge. "Will you be kind enough to hand her this?" says the stranger, passing over five hundred dollars. "Who from?" says the judge. "No name," says the stranger, and goes out. Calling him George Nemo, for want of his real name, I would like to reckon him up, and get the exact quotient or sum total of him if I can. Was he one of those lazy benefactors who give because the angel within them drives, but who take no pleasure in the giving? If so, what ecstasy he misses in giving up the work to another! People of the lower strata who have enjoyed the luxury of giving ten cents or a quarter to some worthy or unworthy sufferer, it makes no difference which, can estimate the heaps of joy which Mr. Nemo might have had in giving away with his own hand that five hundred dollars. To be sure, he thought that Mrs. Tuley could give it away better than he could, and in this he was doubtless right, but he loses the fun, and in my opinion, much of the blessing too. Perhaps he had no right to the luxury of distributing the money, having merely fined himself five hundred dollars for some wrong thing done. Without speculating on the stimulant that actuated Mr. Nemo, what I wish to ask is this, Can a man be charitable by an agent, any more than he can be religious by deputy?

M. M. TRUMBULL.

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